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CJTF 667 OPORD 01

COPY X OF X

CJTF 667

DDTTTTL MON YYYY (d+XX)

OPS 01/XX

OPORD 01/XX – OPERATION STEEL SENTINEL

References:

- A. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 8873.
- B. UNSCR 8882.
- C. UNSCR 8887.
- D. Status of Forces Agreement – AUSTRALIA/BELESIA

Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU.

1. Situation:
 - a. Background. Olvana (OV) invaded the island of Panay of the Belesian Federation on Date XXXXXX, claiming to protect the Olvanan diaspora of PANAY from further persecution because of civil unrest in PANAY. This unilateral act was condemned by the international community, with the UNSC passing Resolution 8873 (Ref A) authorising the raising of the International Belesian Security Assistance Force (IBSAF) to remove OV forces from sovereign Belesian territories. IBSAF (from hereon-called CJTF 667) is an AUSTRALIAN led multinational force authorised to conduct military operations in BELESIA to remove the OV military presence on Belesian territory. Following a short but bloody conflict, the OV Southern Fleet Marine Expeditionary Force (SFMEF) was defeated in PANAY, with an armistice signed by all belligerents for the remaining SFMEF to be repatriated from Belesian territory. The SFMEF was allowed to repatriate its forces relatively intact minus any damaged or destroyed equipment not able to be transported under the conditions of the armistice. Following the signing of this armistice, the UNSC released Resolutions 8882 and 8887 authorising the formation of a peacekeeping force the UN Stabilisation Mission in Belesia (UNSTAB). UNSTAB was formed from IBSAF, with AUSTRALIA continuing to be the lead nation. It is now two months since the end of hostilities (V+60) with the SFMEF. There has been much post-conflict work in providing security to PANAY, re-establishing local governance, repatriating PW/CPERS/human remains and IDPs, clearance of unexploded ordnance (UXO) including clearance of OV protective minefields, reconstruction of basic infrastructure and providing humanitarian aid to the civilian population through the growing number of NGOs and International Organisations (IO). Whilst the threat from OV is now diminished, the slow transition to pre-war stability has allowed non-state actors with an agenda to foment discontent amongst the civilian population. This is compounded by the slow re-establishment of a strong

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local government to enforce civil law across all of PANAY. The Visayan People's Front (VPF) supported the efforts of the SFMEF during the conflict and are now greatly diminished. Their ability to conduct offensive action to meet their political aims of an independent Panay (and the larger Visayan Island group) has been sharply curtailed with the defeat of the SFMEF (and the supply of arms and munitions from OV). Other non-state actors have capitalised on the power vacuum in the more remote areas of Panay to grow their influence and power. These non-state actors include the insurgent Free Sulu Movement (FSM), and criminal organisations such as the Tantoco Cartel and the Black Societies. The Belesian Federation Defense Force (BFDF) has provided a small force (1x Infantry Battalion) along with the Belesian Constabulary to provide security to work alongside UNSTAB. However, the ethnic tensions between native Panayans and Belesians remain, and may curtail the effectiveness of BFDF units in PANAY.

- b. Strategic Aim. The aim of the international community is to:
- (1) Create a free, safe, secure and stable environment in the region.
 - (2) Facilitate the continuation of Belesian democratic national governance and developmental programs.
- c. Strategic Objectives. In order to achieve the desired end state, the strategic objectives of the international intervention include:
- (1) Restore a secure and stable environment throughout the BX Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO).
 - (2) Effect force protection for coalition military forces deployed throughout the JFAO.
 - (3) Assist the government of BX to strengthen the capacities of their national security forces and institutions to enforce central control.
 - (4) Preserve and enforce the freedom of navigation throughout the JFAO.
 - (5) Support UN Agencies, International Organizations (IOs) and NGOs within capabilities and limitations in order to preserve human life and alleviate the suffering of IDPs and refugees within the JFAO.
 - (6) Gradually reduce the size, role and profile of the IBSAF contribution. This process will be guided by reviews of tasks, environment, threat, risks, follow-on forces and Host Nation (HN) capacities as part of a Transition and Exit Strategy that is linked to the achievement of the desired military strategic endstate.
- d. CJTF Center of Gravity. The operational center of gravity is assessed as the CJTF ability to provide security, which allows the international community and HN to re-establish the rule of law, reconstruction of infrastructure, and provide critical humanitarian aid to the civilian population of Panay.

- e. Operational Objectives. With the support and agreement of the international community, UNSTAB will deploy peacekeeping forces into Panay (based off forces from IBSAF with augmentation from contributing nations). The force, which remains as Combined Joint Task Force 667 (CJTF 667) will continue to deploy under the authority of UNSCR 8873 and 8882 (refs A and B). The revised objectives of CJTF 667 are as follows:
- (1) Assist humanitarian efforts and IO/NGO activities in BX.
 - (2) Assist the government of BX to re-establish and maintain a safe and secure environment to facilitate the continuance of democratic government institutions and programmes.
 - (3) Conduct and facilitate reconstruction efforts to restore critical facilities and infrastructure post-conflict.
 - (4) Conduct battlefield clearance of any UXO, both land and maritime.
 - (5) Support any applicable International Criminal Court (ICC) investigations of crimes against humanity through the preservation and collection of evidence.
- f. Desired Operational Endstate. The Desired End State remains the establishment of a sufficiently secure and stable environment in the previously occupied BX islands and improved capability of BX security forces such that state-sponsored hostilities have ceased, territorial borders are secure, humanitarian assistance programs operate unhindered and transition / handover to a HN follow-on security force is complete. A safe and secure environment in BX exists when:
- (1) It allows IOs and NGOs safe and unrestricted access to the BX population.
 - (2) It encourages the return of IDPs and refugees.
 - (3) It fosters the rapid re-establishment of representative government institutions.
 - (4) It allows economic reconstruction and development.
- g. Limitations.
- (1) Constraints. In conducting its operations, CJTF 667 will:
 - (a) Minimise the use of scarce BX resources.
 - (b) Minimise collateral damage and civilian casualties on PANAY.
 - (c) Work closely with the UN to facilitate the work of UN agencies, IOs and NGOs.
 - (d) Minimise the demand on BX resources.
 - (e) Operate in accordance with the SOFA with BX (ref D).

- (2) Restraints. In conducting its operations, TG 667.2 will not:
 - (a) Disrupt the use of civilian air routes in and out of areas outside of the JFAO.
 - (b) Adversely affect the BX economy more than is necessary.
 - (c) Disrupt maritime traffic in the region outside of the JFAO.
 - (d) Exceed its mandate and involved itself with internal disputes within the Belesian Federation.
- h. Operational Areas.
- (1) JFAO. No change.
- i. Threat Assessment. See Annex B for more detail.
- (1) General. The Pacific region encompassing the countries of Olvana (OV), South Torbia (RT), Belesia (BX), Gabal (GX) and North Torbia (NT) have been involved with a tense game of power since the end of European colonisation. OV has aggressively sought to impose its position as the regional hegemon, with expansion into recognised international waters in the South China Sea. Similarly, nations such as RT, GX and BX view the shift as an opportunity to grow their influence and develop their economic ties both in the region and with external partners. Control of critical mineral and fishing resources, manufacturing, and unfettered transport of goods in the region's shipping lanes is a key point of tension for all. The border between NT and RT has been a historical flash point with both nations involved in a recent border clash that has resulted in an uneasy armistice. Within the states of the region, groups that had previously seen no opportunity for influence view the instability as a path to develop their voices. Internal conflict within each state is a persistent and potentially destabilising factor as government's position for legitimacy and consolidate their power.
- (2) Country of BX. The Federated States of Belesia is a relatively new democracy in the region. The turbulence of its independence from colonial rule continues to create stability challenges throughout its many member-islands. Political turmoil, popular unrest, and widespread terrorism combine to create a volatile environment for this young federation. One of the few stabilising factors is the development of economic opportunities and trade, in particular the exploitation of BX's rich natural resources. Despite progress in this area, sufficient infrastructure and business processes have yet to be developed, hampering the further BX progress. The most significant development of the Belesian Federation Defense

Force is the formalisation and aggregation of member islands' inconsistent security efforts. This standardisation and professionalism is most evident in the establishment of a national constabulary and a national guard.

Maintaining a balance between enforcing nationhood and preserving a degree of local autonomy has been the major challenge to national policy implementation and military stationing efforts.

- j. Friendly Forces. CJTF 667 will operate within the established JFAO and will be led by AS. CJTF 667 consists of a HQ, HQ, MCC, LCC, ACC (OPCON), FSG, and assigned BFDF troops OPCON. Troop contributing nations currently include NEW ZEALAND, FIJI, TONGA, PAPUA NEW GUINEA, SINGAPORE, JAPAN, INDONESIA, MALAYSIA and THAILAND. Other like-minded nations may contribute forces or provide materiel support at a future date. As lead nation, AUSTRALIA will provide critical force enablers. AS will collaborate with BX in the provision of strategic-level support such as intelligence and logistics. The composition of CJTF 667 is as follows:

(1) HQ.

- (a) Commander. Lieutenant General XXXXXXXX (AS).
- (b) Deputy Commander (Operations). Rear Admiral XXXXXXXXXX (NZ).

(2) Maritime Component Command (MCC).

- (a) AUSTRALIA – Maritime Component Commander and HQ; Maritime Task Group (MTG) consisting of one Frigate (FFH), two Patrol Boats (PB), and two Mine Hunters (MHC).
- (b) NEW ZEALAND – One Frigate (FFH) attached to the MTG.

(3) Land Component Command (LCC).

- (a) AUSTRALIA – Land Component Command based on Bde HQ, Composite Combat Brigade and enablers including one RAN Clearance Dive Team.
- (b) NEW ZEALAND – One Mechanised Infantry Battalion.
- (c) FIJI – One Infantry Battalion.
- (d) INDONESIA/MALAYSIA/TONGA/PNG/SINGAPORE/THAILAND – One Infantry Battalion.

(4) Air Component Command (ACC).

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- (a) AUSTRALIA – Air Component Commander and HQ, 4x P-8 Poseidon, 4x C-17 Globemaster, 4x C-130J Hercules, and 5x C-27J Spartan. In addition, the following DCSD elms, 2x ECSS, 1x ADG Sqn, and 1x Airfield Engineer Sqn. The ACC will be in support of CJTF 667, but will remain under command of HQJOC.
 - (5) Forces Support Group (FSG).
 - (a) AUSTRALIA – HQ 17 Bde, one reinforced Force Support Battalion (FSB), and one Role 2 Enhanced (R2E) Field Hospital.
 - k. International Organisations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Some IOs and NGOs are currently operating in BX. Their presence is expected to increase dramatically once a more secure operating environment is created. See Annex Q for further details.
 - l. National Command Elements (NCE). No change.
 - m. National Support Elements. Each TCN may deploy an NSE or equivalent capability. The headquarters of those elements will be located in GENERAL SANTOS CITY, collocated with the HQ of the JFLOGCC. JFLOGCC will retain coordinating authority over all NSEs.
 - n. Reserves. No change.
 - o. BX. BX has agreed to act as the HN to support the deployment and staging of CJTF 667.
 - p. Rotation of Forces. No change.
2. **Mission.** No change.
3. **Execution.**
- a. Commander's Analysis. The defeat and withdrawal of the SFMEF from Panay has been a tremendous effort by the Coalition Forces and the International Community. It has been more than two months since the end of hostilities, but the work of ensuring that the previously occupied territories of BX returning to normalcy is equally as important. The transition of CJTF 667 from IBSAF into UNSTAB fundamentally changes the main role of the CJTF. With this change in role, the CJTF has been restructured to meet the new challenges of re-establishing Belesian authority and creating a safe and secure environment in the JFAO. UNSCR 8882 provides the mandate for UNSTAB to operate as a peacekeeping force within Belesia. CJTF 667 will continue to act with resolve in meeting this UN mandate. It is important that our actions continue to be conducted within international guidelines and that we are not drawn into

potential internal Belesian conflicts. Having said this, CJTF 667 must act in a manner that permits the rapid return to a stable economic environment, with minimal negative impact on the strategic infrastructure of BX. The timeline for handover to BX authority will depend greatly on political decisions made at the UN level. Consequently, there may be further force rotations of CJTF 667.

- b. Commander's Intent. CJTF 667 will provide a safe and secure environment within the JFAO to enable a return to rule of law. This in turn will enable the International Community to effectively assist with the rebuilding of Panay, the provision of humanitarian aid and the prosecution of any alleged war crimes. We must remember that we are here at the request of the BX government and the UN and must remain neutral and not become involved in any potential internal Belesian conflicts. CJTF 667 will utilise all forces within its command to meet the UNSCR 8882 goal of establishing a safe and secure environment for the transition of authority back to BX. The end state is a smooth transfer of CJTF 667 responsibilities to a designated follow-on force/authority, with CJTF 667 forces returned to national control.
- c. Main Effort: The main effort is the establishment of a safe and secure environment within the JFAO to enable a return to BX government authority.
- d. Concept of Operations: OSS will be conducted in five phases as follows:
 - (1) Phase 0 – **Shaping** (D-60 – D-11) - Completed
 - (1) Phase 1 – **Denial** (D-10 – D-1) - Completed
 - (2) Phase 2 – **Lodgement** (D-Day – D+2) - Completed
 - (3) Phase 3 – **Neutralise** (D+3 – D+14) - Completed
 - (4) Phase 4 – **Transition** (D+15 onwards)
 - (a) Main Effort: Transition to UN Peacekeeping.
 - (b) Supporting Efforts:
 - i. Conduct Stability Operations (STABOPS).
 - ii. Conduct Information Operations (IO) to support strategic messaging.
 - iii. Conduct Freedom of Navigation Ops (FONOPS) in international waters.
 - iv. Conduct Anti-Piracy Maritime Security (MARSEC) patrols.
 - v. Conduct mine clearance operations.
 - vi. Conduct and facilitate reconstructions efforts in PANAY.
 - (c) Endstate:

- i. Transition of authority will have been conducted between CJTF 667 and BX authority.
- b. Limitations.
 - (1) Restraints. CJTF 667 cannot be involved with potential internal Belesian conflict.
 - (2) Constraints. Defensive ROE will be utilised.
- c. Common Tasks
 - (1) During all phases ensure the security of coalition air, maritime and land lines of communication.
 - (2) Support the BX government and established IO/NGOs in their ongoing humanitarian efforts while remaining cognizant of the need to create and maintain a safe and secure environment.
- h. Groupings and Tasks. See Annex A for details on C2 and groupings.
 - (1) JFMCC (TG 667.1)
 - (a) Phase 0 (Shaping) - Completed
 - (b) Phase 1 (Denial) - Completed
 - (c) Phase 2 (Lodgement) - Completed
 - (d) Phase 3 (Neutralise) - Completed
 - (e) Phase 4 (Transition)
 - i. BPT HOTO OPCON of JFMCC functions to Belesian Navy.
 - ii. BPT conduct maritime STABOPS.
 - iii. BPT conduct FONOPS.
 - iv. BPT conduct MARSEC.
 - v. BPT conduct mine clearance.
 - (2) LCC (TG 667.2)
 - (a) Phase 0 (Shaping) - Completed
 - (b) Phase 1 (Denial) - Completed
 - (c) Phase 2 (Lodgement) - Completed
 - (d) Phase 3 (Neutralise) - Completed
 - (e) Phase 4 (Transition)
 - i. Conduct COIN/STABOPS.
 - ii. BPT support IO/NGO efforts.

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- iii. BPT HOTO OPCON of LCC functions to BX military.
- iv. Coordinate engineer project planning, contract construction, real estate acquisition, environment and infrastructure support for CJTF 667.
- v. Coordinate general engineering support for CJTF 667.
- vi. Coordinate HN engineer support.
- vii. BPT assist BX authorities with the repair of critical infrastructure that affects CJTF 667 operations.
- viii. BPT coordinate engineer support to create a safe environment in BX (including UXO clearance).

(3) ACC (TG 640)

- (a) Phase 0 (Shaping) - Completed
- (b) Phase 1 (Denial) - Completed
- (c) Phase 2 (Lodgement) - Completed
- (d) Phase 3 (Neutralise) - Completed
- (e) Phase 4 (Transition)
 - i. BPT support IO/NGO efforts.
 - ii. BPT conduct maritime surveillance and SAR.
 - iii. BPT handover OPCON of ACC functions to BX Military.

(4) FSG (TG 667.5).

- (a) All phases.
 - i. Establish APOD and SPOD in BX to facilitate the deployment of the CJTF 667 – Completed.
 - ii. Negotiate and arrange for HN and HN contracting support for CJTF 667.
 - iii. Coordinate the deployment of CJTF into the JFAO.
 - iv. Conduct ongoing sustainment operations.
 - v. Coordinate support requirements for all component commands.
 - vi. Manage the deployment of Role 2 and 3 medical facilities into BX.
 - vii. Negotiate and arrange for additional HN medical support from BX.

- viii. Conduct ongoing medical support for CJTF-OIG.
 - ix. Coordinate medical support requirements for all component commands.
- i. Coordinating Instructions.
 - (1) Timings.
 - (a) TBA.
 - (2) Transfer of Authority.
 - (a) BX Forces. BX's SHC will continue to command national forces within their borders but will OPCON selected forces to UN control as needed.
 - (b) ACC. No change.
 - (c) Troop Contributing Nations. No change.
 - (d) Sustainment Forces. Undeclared Combat Service Support resources that are not transferred OPCON as part of the combat force will be transferred TACON to FSG for space allocation, movement control, local defense and coordination. NSEs will remain under national command while deployed in BX but FSG will have coordinating authority over NSE.
 - (3) PWs and Captured Persons (CPERS). No change.
 - (4) Reports and Returns. No change.
- 4. **Admin and Logistics (Sustainment)**
 - a. Outline Concept.
 - (1) Sustainment support to CJTF 6674 will be coordinated and led by the FSG. While TCNs retain overall responsibility for the sustainment of national formations and units, FSG retains coordinating authority.
 - (2) The APOD and SPOD at ZAMBOANGA will contract and relocate to GENERAL SANTOS CITY. All force flow and logistic support will utilise the APOD/SPOD at GENERAL SANTOS CITY.
 - b. Movements. No change.
 - c. Medical Support. The concept of Health Support (HS) is detailed within the Health Support Order at Annex AA. HS to CJTF 667 will be provided by ADF and Coalition medical capabilities coordinated by the CJTF 667 J07. HQJFNZ is to retain oversight for all health care delivery on overseas operations. While TCN will deploy with limited integral HS and retain responsibility for definitive care of their troops, provision of deployed HS to Coalition and HN personnel may occur IAW the Medical Rules of Eligibility (MEDROE) detailed in the HSO.

- (1) Role 1 HS will be provided by Coalition integral capabilities.
- (2) Role 2 and Role 2 (Enhanced) HS will be provided on an area support basis with the deployment of up to two R2E capabilities (from 17 Bde and RAAF – 1 EHS) scalable dependent on phase and expected dependency.
- (3) Role 3 HS will be provided by the NSB (Royal Darwin Hospital or other civilian facility).

4. **Command and Signals.**

a. Command.

- (1) COMD CJTF 667, Lieutenant General XXXXXXXXXXXX (AS).
- (2) Deputy Commander, Rear Admiral XXXXXXXX (NZ).
- (3) COMD MCC, Captain XXXXXX (AS).
- (4) COMD LCC, Brigadier XXXXXX (AS).
- (5) COMD ACC, Air Commodore XXXXXX (AS).
- (6) COMD FSG, Colonel XXXX (AS).

b. Headquarters locations. (see Annex C overlay)

- (1) HQ CJTF 667 no change.
- (2) HQ MCC will relocate to GENERAL SANTOS CITY SPOD (MAKAR WHARF).
- (3) HQ LCC will establish at ILOILO APOD.
- (4) HQ ACC no change.
- (5) HQ JACCE no change.
- (6) HQ FSG no change.

c. Communication and Information Systems (CIS). No change.

5. ACKNOWLEDGE: All Ack.

Commander's last name

MAJGEN

COMD

Annexes:

Annex A.	TG 667.2.1 Task Organisation
Annex B.	Intelligence
Annex C.	Concept of Operations
Annex D.	ISR
Annex E.	Maritime Operations
Annex F.	Land Operations
Annex G.	Air Operations
Annex H.	Special Operations (omitted)
Annex I.	Joint Effects, Targeting and Offensive Support
Annex J.	Information Operations
Annex K.	Legal
Annex L.	Rules of Engagement
Annex M.	Military Public Affairs
Annex N.	Operations Risk Management (omitted)
Annex O.	Force Protection
Annex P.	Blank
Annex Q.	Civil Military Operations
Annex R.	Logistics Support Order
Annex S.	Environmental Protection Policy (omitted)
Annex T.	Orders and Support Document Formats
Annex U.	Communications and Information Systems Support Plan
Annex V.	Reports and Returns
Annex W.	Visits Policy (omitted)
Annex X.	Movement Orders
Annex Y.	Force Preparation (omitted)
Annex Z.	Evaluations and Assessment (omitted)
Annex AA.	Health Support
Annex AB.	Space Operations

Annex AC. Engineering Support
Annex AD. PW/CPERS Handling Policy
Annex AE. Gender Advisor Requirements





INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT PLAN

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: **Zulu**.

1. Situation

a. Characteristics of the Operational Environment (OE)

(1) See Appendix 1 - 4 and ODIN.

b. Threat / stakeholder – Tantoco Cartel

- (1) The Tantoco Cartel operates throughout the region. It is involved in almost every type of criminal activity imaginable: drug and weapons smuggling, extortion, motor vehicle theft, illegal gambling, money laundering, counterfeiting, and murder-for-hire. The majority of the Cartel's operations are non-violent, in particular the Cartel has taken advantage of the technological advantages in South Torbia to jump to the forefront of cybercrime. Another major activity is theft and smuggling, ranging from high-value items of military origin, to a range of narcotics. Their assets are primarily civilian in nature, such as sedans, vans, trucks, twelve private boats and four light aircraft. Their arsenal includes pistols, assault rifles, sniper rifles, light machine guns and anti-armoured weapons. Led by Hilmi Tantoco, a 67-year old native of South Torbia, the cartel is estimated to number approximately 950 members, divided into two crime families plus two drug cartels. The relationship with the other significant crime organization in the region, the Black Societies, is dynamic. In many cases, the Tantoco Cartel and the Black Societies have tacit agreements to leave control of any given island to one group or another. However, the two have clashed over disputed territory. The power vacuum in Panay may be seen as an opportunity for expansion.
- (2) During the conflict between the SFMEF and IBSAF, the Tantoco Cartel was not a significant stakeholder, members were instructed to overall maintain a low profile. However, it is known that where viable, criminal operations were maintained or even increased during the conflict, taking advantage of the situation. In particular this included exploitation of IDP's, smuggling, theft / looting, and settlement of grievances (including contract killings).
- (3) It is assessed that the current strength and resources of the Tantoco Cartel in Panay are similar to the status at the beginning of the conflict. If anything, it may be slightly more because of looting and other gains during the conflict.
- (4) Overall, the Tantoco Cartel is a well-resourced, well-organized and motivated criminal organization of approximately 950 members. They are assessed as the most significant threat to law and order in post conflict Panay, whether as a direct result of their criminal enterprises, or as a destabilizing flow on effect to the general population. With a temporary power vacuum in Panay, the

cartel is likely to use this opportunity to best effect, increasing their operations and influence.

(5) Tantoco Cartel Strengths

- (a) Of all stakeholder groups in Panay, the Tantoco Cartel is the largest, with an estimated 950 members. It is well resourced in terms of vehicles and weapons, and these can be easily replenished. The structure of the organization is not unlike a terrorist organization, with four primary groups (two families and two cartels) which can all operate independently, but with support from cartel level teams such as finance or infowar.
- (b) Most importantly, the nature of any criminal organization is that its members may be difficult to identify, let alone engage. When identified, there is a strong possibility that members can simply disappear into the neighborhood, thanks to loyalties or intimidation of the local citizens. UNSTAB has clearly defined ROE, which stakeholders will no doubt exploit to their advantage. The cartel is particularly adept at exploiting the legal situation. In a post conflict zone, legal due process will still apply, including matters as complex as appropriate chain of evidence. There will likely be many instances of a known Person Of Interest (POI) being identified and apprehended, only to be released without a warrant or sufficient evidence.
- (c) As per many criminal organizations, the Tantoco Cartel is highly dynamic, able to adjust locations / operations / processes as needed to thwart the authorities. Without the bureaucracy of a military or government organization, the nimble nature of the Tantoco Cartel will make it a challenging threat to neutralize. As UNSTAB TTPs are brought to bear, they will be able to adjust quickly – even if the solutions are “low tech”.

(6) Tantoco Cartel Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities

- (a) A significant weakness of the Tantoco Cartel, as per any criminal organization, is its personnel. Widely varying levels of experience, knowledge, training, intelligence, abilities, professionalism, and loyalty will affect operations at all levels. Members will be vulnerable to blackmail, corruption, intimidation, and in fighting. From an UNSTAB / UNPOL perspective, members may be susceptible to plea – bargain arrangements, witness protections schemes, or other enticements.
- (b) A lack of professionalism, resources, training, and processes will hamper the operations of the Tantoco Cartel, especially when compared to the technology of UNSTAB. The military coalition forces of UNSTAB will be utilizing resources and methodologies including counterintelligence, UAV's and EW. It is unlikely that the Tantoco Cartel will have measures

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in place to counter these, their response will no doubt be to devise “low tech” solutions.

(7) Tantoco Cartel Courses of Action (COAs)

- (a) Most Likely Course of Action. The Tantoco Cartel will take advantage of the post conflict situation in Panay, particularly regarding disrupted law and order, to significantly increase their operations for immediate and future financial gain. Specific objectives may include, but are not limited to: exploiting returning IDP's, particularly at checkpoints; exploiting vulnerable persons, particularly those who have lost homes / jobs; profiteering off limited supplies of basic items such as potable water, food, shelter; taking advantage of financial aspects of reconstruction efforts, particularly corrupt local officials; embedding themselves in reconstruction projects as a long term strategy; setting up new structures / staff / logistics for future criminal operations such as smuggling; settlement of outstanding grievances while law and order are fluid, in particular setting up “protection rackets” and neutralising any outstanding threats / competitors. Particularly noting the current nation building status in Panay, they are expected to attempt to install members into key BX government position while there is a power vacuum, with a long-term goal of gaining power via corrupt officials. It is unlikely that the cartel will continue with widespread looting now that combat operations are complete. It is unlikely that the cartel will directly confront UNPOL / UNSTAB, preferring to focus on their criminal operations in the background. However, if UNSTAB is perceived to be targeting the Tantoco Cartel, retaliatory actions may be conducted, if nothing else than to “save face”. It is possible that the cartel will encourage a deterioration in law and order, if this is determined to be beneficial to their criminal operations. This is likely to manifest in the form of initiating and supporting protests, and if necessary, embedding elements to escalate peaceful protests into violent riots.
- (b) Most Dangerous Course of Action. The Tantoco Cartel actively promotes and seeks to prolong a state of lawlessness in Panay. This is because they have determined that a state of impacted law and order is highly beneficial to their operations. Their specific objectives may include, but are not limited to: targeting UNPOL / UNSTAB forces in Panay, in order to divert focus away from law and order operations; conducting low level PSYOPS campaigns amongst the local population, to increase dissent; initiating and supporting protests, and if necessary embedding elements to escalate peaceful protests into violent riots; adjusting criminal activity from non-violent to violent crime; increasing the amount and ferocity of violent crime, in order to encourage an atmosphere of lawlessness. Noting resources of 12 small boats and taking advantage of the unstable law and order situation, maritime

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operations (currently primarily smuggling / logistics) may escalate to include low-level piracy.

c. Threat / stakeholder – VPF

- (1) The Visayan Peoples Front (VPF) is an armed insurgent group, committed to establishing an independent entity composed of the islands of Panay, Negros, Cebu and Bohol. At the time of Belesia's independence numerous Christians, unhappy with what they saw of as Islamification of the islands, began open hostilities against the Belesian government. The government responded with a counter-insurgency strategy rooted in assassination, sabotage, and subversion. The violence peaked a decade ago, since then, all sides made a pledge to peace. Their assets are primarily civilian, comprising sedans and vans. Their weapons include pistols, assault rifles, and two anti-armoured weapons (RPG7). The second in command is Alarico Sanchez, a Panayan from Roxas City. The head of finance and logistics is Eddie Ramos, a Belesian from Roxas City. Information on the leader of the VPF is being confirmed. Prior to the hostilities, alternating sources estimated the VPF to number between 140 to 300 members.
- (2) During the conflict, the VPF supported the efforts of the SFMEF, particularly in operations to secure the San Rafael Mine. Following combat operations against IBSAF and the defeat of the SFMEF, the VPF are now greatly diminished. Their ability to conduct offensive action has been sharply curtailed, their supply of arms and munitions from OV has been blocked, and their morale has been impacted. These factors have driven the VPF to improvise; individuals skilled in explosive ordnance are reported to have begun producing floating and land IED/Mines. Significant supplies of explosives were taken from the San Rafael Mine to facilitate this endeavor.
- (3) The one area where an increase in VPF activities has already been noted is in maritime smuggling / logistics operations. The loss of weapons and material during the conflict, plus the loss of previous resupply routes has resulted in a surge of maritime activity. Regarding locations, updated reporting is being confirmed. However, it is noted that the groups are avoiding large centres such as Iloilo and Roxas, and are focusing on smaller rural location, generally along the north coastline of Panay.
- (4) Overall, the VPF has been significantly impacted in their capabilities, however elements may still present a threat. Individuals or small teams who have gone to ground since the end of combat operations will still have the motivation, and in some cases the resources, to continue the pursuit of their strategic goal of an independent entity. They are assessed as not being an immediate threat, however a crucial intelligence focus will be to monitor their status and intent. A well-trained, well-motivated VPF member acting as a "lone wolf" will present a less likely but more significant threat to stability in Panay.

(5) VPF Strengths

- (a) Members of the VPF are assessed as being highly motivated, well trained, combat experienced, and professional. As per most insurgent groups, the structure of the organization is such that various cells can operate independently, calling on task specific support when needed (e.g. logistics, comms, etc).
- (b) As per most insurgent groups, its members may be difficult to identify. If identified, members may be able to disperse into the local population, because of loyalties or intimidation of the local citizens. UNSTAB has clearly defined ROE, which the VPF will no doubt exploit to their advantage – similar to the situation regarding organized crime members. From a legal perspective, it may be difficult for UNSTAB members to identify and apprehend VPF members without sufficient intelligence.
- (c) As per many insurgent groups, the VPF is highly dynamic. In a post conflict scenario, insurgent groups such as the VPF will be operating in their element, adjusting to UNSTAB TTPs quickly without the restraints of a large bureaucratic organization or legal constraints.

(6) VPF Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities

- (a) The VPF suffered a significant defeat at the hands of IBSAF during the conflict, particularly because of fighting in the vicinity of the San Rafael Mine complex. Prior to the conflict, VPF staffing was estimated at between 140 – 300 personnel. During the conflict, approx. 25 members were confirmed KIA, with another 25 members captured as PW's. (Exact numbers are being confirmed due to VPF membership being confirmed). It is assessed that approx. 50 members were WIA but not captured by IBSAF. The military defeat may have affected the resolve of some members, with numbers reducing due to desertion. In addition, many VPF members may need to return to their homes in order to support family / friends impacted by the conflict. It is assessed that these and similar factors will have reduced the existing staff by approx. 25%. As a result, the current operational staffing of VPF is estimated at 30 – 150. Lastly, their logistics and weapons resources have been diminished during the conflict, it is estimated that 50% of their equipment was either destroyed or captured during the conflict.
- (b) A weakness of the VPF, as per any insurgent group, is its personnel. Widely varying levels of experience, knowledge, training, intelligence, abilities and professionalism will affect the organisation. Following the military defeat, desertion may be an issue. However, loyalty among hard-core central members should be consistent – long term VPF

members are bonded both by their background of Christianity and their desire for an independent state.

(7) VPF Courses of Action (COAs)

- (a) Most Likely Course of Action. The VPF will take advantage of the post conflict situation in Panay to reorganize and consolidate. Following the military defeat and a severe impact to members, resources and capability, the aim is to rebuild the VPF for future operations. Specific objectives may include, but are not limited to: consolidating surviving resources; exploiting the overall situation for financial gain; commencement of new recruitment programs to fill staffing gaps; embedding themselves in various aspects of the rebuilt Panay, for future influence; setting up new structures / staff / logistics for future operations. Enhanced maritime smuggling / logistics operations will continue. It is unlikely that the VPF will directly confront UNSTAB.
- (b) Most Dangerous Course of Action. The VPF continues the conflict, transitioning to a purely insurgent / guerilla style of warfare, actively targeting UNSTAB forces in Panay. Following a military defeat by IBSAF, extremist VPF elements may wish to continue the fight “to the death”. This may include tactics such as sniper attacks, IED’s, sabotage, and PSYOPS campaigns amongst the local population. Suicide IED’s are not typically utilized as a tactic by the VPF (unlike some Muslim extremist groups), however some particularly disgruntled VPF members may resort to this tactic against UNSTAB. Taking advantage of the unstable law and order situation, maritime operations (currently primarily smuggling / logistics) may escalate to include low-level piracy.

d. Threat / stakeholder – disgruntled locals / issue motivated groups.

- (1) There is a developing threat from disgruntled local citizens, who may develop into issue motivated groups (IMGs). Peaceful protests may escalate into violent riots, which would impact the stability of law and order in Panay. Two months after combat operations have ceased in Panay, local citizens have many concerns (some quite legitimate) about the slow pace of reconstruction and the impact on their daily lives. Issues of concern include, but are not limited to: IDP’s still being housed in temporary accommodation (including 11 x 11 tents); limited potable water; limited food; mines / UXO not being cleared fast enough; slow progress of war crimes investigations; intermittent electricity; limited gas for cooking; intermittent communications (including mobile telephone, landlines, internet, satellite TV, etc); impacted transport (including damaged airport, damaged seaport, damaged roads, damaged bridges, etc); lack of law and order; hospitals operating at poor capacity; schools not resumed; employment uncertainty. In particular an issue for UNSTAB is the perception by the local population that the daily living conditions of UN staff and UNSTAB troops is considerably better than that of

local civilians – with locally employed civilians (LEC's) employed in UNSTAB facilities reporting to their countrymen of fully functional coalition bases with numerous creature comforts (including satellite TV, food buffets, gyms, air conditioning, etc). Lastly, there are many long-standing issues that are regaining prominence under these trying circumstances. These include ethnic tensions, wealth disparity, those seeking a fully independent Panay, and those looking to fully reintegrate Panay back into BX. Under these circumstances, an ordinary citizen who is unable to feed their family may be driven to desperation and may resort to protest, violence, or even worse. Vulnerable and desperate citizens may even be coerced into working with threat stakeholders such as the Tantoco Cartel or the VPF.

- (2) Correct as at V+60, protests by disgruntled civilians have been primarily peaceful, addressing some of the issues highlighted, approx. 25 – 75 local citizens, gathering in various locations mainly in Roxas, typically in the late morning / early afternoon. Approx 33% have been organized with 1 – 2 days notice, with formal notification to whatever local authorities are present. Approx 67% have been spontaneous, organized via word of mouth or occasionally via SMS / social media (when working). In the last two weeks (from V+45 onwards), it has been noted that the tone of the protests is becoming more emotive / desperate.
- (3) Disgruntled locals Strengths
 - (a) This particular stakeholder group is unique as it represents the disgruntled local population, as such it is a constantly changing group. As at V+60 there are no specific organised protest groups or protest leaders, the majority of protests are spontaneous. The strength lies in the fact that the issues will seem very legitimate to the general populace, hence a small protest may increase in numbers and ferocity with minimal notice. Minimal organization or preparation is needed, details can be easily spread by word of mouth or communications (when working), similar to a “flash mob”. Another strength is that there is a right to peaceful protest, particularly noting the emotive concerns being highlighted – sympathy will be strong, even from the international community. It will be important for international media in Panay to be engaged with how they present the protests.
 - (b) A large, emotive crowd of protestors can be easily swayed to violence with the appropriate triggers. A strength of the disgruntled locals stakeholder group is that with minimal advance warning, they can be coerced into escalating into a violent riot. Other threat groups ranging from the Tantoco Cartel to the VPF, working towards their own goals, may embed individuals / small teams within protests to encourage a descent into violence. This tactic has been seen worldwide at major anti-

globalisation protests over the years, and more recently during civil unrest across the US.

(4) Disgruntled locals Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities

- (a) A weakness of the disgruntled locals stakeholder group is that they will have negligible resources / logistics support / organization / leadership. Each incident is likely to be emotionally charged but disorganized. As such, they can be easily dispersed by the authorities (however appropriate ROE must be maintained, and the media must be managed).
- (b) The most important weakness of this group is their motivation. If an appropriate PSYOPS campaign can be delivered, such that positive aspects of the reconstruction effort are promulgated, the urge to protest may be reduced. This will require a significant effort by CIMIC and Intel elements of UNSTAB.

(5) Disgruntled locals Courses of Action (COAs)

- (a) Most Likely Course of Action. Protests by disgruntled civilians continue in a primarily peaceful manner, issues of concern will change depending on the latest status. As improvements continue in a slow but steady manner, numbers attending protests will increase however will continue to focus on Roxas. As patience is stretched, the duration or protests will increase along with attendees, but they will continue to commence during daylight hours. On some occasions low level violence may ensue (rock throwing, small burning roadblocks), but these will be by exception and easily quelled.
- (b) Most Dangerous Course of Action. Vulnerable, emotive crowds of peaceful protestors are deliberately incited to violence by other threat groups for their specific objectives. These external groups may range from the Tantoco Cartel to the VPF. Small groups of embedded individuals / teams, masquerading as protesting locals, deliberately encourage a decent into violence. (These teams would conveniently provide logistics support at the appropriate juncture, ranging from Molotov cocktails and rocks, through to comms interruptions and roadblocks – aimed at impeding the authorities trying to restore law and order). Controlled by external threat groups, the disgruntled locals are utilized as part of a larger plan in a carefully orchestrated series of planned violent incidents.

e. Threat / stakeholder – FSM

- (1) The Free Sulu Movement (FSM) is a conglomerate of anti-federation and independence factions of the Belesian archipelago. The group seeks to break free of the alleged overreach of the Belesian central government and abuses of the BFNG. They have become more organised and active since the rise of its

shadowy leader, known only as “Niko”. Its tactics have become increasingly violent, including attacks against government facilities such as political offices and BFNG or Constabulary armories. The group has also claimed credit for attacks against civilians whom they label, “collaborators.” Attacks range from simple vandalism and sabotage to guerrilla-style operations and bombings. In more remote areas, they have also conducted extra-judicial proceedings and seizures. Their assets are primarily civilian, comprising sedans, Toyotas and vans. Their weapons include pistols, assault rifles, light machine guns, sniper rifles, mortars and anti-armoured weapons (RPG7 and RPG22). The FSM is not known to have been actively supporting the SFMEF in Panay. The FSM is estimated at approx. 160 members.

- (2) During the conflict between the SFMEF and IBSAF, the FSM was not a significant stakeholder, members were instructed to overall maintain a low profile. It was noted that activities increased in maritime smuggling / logistics operations, because of the unstable situation. Locations are yet to be confirmed, however it is noted that the FSM is avoiding large centres such as Iloilo and Roxas, and are focusing on smaller rural locations. It is assessed that the current strength and resources of the FSM in Panay are similar to the status at the beginning of the conflict.

(3) FSM Strengths

- (a) Members of the FSM are assessed as being highly motivated, well trained and professional. As per most insurgent groups, the structure of the organization is such that their various “Direct Action” cells can operate independently, calling on task specific support when needed (e.g. sniper, mortar, etc).
- (b) As per most insurgent groups, its members may be difficult to identify. If identified, members may be able to disperse into the local population, as a result of loyalties or intimidation of the local citizens. UNSTAB has clearly defined ROE, which the FSM will no doubt exploit to their advantage – similar to the situation regarding the VPF and organized crime members. From a legal perspective, it may be difficult for UNSTAB members to identify and apprehend FSM members without sufficient intelligence.
- (c) As per many insurgent groups, the FSM is highly dynamic. In a post conflict scenario, insurgent groups such as the FSM will be operating in their element, adjusting to UNSTAB TTPs quickly without the restraints of a large bureaucratic organization or legal constraints.

(4) FSM Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities

- (a) A weakness of the FSM, as per any insurgent group, is its personnel. Widely varying levels of experience, knowledge, training, intelligence, abilities and professionalism will affect the organisation.

(5) FSM Courses of Action (COAs)

- (a) Most Likely Course of Action. The FSM will take advantage of the post conflict situation in Panay to exploiting the overall situation for financial gain; leverage of disgruntled locals in recruitment programs; take the opportunity to embed themselves in various aspects of reconstruction, for future influence. It is unlikely that the FSM will directly confront UNSTAB.
- (b) Most Dangerous Course of Action. The FSM will take advantage of the fragile law and order situation, grasping the opportunity to become a major stakeholder in Panay. Actively encouraging a breakdown in law and order, targeting UNSTAB forces in Panay, and destabilizing the situation, in order to set conditions for FSM to take a more prominent role. This may include tactics such as sniper attacks, IED's, vandalism, sabotage, IT attacks and PSYOPS campaigns amongst the local population. Taking advantage of the unstable law and order situation, maritime operations (currently primarily smuggling / logistics) may escalate to include low-level piracy.

f. Threat / stakeholder – Black Societies

- (1) These criminal networks are normally family affairs, with each family staying local to avoid conflict with other groups. These criminal networks are involved in armed robbery, racketeering, smuggling, narcotics trafficking, prostitution, gambling, and contract killings. Their assets are primarily civilian in nature, such as sedans, vans and trucks. Their arsenal includes pistols, assault rifles, sniper rifles, light machine guns and anti-armoured weapons (RPG7 and RPG22). They are estimated to number approximately 250 members, divided into two crime factions. The relationship with the other significant crime organization in the region, the Tantoco Cartel, is dynamic. In many cases, the Black Societies and the Tantoco Cartel have tacit agreements to leave control of any given island to one group or another. However, the two have clashed over disputed territory. The power vacuum in Panay may be seen as an opportunity for expansion.
- (2) During the conflict between the OV MEF and IBSAF, the Black Societies were not a significant stakeholder, members were instructed to overall maintain a low profile. However, it is known that where viable, criminal operations were maintained or even increased during the conflict, taking advantage of the situation.
- (3) It is assessed that the current strength and resources of the Black Societies in Panay are similar to the status at the beginning of the conflict. If anything, it may be slightly more because of looting and other gains during the conflict.
- (4) Black Societies Strengths

- (a) Similar to the Tantoco Cartel, Black Society members may be difficult to identify, let alone engage. When identified, there is a strong possibility that members can simply disappear into the neighborhood. ROE and legal constraints can further frustrate UNSTAB operations against the Black Societies.
 - (b) As per many criminal organisations, the Black Societies are highly dynamic, adjusting as needed to thwart the authorities. The small and nimble nature of the organization will make it a challenging threat to neutralize.
- (5) Black Societies Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities
- (a) A significant weakness is personnel. Widely varying levels of experience, knowledge, training, intelligence, abilities, professionalism and loyalty will affect operations. Members will be vulnerable to blackmail, corruption, intimidation, and in fighting.
 - (b) A lack of military level technological resources is a weakness. UNSTAB will be utilizing resources and methodologies including UAVs and EW. It is unlikely that the Black Societies will be able to counter these.
- (6) Black Societies Courses of Action (COAs)
- (a) Most Likely Course of Action. The Black Societies will take advantage of the post conflict situation in Panay, to increase their operations for immediate and future financial gain. This will be similar to the Tantoco Cartel, and in many areas there is expected to be conflict between the two. Specific objectives may include, but are not limited to: exploiting returning IDP's, particularly at checkpoints; exploiting vulnerable persons, particularly those who have lost homes / jobs; profiteering off limited supplies of basic items such as potable water, food, shelter; taking advantage of financial aspects of reconstruction efforts, particularly corrupt local officials; embedding themselves in reconstruction projects as a long term strategy; setting up new structures / staff / logistics for future criminal operations such as smuggling; settlement of outstanding grievances while law and order are fluid, in particular setting up "protection rackets" and neutralising any outstanding threats / competitors. Particularly noting the current nation building status in Panay, they are expected to attempt to install members into key BX government position while there is a power vacuum, with a long-term goal of gaining power via corrupt officials. It is unlikely that the Black Societies will directly confront UNPOL / UNSTAB.
 - (b) Most Dangerous Course of Action. The Black Societies actively promote a state of lawlessness in Panay, as this is beneficial to their operations. Their specific objectives may include, but are not limited to: targeting UNPOL / UNSTAB forces in Panay; conducting low level PSYOPS

campaigns amongst the local population; initiating and supporting protests, and if necessary embedding elements to escalate peaceful protests into violent riots. Taking advantage of the unstable law and order situation, maritime operations (currently primarily smuggling / logistics) may escalate to include low-level piracy operations. This most Dangerous Course of Action is very similar to that of the Tantoco Cartel, how the two organisations interact will be an intelligence focus.

g. Environment

- (1) Infrastructure – water, power, gas, communications, sewage: it is assessed that utilities are overall operating at approximately 50% of pre-war capacity. The city of Iloilo has been relatively untouched during the conflict. However, the city of Roxas has seen extensive damage, particularly power and communications.
- (2) Infrastructure – transport including airport, seaport, bridges: it is assessed that transport infrastructure is operating at approximately 67% of pre-war capacity (this follows extensive urgent works by UNSTAB engineer units during the period V to V+60). In particular, the APOD and SPOD in Roxas were heavily damaged during the conflict. The maritime approaches to Roxas are impacted by sea mines, UXO, and significant amounts of large debris. Additionally, in the rural areas of Panay, much critical infrastructure such as roads and bridges have been damaged or destroyed. Iloilo was relatively untouched.
- (3) Infrastructure – buildings including residential, commercial, government: Iloilo has been relatively untouched during the conflict. However Roxas saw extensive damage, it is assessed that regarding general building infrastructure, approximately only 33% survived the conflict without significant damage. The remaining buildings are either destroyed or awaiting safety assessments by engineering teams, but it is more than likely that they will be deemed unsafe for use and scheduled for demolition.
- (4) Mines / UXO: this is still a major threat across the AO, for both land and maritime assets. The majority of the mines / UXO in urban centres (i.e. Roxas) has been cleared, in particular major transport routes and the airport have been a focus for the UNSTAB teams. The maritime approaches to Roxas were a focus during the conflict and are now impacted by sea mines and UXO. In rural areas mines / UXO continues to be a significant concern. Injuries / deaths amongst the civilian population vary greatly from week to week with 0 incidents in a week, only to be followed by 3 incidents in the following week. The maritime routes, but particularly sea approaches to Roxas, continue to be a challenge.
- (5) CBRN: the threat is still being assessed. Whilst the MEF claimed that CBRN was not utilized during the conflict, UNSTAB is taking all appropriate measures as a precaution. In a similar theme, toxic / industrial waste may have been

inadvertently released due to damage during the conflict – the impact is still being assessed across Panay.

h. Friendly Forces

- (1) Coalition Intelligence Capability. Coalition intelligence organizations, including those nested within the CJTF will provide all-source intelligence utilising all possible means, including the establishment of a Multi-National intelligence operations center that will serve as a central all-source intelligence fusion center supporting operations in the JFAO.

2. Mission

- a. Coalition intelligence conducts intelligence operations in order to enable operations against threat groups and affiliated groups in Panay within the JFAO.

3. Execution

- a. Concept of Intelligence Operations. Coalition intelligence will conduct intelligence support to operations to enhance Indications and Warning (I&W) and situational awareness in the region. Intelligence support will focus along three lines of effort to achieve objectives in BX. Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) will be modified to support emerging operations and will drive intelligence operations during the execution of this plan.
- b. Purpose. Coalition intelligence will support a long term, comprehensive approach. Intelligence assessments must account for and connect all factors within the political, military, economic, social, infrastructural, information, physical environment and time domains (PMESII-PT) - and actors influencing the dynamics in the JFAO and Area of Interest (AOI). The main priorities are to provide threat I&W to Coalition forces, identify and exploit opportunities that achieve optimal results against the threat groups, and provide kinetic and non-kinetic targeting information leading to mission success.
- c. Method. Coalition intelligence capabilities organise and conduct intelligence operations that drive collection, production and analysis, contributions to target development, reporting, and collaboration with partners to provide timely and actionable support to the CJTF while maintaining support to the Coalition's ongoing operations in the JFAO. In order to achieve this, the Coalition intelligence architecture must synchronize and share information that produces comprehensive intelligence assessments. Working with partner nations, the Coalition will employ all intelligence capabilities and provide timely and relevant intelligence in order to support operations. Three primary intelligence Lines of Effort complement each other and remain constant throughout each phase of the operation.
 - (1) Intelligence Lines of Effort (LOEs).
 - (a) Intelligence Line of Effort I – ISR and Collection. This line of effort focuses on collection coordination of Coalition ISR capabilities across the JFAO. This LOE seeks to synchronize the collection effort in order to

satisfy operational and intelligence requirements and continue to update and refine the operational environment. LOE I monitors the JFAO and AOI for I&W, builds situational awareness, and supports targeting operations.

- (b) Intelligence Line of Effort II – Analysis and Production. This LOE is designed to ensure a common comprehensive understanding of the operational environment and to support kinetic and non-kinetic targeting operations within the JFAO. LOE II focuses on multisource analysis encompassing PMESII-PT, which satisfies operational, and intelligence requirements.
 - (c) Intelligence Line of Effort III – Information Sharing. LOE III enables a comprehensive Coalition approach to defeat threat groups. This LOE seeks to ensure information sharing to the maximum extent possible allowed or in accordance with each partner nation's perspective, national policies and laws. Information sharing is critical to this effort and must be placed within key nodes of Coalition intelligence enterprise.
- (2) Intelligence Phasing.
- (a) Intelligence Support to CJTF 667. Intelligence support to CJTF 667 to defeat threat groups is tied to five operational phases. This section will identify the main activities of intelligence support LOEs and integrate them into each respective phase.
 - 1. Phase 0 – Shaping. Completed.
 - 2. Phase 1 - Denial. Completed.
 - 3. Phase 2 – Lodgement. Completed.
 - 4. Phase 3 - Neutralise. Completed.
 - 5. Phase 4 - Transition. During this phase, the main effort conducts continuing ISR operations in order to monitor the situation and identify threats towards a safe and secure environment.
- (3) Intelligence Tasks.
- (a) Common Tasks to Coalition Intelligence Organizations.
 - 1. Allocate resources and funding to support intelligence operations specified in the base plan.
 - 2. Monitor I&W for threats to Coalition partners and partner interests.
 - 3. Develop and refine ISR and I&W process to support mission requirements by phase.

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4. Support Advise and Assist (AA), Build Partner Capacity (BPC), Key Leader Engagements (KLEs), Humanitarian Assistance (HA), and Force Protection as necessary by phase.
 5. Assist the development of CJTF organic intelligence capabilities by phase.
 6. Provide reach-back capability to deployed forces, as necessary.
 7. Produce and disseminate intelligence summaries, ISR Collection Plan, and ad hoc intelligence products.
 8. Shape allocation and apportionment of theater collection assets to support collection priorities and UNSTAB objectives.
 9. Establish the necessary intelligence architecture to support UNSTAB.
 10. Provide and receive Coalition partner liaisons to and from the CJTF.
 11. Enable intelligence training that supports regional partners' actions against threat groups to include Advise and Assist (AA), Build Partner Capacity (BPC), and engagement (OAAs) missions.
 12. Identify shortfalls to improve existing intelligence organization, architecture and procedures to optimize collaboration and synchronize orientation, collection, rapid fusion, and timely dissemination of intelligence.
 13. Submit and process intelligence requirements throughout the implementation of this plan for intelligence needs and support to planning.
 14. Task and synchronize ISR collection assets to satisfy Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs).
 15. Identify and recommend opportunities for Coalition intelligence exchanges and training to further develop and refine regional partner forces, as needed.
 16. Support kinetic and non-kinetic targeting operations during appropriate phases of this plan.
- (4) Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs).
- (a) What is the threat to CJTF 667 operations within the JFAO?
 - (b) What is the threat to CJTF 667 land operations (especially mines / UXO) within the JFAO?
 - (c) What is the threat to CJTF 667 maritime operations (especially mines / UXO) within the JFAO?

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- (d) What are the environmental (incl. PMESII) factors that could affect CJTF 667 operations within the JFAO?
 - (e) What is the intent and capacity of BX Defense Forces to provide external and internal security, maintain operational readiness, sustain interoperability with CJTF 667 forces and assist to enhance law and order?
 - (f) What are the threats to BX and other authorized citizens, interests and infrastructure?
 - (g) What is the intent, strength and capability of the Tantoco Cartel? Where is their leadership, C2 facilities, maritime operations and concentrations of manpower and supplies?
 - (h) What is the intent, strength and capability of the VPF? Where is their leadership, C2 facilities, maritime operations and concentrations of manpower and supplies?
 - (i) What is the intent, strength and capability of the FSM? Where is their leadership, C2 facilities, maritime operations and concentrations of manpower and supplies?
 - (j) What is the intent, strength and capability of the Black Societies? Where is their leadership, C2 facilities, maritime operations and concentrations of manpower and supplies?
 - (k) What is the intent, strength and capability of disgruntled locals who are participating in protests? Do they have a leadership, are they organised, what are the common aspects of the groups?
 - (l) Was there any utilization of CBRN resources during the conflict, by SFMEF?
- (5) Intelligence Activities.
- (a) Collection Management (CM). Collection activities will focus on the PIRs and emerging intelligence gaps and will be conducted and deconflicted in accordance with established national policies and procedures, and subsequently published CJTF guidance. Each respective Coalition member will determine an appropriate level of support for its respective theatre collection assets. Wherever possible, Coalition intelligence will participate in collection management working group forums in order to synchronize Coalition and ISR operations.
 - (b) Analysis and Production (A&P). Coalition intelligence will analyse, produce, and provide current intelligence and assessments in support of PIRs and provide collateral releasable products to other partners as required.

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- (c) Dissemination and Information Sharing. The Coalition will seek to allow greater sharing of intelligence on a more regular basis; however, disclosure decisions must be in accordance with each partner nation's policies. Safeguarding of information remains a responsibility of each Coalition member in order to prevent unauthorized release.

4. **Sustainment**.

- a. Shortfalls and Limiting Factors. Primary shortfalls include intelligence resources needed to protect the force and ground-based collection assets that cannot access the JFAO due to operational restrictions.

5. **Command and Signal**

- a. Communications. See Annex U.

Appendices

- Appendix 1 - Signals Intelligence
- Appendix 2 - Human Intelligence
- Appendix 3 - Counterintelligence
- Appendix 4 - Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE

References:

- A. CJTF 667 FRAGO XX to OPORD 01(Operation Steel Sentinel)
- B. Annex B – Intelligence to CJTF FRAGO XX to OPORD 01
- C. APPENDIX 1 to ANNEX B to CJTF OPORD, SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE

Time Zone Used Throughout the FRAGO: ZULU

- 1. **Situation.** This appendix provides a general statement of responsibility and planning guidance for the use of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) resources. See para 1 of ref A, or ref B for further information.
- 2. **Mission.** SIGINT organisations and forces conduct collection activities to satisfy intelligence needs of CJTF 667 through all phases of OP STEEL SENTINEL (OSS).
- 3. **Execution.**
 - a. Concept of Operations. No change.
 - b. Responsibilities.
 - (1) CJTF J-2.
 - (a) Noting the realigned focus on domestic threats / stakeholder groups (almost all of which will be BX citizens), reconfirm EW TTP's regarding legal aspects. Confirm / de-conflict / escalate as needed.
 - (b) All other aspects no change.
 - (2) Subordinate Units. No change.
 - c. Coordinating Instructions. No change.
- 4. **Sustainment.** No change.
- 5. **Command and Signal.**
 - a. The ASD shall continue to exercise SIGINT Operational Tasking Authority (SOTA) over the SIGINT assets until SOTA is delegated to CJTF 667.
 - b. Communications Systems. No change.

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HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

References:

- A. CJTF 667 FRAGO XX to OPORD 01(Operation Steel Sentinel)
- B. Annex B – Intelligence to CJTF FRAGO XX to OPORD 01
- C. APPENDIX 2 to ANNEX B to CJTF OPORD, HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

Time Zone Used Throughout the FRAGO: ZULU

1. **Situation.** This appendix provides a general statement of responsibility and planning guidance for the use of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) resources. See para 1 of ref A, or ref B for further information.
 - a. **Assumptions.** No change.
2. **Mission.** HUMINT organizations and forces shall conduct collection activities to satisfy intelligence needs of CJTF 667.
3. **Execution.**
 - a. **Organization.** No change.
 - b. **Concept of Operations.** No change.
 - c. **Tasks.**
 - (1) Noting the realigned focus on domestic threats / stakeholder groups (almost all of which will be BX citizens), reconfirm HUMINT TTP's regarding legal aspects. Confirm / de- conflict / escalate as needed.
 - (2) Targeting of stakeholder groups within the AO. These are to include (but not limited to):
 - (a) The Tantoco Cartel.
 - (b) The VPF.
 - (c) The FSM.
 - (d) The Black Societies.
 - (e) Issue Motivated Groups.
 - (3) All other aspects no change.
 - (4) **Captured Documents.** No change.
 - (5) **Captured Materiel.** No change.
 - (6) **HUMINT deconfliction.** Provide support to and maintain mutual activities with other Coalition intelligence collection activities such as Weapons and Signals Intelligence. Coordination and deconfliction between HUMINT and other intelligence collection activities will be conducted by the CJTF 667 J2X in order to utilize a multi-discipline approach to intelligence collection. All intelligence collection activities will be coordinated with the CJTF J2X and Collection Manager.

OFFICIAL

B2-3/3

(7) Debriefing of Returnees. No change.

(8) Requirements and Reporting. No change.

d. Coordination. No change.

4. **Sustainment**.

a. Transportation. No change.

b. Billeting. No change.

c. Clothing. Noting the realigned focus on domestic threats / stakeholder groups (almost all of which will be BX citizens), reconfirm HUMINT TTP's regarding legal aspects. Confirm / de- conflict / escalate as needed. Until confirmed otherwise, CJTF HUMINT personnel are not authorized to use civilian clothing except when it is deemed advantageous to the mission and only within areas in control of CJTF 667 forces. The CJTF J2 is the approval authority for exceptions to this policy. All other HUMINT personnel operating in support of this operation will comply with the clothing policies of their organisations/National policy.

d. Equipment. No change.

e. Operational or Contingency Funds. No change.

5. **Command and Signal**. No change.

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B3-1/3

**APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX B TO CJTF 667 FRAGO XX
DATED XXXXXX**

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

References:

OFFICIAL

B4-1/3

- A. CJTF 667 FRAGO XX to OPORD 01(Operation Steel Sentinel)
- B. Annex B – Intelligence to CJTF FRAGO XX to OPORD 01
- C. APPENDIX 3 to ANNEX B to CJTF OPORD, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU

1. Situation.

- a. Foreign Intelligence and Security Services (FISS) / threat stakeholders.
 - (1) Threat. Hostile Intelligence Services (HIS) conventional and irregular forces operating within the JFAO are capable of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection. Although there is a reduced presence following the completion of combat operations, this is still a threat. SPF and / or irregular intelligence operatives may use "third parties" in an attempt to impede, disrupt, and/or degrade friendly operations.
 - (2) Various stakeholders have taken priority over previous enemy threats. Noting the realigned focus is on domestic threats / stakeholder groups (almost all of which will be BX citizens), it will be important to reconfirm counterintelligence TTP's, particularly regarding legal aspects.
 - (3) Counterintelligence (CI) matters concerning citizens of other countries shall be handled IAW existing agreements between Australia (operating as lead nation for Intelligence/Counterintelligence) and each country's respective government.
- b. Friendly.
 - (1) AS National Agencies. No change.
 - (2) Coalition Assets, Agencies and Organisations. No change.
 - (3) Command CI Structure.
 - (a) The CJTF 667 counterintelligence structure consists of CJTF, Subordinate Commands, Coalition Partners, and other agencies.
 - (b) CJTF J2 coordinates requests for and monitors CI activities of AS national agencies and supporting forces to ensure CI coverage within the JFAO.
 - (c) CJTF Counterintelligence Staff Officer (CISO) assists and advises the CJTF by functioning as the Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority (CICA). The CICA conducts liaison with all friendly agencies that have CI capabilities and/or functions in the JFAO. Coordination will ensure receipt of appropriate information required to support this OPORD when executed. The CICA is to ensure that all counterintelligence activities will be coordinated through the CJTF J2X.

2. Mission. Provide for the receipt and dissemination of counterintelligence information in a coordinated and timely manner.

3. Execution.

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B5-1/3

- a. Concept of Operations. No change.
- b. Procedures. No change.
- c. Tasks
 - (1) Noting the realigned focus on domestic threats / stakeholder groups (almost all of which will be BX citizens), reconfirm HUMINT TTP's regarding legal aspects. Confirm / de- conflict / escalate as needed.
 - (2) Counterintelligence Collection and Reporting. No change.
 - (3) Counterintelligence Analysis and Production. No change.
 - (4) Counterintelligence Investigations. No change.
 - (5) Counterintelligence Operations. No change.
- 4. **Sustainment**. Refer to base OPORD and Annex R (Logistic Support Order).
- 5. **Command and Signal**. Refer to base OPORD and Annex U (CIS

OPERATION STEEL SENTINEL

JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Step 1

Olvana

Area of Interest

Operational Environment


North
Torbla

South
Torbla


Gabal

Belesla


Joint Force Area of
Operations





Belesia



Capital	Davao
Ethnic groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•Mindanaoan Sulu: 55%•Cebuan Sulu: 14%•Olvanese: 23%•Torbian: 7%•Other: 1%
Population	59.9 Million
Religion	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•87% Muslim•10% Christian•3% Buddhist
Type of Government	Presidential Republic
State Forces	98,500
Total Area	99,926 sq mi (258,807 km²)
Total GDP	\$209.5 Bn
Miscellaneous	Relatively new democracy emerged from colonialism
	Volatile arena of political unrest and terrorism








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UNCLASSIFIED


Human Terrain (Panay)

- Threat – Tantoco Cartel
- Threat – Visayan Peoples Front (VPF)
- Threat / stakeholder – disgruntled locals / issue motivated groups
- Threat – Free Sulu Movement (FSM)
- Threat – Black Societies
- Stakeholder – IDPs
- Stakeholder – BX government
- Stakeholder – NGOs

CJTF Named Area of Interest (NAI) Overview











NAI	Description	Grid NE (Lat/Lon)	Grid NW (Lat/Lon)	Grid SW (Lat/Lon)	Grid SE (Lat/Lon)
0001	Sea Lines of Communication – Sth China Sea	17deg 0' N, 119deg 20' E	17deg N, 119deg 45' E	12deg 50' N, 119deg 45' E	12deg 50' N, 119deg 20' E
0002	Sea Lines of Communication – Sth China Sea	12deg 15' N, 119deg 12' E	12deg 22' N, 118deg 39' E	11deg 34' N, 118deg 29' E	11deg 26' N, 119deg 01' E
0003	Sea Lines of Communication – Philippine Sea	16deg 50' N, 123deg 24' E	16deg 26' N, 122deg 42' E	12deg 56' N, 124deg 53' E	13deg 20' N, 125deg 31' E
0004	SAG 1 Patrol AO	11deg 18' N, 119deg 13' E	11deg 39' N, 118deg 11' E	10deg 34' N, 117deg 43' E	10deg 12' N, 118deg 43' E
0005	Sea Lane – Gabal / Linapacan Is	11deg 33' N, 120deg 03' E	11deg 40' N, 119deg 51' E	11deg 43' N, 119deg 47' E	11deg 27' N, 119deg 59' E
0006	Sea Lane – Linapacan / Palawan Is	11deg 19' N, 119deg 51' E	11deg 27' N, 119deg 39' E	11deg 20' N, 119deg 34' E	11deg 12' N, 119deg 47' E
0007	Mischief Reef SPOD/APOD	11deg 14' N, 119deg 26' E	11deg 14' N, 119deg 20' E	11deg 6' N, 119deg 20' E	11deg 6' N, 119deg 26' E
0008	Sea Lane – Nth Panay / Romblon Is	12deg 7' N, 122deg 06' E	12deg 7' N, 121deg 49' E	11deg 55' N, 121deg 49' E	11deg 55' N, 122deg 06' E
0009	Sea Lane – Romblon Is / Sth Torbia	12deg 42' N, 122deg 02' E	12deg 46' N, 121deg 51' E	12deg 34' N, 121deg 46' E	12deg 29' N, 121deg 57' E
0010	Sea Lane – Samar / Sorsargon	12deg 37' N, 124deg 19' E	12deg 41' N, 124deg 10' E	12deg 30' N, 124deg 04' E	12deg 25' N, 124deg 12' E
0011	Sea Lane – Sth Panay / Negros Is	10deg 32' N, 122deg 15' E	10deg 20' N, 121deg 59' E	09deg 55' N, 122deg 21' E	10deg 07' N, 122deg 36' E
0012	Sea Lane – Nth Panay / Negros Is	11deg 28' N, 123deg 27' E	11deg 15' N, 123deg 10' E	10deg 58' N, 123deg 10' E	11deg 10' N, 123deg 42' E
0013	Sea Lane – Nth Panay	11deg 57' N, 123deg 01' E	11deg 57' N, 122deg 22' E	11deg 45' N, 122deg 22' E	11deg 45' N, 123deg 01' E
0014	Roxas City APOD/SPOD	11deg 36' N, 122deg 48' E	11deg 36' N, 122deg 42' E	11deg 32' N, 122deg 42' E	11deg 32' N, 122deg 48' E

NAI	Description	Grid NE (MGRS)	Grid NW (MGRS)	Grid SW (MGRS)	Grid SE (MGRS)
0015	San Rafael Mine	11deg 12' N, 122deg 51' E	11deg 12' N, 122deg 47' E	11deg 08' N, 122deg 47' E	11deg 08' N, 122deg 51' E
0016	Panay MSR vic Passi	11deg 11' N, 122deg 41' E	11deg 11' N, 122deg 38' E	11deg 02' N, 122deg 36' E	11deg 01' N, 122deg 30' E
0017	Panay MSR vic Calinog	11deg 09' N, 122deg 33' E	11deg 10' N, 122deg 30' E	11deg 04' N, 122deg 28' E	11deg 03' N, 122deg 32' E
0018	Panay MSR vic Cuartero	11deg 25' N, 122deg 42' E	11deg 25' N, 122deg 38' E	11deg 16' N, 122deg 38' E	11deg 16' N, 122deg 42' E
0019	Panay MSR vic Tangalan	11deg 49' N, 122deg 12' E	11deg 47' N, 122deg 10' E	11deg 40' N, 122deg 18' E	11deg 42' N, 122deg 20' E
0020	Potential JFEO site - Banate	11deg 01' N, 122deg 51' E	11deg 01' N, 122deg 47' E	10deg 58' N, 122deg 47' E	10deg 58' N, 122deg 51' E
0021	Iloilo SPOD	10deg 44' N, 122deg 36' E	10deg 44' N, 122deg 31' E	10deg 40' N, 122deg 31' E	10deg 40' N, 122deg 36' E
0022	Iloilo APOD	10deg 51' N, 122deg 31' E	10deg 51' N, 122deg 28' E	10deg 48' N, 122deg 28' E	10deg 48' N, 122deg 31' E
0023	Panay MSR vic Tibiao	11deg 21' N, 122deg 04' E	11deg, 21' N, 122deg 01' E	11deg 13' N, 122deg 01' E	11deg 13' N, 122deg 04' E

Step 2

Maritime Effects

- Hydrographic
- Littoral
- Maritime Logistic
- Environmental – mines / UXO / debris
- Threat / stakeholder groups – smuggling / piracy

Primary SPOD Makar Wharf, General Santos City



HQ MCC will
relocate to
Makar Wharf

Lat: 6°5'39"N, Lon: 125°9'31"E

50 m



Alternate SPOD Zamboanga Port, Zamboanga City



Alt SPOD will
contract and
relocate to
General Santos
City

Panay SPOD Iloilo Port, Iloilo City

- Important for UNSTAB logistics

Lat: 10°42'30"N, Lon: 122°35'43"E

100 m



Panay SPOD Culasi Port, Roxas City

- Shallow water restricts size of ship berthing

Lat: 11°36'37"N, Lon: 122°42'55"E

50 m



Panay SPOD Caticlan Port, Caticlan

- Relatively deep water

Lat: 11.9280, Lon: 121.9503

50 m




Time & Space (Indicative)

Maritime Transit Times (8kts)				
	Darwin	General Santos City	Zamboanga	Iloilo
Darwin	N/A	1160NM (6 days)	1275NM (6 days 14hrs)	1480NM (7 days 17hrs)
General Santos City	1160NM (6 days)	N/A	189NM (1 day)	320NM (1 day 14hrs)
Zamboanga	1275NM (6 days 14hrs)	189NM (1 day)	N/A	234NM (1 day 5hrs)
Iloilo	1480NM (7 days 17hrs)	320NM (1 day 14hrs)	234NM (1 day 5hrs)	N/A



Air Effects

- POL
- Air traffic
- Air Navigation / Traffic Control



- Runway: 10,500ft long
- Can be used by:
 - C-17
 - C-130J
 - C-27

Primary APOD General Santos Airport, General Santos City

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Alternate APOD Rajah Buayan Airbase, General Santos City

- Runway: 5,500ft long
- Can be used by:
 - C-27


Lat: 6.1039, Lon: 125.2347

200 m

Lat: 6.1088, Lon: 125.2354

50 m

Colonel Edwin Andrews Airbase, Zamboanga (APOD will contract and relocate to General Santos City)



- Runway: 8,500ft long
- Will base RAAF Strike:
 - F-35A
 - F/A-18F
 - EA-18G
- Current BFAF:
 - 12x F-16C



- Runway: 8,500ft long
- Minimal infrastructure damage during OSS Ph 0-3

Panay APOD Iloilo Airport, Iloilo City

Lat: 10.8313, Lon: 122.4961

200 m


- Runway: 6,00ft long
- Significant infrastructure damage during OSS Ph 0-3



Panay APOD Roxas Airport, Roxas City

Lat: 11.6007, Lon: 122.7493

200 m



- Runway: 5,00ft long
- Some infrastructure damage during OSS Ph 0-3

Panay APOD Godofredo Ramos Airport, Caticlan

Lat: 11.9249, Lon: 121.9626

200 m




Time & Space (Indicative)

Air Transit Times (300kts)				
	Darwin	General Santos City	Zamboanga	Iloilo
Darwin	N/A	1160NM (4hrs)	1275NM (4hrs 15min)	1480NM (5hrs)
General Santos City	1160NM (4hrs)	N/A	189NM (40mins)	320NM (1hr)
Zamboanga	1275NM (4hrs 15min)	189NM (40mins)	N/A	234NM (45mins)
Iloilo	1480NM (5hrs)	320NM (1hr)	234NM (45mins)	N/A



Land Effects (Panay)

- **Vegetation**
 - Thick jungle vegetation along the western side
 - Farmlands and sub-tropical forests along the lowlands
- **Topography**
 - Panay is bisected by the Central Panay Mountain Range close to the west coast
 - Highest peak is Mt Madia-as (2,117m)
 - There are many rivers with the longest being the Panay River
 - Most of the population is concentrated on the central and eastern part of the island (lowlands)
 - The eastern lowlands contain many farms (sugarcane and rice)
- **Assessment**
 - Heavy vehicles may be restricted in movement to MSR
 - Will require engineer support to traverse along lowland areas (create/reinforce bridges)
 - Wet season will restrict movement significantly



Land Effects (Panay)

- Urban
 - Iloilo City (pop - 448,000) - Provincial capital
 - Roxas City (pop – 167,000)
- Logistical hubs
 - See APOD/SPOD data for Panay
 - Single railway linking Roxas and Iloilo
 - Severe damage during OSS Ph 0-3
- POL sites
 - Damage during OSS Ph 0-3
 - Approx 50% of pre-war capacity
- Infrastructure
 - Damage during OSS Ph 0-3
 - Approx 67% of pre-war capacity






Space Effects

- GPS
 - GPS and GLONASS available throughout the region
- Comms
 - Damage during OSS Ph 0-3
 - Approx 50% of pre-war capacity

Weather Effects - Belesia

- Two seasons: Wet and Dry
 - Dry season Dec – May
 - Wet Season Jun – Nov
- Region is susceptible to tropical typhoons during the wet season
 - Typhoons are regular and generally occur during Jul to Oct
 - On average Belesia is hit by 9 typhoons/year of varying strength
- Temperature is relatively constant all year as expected in a tropical climate



Step 3

Non-State Actors (Insurgents)

Visayan Peoples Front (VPF)


- Insurgent organisation based in Belesia (approx. 300 active members)
- Committed to the establishment of an independent entity composed of the islands of Panay, Negros, Cebu and Bohol from the Belesian Federation
- Predominantly a Christian organisation seeking to create a Christian nation
- Has been active in aiding SFMEF in Panay to achieve political goals
 - Prominently aided the SFMEF in securing the San Rafael Mine
- Likely to actively oppose CF in region



Visayan Peoples Front (VPF)

Infantry BN equivalent

Total Pers: 142



TOYOTA



RPG 7



SEDAN



Alarico Sanchez


Second-in-command – Visayan People's Front



DOB	13 Apr 1992
Nationality	Belesian (Panayan)
Service / Organisation	VPF
Birthplace	Roxas City, Belesia
Education	Qi Yang Kuen Academy
Religion	N/A
Marital Status	
Personality Traits	
Biography	

Eddie Ramos

Finance/Logistics - Visayan People's Front



DOB	06 Mar 1968
Nationality	Belesian
Service / Organisation	VPF (CEO Libas Fisherman's Co-operative)
Birthplace	Roxas City, Belesia
Education	Tanque Nacional High School
Religion	Christian (Catholic)
Marital Status	Married
Personality Traits	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Prone to violence/brutality• Anti-authority/establishment sentiment, but very patriarchal• Impulsive, secretive
Biography	<p>Born into a large fishing family, Eddie grew up under the guidance of his mother after his father and step-father were lost at sea in successive storms. Eddie holds very strong anti-local authority sentiments but holds close ties with his local church. Due to the lack of a strong paternal influence, Eddie often resorts to violence and brutality to resolve disputes. Eddie is suspected of being associated with the VPF. It is not known whether Eddie holds strong sentiments towards the West.</p>

Non-State Actors (Insurgents)

Free Sulu Movement (FSM)


- Conglomeration of anti-federation and independence factions on the Belesian archipelago (approx. 200 active members)
- The group seeks to break free from the alleged over reach of Belesian central government
- Predominantly a secular organisation
- Has links to criminal organisations and will commit criminal acts to support political goals
- Is not known to be actively supporting the SFMEF in Panay
- May oppose CF in region if CJTF mission does not support political goals



Free Sulu Movement (FSM)

Infantry BN equivalent

Total Pers: 164



TOYOTA



RPG 22



Niko (pseudonym - real name unknown)

Commander – Free Sulu Movement



DOB	
Nationality	Belesian
Service / Organisation	FSM
Birthplace	
Education	
Religion	
Marital Status	
Personality Traits	
Biography	

Non-State Actors (Criminal)

Tantoco Cartel


- Criminal cartel founded in South Torbia (approx. 950 active members)
- Operates across the region (even within Nth Torbia)
- Involved in most criminal activities including:
 - Drug and Weapons Smuggling
 - Extortion
 - Motor Vehicle Theft
 - Illegal Gambling
 - Money Laundering
 - Counterfeiting
 - Contract Killing
 - Piracy
- Has clashed with Black Society network over territory
- Will not likely be a threat to CF but may leverage off CF presence in Belesia



Tantoco Cartel

Infantry BDE equivalent

Total Pers: 957



CESSNA 172



RPG 7



ARMED LIMO




RPG 22



Hilmi Tantoco

Leader - Tantoco Cartel



DOB	Approx 1953
Nationality	South Torbian
Service / Organisation	Tantoco Cartel
Birthplace	
Education	
Religion	
Marital Status	
Personality Traits	
Biography	<p>Hilmi Tantoco operates a string of businesses under the umbrella company known as Tantoco Enterprises. He got his start as an enforcer with a local gang involved in racketeering—primarily extortion—from small business owners. He worked his way up until, in his mid-30s, he ousted the local gang leader by bombing his boat while he was deep-sea fishing. Hilmi then set up a number of legitimate businesses to serve as a front for his illegal activities. His political and social connections are thought to be extensive, including local police and politicians, as well as the federal police and some cabinet members. These connections allow him to stay one step ahead of most attempts to close down his businesses. There is enough distance between him and his illegal practices</p>

**FREE SULU MOVEMENT / TANTOCO CARTEL****BK-10 FAST ATTACK CRAFT**

Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	2 crew 12 passengers
Weapons	No fixed weapons systems
Displacement	4.5t
Speed	40kts
Range	?
Sensors	UNK
Aircraft/Landing Craft	Nil
Notes	Free Sulu Movement and Tantoco Cartel known to operate variants to support piracy activities in Sulu Sea
WEG Link	BK-10 Class Olvanan Fast Attack Craft (Assault Boat)

Non-State Actors (Criminal)

Black Societies

- Criminal networks based in Olvana but operating across the Belesian archipelago (approx. 250 active members)
- This criminal network is normally a family affair, with each family staying local to avoid conflict with other groups
- This criminal network is involved in:
 - Armed Robbery
 - Racketeering
 - Smuggling
 - Narcotics Trafficking
 - Prostitution
 - Gambling
 - Contract Killings
- Will not likely be a threat to CF but may leverage off CF presence in Belesia




Step 4



Situation (Panay)

- Armistice signed between SFMEF and IBSAF
- Air and sea approaches to Panay are returning to normal
- SFMEF have left Panay
- Majority of PW's, on both sides, have been repatriated
- IBSAF has transitioned into UNSTAB
- Infrastructure – water, power, gas, communications, sewage: approx 50%
- Infrastructure – transport: approx 67%
- Infrastructure – buildings: approx 33%
- Mines & UXO a significant issue, both Maritime and Land



Situation

Host Nation (Belesia):

- Strategic Goals
 - Seeks UN support to reinstate Belesian authority over Panay and Palawan
 - Seeks not to antagonise ethnic Panayan citizens into independence actions
 - Seeks to maintain fragile cohesion of Belesian Federation
- Tactical Goals
 - Working with UNSTAB, ensure law and order in Panay
 - Reinstall pre-conflict Belesian Security Forces in Panay
 - Will maintain other BX military commitments within own borders

Neutral Nation (Gabal):

- Strategic Goals
 - Remain neutral
 - Reduce impact of potential humanitarian crisis in region within borders
- Tactical Goals
 - Defend sovereign territory within means (lack of military capability means that defending sea and air lanes is ineffective)

Neutral Nation (South Torbia):

- Strategic Goals
 - Maintain recent armistice with North Torbia after last border skirmish in previous year
 - Remain neutral
- Tactical Goals
 - Defend against any border incursions

Neutral Nation (North Torbia):

- Strategic Goals
 - Defend interests in the region (incl economic interests)
 - Remain outwardly neutral in the conflict
- Tactical Goals
 - Maintain strong military presence in the region
 - Will defend interests in the region with military force



Tantoco Cartel MLCOA

- ME:
 - Increase criminal ops
- SE:
 - Exploiting IDP's & vulnerable persons
 - Profiteer off reduced law & order
 - Embed members in key reconstruction positions



Tantoco Cartel MDCOA

- ME:
 - Actively increase lawlessness
- SE:
 - Target UNSTAB / UNPOL FE
 - Encourage, initiate & escalate civil unrest
 - Escalate maritime ops from smuggling to piracy

Assessed Tantoco Cartel Critical Factors / Decisive Points

Critical Factors

- Well resourced in terms of personnel, vehicles and weapons
- Difficult to identify, locate, apprehend and prosecute – as is the nature of criminal organisations
- Organised in independent groups (2 families and 2 cartels), highly dynamic
- Personnel: varying levels of experience, knowledge, training, intelligence, abilities, professionalism, and loyalty

Decisive Points

- Major urban centres (i.e. Roxas) declared safe of mines / UXO / etc & infrastructure repaired such that IDPs can return
- Handover of security responsibilities from UNSTAB to BX authorities
- Set conditions for independence referendum
- Set conditions for UNSTAB withdrawal

Assessed Tantoco Cartel Centre of Gravity

Strategic

- The ability to conduct criminal and legitimate operations, kinetic and non-kinetic, in order to expand the criminal organisation throughout the region, for financial gain and political influence / power

Operational

- Sustainment of resources in terms of finances, vehicles, weapons, and in particular motivated & professional personnel

Tactical

- Ability to conduct operations in the JFAO with minimal impact from UNSTAB / BX authorities



VPF MLCOA

- ME:
 - Reorg & consolidate
- SE:
 - Consolidate surviving resources
 - Embed members in key reconstruction positions
 - Enhance maritime smuggling ops



VPF MDCOA

- ME:
 - Aggressive insurgent warfare campaign
- SE:
 - Escalate violent activities
 - Encourage, initiate & escalate civil unrest
 - Escalate maritime ops from smuggling to piracy

Assessed VPF Critical Factors / Decisive Points

Critical Factors

- Personnel are highly motivated, well trained, combat experienced, and professional
- Difficult to identify, locate, apprehend and prosecute – as is the nature of terrorist organisations
- The VPF suffered a significant defeat at the hands of IBSAF, particularly IVO the San Rafael Mine
- Logistics and weapons resources were diminished during the conflict. Supply lines have been disrupted

Decisive Points

- Major urban centres (i.e. Roxas) declared safe of mines / UXO / etc & infrastructure repaired such that IDPs can return
- Handover of security responsibilities from UNSTAB to BX authorities
- Set conditions for independence referendum
- Set conditions for UNSTAB withdrawal

Assessed VPF Centre of Gravity

Strategic

- The VPF's Strategic CoG is to set the pre-conditions needed to create a separate secular state free of Muslims, leading to the creation of a Christian nation

Operational

- Ability to reorganise and consolidate resources post conflict, particularly in terms of finances, vehicles, weapons, and motivated & professional personnel

Tactical

- Ability to conduct operations in the JFAO with minimal impact from UNSTAB / BX authorities



Disgruntled Locals MLCOA

- ME:
 - Mainly peaceful protests
- SE:
 - Protests in high visibility locations
 - Disrupt UNSTAB ops (e.g. roadblocks)
 - Low level vandalism / theft / sabotage



Disgruntled Locals MDCOA

- ME:
 - Planned violent protests & civil unrest
- SE:
 - Target UNSTAB / UNPOL FE
 - Plan, coord & escalate violent civil unrest
 - Significant vandalism / theft / sabotage

Assessed Disgruntled Locals Critical Factors / Decisive Points

Critical Factors

- Constantly changing stakeholder group in terms of motivation, numbers, leadership, organisation, locations, TTPs
- Highly emotive members, many with legitimate concerns and the legal right to protest
- Highly vulnerable to manipulation by malicious stakeholders, such that a peaceful protest can be escalated into a dangerous riot
- Negligible resources / logistics support / organization / leadership

Decisive Points

- Major urban centres (i.e. Roxas) declared safe of mines / UXO / etc & infrastructure repaired such that IDPs can return
- Handover of security responsibilities from UNSTAB to BX authorities
- Set conditions for independence referendum
- Set conditions for UNSTAB withdrawal

Assessed Disgruntled Locals Centre of Gravity

Strategic

- N/A

Operational

- Common disgruntlement regarding the slow pace of reconstruction following the conflict

Tactical

- Ability to quickly gather large numbers for protests, with the ability to rapidly escalate into violent riots

Assumptions and IRs

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT – OPERATION TE POU MAITAI**References:**

- A. MC 362/1 NATO Rules of Engagement (ROE), dated 27 JUN 03
- B. San Remo Handbook on Rules of Engagement, dated 09 NOV 09
- C. UN Security Council Resolution 8882 dated XXXXXXXX

1. General Principles

- a. Introduction. The United Nations, has issued policy and military guidance on the strategic objectives for operations in Belesia. For the UN Stabilization Mission in Belesia (UNSTAB), it has been decided to adopt NATO principles and procedures, with the San Remo Manual for Rules of Engagement for the promulgation and amendment of ROE. General guidance in relation to NATO ROE, is set out in Ref A, with further clarification of San Remo ROE at Ref B. When referring to UNSTAB, this reference shall encompass Combined Joint Task Force-Operation 667 (CJTF 667) and all attached force elements. MILITARY COMD CJTF 667 is referred to as the MILITARY MILITARY COMD UNSTAB in this document (versus the UN Civilian Head of Mission UNSTAB).
- b. Authority. The authority providing the legal framework for the operation is set out in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) in accordance with Refs C. Any changes to this ROE shall be authorised by CJOPS with Coalition partner input. The current authority provides for UNSTAB to take all necessary measures to carry out the tasks listed in UNSCR 8882, including the use of deadly force in order to fulfil its mission.
- c. ROE Definition. ROE are directives that define the circumstances, conditions, degree and manner, in which force or actions, which might be construed as provocative, may or may not be applied or taken. The ROE implemented for this operation provide the sole authority for UNSTAB to use force. Although the ROE do not limit the inherent right of self-defence, different national approaches to the definition of self-defence may result in inconsistency between multinational forces as to where the right to use force in self-defence ends and the use of force authorised by the mission ROE begins.
- d. Geographical Application of the ROE. These ROE apply within the geographical boundaries of the JFAO as defined in the CJTF 667 OPORD at paragraphs 1.h.(1) and (2).
- e. Self-Defence. Nothing in these ROE shall negate a commander's right to take all necessary action for unit and individual self-defence.
 - (1) Individuals and units have a right to defend themselves against attack or an imminent attack.
 - (a) In exercising this right, individuals and units will act in accordance with national law. Therefore more detailed and specific guidance from Troop

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Contributing Nations (TCN) applicable for their respective forces will be required.

- (b) Self-defence is the use of such necessary and proportional force, including deadly force, to defend against an attack or an imminent attack.
 - (c) The principles of necessity and proportionality, together with terms “imminent” and “attack” defined in Ref. A para 7 will apply for all UNSTAB.
- (2) Within the general concept of self-defence, UNSTAB have the right to use force that is necessary and proportional to defend civilians accompanying UNSTAB, including UN personnel, and civilians who have been taken hostage.
- f. Extended Self-defence. Ref A stipulates, “In keeping with the principles of the Alliance, within the general concept of self-defence, Coalition/Coalition-led forces and personnel also have the right to take appropriate measures, including the use of necessary and proportional force to defend other Coalition/Coalition-led forces and personnel from attack or from imminent attack”. “Coalition led forces” include any UNSTAB forces OPCON, TAMILITARY COMD or TACON (for the time being) to CJTF 667.
- g. Application of ROE and the Use of Force. Within this coalition for Operation STEEL SENTINEL, ROE are authorised by UNSTAB. The chain of command is therefore responsible to disseminate the ROE, ensure understanding, request clarifications and, seek amendments as required. The chain of command also assumes the responsibility to ensure compliance and determine incompatibilities. During the conduct of the operation the use of force principles described in Ref A para 10-12 apply.
- h. Applicable Law. The ROE applies principles of international law. The UNSTAB mission must be communicated and correctly perceived as being lawfully requested/mandated by the UN. MILITARY MILITARY COMD UNSTAB will engage with non-military entities mitigating any incorrect perception of the Coalition presence in the Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO) (once authority to coordinate is delegated). Simultaneously, coordinating efforts will be conducted at the strategic level, communicating the legitimacy of this UN-sanctioned operation.
 - (1) International Law. The conduct of UNSTAB is circumscribed by international law, including the applicable principles derived from the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). When applicable, UNSTAB also have a responsibility to obey other International treaties that affect military operations. In particular, UNSTAB must comply with the LOAC principles: distinction, military necessity, proportionality, and humanity.
 - (2) National Laws. TCNs shall adhere to their national laws. They are not obliged to execute tasks or operations that would constitute a breach of their national laws. Therefore, nations should issue national restrictions, caveats and/or clarifying instructions to their members, MILITARY COMD UNSTAB and coalition partners in order to ensure compliance with national law. Any such national clarifying instructions must not be more permissive than the ROE. The normal mechanisms for notification of such national restrictions and/or clarifying instructions are FORCEPREP/Order of Battle Transfer of Authority (ORBATTOA) messages.
 - (a) In the case of sending enabling forces to the JFAO, TCN should communicate their caveats prior to deployment, facilitating an initial package of ROE being

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implemented for theater enablers.

- (b) Where nations have expressed caveats on involvement or the use of force, such caveats will be summarized and the resultant impact on the mission identified. The full range of national caveats held by UNSTAB should be communicated to the operational level, analyzed and applied as soon as possible. UNSTAB Point of Contact (POC) for this activity is the CJ35.

2. UNSTAB Authorised ROE

- a. General Outline and Application. UNSTAB authorised ROE enable the successful execution of the mission, while safeguarding all forces. They apply to all UNSTAB elements, and can only be deviated from on the basis of national caveats or restrictions.
- b. ROE Request /Authorisation and Implementation Procedure. The procedures to request, authorise, and implement ROE are set out in Ref A.
- c. ROE Changes and Supplemental ROE. The ROE authorised by the UNSTAB are found in ROE Authorization Messages (ROEAUTHs) and implemented by MILITARY COMD UNSTAB in ROE Implementation Messages (ROEIMPLs) may only be changed with the approval of CJOPS. Any limitation or restriction in its application of LOAC that is viewed as a potential threat to the safety of the force and/or the successful conduct of the mission should be addressed upon discovery and reported up the chain of command. Supplemental ROE measures that may be required due to changes in the operational situation or otherwise may be submitted in a ROE Request Message (ROEREQ). This includes requests for ROE previously requested but denied, new or additional ROE.
- d. Dissemination. The ROE for UNSTAB will be appropriately classified to allow dissemination to all TCN. The full ROE and use of force guidance might contain sensitive material, publication of which could harm operations. UNSTAB ROE authorisation should be accompanied by guidance in the form of a Political Policy Statement (PPS). The PPS should be complemented by Political Policy Indicators (PPIs).
- e. Protection of Persons and Property with Designated Special Status. Persons with Designated Special Status (PDSS) and Property with Designated Special Status (PRDSS) may be protected against hostile intent or hostile acts only pursuant to ROE. The authority to designate PDSS or PRDSS is restricted to MILITARY COMD UNSTAB.

3. Other Considerations. The instructions outlined below are amplifying mission-specific guidance based on international law, but should only be undertaken pursuant to UNSTAB authorised ROE:

- a. Detention. Persons may be detained as a force protection measure to prevent them from conducting acts against Coalition forces, Host Nation Security Forces (HNSF) or the HN civilian population. MILITARY COMD UNSTAB guidance on actions to be taken when detaining persons can be found in Annex AD and must be adhered to by all UNSTAB elements involved in detention.
- b. Riot Control Means. Riot control means (RCM) must not be used as a means of warfare. RCM may only be used at the discretion of the Appropriate Commander in the following circumstances:
 - (1) To protect the safety of UNSTAB personnel, HN, IO, governmental organisations

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and / or NGO or PDSS; or

- (2) To protect the property of UNSTAB, HA, IO, governmental organisations, NGO or PDSS.
- c. Prevention of Serious Crimes. The use of minimum force, up to and including the use of deadly force, may be used to prevent serious crimes (which includes trafficking in Human Beings) against a person, including civilian, who unlawfully commits, or is about to commit, an act which endangers life of PDSS or coalition forces, or is likely to cause serious bodily harm, in circumstances where there is no other way to prevent the act. The use of minimum force includes the authority to detain the person. All use of force in the prevention of serious crimes must be reported through the chain of command at the earliest opportunity.
 - d. Soldiers' Cards. All UNSTAB members must carry a Soldiers' Card issued by the relative Component Command or national authorities adhering to this ROE. TCN may issue translations of the Soldiers' Card issued by the Component Commands. The TCN Soldiers' Card may include national clarifying instructions in accordance with the main body of this Annex. The nationally authorised Soldiers' Card, translations of Soldiers' Card or any clarifying instructions must be developed in consultation with or disclosed to MILITARY COMD UNSTAB. No nationally authorised Soldiers' Card will permit a wider use of force than authorised by this ROE.
 - e. Avoidance of Collateral Damage. In all cases, every effort should be made to minimize, to the maximum extent possible, any loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects resulting from the use of force. Collateral damage is incidental to military action and must not be excessive or disproportionate to the military advantage to be gained from the specific attack.
 - f. Prohibition against Reprisals. The punitive use of force is prohibited.
 - g. Duty to Report. Each situation resulting in a detention, or involving the use of deadly force, or use of riot control means (if authorised), whether it results in casualties or not, is to be reported through the chain of command as soon as possible.
 - h. Right to Position Defence. The use of force is authorised to defend a position.
 - i. ROE for Open Sources. Bringing ROE into the open discourse may become beneficial for many reasons (e.g. STRATCOM). Because ROE contain sensitive information, the release of which could be harmful to the mission, UNSTAB may indicate what information is releasable to the public, parallel to ROEAUTH message, by giving guidance on Public Information (PI) policy concerning release of ROE.

ATTACHMENTS:

Appendix 1 Defensive ROE for Phase IV Operations

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**APPENDIX 1
TO ANNEX L
TO
CJTF 667 FRAGO XX
DATED XXXXXX**

DEFENSIVE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

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- A. MC 362/1 NATO Rules of Engagement dated 27 June 2003
- B. Status of Forces Agreement – Australia/Belesia dated 11 April 2006

1. The following ROE are issued under the authority of MILITARY COMD UNSTAB. They have been developed and approved in consultation with the UNSTAB and the Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) and are based on ROE under reference A.

2. The ROE listed below were designed to encompass deterrence and defensive operations by Belesian and CJTF 667 forces during Phases 0 (Shaping) and 4 (Transition).

3. **Defence of Forces.**

- a. 90. – The use of force up to and including deadly force for individuals and unit self defence against attack or an imminent attack is authorised. In exercising this right, individuals and units will act in accordance with national law.
- b. 91. – The use of force for the defence of military property against attack or an imminent attack is authorised in accordance with national law.
- c. 92. – The use of force, up to and including deadly force for the protection of Belesian Defense Forces and Belesian law enforcement members stationed within the landmass of Belesia is authorised.
- d. 93. – The use of force up to and including deadly force for the defence of civilians accompanying CJTF667 forces, UN Personnel against attack or an imminent attack is authorised. In exercising this right, individuals and units will act in accordance with national law.

4. **Geographic Positioning of Forces.**

- a. 100. – Except as otherwise authorised under Rule 101, entry into the landmass, territorial waters or airspace of North Torbia is prohibited.
- b. 101. – Entry into the landmass, airspace and territorial waters of North Torbia for the purposes of conducting combat search and rescue operations is authorised.
- c. 103. – Entry into the landmass, territorial waters or airspace of Belesian can be authorised by MILITARY COMD UNSTAB under reference B, which can be delegated.
- d. 104. – Entry into the landmass, territorial waters or airspace of any other nation State is by consent of that State, which is to be obtained by UNSTAB.

5. **Prevention of Boarding, Detention, or Seizure of Belesian or CJTF 667 Property.**

- a. 132. – The use of force, up to and including deadly force to prevent the boarding, detention or seizure of UNSTAB military, Belesian military or civilian vessels, aircraft or vehicles containing people is authorised.

6. **Intervention in Non-Military Activities.**

- a. 140. – Intervention in North Torbian flagged non-military maritime shipping to enforce

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the provisions of UNSCR 8869 is authorised.

- b. 143. – The use of force, up to and including disabling fire to interdict North Torbian flagged shipping vessels within the designated Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO) is authorised.
- c. 145. – The use of non-deadly force to detain persons for force protection purposes in Belesia is authorised.
- d. 146. – The use of non-deadly force, to disarm persons is authorised.
- e. 147. – The use of non-deadly force to prevent the escape of unarmed individuals for force protection purposes is authorised.

7. **Warnings.**

- a. 152. – The use of warning bursts by UNSTAB and Belesian air assets is prohibited.
- b. 153. – The use of warning shots by UNSTAB land based forces is prohibited.
- c. 154. – The use of warning shots by UNSTAB maritime assets is permissible as this is seen as not using force under international maritime laws.

8. **Diversions.**

- a. 161. – The ordering of diversions to all commercial and merchant shipping and aircraft for force protection purposes is authorised.
- b. 164. – The ordering of diversions to any aircraft to enforce the provisions of the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) is authorised.

9. **Boarding, Detention or Seizure.**

- a. 171. – Whether unopposed, uncooperative or opposed, the boarding of North Torbian flagged civilian vessels for the purposes of inspection in compliance with UNSCR 8869 is authorised.
- b. 172. – Unopposed and uncooperative Boarding operations will be conducted under the provisions of Annex D of reference A.
- c. 173. – Rule 143 can be relied on to facilitate opposed boardings under Rule 171.
- d. 174. – The boarding of any commercial or merchant shipping vessel within the JFAO to determine if there has been a contravention of the arms and economic embargo established under UNSCR 8869 is authorised.
- e. 181. – The detention and/or seizure of North Torbian military vessels, aircraft, vehicles, personnel, goods, cargos and/or equipment within the landmass or territorial waters of Belesia is authorised.

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- f. 183. – Following the boarding of North Torbian flagged civilian vessels for inspection under Rule 171, any vessels in contravention of UNSCR 8869 is authorised to be detained and/or seized, as well as any personnel, goods, cargos and/or equipment for the purposes of enforcement of UNSCR 8869
 - g. 185. - Should there be compelling evidence to suggest non-conformity with the provisions of UNSCR 8869, any vessel within the UNSTAB JFAO proceeding to or from a seaport of North Torbia may be boarded, diverted, detained and/or or seized.
10. **Illumination.**
- a. 221. – The illumination of suspected North Torbian Armed Forces vessels, aircraft personnel, and equipment by white light, spotlight, projectiles, or infrared means is authorised.
 - b. 222. - The use of laser target markers against North Torbian Armed Forces vessels, aircraft, personnel, and equipment is authorised.
 - c. 223. – The use of illumination for harassment operations is prohibited.
11. **Identification of Targets.**
- a. 232. – Potential targets are to be identified by visual means (this may include video footage from UAS and other remote systems) **and** by one or more of the following means: IFF (or other systems that require a response from an unidentified unit); electro-optical; electronic warfare support measure; track behaviour, flight plan correlation; thermal imaging; acoustic intelligence; or other secure active/passive systems not requiring a positive response from an unidentified unit prior to an engagement.
12. **Prohibited Use of Certain Weapons.**
- a. 350. – The use of riot control agents by UNSTAB against military threats is prohibited.
 - b. 351. – The use of anti-personnel mines by CJTF 667 forces is prohibited.
 - c. 352. – The use of cluster munitions and explosive and non-explosive booby traps by UNSTAB is prohibited.
 - d. 353.– The use of weapons of mass destruction to include chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear by UNSTAB is prohibited.
13. **Information Operations**
- a. 361. – The control of North Torbian military information distribution mechanisms with the intent to disrupt and deny North Torbian command and control nodes is authorised.
 - b. 367. – The use of electronic warfare measures by UNSTAB is authorised.
 - c. 368.– Psychological operations directed against North Torbian military forces is authorised.
 - d. 369.– The use of physical military deception through the use of dummies and/or

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decoy equipment by UNSTAB and Belesian Defense Forces is authorised.

14. **Use of Electronic Countermeasures (ECM).**

- a. 374. The unrestricted use of ECM against North Torbian military targets is authorised.

15. **Air Operations.**

- a. 400. – The use of air-to-surface and sub-surface munitions against targets belonging to the North Torbian Armed Forces is permitted.
- b. 401. – The use of precision-guided air-to-surface munitions within the JFAO is authorised.
- c. 402. - Beyond visual range air-to-air engagement is permitted as long as the criteria laid out in ROE 232 are met.

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CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS

References:

- A. World Fact Book 2020 – The Republic of Belesia as at 8 Nov 18
- B. Panay District Supplement as at 1 Jan 18
- C. Palawan District Supplement as at 13 Jan 18
- D. HQ JOC OIE Prospects for Security and Stability in Belesia dated 30Oct19
- E. UNHC – P Report 008/19 – Humanitarian Sit Panay Isles dated 25 Oct 19

OVERVIEW

1. **General.** This annex details the Civil Military Operations (CMO) objectives and activities to be undertaken in support of the land component operations. This is to support the establishment of security and stability conditions in the JFAO sufficient for the transition of responsibility for security to the mandated authority. This annex is to be used by those elements involved in Civ-Mil activities and those whom may need to understand the Civ-Mil environment for their own BOS. All CMO intentions will be undertaken with in IO objectives and in line with the COMD's intent (here with restated);
 - a. **Purpose.** No change.
 - b. **Method.** Support CJTF 667 with enablers from ADF and OGA to the JFAO to enable reconstruction efforts. Coordinate WOAG and multinational efforts to enforce UNSCR 8873.
 - c. **Endstate.** The establishment of a safe and secure environment, and conditions set for the UN supervised transition of authority in Panay and Palawan back to the Belesian Government.

SITUATION

2. **Threat / stakeholder groups.** Analysis of operational environment, threat forces, stakeholder groups and assessment of likely COAs, see Intelligence, FRAGO Annex B.
3. **Friendly.** Detailed friendly forces, groupings, tasks and organisation see Operations, FRAGO Annex C.
4. **Inhabitants.** No change.
 - a. **Population.** No change.
 - b. **Language.** No change.
 - c. **Culture and Society.** No change.
 - d. **Religion.** No change.
 - e. **Politics and Government.** No change.

- f. **Economic outlook.** Successive Panay governments have overseen the exploitation of the islands natural resources with a light hand, generally granting concessions, specifically mining, in a resource bidding war that if successful would see Panay gain high economic benefits. The commercial and industrial businesses which thrive in Panay have worked out that small wages and pay offs to politicians can lead to high profit. These commercial interests need careful handling. The FE can expect that commercial enterprises will be quick to exploit the situation and it is anticipated that claims and compensation will be sought as the security circumstances improve. **V+60:** the situation in Panay is highly fluid, reconstruction and nation building are the focus for UNSTAB. Threat / stakeholder groups including insurgents and organised crime may take the opportunity to attempt to embed themselves in positions of influence as a long-term strategy to gain power via corruption.
- g. **Electricity.** Panay has a coal fired power generator located on the outskirts of each of the provincial centres. Power is reasonably well provided for but suffers from high demand shortages especially during peak periods, resulting in outages of a few hours. Energy is supplied as 240-250v 60Hz cycle which is broken into 110-120v in the homes and buildings with power within the pop. Breakdowns in coal delivery can also disrupt supply sometimes lasting in outages of days. Critical infrastructure has backup generators but these are also subject to outage due to disruptions in diesel fuel supply. FE should not expect to be able to tap into and utilise the civilian electricity grid and must come self-contained with its own generator power supply and fuel to run it. **V+60:** it is assessed that utilities are overall operating at approximately 50% of pre-war capacity. Power and communication were severely impacted during the conflict, particularly in Roxas.
- h. **Water Supply.** All towns draw their town water from underground aquifers and the larger rivers which runs through them. The water quality can run from an A to C rating. Supply during the dry season may also cause shortages. Given the low quality and lack of quantity, FE must bring its own purification and water supply systems. **V+60:** it is assessed that utilities are overall operating at approximately 50% of pre-war capacity. Power and communication were severely impacted during the conflict, particularly in Roxas.
- i. **Fuel Supply.** Panay is bisected by the AMADA Natural Gas Pipeline, which is a significant infrastructure of considerable value to the national Belesian government. Natural gas is the fuel of choice for the pop needs being used for everything from cooking to powering vehicles and generators. Fuel supply of both diesel and petrol is provided from refineries in Belesia which can result in shortages due to the problems of shipping and distribution. Fuel supplies for FE will not be possible from inside Panay and LOG should not plan to get these from in country with care taken to not cause shortages to the pop. **V+60:** it is assessed that utilities are overall operating at approximately 50% of pre-war

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capacity. Power and communication were severely impacted during the conflict, particularly in Roxas.

- j. **Waste Treatment.** Regional centres have a rudimentary and inefficient sewage systems with the more remote areas generally have individual house septic systems. This has in past caused fouling of the water supply which then causes health concerns with the pop. The FE needs to be cognisant that its waste disposal systems and programs do not cause environmental issues nor exacerbate problems with the existing infrastructure. **V+60:** it is assessed that utilities are overall operating at approximately 50% of pre-war capacity. Power and communication were severely impacted during the conflict, particularly in Roxas.
- k. **Telecommunications.** A high standard of telephone, mobile phone and internet connections are available across the whole island and high data capability available in regional centres. Remote rural areas are for the most part available with various levels of reliability. It is well known that the phone infrastructure was built by the MISO Telecom company and that while a reliable and well used system, can be intercepted and be used as an information and intelligence source. Phones which use the local system will be subject to foreign intelligence service information collection activities. **V+60:** it is assessed that utilities are overall operating at approximately 50% of pre-war capacity. Power and communication were severely impacted during the conflict, particularly in Roxas.
- l. **Health.** The island's civilian health services and support infrastructure is based on hospitals at the provincial centres. Nationals generally seek treatment for major medical treatment in Belesia in preference to the Panay health service. FE should not expect to be able to use the civilian infrastructure and can expect requests for support when they are located in country. **V+60:** it is assessed that regarding general building infrastructure, approximately 33% survived the conflict without significant damage. This includes medical facilities. This is particularly the case in Roxas.
- m. **Legal System.** Justice is administered by the national authority, which was generally only concerned with serious crimes. Local issues are generally handled by provincial magistrates or city judges. Given the CJTF will operate under the provisions of the UNSCR 8873 and an extant SOFA, FE should have very limited dealings with the Panay legal system. Legislative issues including the SOFA and ROE are to be found with the Legal OPORD Annex K. **V+60:** the situation has changed significantly in that the primary threat / stakeholder groups are almost completely comprised of BX citizens. TTPs regarding identification, arrest, debriefing of Persons of Interest (POIs) must ensure compliance with both BX law and ROE.
- n. **Policing.** Under national rule, a semi-professional constabulary force of approximately 100 officers was trained in basic policing skills. Following self

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autonomy this small department was expanded and now has some 5,000 members. A Police Proficiency and Capability report is expected from the AFP on the competencies and shortfalls of this law enforcement agency. It is to be found with the Military Police OPOD Annex AD. **V+60:** the situation has changed significantly. While the local police are being reconstituted, UNPOL has primacy in Panay.

- o. **Transportation.** Panay has a well-developed, albeit not extensive road system. Road haulage operations are a key component of the success of the Panay economy. Care must therefore be exercised by FE to ensure damage to the roads by either offensive support actions (deliberate or dynamic) or ground force usage, is kept to a minimum. Where damage occurs, it is to be reported immediately and repaired as soon as practically possible. The low weight rate (40t classification) of most highways and bridges will see the use of the roads by the heavy A veh fleet and larger logistics vehicle fleet severely curtailed. **V+60:** it is assessed that transport infrastructure is operating at approximately 67% of pre-war capacity (this follows extensive urgent works by UNSTAB engineer units during the period V to V+60). However it should be noted that the APOD and SPOD in Roxas were heavily damaged during the conflict.
 - p. **Humanitarian Situation.** United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator – Panay (UNHC- P) reporting at Ref F estimates approximately 40,000 IDP's are scattered throughout Panay as a result of increased activities by the enemy who have a sophisticated public communications and information operation. These are moved as the camps reach capacity or if the reason for the displacement ceases. In most cases, the camps successfully re-integrate the IDPs back to their home locations. **V+60:** the processing of IDPs is well underway, exact figures are being compiled – it is assessed that it is not significantly more than previously reported. A significant issue is that many IDPs are returning to their home locations to find the residence not fit for habitation due to war damage. This is becoming one of the main priorities for UNSTAB and UNHCR.
 - q. **IDP Camps.** No change.
 - r. **IDP/Refugees Movements.** No change.
- 5. **HA and Civil Society Organisations (CSO).** No change.
 - 6. **CIMIC Assumptions.** No change.

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- 7. **Purpose.** CMO activities will support the CJTF 667 Mission in order to set the conditions for transition of authority to the mandated authority supported by the international community and to minimise the impact of CJTF 667 operations on the civil population.

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8. **Method.** No change.

9. **Endstate.** Set the conditions for the transition of responsibility to the mandated authority.

EXECUTION

10. **Concept of Operations.**

- a. **CMO Elements.** To conduct CMO the following units and force elements will be utilised for the delivery of effects and provision of Civ-Mil influencing and informing activities as assigned and directed by the JETB. The lack of coalition forces means that Civil Affairs teams are unavailable for tasking or use.
 - (1) The principal CMO tool will be the CIMIC detachments and teams as provided from the formation CIMIC Group. These elements will be the priority task for assessments coordination of CMO effects as tasked to units and FE. It is expected that each Battle Group will be provided with its own CIMIC Tac Spt Tm (TST). The role of CIMIC is to support the mission through three core functions:
 - (a) enhance situational understanding of the civil space.
 - (b) support/enhance decision-making, and
 - (c) conduct tactical CIMIC tasks as detailed from OPORD.
 - (2) All other aspects, no change.
- b. **Scheme of Manoeuvre.** CMO will be conducted across all phases. CJTF 667 CMO elms and those FE tasks with CMO effects will deploy to support CJTF 667 operations during all phases with CTF 667 conducting a handover of CMO activities to the mandated authority in Phase 5.
 - (1) **Ph 0 Shaping.** Completed.
 - (2) **Ph 1 Denial.** Completed.
 - (3) **Ph 2 Lodgement.** Completed.
 - (4) **Ph 3 Neutralise.** Completed.
 - (5) **Ph 4 Transition and Redeployment.** Conduct handover of all CJTF 667 CMO activities which will be purposely planned and undertaken to NOT build in dependencies, to other agencies and the mandated authority.

11. **CMO Grouping and Tasks.**

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- I- 6
- a. **Grouping.** HQ CJTF 667 C9 Main
 - (1) **Tasks all phases:** No change.
 - b. **Grouping:** TU 667.2.1 (O/O), TU 667.2.2 and TU 667.2.3.
 - (1) **Ph 0 Preparatory Tasks:** Completed.
 - (2) **Ph 1 Shaping Tasks:** Completed.
 - (3) **Ph 2 Decisive Tasks:** Completed.
 - (4) **Ph 3 Stability Tasks:** Completed.
 - (5) **Ph 4 Transition and Redeployment Tasks.**
 - (a) Maintain engagement with HN/IO/NGOs and civil society organisations within AO.
 - (b) Facilitate release of authorised information to key stakeholders.
 - (c) Conduct handover of all CJTF 667 CMO activities to the mandated authority.

12. Coordinating Instructions.

- a. **Stabilization Aid Funds/Commanders' Emergency Relief Program (SAF/CERP).** No change.
- b. **Compensation Claims.** No change.
- c. **Locally Employed Civilians (LEC).** No change.
- d. **Operations Assessment (OA).** No change.
- e. **Request for Assistance (RFA).** No change.
- f. **Humanitarian Standards for Encampment Site Selection and Operation.** No change.
- f. **CMO Measures of Effect.** No change.
- g. **CMO Normality Indicators.** No change.

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ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

13. **Civilian Resource Requirements.** No change.

14. **Military Resource Requirements.**

- a. **ILSA.** No change.
- b. **Bottled Water.** No change.
- c. **Foodstuffs.** No change.
- d. **Shelter.** No change.
- e. **Medical.** No change.
- f. **Transportation.** No change.
- h. **Rescue.** No change.
- i. **Maintenance.** No change.

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

15. **CMO Coordinating and Liaison Architecture.** TECHCON will be established by HQ CTF 667 J9 from Ph 1 to all CJTF 667 BN S9 staff to assist in overall coordination of CMO activity and allocation of resources. CJTF 667 J9 will establish comms to the CJTF CMOC in DWN. CJTF 667 J9 will remain in loc with HQ CJTF 667 for all phases.

16. **Reports and Returns.** All CJTF 667 BN S9 are to ensure daily CMO SITREP is compiled and forwarded to HQ JTF 667 JOR NLT 2100H daily. The format for the CMO SITREP is at Appendix 5. Significant CIMIC contacts are to be recorded as CHATREPS and forwarded on completion NLT 12h following contact. Layout is noted at Appendix 6.

17. **Communications.** No change.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Appendices:

- 1. Country Brief (no change)
- 2. Map of Panay City and Provincial Boundaries (no change)
- 3. Map of Pop Tribal Demographics and Boundaries (no change)
- 4. Civil Contacts in country (no change)
- 5. CMO SITREP Format (no change)

6. CMO CHATREP Format (no change)
7. CIMIC MOE (no change)
8. CIMIC Normalcy Indicators (no change)

LOGISTIC SUPPORT ORDER

References:

- A. CJTF 667 FRAGO XX to OPORD 01 (Operation Steel Sentinel)
- B. Belesian (BX) Country Study
- C. Annex AA to CJTF 667 FRAGO XX to OPORD 01 – Health Support Order
- D. Status of Forces Agreement – AS/BX dated 11 Apr 06

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU.

1. Situation.

- a. Background. See paragraph 1 of the main body of CJTF 667 FRAGO XX (Ref A) and Annex B - Intelligence.
- b. General. After the cessation of hostilities, the JFLOGCC has since been reduced in size to reflect the reduction in force structures of CJTF 667. The Force Support Group (FSG) is now the Logistic Component Command under CJTF 667. FSGs role is to provide and coordinate intimate logistic support to all CJTF 667 component commands during Ph4 in order to prosecute the strategic and operational objectives of Operation STEEL SENTINEL (OSS).
- c. Purpose. No change.
- d. Operational Areas.
 - (1) Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO). No change. Note that the CJTF 667 assets previously located at the Alternate APOD/SPOD at Zamboanga have been moved to General Santos City or the new APOD/SPOD in Panay.
 - (2) Primary APOD. General Santos International Airport, General Santos City, BX.
 - (3) Alternate APOD. Iloilo Airport, Panay, BX.
 - (4) Primary SPOD. Makar Wharf, General Santos City, BX.
 - (5) Alternate SPOD. Iloilo Port, Panay, BX.
 - (6) JFLOGCC Area of Operations (AO). No change.
- e. Terrain and Man-Made Features. See the BX Country Study (Ref B).
- f. Host Nation Considerations
 - (1) As an island nation, BX relies on a network of regular maritime ferry and domestic air services to move personnel and freight amongst its various islands. Typically, the maritime ferry services are the primary means of inter-island transportation. BX road networks on the larger islands are mainly paved. However, there are numerous unimproved dirt and gravel roads throughout the area, especially on the smaller islands, or islands with a small population. Rural roads do not receive proper maintenance, leaving them susceptible to damage from the weather and

neglect. The monsoonal season also has a drastic effect on the inland roads with communities at times being cut off and isolated during severe weather. BX is currently constructing a railway network in Mindanao, connecting all the major cities, but will not see operational service for at least another 5 years. There is a nascent railway connecting the cities of Iloilo and Roxas on Panay, but has not seen operations since 1985.

- (2) Most of the region, particularly rural areas, cannot access all modern utilities such as potable water, electricity, and modern sewage systems. This will cause a reliance on military electrical, water and sanitation systems.
- (3) Much of the infrastructure on Panay has been damaged to varying degrees, particularly further to the north of the island near Roxas. This will cause challenges in ensuring that CJTF 667 force elements are adequately supplied to support continued operations. More details on the terrain post-conflict can be found in Annex B – Intelligence.

g. Enemy Forces. See Annex B Intelligence.

h. Host Nation Forces. See Belesian Country Study (Ref B).

i. Friendly Logistic Forces. See Appendix 1.

2. **Mission.** FSG will provide logistic support to CJTF 667 and Component Commands IOT sustain operations for the duration of Operation STEEL SENTINEL.

3. **Execution.**

a. COMD FSG Intent.

- (1) Purpose. To ensure that all CJTF 667 components are provided with sufficient logistic support to enable the completion of operations in support of CJTF 667 objectives.
- (2) Method. Reception and staging (RSO&I) activities will be coordinated by Joint Force Reception Centres (JFRC) located in the Primary and Alternate APOD/SPOD, in conjunction with the Joint Movements Coordination Cell (JMCC) and supported by the National Support Base (NSB) and ADF assets. Once deployed in the JFAO, logistic support will be provided along national and component lines with integral and close support assets being embedded within all components. The FSG and the Joint Contract Management Cell (JCMC) will provide general support to those FE located within the APODs/SPODs. The FSG HQ will have a live logistics cell providing oversight of general common user logistics support being provided by its subordinate organisations to all CJTF 667 FE. AS will provide sustainment support for classes I (fresh rations and bulk water only), II (AS camp stores only), III, IV, VI, VII, and X. Sustainment of TCN specific class II, and classes V and IX will be provided along national lines. Administrative and logistic support will be provided IAW the following phases:
 - (a) Phase 0: Shaping (D-60 – D-11) – Completed.
 - (b) Phase 1: Denial (D-10 – D-1) – Completed.

- (c) Phase 2: Lodgement (D-Day – D+2) – Completed.
 - (d) Phase 3: Neutralise (D+3 – D+14) – Completed.
 - (e) Phase 4: Transition (D+15 onwards). This phase will see the redeployment of designated FE to home locations in a staged manner. This phase will also include the finalization of all logistic support arrangements and reconstitution of all FE redeploying to home stations. Provision of enabling support to reverse RSO&I activities coordinated by the JFRCs, JMCC and the components. The FSG will also support stability operations as CJTF 667 transitions to peacekeeping. Additional tasks include:
 - 1. Cleaning of stores and equipment.
 - 2. EO remediation.
 - 3. Personnel tracking of departing FE.
 - 4. Continued provision of casualty regulation, Role 2 health facilities and support to RW AME.
 - 5. Continued RSO&I of additional CJTF 667 FE to support stability operations.
 - 6. Continued logistic support to CJTF 667 stability operations.
- (3) Endstate. Administrative and logistic support has been provided to ensure the successful completion of all CJTF 667 objectives. All CJTF 667 FE will have redeployed back to home locations.
- b. Logistic support statement by Component. Logistic support to components will be characterized by the following:
- (1) MCC. HQ MCC will be re-located at the SPOD in General Santos City, BX. Maritime units are to deploy with sufficient stocks to meet OVP requirements IAW single Service and national guidance. The provision of logistic support services will occur through a combination of Replenishment at Sea (RAS), coalition mutual logistic support, direct support from logistic nodes in the JFAO, dedicated shore-based RW support and local contractual arrangements with the HN.
 - (2) X AS Bde (LCC). HQ X AS Bde is located at the APOD, Iloilo, BX. The bulk of the X AS Bde will be located in Panay. The X AS Bde concept of support is:
 - (a) FE will deploy with integral medical (Role 1) and logistic support assets.
 - (b) Close logistic support will be provided by X Combat Service Support Battalion (X CSSB).
 - (c) General health support will be provided by the deployable Role 2 Enhanced (Role 2E) health assets (more detail covered in Ref C).
 - (d) General support will be provided to the X AS Bde through the Force Support Group (FSG).
 - (e) Class V is to be provided along national lines and positioned at the

Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) established in the APOD at General Santos City, and Iloilo, BX.

- (3) ACC. HQ ACC (and CAOC) is located with HQJOC and is supported logistically under extant arrangements. The CTUs under ACC are based by APOD location; General Santos City, BX, and Darwin, AS. ACC FE will deploy with integral logistic support elements. Close support will be provided at each base. General support will be provided by an expeditionary Combat Support Element (Squadron) allocated to each base.
 - (4) FSG. The former HQ JFLOGCC will be downgraded to form around the FSG, augmented by coalition logistic FE and will be based out of the APOD in General Santos City, BX. FSG will provide general support to all CJTF 667 FE. The FSG is to:
 - (a) Continue to provide limited transport assets for the distribution of materiel (principally classes I, II, and V) to CJTF 667 FE within the JFAO.
 - (b) Be self-supporting for the duration of OSS.
 - (c) Maintain an Australian Forces Post Office (AFPO) at APOD, General Santos City, BX.
 - (5) Engineer Support. Previous Engineer assets have been re-allocated to the **X** AS Bde. Any Engineer support the FSG requires at the General Santos City APOD will be through contracted means.
- c. Groupings. See Annex A for the C2 construct.
 - d. Mortuary Affairs. No change.
 - e. Replacements. No change.
 - f. Religious service. No change.
 - g. Salvage. No change.
 - h. Repair, Recovery and Back-loading. No change.
 - i. Contracting. The JCMC will continue to be responsible for all CJTF 667 contracts with local HN services.
 - j. Distribution. Distribution will be provided through a combination of ADF, TCN and contracted assets across the JFAO, primarily by maritime, but using road and air assets as appropriate.
 - (1) Inter-theatre distribution. Distribution between the NSB and the agreed points identified below will primarily utilise contracted distribution assets. ADF distribution capabilities may be utilised when appropriate.
 - (2) Intra-theatre distribution. Distribution from the agreed point and the JFAO is to be under FSG arrangements through HQJOC.
 - (3) Agreed Points. The Agreed Point for all personnel and materiel into the JFAO will be through the APOD/SPOD, General Santos City, BX.
 - k. Diplomatic clearances / customs. Diplomatic clearances will be IAW the SOFA in Ref D.

TCN may utilise the umbrella provided under Ref D as part of CJTF 667, or establish their own exchange of letters with BX.

- I. Postal. Free post will be made available for all CJTF 667 mail between the JFAO and AS. An AFPO will be established by the FSG at the APODs, with mail to be serviced through service air / contracted flights and then further distribution in AS by Australia Post. The postal address for CJTF 667 will be:

PMKeys No. Rank, Initial, SURNAME Deployed Unit
Operation STEEL SENTINEL AFPO 44
Darwin Mail Distribution Centre
DARWIN NT 0800

4. **Command and Signal.**

- a. COMD FSG – Colonel XXXXXX (AS) is appointed as the Force Logistic Commander.
- b. Location. COMD FSG will be established at General Santos City, BX.
- c. Reporting.
 - (1) LOGSITREP. No change.
 - (2) PERSTAT. No change.
 - (3) Health Reporting. No change.
 - (4) Point of Contact. The POC for all matters regarding this Logistic Support Order is the SO1 Plans, HQ JFLOGCC.

Appendices:

1. JFLOGCC C2 Diagram
2. Dependency Matrix (TBI)
3. Personnel Support (no change)
4. Mortuary Affairs (no change)


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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX R
TO
CJTF 667 FRAGO XX DATED
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FSG Ph4 C2 DIAGRAM



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OPERATION TE POU MAITAI HEALTH SUPPORT ORDER

References:

- A. Operational Support Publication Part 2, Vol 3.1 – *Management of air quality exposure – Airborne Particulate Matter* (BO4488490)
- B. Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 7, Chap 10 – *Pre-deployment Health Preparation*
- C. Casualty Manual (CASMNA) Chap 1, Annex B – *NOTICAS*
- D. Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 2, Chap. 7 – *MEDICAS*
- E. Defence Health Manual Vol. 1, Part 10, Chap. 3 – *Critical Incident Mental Health Support*
- F. Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 9, Chap. 19 – *Health Management of Sexual Assault*
- G. Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 7, Chap. 17 – *Post-deployment Health Requirements*
- H. Defence Health Manual Vol. 3, Part 7, Chap. 11 – *Australian Defence force levels of health support in operations – dental implications*
- I. Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 10, Chap. 4 – *Operational mental health screening for Defence employees*
- J. Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 4, Chap. 7 – *Provision of emergency health support to civilians*
- K. Operational Support Publication Vol. 3, Chap 3.11 – *Deployed Health Surveillance*
- L. Maritime Health Logistics Instruction and Medical Allowance List *dated 19 Sep 14*
- M. Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 15, Chap. 8 – *Health Materiel Manual*
- N. Army Standing Instruction (P) Part 8, chap. 12 – *Supply, control, carriage, issue and administration of scheduled medication by Army non-Medical Officers, 1 Jul 16*
- O. Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 1, Chap. 5 – *Management of clinical Incidents within Defence*
- P. Defence Health Manual Vol. 3, Part 1, Chap. 1 – *Health care complaints and clinical incident management process*
- Q. Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 15, Chap. 21 – *Health materiel support to operations*

Situation

1. **General.** The Combined Joint Task Force 667 (CJTF 667) which deployed under the authority of UNSCR 8873, has transitioned from IBSAF to UNSTAB.
2. CJTF 667 will operate within the established JFAO and will be led by AS. Troop contributing nations currently include New Zealand, Fiji, Tonga, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia. As Lead Nation, Australia will provide and/or coordinate critical force enablers:
 - a. Role 1 HS will be provided by ADF and Coalition integral capabilities.
 - b. Role 2 (Enhanced) HS will be provided on an area support basis with the deployment one R2E capability (2 GHB) scalable dependent on phase and expected dependency.

- c. Role 3 HS will be provided by the NSB (Royal Darwin Hospital or other civilian facility).
3. **Aim.** The aim of this Health Support Order (HSO) is to provide the concept of health support to OP TE POU MAITAI, and the medical requirements for NZ personnel ISO the Operation during Ph4.
4. **Area of responsibility.** No change.
5. **Current situation.** Analysis of operational environment, threat forces, stakeholder groups and assessment of likely COAs, see FRAGO XX, Annex B - Intelligence.
6. **Friendly health capabilities.** CJTF 667 will operate within the established JFAO and will be led by AS, providing and/or coordinating up to Role 3 deployed HS through a combination of ADF and Coalition Land and Maritime capabilities, as well as tactical, forward and strategic AME through RW and FW AME capabilities. All TCNs will deploy with a minimum of integral R1 HS capabilities. Primary Role 3 for NZ casualties will be through the NSB (Flight time from AO to Darwin <5hrs).
7. Whilst all TCNs will retain overall responsibility for medical support to their troops, NZ personnel and capabilities may provide HS to HN and Coalition personnel IAW the Medical Rules of Entitlement outlined in Enclosure 3.
8. **Civilian Medical Infrastructure.** Medical infrastructure within HN is restricted and in many cases was impacted during Ph 0-3. Except under emergency circumstances, and through approval of the CJTF 667 J07 Military forces will not use HN medical facilities.
9. **External agencies.** No change.
10. **Assumptions.** No change.
11. **Limitations.** HN medical assets are extremely limited throughout the AO with primary focus on the civilian population, this is particularly the case following impact to local infrastructure during Ph 0-3. Except under emergency circumstances, CJTF 667 Military forces will not use HN medical facilities and Legal authorization is required before Coalition medical forces provide any non-emergency care to foreign nationals
12. In mass casualty situations, the capacity of hospitals, pharmaceuticals for advanced treatment, and detection equipment will be overwhelmed.
13. Only decontaminated or non-infectious patients will be transported via STRATAME unless the aircraft and receiving facilities are prepared and authorized to receive contaminated or infected casualties.
14. **Health threat to Friendly Force Elements (FE).** No change.
- a. **Air quality.** No change.

- b. **Bio-scientific Capabilities and Bio-threats.** No change.

15. **Casualty estimate.** Management of casualties sustained during Ph 0-3 is as per the original OPOD. Casualties during Ph 4 are expected to be minimal, where needed they will be managed as per Ph 0-3.

Mission

- 16. Maintain the physical and psychological well-being of FE deploying on OP TE POU MAITAI.

Execution

- 17. The concept of health support is as follows:

- a. **Purpose.** No change.
- b. **Method.** HS arrangements apply to FE deploying to the region in the following phases:
 - (1) **Force preparation.** No change.
 - (2) **Conduct of operations.** No change.
 - (3) **Post-Operational administration.** No change.
- c. **Endstate.** No change.

- 18. **Health Force Preparation Requirements:**

- a. **First Aid.** No change.
- b. **Pre-deployment health briefs.** No change.

- 19. **Deployed Health Support.** Deployed HS for Defence personnel is as follows:

- a. **Individual/Buddy First Aid.** No change.
- b. **Role 1 HS.** No change.
- c. **Role 2/2E HS.** Will be provided through a combination of ADF and coalition health assets. The NZDF will deploy one R2E capability (XXX Unit) scalable dependent on phase and expected dependency.
- d. **Role 3 HS.** In most cases, casualties will be strategically evacuated to health facilities in Australia through J1Health.
- e. **Contracted Health Solutions.** No change.

20. **Holding policy.** No change.
21. **Casualty Regulation (CASREG).** No change.
 - a. **Tactical regulation.** No change.
 - b. **Strategic regulation.** No change.
22. **Mass Casualties (MASCAS).** No change.
23. **Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC).** Depending upon which location evacuation is required, these services will be provided by either ADF, coalition forces or civilian assets.
 - a. **Surface CASEVAC.** No change.
 - b. **Tactical and Forward AME.** No change.
 - c. **STRATAME.** FW STRATAME will be via the APOD at General Santos International Airport, with an alternate APOD at Rajah Buayan Airbase, General Santos City, BX.
24. **Medical Return to New Zealand (MRTNZ).** No change.
25. **Dental support.** Emergency dental support will be provided by the R2E. Any NZ person requiring a greater level of dental care than can be provided in theatre will be MRTA.
26. **Psychological support.** No change.
27. **Environmental Health (EH) Support.** No change.
28. **Veterinary Support.** No change.
29. **Mortuary Affairs.** No change.

Groupings and Tasks

30. **LOGCC.** Establish R2E HS IAW the SOM and this HSO utilising below capabilities:
 - a. 1 x Army R2E
31. **LCC.** BPT receive one NZ CHC to provide integral Role 1 HS.
32. **CJTF 667 J1H.** No change.
33. **HQJOC support.** No change.
34. **JSG.** No change.

- 35. **Deploying units.** No change.
- 36. **Individual members.** No change.
- 37. **Coalition Civilians.** No change.
- 38. **Medical Rules of Entitlement (MEDROE).** No change.
- 39. **Prisoners of War (PW), Civilian Internees and Detainees.** Medical care provided will be in accordance with the protocols of the Geneva Conventions governing warfare and peacekeeping operations. Use of Class 8 supplies from CJTF 667 stocks is only authorised to provide the minimum accepted standard of care for PWs. Civilian Internees and Detainees will be provided medical care as appropriate and turned over to the appropriate civilian authority as soon as possible.
- 40. **Local National Civilian Health Support and Humanitarian Assistance.** No change.
- 41. **Medical documentation.** No change.

Administration and Logistics

- 42. **Medical stores and supplies.** No change.
- 43. **Medical equipment.** No change.
- 44. **Blood products and donation.** No change.
- 45. **Medical waste.** No change.
- 46. **Pharmaceuticals management.** No change.
- 47. **Clinical governance.** The following clinical governance requirements are to be met by all health personnel deploying.
 - a. **Currency.** No change.
 - b. **Authorisation to carry (ATC).** No change.
- 48. **Health incident reporting.** No change.
- 49. **Health care complaints.** No change.
- 50. **Health Worthiness Checks.** No change.
- 51. **Sexual assault.** No change.

Command and Signals

52. Whilst OPCON of medical elements resides with the relevant TG Commander, TECHCON of all deployed medical elements is retained by CJTF 667 J07, and HQQJOC J07 retains overall TECHON of all healthcare delivery on an overseas operation. The senior medical officer within each facility is the medical advisor to that commander and serves as the CJTF 667 J07's representative for all matters

53. **Technical Control (TECHON).** No change.

54. **Tactical Command.** No change.

55. **Maritime Health.** No change.

56. **Aviation Health.** No change.

57. **Reports and Returns.** The overall reporting of health incidents and issues is the responsibility of the CJTF 667 J1Health.

a. **Health Situation Report.** No change.

b. **NOTICAS.** No change.

c. **MEDICAS.** No change.

d. NOTICAS and MEDICAS messages are to be raised when:

(1) An DF/Coalition fatality occurs

(2) A casualty is classified as VSI, SI or Satisfactory, regardless of the mechanism of injury or illness (No medical information is to be placed on the NOTICAS)

(3) A member has been given greater than 72 hours Restricted Duty as a result of health issues

(4) A member is to be MRTNZ

(5) A member is treated for a vector borne or climate related illness

(6) A member is admitted to a health facility

(7) A member is declared Missing or has been captured (NOTICAS only).

58. **Key Contacts.** Key contact details are as follows:

a. HQJFNZ J1H - Tel: +XXXXXX

- b. HQ JFNZ Watch keeper - Tel: XXXXX
- c. HQJOC AOC AECC – Tel: XXXX

ENDORSED: XXXXXXXXXXXX

Enclosures:

- 1. OP TE POU MAITAI Health threat assessment matrix
- 2. OP TE POU MAITAI Pre-deployment health requirements
- 3. OP TE POU MAITAI Post-deployment health requirements
- 4. OP TE POU MAITAI Medical Rules of Eligibility

ENCLOSURE 1 TO HEALTH SUPPORT ORDER OP TE POU MAITAI

Dated: XXXXXX

HEALTH THREAT ASESMENT MATRIX - OP TE POU MAITAI AO		
Threat category	Food and water-borne disease	
Unmitigated risk	HIGH	
Mitigations	<p>All personnel to be compliant with ADF routine vaccinations schedule, IAW Vaccination Manual (Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 8, chap. 12)</p> <p>Deploying personnel must have current Polio vaccination coverage and must BPT provide proof of vaccination. Additional vaccinations: Typhoid</p> <p>Only drink commercially bottled water, avoid local ice where possible. Avoid large reef fish and raw/incompletely cooked meat, fish and snails.</p>	
Mitigated risk (if all measures are effectively implemented)	LOW	
Threat category	Vector-borne disease (VBD)	
Unmitigated risk	HIGH	
DENV and CHIKV	HIGH	
ZIKA	MEDIUM	Sporadic cases since 2012
JEV	HIGH	Endemic outbreaks reported
Malaria	MEDIUM	Risk in this region is considered HIGH
Mitigations	<p>All personnel are to employ individual protective measures - long sleeves and pants, DEET / Picaridin - containing insect repellent, use of bed nets (where possible). Where achievable, personnel</p>	

	<p>should conduct permethrin dipping of all uniforms prior to deployment.</p> <p>All personnel should be made aware of the reproductive risks associated with Zika Virus. Personnel planning on reproduction should consult their treating GP to discuss the relevance of their travel to family planning.</p> <p>JEV vaccination is required for personnel deploying to this region.</p> <p>Recommend all personnel deploying to HIGH risk transmission areas receive chemoprophylaxis.</p> <p>Leptospirosis is a bacteria spread through soil and water contaminated with the urine of infected animals, and has a global distribution. Risk increases during periods of flooding. Person to person transmission is rare. Where there is an increased risk, personnel are to avoid contact with untreated water source, cover open wounds or scratches, and wash body and clothes thoroughly if exposed.</p> <p>Note: Target vectors are both day and night biting, therefore protective measures should be employed at all times.</p>	
Mitigated risk (if all measures are effectively implemented)	LOW	
Threat category	Sexually Transmitted Infections (STIs)	
Unmitigated risk	HIGH	STIs including HIV are endemic throughout the region
Mitigations	Abstain from unprotected sex or other high risk activities involving exchange of or exposure to bodily fluids (including sharing of needles, body piercings/tattoos etc)	
Mitigated risk (if all measures are effectively implemented)	LOW	
Threat category	Communicable diseases	

Unmitigated risk	HIGH	
Tuberculosis	HIGH	High burden (311-366/100K)
Mitigations	<p>All personnel are to comply with ADF routine vaccination schedule IAW Vaccination Manual (Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 8, Chap. 12).</p> <p>Additional vaccinations: seasonal influenza vaccine and meningococcal meningitis vaccine.</p> <p>Tuberculosis is endemic throughout the region, post deployment screening is to be undertaken for personnel with close regular contact with a TB case; have spent 8 or more hours with a TB case in a confined environment; or deploy for 3 months or more to a country with an estimated annual TB incidence of at least 49/100K population, IAW Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 8, Chapt. 9 – Tuberculosis.</p>	
Mitigated risk (if all measures are effectively implemented)	LOW	MITIGATED RISK OF TUBERCULOSIS: LOW MITIGATED RISK OF COVID-19 – HIGH if no integral health support is deployed
Threat category	Environment	
Unmitigated risk	MEDIUM	
Climatic conditions	MEDIUM	
Heat	MEDIUM	
Air quality	MEDIUM	
Mitigations	<p>The nature of duties, climatic conditions and period of deployment are expected to exposure personnel to an increased risk of heat stress. Commanders are to ensure personnel comply with heat</p>	

	<p>stress mitigations including work-rest cycles IAW SafetyMan – Work Environment: Excessive Heat or Cold</p> <p>In the conduct of their duties, personnel may be exposure to environmental contaminants (e.g. hazardous chemicals, asbestos) and conditions (including reduced air quality). Personnel are to be cognisant of their safety and maintain Australian Standards. Operational Support Library Part 2, Vol. 3, Chap 3.12 Air Quality – Management of Particulate Matter Exposure provides information and guidance in the event of reduced air quality – particularly in areas affected by transboundary haze events.</p>	
Mitigated risk (if all measures are effectively implemented)	LOW	

ENGINEER SUPPORT

References:

- A. CJTF 667 FRAGO XX to OPORD 01 (Operation Steel Sentinel)
- B. Belesian (BX) Country Study

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU.

1. Situation.

- a. Background. See paragraph 1 of the main body of CJTF 667 FRAGO XX (Ref A) and Annex B - Intelligence.
- b. General. No change .
- c. Purpose. The purpose of this Annex is to describe the Scheme of Engineer Operations and provide Engineer guidance at the operational level for Ph4.
- d. Engineer Intelligence. Refer to Annex B to CJTF 667 FRAGO XX.
- e. Operational Areas.
 - (1) Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO). The JFAO includes the landmasses, national air space and territorial waters of Belesia (BX), the Sulu Sea, parts of the Celebes Sea, the Philippine Sea and the South China Sea. The landmass, airspace and territorial waters of Gabal (GX) and South Torbia (RT) remain neutral and are excluded from the JFAO.
 - (2) JFLCC Area of Operations (AO). The JFLCC AO is comprised of the landmass, airspace and territorial waters (12NM) of BX.
- f. Terrain and Man-Made Features. See the BX Country Study (Ref B). g. Civil

Considerations

- (1) As an island nation, BX relies on a network of regular maritime ferry and domestic air services to move personnel and freight amongst its various islands. Typically, the maritime ferry services are the primary means of inter-island transportation. BX roads networks on the larger islands are mainly paved. However, there are numerous unimproved dirt and gravel roads throughout the area, especially on the smaller islands, or islands with a small population. Disrupting mobility would be easily affected by damaging paved roads through the use of IEDs or cratering charges. Rural roads do not receive proper maintenance, leaving them susceptible to damage from the weather and neglect. The monsoonal season also has a drastic effect on the inland roads with communities at time being cut off and isolated during severe weather. BX is currently constructing a railway network in Mindanao, connecting all the major cities, but will not see operational service for at least another 5 years. There is a nascent railway connecting the cities of Iloilo and Roxas on Panay, but has not seen operations since 1985.

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- (2) Citizens of BX hold their religion in high esteem and many religious centers and structures are considered to be very important. For the most part, religious structures have not been damaged during the recent conflict and remain relatively intact on Panay.
- (3) Most of the region, particularly rural areas, cannot access all modern utilities such as potable water, electricity, and modern sewage systems. The city of Iloilo has been relatively untouched during the conflict with utilities remaining intact. However the city of Roxas as seen extensive damage due to the fighting with all major utilities (power, water, sewage) damaged in some way. Additionally, in the rural areas of Panay, much critical infrastructure such as roads and bridges have been damaged or destroyed.
- (4) Paramilitary, insurgent, and guerilla forces continue to operate in BX. This could lead to an increased threat of IEDs in Panay, particularly on main highways and field landing strips, having a negative impact on mobility.
- (5) BX contains a number of heavily populated areas such as the cities on Panay. Enemy operations in these areas could result in the Host Nation asking for engineers to provide survivability/force protection, and general engineering assistance.
- h. Enemy Engineer Forces. All SFMEF have now left Belesia (aside from PW/CPERS yet to be repatriated).
- i. Friendly Engineer Forces. See Belesian Country Study (Ref B).
- 2. **Mission.** No change.
- 3. **Execution.**
 - a. Concept of Engineer Support. The Coalition engineer effort will be continue to be centrally planned and coordinated, and executed by the Component organic and assigned engineers. Theatre planning and coordination for engineer support will be provided by the Joint Force Engineer, supplemented by elements from 19 Chief Engineering Works. Theater-level engineering support will be provided by X Combat Engineer Regiment (augmented with a Construction Engineer Squadron) as part of the LCC. RAAF Airfield Engineers (65 Sqn) will continue to provide intimate support to the APODs through the Combat Support Squadrons assigned to each APOD. HN engineering capability will be required during Ph 4 Transition operations to rebuild infrastructure damaged or destroyed during the conflict. This may include civilian contractors. The Joint Force Engineer will be responsible for coordinating all sustainability engineering support across the JFAO.
 - b. Scheme of Engineer Operations. During Ph4, CJTF 667 Engineers will provide and synchronise mobility, survivability, sustainability and general Engineer efforts to support the UN and BX civil authorities.
 - c. Priority of Engineer Effort by Phase.
 - (1) Phase 0 – Deployment – Completed
 - (2) Phase 1 – Denial – Completed

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- (3) Phase 2 – Lodgement – Completed
- (4) Phase 3 – Neutralise – Completed
- (5) Phase 4 – Transition.
 - (a) Conduct reconstruction tasks ISO capacity building.
 - (b) Conduct battlefield clearance (including EOD tasks)
 - (c) Support the handover of engineer sites and works to civil and military authorities of respective Host Nations.
 - (d) Contribute to capacity building of Belesian security forces.
 - (e) Support CJTF 667 in the conduct of relief in place and transition to a follow-on force.
 - (f) Support the withdrawal of CJTF 667 forces to locations directed by TCNs.
- d. Assignment of Additional Engineer Assets. Components will deploy with organic and assigned engineer units and assets. Engineer organizations are assigned as follows:
 - (1) LCC. X CER
 - (2) MCC. X Clearance Diving Team. (3) ACC. 65 Squadron.
- e. Common Tasks.
 - (1) Conduct combat engineering and general engineering support to assigned Component or formation.
 - (2) Maintain CJTF 667 MSRs operational within assigned AOs.
 - (3) Coordinate Explosive Hazard information collection and counter-explosive hazard operations.
 - (4) Be prepared to assist BX authorities with the repair of critical infrastructure that impacts CJTF 667 operations.
 - (5) Be prepared to coordinate engineer support for humanitarian assistance and to create a safe environment in BX.
 - (6) Liaise with Host Nation Engineers, and coordinate Host Nation engineer support in AOs.
- f. Specific Tasks.
 - (1) X CER.
 - (a) Maintain CJTF 667 policy, standards, and priorities for construction, facilities, and real estate utilization.
 - (b) Maintain CJTF 667 environmental policy and standards.
 - (c) Operate the theater Explosive Hazard Coordination Centre and reporting system.
 - (d) Manage engineer reach back capabilities.
 - (e) Provide theatre-level engineer support to CJTF 667, including permanent horizontal and vertical construction, pipeline repair and construction, well-

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drilling, and power generation.

- (f) Manage CJTF 667 facilities, real estate, construction, and engineer construction contracts.

g. Engineer Intelligence Requirements for Planning.

- (1) APOD and SPOD capacity, limitations, and damage.
- (2) Extent of damage to BX critical infrastructure in Panay and Palawan.
- (3) Disruption to the Ground LOC.
- (4) Employment of improvised explosive devices, booby-traps, and mines.
- (5) Extent of damage or obstacles on BX airfields.
- (6) Capacity, limitations, and damage of bridges over major waterways in Panay and Palawan.
- (7) Location and extent of engineer construction materials in BX.

h. Explosive Hazards.

- (1) X CER will maintain an Explosive Hazards Coordination Cell (EHCC) to gather information, track, predict, distribute information on, and mitigate explosive hazards within the theater that affect force protection and mobility.
- (2) EOD within X CER, Clearance Diving Teams and 65 Sqn will conduct activities to address explosive hazards. Combat engineer unit activities include the detection, reporting, and clearing of minefields, and the detection, reporting, and destruction of IEDs. Only EOD units and properly qualified EOD personnel shall conduct EOD procedures against explosive ordnance, UXO, Mines or IEDs. Attempts will be made to render safe explosive devices for intelligence gathering efforts if the situation does not affect the local population and CJTF 667 ability to accomplish the mission being undertaken.
- (3) Mines. No CJTF 667 units had emplaced mines during this conflict. The SFMEF had placed protective AT/AP minefields at strategic locations in Panay. Details of the type of mines used is noted in separate documents (INTSUM). Additionally, the OPN are reported to have laid sea mines along the approaches to Roxas (unconfirmed).
- (4) Humanitarian Demining (HDM). Because of the threat to peace and safety, HDM has become a significant disarmament and peace operations activity. Demining is ultimately an HN responsibility; however, CJTF 667 will assist BX through mine awareness education and training of HN personnel in the surveying, marking, and clearing of mines. As part of battlefield clearance, CJTF 667 may be required to clear mines/UXO in critical areas to ensure the safe movement of critical / time sensitive humanitarian aid where contracted HDM capabilities cannot provide timely support.

- i. Firefighting. ACC and MCC will deploy with organic firefighting capabilities, as will the National Support Elements from TCNs. Fire protection will be coordinated with the Host

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Nations. The CER will provide close firefighting capabilities ISO RW operations. TCNs will develop fire prevention and protection plans for TCN-owned or rented facilities that meet CJTF-667 standards. CJTF-OIG fire protection priorities are:

- (1) APODs and SPODs.
- (2) Medical facilities.
- (3) Ammunition and fuel storage installations.
- (4) CJTF 667 and Component Headquarters and communication centers.
- (5) ACC airfields.
- (6) Personnel accommodation facilities.
- j. Reach back. The Joint Force Engineer will facilitate the utilization of NSB engineer capabilities. All requests for assistance will be passed to the Joint Force Engineer.
- k. Facilities.
 - (1) No change.
- l. Host Nation Support. No change.
- m. Construction Standards. No change.
- 4. **Sustainment.**
 - a. Logistics. No change.
 - b. Medical. No change.
 - c. Construction Materiel. No change.
- 5. **Command and Signal.**
 - a. CJTF 667 Engineer – Colonel XXXXXX (AS) is appointed as the Joint Force Engineer.
 - b. Location. No change.
 - c. Engineer Coordinating Boards.
 - (1) The CJTF 667 Engineer Synchronisation teleconference. Fridays at 1000 hours, commencing XXXXXXX. Required attendees: HQJOC, HQ CJTF 667 J2, J3, J4, J5 Engineer staff officers, X CER, 65 Sqn, MCC Engineer.

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