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HQ TG 667.2
Gen Santos City, BX

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HQ 1 DIV TASK GROUP 667.2 OPORD 01 (OPERATION CERIUM STEAL)

References:

- A. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 8868.
- B. UNSCR 8869.
- C. UNSCR 8873.
- D. Status of Forces Agreement – Australia/Belesia
- E. Belesia (BX) Country Study.
- F. Olvana (OV) Country Study.
- G. South Torbia (RT) Country Study.
- H. Gabal (GX) Country Study.
- I. Olvana (OV) Country Study.
- J. CJTF 667 OPORD 01 (OP STEEL SENTINEL)

Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU.

1. Situation.

- a. Background. Growing ethnic tensions in the Belesian island of PANAY resulted in violence when the local government in PANAY attempted to take control of the lucrative Cerium rare earth mine in San Rafael from the Olvanan registered operator. The resulting loss of life amongst the Belesian Constabulary and unknown number of mine employees has sparked unrest in the nearby city of ROXAS. Violence has occurred along ethnic lines with the greatest loss of life amongst the Olvanan diaspora. Olvana (OV) and Nth Torbia (NT) had been conducting a week's long biennial exercise in the South China Sea, named Exercise RISEN SWORD. It was under the cover of this exercise that OV lodged an amphibious force (estimated to be a Marine Brigade plus Divisional enablers) on Mischief Reef, utilising the port and airfield facilities. Simultaneously, OV landed a Marine Expeditionary Force (estimated to be the 1st Marine BDE plus DIV enablers) near the city of ROXAS, PANAY and captured the seaport, airport, and the San Rafael Mine. OV has claimed the justification for this act of aggression is to protect ethnic Olvanans in PANAY from persecution. In addition, a pro-OV Visayan Peoples Front (VPF) insurgent group has commenced insurgency operations ISO of SFMEF in PANAY. In response to this blatant disregard for international protocols, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed UNSCR 8868 (ref A) condemning OV aggression and

calling for the withdrawal of OV Forces from Belesian territory. Concurrently, Belesia (BX) landed a Brigade of troops in the south of PANAY through the city of ILOILO in an attempt to force the OV forces off the island. This course of action has resulted in a stalemate with the OV Marine Expeditionary Force (SFMEF) holding the northern half of PANAY centred on the city of ROXAS and SAN RAFAEL, and the BX Forces holding the area around ILOILO. OV has since declared a Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) and Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the occupied islands and parts of the Sulu and South China Sea. In an effort to allow diplomatic options to be utilised and reduce further loss of life, the UNSC passed UNSCR 8869 (ref B) calling on all Member States to enforce economic and military sanctions against OV. With OV's continued occupation of PANAY in contravention of International laws, the UNSC passed UNSCR 8873 (Ref C) authorising the raising of the International Belesian Security Assistance Force (IBSAF) to utilise military force to remove OV military elements on sovereign Belesian territory. The Australian government has volunteered to be the lead nation of the Combined Joint Task Force 667 (CJTF 667) with contributing nations including **New Zealand and Fiji**. The Government of BX has consented, subject to SOFAs (ref D), to allow CJTF 667 forces to stage through their territories, to station forces, materiel and installations involved in supporting its operations and to conduct overflights.

- b. **Strategic Aim**. The aim of the international community is to:
 - (1) end Olvanan aggression towards Belesia
 - (2) expulsion of all Olvanan military forces from Belesian sovereign territory
 - (3) creation of a free, safe, secure and stable environment in the region
 - (4) continuation of Belesian democratic national governance and developmental programs.
- c. **Strategic Objectives**. In order to achieve the desired end state, the strategic objectives of the international intervention include:
 - (1) Expel all Olvanan military forces from BX sovereign territory.
 - (2) Restore a secure and stable environment throughout the BX Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO).
 - (3) Effect force protection for coalition military forces deployed throughout the JFAO.
 - (4) Assist the government of BX to strengthen the capacities of their national security forces and institutions to enforce central control.
 - (5) Preserve and enforce the freedom of navigation throughout the JFAO.
 - (6) Support UN Agencies, International Organizations (IOs) and NGOs within capabilities and limitations in order to preserve human life and alleviate the suffering of IDPs and refugees within the JFAO.
 - (7) Gradually reduce the size, role and profile of the IBSAF contribution. This process will be guided by reviews of tasks, environment, threat, risks,

follow-on forces and Host Nation (HN) capacities as part of a Transition and Exit Strategy that is linked to the achievement of the Desired Military Strategic End State.

- d. Operational Objectives. With the support and agreement of the international community, IBSAF has undertaken to end the crisis in BX by deploying a combined joint task force to BX to repel OV invading forces and restore BX territorial sovereignty. The force, hereafter referred to as the Combined Joint Task Force 667 (CJTF 667) will deploy under the authority of UNSCR 8873 (ref C). The objectives of this military intervention are as follows:
 - (1) Establish military superiority in the maritime and airspace within the JFAO in a manner which supports decisive operations.
 - (2) Conduct decisive military operations, which leads to the restoration of BX sovereignty in the occupied islands; stabilise the region; and deter further external aggression against BX.
 - (3) Assist humanitarian efforts and IO/NGO activities in BX.
 - (4) Assist the government of BX to re-establish and maintain a safe and secure environment to facilitate the continuance of democratic government institutions and programmes.
 - (5) Support any applicable International Criminal Court (ICC) investigations of crimes against humanity through the preservation and collection of evidence.
- e. To this end, a ground force, designated TG 667.2 is to deploy to the BX island of PANAY to expel SFMEF from the island, defeat the ongoing insurgency and to return control to the BX authorities.
- f. Desired Operational End State. The Desired End State remains the establishment of a sufficiently secure and stable environment on the island of PANAY and improved capability of BX security forces such that state-sponsored hostilities have ceased, irregular insurgency has been controlled and territorial borders are secure, humanitarian assistance programs operate unhindered and transition to an UN-sanctioned and/or HN follow-on security force is complete. A safe and secure environment in PANAY exists when:
 - (1) Insurgency activities have ceased
 - (2) It allows IOs and NGOs safe and unrestricted access to the BX population.
 - (3) It encourages the return of IDPs and refugees.
 - (4) It fosters the rapid re-establishment of representative government institutions.
 - (5) It allows economic reconstruction and development.
- g. Limitations.
 - (1) Constraints. In conducting its operations, TG 667.2 will:
 - A. Minimise the use of scarce BX resources.

- B. Minimise collateral damage and civilian casualties on PANAY.
- C. Deploy to the AO as soon possible in a sequence coordinated by CJTF HQ.
- D. Work closely with the UN to facilitate the work of UN agencies, IOs and NGOs.
- E. Operate in accordance with the SOFA with BX (ref D).

(2) Restraints. In conducting its operations, TG 667.2 will not:

- A. Adversely affect the civilian population of PANAY more than is required
- B. Kinetically target the San Rafael mine complex.
- C. Adversely effect the BX economy more than is necessary.
- D. Disrupt port operations in ILOILO more than necessary.
- E. Damage ROXAS infrastructure more than is necessary

h. Operational Areas.

(1) AO FANNING. The AO includes the landmass, national air space and territorial waters of the BX island of PANAY (out to 12nm off the coast).

i. Threat Assessment. See Annex B, as well as the Country Studies at References E to I inclusive for more detail.

(1) General. OV has projected forces onto the BX island of PANAY IOT control the mineral resources, and to provide a viable alternate government that seeks to protect the Olvanan minority of PANAY.

(2) SFMEF located on PANAY. The principle land component of the SFMEF located on PANAY is the 1 Marine BDE Task Group (BTG) supplemented with DIV troops. The HQ is located in the city of ROXAS in the N of PANAY. One MAR BDET is in mobile defence IVO the SAN RAFAEL mine, One MAR BDET is conducting mobile defence IVO PASSI, a third MAR MBET is located in SARA, and the fourth is defending IVO CUARTERO. The MAR Tank Bn is in reserve IVO ROXAS to CATK any AS advance N from ILOILO or landing forces on the E coast. Recent intelligence suggests that the 1 Marine BDE has been reinforced with a Tank Coy equipped with T-72Bs. The SFMEF is positioned to prevent the return of control to the BX authorities IOT to gain time to legitimise their occupation through Information Warfare. 1 MAR BDE is supported by a BN size organisation of insurgents from the Visayan Peoples Front:

- A. HQ
 - 1. Commander, ?
 - 2. Chief of Staff, ?
- B. DIV Troops.

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1. AD assets in defence of ROXAS airfield,
2. COY (+) from 1 CBT ENG BN
3. BTY MLRS
4. DIV comms assets (including EW).
5. ELMS from DIV INFOWAR BN
6. ELMS from DIV MAT SUP BN

C. Land Component. 3 Marine BDE.

D. Air Component. SFMEF has located significant air assets at ROXAS.

1. 12 SU-30MKK (FLANKER-G) Strike Fighter
2. 12 J-11B (FLANKER-L) Air Superiority Fighter
3. 12 KA-28 (HELIX-A) Anti-submarine Helicopter
4. 6 Z-19 Recon/Attack Helicopter

E. Insurgents. One BN size elm of the Visayan Peoples Front.

j. Friendly Forces. TG 667.2 will operate within the established AO and will be led by AS. TG 667.2 consists of a HQ, TU667.2.1 (X BDE), TU667.2.2 (Y BDE), TU667.2.3 (16 AVN BDE), BX 12th BDE (OPCON) and DIV Troops. Other like-minded nations may contribute forces or provide materiel support at a future date. As Lead Nation, AS will provide critical force enablers. AS will partner with BX in the provision of strategic-level support such as intelligence and logistics. The composition of TG 667.2 is as follows:

- (1) HQ.
 - A. Commander, Major General, XXXXXXXX, (AS).
 - B. Deputy Commander (Operations), Brigadier XXXXXXXXXX(AS).
- (2) Task Unit 667.2.1 (X BDE).
- (3) Task Unit 667.2.2 (Y BDE).
- (4) Task unit 667.2.3 (16 AVN BDE).
- (5) DIV Enablers (see TASK ORG at Annex A)
- (6) Belesian 12 INF BDE (Light) OPCON.

k. TG667.1.2 will provide naval vessels to complete the lodgement of TG 667.2 on PANAY

l. TG667.1.1 will provide protection to TG 667.1.2 during the passage of sea lines.

m. Detailed ORBAT is shown in Annex A.

n. International Organizations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Some IOs and NGOs are currently operating in BX. Their presence is expected to increase dramatically once a more secure operating environment is created. See Annex Q of the Ref J for further details.

- o. BX. BX has agreed to act as the HN to support the deployment and staging of TG 667.2
- p. Rotation of Forces. The timeframe for OSS is situation dependent. The initial operating mandate provided by the UN is of 12 months duration, with extensions as required. The initial force deployment is to be for 6 months. TCNs may plan for the rotation of forces after that period of time.

2. **Mission.** TG 667.2 is to conduct lodgement and subsequent land operations to defeat all SFMEF forces in PANAY on order IOT to create conditions for expulsion of all OV forces from BELESIA.

3. **Execution.**

- a. Commander's Analysis. The occupation of Belesian sovereign territory and the subjugation of Belesian citizens in PANAY by the Olvanan military is an unacceptable act of aggression and will not be tolerated by the international community. This act of aggression flies in the face of international norms. To that end, TG 667.2 will land on and conduct land combat operations within the BX island of PANAY IOT eject the SFMEF currently located there. To date, this conflict has remained localised between OV and BX. However, all subordinate commanders must understand that antagonising other neutral regional countries through unrestricted use of force can escalate into a wider conflict. It is important that our actions are conducted within international guidelines and that in all planning considerations, utmost care is taken to reduce collateral death and damage to non-combatants. Subordinate commanders at all levels must be alert to these factors in the conduct of all of their operations, particularly during the transition from combat operations.
- b. Commander's Intent. The Belesian Federation Defense Force (BFDF) is a capable force that has the capacity to deal with the OV aggression effectively. However, internal politics and the unstable nature of government institutions in this young nation has meant that they have requested international support to assist in dealing with OV aggression. Additionally, historic ethnic tensions between BX central authority and the various ethnic groups, supported by an existing insurgency in the occupied territories means that BX is not able to utilise their capable military to deal with OV aggression effectively. TG 667.2, supported by CJTF667, will utilise all forces within its command to meet the UNSCR 8873 goal of removing OV military presence in PANAY and the establishment of a safe and secure environment for the transition of authority back to BX.
 - (1) Purpose: Defeat SFMEF and insurgency forces located on PANAY.
 - (2) Method: Operation CERIUM STEAL will be a three-phase operation, with a preliminary phase, nested within Operation STEEL SENTINEL (OSS). Phase 0 will see the preparation of all ground forces for lodgment onto PANAY (including embarkation on maritime assets). Phase 1 will consist of an amphibious and air lodgement of the TG onto PANAY. Phase 2 will result in the Neutralisation of the SFMEF by dislocating and then defeating them

in battle. During Phase 2, **X** BDE will ADV N and defeat SFMEF forces loc IVO of PASSI, and cut-off LoC to the alternate APOD/SPOD in CATICLAN. This will dislocate the SFMEF forces IVO ROXAS and set the conditions for **Y** BDE to decisively defeat these forces in detail and secure ROXAS. Phase 3 will be the transition of authority back to the BX government. At all times, we must be cognisant that the main effort is the removal of OV forces in BX. If this can be achieved during any of the stages without further bloodshed, then all effort must be taken to explore those options.

- (3) Endstate: The liberation of PANAY, removal of SFMEF forces, the establishment of a safe and secure environment in PANAY, and the conditions set for a UN supervised transition of authority to the BX Government.
- c. Main Effort. The main effort is the defeat of SFMEF on PANAY by the capture of ROXAS.
- d. Centre of Gravity. The TG COG is assessed as being its manoeuvre units which provide the mobility and firepower to overmatch and dislocate the lighter armour of 1 MAR BDE
- e. Concept of Operations. OP Cerium Steal will be conducted in three phases as follows:
 - (1) Phase 1 – Lodgement (D-Day – D+2)
 - A. Main Effort:
 - 1. Conduct lodgement into the city of ILOILO
 - B. Supporting Efforts:
 - 1. Dislocate OV forces by conducting lodgement into BANATE by **Y** Bde
 - 2. Conduct IW effects to counter OV/Insurgent IW.
 - 3. Conduct passage of lines with BX forces in ILOILO
 - 4. BPT take OPCON of Belesian ground forces
 - 5. Initiate comms with Belesian Govt reps in PANAY
 - 6. Initiate comms with NGO located in PANAY
 - 7. Conduct SF recon operations on HVTs
 - 8. Conduct interdiction of SFMEF lines of communication in PANAY
 - 9. Continue to conduct shaping operations to isolate SFMEF
 - 10. Degrade SFMEF ground forces capability in PANAY
 - C. Endstate:
 - 1. TG 667.2 elms have successfully lodged in PANAY and taken up positions in preparation for phase 2.

(2) Phase 2 – Neutralise (D+3 – D+14)

A. Main Effort:

1. Defeat SFMEF forces located on PANAY.

B. Supporting Effort:

1. Conduct advance from ILOILO to capture PASSI
2. Conduct advance from BANATE to capture ROXAS
3. Defeat insurgency forces
4. Secure the SAN RAFAEL Mine
5. Secure the CATICLAN APOD/SPOD
6. Conduct Counter-Insurgency (COIN) operations
7. Continue to conduct shaping operations to isolate SFMEF

C. Endstate:

1. SFMEF ground forces will have been defeated on PANAY

(3) Phase 3 – Transition (D+15 onwards)

A. Main Effort:

1. Transition to UN Peacekeeping

B. Supporting Efforts:

1. Conduct Stability Operations (STABOPS)
2. Conduct Information Operations (IO) to support strategic messaging
3. Neutralise any remaining elms of the VPF

C. Endstate:

1. Transition of authority will have been conducted between TG 667.2 and UN Mission
2. TG 667.2 will have transitioned and postured to conduct STABOPS as required

f. Limitations.

(1) Restraints.

- A. All targeting of BX infrastructure will take into consideration the economic and humanitarian effects post conflict – see Targeting Directive at Annex I of Ref J.

(2) Constraints.

- A. Defensive ROE will be in place prior to deployment and into BX. Offensive ROE will be on order.

g. Common Tasks.

- (1) During all phases ensure the security of coalition air, maritime and land lines of communication.
- (2) Support the BX government and established IO/NGOs in their ongoing humanitarian efforts while remaining cognisant of the need to create and maintain a safe and secure environment.

h. Groupings & Tasks. See Annex A for details on C2 and groupings

(1) JFLCC TG 667.2

A. Phase 1 (Lodgement)

1. Coordinate with HQ CJTF 667, JFMCC and JFLOGCC the deployment of subordinate land forces into PANAY.
2. Coordinate with CJTF 667 air and naval support required
3. Assume OPCON of all BX land forces in PANAY
4. Initiate contact with BX Govt reps in PANAY
5. Initiate contact with NGO reps in PANAY

B. Phase 2 (Neutralise)

1. COMD all land forces in PANAY
2. Develop liaison with BX Govt officials IOT arrange transition
3. Develop liaison with NGO in PANAY IOT facilitate management of internal refugees
4. Coordinate SF operations in PANAY

C. Phase 3 (Transition)

1. BPT conduct COIN/STABOPS
2. BPT to hand over to BFDF
3. BPT support BX Govt during transition
4. BPT support NGO

(2) TG 667.2 DIV Troops:

A. 1 Int BN

1. Prov Int support to TG 667.2 and subordinate commands

B. 20 Regt RAA

1. All Phases – target acquisition in support of targeting direction

C. 16 REGT (AD)

1. Provide AD IAW AOC OPORD

D. 7 SIG REGT (EW)

1. Provide EW support IAW App 1 to Annex B to Ref J

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- E. 1 MP BN
 - 1. All Phases – provide general Military Police support
- F. BG XXXXX (ARES)
 - 1. Provide security to primary APOD/SPOD (ILOILO) on order.
- G. 1 SIG REGT
 - 1. Provide comms support
- H. 6 ESR
 - 1. Provide force engineering capabilities to project, protect and sustain the Joint Force in persistent threat environments; and be ready to provide discrete, short-notice, independent tactical engineering capabilities to achieve strategic outcomes.
 - 2. The command and control (Force Engineer) of whole-of-theatre engineering, including attached coalition force elements
 - 3. Engineer planning and advice at the theatre level; including the development of train, advise, and assist concepts in consultation with other government agencies
 - 4. Force level survivability (explosive ordnance, CBNRD, force protection) advice and support
 - 5. Line of communications development within a persistent threat environment
 - 6. Theatre level construction, services, resources winning, and light watercraft support
 - 7. Coordination and management of a theatre-level (Joint Task Force/Divisional) engineer park that supports the whole-of-theatre engineer effort
- I. MLRS Bty
 - 1. Provide FS IAW JTEOS OPORD
- J. 35 Water Tpt Sqn
 - 1. Provide logistic support as per Log Plan

(3) TU 667.2.1 – X BDE.

- A. Phase 1 (Lodgement):
 - 1. Secure SPOD (ILOILO Port)
 - 2. Secure APOD (ILOILO Airport)
 - 3. Establish comms and LO with BX 12 INF BDE
 - 4. Assume defensive posns N of ILOILO prior to commencing ADV to N.

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- B. Phase 2 (Neutralise):
 - 1. Conduct FPL with BX 12 Inf Bde
 - 2. Adv N along Route GREEN / ORANGE towards PASSI
 - 3. Neutralise / Isolate OV BDET vic PASSI
 - 4. Secure Route BLUE
 - 5. BPT Secure the CATICLAN APOD/SPOD
 - 6. BPT secure the SAN RAFAEL Mine Complex
 - 7. BPT neutralise insurgency
 - 8. BPT participate in Joint Targeting
 - 9. BPT support SF operations
 - 10. BPT support deception plan
- C. Phase 3 (Transition):
 - 1. Conduct STABOPS within PASSI and boundaries
 - 2. BPT to hand over to BFDF
 - 3. BPT support BX Govt during transition
 - 4. BPT support NGO in humanitarian assistance tasks

(4) TU 667.2.2 - Y BDE.

- A. Phase 1 (Lodgement):
 - 1. Conduct landing IVO BANATE.
 - 2. Secure SPOD
 - 3. Clear SFMEF from immediate area.
 - 4. Establish liaison with any BFDF in the area
 - 5. BPT support SF operations
 - 6. BPT support NGO in humanitarian assistance tasks
- B. Phase 2 (Neutralise):
 - 1. Adv N and secure SAN RAFAEL Mine Complex
 - 2. Adv NW along Route RED towards ESTANCIA
 - 3. Clear OV BDET IVO SARA
 - 4. Neutralise / Contain OV BDET IVO ESTANCIA
 - 5. Secure ROXAS
 - 6. BPT support BX Govt members as required
 - 7. BPT support SF operations
 - 8. BPT support NGO in humanitarian assistance tasks

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C. Phase 3 (Transition):

1. Conduct STABOPS within boundaries
2. BPT to hand over to BFDF
3. BPT support BX Govt during transition
4. BPT support NGO humanitarian tasks

(5) TU 667.2.3 (AVN BDE).

A. Phase 1 (Lodgement):

1. Support lodgement of TU 667.2.1 in securing SPOD/APOD
2. Support lodgement of TU 667.2.2
3. BPT conduct recon tasks ISO of TG 667.2

B. Phase 2 (Neutralise):

1. Conduct recon tasks ISO TU 667.2.1
2. Destroy SFMEF armour concentrations when identified
3. Conduct AMO ISO TU 667.2.2
4. Conduct AME as required

C. Phase 3 (Transition):

1. Assist in conduct of STABOPS/COIN.
2. BPT Conduct AMO/patrols as required
3. BPT assist BFDF as required
4. BPT assist NGO in conduct of Humanitarian assistance operations

(6) SOTG (TG 667.4). Tasks to be issued separately.

(7) BFDF 12 INF BDE.

A. Phase 1 (Lodgement):

1. Maintain security of ILOILO APOD/SPOD
2. Prov CT to secure BANATE SPOD
3. Maintain defensive lines around ILOILO

B. Phase 2 (Neutralise):

1. Relocate to SAN JOSE
2. Adv north along Route YELLOW
3. Secure CATICLAN APOD/SPOD
4. Maintain security of ILOILO APOD/SPOD

C. Phase 3 (Transition):

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1. BPT conduct STABOPS in CATICLAN
 - i. Coordinating Instructions.
 - (1) Routes, Boundaries and Control Measures
 - A. See Op Overlay Annex C
 - (2) Timings.
 - A. Phase 1 Operation Cerium Steal to commence NB completion of OTPM Phase One (Denial) is complete.
 - B. SPOD ILOILO secure – by D+1.
 - C. APOD ILOILO secure – by D+1
 - D. SPOD BANATE secure – by D+2
 - E. Lodgement complete in PANAY – by D+3.
 - F. Phase two will commence on order once the following conditions have been met:
 1. SPODs and APODs are secure.
 2. Supplies sufficient for 5 days are landed in ILOILO APOD.
 - G. SFMEF cleared from SAN RAFAEL Mine by D+12.
 - H. SFMEF cleared from ROXAS by D+14.
 - I. SFMEF cleared from CATICLAN by D+16.
 - J. Phase three will commence on order when the following conditions have been met:
 1. SFMEF cleared from PANAY.
 2. Insurgency has been controlled
 - K. Transition complete TBA.
 - (3) Joint effects, targeting and offensive support
 - A. IAW Annex I of Ref J
 - B. COL EFFECTs TG HQ is responsible authority
 - (4) Services Support
 - A. IAW Annex R of Ref J
 - (5) Transfer of Authority.
 - A. BX Forces. BX's SHC will continue to command defensive operations until declaration of CJTF 667 OPRED (most probably coincident with JFACC OPRED). At that time, designated BX land combat forces in PANAY will TOA OPCON to TG 667.2.
 - B. BX GOVT. BX GOVT will regain command of its forces on PANAY post- transition. This will be coord by HQ CJTF667.

(6) PWs and Captured Persons (CPERS). Handling and disposition of PWs and CPERS will be in accordance with Annex AD to Ref J. AS has agreed to be Lead Nation on the handling and disposition of PW and CPERS.

- A. National Responsibilities on PW/CPERS. For reasons of National sensitivity and ownership of processes relating to PW/CPERS, all Coalition personnel will respect their own national procedures following guidelines in accordance with the Geneva Convention:
- B. Custody of PW/CPERS. PW/CPERS operations are a National responsibility. As such, it is imperative that all persons detained by Coalition personnel remain in the care and custody of authorised personnel only. It is understood that operational requirements may force acceptance of PW/CPERS from, or transfer to, other Allied nations of the Coalition. This shall be the exception and not the norm. Should such circumstance become necessary, only the respective National Commander or his designated representative can authorize the acceptance or transfer of a PW/CPERS to or from another nation.
- C. Treatment. PW and CPERS are to be treated in accordance with all accepted international laws and conventions.
- D. Transfer or Release. Although tactical situations may oblige commanders to detain persons during the conduct of operations, it is the responsibility of National Commanders at all levels to determine who will be categorised as a CPERS and immediately field release all others. Once a determination has been made to further retain the detained person and a PW/CPERS number has been assigned, only the National Commander of the capturing nation has the authority to release or transfer PW/CPERS to other nations. For the specific purpose of an individual clearly detained as a PW, there is no requirement to determine status upon capture, as PW are captured enemy combatants and remain in detention for the duration of hostilities. The detaining power has an obligation to make a determination of PW versus other CPERS status as soon as practical after capture.
- E. PW and CPERS Reporting. In accordance with national directives, all PW or CPERS in Coalition custody shall be reported via official means by using a PW/CPERS Capture Report.
- F. PW/CPERS Holding Facilities. TG 667.2 will establish holding facilities in PANAY. The locations of facilities will be reported to CJTF667 when established. This facility is to be considered temporary until declared otherwise by CJTF667 HQ.

(7) Reports and Returns. The Battle Rhythm schedule for Reports and Returns will be published once the HQ CJTF 667 has declared OPRED.

4. Admin and Logistics (Sustainment).

- a. Outline Concept.

- (1) Sustainment support to TG 667.2 will be coordinated and led by HQ TG 667.2 in conjunction with JFLOGCC. While TCNs retain overall responsibility for the sustainment of national formations and units, JFLOGCC retains coordinating authority.
- (2) HQ TG 776.2 will establish a Theater Support Area (TSA) within PANAY adjacent to the SPOD/APOD (ILOILO) in order to execute sustainment operations. Additional logistic nodes will also be set up as required such as at COLLINSVILLE once the ATG has lodged. Sustainment support during OSS Ph 2-4 to forward FE will be the responsibility of organic logistic FE through JFLOGCC coordination. Annex R to Ref J will provide more details.
- (3) HQ TG 667.2 will draw additional logistic support from JFLOGCC as required.
- (4) TG 667.2 will deploy to PANAY with sufficient Op stock for 15 days. TU will deploy with sufficient for 10 days.

b. **Movements.** Movement forward into PANAY post D-Day will be coordinated by JFLOGCC HQ. Movement within PANAY will be coord by HQ TG 667.2

c. **Medical Support.** The concept of Health Support (HS) is detailed within the Health Support Order (HSO) at Annex AA to Ref J. HS to TG 667.2 will be provided by ADF and Coalition medical capabilities coordinated by the CJTF 667 J07. HQJOC J07 retains overall technical control (TECHON) for all health care delivery on an overseas operation. While TCN will deploy with limited integral HS and retain responsibility for definitive care of their troops, provision of deployed HS to Coalition and HN personnel may occur IAW the Medical Rules of Eligibility (MEDROE) detailed in the HSO.

- (1) Role 1 HS will be provided by ADF and Coalition integral capabilities.
- (2) Role 2 and Role 2 (Enhanced) HS will be provided by deployment of health services personnel into ILOILO.
- (3) Role 3 HS will be provided by the NSB (Royal Darwin Hospital or other civilian facility) or the USNS Mercy, which will be determined and coordinated by CJTF 667 J07.

5. **Command and Signal.**

- a. **Command.**
 - A. **Commander**, Major General, XXXXXXXX, (AS).
 - B. **Deputy Commander (Operations)**, Brigadier XXXXXXXXXX (AS).
- b. BX Forces in PANAY (principally 12 INF BDE) are to be OPCON to TG 667.2 from commencement of phase one.
- c. **Headquarters Locations.** (see C2 overlay)
 - (1) HQ TG 667.2 will establish at ILOILO APOD, BX by D+1.
- d. **Communication and Information Systems (CIS).** Effective C2 of TG 667.2 will be highly dependent upon the flexible and interoperable CIS between Components

and contributing nations.

- (1) TF 667.2 Sig REGT will:
 - A. Establish force level CIS down to TF HQs, including the management of network interface gateways
 - B. Coordinate theatre-wide CIS plans
 - C. Perform theatre spectrum management
- (2) HQ TG 667.2 CIS will provide secure voice, VTC and Coalition WAN (based on NATO-CENTRIXS) to provide secure email, chat and other C3 tools down to TU level. Requests for extension of coalition CIS in support of national, component or other requirements will be coordinated through the CJTF 667 J6 and funded as appropriate.
- (3) Use of HN communication infrastructure to supplement military networks will be coordinated by HQ TG 667.2 in conjunction with HQ CJTF 667 J6, but contracted independently by TCN.
- (4) Network Operations.
 - A. Defensive Measures. TG 667.2 networks are targets for Computer Network Attack (CNA) by enemy seeking to sabotage or exploit coalition information or services. The primary vulnerabilities are through gateways with external systems and inadvertent transfer of viruses from open systems. All contributing nations are responsible for effective COMSEC and Computer Network Defence (CND) on all national networks and systems; these measures are vital for effective C2 and the maintenance of information dominance. TG 667.2 J6 is responsible for the coordination of defensive measures and COMSEC for all TG 667.2 systems through the Network Operations Center located with HQ TG 667.2 (deployed).
 - B. Offensive Measures Offensive network operations or Computer Network Attack (CNA) will not be conducted by coalition partners against adversary networks without approval of COMD CJTF 667.

ACKNOWLEDGE:

Commander's last name
Commander's rank

Authenticator's Name

UNCLASSIFIED


Authenticator's Position

ANNEXES:


Annex A TG 667.2 Task Organisation
Annex B Intelligence
Annex C Operations

OFFICIAL
CJTF 667 C2 ORGANISATION

ANNEX A TO
TG 667.2 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX



UNCLASS



ANNEX B
TO TG 667.2 OPORD
DATED XXXXX

IOVELLIGENCE SUPPORT PLAN

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu.

1. Situation

- a. Characteristics of the Operational Environment (OE).
 - (1) See Appendix 4 and ODIN.
- b. Enemy.
 - (1) Under the stated aim of “liberating ethnic Olvanans from the oppressive governance of the Belesian government”, Olvana (OV) invaded the Belesian (BX) island of Panay with the OV Southern Fleet Marine Expeditionary Force (SFMEF) landing on Mischief Reef in the South China Sea (SCS) on (insert date) and Panay on (insert date). The SFMEF utilised the cover of a biennial exercise with Olvana (Ex RISEN SWORD) to muster forces to commence their OP RIGHTEOUS HARMONY, the annexation of Panay. The first phase of OP RIGHTEOUS HARMONY saw the landing of SFMEF elements on Mischief Reef. Utilising Mischief Reef as a logistic staging base, within 24hrs OV landed (utilising amphibious and heli-borne troops) and captured the seaport, airport and other key locations of the northern Panayan city of Roxas. A few months earlier, Roxas was the scene of rioting, which resulted in the deaths of over one hundred ethnic Olvanans. Little effective resistance was encountered during the capture of Roxas. It is estimated that the SFMEF has landed a Marine Brigade Task Group (4th Marine BTG) on Mischief Reef and established a logistic node to support operations on Panay. The SFMEF HQ is also identified to have setup in Mischief Reef to better coordinate C2 and sustainment operations. The SFMEF is estimated to have landed a reinforced Marine Brigade Task Group (1st Marine BTG) in Panay. Shortly after taking control of Roxas, the 1st Marine BTG has advanced south to Charters Towers and Ravenswood and established a defensive line. Conveniently, this defensive line incorporates the San Rafael Mine complex, a key strategic asset in Panay that produces a large quantity of rare earth metals, notably Cerium.
 - (2) In response to the capture of Roxas, the Belesian Federation Defence Forces (BFDF) landed a Brigade (12th Infantry Bde) in the southern Panayan city of Iloilo. The 12th Bde is a light infantry unit, so could be

deployed at a relatively short notice. However, the 12 Bde does not have the combat power to defeat the SFMEF 1st Marine BTG. Initial advances north from Iloilo by the BFDF 12th Bde were stopped short of the SFMEF defensive line which has since resulted in a stalemate with the majority of the 12th Bde holding defensive positions around Iloilo to secure the sea and airport.

- (3) The SFMEF has declared a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) over Mischief Reef, half of Panay and the sea and air lanes connecting the two islands, including large areas of the sovereign nation of Gabal. The SFMEF has reinforced their hold in Mischief Reef and Panay with SU-30MKK fighter-bombers, and J-11B fighters, along with active patrolling in the Sulu Sea between Mischief Reef and Panay. Aside from organic elements within the two SFMEF Marine BTGs, there have been reports of HQ-16 SAMs, 122mm MLR batteries and other SFMEF Division troops in Mischief Reef and Roxas. It appears that not all OV Marine Expeditionary Division elements have been deployed to Mischief Reef or Panay. The remaining two Marine BTGs are reported to still be in Olvana and it is estimated that the OV armed forces do not want to escalate this conflict wider. These two Marine BTGs may also be kept back as a strategic reserve to reinforce the deployed Marine BTGs as required. Identified OV Naval elements patrolling the sea-lanes within the declared TEZ include 1x Type 052D (Luyang III) destroyer, 2x Type 052C (Luyang II) destroyers, 1x Type 051G (Luda) destroyer, 2x Type 054A (Jiangkai II) frigates, 1x Type 053H3 (Jiangwei II) frigate, and 2x Type 053 (Jianghu V) frigates. Whilst not observed, it is assessed that an unknown number of up to three Song class diesel-electric submarines (SSG) are operating in and around the sea-lanes between Mischief Reef and Panay. Combat Air Patrols of fighter aircraft have been observed operating out of Mischief Reef and Roxas in addition to rotary wing traffic of Z9 helicopters.
- (4) Overall, the SFMEF are well trained and capable of conducting combined arms and joint operations and are capable of limited power projection in the region. The land forces of the SFMEF are designed for quick deployment and are therefore lacking in heavier armour, but make up for this deficiency in a larger number of combat units within each Marine BTG. It is expected that the 1st Marine BTG in Panay has been augmented with additional Divisional troops such as a Tank Coy of T-72Bs, an MRL Battery, an HQ-16 SAM AD Battery and significant Engineer troops. Similarly, the SFMEF maritime and air capabilities are also substantial and capable with several platforms of Tier 1 or 2 capability (<15 years old). Additionally, all SFMEF assets are under a unified command similar to a JTF based on the Marine Division HQ. It is noted that OV has significantly more forces on the mainland, but is postured along the South Olvanan border. OV sees a conflict with their neighbours such as Korathidin as the more dangerous

possibility and will keep the bulk of its forces poised for a possible conflict on their southern borders. Consequently, we can expect that OV's considerable strike capabilities on the mainland will not be utilised in the conflict in BX.

(5) **Enemy Strengths**

- (a) General. OV maintains the largest military of the five Pacific countries. Militarily, it is a dominant actor within the region, capable of conducting military action across the spectrum of operations. The OV military conducts overt, covert, and clandestine operations with ripple effects across the region. Reporting also suggests ties between elements of OV's military and criminal and terror groups within the region, which further extends the potential for a global threat.
- (b) Army. The Olvanan People's Army (OPA) is the largest and most influential of the OV Armed Forces. With compulsory national service, the OPA has a large number of military trained personnel from which to draw upon. The bulk of the OPA is located within the Southern and Eastern Military Theatres. The Southern Military Theatre has the only credible non-land based power projection capability through the OV Marine Division. This Marine Division reflects the OV shift to power projection and is therefore well equipped with Tier 1, 2 and 3 equipment. The Marine Division is slightly different to other OPA Divisions in that it has more Mechanised Infantry Battalions per Brigade (4 vs 3). However, this is offset by having lighter armoured vehicles than their non-marine counterparts.
- (c) Air Force. The Olvanan Peoples Air Force (OPAF) is a capable organisation that is able to strike any targets within the region. The OPFAF has two squadrons of H-6 bombers that can reach any target within the JFAO. However, these assets are kept in strategic reserve and are primarily postured to counter any attack by Olvana's neighbours. Instead, for OP RIGHTEOUS HARMONY, two squadrons of J-11 fighters and two squadrons of SU-30MKK fighter-bombers have been allocated to support the SFMEF. Additional AEW&C, surveillance and tanker support is provided. One squadron of J-11 and SU-30MKK is operating out of Mischief Reef, with the other squadrons operating out of the Roxas airport.
- (d) Navy. In recent years, the Olvanan Peoples Navy (OPN) has greatly expanded its maritime capability. In order to project power and maintain logistic support, the OPN has provided significant support to OP RIGHTEOUS HARMONY. The focus of the OPN in support of the SFMEF is to secure the sea-lanes in and around the islands of Panay

and Mischief Reef. The single Luyang III destroyer assigned to the SFMEF is a significant threat to all aircraft in the TEZ. The SFMEF also recognises the importance of the Luyang III and has kept this ship in the South China Sea to secure the link between OV and Mischief Reef, but also out of harm's way from possible attack.

(6) Enemy Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities.

- (a) Army. The terrain (tropical) of Panay means that travel of armoured vehicles is restricted during the wet season and will tend to canalize ground forces along MSRs. The availability of engineer assets to support maneuverability is limited within the SFMEF. It is expected that the 1st Marine Brigade will have limited engineer support assets. This is alleviated somewhat with the amphibious and light armour nature of the SFMEF. This light amphibious armour nature of the SFMEF will mean that the use of heavy armour by friendly forces will provide overmatch in most tactical situations. The 1st Marine BTG has recently been reinforced by a Tank Coy from the 17th Group Army consisting of Type-99A MBTs.
- (b) Air Force: In the event of full-scale combat engagement by modern air forces, the OPAF would not be able to accomplish more than local air parity for a short period. The OPAF ability to project force against OV's neighbors is not only a source of national prestige but represents a significant investment on the part of the Central Military Commission (CMC). The OV CMC is unlikely to risk more than a token loss to a superior force. The training and equipment of the OPAF is below the level of CJTF 667. Additionally, any strike aircraft from mainland OV will have to fly a circuitous route through the South China Sea, which will reduce their ability to dominate the TEZ. Instead, the OPAF will have to rely on forces staged out of Mischief Reef and Panay in order to maintain dominance over the TEZ.
- (c) Navy. The OPN has a relatively long line of communication from Panay, through Mischief Reef back to OV. The OPN ability to enforce the TEZ will be limited in the relatively close waters of the north Sulu Sea. The OPN has no problems transiting through sovereign Gabal waters as Gabal has no naval capabilities. Olvana has been able to leverage its economic influence over Gabal to ensure that Gabal can only provide a token objection through diplomatic means. Finally, the OPN has invested heavily in its naval vessels and will be reluctant to expose these assets to complete loss. Hence, it is expected that their most valuable naval surface vessels will likely remain in the South China Sea with lower tiered vessels operating in the Sulu Sea (with the exception of their SSGs).

(7) **Enemy Courses of Action (COAs)**

(a) Most Likely Course of Action. The strategic goal of the OV occupation of Panay is for a political solution to foster Panayan independence under OV sponsorship and not to escalate the conflict further. This means that at the strategic level, OV will be careful not to portray itself as an occupying aggressor. It is likely that OV will limit its military presence on Panay to that of a Marine Brigade and supporting maritime and air elements. It is highly unlikely that OV will reinforce the Marine BTG on Panay with significant additional ground elements, but holding enough combat power to deter or defeat any offensive attacks by Coalition Forces. In the event of CF landing ground forces on Panay, the SFMEF will utilise SPF and local insurgents to disrupt TG 667.2 activities before using maneuver and fortified defensive positions to defeat or cause attrition to TG 667.2 elements. The SFMEF will continue to maintain the TEZ with combat air patrols and surface warship patrols. They will remain in a defensive posture until hostilities commence. Additionally, the SFMEF will likely aim to cause attrition of TG 667.2 in order to force a diplomatic solution. The SFMEF will use information warfare to discredit TG 667.2 and BX Defense Forces, challenge the legitimacy of the BX government, tell its “liberation of ethnic Olvanans” story and promote its claim to support Panayan independence.

(b) Most Dangerous Course of Action. The SFMEF will reinforce the ground forces on Panay with an additional Marine BTG (likely the 2nd Marine BTG as the 3rd is currently under strength and on a lower readiness cycle). With that amount of combat power, the SFMEF may be able to capture the southern city of Iloilo and occupy the entire island of Panay. If Coalition Forces have been successful in degrading SFMEF capability prior to ground operations, the SFMEF may commit to capturing Iloilo with just the 1st Marine BTG or commit to attacking TG 667.2 ground forces before the Land Component can commence offensive operations on Panay. The SFMEF will use information warfare to discredit TG 667.2 and BX Defense Forces, challenge the legitimacy of the BX government, tell its “liberation of ethnic Olvanans” story and promote its claim to support Panayan independence.

c. **Friendly Forces.**

(1) Coalition Intelligence Capability. Coalition intelligence organizations, including those nested within the CJTF will provide all-source intelligence utilising all possible means, including the establishment of a Multi-National

intelligence operations center that will serve as a central all-source intelligence fusion center supporting operations in the JFAO.

2. **Mission**

- a. TG 667.2 intelligence conducts intelligence operations in order to enable operations against the 1st Marine BTG and affiliated groups in Panay.

3. **Execution**

- a. **Concept of Intelligence Operations.** TG 667.2 intelligence will conduct intelligence support to operations to enhance Indications and Warning (I&W) and situational awareness in the region. Intelligence support will focus along three lines of effort to achieve objectives in BX. Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) will be modified to support emerging operations and will drive intelligence operations during the execution of this plan.
- b. **Purpose.** TG 667.2 intelligence will support a long term, comprehensive approach. Intelligence assessments must account for and connect all factors within the political, military, economic, social, infrastructural, information, physical environment and time domains (PMESII- PT) - and actors influencing the dynamics in the Div Area of Interest (AOI). The main priorities are to provide threat I&W to Coalition forces, identify and exploit opportunities that achieve optimal results against the enemy, and provide kinetic and non-kinetic targeting information leading to mission success.
- c. **Method.** TG 667.2 intelligence capabilities organise and conduct intelligence operations that drive collection, production and analysis, contributions to target development, reporting, and collaboration with partners to provide timely and actionable support to TG 667.2 while maintaining support to the Coalition's ongoing operations in the AO. In order to achieve this, the TG 667.2 intelligence architecture must synchronize and share information that produces comprehensive intelligence assessments. Working with partner nations, TG 667.2 will employ all intelligence capabilities and provide timely and relevant intelligence in order to support operations. Three primary intelligence Lines of Effort complement each other and remain constant throughout each phase of the operation.
 - (1) **Intelligence Lines of Effort (LOEs).**
 - (a) **Intelligence Line of Effort I – ISR and Collection.** This line of effort focuses on collection coordination of Coalition ISR capabilities across the JFAO. This LOE seeks to synchronize the collection effort in order to satisfy operational and intelligence requirements and continue to update and refine the operational environment. LOE I monitors the JFAO and AOI for I&W, builds situational awareness, supports targeting operations, and conducts battle damage assessments (BDA).

- (b) Intelligence Line of Effort II – Analysis and Production. This LOE is designed to ensure a common comprehensive understanding of the operational environment and to support kinetic and non-kinetic targeting operations within the JFAO. LOE II focuses on multisource analysis encompassing PMESII-PT, which satisfies operational, and intelligence requirements.
- (c) Intelligence Line of Effort III – Information Sharing. LOE III enables a comprehensive Coalition approach to defeat the SFMEF. This LOE seeks to ensure information sharing to the maximum extent possible allowed or in accordance with each partner nation's perspective, national policies and laws. Information sharing is critical to this effort and must be placed within key nodes of Coalition intelligence enterprise.

(2) Intelligence Phasing.

- (a) Intelligence Support to TG 667.2. Intelligence support to TG 667.2 to defeat the 1st Marine BTG is tied to the four operational phases of OP CERIUM STEAL. This section will identify the main activities of intelligence support LOEs and integrate them into each respective phase.
 1. Phase 0 – Shaping. During this Phase, the main effort of intelligence operations will be to support ISR collection efforts. This phase will see the deployment of critical advance force operation assets along with the utilization of HUMIOV, SIGIOV and other intelligence gathering assets to confirm 1st Marine BTG force disposition and intent, and inform the targeting process. The intelligence effort will also support the CJTF main effort of non-kinetic shaping operations.
 2. Phase 1 – Lodgement. The main effort for intelligence operations during this phase will be to continue to analyse information from all sources to support the lodgement of ground forces into Panay. It is important that I&W for SFMEF movement and intent be closely monitored. This is a critical phase of operation, as failure to achieve lodgement into Panay will mean the overall failure of the mission. Joint intelligence assets will also support the TG 667.2 deception plan of staging amphibious forces off Panay to make the SFMEF believe the TG 667.2 ATG main effort is the landing of ground forces on the Panayan NE coast, closer to Roxas.
 3. Phase 2 - Neutralise. During this phase the main effort of the intelligence operations shifts to supporting the execution of TG 667.2 offensive ground operations. As SFMEF ground forces

are defeated in Panay, the main effort will shift from direct action against the SFMEF to operations against indigenous hostile forces inside Panay. Despite the main effort shift to supporting indigenous forces, intelligence support will still likely be required to support TG 667.2 and BX Defense Forces as they hold territory regained from the invading SFMEF. Intelligence support to targeting, I&W, ISR, and OE refinement will continue throughout this phase as well.

4. **Phase 3 - Transition.** During this phase, the main effort conducts continuing ISR operations in order to monitor the situation and identify threats towards a safe and secure environment.

(3) Intelligence Tasks.

(a) Common Tasks to TG 667.2 Intelligence Cells.

1. Allocate resources and funding to support intelligence operations specified in the base plan.
2. Monitor I&W for threats to Coalition partners and partner interests.
3. Develop and refine ISR and I&W process to support mission requirements by phase.
4. Support Advise and Assist (AA), Build Partner Capacity (BPC), Key Leader Engagements (KLEs), Humanitarian Assistance (HA), and Force Protection as necessary by phase.
5. Assist the development of TG 667.2 organic intelligence capabilities by phase.
6. Provide reach-back capability to deployed forces, as necessary.
7. Produce and disseminate intelligence summaries, Battle Damage Reports, ISR Collection Plan, and ad hoc intelligence products.
8. Shape allocation and apportionment of theater collection assets to support collection priorities and Campaign Plan objectives.
9. Establish the necessary intelligence architecture to support the TG 667.2 CONOPS.
10. Provide and receive Coalition partner liaisons to and from the TG.

11. Enable intelligence training that supports regional partners' actions against enemy threats to include Advise and Assist (AA), Build Partner Capacity (BPC), and engagement (OAs) missions.
12. Identify shortfalls to improve existing intelligence organisations, architecture and procedures to optimise collaboration and synchronise orientation, collection, rapid fusion, and timely dissemination of intelligence.
13. Submit and process intelligence requirements throughout the implementation of this plan for intelligence needs and support to planning.
14. Task and synchronise ISR collection assets to satisfy Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs).
15. Identify and recommend opportunities for Coalition intelligence exchanges and training to further develop and refine regional partner forces, as needed.
16. Support kinetic and non-kinetic targeting operations during appropriate phases of this plan.

(4) Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs).

- (a) What is the threat to TG 667.2 operations within the AO?
- (b) What is the threat to TG 667.2 land operations within the AO?
- (c) What is the threat to TG 667.2 rotary wing operations within the AO?
- (d) What is the threat to TG 667.2 Lines of Communication, specifically with respect to choke points?
- (e) How will OV info-war operations affect TG 667.2?
- (f) What are the environmental (incl. PMESII) factors that could affect TG 667.2 operations within the AO?
- (g) What is the intent and capacity of BX Defense Forces to provide external and internal security, maintain operational readiness, sustain interoperability with TG 667.2 forces and defend against SFMEF?
- (h) What are the threats in Panay and other authorised citizens, interests and infrastructure?
- (i) Where have the Visayan People's Front (VPF) and other hostile elements positioned their leaders, C2 facilities, interior lines and concentrations of manpower and supplies?

- (j) What is the capacity of SFMEF to include VPF in BX (Panay) to sustain their offensive campaign, gain territory and control the population?
- (k) What are the intentions of VPF regarding their opposition to the government of BX and incentives to support and cooperate with TG 667.2 activities?
- (l) What are the intentions of SFMEF with respect to their posturing and potential employment of chemical /biological weapons and the associated impact on TG 667.2 operations?
- (m) What are the intentions of SFMEF and leadership with respect to own assembly/use of chemical/biological weapons?

(5) **Intelligence Activities.**

- (a) **Collection Management (CM).** Collection activities will focus on the PIRs and emerging intelligence gaps and will be conducted and deconflicted in accordance with established national policies and procedures, and subsequently published CJTF guidance. Each respective Coalition member will determine an appropriate level of support for its respective theatre collection assets. Wherever possible, Coalition intelligence will participate in collection management working group forums in order to synchronise Coalition and ISR operations.
- (b) **Analysis and Production (A&P).** Coalition intelligence will analyse, produce, and provide current intelligence and assessments in support of PIRs and provide collateral releasable products to other partners as required.
- (c) **Dissemination and Information Sharing.** The Coalition will seek to allow greater sharing of intelligence on a more regular basis; however, disclosure decisions must be in accordance with each partner nation's policies. Safeguarding of information remains a responsibility of each Coalition member in order to prevent unauthorised release.

4. **Sustainment.**

- a. **Shortfalls and Limiting Factors.** Primary shortfalls include intelligence resources needed to protect the force and ground-based collection assets that cannot access the AO due to operational restrictions.

5. **Command and Signal**

- a. Communications. See Annex U to CJTF 667 OPORD 01.

Appendices

- Appendix 1 - Signals Intelligence (Omitted)
- Appendix 2 - Human Intelligence (Omitted)
- Appendix 3 - Counterintelligence (Omitted)
- Appendix 4 - Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

OPERATION CERIUM STEAL

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

LAND OPERATIONS – PANAY

V2.0

LINES OF OPERATION – OP STEEL SENTINEL

LOO 1 – Advance Force Ops



LOO 2 – Sustainment



LOO 3 – Decisive Action

Operational
COG



LOO 4 – Information Ops



Strategic
COG





Decisive Points

1. Enemy dispositions in PANAY are defined/confirmed
2. Coalition Forces have temporal control of sea/air lanes within the JFAO
3. Coalition Forces have staged enough combat power in the JFAO to prosecute decisive actions
4. Coalition Forces have successfully executed the deception plan
5. SFMEF have been successfully isolated logistically on Panay
6. SFMEF isolated politically and socially from the local population on Panay
7. Coalition Forces have conducted JFEO successfully
8. Advance Forces have successfully transitioned operations
9. SFMEF is defeated in JFAO
10. Coalition Forces have transition of authority to UN

Objectives

1. Deny SFMEF sustainment on Panay
2. Estb safe and secure environment in occupied Belesian territories
3. Degrade Enemy Strategic CoG

CONOPS OUTLINE – OP STEEL SENTINEL



CONOPS OUTLINE – OP CERIUM STEAL

COMD 1 Div (TG667.2) Intent

- **Commander's Intent**

- **Purpose.** Defeat SFMEF land forces on PANAY.
- **Method.** Operation CERIUM STEAL will be a three-phase operation nested within Operation STEEL SENTINEL (OSS). Phase 1 will consist of an amphibious lodgement of the TG onto Panay. Phase 2 will result in the Neutralisation of the SFMEF by dislocating and then defeating them in battle. During Phase 2, **X** BDE will ADV N and defeat SFMEF forces loc N of Passi. This will dislocate the SFMEF forces IVO Roxas City and set the conditions for **Y** BDE to defeat these forces in detail. Phase 3 will be the transition of authority back to the BX government. At all times, we must be cognisant that the main effort is the removal of OV forces in BX. If this can be achieved during any of the stages without further bloodshed, then all effort must be taken to explore those options.
- **Endstate.** The liberation of PANAY and removal of Olvanan forces from PANAY, establishment of a safe and secure environment in the occupied Belesian territories, and conditions set for the UN supervised transition of authority in Panay back to the Belesian Government

Critical Assumptions

- Critical Assumptions
 - ADF Armoured vehicles have overmatch against most SFMEF armoured vehicles
 - Armoured vehicles restricted to roads without significant engineering effort
 - Full SOFA and cooperation with Belesia to allow staging of Coalition Forces (CF) from Belesian territory
 - TG667.2 will have operational control of Belesian Forces within PANAY
 - TG667.2 will not be permitted to kinetically target the San Rafael mine complex
 - SFMEF will anticipate and oppose landing
 - Air superiority achieved for certain periods over PANAY by coalition forces



Situation

Enemy (Olvana):

- Southern Fleet Marine Expeditionary Force (**SFMEF**) elements have lodged in Panay and Mischief Reef (Spratly Islands)
- SFMEF 4th MAR Bde lodged on Mischief Reef with port and airfield being used as a staging base for movement into Panay
- SFMEF 1st MAR Bde in Panay have secured the city of Roxas and San Rafael Mine complex
- Pro-OV insurgents (Visayan Peoples Front - VPF) have aided OV in securing strategic locations in Panay
- Surface and sub-surface sea elements are operating in the Sulu and Sth China Sea
 - 1x Type 052D Luyang III (DDG)
 - 2x Type 052C Luyang II (DDG)
 - 1x Type 051G Luda (DDG)
 - 2x Type 054A Jiankai II (FFG)
 - 1x Type 053H3 Jiangwei II (FFH)
 - 2x Type 053 Jianghu V (FFH)
 - 3x Type 039 Song (SSK)
- Combat air elements operating out of Mischief Reef (12x SU-30MKK, 12x J-11B) and Roxas Airport (12x SU-30MKK, 12x J-11B, 12x Z-9, and 6x Z-19)
- Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) declared over occupied islands and connecting sea/air lanes
- Strategic Goals
 - Seek political solution to establish Panay 'independence' (annexation) under OV sponsorship
 - Seek to maintain destabilised region to set the conditions for annexation of Panay
 - Control of 'rare earth metals' supply in region
- Tactical Goals
 - SFMEF will likely secure positions within Panay and may reinforce presence in region
 - Secure sea/air lines of communications/supply between Roxas/Mischief Reef/Olvana
 - Maintain and defend TEZ over occupied territories and sea/air lanes
 - No intent to escalate conflict beyond occupied islands



South
China
Sea

SAG 1

1x Luyang III DDG
1x Jiangkai II FFH



Gabal

TEZ

G

Sulu Sea

SAG 3

1x Luyang II DDG
1x Luda DDG
1x Jiangwei II FFH
1x Jianghu V FFG

Roxas

Panay

San
Rafael
Mine

Iloilo

Belesia

Assessed Enemy Critical Factors / Decisive Points

Critical Factors

- SFMEF Forces in Panay will be dependant on log node on Mischief Reef
 - Supply lines will have to traverse through international waters in the South China Sea and Sulu Sea
 - Main Log hub will be in Roxas – at least a BN will be used to hold this log node (Port/Airfield)
 - Alternate Log hub has been identified at Greenvale – estimate a Coy strength holding this node
- 1 MAR BDE HQ (SFMEF) will be located in Roxas
 - Affiliate with VPF
- 1 MAR BDE likely to use tank BN as reserve to defeat AS lodgement
 - Reinforced with Company of Type 99 tanks
- Olvana is relying on local Panayan support to maintain legitimacy of invasion
 - Olvana will foment Panayan dissatisfaction with Belesian Federation and spur independence movement

Decisive Points

- Reinforce the ground forces in Panay with an additional SFMEF assets (AD, Cbt Engr, EW, MLRS)
- Potential capture of Iloilo
- Set conditions for favourable political solution [don't lose!]
- Set conditions for the independence of Panay (under Olvanan auspices) from Belesian Federation by exploiting historical ethnic tensions

Assessed Enemy Centre of Gravity

Strategic

- Olvana's Strategic CoG is the moral narrative that their occupation of Belesian territory is to protect ethnic Olvanans from persecution in Belesia and their ability to control and maintain that narrative

Operational


- Olvana's ability to sustain projected power in the region
- Ability to control the sea/air lanes
- The physical manifestation of this CoG are:
 - Surface and sub-surface naval capability
 - Combat aircraft operating out of Mischief Reef and Panay
 - Logistics node at Mischief Reef

Tactical



- 1 MAR BDE COG is assessed as their ability to maintain their occupation of Roxas.

C2 and Groupings


See separate CJTF 667.2 C2 Diagram for more detail



AO FANNING



ROUTES



Control Routes

Route ORANGE

- Old Iloilo-Capiz Road – PC Barracks Rd – Tapaz-Jamind-Altavaz Road
- ILOILO CITY APOD/SPOD – CALINOG – TAPAZ – JAMIND – SAPI-AN

Route PURPLE

- Calinog-Passi Road – Passi-San Rafael Road – Sara-Lemery Road
- CALINOG – PASSI – SAN RAFAEL – LEMERY – SARA

Route BLUE

- Roxas Ivisan Bypass– PC Barracks Road – Aklan West Road
- ROXAS CITY – ALTAVAS – KALIBO – CATICLAN SPOD

Route GREEN

- Iloilo-East-Coast-Capiz Road
- ILOILO CITY APOD/SPOD – PASSI – CUATERO – ROXAS CITY


Route RED

- Barotac-Nuevo Rd-Zarraga Road – Western Nautical Highway
- ILOILO CITY – BAROTAC NUEVEO – BANATE – SARA – ESTANCIA

Route MAGENTA

- Iloilo-East Coast-Capiz Road
- ROXAS CITY – PILAR – ESTANCIA

BOUNDARIES & PHASE LINES



Phase Lines

Phase Line ABLE

- SAN JOSE – SANTA BARBARA – BANALE – CONCEPCION

Phase Line BAKER


- VALDERRAMA – CALINOG – PASSI – SAN RAFAEL – SARA

Phase Line CHARLIE

- SEBASTE – JAMINDAN – DAO – MAAYON – PRESIDENT ROXAS – ESTANCIA

Phase Line DOG

- CATICLAN – KALIBO – ROXAS CITY – PILAR – CARLES



1 Div Scheme of Manoeuvre

Phase 1 – Lodgement (D-Day – D+2)

Main Effort:

- Conduct lodgement and Joint Force Entry Operations into Panay

Supporting Efforts:

- Conduct Joint Force Entry Operations deception plan on Palawan
- Establish logistic node at Iloilo
- Degrade SFMEF ground forces capability in Panay

Endstate:

- CJTF 667.2 ground elements will have lodged successfully in Panay and postured to conduct decisive actions

Groupings & Tasks

HQ 1 Div:

- Estb HQ Main at Iloilo APOD
- Assume OPCON of all Coalition assets in Panay (incl BX 12 Inf Bde)

Y Bde:

- Conduct JFEO in the vic of Banate

X Bde:

- Lodge at Iloilo SPOD/APOD
- Secure SPOD/APOD within Iloilo
- BPT conduct Fwd Passage of Lines with BX 12 Bde

16 Avn Bde

- Support lodgement and secure APOD
- BPT conduct recce tasks

FSG:


- Estb main log node at Iloilo APOD/SPOD

SF Elms

- Continue to conduct AFO on key SFMEF HVT

BX 12 Bde

- Secure Iloilo APOD/SPOD
- Maintain defensive positions around Iloilo



1 Div Scheme of Manoeuvre Phase 2 – Neutralise (D+3 – D+14)

Main Effort:

- Defeat SFMEF in Panay by securing Roxas

Supporting Efforts:

- Isolate Charters Towers
- Secure Hervey Range Rd
- Secure San Rafael Mine
- Contain Ayr
- Conduct RASO

Endstate:

- SFMEF ground forces will have been defeated on Panay

Groupings & Tasks

Y Bde:

- Adv NW and secure San Rapahel Mine
- Clear NE BDET vic Sara
- Neutralise/Contain OV BDET vic Estancia
- Secure Roxas

X Bde:

- Conduct Fwd Passage of Lines with BX 12 Bde
- Adv N along Route GREEN / ORANGE
- Neutralise/Isolate OV BDET vic Passi
- Clear towards Route BLUE

16 Avn Bde:


- Conduct recce tasks ISO Cbt Bdes
- Destroy SFMEF armour/HVT
- Conduct AMO
- Conduct AME

SF Elms

- Continue to conduct AFO on key SFMEF HVT

BX 12 (Z) Bde

- Advance north along Route Yellow
- Secure Caticlan



1 Div Scheme of Manoeuvre

Phase 3 – Transition (D+15 onwards)

Main Effort:

- Transition to UN peacekeeping

Supporting Efforts:

- HOTO authority to Belesian Forces
- Reconstruction efforts
- Stability Operations
- Repatriate/Return to Aus ADF assets
- Conduct COIN as needed

Endstate:

- Establishment of Belesian authority in Panay
- Removal/repatriation of all SFMEF from Belesian territory

Groupings & Tasks

HQ 1 Div:

- Maintain security of Panay under UN mandate
- BPT transition authority to BX Forces / Government

Y Bde:

- Conduct STABOPS within Roxas and boundaries
- BPT handover security to BX authority

X Bde:

- Conduct STABOPS within Passi and boundaries
- BPT handover security to BX authority

16 Avn Bde:

- Assist in conduct of STABOPS
- BPT conduct AMO as required

FSG:

- Begin RTA procedures on ADF assets no longer required as per draw down plan
- BPT conduct reconstruction efforts

SF Elms

- BPT conduct COIN

Concept for Intelligence Operations

Collection

- All available intelligence gathering assets across all domains will be utilised including:
 - HUMINT
 - ELINT
 - SIGINT

Link to PIR

- TBA

Counterintelligence

- TBA

Communications and Information Systems

Space

- TBA

Datalinks

- TBA

Coordination

- TBA

Command and Signal

Command

- Succession of Command
 - COMD TG 667.2
 - Deputy COMD TG 667.2
 - COMD **Y** Bde
 - COMD **X** Bde

Signals

- TBA

Vulnerabilities and Risks

Phase 1

- TBA

Phase 2

- TBA

Phase 3

- TBA

Annex D
HQ 1 DIV Task Group 667.2 OPORD 01FIRE SUPPORT, JOINT FIRES AND TARGETING**Reference:**

A. CJTF 667 OPORD 01 (OP STEEL SENTINEL)

Time Zone: Reference A

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy. Reference A. b. Friendly Forces.

(1) 1 Div Field Artillery Order of Battle:

- (a) 1 Regt RAA (M777, 155mm How), DS 7 Cbt Bde, and
- (b) 4 Regt RAA (M777, 155mm How), DS 3 Bde.

(2) 6 Bde Units:

- (a) 16 Regt RAA (GBAD, RBS70),
- (b) 20 Regt RAA (STA), DS TG 667.2, and
- (c) HIMARS Bty RAA (M142 RKT) DS TG 667.2.

(3) 12 (BX) Moto Bde:

- (a) 12 FA Bn (18 x D30, 120 mm How) DS 13 (BX) Moto Bde, and
- (b) 12 ADA Bty (9 x ZU 23 8, 23 mm canon).

2. MISSION. To provide coordinated joint fires in support of TG 667.2 IOT CLEAR NT Mar DTG on PANAY.

3. EXECUTION

a. Commander's Guidance for Joint Firepower.

- (1) Employ lethal and non-lethal capabilities ISO TG 677.2 mission;
- (2) JFECC HQ TG 667.2 is responsible for coordinating targeting, joint offensive support to achieve effects as guided by Joint Targeting Directive issued by CJTF 667;
- (3) 12 (BX) FA Bn will provide fire support to TG 667.2 lodgement until 1 Div FA reports ready;
- (4) 1 Div field artillery units will lodge with their supported brigades once sufficient and suitable AMA are secure in bde AO;
- (5) Once ready, 1 & 4 Regt RAA will assume FIRES to respective bde NLT attainment of PL ABLE (D+3) and manoeuvre to ensure IDF coverage for duration of OCS;

- (6) Elements of 16 Regt RAA will lodge to provide GBAD at ILOILO;
- (7) 20 Regt RAA, remainder 16 Regt RAA and HIMARS Bty RAA will lodge once 3 & 7 Bde secure PL BAKER;
- (8) 20 Regt RAA will commence STA ISO of TG 667.2 advance to SAN RAFAEL and PASSI;
- (9) 16 Regt RAA will continue to provide GBAD at ILOILO, once PL CHARLIE is secure, provide GBAD to deny enemy air assets use of ROXAS;
- (10) HIMARS Bty RAA is to provide depth FIRES against enemy IDF, armour and counter attack elements;
- (11) TG 667.3 CAS will provide up three sorties per day to support TG 667.2, bids for CAS by Bde HQ through gun RHQ to JFECC 72 hours prior;
- (12) TG 667.1 will provide opportunity NGS by NGS Request through JFECC from gun RHQ through all phases.

b. Field Artillery Groupings and Tasks

- (1) D-D+3 (PL ABLE)
 - (a) 12 (BX) FA Bn ISO TG 667.2; (b) 1 Regt RAA DS 7 Cbt Bde;
 - (c) 4 Regt RAA DS 3 Bde;
 - (d) 20 Regt RAA ISO TG 667.2 priority STA 7 Cbt Bde; and
 - (e) HIMARS Bty RAA ISO TG 667.2 priority deep FIRES.
- (2) D+3-D10 (PL CHARLIE)
 - (a) 12 (BX) FA Bn reverts ISO 12 (BX) Moto Bde
 - (b) Remainder – no change
- (3) D+10-D+14 (PL DOG): no change.
- (4) D+15 onwards: BPT support Transition

c. GBAD

- (1) D-D+3
 - (a) 16 Regt RAA – area defence ILOILO; and
 - (b) 12 (BX) ADA Bty – as directed by 12 (BX) Moto Bde.
- (2) D+3-D10 (PL CHARLIE)
 - (a) 16 Regt RAA:
 - i. Area defence ILOILO; and
 - ii. Area defence IVO ROXAS.
 - (b) 12 (BX) ADA Bty – no change.
- (3) D+10-D+14 (PL DOG): no change.
- (4) D+15 onwards: BPT support Transition

d. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Fire Support Coordination Measures:

(a) Boundaries.

i. FIRES predicted to land within own boundaries but which may have an effect outside their own formation or unit boundaries must be coordinated with adjacent formation or unit,

(b) Coordinated Fire Line (CFL). Battle Groups (BG) are responsible for identifying and promulgating a CFL that must be coincident with a phase line (PL). A trigger line is to be identified 1000m short of the CFL; JOSTs must request a shift to CFL on attaining the trigger line.

(c) Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT). BG are to update FLOT NLT every 30 minutes when units are on the move.

(d) Fire Support Coordination Line. (FSCL).

i. D-D+3 – FSCL IRON coincides with PL BAKER;

ii. D+4-D+10 – FSCL COBALT coincides with PL DOG;

iii. D+11-D+14 – FSCL ZINC coincides with PL EASY; and

iv. D+15 onwards – Revert to TG 667.2 AO as RFA.

(e) Free Fire Areas (FFA). No FFA are designated on the friendly side of the FSCL.

(f) Restrictive Fire Area (RFA). The following are RFA for OSC. HQ TG 667.2 is the authority to engage within RFA:

i. Population and conglomeration centres: ROXAS, SAN RAFAEL, PASSI, CATICLAN.

ii. Within 500m of major watercourse crossing (bridge or causeway) of PANAY Island rivers;

iii. Within 500m of airstrips identified as AMA for HIMARS.

(g) No Fire Area (NFA). San Rafael Cerium Mine.

(h) Restrictions on ammunition natures. Cratering munitions and white phosphorous are prohibited in RFAs.

(2) Joint Fires

(a) JFECC TG 667.2 to coordinate Joint Fires and targeting in AO see appendix 1;

(b) Bdes may nominate targets to JFECC to support manoeuvre OSC;

(3) Ammunition Planning. The following table provides the current ammo planning estimate to TG 667.2 OSC:

(a) 155mm – 1st lines/gun/day;

UNCLASSIFIED

(b) M142 RKT – Pods per launcher/day

(c) RBS 70 – missiles per launcher/day:

PHASE	H	SM	IR	M142 RKT	RBS 70
D-D+3	0	0.5	0.5	1	1
D+3-	2	2	2	4	6
D+10-	3	3	3	6	6
D+15	1	1	1	2	4

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

a. A arty Ammunition

- (1) 12 (BX) Moto Bde is responsible for its Class V supplies;
- (2) TG 667.2 FA units initial load of ammunition will be demand replenishment through brigade support group (BSG);
- (3) From D+3 ammunition resupply will be automatic from BSG to gun lines; and
- (4) BSG will collect ammunition from FSG ammunition dumps IAW dumping program.

b. Movement

- (1) DS units will move to designated AMA, hides, Assy Area IAW supported formation orders.
- (2) GBAD and STA units will move as directed by HQ TG 667.2.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command

- (1) Comd TG 667.2 will exercise command of all Arty units.
- (2) Alternate Comd. COL Effects TG 667.2 is alternate Comd arty units TG 667.2.
- (3) Locations. JFECC will collocate with TG 667.2 Main CP.
- (4) Coordination:
 - (a) Target lists
 - (b) Air space control

b. Signal

- (1) Communications IAW with TG 667.2 SIG OP Procedures.

Appendices:

Appendix 1 - Joint Targeting
Appendix 2 - Fire Support Coordination Measures Overlay
Appendix 3 - Effects Guidance Matrix (TBIL)
Appendix 4 - High Priority Target List (TBIL)

JOINT TARGETING

Reference.

A. CJTF 667 OPORD 01 (OP TE POU MAITAI)

1. SITUATION.

a. General. This order sets out the agreed approach to joint targeting for OCS.

2. **MISSION.** To provide coordinated joint fires in support of TG 667.2 IOT CLEAR NT Mar DTG on PANAY.

3. EXECUTION.

a. **The Targeting Process.** The targeting process:

- (1) does not apply when exercising self-defence governed by the appropriate principles and ROE;
- (2) does not apply immediate action is required;
- (3) these situations are not to be used to avoid the targeting process when of offensive action can be foreseen; and
- (4) all targeting and application of joint FIRES are to be conducted in compliance with the ROE implemented and the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC).

b. **TG 667.2 Targeting Board (DTB).** Comprises:

- (1) Comd TG 667.2 or delegate;
- (2) COL Effects
- (3) INT;
- (4) OPS;
- (5) LEGAL;
- (6) LO 12 (BX) Moto Bde; and
- (7) JFECC secretariat.

c. **Legitimate Targets.** The principle of distinction as described in International Humanitarian Law (IHL) will always be applied by commanders. Commanders at all levels must distinguish the civilian population and objects, and combatants and military objectives.

d. Legitimate targets are divided into two categories:

- (1) Persons as military objectives; and
- (2) Objects as military objectives.

- e. The Doubt Rule. If doubt exists about the person or object, they shall be considered civilian.
- f. Dynamic Targeting. The Dynamic Targeting process is applied to:
 - (1) targets of opportunity; and
 - (2) planned targets that have changed and require rapid engagement. COMD TG 667.2 has pre-approved engagement of the following targets in the AO:
 - (a) IDF systems;
 - (b) GBAD systems;
 - (c) Tank units;
 - (d) AT units; and
 - (e) C2 vehicles.

Tabs (TBI):

Tab A - Targeting Priorities

Tab C - Target Checklist

Tab D - Attack Guidance Matrix

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ANNEX N TO OP CERIUM STEAL DATED XXXXXX

SPACE OPERATIONS

References:

- A. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, Oct 1967
- B. *The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space*, Dec 1968
- C. *The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects*, Sep 1972
- D. *The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space*, Sep 1976
- E. *The Agreement Governing the Activities of State on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies*, Jul 1984

1. Situation.

a. Olvana (OV).

- (1) Space Capabilities. SFMEF capabilities are generally focused on missile launch controls and observation, however possess limited optical or positional satellites, any Space capabilities continue to be augmented through use of state/non-state actors willing to provide or disseminate technology or proxy access to OV.
 - (a) Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RISTA). OV Image Intelligence (IMINT) requirements are supported by purchases of commercial imagery from other countries, and proxy access by OV proxies operating internationally.
 - (b) OV's allies including Donovia has access to Hi-Fidelity IMINT supported by an aggressive Satellite program, providing PROBABLE access to OV, depending on operational requirements of the host nation forces and opportunity. Recent Olvanian IMINT reportedly consists high-speed bandwidth with up to 4K, with 0.5m - 0.8m ground resolution, and 3D Micro-Millimeter Spatial Mapping capabilities.

Owner	Satellite Class	IMINT Resolution	Coverage	ELINT	Revisit Time	Orbit Class	Zulu Window
OV	KMS-4	3m	Unknown	Possible	94min 24sec	Sun Synch	0045-0115
Olvana	Gao Feng 03A	3D @ 1m	17km	N/A	Once Every 72 hrs	LEO	2200-2230
Olvana	Gao Feng 02	0.75m	40km	N/A		LEO	0100-0120
Olvana	Jilin Shipin 02	HD Video 1.13m	4.6 x 3.4 km	N/A	Once Every 24 hrs	Sun Synch	2200-2300

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- (c) Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT). OV's military is believed to use hybrid solutions dependent on commercially accessible solutions, with certain capabilities tied to specific Defence treaties and technology transfer agreements. While these include GPS, GLONASS, and BDS
- (d) It is likely that GPS also provides the backbone for timing for services such as SATCOM.
- (e) SATCOM. OV operates one earth observation satellite that utilizes X-Band transponders to communicate images for download while in a sun-synchronous orbit with IMINT and potential ELINT capabilities. OV may also be using commercial or allied satellites from Olvana, Donovia and other nations.
- (f) ELINT. OV's KMS4 is unlikely to have sophisticated ELINT capabilities, however OV may have negotiated access to a combination of Olvanian capabilities including Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS), SIGINT and supporting precision strike capabilities.

Owner	Satellite Class	Cluster Size	ELINT	Focus	Revisit Time	Orbit Class	Zulu Window
Olvana	Yaogan 30-K	3	Yes	Land SIGINT	107mins	LEO	1800-1840
Olvana	Yaogan 30-10	3	Yes	Maritime SIGINT	97mins 30 sec	LEO	1600-1630
Donovia	Kosmos 2543	1	Probable	Unknown	96min 40 secs	LEO	1500-1530

Sources:

Kosmos Tracker <http://n2yo.com/satellite/?s=44835>

Yaogan 31-K Tracker <http://n2yo.com/satellite/?s=47854>

- (2) Counter-Space Capabilities. Counter Space capabilities are a set of capabilities that OV may use to deny Coalition space effects:
 - (a) ISR. OV ability to negate threats from the US, Coalition, and other more sophisticated opponents is extremely limited and the threat from OV for ISR counter-space will be minimal.
 - (b) PNT. The ability to counter Coalition use of space-based PNT will be dependent on OV's access to COTS technology or jammers acquired from Donovia or other vendor nations or third parties.
 - (c) SATCOM. The ability to counter Coalition use of space-based SATCOM is UNLIKELY, due to current capabilities.
- (3) Launch Capability. The Olvanian Space Agency is UNLIKELY to launch any successful Satellite payloads. OV allied capabilities are significantly advanced with Olvana launching 3-4 commercial and military Hi-Res IMINT, SIGINT monthly through both Land and Sea-based launches. It is assessed that Olvana is LIKELY to have short-term

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Satellite Surge launch capacity.

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b. Coalition Forces.

(1) General. The CJTF has access to a limited use of Hi-Res US Keyhole technologies with

Ground Resolution of under 1 metre, via FVEY arrangements.

(2) Space Capabilities. The IBSAF use a wide range of space-based ISR assets, reliant on GPS and GLONASS. Use of space based PNT and SATCOM by the Coalition is ubiquitous at all levels; denial of this capability would be debilitating.

(3) Counter-Space Capabilities. The IBSAF may leverage existing legislation from respective governments to interrupt or restrict service by commercial satellite imagery providers over the JFAO.

(4) Host Nation (HN).

(a) Belesia (BX). The host nation commercially purchases global positioning receivers that support commercial needs as well as military navigation and targeting operations, which may be leveraged for additional bandwidth of capabilities.

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**ANNEX Q TO
TG 667.2 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX**

CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS

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References:

- A. World Fact Book 2020 – The Republic of Belesia as at 8 Nov 18
- B. Panay District Supplement as at 1 Jan 18
- C. Palawan District Supplement as at 13 Jan 18
- D. HQ JOC OIE Prospects for Security and Stability in Belesia dated XX XXX XX
- E. UNHC – P Report 008/XX – Humanitarian Sit Panay Isles dated XX XXX XX

OVERVIEW

1. **General.** This annex details the Civil Military Operations (CMO) objectives and activities to be undertaken in support of the land component operations. This is to support the establishment of security and stability conditions in the JFAO sufficient for the transition of responsibility for security to a mandated UN Follow on Force (FoF) and subsequent Host Nation Military / Security forces. This annex is to be used by those elements involved in Civ- Mil activities and those whom may need to understand the Civ-Mil environment for their own BOS. All CMO intentions will be undertaken with in IO objectives and in line with the COMD's intent (here with restated);
 - a. **Purpose.** Enforce UNSCR 8873 to re-establish Belesian sovereignty in Panay.
 - b. **Method.** Deploy TG 667.2 with enablers from ADF and OGA to the JFAO to prosecute Multi-Domain Operations against Olvanan elements in Belesian sovereign territory. Coordinate WOAG and multinational efforts to enforce UNSCR 8873.
 - c. **Endstate.** The removal of SFMEF from Belesian sovereign territory, establishment of a safe and secure environment in the occupied Belesian territories, and conditions set for the UN supervised transition of authority in Panay and Palawan back to the Belesian Government.

SITUATION

2. **Enemy.** Analysis of operational environment, threat, threat forces and assessment of likely En Ops, see Intelligence, OPORD Annex B.
3. **Friendly.** Detailed friendly forces, groupings, tasks and organisation see Operations, OPORD Annex C.
4. **Inhabitants.** A detailed social-political and infrastructure summary of the JFAO is provided in Ref A to E, and detailed in the enclosed Country Study Appendix 1. That study providing the following points as particular relevance to the TG 667.2 CMO plan for the Panay Island province of the nation state of Belesia:
 - a. **Population.** The population of Belesia is 109,000,000 based on July 2016 estimates. The pop in Panay is 4,301,000 (2015) which is spread throughout the island's urban and rural area with pop centres noted in Panay Map Appendix 2 and as follows;

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- (1) Roxas; pop 574,000 capital of province of Aclan supporting 17 smaller towns.
- (2) San Rafael; pop 582,000 capital of province of Antiq supporting 18 towns.
- (3) Caticlan; pop 761,000 capital of province of Apiz supporting 16 towns.
- (4) Iloilo City; pop 2,384,000 capital of province of Iloilo supporting 42 towns.

b. **Language.** Panay has three official languages, Tok Belesia, Tagalog, and English, although Tagalog is seldom used by the younger generations. English is the language of government, education and business. Tok Belesia, a Melanesian pidgin similar in nature to Papua New Guinea Tok Pisin and Vanuatu Bislama. It is the lingua franca. There are a number of indigenous languages spoken which belong to various linguistic groups. The number of speakers of these languages has steadily dwindled in recent decades. FE should be able to communicate with the pop in English, especially the younger people without need of translators.

c. **Culture and Society.** Within Panay there are four ethnic groups, Panayan 48%, Olvanan 32%, Olvanan 18%, and European 2%. Within each of these groups a number of clans or extended family groups exist. Each of these clans historically operated within a defined territory as noted in Panay Map attached as Appendix 3, moving throughout their home lands. While a homogeneous and multicultural population, FE should still exercise caution when dealing with tribal issues as this is still a strong bond within Panay society.

d. **Religion.** The Roman Catholic Church (RCC) is the major religion in Panay, being a de facto provider of many public services a more functional government would ordinarily supply. The RCC has strong and deep roots within most communities both religious and secular, and its international character has led to some suspicion that factions within the local cathedral communities might be partisan actors or at least being logistical links for Olvana and Torbia. The influence the RCC has over the population, almost 65% are active parishioners, cannot be overstated. A highly religious society means that care must be taken by the FE to not be seen to be contrary to the church or its symbology.

e. **Politics and Government.** Following the 1967 announcement of the government to grant Panay self-governance no later than 1972, elections to a popular assembly were held in 1971. The Panay District Assembly consists of 40 members with 10 members elected by each of the 4 districts and is headed by a parliament based out of the capital Iloilo City. The government still operates on a small “pay for services” scheme to get work done. This is often and incorrectly referred to as corruption, but is not. It is the recognised method of getting govt work done. This is not to be confused with the graft and payouts done by the mining sector of business as this money goes straight to elected members and not into the government supply.

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- f. **Economic outlook.** Successive Panay governments have overseen the exploitation of the islands natural resources with a light hand, generally granting concessions, specifically mining, in a resource bidding war that if successful would see Panay gain high economic benefits. The commercial and industrial businesses which thrive in Panay have worked out that small wages and pay offs to politicians can lead to high profit. These commercial interests need careful handling. The FE can expect that commercial enterprises will be quick to exploit the situation and it is anticipated that claims and compensation will be sought as the security circumstances improve.
- g. **Electricity.** Panay has a coal fired power generator located on the outskirts of each of the provincial centres. Power is reasonably well provided for but suffers from high demand shortages especially during peak periods, resulting in outages of a few hours. Energy is supplied as 240-250v 60Hz cycle which is broken into 110-120v in the homes and buildings with power within the pop. Breakdowns in coal delivery can also disrupt supply sometimes lasting in outages of days. Critical infrastructure has backup generators but these are also subject to outage due to disruptions in diesel fuel supply. FE should not expect to be able to tap into and utilise the civilian electricity grid and must come self-contained with its own generator power supply and fuel to run it.
- h. **Water Supply.** All towns draw their town water from underground aquifers and the larger rivers which runs through them. The water quality can run from an A to C rating. Supply during the dry season may also cause shortages. Given the low quality and lack of quantity, FE must bring its own purification and water supply systems.
- i. **Fuel Supply.** Panay is bisected by the AMADA Natural Gas Pipeline, which is a significant infrastructure of considerable value to the national Belesian government. Natural gas is the fuel of choice for the pop needs being used for everything from cooking to powering vehicles and generators. Fuel supply of both diesel and petrol is provided from refineries in Belesia which can result in shortages due to the problems of shipping and distribution. Fuel supplies for FE will not be possible from inside Panay and CSS & LOG should not plan to get these from in country with care taken to not cause shortages to the pop.
- j. **Waste Treatment.** Regional centres have a rudimentary and inefficient sewage systems with the more remote areas generally have individual house septic systems. This has in past caused fouling of the water supply which then causes health concerns with the pop. The FE needs to be cognisant that its waste disposal systems and programs do not cause environmental issues nor exacerbate problems with the existing infrastructure.
- k. **Telecommunications.** A high standard of telephone, mobile phone and internet connections are available across the whole island, with high speed data capability available in regional centres. Remote rural areas are for the most part available with various levels of reliability. It is well known that the phone infrastructure was built by the MISO Telecom company and that while a reliable

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and well used system, can be intercepted and be used as an information and intelligence source. Phones which use the local system will be subject to foreign intelligence service information collection activities. It is important for rebuilding of the country so must be protected from kinetic or non-kinetic disruption in all phases.

- I. **Health.** The island's civilian health services and support infrastructure, based on hospitals at the provincial centres. Nationals generally seek treatment for major medical treatment in Belesia in preference to the Panay health service. FE should not expect to be able to use the civilian infrastructure and can expect requests for support when they are located in country.
- m. **Legal System.** Justice is administered by the national authority, which was generally only concerned with serious crimes. Local issues are generally handled by provincial magistrates or city judges. Given the CJTF will operate under the provisions of the UNSCR 8873 and an extant SOFA, FE should have very limited dealings with the Panay legal system. Legislative issues including the SOFA and ROE are to be found with the Legal OPORD Annex K.
- n. **Policing.** Under national rule, a semi-professional constabulary force of approximately 100 officers was trained in basic policing skills. Following self-autonomy, this small department was expanded and now has some 5,000 members. A Police Proficiency and Capability report is expected from the AFP on the competencies and shortfalls of this law enforcement agency. It is to be found with the Military Police OPORD Annex AD. The expectation is that the countries police force will return and provide the necessary law enforcement activities upon cessation of hostilities.
- o. **Transportation.** Panay has a well-developed, albeit not extensive road system. Road haulage operations are a key component of the success of the Panay economy. Care must therefore be exercised by FE to ensure damage to the roads by either offensive support actions (deliberate or dynamic) or ground force usage, is kept to a minimum. Where damage occurs, it is to be reported immediately and repaired as soon as practically possible. The low weight rate (40t classification) of most highways and bridges will see the use of the roads by the heavy A veh fleet and larger logistics vehicle fleet severely curtailed.
- p. **Humanitarian Situation.** United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator – Panay (UNHC-P) reporting at Ref F estimates approximately 40,000 IDP's are scattered throughout Panay as a result of increased activities by the enemy who have a sophisticated public communications and information operation. These are moved as the camps reach capacity or if the reason for the displacement ceases. In most cases, the camps successfully re-integrate the IDPs back to their home locations.
- q. **IDP Camps.** The following IDP camps may have been identified in Panay:

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- (1) Municipality of Roxas: Two camps; *Tanza Norte to the east & Ilaya* adjacent to Roxas.
- (2) Municipality of Passi; Two camps; *Arac* and *Bacuranan*.
- (3) Municipality of Sara. Three camps; *Alibayog, Labigan and Salcedo* near Sara.
- (4) Municipality of Iloilo: Two camps; *Cabatuan and New Lucena*.

r. **IDP/Refugees Movements.**

- (1) Population movement internal of a country produces internally displaced persons (IDP) but if the population flees across countries borders, they become refugees. Additional IDP/Refugee movement is expected on commencement of Phase 2 and additional temporary camps are expected to emerge. These movements are expected to include both those fleeing active conflict and those who have benefitted from the supported government and now fear reprisals.
- (2) Greater movements of people combined with an expected deterioration of law & order and the economy during and immediately after decisive operations are likely to exacerbate existing problems within communities. This is likely to have a particular impact on women with increased incidence of rape, transactional sex and related gender based violence.
- (3) The maintenance of awareness on the situation of Displaced Persons and Refugees (DPRE) in the AO will remain a CMO responsibility.
- (4) Upon ceasing of hostilities, security of movement is restored and people feel that there is sufficient law and order to protect them from attack or retaliation in their home communities, IDP/refugees will begin to return. This is expected to strain post-conflict housing availability, public services and food/water supplies.

5. **HA and Civil Society Organisations (CSO).**

- a. Some of the IO/NGO operating across the CJOA and within Belesia are managing the IDP camps. It is likely that international and other staffs who work for IO/NGO may depart or curtail their activities during military operations as they will conduct their own threat assessments and act IAW the UN Security Level System.
- b. Some CSO are anticipated to be in place to support HA distribution. NGO/IO will likely determine their own security criteria for entry based on information from their own sources and the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). Threat elements will likely attempt to disrupt HA supply and distribution IOT support their own agenda.

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- c. Those IOs and NGOs are found in the Panay civil organisations and contact list attached as Appendix 4.

6. Civil Assumptions.

- a. Heads of various sections, key stakeholders within the Panay government will also be based at the capital in Iloilo. Further, other coalition stakeholders within military and government, NGOs, and other stakeholders such as ICRC will be based in Iloilo during operations.
- b. The Panay people in the occupied area have a neutral position yet positive sentiment towards the CJTF and aligned Panay Govt.
- c. Threat groups will leverage off the CivPop to collect on the CJTF/ADF activities.
- d. Provincial political entities are positive towards Panay Govt and CJTF elements.
- e. Law enforcement aligned with provincial govt are also positive towards Panay Govt and CJTF elements as well.
- f. Medical services and public utilities will deteriorate less than 24hrs of the commencement of combat operations.
- g. National economic aspect of country will deteriorate and will heavily rely on the informal market and local and provincial economies.
- h. Liaison authority to engage with for HN government ministers resides with CJOPS.
- i. IO/NGO will be capable of provision of HA and initial capacity building.

MISSION

- 7. **Purpose.** CMO activities will support the TG 667.2 Mission in order to set the conditions for transition of authority to the mandated UN Follow on Force (FoF) supported by the international community and to minimise the impact of TG 667.2 operations on the civil population.

- 8. **Method.** CMO will support the TG 667.2 mission by:

- a. Undertaking direct comms and liaison, collaboration and interagency planning, actions and activities with the WOG to set the conditions for transition to the mandated UN FoF.
- b. Supporting the IO objectives, assist in the delivery of key messages to the local population which prepares them for the return and establishment of the legitimate Govt of Belesia with an emphasis on our intention to achieve transition to the UN or Host Nation FoF.

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- c. Conduct or coordinate those targeted CMO activities on the assigned persons or groups to achieve the desired effects and outcomes and control those elements with the AO who will interface with the population.
- d. Ensuring that TG 667.2 operations and offensive actions minimise targeted activities and collateral damage to key civil infrastructure. Where this has not been achieved, undertake such assessments and organise the repair or replacement of this damage in as orderly and responsive way as possible.
- e. Ensuring that CJTF operations do not create a dependency by the HN population on TG 667.2 resources.
- f. Ensure the avoidance of placing additional strain upon the already fragile key civil infrastructure including assisting those FE responsible for assisting the HN Govt departments becoming re-established to provide a return to normality.
- g. The provision of appropriately OFFICIAL briefs to key stakeholders.
- h. Assist with the provision of a secure environment that allows IO/NGO to deliver services and possible HA to the populace.
- i. Coordinating with key agencies regarding IDP/Refugee movement through the AO so agencies are able to establish interim IDP camps if required.
- j. Facilitating the provision of Immediate Life Sustaining Aid (ILSA) through coordination with the On-Site Operational Coordination Centre (OSOCC), Other Governmental Agencies (OGA), International Organisations (IO) and NGOs.

9. **Endstate.** Set the conditions for the transition of responsibility to the mandated UN or HN FoF.

EXECUTION

10. Concept of Operations.

- a. **CMO Elements.** To conduct CMO the following units and force elements will be utilised for the delivery of effects and provision of Civ-Mil influencing and informing activities as assigned and directed by the Joint Effects Targeting Board. The lack of coalition forces, specifically US Mil, means that Civil Affairs (CA) teams are unavailable for tasking or use.
 - (1) The lack of CA means that the principal CMO tool will be the tactical CIMIC detachments and teams as provided from the formation CIMIC Group. These elements will be the priority task for assessments coordination of CMO effects as tasked to units and FE. It is expected that each Cbt Bde will be provided with its own CIMIC Tactical Support Teams (TST). The role of CIMIC is to support the mission through three core

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functions:

- (a) enhance situational understanding of the civil space
- (b) support/enhance decision-making, and
- (c) conduct tactical CIMIC tasks as detailed from OPORD.

(2) Civ Mil Activities (CMA), any unit / sub-unit, elements or staff can be utilised for activities and duties as tasked through ops as detailed in TASKORDs from HQs. This is inclusive of any specialist elements as attached to the formations.

(3) Civ Mil Liaison (CML) staff for communication and coordination between HQs and those OGA or HN departments. All staff are BPT to be detached as required within the TG 667.2 C2. These would be coordinated through the Info Ops KLE cell staff (G2) assisted by the CIMIC Teams.

(4) Engineer Assessment Teams for reconnaissance and assessment of infrastructure and civilian capabilities. May also be required for Engineer Civil Assistance Program (ENGCAP) activities in later phases.

(5) Medical Assessment Teams for assessment and inspection of medical facilities and population health services. May also be required for Medical Civil Assistance Program (MEDCAP) activities in later phases.

(6) Military Police detachment Engagement Teams for investigations and assessment of detainee handling infrastructure and civilian capabilities. May also be required for Police Civil Assistance Program (POLCAP) activities in later phases. It will be expected that a separate and comprehensive hand over of security arrangements will be specified.

(7) Female Engagement Teams (FET) or Cultural Support Teams (CST) for engagement and assessment of the civil situation and population support either from specialised formed teams or those created for the operation. These teams are not to be used in the HUMINT role and if they are, must not be additionally tasked for Civ Mil activities or actions.

(8) Other IO Information Related Capabilities (IRC) units or elements which may be tasked or accompany the CMO elements as part of an IRC combined effects team. These may include but are not limited to;

- (a) The Key Leader Engagement (KLE) cell will have a close relationship with the CMO elements as they will coordinate much of the interactions between any FE and those civilian leaders and persons of influence.
- (b) Psychological Operations (PSYOP) teams may also be with CMO

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elements to either distribute or provide for delivery that IO product and messages for the same audience that Civ Mil activities apply to. CMO elements may also be tasked to distribute this product as they meet with the civilian agencies and individuals allocated to so engage.

- (c) Light Electronic Warfare Teams (LEWT) may accompany CMO elements as a means of gaining movement within the AO. They may also be there to provide early warning in the event of hostile activities against FE.
- (d) Public Affairs (PA) officers or teams may also accompany or request information for input into their products and stories in spt of the FE IO campaign. They may include Combat Camera members or staff or they may request imagery as part of CMO activities.
- (e) Those staff which exist in or on the formation HQs which can facilitate civil engagement either through personal contacts (such as family, educational or business etc ties), secular contacts, medicinal contacts or any interest contacts that may provide meeting opportunity.

(9) The Dept of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) has a special relationship with defence. It may provide a liaison offr, a Policy Advisor (POLAD) to the higher headquarters who advises the COMD on strategic issues such as diplomatic negotiations, demarche exchanges, adherence to agreements such as the Montreaux document or Ottawa agreement and national policy interpretation. They cannot provide operational or tactical direction nor should they interpose in the manoeuvre of combat forces.

(10) Interactions with other Civil Agencies. These are defined as those non-military organisations which will exist in the battle space and may be made up on International Organisations (IOs) such as the UN, ICRC, Amnesty International etc, Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) such as WADE, RAID, FADE, MWC, LoRD etc., and Other Government Agencies (OGA) such as AFP, DSTO, ABF etc. It is a misconception that the Military Land Force entrusted with enforcing the UN mandated actions can also direct or task those civil agencies which are or may soon be present in the AO. The military should never task nor expect that those civ agencies will do the land forces bidding and can only set the security conditions, which enables them to do the work that they wish to do. Dialog and open communications must always be sought but influencing or exploitive actions on behalf of the force is never to be planned. Their neutrality, impartiality and organisational concern for humanity must always be respected.

b. **Scheme of Manoeuvre.** CMO will be conducted across all phases. TG 667.2

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CMO elms and those FE tasks with CMO effects will deploy to support TG 667.2 operations during all phases with TG 667.2 conducting a handover of CMO activities to the mandated UN or HN FoF in Phase 3.

- (1) **PH 0 Shaping.** CMO elms conduct initial liaison with key stakeholders, including HN Govt, OGA and UN OSOCC. These tasks will be conducted under the guidance and coordination of the CJTF 667 CMO. Conduct mission planning for the possible assistance in population movements including the returning of IDP/Refugees. Participate in the refinement of target lists with Joint Effects and Targeting (JET) and the provision of information for the KLE engagement strategy. Gain Situational Awareness and Situational Understanding (SASU) of key civilian and humanitarian issues, threats and opportunities IOT identify potential CMO activities within the AO.
- (2) **PH 1 Lodgement.** TG 667.2 G9 will deploy with HQ TG 667.2. G9 will coordinate initial assistance and response with OGA, OSOCC, IO/NGO. Allocation of CMO assets throughout the AO is as follows:
 - (a) TG 667.2 – G9 CMO Dir (O6) and Staff,
 - (b) TG 667.2 – G9 CMO PSO (O5), Staff Brch and 1 x TST (-)
 - (c) TG 667.2.1 (**X** BDE) – 1 x CIMIC TST (26);
 - (d) TG 667.2.2 (**Y** BDE) – 1 x CIMIC TST (26);
 - (e) TG 667.2.3 (16 AVN BDE) – 1 x CML Tm (from 667.2 TST).
- (3) **PH 2 Neutralise.** Refine initial CIMIC assessments and continue Key Stakeholder Engagement (KSE). Conduct civil engagement with available HN civil authorities. Facilitate the delivery of key IO messages to local population. BPT facilitate and control the delivery of ILSA. Coord with OGA, OSOCC, and IO/NGO for the management of refugees/IDP's within the AO. In conjunction with OGA and OSOCC plan and facilitate the restoration of key essential services within capacity.
- (4) **PH 3 Transition and Redeployment.** Conduct handover of all TG 667.2 CMO activities which will be purposely planned and undertaken to NOT build in dependencies, to other agencies and the mandated UN or HN FoF.

11. CMO Grouping and Tasks.

- a. **Grouping.** HQ TG 667.2 G9 Main
 - (1) **Tasks all phases:**
 - (a) Respond to HQ CJTF 667 tasking;

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- (b) Establish technical control (TECHCON) with all CMO assets within the AO;
- (c) Conduct collaborative interagency planning with OGA for stabilisation and transition activities;
- (d) Develop relationships with key stakeholder networks (Tribal, HN, OSOCC, and IO/NGO); and
- (e) Develop and maintain an OFFICIAL security and Belesia entry procedures briefing pack for IO/NGOs.

b. **Grouping:** TU 667.2.1 (O/O), TU 667.2.2 and TU 667.2.3.

- (1) **PH 0 Preparatory Tasks:**
 - (a) Prepare for deployment;
 - (b) Commence key stakeholder identification and engagement;
 - (c) Confirm through KSE the locations of UN agencies with IO and NGO;
 - (d) Coordinate with G4 the HA needs for ILSA; and
 - (e) Establish baseline data through all source reporting in support of effects including:
 - (i) Key civil infrastructure;
 - (ii) Status of essential services; and
 - (iii) Humanitarian situation.
 - (f) Identify suitable civilian evacuation routes that are de-conflicted from initial activities and advise HQ G9 Main;
 - (g) Capabilities and dispositions of key civil stakeholders (HN/IO/NGO); and
 - (h) Support the delivery of IO messaging to the local population.
- (3) **PH 2 Decisive Tasks:**
 - (a) Support the conduct of mission planning.
 - (b) Commence tactical CIMIC assessments in support of effects including:

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- (i) Key civil infrastructure;
- (ii) Status of essential services;
- (iii) Humanitarian situation; and
- (iv) Capabilities and dispositions of key civil stakeholders (HN/IO/NGO).

(c) Identify and engage with key stakeholders within AO IAW the liaison architecture to inform KLE and targeting.

(d) Support the delivery of IO messaging to the Belesia population.

(e) Report incidences of alleged atrocities and Human Rights abuses and secure the location.

(f) Facilitate the release and distribution of appropriately de-classified information to key stakeholders.

(g) BPT spt Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation and Reintegration (DDRR) (FRAGO TBI). Tasks may include but are not limited to:

- (i) Disarming all mandated armed groups and individuals IOT support DDR plan and the TG 667.2 mandate;
- (ii) Influencing the population to support the disarmament requirement by disseminating authorised and approved DDR IO themes and messages;
- (iii) Identifying suitable disarmament /demobilisation sites, collect, store, and secure all confiscated weapons;
- (iv) Securing Panay Police armouries, weapons and critical infrastructure;
- (v) Receipting surrendered/seized small arms and light weapons (SALW), storage and security of surrendered/seized SALW and EO/IED components in suitable storage facilities, including maintaining an inventory of surrendered weapons

(h) BPT to assist in the movement of disarmed combatants to demobilisation sites;

(i) BPT transport weapons from disarmament sites to final disposal destination;

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- (j) BPT conduct biometric enrolling (subject to approval);
- (k) BPT detain and secure individuals accused of serious criminal crimes and release or transfer to appropriate authorities;
- (l) BPT support requests for critical infrastructure repair after a Request for Assistance (RFA) approval and report details of effects delivered;
- (m) BPT facilitate the delivery and distribution of ILSA IAW para 4c; and
- (n) BPT provide appropriately de-classified briefings to IO/NGO regarding route conditions, movement control measures and security coord protocols and mechanisms that are applicable to the entry of their land, sea and air assets.

(4) PH 3 Transition and Stability Tasks

- (a) Continue tactical CIMIC assessments in support of effects including updates on:
 - (i) Key civil infrastructure and essential services;
 - (ii) Reconstruction and development tasks;
 - (iii) Humanitarian situation; and
 - (iv) HN/IO/NGO – HA, reconstruction, development, capabilities and disposition.
- (b) Maintain engagement with HN/IO/NGOs and CSO within CJOA.
- (c) Facilitate release of authorised information to key stakeholders.
- (d) BPT support requests for ILSA and critical infrastructure repair after a Request for Assistance (RFA) approval and report details of effects delivered.
- (e) BPT facilitate repatriation of refugees and displaced persons.
- (f) BPT transition responsibilities/tasks to mandated UN FoF.
- (g) Report on all ERW requirements as requested.
- (h) Conduct handover of all TG 667.2 CMO activities to the legitimate national authority or authorised agencies.

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12. Coordinating Instructions.

- a. **Stabilization Aid Funds/Commanders' Emergency Relief Program (SAF/CERP).** TG 667.2 currently does not have an allocation of funding to implement Consent Winning Activities (CWA) and Quick Impact Projects (QIP). A request for funding has been sent to HQJOC and further details will be released by FRAGO.
- b. **Compensation Claims.** All civilian claims for compensation are to be investigated at the command level prior to submission to the HQ TG 667.2 G06. Commanders are not authorised to agree to pay compensation claims.
- c. **Locally Employed Civilians (LEC).** Opportunities will exist for contracting LEC to fulfil certain functions in support of TG 667.2 efforts and base support plans. The employment of LEC is to consider the effect upon the integrity of local community structures and delivery of essential services. Formation S9 staff are to ensure coordination with HQ TG 667.2 G9 Main during LEC employment planning phase. Guidance on payment rates is TBI, but shall conform within existing SOFA. HQ TG 667.2 G9 approval is required to employ LEC from: Police, Fire, Ambulance, Border Protection, Education Dept, Water Dept or Health Dept. This also includes specialists e.g. police/teachers and administrators.
- d. **Operations Assessment (OA).** All CMO reporting including SITREPs, Incident Reports, CMO SITREPS and Quicklook Storyboards will be utilised in support of the TG 667.2 OA process.
- e. **Request for Assistance (RFA).** The following procedures are to be used for RFA planning and execution:
 - (1) In the first instance formations are to ensure civilian agencies maximize use of their resources (either integral or contracted) before accepting RFA for consideration.
 - (2) Formations are authorized to execute RFA as long as they do not prejudice the TG 667.2 mission and can be executed within formation capabilities.
 - (3) RFA that require external support are to be passed through TG 667.2 G9 for assessment, coordination and de-confliction with other civilian agencies and CJTF resources.
- f. **Humanitarian Standards for Encampment Site Selection and Operation.** TG 667.2 will not be responsible for establishing IDP or refugee camps. Responsibility for the establishment of IDP/refugee camps resides with the UN humanitarian community. However, TG 667.2 may be required to support the movement and route security if requested by the IO / NGOs through the OSOCC.
- g. **CMO Measures of Effect.** There must also be continuous assessment of the civil dimension in order to determine measures of effectiveness (MOE) and the

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progress of the mission. This ongoing assessment task is performed by CIMIC assessment teams and monitored by the CMO staff. MOE refer to observable, preferably quantifiable, subjective indicators that an activity is proceeding along a desired path. A commander uses MOE to determine whether an operation is succeeding in achieving the goals of the operation according to the mission. MOE should be developed as a product of mission analysis. MOE will differ for every mission and for different phases of a mission. As the commander and staff identify specified, implied, and critical tasks, they should define what constitutes successful completion of each task. They decide how the MOE will be identified, reported and validated. They determine what action will be taken when the MOE is achieved, as well as contingency plans in case MOE are not achieved according to the original plan. MOE are not necessarily fixed and can be adjusted as the situation changes. See appendix 7.

- h. **CMO Normality Indicators.** Normality Indicators (NI) serve to measure trends and progress in the recovery of a civil society to an improved quality of life. NI measure the level of development of the civilian condition to reduce the level of dependency on the military force by the civil population and civil authorities. Data should be objective, quantifiable and collected systematically. The force commander must exploit all sources of data measuring the quality of life and recovery of the local population in the AO, as well as the effectiveness of military operations that assist in this recovery. Direct and indirect MOE and NI should be jointly developed with civilian agencies to reinforce unity of purpose and effort in civil– military activities. It is the interface with the civilian sector that provides the means for collecting data that contributes to normality. NI should be SMART (specific, measurable, attainable, results oriented and time based), objective and comparable from occasion to occasion. Measuring only that which is easily measured, will give a false impression. Robust information management systems are required to support the delivery of worthwhile MOE and NI. See appendix 8.

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

13. **Civilian Resource Requirements.** Arrangements will be required to provide a minimum of one APOD/SPOD access to the AO which must remain serviceable, with apron or wharf space, to be provided to IO/NGO for delivery of HA. Ideally, this will be a separate facility from the military. It should come complete with its own aircraft / vessel handling and refuelling facilities as well as transport facilities for loading cargo.

14. **Military Resource Requirements.**

- a. **ILSA.** Immediate Life Sustaining Assistance is defined as the provision of small scale emergency supplies and services which are needed as a matter of extreme urgency (in- extremis) to save life or to prevent serious suffering. The provision of ILSA may be conducted without approval from TG 667.2 HQ where it can be provided within formation resources and or capability. In the main, ILSA comprises the provision of water and food however, depending on the circumstances it may also include; shelter, medical assistance (life, limb or

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eyesight), transport, rescue and repair of essential infrastructure.

- b. ILSA should be provided at 'arm's length' whenever possible with the direct distribution to beneficiaries undertaken by IO/NGO, HN agencies, CSO, village or tribal leader. Direct distribution of ILSA by TG 667.2 FE should only be undertaken in-extremis and as a last resort and may be sourced from TG 667.2 supply chain. ILSA stocks will be made available to TG 667.2 formations from PH 1 for emergency distribution to the population as required. Provision of ILSA should be in response to immediate and life threatening requirement and should not displace any current arrangements in place by NGOs. Under no circumstances should ILSA become the main source of provisioning for the population.
- c. **Bottled Water.** Water (bulk or by 5, 10 or 20 litre military jerry can) **is not** to be provided for from TG 667.2 log stocks. Commercially procured plastic 5 or 10 litre collapsible water containers in either blue or clear colour and bottled drinking water may be authorised where thirst may become the possible cause of death within the population. It will be carried in unit A and B Ech in sufficient bulk quantities and provided for upon auth from the unit Comd. Water for bathing/cleaning will **not** be provided.
- d. **Foodstuffs.** Military rations / CRP **is not** to be provided for from TG 667.2 log stocks. Limited quantities of HUMRAT prepacked high energy supplements may be available and are to be used only as a means of having an immediate relief of starvation. It will be carried in unit A and B Ech in sufficient bulk quantities and provided for upon auth from the unit Comd.
- e. **Shelter.** Shelter **is not** to be provided for unless it is necessary to provide an immediate life sustaining assistance. FE tentage or canvas, especially that which is easily identified as military (coloured green, brown or camouflaged) must never be used to provide shelter to the population. Where shelter is required to protect from the elements it must be of a civilian pattern, coloured blue or white and set up away from any possible military associated facilities. Blue tarpaulins, poles and cordage will be carried in formation B Ech in sufficient bulk quantities and provided for upon auth from the formation Comd.
- f. **Medical.** Medical care and use of med supplies is to be strictly limited and is only to be used in those extreme cases where life, limb or eyesight is in danger of being lost. The application of med supplies is to be limited to those members of the FE who are trained and can provide the necessary care and support given the conditions as found in the AO. Civilians who enter the chain of evacuation due to FE actions, must be turned over to the civil authority at the earliest opportunity. The SMO or G07 will provide the necessary decision making arrangements with the formation Comd.
- g. **Transportation.** Pop movement and transportation **is not** to be done utilising any military vehicle of TG 667.2. Pop movement is to be carried out with civilian pattern vehs and should be made off of the designated MSR. Should a requirement exist to provide life sustaining transport then the use of clearly

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identified ambulances / medevac ac may be requested. The auth of this will require Formation Comd approval. Under no circumstances should A vehs or armoured veh ambulances be used.

- h. **Rescue.** Any requirement to facilitate any rescue should only be undertaken where life is in danger or the pop was forced into a position of requiring rescue owing to the unintended consequences of FE activities. Rescue may be required where the pop has, in moving out of the way of FE manoeuvre, inadvertently become entrapped in the obstacles or minefields of either side. Such rescue activities will require the unit COMDs approval and may extend to the use of TG 667.2 resources such as breaching and mine detection eqpt but done only after the area has been secured and cleared of en threat. The rescue activities are only to be undertaken after the force has achieved its assignment and any rescue effort must not impede the military mission.
- i. **Maintenance.** Any requirement to complete work on civilian infrastructure such as; power generators and electricity lines, water pumps, filtration units and distribution systems, sewage and sanitation works, and medical / education facilities may only be undertaken if;
 - (1) The damage to these facilities were a result of FE actions or fires,
 - (2) The damage is to public facilities and not private or commercial interests,
 - (3) The maint undertaken is sufficient to render serviceability and not surpass the normal standard for the area or facilities.
 - (4) That works has been tasked via the CMO / CIMIC team as part of the Effects battle rhythm, approved by the Comd and detailed as an OPS FRAGO or TASKO.

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

15. **CMO Coordinating and Liaison Architecture.** TECHCON will be established by HQ TG 667.2 G9 from PH 1 to all TG 667.2 Bde S9 staff to assist in overall coordination of CMO activity and allocation of resources. TG 667.2 G9 will establish comms to the CJTF CMOC in General Santos City. TG 667.2 G9 will remain in loc with HQ TG 667.2 for all phases.

16. **Reports and Returns.** All TG 667.2 Bde S9 are to ensure daily CMO SITREP is compiled and forwarded to HQ TG 667.2 NLT 2100H daily. The format for the CMO SITREP is at Appendix 5. Significant CIMIC contacts are to be recorded as CHATREPS and forwarded on completion NLT 12h following contact. Layout is noted at Appendix 6.

17. **Communications.** CMO elements requiring interactions with the HN Govt, UN Agencies or IO/NGOs must come complete with civilian mobile phones, network data devices and civilian means laptop computers to be able to effectively pass and collect information from these sources. As a minimum, elements must have the following communications means;

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- a. Civ Telecom land line phone with answering device and facsimile capabilities. These may need to be source in country given the power supply incompatibility with the AS power system.
- b. Civ Mobile phones for voice, text, and NGO chat app usage. The SIM cards must be sourced in country and care must be exercised given the FIS collection capabilities within that system.
- c. CIMIC PC laptops with non military email accounts as established prior to in country operations. These can be connected to the data communications system via network devices but will also require local telecom data network SIM cards. This LAN system is to have backup capability and multifunction device capability to allow printing and scanning of documents and IO products.
- d. Those CMO elements should also come with a number of civilian two way hand held radios compatible with those used by NGOs and must have a charging capability for those power packs.
- e. Elements must come with or be provided with, Military PRR and MBTR radios for internal sigs and patrol comms. SOIs and CEOIs to be provided from the HQs elements.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Appendices:

- 1. Country Brief
- 2. Map of Panay City and Provincial Boundaries.
- 3. Map of Pop Tribal Demographics and Boundaries.
- 4. Civil Contacts in country.
- 5. CMO SITREP Format.
- 6. CMO CHATREP Format.
- 7. CIMIC MOE.
- 8. CIMIC Normalcy Indicators.

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Appendix 1 to
ANNEX Q TO TG
667.2 OPORD
Dated XXXXX

COUNTRY BRIEF (DRAFT FRAMEWORK)

BACKGROUND

1. The island of Panay was formerly a possession of the Skolkan Empire along with Palawan, Cebu, Negros, and Bohol. After the empire's collapse in the early 20th century, Panay declared independence but was subsequently absorbed into the Belesian Federation after a period as a protectorate of Torrike, former seat of the Skolkan Empire. Panay's two main population centres are Caticlan in the north and Iloilo in the south. Panay is also home to the San Rafael Cerium mine, where one of the world's few concentrated rare earth mineral deposits is located. Since its shift from gold ore extraction to Cerium mining, San Rafael has both created opportunities and exacerbated local ethno-social tensions as well as becoming a focus of regional power competition.

2. Panay has never been a willing member of the Belesian Federation being culturally distinct owing to its history of Skolkan influence. Over the years, strong separatist sentiment has periodically escalated into violent revolt, a frequent and costly irritant for the Belesian government. Despite this, they have been loth to grant independence, partly from unwillingness to compromise the territorial integrity of their young state, and partly owing to the revenues generated by the San Rafael mine. These tensions culminated in the 1972 massacre of some one hundred and forty four during ethnic clashes with the Belesian paramilitary police officers. This event, dubbed "The Ash Wednesday Massacres", resulted in Panay being granted autonomous home rule. Relations between the local Panay government and Belesian central authorities have yet to be normalised, and Ash Wednesday has become a frequent catchcry for separatist elements in Panay.

3. Panayan internal politics are no less fraught. The mine, which is integral to the local economy, is largely worked by Olvanan immigrants who have to some extent monopolised mining employment on the island. While the mine itself is owned by Panay (and therefore nominally by Belesia), much of the plant and infrastructure was acquired through Olvanan investment. The Olvanan immigrant population is the most sizeable ethnic minority, making up some 32% of the island's total population, having arrived in Panay shortly after WWII as indentured labour for the San Rafael mine during its gold extraction period. A small Olvanan diaspora, mainly concentrated in Caticlan around Olvanatown and the recently established Olvanan trade mission set up to safeguard Olvanan interests in San Rafael, is the next largest ethnic minority. The remaining bulk of the island's population identify as Panayan.

ETHNIC GROUPS

4. Panayan: The Panayan people share a common heritage with the broader Belesian population, but are culturally distinct. This is partly owing to their position near the Western hinterland of the archipelago which has a high concentration of unmixed indigenous tribes, but is mostly to do with the fact that Panay is majority Christian, the island having been largely insulated from the spread of Islam through the region in the 15th century by Skolkan rule. This has led to significant differences in culture, custom, and world view between the

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inhabitants of Panay and the rest of the Belesian Federation. The majority of Panayans feel marginalised by the majority Islamic Belesian state, and despite a heavy Christian presence within the Belesian military, the Christians of Panay feel disadvantaged and sometimes persecuted by their Muslim neighbours. This disaffection has allowed the Visayan People's Front (VPF), a separatist Christian armed insurgent group, to maintain a strong presence on the island.

5. **Torbian:** The Torbian diaspora has a long history in Belesia in general and Panay in particular, many Belesians having mixed Torbian ancestry. The Torbian population on Panay, however, has failed to integrate into Panayan society. Given their size, making up one third of the local population, Torbians on Panay have been a largely self-sustaining, self-referential community. While their original status as indentured labour is no longer in effect, the Torbians on Panay remain an underclass, being economically disadvantaged even relative to the high levels of youth and rural poverty in the region, and driven into insularity by periodic racial scapegoating over their long history on the island. This has led to the Torbian population demonstrating unusually high levels of ethnic tribalism, which acts to drive a further wedge between them and the indigenous population of Panay.

6. **Olvanan:** The Olvanan diaspora in Belesia possesses disproportionate social and economic power, and the Olvanan minority on Panay is no exception. Despite making up only a small percentage of Panay's population, Olvanans own a sizeable chunk of the island's wealth and are significantly overrepresented within the island's educated, business and property owning middle class. This has led to a long history of mistrust and resentment between the Panayan and Olvanan populations, not helped by the history of antagonism between their two nations. These tensions have been further exacerbated by the recent upsurge in Olvanan activity on the island, the Olvanan government having invested heavily in roads, ports, and other mine related infrastructure. This investment has come at the cost of punishing royalties and loan repayments overseen by the recently established Olvanan trade mission in Caticlan. The mine, Olvanatown, and especially the trade mission, have become symbolic targets for Panayan resentment of the far more prosperous Olvanan minority.

POLITICAL AND SECURITY — INTERNAL

7. The autonomous government of Panay is a small, beleaguered, and highly corrupt institution with a poor record in delivering services, especially to the Olvanan community centred on the San Rafael mine. Poor governance and lack of interest has resulted in the Panayan government having little to no monopoly of force outside Iloilo and Roxas. The tense nature of relations with Belesia has meant that not only has the BF been extremely unwilling to involve itself in Panayan affairs at any level, it has also resulted in the island being effectively cut off from services and other benefits available to Federation members. Conversely, significant revenues from the San Rafael mine flow out to the BF government as part of the home rule agreement, and this has led to increased levels of resentment amongst Panayans towards the rest of Belesia. This coupled with the memory of The Ash Wednesday Massacres has made the Belesian authorities deeply reluctant to intervene overtly in Panayan affairs.

8. The Roman Catholic Church is a major player in Panay, being a de facto provider of many services a more functional government would ordinarily supply. The RCC has strong and deep

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roots within most Panayan communities both religious and secular, and its international character has led to some suspicion that factions within the local cathedral communities might be partisan actors or at least logistical links for Olvana and Torbia.

9. Given the marginalisation of the Olvanan population on Panay, the Olvanan community has become largely self-sufficient in terms of service delivery and security. Localised committees organise essential services such as garbage collection and education, and what little policing and security which exists is administered via small localised militias formed from past and present private security contractors hired either by the Olvanan trade mission or the historical owners of the mine. This has led to what is effectively a Olvanan enclave in the immediate environs of the mine, with smaller satellite enclaves existing in the major population centres.

10. The Olvanan trade mission represents a syndicate of Olvanan SOEs which, between them, own the major port facilities in both Caticlan and Roxas, the main trunk roads linking these ports with the San Rafael mining complex, and large gated precincts in Caticlan, Roxas, and San Rafael in which technical and trade personnel, mostly Olvanans, are housed. They also have major interests in the power distribution and generation networks and telecommunications infrastructure of Panay. This unusually heavy level of investment arises from the fact that the San Rafael mine makes up a significant percentage (12%) of Olvana's total rare earth metal inflows, the securing of which is a key Olvanan strategic goal. The segregated nature of the Olvanan footprint, and the relative prosperity of Olvanans in Panay, is a major source of tension and conflict.

11. Given Panay's position near the western extremity of Belesia, the island has always acted as a nexus for regional licit and illicit trade. Crime levels in Belesia are considered high, and Panay is no exception. The principle criminal enterprises involve smuggling of people, goods, and/or illicit drugs. Local crime syndicates, Olvanan Black Societies, and the Tantoco Cartel are highly active in the region. The traffic in drugs, uncustomed goods, and labour slaves (mostly Olvanan) is estimated to be worth over \$1 billion dollars per annum. It can sometimes be difficult to disambiguate Olvanan and Panayan criminal organisations from legitimate centres of power, especially at a local level.

12. The Visayan People's Front is a Christian separatist insurgent militia committed to establishing an independent entity composed of the islands of Panay, Negros, Cebu, and Bohol. Whilst the Panayan government is not one hundred percent aligned with their goals, there is sufficient crossover, especially with regard to ethno-religious commonalities, to make the relationship between Panayan authorities and the VPF highly ambiguous. Additionally, given the general poverty of the island and its role in illicit trade routes, the VPF has developed a significant degree of interoperability with local and Olvanan criminal syndicates, often turning to smuggling and piracy for fundraising purposes. Along with the heavy presence of Wagner Group PMCs, VPF militants are frequently used as armed security for various criminal and even some legitimate groups across Panay.

13. The Wagner Group has a heavy footprint in Panay. The general inability of government to maintain law and order unaided, combined with the Wagner Group being the principal contractor providing security for the Olvanan SOEs associated with the San Rafael mine, means that Wagner Group PMCs are a significant armed body existing within the security matrix of the island of Panay. Given that most Wagner Group operatives in the region are of Olvanan descent, there is significant crossover between the Olvanan immigrant community and Wagner

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Group personnel.

14. The Red Tigers Black Society is a major link in the illicit trade route that runs through access points north and south of Palawan, as well as elsewhere. The Red Tigers are suspected to be in direct competition with the Tantoco Cartel for control of the arms, drugs, and people trafficking markets within the region. The leadership of the Red Tigers is unknown, but given the general character of the group, their head is thought to be a member of the Olvanan community.

15. The Tantoco Cartel is the second of the large transnational criminal organisations operating in the area, with significant suspected drug and weapons markets within and around the San Rafael mine and Olvanan workers' ghetto. Their leadership is also unidentified, but strong suspicions rest on the local police department. It is also thought that the Tantoco Cartel is the vector for most Wagner Group recruitment which occurs off island.

POLITICAL AND SECURITY — EXTERNAL

16. The Local Panayan Government has a UN mandate for independence, but is in reality a semi-autonomous member of the Belesian Federation. This complicates Panay's external security situation, creating a triangle effect between Panay, Belesia, and the external power in question.

17. At this point in time, Belesia is embroiled in an EEZ dispute with neighbouring South Torbia, a major aspect of which concerns the San Rafael mine. This has led to a number of minor cross maritime border incidents between Panay/Belesia and South Torbia.

18. Belesian relations with Olvana, a regional hegemon within easy reach, are highly complex. On the one hand, Olvanan investment is eagerly sought after by all of the islands of the Belesian Federation, including and especially Panay. On the other hand, however, the strategic interests of the two nations often clash, and Olvana and Belesia are currently embroiled in maritime territorial disputes, both nations frequently conducting provocative FONOPS. Panay itself is increasingly at odds with Olvana over what is perceived to be Olvana's rapacious financial exploitation of the San Rafael mine.

19. Belesia's relationship with the small island nation of Gabal is described as good. Gabal's neutrality and relative unimportance help to facilitate this.

20. In the broader region, North and South Torbia are experiencing a periodic cooling of their perennial conflict. This has freed South Torbia to pursue its other claims and disputes and is the cause of South Torbia's current intense focus on its disputes with Belesia/Panay. Belesia is one of the few nations which has cordial relations with North Torbia.

21. Olvana's expansionist strategy has ruffled the feathers of many of its regional neighbours, including Belesia and South Torbia, but there is little expectation at present of these tensions leading to a major conflict in the immediate future. Having said that, Olvanan military activity has ramped up significantly over recent years. At present, Olvana and North Torbia are currently conducting Ex RISEN SWORD, a biannual interoperability and cooperation exercise, in the South China Sea west of Palawan Island and just outside Belesia's EEZ.

22. Belesia has generally good relationships with the US and its allies, specific economic or territorial disputes aside. At present, there is a high level of information and personnel exchange

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between the Belesian military and western powers active in the region including Australia, New Zealand, and the USA. Panay itself maintains close ties with Torrike, though these are generally considered to consist more of a sense of historical kinship rather than any more tangible relationship of exchange.

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CIVIL CONTACTS in JFAO

1. Host Nation Government Contacts

- a. Chief Minister
- b. Deputy Chief Minister
- c. Minister of Health
- d. Chief of Police
- e. Chief of Fire & Emergency Services

2. UN Organisations and contacts

- a. SRSG
- b. UNHCR
- c. UNWFP
- d. UNPKO
- e. UNPOL

3. International Organisations and contacts

- a. ICRC
- b. Amnesty International
- c. The Holy Roman Catholic Church

4. Non Government Organisations

- a. RAID "Reconstruction Assistance for International Disasters".
 - (1) Provision of emergency shelter & Camps RAID.NGO@worldwideweb.org
 - (2) This NGO uses a combination of funding means, public and govt to provide workers and infrastructure to both construct camps and run them for displaced pop. Provides Temp bldg, tentage, limited camp power and toilets.
- b. FADE "Food Assistance in the Disaster Environment".
 - (1) Provision of food FADE.NGO@worldwideweb.org
 - (2) This NGO uses a combination of funding means, public and govt to provide workers and foodstuffs to both supply food, refrigeration and cooking facilities to feed a displaced pop. Provides food, cooking, kitchens, refrigeration and limited water for cleaning and cooking
- c. WADE "Water Assistance in the Disaster Environment"
 - (1) Provision of water WADE.NGO@worldwideweb.org
 - (2) This NGO uses a combination of funding means, public and govt to provide workers and distribution systems for the winning, treating, storing

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and distribution of fresh and clean water to displaced pop. Provides water, purification, dist lines, storage, plumbing & heating

d. MWC "Medicos Without Concern"

- (1) Provision of health services MWC.NGO@worldwideweb.org
- (2) This NGO uses public funding only to provide medical staff and facilities for the evacuation and treatment of medical and health issues to a displaced pop. Provides Health services

e. LoRD "Logistics Relief in Disasters"

- (1) Provision of transport and material LORD.NGO@worldwideweb.org
- (2) This NGO uses govt funding to provide staff, vehicles, material and facilities for the movement and handling of stores, fuel and logistics to a displaced pop. Specialises in transport, maintenance, veh lift, recovery, mobile spt eqpt.

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CMO SITREP

SUBJ:FM/TG/ COMPONENT CMO SITREP XX/XX, DTG XXXX to DTG XXXX

1. AO/REGION/PROVINCE
2. PREVIOUS 24HRS:
 - a. OVERVIEW OF AO STATUS, INCLU SECURITY, EMERGENCY SERVICES AND GOVERNENCE SECTOR.
 - b. MAJOR ACTIVITIES – SUMMARY OF INCIDENTS / EVENTS THAT Affected THE CIVIL POPULATION
 - c. CIVIL INTERACTION WITH AUS MILITARY FORCES.
 - d. KNOWN CIVIL INTERACTION WITH OTHER FE ELEMENTS BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL.
 - e. CIVIL ATTITUDES / ACTIONS TOWARDS AUS FE.
 - f. CIVIL ATTITUDES TOWARDS OTHER FE.
 - g. OGA/NGO/IO ACTIVITY, INCLU REQ FOR ASSISTANCE.
 - h. POPULATION MOVEMENT AND EMERGENCY AID / PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS.
 - i. MAIN ISSUES / CONCERNs WITHIN AO.
 - j. DETAIL ANY TRENDS WITHIN CIVIL DIMENSION.
 - k. IDENTIFIED OPPORTUNITIES FOR AUS INFLUENCE.
 - l. STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT CULTURAL FACILITIES / LOCATIONS.
3. NEXT 24HRS:
 - a. ANTICIPATED BOTH MILITARY AND CIVIL ACTIVITIES /INCIDENTS/ EVENTS THAT MAY EFFECT/INFLUENCE THE CIVIL POPULATION.
 - b. PLANNED CIMIC ENGAGEMENT/ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES
 - c. KNOWN CIVIL INTERACTION WITH OTHER FE BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL.
 - d. EXPECTED MOVEMENT OF POPULATION AND EFFECT ON AUS FE.

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Appendix 6 to ANNEX**Q TO TG 667.2****OPORD Dated****XXXXXX****CMO CHATREP**

SUBJECT	CHATREP 038 OF 111050K JUL15 – SUBJECT HEADER
FROM	C/S, Unit and sub-unit
TO	For action Unit / Fmn C/S
A Collector	Military member; (Name / Position & DOB/ ID)
B Info Provider	The civil actor; Name / Position / Contact details
C Location	GR / address loc collected, GR and address loc of subject reference
D DTG	DTG collected (discussion)
E DTG	DTG report written
F Brief	Brief description of incident event or topic discussed BLUF (Summary, key points of relevance) DISCUSSION Points discussed in the civilian providers words Questions asked or points made by collector State facts and perceptions reported not the collectors opinions COLLECTORS COMMENT (if required)
G Source	First-hand account (the person has first-hand knowledge) Yes/No
H Other source	Has the information come via other POC?
I Identification	POC name and contact details
J Discussion	Discussion initiated by provider or collector Y/N
K Language	Language used
L Interpreter	Identification and skill or language level

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APPENDIX 7
TO ANNEX Q
TO TG 667.2 OPORD
Dated XXXXX

CMO MEASURES OF EFFECT

1. CIMIC MOE. CIMIC MOE is to be developed in conjunction with major civilian participants to ensure transition success. MOE guidelines will focus on the following sectoral areas:

- a. Water winning, treatment and supply,
- b. Electricity generation and supply,
- c. Shelter and site planning,
- d. Food and Nutrition aid,
- e. Waste and sanitation,
- f. Health services,
- g. Public security,
- h. Infrastructure,
- i. Communications,
- j. Transportation,
- k. Economics, and
- l. Agriculture.

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CMO Normality Indicators

1. CIMIC Normality Indicators. Normality indicators to be grouped into categories and adapted to meet the changing requirements, e.g., political, socio-economic, cultural and technological. Guidance for development and reporting of NI listed below:

- a. Staple availability;
- b. Water;
- c. Power;
- d. Medical (Civilian);
- e. Law and Order;
- f. Infrastructure;
- g. Civil communication (freedom of speech, incl media);
- h. Education;
- i. Non-staple consumer goods available;
- j. Inflation;
- k. Sport and social activity;
- l. Unemployment;
- m. Religious;
- n. Infant mortality; and
- o. Agriculture.
- p. Sensitive Areas.
- q. FEG are to make all efforts to avoid cultural and environmentally sensitive areas.
- r. Cultural sites and environmentally sensitive areas – TBC.

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ENGINEER SUPPORT

References:

- A. TG667.2 OPORD 01 (Operation Cerium Steal) B. Belesian (BX) Country Study
- C. Olvanan (OV) Country Study

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU.

1. Situation.

- a. Background. See paragraph 1 of the main body of TG667.2 OPORD 01 (Ref A) and Annex B - Intelligence.
- b. General. Engineer operations for TG667.2 requires a rapid build-up of Mobility (M)/Counter mobility (CM)/Survivability (S)/General Engineer (GE) capacity across the Combined, Joint, Interagency domain.
- c. Purpose. The purpose of this Annex is to describe the Scheme of Engineer Operations on Panay during Ph 2 and 3 of OP CERIUM STEAL and provide Engineer guidance at the Component Command (Div) level.
- d. Engineer Intelligence. Refer to Annex B to TG667.2 OPORD 01.
- e. Operational Areas.
 - (1) TG667.2 Area of Operations (AO FANNING). The AO FANNING is comprised of the landmass, airspace and territorial waters (12NM) of Panay Island.
- f. Terrain and Man-Made Features. See Appendix 4 to Annex B of Ref A.
- g. Civil Considerations
 - (1) As an island nation, BX relies on a network of regular maritime ferry and domestic air services to move personnel and freight amongst its various islands. Typically, the maritime ferry services are the primary means of inter-island transportation. BX roads networks on the larger islands are mainly paved. However, there are numerous unimproved dirt and gravel roads throughout the area, especially on the smaller islands, or islands with a small population. Disrupting mobility would be easily affected by damaging paved roads through the use of IEDs or cratering charges. Rural roads do not receive proper maintenance, leaving them susceptible to damage from the weather and neglect. The monsoonal season also has a drastic effect on the inland roads with communities at time being cut off and isolated during severe weather. For more details on BX terrain, see Ref B.
 - (2) Most of the region, particularly rural areas, cannot access all modern utilities such as potable water, electricity, and modern sewage systems. This will cause a reliance on military electrical, water and sanitation systems.
 - (3) Paramilitary, insurgent, and guerrilla forces operate in BX. This could lead to an increased use of IEDs in Panay, particularly on main highways and field landing strips, having a negative impact on mobility.
 - (4) BX contains a number of heavily populated areas such as the cities on

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Panay. Enemy operations in these areas could result in the Host Nation asking for engineers to provide survivability/force protection, and general engineering assistance.

- h. Enemy Engineer Forces. See Annex B Intelligence and OV Country Study (Ref C).
- i. Friendly Engineer Forces. See Belesian Country Study (Ref B).

2. **Mission**. TG667.2 Engineer Elements will provide Force Level Engineering effects to project, protect and sustain the Land Force on Panay.

3. **Execution**.

- a. Concept of Engineer Support. The Divisional engineer effort will be centrally planned and coordinated, and executed by the Divisional organic and assigned engineers. Theatre planning and coordination for engineer support will be provided by the Joint Force Engineer, supplemented by elements from 19 Chief Engineering Works. Divisional level engineering support will be provided by 6th Engineer Support Regiment (6 ESR) as part of TG667.2.
- b. Each Combat Bde within TG776.2 will have organic engineer support to provide intimate mobility/counter-mobility/survivability support. RAAF Airfield Engineers (65 Sqn) will provide intimate support to the APOD at Iloilo post lodgement through the Combat Support Squadrons assigned to each APOD. RAAF Airfield Engineers will remain OPCON to the CJTF 667 HQ, but may be assigned TACON to the relevant AO commander.
- c. HN engineering capability will be required during Ph 4 Transition operations to rebuild infrastructure damaged or destroyed during the conflict in Panay. This may include civilian contractors. The Joint Force Engineer will be responsible for coordinating all sustainability engineering support across the JFAO. Div Engineer will be responsible for coordination for all sustainability engineering operations within Panay.
- d. Scheme of Engineer Operations. TG667.2 Engineers will provide and synchronise mobility, counter-mobility, survivability, sustainability and general Engineer efforts to defeat OV forces and support BX civil authorities. The majority of planning effort will focus around Phases 2 and 3 of OP CERIUM STEAL.
- e. Priority of Div Engineer Effort by Phase.
 - (1) Phase 1 – Lodgement
 - (a) Support the establishment of a beachhead on Panay.
 - (b) Support the establishment of an APOD/SPOD in Iloilo.
 - (c) BPT conduct mobility/counter-mobility/survivability tasks ISO ground operations.
 - (2) Phase 2 – Neutralise
 - (a) Conduct mobility/counter-mobility/survivability tasks ISO ground operations.
 - (b) Conduct sustainment operations by maintaining Lines of

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- Communication (LoC). (c) Conduct battlefield clearance.
- (d) Conduct survivability tasks for key Div capabilities.
- (e) BPT conduct sustainability operations ISO RASO and Stability Operations.

(3) Phase 3 – Transition.

- (a) Conduct reconstruction tasks ISO capacity building. (b) Conduct battlefield clearance.
- (c) Support the handover of engineer sites and works to civil and military authorities of respective Host Nations.
- (d) Contribute to capacity building of Belesian security forces.
- (e) Support TG667.2 in the conduct of relief in place and transition to a follow-on force on Panay.
- (f) Support the withdrawal of TG667.2 forces.

f. Assignment of Additional Engineer Assets. Components will deploy with organic and assigned engineer units and assets. Engineer organizations are assigned as follows:

- (1) TG667.2. 6 ESR, 1 Int Bn (5 Coy for Geospatial support).
- (2) X BDE. X CER.
- (3) Y BDE. Y CER.
- (4) BX 12 MOT BDE. 12 ENGR Coy

g. Common Tasks.

- (1) Conduct combat engineering and general engineering support to assigned formation.
- (2) Maintain TG667.2 MSRs operational within assigned TAORs.
- (3) Coordinate Explosive Hazard information collection and counter-explosive hazard operations.
- (4) Be prepared to assist BX authorities with the repair of critical infrastructure that impacts TG667.2 operations.
- (5) Be prepared to coordinate engineer support for humanitarian assistance and to create a safe environment in Panay.
- (6) Liaise with Host Nation local engineers, and coordinate Host Nation engineer support in AO.

h. Specific Tasks.

- (1) 6 ESR.
 - (a) Establish TG667.2 policy, standards, and priorities for construction, facilities, and real estate utilisation.

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- (b) Establish TG667.2 environmental policy and standards.
- (c) Operate the Explosive Hazard Coordination Centre and reporting system.
- (d) Provide Div level engineer support to TG667.2, including permanent horizontal and vertical construction, pipeline repair and construction, well-drilling, and power generation.
- (e) Manage TG667.2 facilities, real estate, construction, and engineer construction contracts.

(2) 1 Int Bn

- (a) Provide geospatial support to the TG667.2 (5 Coy (Topographical)).
 - i. Engineer Intelligence Requirements for Planning.
 - (1) Iloilo APOD and SPOD capacity, limitations, and damage.
 - (2) Extent of damage to BX critical infrastructure in Panay.
 - (3) Status of MSRs on Panay.
 - (4) Employment of improvised explosive devices, booby-traps, and mines by VPF.
 - (5) Extent of damage or obstacles on airfields in Panay.
 - (6) Location and disposition of OV breaching and bridging assets.
 - (7) Type and location of OV obstacles in Panay.
 - (8) Capacity, limitations, and damage of bridges over major waterways in Panay.
 - (9) Loss of friendly breaching and bridging assets.
 - (10) Location and extent of engineer construction materials in Panay.

j. Explosive Hazards.

- (1) 6 ESR will establish an Explosive Hazards Coordination Cell (EHCC) to gather information, track, predict, distribute information on, and mitigate explosive hazards within the theatre that affect force protection and mobility.
- (2) EOD within 6 ESR and CERs will conduct tactical activities to address explosive hazards. Combat engineer unit activities include the detection, reporting, breaching and clearing of minefields, and the detection, reporting, and destruction of IEDs. Only EOD units and properly qualified EOD personnel shall conduct EOD procedures against explosive ordnance, UXO, or IEDs. Attempts will be made to render safe explosive devices for intelligence gathering efforts if the situation does not affect the local

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population and TG667.2 ability to accomplish the mission being undertaken.

- (3) IEDs/Booby-Traps. TG667.2 will not employ booby-traps or IEDs.
- (4) Mines. COMD TG667.2 is the emplacement authority for AT mines in AO FANNING. Artillery delivered mines will not be utilised by TG667.2. Anti-tank mines, if utilised, will be surface laid. No AP mines will be utilised.
- (5) Humanitarian Demining (HDM). Because of the threat to peace and safety, HDM has become a significant disarmament and peace operations activity. Demining is ultimately an HN responsibility; however, TG667.2 may assist BX through mine awareness education and training of HN personnel in the surveying, marking, and clearing of mines during Ph3.

- k. Geospatial. Div and formations will deploy with integral terrain analysis capabilities. Div geospatial support will be provided by 5 Coy, 1 Int Bn.
- l. Firefighting. The CERs will provide close firefighting capabilities ISO RW operations. These firefighting capabilities will be OPCON to 16 Avn Bde during Ph1 – 3. 6 ESR will be responsible for TG667.2 policy on firefighting capabilities for TG667.2 facilities. TG667.2 fire protection priorities are:
 - (1) APODs and SPODs.
 - (2) Medical facilities.
 - (3) Ammunition and fuel storage installations.
 - (4) TG667.2 Headquarters and communication centres.
- m. Reach back. The Div Engineer will reach back to the Joint Force Engineer will facilitate the utilisation of NSB engineer capabilities. All requests for assistance will be passed to the Joint Force Engineer based out of General Santos City.
- n. Host Nation Support. TG667.2 Engineers will maximise the use of Host Nation (civilian) engineer support. Host-Nation Support planning considerations include the following: indigenous labour; local availability of construction materiel, supplies, and equipment; local contractor support; and local facilities.
- o. Construction Standards.
 - (1) When new construction is the only means of sourcing facility requirements, it will be constructed either using respective TCN standards or using temporary guidelines (less than six months) found in extant Doctrine and Policy.
 - (2) Expedient construction (e.g., rapid construction techniques such as pre-fabricated buildings, clamshell structures, etc.) should also be considered as these methods can be selectively employed with minimum time, cost, and risk to offer in-theatre forces another source of required temporary facilities.

4. **Sustainment.**

- a. Logistics. Engineer Units will deploy with their own organic logistic support, and

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will receive additional support from their supported formations. During Ph2, priority of availability for CL IV supply will be lower. CL IV supplies will be limited to what formations will bring as part of basic defensive stores.

- b. Medical. Engineer Units will deploy with their own organic medical assets (RAP), and will receive additional support from their supported formations (R1 – R2E).
- c. Construction Materiel. Construction materiel is readily available for local purchase, and contracted construction capability is available. The following quantities of CL IV material will be made available to be called forward from the Iloilo APOD.

Serial	Description	Qty	Notes
1	Star Pickets	10,000	
2	HESCO Barrier Baskets	500	
3	Corrugated Iron sheets (2.4m x 0.66m)	5,000	103/pallet
4	Concertina Wire (15m coil)	200	36/pallet
5	Barbed Wire (100m coil)	1000	78/pallet
6	Hessian (0.9m wide) 110m roll	50	19/pallet
7	Sandbags (pallet of 3000)	50	

- d. Mines. All AT mines will be held within the ammunition store at the Iloilo APOD and brought forward on request. Authority to issue AT mines will be as per paragraph j(4). Quantity of mines available listed below.

Serial	Description	Qty	Notes
1	Mk 5 AT Mines (pallet)	20	145 mines/pallet

- e. Explosive Stores. CERs will deploy with their own quantity of explosive stores. The following quantities of service explosives will be held at the Iloilo ammunition store and can be called forward.

Serial	Description	Qty	Notes
1	Chg, dml, block, Comb B	100 cases	10 slabs / case
2	Chg, dml cart, PE4	100 cases	20 carts / case

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3	Sheet expl, Primasheet 1000	20 crates	12 sheets / crate
4	ANFO	200 bags	25kg / bag
5	Primer, CE, 35g	10 boxes	60 / box
6	Bangalore Torpedo Mk 1	50	
7	Chg, dml, shaped, No 1 Mk 6, 150mm, Beehive	10 cases	4 / case
8	Chg, dml, shaped, NR50 Mk 1, 200mm, Beehive	10 crates	2 / crate
9	Chg, dml, shaped, No 14 Mk 1, Hayrick	10 cases	5 / case
10	Charge linear cutting (CLC)	50 boxes	24 / box
11	PELCC	20	

f. Bridging Equipment. CERs will hold the following bridging equipment as part of their integral holdings and will be kept within the BMA:

- (1) 1 x DSB
- (2) 2 x Footbridge

g. The following bridging equipment will be kept at the Iloilo APOD and be brought forward on demand:

- (1) 2 x MGB (22 bay)
- (2) 1 x IRB (complete with BEPB)

5. **Command and Signal.**

- a. TG667.2 Engineer – Lieutenant Colonel XXXXXX (CO 6 ESR) is appointed as the Divisional Engineer.
- b. Location. The Divisional Engineer will establish at Iloilo APOD, Panay with TG667.2 HQ by XXXXXX.
- c. Engineer Coordinating Boards.
 - (1) The TG667.2 Engineer Synchronisation teleconference. TBA

ANNEX XX
TO TG 667.2 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

References:

- A. ANNEX N to OP CERIUM STEAL – Space Operations dated XXXXXX
- B. ADDP 3.24 - Cyberspace Operations 1st Ed – 30 Jul 2020

1. **Situation.**

a. North Torbia (OV).

- (1) SIGINT and EW. SFMEF capabilities are focused on RISTA, Electronic Intelligence Warfare (EIW) as key to any Offensive or Defensive manoeuvre, specific planning down to a Division-level are assigned, and executed by manoeuvre forces including SPF and trained insurgent forces within the AO.
 - (a) Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RISTA) and Counter Reconnaissance Detachments (CRDs) – DTG assets are allocated in all phases of the Defence and Offense, with a focus on Detection, Disruption and Electronic of Physical Attacks. A dedicated CRD is assigned per disruption zone to maximise system warfare principles including C2, Logistics and Sensors.
 - (b) The Defensive Main Effort of an SFMEF DTG is the detection of the enemy's Main Effort, C2, Logistics nodes, and strategic reserve.
 - (c) BTG Design of EIW. Focus on disaggregation of C2 nodes, including elaborate deception plans are typical of Inforwar / Deception C3D plans, involving ghost formations, realistic manoeuvre deception plans and false emissions in line with the higher echelon intent.
 - (d) SFMEF will operate with as little emissions as possible during the pre-battle phase, within strict schedules and spectrum management. Radio silence or limited transmission is typical when manoeuvring fires or manoeuvre elements into place.
 - (e) Land Forces. SFMEF land ELINT and EW capabilities include: Vehicle-mounted 1L222 ELINT (8-18 GHz), RASIT, and Tigr-M REI PP LEER mobile EW units.
 - (f) SFP and Insurgents. SFMEF forces will employ SPF and provide capacity building to allied insurgents with Super High Frequency (SHF) and High Frequency (HF) capabilities for organic long-range communications, and sustained operations behind enemy lines. Where integrated with civilian infrastructure, redundancies away from main population centres are established to ensure sustainment of viable operations they have been compromised.

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- (g) Air Force. SFMEF Air Force has a moderate heli-borne EW jamming capability, employing HIP-J/K and HORIZON platforms.
- (h) Sat ELINT. SFMEF rely on the indigenous KMS-4 satellite with limited visual resolution and ELINT capabilities, however are likely to be supported by allied Olvanan YAOGAN or Donovan KOSMOS assets which include triangulation ELINT detection capabilities.
- (i) GPS Jamming. SFMEF deploys COTs and specifically designed EXJAMs in PELs and choke points which can be pre-positioned or remotely activated, just-in-time emplacements are achieved either through covert of Artillery delivered means. Activation strategies are known to use Civilian telecommunications and energy infrastructure, including operatives within the NGOs/OGA networks. Use of M-GPS Assured Positioning and Timing (A-PNT) reduces but does not eliminate impacts of EXJAMs or targeted Jamming.
- (j) Cyber Operations. The SFMEF employs highly sophisticated and effective Cyber Offensive operations, synchronised to Strategic and Tactical effects. It is assessed as HIGHLY LIKELY civilian SCADA infrastructure has been compromised and can be activated to enhance Disruption activities within CIVPOP and critical IBSAF nodes. Cyber operations are nominally controlled at the strategic level and may be activated remotely from outside the AO.
- (k) Redundancy. Within the AO of a BTG, as far as practically feasible Line-based communications and physical means are established to reduce the electronic signature of SFMEF forces.

b. Olvana (OV).

- (1) Olvanan ELINT/IMINT capabilities may be deployed in support of OV at a National level including Hi-Res video, ELINT triangulation and millimeter wave 3D mapping within specified windows as described in Ref A.

2. **Mission.** EW will provide support to TG 667.2 during OP CERIUM STEAL IOT counter and neutralise enemy EW capabilities.

3. **Execution.**

- a. Joint Information Domain Concept of OPs. TG 667.2 will employ Joint Manoeuvre in the Information Environment (MIE), to take advantage of any opportunities and mitigating vulnerabilities, IOT operate with freedom within the Information Environment.
- b. Linked to National Objectives. TG 667.2 will plan and execute Joint Information Warfare through use of Information Related Capabilities (IRCs) in line with National Objectives directed by National and Integrated IW outcomes. TG 667.2 is authorised to leverage military capabilities and IRCs to conduct the following limited activities and objectives within the following constraints:
 - (1) Centralised Control. TG 667.2's authority to conduct Joint MIE is co-ordinated through MSC, IWD and JOC to Assure, Advise and Affect.

- (2) Decentralised Execution. To execute the InfoWar Combat Functions, SHIELD, SHAPE, KNOW, aligned with National Objectives. Where executed, simultaneous manoeuvre should be used to enhance Battlespace effects including Deception.
- (3) Limitations. The Australian Government and ADF plans and executes information warfare to ensure it is legal, policy compliant, ethical, rules-based and measured. As with other engagements, the ADF will have specified rules of engagement that have been approved at the highest levels.
- (4) Authority and Waivers. CJTF 667 is the lead for the International response, operational authorities and waivers can be obtained for the implementation of MIE activities within a specified military operating area. A minimum of 30 days is required for submission to CJTF 667 for Joint MIE Ops, when responding to an immediate and impending threat waivers can be submitted with 36 hours' notice.
- (5) Constraints. Lethality and impacts across Time must be considered when planning MIE, where enduring effects may linger across years. Where practicable, it should be contained within the operating environment.
- (6) Integrated Workforce. MIE will utilise all the IRC's integrated workforce to leverage expertise and enhance effects, these support the IBSAF's Mission to Defeat the SFMEF within BX.
- c. Satellite Access Requests. TG 667.2 has limited access to Allied Sat OPS, where required TG 667.2 will submit a Communications Access Request (CAR) through Defence Communications Area Master Station Australia (DEFCAMSAUS) via HQ CJTF 667 J6.
- d. Spectrum Frequency Assignment Operating in a Foreign Country. This operation will utilise a combination of Area, Space and Band assignments. IAW Ref B, international frequency assignments are to be submitted with a minimum of 90 days' notice to ensure international frequency requests are managed.
- e. Groupings & Tasks. (1) **66**.
 - (a) Is to comply and coordinate EMS use with the joint restricted frequency list (JRFL) / combined restricted frequency list (CRFL) and associated processes ensuring the Worldwide Restricted Frequency List IAW Ref B is used as the minimum restricted frequencies that will be protected against friendly electronic warfare (EW).
 - (b) Contribute to the joint or combined communications-electronics operating instructions (JCEOI/CCEOI).
 - (c) Provide administrative and technical support to TG 667.2 units for military spectrum use.
 - (d) Receive and send reports, analyse and attempt to resolve incidents of unacceptable interference within the AO.
 - (e) Act as the focal point for requesting interference resolution support

within AO. (f) Provide and resolve conflicts not resolved at a lower level.

(g) Be the focal point for inclusion of spectrum use considerations in the communications annex of future operational plans (OPLAN).

(h) Participate in multifunctional user use of the EMS to resolve interference.

(i) Identify and resolve potential electromagnetic environmental effect hazards to ordnance, equipment, personnel, and fuel.

(j) Assist the EW staff in integrating EW activities into operations to ensure minimum impact on friendly use of the EMOE.

(k) Provide recommendations for the update of the JRFL/CRFL as required.

(l) Be the primary source for information on the impact of EW actions on friendly command and control nodes and the overall impact of EW actions on friendly force EMS operations within AO.

(2) **G5 (Plans)** is to:

(a) Incorporate EMS use into long-range and future operations planning and the EW strategy, based upon input from the G2, G3 and G6.

(b) Establish coordination channels with any HN forces involved in a joint or multinational operation to negotiate EMS use where procedures do not already exist.

(3) **Spectrum users** need to:

(a) Obtain frequency authorisation for each use of the EMS by their appropriate SMC.

(b) Use frequencies within their parameters as authorised by the frequency assignment process.

(c) Coordinate any need to exceed or operate spectrum-dependent equipment outside the parameters authorised by the frequency assignment authority.

(d) Ensure the spectrum-dependent equipment is properly maintained to preclude unintentional violation of authorised spectrum-use parameters.

(e) If an incident is encountered, initiate a Harmful Interference Report in accordance with Appendix 2 in the format attached below.

4. **Admin & Log.** TBA.

5. **Command and Signal.**

- a. ASD shall continue to exercise SIGINT Operational Tasking Authority (SOTA) over the SIGINT assets until SOTA is delegated to CJTF 667.
- b. **Communications Systems.**
 - (1) The cryptologic communications architecture shall include: (a) TBA
 - (2) The SIGINT section has access to the following communications networks:

(a) TBA

c. Coalition Networks as applicable

Appendix 1 – Minimum Required Information for Frequency Clearance and Assignment

Appendix 2 – Harmful Interference Reporting Format

MINIMUM REQUIRED INFORMATION FOR FREQUENCY CLEARANCE AND ASSIGNMENT

SFAF Data Item Number	Title	Note
005	Security classification	
010	Type of action	
110	Frequency (ies)	
111	Excluded frequency band	
113	Station class	
114	Emission designator	
115	Transmitter power	
140	Required date	
141	Expiration date	
207	Operating unit	
300	State/Country	1
301	Antenna location	1
303	Antenna coordinates	1
306	Authorised radius	1, 3
340	Equipment nomenclature	1
345	Radar tunability	1, 4
346	Pulse duration	1, 4
347	Pulse repetition rate	1, 4
354	Antenna name	1
355	Antenna nomenclature	1
357	Antenna gain	1
400	State/Country	2
401	Antenna location	2
403	Antenna coordinates	2
406	Authorised radius	2, 3
440	Equipment nomenclature	2
454	Antenna name	2
457	Antenna gain	2
502	Description of requirement	
803	Requestor data	
805	Date response required	

APPENDIX 2

HARMFUL INTERFERENCE REPORTING FORMAT

1. The following format is to be used for the reporting of harmful interference. The layout follows the format used in Appendix 10 of the International Telecommunication Union Radio Regulations and is similar to the format in Allied Communications Publication (ACP) 194—*Policy for the Coordination of Military Electromagnetic Spectrum Allocations and Assignments Between Cooperating Nations*. The report should include the following information

a. Particulars concerning the interference:

- (1) name, call sign or other means of identification
- (2) frequency measured, including date-time group
- (3) class of emission
- (4) bandwidth (indicate whether measured or estimated)
- (5) measured field strength or power flux-density (including date and time)
- (6) class of station/nature of service
- (7) location/position/bearing of the station which made the above measurements.

b. Particulars of station experiencing interference:

- (1) name of station
- (2) location/position/area
- (3) dates and times (universal time coordinated (UTC)) of occurrence of harmful interference
- (4) bearings or other particulars
- (5) nature of interference
- (6) field strength or power flux-density of the wanted emission at the station experiencing the interference, including date and UTC time
- (7) polarisation of the receiving antenna or observed polarization
- (8) action requested.

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**ANNEX XX
TO TG 667.2 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX**

FORCE PROTECTION

References:

- A. ADDP 3.22 Force Protection 2015
- B. CJTF 667 OPORD 01 OP STEEL SENTINEL

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu

1. Situation.

- a. Background. See paragraph 1 of the main body of TG 667.2 OPORD 01 and Annex B (Intelligence).
 - (1) Force Protection (FP). Force protection is defined as preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against ADF personnel, resources, facilities, and critical information (see Ref A). FP measures may be defensive (active and passive), offensive and recuperative measures.
- b. Protection Principles. The following principles of protection provide military professionals with a context for implementing protection efforts, developing schemes of protection, and allocating resources:
 - (1) Command Responsibility. FP is a function of command. Commanders at all levels are responsible and accountable for the protection of their assets. Subordinate commanders may use their discretion in imposing additional FP measures, but may not reduce the measures imposed by this HQ without prior approval.
 - (2) Risk Management. Risk Management is the coordinated activities to direct and control the Joint Force with regards to risk. Risk management ensures that risk is managed effectively, efficiently and coherently across the Joint Force.
 - (3) Coordination. FP must be fully coordinated across all components, multi-agency and multinational elements. It is essential to coordinate FP planning at the strategic, operational and tactical levels in order to ensure a unified approach and mitigate vulnerabilities that might otherwise be exploited by a threat.
 - (4) Integrated. FP is integrated with other activities, systems, efforts, and capabilities associated with unified joint operations to provide strength and structure to the overall effort. Integration must occur vertically and horizontally with coalition partners throughout the operations process.
 - (5) Economy. Excessive allocation of resources for FP may remove capabilities needed to accomplish the mission. Economical use of FP capabilities allows the commander to focus resources on the protection of those assets that are deemed critical to operational effectiveness and mission success.
 - (6) Prioritisation. There will always be insufficient resources to protect every asset against every threat all of the time. Priority should be given to centres of gravity, both tangible and intangible.

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- (7) Flexibility. FP policies and measures must have the flexibility and agility to respond to rapidly changing threats, within resource limitations.
- (8) Layered. FP capabilities are arranged using a layered approach to provide strength and depth. Layering reduces the destructive effect of a threat or hazard through the dispersion of energy or the culmination of the force.
- (9) Redundant. Protection efforts are often redundant anywhere that a vulnerability or a critical point of failure is identified. Redundancy ensures that specific activities, systems, efforts, and capabilities that are critical for the success of the overall protection effort have a secondary or auxiliary effort of equal or greater capability.
- (10) Enduring. Protection capabilities are ongoing activities for maintaining the objectives of preserving combat power, populations, partners, essential equipment, resources, and critical infrastructure in every phase of an operation.

c. Threat and Risk Assessment.

- (1) Conventional threats. For more detail see Annex B. The Olvanan Southern Fleet Marine Expeditionary Forces (SFMEF) essentially represent a “peer” threat with a wide range of capabilities. As they have demonstrated, they have sufficient force capabilities to seize and control key infrastructure and large areas of terrain in a littoral environment. They also possess the necessary capabilities to project and sustain power beyond their national boundaries. Whilst the Olvanan People’s Army (OPA) is known to hold quantities of CBRN capabilities, it is highly unlikely they will utilise these weapons during this conflict.
- (2) Unconventional Threats.

- (a) Visayan Peoples Front (VPF) Insurgents. The VPF is an armed insurgent group committed to establishing an independent entity composed of the islands of Panay, Negros, Cebu and Bohol. Over time, the group, which originally sought the creation of a separate secular state, demanded the exclusion of Muslims and creation of a Christian nation. The VPF has aided the SFMEF in securing key infrastructure and installations during the early stages of OV occupation of Panay. Levels of cooperation between the SFMEF and the VPF at this time is unknown.
- (b) Free Sulu Movement (FSM) Separatists. The FSM is a conglomeration of anti- federation factions of the Belesian archipelago. The group seeks to break free of the alleged overreach of the Belesian central government and abuses of the Belesian Federation National Guard. The FSM is not known to be actively supporting the SFMEF in Panay.
- (c) Black Societies Criminal Network. The Black Societies Criminal Network is based mainly in Olvana with networks and interests in Belesia and surrounding nations. This criminal network is involved in

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armed robbery, racketeering, smuggling, narcotics trafficking, prostitution, gambling, and contract killings. The Black Societies will not involve themselves directly in the current conflict but may capitalise on demand through black market operations. Post conflict, these criminal elements will take advantage of any power vacuums to establish greater influence, particularly in areas with no or little law enforcement.

- (d) Tantoco Cartel Criminal Organisation. Originating in South Torbia (RT), the Tantoco Cartel operates across the region with networks and interests in Olvana and Belesia. Like the Black Society, the Tantoco Cartel is involved in all forms of illegal activities. Recent expansion into Belesia and Olvana has resulted in turf disputes with the Black Society. Again, like the Black Society Criminal Networks, expect that the Tantoco Cartel will establish in areas where law enforcement is at a minimum, particularly in a post-conflict environment.
- (3) Non-Military Threats. For environmental health threats, see the Health Support Annex.
 - (a) Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs) / Contaminated Grounds. BX holds large amounts of toxic industrial chemicals for multiple purposes, including mining, production of electronic goods, water purification, wastewater management, pesticides and fertiliser to increase agricultural output. A mine collapse in Panay a few years ago resulted in a release of 20.6 million tons of waste water into a nearby river. Prior to the capture of the San Rafael Mine Complex, large quantities (5000lt+) of reagents were kept at a storage facility near the mine complex. These reagents include Sulfuric and Hydrochloric Acids, chemicals which in their storage state presents hazardous chemicals. Large quantities of Hydrochloric acid can also be distilled to produce Chlorine gas, that can be crudely weaponised. In most instances, a level of MOPP will need to be taken when operating near large TIC storage facilities.
 - (b) Battlefield Pollutants. Aside from UXOs (detailed below), battlefield pollutants from destroyed vehicles and equipment will pose a hazard to TG667.2 forces. SFMEF armoured vehicles are not known to utilise depleted Uranium (either as part of composite armour or as a projectile) or other radioactive material. However, commanders at all levels must be cognisant of these threats.
 - (c) Unexploded Ordnance (UXO). It is expected that UXOs will litter the battlefield. UXOs from dropped ordnance (from aircraft, missiles and artillery) can be encountered when manoeuvring around previously held enemy defensive positions. All identified UXO are to be treated under SOPs relating to EOD disposal.
 - (d) Pollution. BX faces significant pollution problems stemming from

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poor industrial practices. High levels of air pollution require mitigating measures to ensure TG 667.2 members health and safety.

- (e) Potable Water. The majority of the BX archipelago's urban population has access to potable water. In rural areas people must rely on local sources such as rivers, streams and wells to obtain water for cooking, drinking and washing. Currently, about 90% of all Belesians can access potable water. All water sources are considered potentially contaminated and not potable until tested.
- (f) Sewage. Seventy-five percent of the population has access to improved sanitation, predominantly in the developed urban areas. Even in the cities, this does not always equate to fixing plumbing in residences, but also includes improved latrines. The lack of universal or adequate sanitation contributes to the high rate of infectious disease spread, especially in the dense urban environments.
- (g) Disease. The following diseases are known to be present in BX:
 - 1. Diarrheal diseases;
 - 2. Hepatitis A;
 - 3. Malaria;
 - 4. Cutaneous Leishmaniasis;
 - 5. Leptospirosis;
 - 6. Schistosomiasis;
 - 7. Hepatitis;
 - 8. Tuberculosis; and
 - 9. Q Fever.

2. Mission. TG 667.2 will protect the force and conserves combat power against threats and risks associated with the conduct of operations throughout Operation CERIUM STEAL.

3. Execution.

- a. General. FP must be included in all parts of planning down to the lowest levels. Commanders will conduct appropriate risk management procedures to ensure that all risk to maintaining force preservation is considered. Reduction in operational capability due to avoidable identified threats is unacceptable.
- b. Risk. The FP posture should be based on risk management, not risk elimination. Deliberate or accidental casualties are a reality of military operations, as are material and equipment losses and an overemphasis in avoiding them may impact adversely on the achievement of the mission. Commanders therefore must balance risk within the context of mission accomplishment. Component commanders should establish FP awareness within their staffs and provide suitable advice and direction to subordinate units. FP functions will be fully integrated and coordinated in the operational planning process from the outset.
- c. Tasks Throughout. Formation Commands conduct FP operations to protect the

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force and conserve combat power in AO FANNING. Large troop concentrations and sustainment facilities shall be protected from OV missile/CBRN attacks by establishing an Integrated Air Defense System. Vulnerability assessments are to be conducted for staging areas, C2 nodes, and MSRs / ASRs concerning threats from CBRN, IEDs, missile attacks and other indirect fires as well as direct attack throughout this operation. Operational threats from enemy UAVs/UASs must be determined and mitigated. We must take clear measures and undertake effective coordination to ensure inter-operability between TG 667.2 and BX Defense Forces under OPCON. The implementation of successful FP measures will be particularly important for safeguarding the TG 667.2 Center of Gravity (our long range strike capability). Supporting tasks of the FP warfighting function include:

- (1) Conduct operational area security.
- (2) Employ safety techniques (including fratricide avoidance).
- (3) Implement OPSEC.
- (4) Provide intelligence support to protection.
- (5) Implement physical security procedures.
- (6) Apply anti-terrorism (AT) measures.
- (7) Conduct law and order.
- (8) Conduct survivability operations.
- (9) Provide force health protection.
- (10) Conduct chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) operations.
- (11) Provide explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and protection support.
- (12) Coordinate air and missile defense.
- (13) Conduct personnel recovery.
- (14) Conduct internment and resettlement.

d. Protection by Phase of OP CERIUM STEAL.

- (1) Phase 1 - Lodgement. This phase will see the lodgement of ground forces in Panay as the main effort. Amphibious landings will be conducted on Panay along with landings at an established APOD/SPOD. TG 667.2 FP will focus on maintaining safe operations of the disembarkation of forces through the APOD/SPOD. Protection to be enhanced by OPSEC, and measures to eliminate fratricide during forward passage of lines with BX forces already on Panay.
- (2) Phase 2 - Neutralise. This phase will see decisive land operations take place on Panay. The aim of this phase is to defeat the SFMEF on Panay. Protection to be enhanced by control of all sea and air lanes around Panay and consideration for CBRN threats to be factored into daily MOPP states.
- (3) Phase 3 – Transition. This phase will see the transition of authority on Panay from TG 667.2 to either a UN sanctioned Peacekeeping Force or a

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follow on HN force. It will be expected that TG 667.2 FE will remain to conduct Stability Operations until a replacement force can take over. Protection measures will begin to put greater emphasis on non-conventional threats, law and order, health, crime, drugs, safety, protection of captured enemy personnel, operational area security, physical security, antiterrorism and on coordination of FP measures with Host Nation. The potential for kidnapping or capture of friendly forces increases significantly in this phase requiring the establishment of a Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC). Key risks to TG 667.2 forces throughout this phase include accidents caused by fatigue or failure to adhere to published SOPs and standards. The BX government assumes responsibility for their own security and infrastructure maintenance.

e. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Training. Personnel and units are to receive appropriate FP training, particularly in Escalation of Force procedures, ROE and battlefield / environmental hazards.
- (2) Vulnerability Assessments (VA). In order to ensure that FP measures meet required standards, site assessments must be conducted for any semi-permanent sites (FOBs, main camps, etc.). The assessments routinely involve sites visits with interviews with key specialists and inspection of all FP related procedures and infrastructure, ranging from defensive positions through classified document handling procedures to food hygiene. The process is intended to be consultative and can be used by site commanders to reinforce their cases for improvements to their FP posture.
- (3) Force Protection Working Groups. Force Protection Working Groups will be established at HQ TG 667.2 and at subordinate Formation Commands.

4. Sustainment. See Logistic Support Order Annex to TG 667.2 OPORD 01.

5. Command and Signal.

- a. Command. FP measures issued by COMD TG 667.2 are valid for all Coalition members and facilities in AO FANNING.
- b. Reporting. Deviations from the prescribed FP measures, changes in threat, and FP incidents are to be reported via the TG 667.2 reporting chain. CBRN incidents are to be reported to COMD TG 667.2 via the TG 667.2 CBRN Warning and Reporting chain.

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ANNEX XX TO
TG667.2 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

HOST NATION SUPPORT (HNS)

Reference:

A. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Belesia/Australia 11 April 2006

1. **SITUATION.** The Belesian (BX) Government has limited resources available to support CJTF 667 efforts to end Olvanan aggression on Panay. As a relatively new democratic federation, the Belesian Government is busy with maintaining law and order among its other provinces. To that end, Belesian resources will be limited to humanitarian aid and other essential resources for the effective governance of Panay during and post conflict. The Belesian Federation Defense Force (BFDF) has provided support to the liberation of Panay in the form of a Motorised Brigade (12 Mot Bde). Logistic support for the 12 Mot Bde will be through the BFDF, coordinated and augmented by TG 667.2 whilst the 12 Mot Bde remains in the TG 667.2 AO.
2. **MISSION.** Coordinate the provision of HNS to TG 667.2 elements located in Panay to contribute to mission success.

3. **EXECUTION**

- a. **Scheme of HNS.** Resources are constrained within BX. To that end it is the intent of Comd TG 667.2 that forces operating within the TG 667.2 Area of Operations (AO) shall be self-sufficient and will not impose a significant support bill on the host nation (HN). In order to reduce demands on HN, all HNS requests shall be made through the Force Support Group (FSG).
- b. **HNS Considerations.**
 - (1) **Facilities.** HN has agreed that TG 667.2 will have access to buildings within the Iloilo APOD and SPOD where they are available. Requests are to be made through FSG.
 - (2) **Ammunition and Weapons.** TG 667.2 FE will not utilise BX ammunition and weapons, except those under OPCON with the 12 Mot Bde.
 - (3) **Communications.** Belesian telephone (cell and land-line) networks are relatively advanced and provide a high degree of functionality for military communications as does the national data network. TG 667.2 may utilise some of the existing communications infrastructure on Panay, but only at the OFFICIAL level. Consideration must be taken that civilian NGO/OGAs will be relying on existing telecommunications infrastructure on Panay. TG 667.2 will minimise use of the limited telecommunications infrastructure where possible
 - (4) **Finance.** The government of BX has agreed that there will be no charge for the use of government and military facilities for TG 667.2. Local contractors which can be provided (permissive environment permitting) will be charged at the same rate as the local government for the same service.

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- (5) Fuel. Fuel shall be drawn from Belesian sources only in emergency circumstances. Where it is necessary to draw from Belsian sources, fuel will be replaced in kind as soon as practical.
- (6) Local Labour. Local labour is available to support TG 667.2 operations. Payment for labour shall be at agreed rates identified in the technical arrangement to the SOFA (Ref A, Annex 1, Section 6). All requests for local labour are to be made through the FSG.
- (7) Maintenance. TG 667.2 units shall have access to maintenance facilities and equipment not in use by Belesian government agencies or military. Access will be strictly controlled through advance requests to the FSG.
- (8) Medical. TG 667.2 units and personnel shall only use Belesian medical facilities in an emergency to save life and limb. TG 667.2 will utilise organic CJTF 667 medical services in line with the Health Support Order Annex. This includes the 12 Mot Bde whilst it is within the TG 667.2 AO. Injured TG 667.2 members shall subsequently be transferred to the Role 2E or 3 hospital as soon as practical. Any emergency treatment by Belesian medical services shall immediately be reported to TG 667.2 J07.
- (9) Movement/Transport Support. There is limited transport available within Panay and TG 667.2 formations cannot rely on transportation support from local contractors within Panay whilst it remains a non-permissive environment. During Ph3 (Transition), we can expect more transportation support to become available as government and private industry return. Additionally, any riverine/littoral services within and around Panay cannot be counted upon to be available until hostilities cease. 35 Water Transport Sqn will provide riverine transportation where needed, in addition to organic engineer assets from the CERs and 6 ESR. Several large water obstacles within Panay may have operating ferries. Planning for their usage must assume that these services will not be available due to enemy action.
- (10) Rations. TG 667.2 will draw upon organic ration supplies (CL I stores). Fresh rations will be procured through the FSG and purchased at market rates if available within Belesia. If fresh rations are available within Panay, careful consideration must be given that these supplies do not affect availability to the local population or NGO/OGAs providing humanitarian aid.
- (11) Supplies and Equipment. All spare parts and equipment will be provided through extant supply chains back to the National Support Base (NSB). Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) will be responsible for providing their own spare parts and equipment. If available, common spare parts and equipment (e.g. tools) may be purchased through Belesian stocks by the FSG, but only in accordance with arrangements in the SOFA (Ref A).
- (12) Translation. Translation and interpreter services are available within BX. Payment for translation and interpreter services shall be at agreed rates identified in the technical arrangement to the SOFAs (as contractors or local labour). Requests for translation and interpreter services are to be made

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through the FSG.

(13) Water. TG 667.2 formations and units are to draw water exclusively from military sources. Units responsible for acquiring and treating bulk water may draw water from Belesian military and government facilities although potability will still need to be confirmed.

c. Tasks to Subordinate Units.

(1) Force Support Group.

- (a) Coordinate requests for local labour services;
- (b) Coordinate requests for translation and interpreter services;
- (c) Coordinate contracting for commercial transport services; and
- (d) Coordinate requests for use of Belesian military facilities and locations in Panay.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT. No change to base order.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. No change to base order.

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INFORMATION OPERATIONS

References

- A. Joint Media and Communications Directive 01/2020, MSC dated 15 July 2019
- B. Joint Targeting Directive 01/2020 Defence Minister - Joint Effects Guidelines
- C. Annex J to OP STEEL SENTINEL – CJTF 667 OPORD 01 – Info Ops
- D. United Nations Security Council Resolution 8873 dated 01 May 2020
- E. Joint Information Operations Policy CJOPS dated 14 May 2020
- E. Information Operations Support - Planning Directive, dated 05 Jun 2020
- F. Multi-National Headquarters SOP and Operating Instrs dated May 2020

SITUATION

1. General. Information Operations (IO) is the integration, synchronisation and coordination of two or more non-kinetic means through a number of Information Related Capabilities (IRC) that generate and sustain a targeted information advantage. An information advantage is a favourable information situation relative to a group, organisation or adversary. IO includes both influencing the decision-making of actors while protecting our own information and decision-making. These include:

- a. Shaping and Influencing (S&I) (at the strategic level);
- b. Information Operations (IO) (at the operational level); and
- c. Inform and Influence Actions (IIA) (at the tactical level).

2. The IRCs are the tools, capabilities or processes, which can have effects of a physical, functional, temporal or psychological nature upon target systems and/or target audiences (an individual group selected for an effect). The IRCs have many extended sub elements to them but all work towards the same aim as the main component under the direction of IO. All actions are integrated into the overall campaign plan and are applicable from Phase 1 to Phase 3 of OP CERIUM STEAL and must be planned accordingly and not added later. Achievement of Australia's national aims and national strategic objectives, as stated in Ref A, within the South Pacific region requires TG 667.2
IO assets to nest within the CJTF 667 ability to synchronise and integrate the Info Ops BOS activities with CJTF 667 Manoeuvre BOS and Offensive Support BOS activities. This Info Ops Annex provides the non-kinetic guidance for TG 667.2 IO efforts IAW Refs B and C.

3. Adversary Forces. For analysis of operational environment, threat forces and assessment of likely en ops, see OPORD Annex B, Intelligence. In summary, Nth Torbian (OV) forces have invaded Panay in a bid to seize control of critical natural resources under the guise of protecting the Olvanan diaspora in Panay. OV government (GoOV) and military (Southern Fleet Marine Expeditionary Force – SFMEF) forces are heavily engaged in air, land and sea operations and shaping and influencing effects across the northern most island province of Panay, in an undermining attempt to separate it from its

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nation state of Belesia. This has necessitated the United Nations assembly to pronounce a Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 8873, noted as Ref D, to re-establish the Government of Belesian (GoB) sovereignty in Panay. However, SFMEF information operations activities have been undertaken for some time and have had the desired effect on the population and will take some determination to change. This is especially true given SFMEF IO elements have an additional IRC in their organisation and which has been actively deployed. That of terrorism. This non-kinetic IRC has the capability of producing both lethal and non-lethal effects and is very successful.

4. Friendly Forces. For information and organisations of detailed friendly forces, groupings, tasks and capabilities, see OPORD Annex C, Operations. Those friendly force IRC planners, staff and elements to be made available to TG 667.2 IO Cell, include but are not limited to, those below noted;

- a. Civil Military Operations (CMO) elements and components including the provisions and coordination of tactical CIMIC Team, Civil Aid Programs (CAP), and Civil Military Actions or Activities (CMA).
- b. Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) elements and components including the provision of Radio in a Box (RIAB) broadcast staff and eqpt and speaker announcement / material delivery teams.
- c. Electronic Warfare (EW) elements and components including air strike capabilities (EA-18 Growler sorties) and ground Direction Finding and Radio Intercept (LEWT) teams.
- d. Key Leader Engagement (KLE) cell for the creation of the liaison architecture and assignment and coordination of Force Elements (FE) for the implementation of the KLE plan.
- e. Media and Public Affairs (MPA) officers, staff and combat camera teams (CCT) to be coordinated with IO to achieve the COMD's desired Public Relations (PR) effect as detailed in the strategic communications directive and the MPA plan. This includes media liaison and release of approved targeted public information.
- f. Computer Network Operations (CNO) staff and teams to advise on strategic effects and assist with protection measures. Its strike capability is not advised and will be noted in the CJTF 667 strategic S&I Plan.
- g. Deception (DECEP) staff and units to create and implement the larger operational manoeuvre decep plan and the coordination of tactical level deception activities. This includes but is not limited to cam and concealment, dummy sites and decoy wpns, false electronic signatures and the staging of false activities and lures.
- h. Operational Security (OPSEC) staff and teams to advise on OPSEC measures to protect EEFIs and monitor, investigate and report on OPSEC violations for further actions.

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- i. Presence, Posture and Profile (PPP) activities will be a matter for all FE units and members adherence to follow IAW established procedures, orders, instructions and the PPP plan.
- j. Protective Security (PS) staff and Rear Security, Regimental Provost and Military Police FE to work towards the PS plan.
- k. Information Assurance (IA) activities to secure ICT hardware and software, networks and routers, data servers and information, and systems access protection measures IAW Information System Security Procedures (ISSP).
- l. Offensive Support (OS) elements along with Joint Fires (JF) units and systems which support the Manoeuvre BOS but with whom can be leveraged non-lethal effects such as show of force, fire power demonstrations or destruction of material IAW synchronised effects plan.
- m. Evidentiary Imagery (EI) staff and elements capable or capturing before and after activities imagery, such as bomb damage assessment to counter that which may be used against FE by adversary.
- n. Military to Military (M2M) networking cell for the creation of the communications and information architecture between deploy allied and host nation military force units and HQs, and the publishing of this data for the implementation of the M2M Plan. M2M should not be confused with the Liaison Officer function as prescribed in the C2 BOS.
- o. Other related staff and organisations as detailed by the Comd to achieve a desired effect on a target using the means at their disposal. These include resources inside and outside of the AO.

MISSION

5. Information Operations are to be conducted in support of the TG 667.2 mission of conducting military operations to expel all SFMEF from Panay, in order to create conditions for the re-establishment of a safe and secure environment in Belesia and the surrounding region in accordance with the provisions of the UNSCR 8873.

EXECUTION

6. Commanders Intent.

- a. **Purpose.** The purpose of TG 667.2 IO within Panay is to DEGRADE adversary information and information systems whilst protecting and enhancing TG 667.2 information and information systems.
- b. **Method.** IO will support the TG 667.2 mission in accordance with the IRC taskings as noted in Ref E, through performance of the following inform and influence actions:
 - (1) PROTECT TG 667.2 legitimacy, information and information systems IOT

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ENABLE TG 667.2 operations.

- (2) INFORM Panay civil population of SFMEF subversion/atrocities IOT UNDERMINE SFMEF actions and narrative.
- (3) DEGRADE enemy forces and belligerent actors within Panay IOT ENHANCE GoB and Panayan authorities.
- (4) INFLUENCE Panay civil population to reconcile IOT ASSIST GoB to re-establish law and order.

c. **End state.** All foreign actors have been rejected by Panayan CIVPOP, belligerent groups degraded to ineffectiveness, community groups commencing reconciliation, GoB endorsed and supported as legitimate authority and TG 667.2 preparing to conduct transition actions.

7. Concept of Operations.

a. **Essential Effects.** The desired TG 667.2 essential effects are as follows:

- (1) **1. PROMOTE GoB and TG 667.2 legitimacy.** The immediate acquisition of the dominant narrative within Panay is essential to achieving specified national strategic aims. IOT facilitate the below listed joint essential effects, TG 667.2 and GoB legitimacy are a crucial platform that will both prevent further OV involvement and undermine SFMEF shaping and influencing actions.
- (2) **2. ISOLATE Panay from foreign influence.** IOT allow Panay to return to normal patterns of life, external destabilising influences that are affecting the internal security of Panay must be isolated. If belligerent groups within Panay are unable to communicate and resupply, their influence on the battle space will be dramatically reduced.
- (3) **3. DEGRADE belligerent actors within Panay.** Once belligerent groups are isolated from supply and support, these groups must be systematically degraded to reduce their impact on TG 667.2 and GoB operations. This will be achieved through synchronisation of direct and indirect kinetic and non-kinetic TG 667.2 actions to dislocate and neutralise belligerent actors in Panay.
- (4) **4. ASSIST GoB to re-establish law and order.** The degradation of belligerent groups alone will not be sufficient to allow transition of Panay to HN control. The enhancement of local security forces and government authorities will be essential to the achievement of the TG 667.2 end state.

b. **Joint Effects Tasks (JETs).** In line with the joint essential effects listed above, the approved JETs are as follows:

- (1) **1.1 PROMOTE TG 667.2 legitimacy.** Throughout this operation, it is essential that TG 667.2 legitimacy is maintained both IOT maintain public support in Panay and AS, and to counter pro-OV narratives that seek to undermine TG 667.2 presence.

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- (2) **1.2 ENHANCE GoB legitimacy.** IOT achieve the end state it is essential that both the Panay CIVPOP and the international community accept the reinstated GoB. Therefore, TG 667.2 under CJTF 667 is to facilitate every opportunity to enhance the GoB's reputation to further counter the OV negative narrative.
- (3) **1.3 UNDERMINE OV legitimacy.** IOT prevent OV force projection and escalation, it is essential that the OV narrative is dismantled at every opportunity using facts and examples of SFMEF influence within Panay. This will undermine OV's political standing in the region and reduce their impact on shaping regional and global opinion.
- (4) **1.4 EXPOSE SFMEF atrocities and regional shaping actions.** Linkages to activities within the SFMEF shaping and influencing activities will further degrade OV's political position and enhance the TG 667.2 narrative.
- (5). **2.1 DISLOCATE SFMEF within Panay.** Where possible, TG 667.2 seeks to physically and functionally dislocate SFMEF forces through non-kinetic actions and non-lethal effects IOT activate SFMEF withdrawal triggers and avoid kinetic engagement with TG 667.2 elements.
- (6) **2.2 ISOLATE SFMEF, Insurgents and Auxiliaries from support bases.** Concurrent isolation of belligerent groups within Panay from local, regional and transnational support will deny these groups the ability to remain below the detection threshold and enable TG 667.2 targeting.
- (7) **3.1 EXPOSE SFMEF destabilising actions.** IOT influence Panayan CIVPOP to expose belligerent groups concealed within their midst, links to SFMEF shaping and influencing within Panay are an important platform for the dismantling of belligerent group support.
- (8) **3.2 INFORM Panayan CIVPOP of atrocities.** Continual exposure of belligerent group activities against the Panayan CIVPOP and GoB will contribute to the isolation of subversive elements from the population.
- (9) **3.3 ISOLATE SFMEF, Insurgents and Auxiliaries from Panayan CIVPOP.** In addition to INFORM effects, TG 667.2 must undertake non-kinetic actions to cause these groups to isolate themselves from the population IOT allow targeting.
- (10) **3.4 SHAPE SFMEF, Insurgents and Auxiliaries into TG 667.2 EAs.** Once clearly isolated from Panayan CIVPOP, TG 667.2 needs to shape these groups into a time and place of its own choosing IOT neutralise them.
- (11) **4.1 ENHANCE Panayan authorities.** IOT ensure that Panayan establishments have the capabilities required to assume control of Panay, TG 667.2 must progressively enhance host nation authorities in preparation for transition.

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(12) **4.2 ENHANCE ethnic relations.** A significant factor of instability within Panay is the state of relations between the various ethnic groups. By improving these relations at the local level, TG 667.2 will reduce a significant threat to Panayan authority's ability to maintain control of the population.

(13) **4.3 PROTECT vulnerable populations within Panay.** In concert with international conventions, treaties and obligations, TG 667.2 must understand its responsibilities with regard to UNSCR1325, 1612, 1674, 1820 and 2242 in addition to the culture and values beliefs within Panayan society.

(14) **4.4 PROTECT critical infrastructure within Panay.** The legitimacy of both TG 667.2 and GoB in Panay will rest on TG 667.2's ability to maintain essential services, utilities and amenities to maintain or return to normal patterns of life. TG 667.2 must ensure these services are not targeted, collaterally protected and maintained where possible throughout this operation. That which is not, must be repaired or replaced as soon as practically possible and implement minimum military involvement in maintaining function.

c. **Approved Target Audiences (TA).** As advised in the Target Directive, Ref B, the approved TG 667.2 TAs are as follows:

(1) **TA 1: Government of Belesia (GoB) - Panay.** This TA includes all members of local and regional government in all capacities within Panay. The GoB is deemed critical to the success of OP CERIUM STEAL as it is the basis for the implementation of UNSCR 8873 and provides TG 667.2 its legitimacy and authority.

(2) **TA 2: Panay Civilian Population (CIVPOP).** This includes all ethnic groups collectively IOT build understanding, unity and social cohesion. This TA will be essential to the success of OP CERIUM STEAL as it is that, they who must ultimately endorse the GoB and TG 667.2 and comply with Panayan authorities whilst denying foreign and belligerent actor influence within the community.

(3) **TA 4: Panay local Authorities.** This includes all law enforcement (police), emergency services (fire, rescue, and ambulance), security organisations (customs, sheriff, and bailiff) and regulatory arms of government that regulate, oversee, enforce and maintain rule of law within Panay. A holistic, WoG approach to the reformation and enhancement of Panay institutions is deemed critical to the strengthening of the government and the long term restoration of law and order.

(4) **TA 5: OV CIVPOP.** This TA is restricted to those groups within OV IOT influence support to the OV Government. The degree of public support for OV's political position will directly influence the likelihood of military incursion or further SFMEF employment. This TA will mainly be the responsibility of CJTF 667, but TG667.2 will enable these efforts.

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- (5) **TA 6: International Civilian Population (INTNPOP).** This TA is restricted to those groups external to the Belesian Islands IOT influence support to the OV Government. The degree of public awareness of OV and SFMEF's shaping and influencing actions within the region will directly influence perceptions of TG 667.2 legitimacy, regional diplomacy and lobbying of the UN, placing increased political pressure on both SFMEF and OV.
- (6) **TA 7: SFMEF.** This includes enlisted ranks through to senior command levels. The SFMEF poses a significant threat and is likely to deliberately seek opportunities to escalate its involvement in Panay based on TG 667.2 activities. TG 667.2 must not present opportunities for SFMEF to dominate the narrative by claiming that TG 667.2 is manoeuvring aggressively, must try to influence peaceful SFMEF withdrawal from the disputed region and if unsuccessful must convince the SFMEF that it cannot win any military contest on either practical or moral grounds. This is to be further developed into a surrender strategy during the combat ops phase.
- (7) **TA 8: Insurgents.** This includes members through to senior leader levels. The Insurgents are predominantly from the Visayan People's Front and are being used by the SFMEF as a force to divide the community, incite violence and promote propaganda as a platform/screen for subsequent SFMEF and SFMEF SF activities. The chaos and optics that the Insurgents provide SFMEF are essential to SFMEF's ability to retain the initiative and maintain the dominant narrative within Panay, therefore the degradation and dismantling of the Insurgency will present a significant operational and messaging victory for TG 667.2.
- (8) **TA 9: OV Auxiliaries.** This includes interested parties through to organisers and instigators. The Auxiliaries include privately funded security firms (such as the Wagner Group) used to provide security to the San Rafael Mine. The debunking of Auxiliary propaganda and countering of violence and influencing actions is crucial to establishing a safe political environment for Panay to work towards the desired end state.

d. **Approved Operational Themes.** The approved TG 667.2 themes are as follows:

- (1) TG 667.2 is here at the invitation of the GoB to enforce UNSCR 8873 and to protect the Panayan people.
- (2) The current destabilised situation in Panay is the result of OV intervention and SFMEF influences assisted by local radicals.
- (3) Panay's future rests on dialogue, not violence. All aspects of the Panayan community are encouraged to leave the past behind and move towards a brighter future together.
- (4) TG 667.2 looks forward to working with the GoB (in Panay) and the Panayan people to restore Panay to prosperity and success.

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- e. **Key Messages.** The key messages aligned with the approved TG 667.2 themes are as follows:
 - (1) TG 667.2 is here to help. Please work with coalition forces to allow them to assist the Panayan local government.
 - (2) If you see something, say something; report any suspicious activity to local authorities. Do not take action yourself.
 - (3) Violence is being used to drive Panayans apart; talking between community groups is the key to the future.
 - (4) TG 667.2 looks forward to working with the government and the community to return life in Panay to normal.
 - (5) Do not take up arms or support those that do. Law and order will be restored and criminal acts will be punished under law.

8. Groupings and Tasks.

- a. **CMO.** TG 667.2 will be supported by CMO from the tactical level to plan and conduct PROMOTE, ENHANCE, INFORM and INFLUENCE actions in support of the force. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 1.
- b. **PSYOPS.** Tactical PSYOPS Teams (TPT) will be held at the operational level for distribution to tactical formations at the direction of the commander. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 2.
- c. **EW.** Electromagnetic and directed energy will be used to SCREEN, DENY, DISRUPT, INTERDICT and DEGRADE adversary communications and emissions across the EM spectrum. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 3.
- d. **KLE.** Key WoG representatives from DFAT, AFP, OGA and Defence will foster strategic outcomes through engagement with the relevant Panayan stakeholders. Additional guidance and engagement instrument of authority is contained within Appendix 4.
- e. **MPA.** PAOs and detachments will operate from HQ TG 667.2 and formation HQs across Panay under guidance from CJTF 667. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 5.
- f. **CNO.** May be proliferated at the operational and strategic level to attack, defend and exploit information and data networks from the National Support base within Australia and New Zealand. At the TG 667.2 level, these effects may be requested and coordinated at the tactical level, but HQJOC will maintain OPCON of these capabilities. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 6.

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- g. **DECEP.** Deception activities will be coordinated at the tactical level by HQ TG 667.2 supported by elements of CJTF 667 and JOC within Australia. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 7.
- h. **OPSEC.** All formations and units are responsible for the maintenance of OPSEC. Specific guidance is contained within Appendix 8.
- i. **PPP.** Force postures will be dictated by the developing situation on the ground tempered by the achievement of national strategic aims when security permits. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 9.
- j. **PS.** Force Protection Elements (FPE) will be allocated to key strategic points of entry (SPOE) within Panay, whilst Reserve components will provide tactical commanders an organic protective security asset for use within tactical AOs. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 10.
- k. **Information Assurance (IA).** IA activities will be coordinated at the operational level by HQ CJTF 667 supported by elements of the National Support base within Australia. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 11.
- l. **Offensive Support (OS) / Destruction.** Elements of conventional naval, air and land manoeuvre will be combined with Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) assets to facilitate strategic destruction effects. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 12.
- m. **Evidentiary Imagery (EI).** All images captured that are of an operational nature should be forwarded to MPA through respective formation Chains of Command, and opportunities to leverage the dominant narrative should be exploited. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 13.

9. Coordinating Instructions

- a. It is incumbent on the Tactical Headquarters to ensure adequate control and support/taskings are organised for the IRCs. The coordination of which begins with the IRC's elements meeting in their respective working group and discuss the issues and progression of their task and effect deliver on their assigned targets. These targets being assigned from the Joint Prioritised Integrated Target List as (JPITL) maintained by the Joint Fires and Effects Coordination Centre (JFECC). The results of which and suggestions for future targets/effects will be then brought forward by their applicable operations staff to the Information Operations Work Group (IOWG). The SO2 IO will then collate the Measures of Performance (MOP) and the Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) and synchronise them at the Joint Effects Working Group (JEWG). At the JEWG, staffed by the SO2 Joint Effects will be the SO2 Joint Fires, intelligence rep, legal rep, targeting officer and other staff involved in the targeting process. After the discussions and proposals are advised, these will be brought to the Joint Effects Target Board (JETB) where the Comd or his delegate will approve the actions, apportion

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resources and if required, task elements via Fragmentary or Task Order (FRAGO for assigned FE or TASKORD for resources not found on the ORBAT) to achieve effects. The times and frequency of these meetings and work groups will be advise by way of a HQ Battle Rhythm (B2C2WG).

- b. IRCs are expected to conduct their own work groups and have a trained staff member provide inputs and exchange information coherently as the IRCs Subject Matter Expert (SME). The SME may be required to attend at the JEWG or to the COMD's JETB but should not attend as a regular matter of course. Where an order is to be struck for an action or activity, the SME can assist in drafting the order and give advance warning of the order to their respective IRC elements.
- c. In some cases where the sensitivity of the desired effect or the secrecy surrounding the chosen target exists, the IRC tactical element may not necessarily be inform of the higher order impact or the true target for the desired effect. IRCs are expected to conduct their activities with a minimum of information and should report all aspects of their task using the communications chain in accordance with command and signals reporting requirements. Timings are TBA.
- d. MOPs and MOEs assist in the accomplishment of the assessment process by qualifying or quantifying the intangible attributes of the information environment. The MOP for any one action should be whether or not the TA was exposed to the IO action or activity. MOEs should be observable, to aid with collection; quantifiable, to increase objectivity; precise to ensure accuracy; and correlated with the progress of the operation to attain timeliness. Indicators are crucial because they aid the joint IO plan in informing MOEs and should be identifiable and reported on by all IRCs. Information of effects and measures can be found in Ref E.

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

10. Log Arrangements and Resupply

- a. The prudent and general log rule for all IRC tactical teams and elements is self-sufficiency. When employed in the AO, all IRC elements with teams or staffs must have their own logistics and transportation resources and be capable of sustained ops for periods from 72 hrs to 7 days without the need for resupply. If resupply is required then the parent unit of the IRC team is to make the necessary arrangements. Contingency plans for emergencies such as break down, veh recovery or comms failures must be detailed in a units patrol TTPs and orders.
- b. All IRCs with actual tactical elements, will retain responsibility for the provision of daily sustainment or for organising that resupply with a unit with control of the AO where the team operates. Where the element is allocated to a formation HQs for a task, then it is to come under administrative control of the HQs support unit. Where an element is in location of a forward combat unit then

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administrative arrangements may be made with that unit for sustainment. Care must be used when assigning command and control arrangements while elements are in a units location or under their responsibility for security. It is expected that elements may have to provide assistance to a supporting unit and it may even be necessary for them to be incorporated into the watch routine and perimeter security plan.

- c. The IO staff in the HQs are to become the technical administrative leader for IRC staff or cells as maybe assigned to the HQs. As such, the IO staff cell of that HQ are expected to have an administrative officer / NCO capable of sorting the working and living arrangements of these members whilst attached to the HQs. These staff should come as self-contained as possible but there is an expectation that their pers welfare and basic office needs will be meet by the staff in IO to ensure maximum efficiency of their staff function. However, as the SME for their IRC, the HQs will have an expectation that special to needs items such as laptops and software or systems access will be brought with the SME or sorted out with that staff member prior to assignment.

11. Tpt Arrangements and Movements.

- a. IRC tactical elements and teams are also expected to come with their own intrinsic transportation to move them into and around the assigned AO. Where this transport is not compatible with the organisation assigned or doesn't meet the protection or mobility needs of the team, then arrangements detailing the transportation requirements are to be created and tasked to the forward unit. This may also include the assignment of security to the team as well. The IRC teams will be expected to organise vehicle resupply and light recovery and should a vehicle require replacement, that IRCs unit remains responsible.
- b. Staff assigned as SME to a HQs are to be carried and transported by the HQs in its vehicles and transport means when the HQ moves. Should a SME arrive with intrinsic transportation, arrangements should immediately be made for that vehicles resupply and recovery arrangements. The HQs has responsibility for the veh but should not expect to have control or use of that resource unless arrangements can be mutually organised and agreed to.

12. Admin Support Arrangements.

- a. As for the logistical arrangements, tactical teams remain the responsibility of their higher IRC organisation for admin support. The exception being health care. Should a tac team member become a casualty, especially in the forward area, then they are to enter the chain of evacuation by the best means possible with consideration given towards their condition and severity.
- b. Staff attached to the HQs will be treated as for the arrangements of the permanent HQs staff.

COMMAND AND SIGNALS

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13. Command.

- a. The Principle Command staff of the formations are;
 - (1) COMD 1 DIV is MAJGEN XXXXXX (AS)
 - (2) DEPCOMD 1 DIV is BRIG XXXXXX (AS).
 - (3) COS 1 DIV is COL XXXXXX (AS).
- b. Those listed in para A above are all listed as having full Target Authorisation. Changes to this list are to be promulgated as made.

14. Headquarters Locations.

- a. HQ TG 667.2
 - (1) FWD HQ Located at; TBA
 - (2) MAIN HQ Located at; Iloilo APOD
 - (3) REAR HQ Located at; General Santos City APOD

15. Communication and Information Systems (CIS).

- a. Main Comms to be provided by secure link as follows;
 - (1) Primary – VHF
 - (2) Alternate – HF
 - (3) Contingency – TacSat
 - (4) Runners

16. Signals.

- a. Frequencies, rotating call signs and net identifiers to be published and changed on schedule IAW CEOI.
- b. All reports and returns are to be compiled and transmitted IAW Ref F.

17. Acknowledge.

Appendices:

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- 1 CMO Plan (TBI)
- 2 PSYOPS Plan (TBI)
- 3 EW Plan (TBI)
- 4 KLE Plan (TBI)
- 5 MPA Plan (TBI)
- 6 CNO Plan (TBI)
- 7 DECEP Plan (TBI)
- 8 OPSEC Plan (TBI)
- 9 PPP Plan (TBI)
- 10 PS Plan (TBI)
- 11 IA Plan (TBI)
- 12 OS/Destruction Plan (TBI)
- 13 EI Plan (TBI)
- 14 M2M Plan (TB)

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MILITARY PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Reference: ADFP 3.13.2 Military Public Affairs 14 Feb 2020

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: **Zulu.**

1. Situation

- a. **Background.** See paragraph 1 of the main body of TG 667.2 OPORD 01, Annex B (Intelligence), and Annex XX (Civil-Military Operations).
- b. **General.** The Public Affairs (PA) office is assigned as a Command Advisory Group section (G09) to TG 667.2. PA provides timely and accurate information in support of the Commander's objectives for strategic communication. PA informs, educates and counters misinformation with respect to key audiences (both civilian and military) regarding TG 667.2 objectives, accomplishments and challenges. By engaging local and international media, as well as through social media, PA is able to disseminate key themes and messages to a wide audience to engender and maintain support for TG 667.2 and to correct misinformation in the public domain. Via spoken and written word, and through still and video images, PA represents a trusted and powerful tool to reach diverse audiences. Robust and effective PA activities are fundamental to TG 667.2's ability to proactively communicate to audiences in a truthful and timely manner. PA aims to be 'first with the truth,' providing the facts regarding ongoing events and military and humanitarian activities, and by assisting the media in reporting accurately by providing context. It also informs public perception and opinion by providing reliable, timely and accurate information to local and international media, while monitoring media outlets to ensure that information is disseminated. Media monitoring collects reports from all open sources to disseminate a complete picture of media coverage and to assist Key Leader Engagement in decision-making and ensure consistency with other PA organisations throughout the Area of Operations (AO). All units and elements of TG 667.2 as well as Host Nations' armed forces and IO and NGOs are primary sources regarding security-related and humanitarian issues. This annex provides policy guidance and tasking concerning the public affairs coverage of TG 667.2 operations. It includes coordinating instructions for releasing information and visual products, news coverage, media support and, support of the internal information and outreach engagement programs.
- c. Communication in the Information Environment.
 - (1) **Host Nation.** Belesia's state-run and public media compete with private and opposition publications and broadcasters. Internet, television and mobile phone networks are more accessible to much of the population in the AO, notably in urban areas. TV is the most- popular medium. In more isolated rural areas and islands, traditional communication print and media remain the most influential communication tools. Belesian government

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bodies are in the lead for shaping and influencing their publics' opinions regarding progress made in re-establishing regional development and security. TG 667.2 will deliver support and assistance in this area to local authorities. TG 667.2 PA effort is aimed at attaining and maintaining popular support for the mission at the higher level by explaining the goals and legitimacy of the UN-sanctioned IBSAF mission and of TG 667.2's intentions, actions and achievements as well as by developing a media campaign based on success stories that appeal to the public.

- (2) **International Media.** All personnel must understand the power of the international media and the importance it plays in maintaining support for ongoing operations. The international media, to include traditional journalists, documentarians and reputable bloggers, will significantly influence western public and political opinion. The international media is strongly augmented by local stringers, who will accompany the other local media representatives at media functions. These stringers will feed the international media from Coalition events as well as from adversary spokespersons.
- (3) **Olvana.** Transparency in political and social debate is subject to extremely tight governmental control in Olvana, resulting in the populace being extremely hard to influence from external government and organisation. The Olvanan government continues to use a wide range of media as an integral part of its activities to influence the populace and international actors. Olvana and its affiliated partners and proxies will attempt to shape the information environment based on their interests.

d. **Core Audiences.**

- (1) Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) members, countries and regional policymakers, opinion leaders, publics, service members, and families.
- (2) Regional, national, and international News Media Representatives (NMRs).
- (3) Belesian and Olvanan public.
- (4) TG 667.2 TCN service members and civilian staff.
- (5) Host Nations Defence Forces.
- (6) International Organisations (IO) and NGOs.

e. **Assumptions.**

- (1) The Olvanan government and the Olvanan Armed Forces can be expected to mount a massive, carefully constructed, well-orchestrated, worldwide propaganda campaign as part of its military campaign.
- (2) Olvana will use political, economic, cultural, and military issues and events as opportunities to discredit Coalition resolve, military capability and intentions in the free press. Olvana will use the media to further its propaganda goal to weaken public support and confidence in Coalition military resolve and/or intentions.

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- (3) Non-state organisations and proxies associated with Olvana can be

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expected to use the media to further their goals.

2. **Mission.** TG 667.2 plans and executes active communications and military public affairs activities in support of Operation CERIUM STEAL (as part of Operation STEEL SENTINEL) to provide responsive, timely, and accurate information about TG 667.2 activities to both domestic and foreign audiences, and to counter enemy misinformation to support the goals and objectives of the Commander.

3. **Execution.**

a. **Concept of Operations.** PA policy is maximum disclosure with minimum delay, but consistent with operational security and Privacy Act provisions. PA will assist in the creation of conditions that maintain Coalition integrity and the confidence of TCNs as well as the International Community in TG 667.2 operations by:

- (1) Providing timely information and news products that demonstrate the core messages;
- (2) Providing timely information about TG 667.2 operations to public and news media representatives and facilitate news media operations;
- (3) Providing internal command information programs and products to keep units and family members informed;
- (4) Counteracting effects of Olvanan propaganda attempts through an active PA posture by informing and educating external and internal publics of the actual situation and facts;
- (5) Conducting media embed program consistent with AS and/or TCN media embed directives;
- (6) Facilitating outreach engagement initiatives to inform and educate local, national and international opinion leaders, academics, and defence-issues analysts; and
- (7) Maintaining and managing TG 667.2 social media.

b. **PA Effects.**

- (1) TG 667.2 is recognised as a stabilising force by national and international audiences.
- (2) TCNs and public audiences receive timely updates of TG 667.2 mission progress and significant events to include enemy and friendly casualty status without compromising operational security.
- (3) International recognition and support for the IBSAF Coalition is strong and unwavering.
- (4) Olvanan propaganda is effectively countered by increased accurate and independent reporting from international, national, and local news agencies.
- (5) International public understands that Olvanan people are not the targets of TG 667.2 military efforts.

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- (6) TG 667.2 forces and TCNs are informed of mission progress and critical issues of force protection and safety and efforts to sustain health, welfare, and morale.
- (7) Increased reporting of defeats suffered by Olvanan military forces by international, national, and local media.
- (8) Key audiences recognise TG 667.2 will transition authority to follow-on forces or Host Nations for stability or peace support operations on Panay once security conditions permit.

c. TG 667.2 PA Tasks.

- (1) Coordinate across the TG 667.2 staff sections and Formation Commands to synchronize communications efforts.
- (2) Provide PA guidance to Formation Commands.
- (3) Prepare for media coverage throughout all phases of the operation, including social media coverage and support to outreach engagement initiatives.
- (4) Plan for and support the media embed program (to be led by CJTF 667 J09).
- (5) Inform public of IBSAF initiatives and diplomatic stances.
- (6) Coordinate with national reps of TCNs as appropriate.
- (7) Consolidate daily TG 667.2 PA SITREP.
- (8) Inform public in order to support TG 667.2 mission and objectives.
- (9) Illustrate TG 667.2 units' capabilities and resolve, as well as their professionalism through external and internal media coverage, social media outlets, and visual imagery.
- (10) Support internal communications efforts to reach and inform internal audiences and protect them from enemy misinformation and propaganda.

d. PA Support to Inform and Influence Activities.

- (1) Coordinate daily messages and talking points consistent with strategic objectives.
- (2) Coordinate efforts to counter Olvanan propaganda by having international news media presence in critical locations to accurately report events.
- (3) Coordinate to ensure PA activities do not compromise or conflict with TG 667.2 Information Operations.
- (4) Coordinate and focus media attention on operational and strategic isolation of Olvanan regime, destruction of SFMEF military capability in Panay, and TG 667.2 humanitarian assistance efforts.

e. Coordinating Instructions to Formation Command and Subordinate Units PAOs.

- (1) All Formation Commands ~~OFFICIAL~~ daily Public Affairs Situation Reports

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(PASITREP) to TG 667.2 PAO. TG 667.2 PAO will consolidate all reports.

- (2) Keep TG 667.2 Public Affairs Officer (PAO) informed of any critical information requirements such as media requests, military and civilian casualties, large- scale/significant incidents, injuries to PAO personnel or NMRs.
- (3) Lead, plan, coordinate, and conduct operational and tactical PA activities within their TAORs.
- (4) Obtain still and video imagery of events/activities and send to TG 667.2 PAO for approval and release.
- (5) Safeguard classified information and imagery by retaining the release authority at the military public affairs office.
- (6) Key Leader Engagements (KLE) are critical to the success of all PA operations. They should be used as frequently and in as many situations and mediums as possible.
- (7) Provide military public affairs support to the TG 667.2 command to highlight the successes of the operation to Target Audiences through internal and external media coverage, KLE, and visual imagery.
- (8) Keep TG 667.2 military personnel and family members informed; provide the local and International audiences truthful information through News and TCN Department of Defence Media Representatives.
- (9) Support higher level PA plans to counter misinformation, gain, and maintain the support of the Local and International Communities and deter further Olvanan aggression.
- (10) Be prepared to receive media embeds and provide support to media during the operation.
- (11) Designate Unit Public Affairs Representatives (UPAR) for each Bn sized element. UPARs are responsible for briefing commanders on current Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) and ensuring PAG is disseminated and units are prepared to facilitate media engagements. All appropriate military personnel should be provided with Talking Points prior to media engagements to help facilitate communication synchronisation and ensure they understand the overarching intent on the mission.
- (12) Ensure that subordinate commanders and PA personnel are familiar with communications, transportation and other media support requirements; approved PAG and ground rules concerning this operation.
- (13) Do not interfere with News Media Representatives (NMR) as long as they do not interfere with the execution of the mission or threaten to violate OPSEC.
- (14) Advise TG 667.2 PAO immediately of news media exposure to classified information or any possible media ground rules violations.
- (15) TG 667.2 personnel are ~~not authorized~~ to confiscate media cameras, film,

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audio/videotape, or reporter's notebooks. Any questions regarding the specific application of this policy should be referred to the TG 667.2 PAO.

- (16) All entitled media are to have approved credentials before joining any unit with TG 667.2 PAO task organisation. Lists of accredited and registered media will be provided to the Formation Command and subordinate PAOs on a daily basis.
- (17) Provide TG 667.2 PAO with a press kit for their Formation or unit, to include a formation/unit fact sheet and Commander's biography with photo.
- (18) Utilise best practices in media interviews when talking to reporters.
- (19) Following official announcement of deployment, units may acknowledge they have been notified for a deployment; however, they may not release specific details that may violate OPSEC. Commanders are encouraged to release information if appropriate and PAOs should be prepared to address media requests in support of family readiness efforts.
- (20) In the event of a large scale incident, critical information leak, capture/kill of a key leader, or mass casualty situation which may require communications consequence management, all key information (5W's) must be forwarded immediately to TG 667.2 PAO.
- (21) In the event of a crisis, the TG 667.2 PAO will coordinate with higher headquarters to determine release authority and appropriate public statements to make.
- (22) Requests for public affairs information (RFIs). Submit all RFIs to TG 667.2.
- (23) Support for News Media Representatives.
 - (a) Media Escort.
 1. Accreditation. Requirements for accreditation will be established by the Coalition/national-level defence agencies and supported by TG 667.2 PAO through the CJTF 667 J09. As a minimum, the CJTF 667 J09 will institute procedures to determine the legitimacy of individuals as *bona fide* media representatives entitled to receive support afforded by TCN and TG 667.2 forces. News media representatives must have passports and working visas identifying them as journalists to fulfil CJTF 667 accreditation requirements.
 2. Assignment. TG 667.2 G09, in consultation with subordinate unit PAOs, will determine the assignment of NMR to specific subordinate units within the AO to preclude overloading any single unit. Where possible, media representatives will be assigned to their preferred location.
 3. Facilities. TG 667.2 units will provide media embeds with adequate accommodation, meals, and transportation. A degree of discomfort ~~is~~ ^{is} expected by embeds and will not be

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treated any better than their host unit personnel.

4. **Inoculations**. NMR accompanying TG 667.2 in the field will be required to have the same inoculations, at their own expense, administered to military personnel participating in the operations.
5. **Communications**. TG 667.2 and major subordinate commands will provide communications services free of charge to civilian media representatives when commercial facilities are not available. Transmission by military communication facilities will be on a non-interference basis. News media will be advised of the status of their traffic.
6. **Transportation**. TG 667.2 will provide accredited media representatives with military transportation into and within the AO when such travel is in connection with assignments to cover the operation and when commercial transportation is restricted into the area or unavailable.

(b) **Security**. The presence of news media representatives in operational areas will require the following considerations concerning security:

1. Procedures will be implemented to preclude the unauthorised release of classified or sensitive information. NMRs violating embargo agreements will be immediately dis-embedded.
2. Media representatives can access operations, intelligence, and other classified areas only in case of strong need and under strict escort and control.
3. Individuals are not authorised to release information to media nor are they permitted to agree to a personal interview without prior coordination with the PAO supporting that unit or command. When the PAO has coordinated the media visit, personnel may grant media requests for interviews and provide only unclassified information in interviews, briefings, and written materials. Do not make "off the record" statements to media representatives.

(c) **Audio-Visual**. TG 667.2 will assist the media as necessary in obtaining audio- visual coverage.

(d) Embedded media will abide by established ground rules on releasable and non- releasable information.

4. **Sustainment**.

- a. **Administration**. Media are required to carry their own equipment.
- b. **Logistics**.
 - (1) Non-embedded media (Unilateral) covering our operations should be "self-sustaining". TG 667.2 PAO will coordinate additional logistical support to media as required. Intent is to maximize use of Host Nation Support (HNS).

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Host Nation Contract Support is used if support/service is not available through military logistic means or through HNS.

- (2) Media embeds will have their own protective equipment. Military embeds will be provided with military transportation (ground or air) into and within the AO while covering the operation.
- (3) Embedded NMRs will be entitled to medical care provided to TG 667.2 personnel in the event of life threatening injuries.

5. Command and Signal.

- a. Media will use commercial means of communications if available. If commercial lines are not available, official military means will be authorised. Military satellite transmission facilities can be provided when operationally feasible.
- b. Media may use independent satellite uplinks for transmission of products from field locations when the on- scene commander determines transmission will not violate OPSEC or compromise an ongoing operation.
- c. TG 667.2 PAO co-locates with TG 667.2 HQ.

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