

UNCLASSIFIED
1 (ANZAC) DIV OPORD 01

COPY X OF X
HQ 1 (ANZAC) DIV
DDTTTTL MON YYYY (d+XX)

OPS 01/XX

OPORD 01/XX – OPERATION SWIFT DEFENDER

(U) References:

- A. (U) CJTF OPORD 01/XX
- B. (U) US Joint Publication 3-16 Multinational Operations
- C. (U) US Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations
- D. (U) Maps:

Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU.

1. (U) Situation:

a. (U) Battlespace Description:

- (1) (U) Area of Interest (AI). The 1(ANZAC) DIV AI includes the airways and land areas of NORTH ISLAND fm CAPE REINGA in NORTH TORBIA (NT) to CAPE PALLISER in SOUTH TORBIA (ST), the SOUTH CHINA SEAS (W), the SULAWESI SEA (S), and the PHILLIPEANS SEA (N and E). See Appendix 5 (JIPOE) of Annex B (Int).
- (2) (U) Area of Operations (AO). The 1(ANZAC) DIV AO, AO APPLE, covers ST bounded by PL LION (Mil Demarcation Line - MDL) in the N, the west coast of ST in the W and the east coast of ST in the E. Currently 1 (ANZAC) DIV forces are deploying to the AO. See Tab A (Op Overlay) to Appendix 1 (Int Estimate) and Appendix 5 (JIPOE) of Annex B (Int).
- (3) (U) Terrain:
 - (a) (U) NORTH ISLAND has a 'spine' of mountain ranges running through the middle, with gentle rolling farmland on both sides. Central NORTH ISLAND is dominated by the Volcanic Plateau, an active volcanic and thermal area.
 - (b) (U) Multiple natural hazards exist, resulting from (fm) the country's geology, weather, native wildlife, and human activity. While this terrain offers considerable challenges, they are not insurmountable.
 - (c) (U) As the mountainous terrain suggests, NORTH ISLAND lies in an area of active earthquakes and volcanism ringing the Pacific Plate. A major fault line runs through WELLINGTON. Earthquakes are sometimes felt and can cause damage.

- (d) (U) Further detail is provided in Tab B (Terrain) to Appendix 1 (Int Estimate) to Annex B (Int).
- (4) (U) Weather:
 - (a) (U) NORTH ISLAND lies in the Temperate Zone and has a generally mild climate with sharp regional contrasts. The rugged terrain of the country has a dramatic effect on the weather. Many parts of the country are subject to high winds and rains fol by sharp drops in temperature.
 - (b) (U) Jan and Feb are NORTH ISLAND warmest months with Jul normally the coldest. Spells of cool, damp weather occur even in the summer, fm Dec through Feb. Rainy winter days of Jun, Jul, and Aug are interspersed with days of brilliant sunshine and crisp, clear air. Oct, Nov, and Dec are particularly windy months. Winds of 100 kph are not unusual, especially in the WELLINGTON area, and on rare occasions they exceed 160 kph.
 - (c) (U) Further detail is prov in Tab C (Weather) to Appendix 1 (Int Estimate) to (Annex B (Int).
- b. (U) En Forces. See Annex B for a full discussion of the Democratic People's Republic of Torbias (DPRT) forces:
 - (1) (U) Background:
 - (a) (U) After taking a significant defeat the last time the Torbian People's Army (TPA) crossed the MDL, its remnants wdr back to recovery. After a significant reorg the DPRT was reconstituted to consist of one corps-sized force (3 Operational Support Command (OSC)) consisting of the Marine Expeditionary Force (transferred from the Western Army) and re-designated as 1st Marine Expeditionary Division known as 1 MED) and 5 and 6 MECH div's (at 80% strength) With the loss of most of its old DONOVIA equip, the DPRT is slowly being stocked (stk) with equip fm OLVANA. 3 (OSC) has been the priority for receipt of OLVANA equipment. The remainder of the DPRT is largely cbt ineffective or has been tasked with internal sy within NT and is unlikely to be deployed S of the MDL.
 - (b) (U) The current sit in the W of the Indo-Pacific region involves significant US and allied forces assisting the Govt of KHORATHIDIN dislodge an OLVANA army-group spt by BAGASANTI forces fm its northern regions. Int sources believe that despite the DPRT current status the Song regime will view this current sit across the Indo-Pacific region as an opportunity to try again and reunite the two TORBIA's. ST will likely be able to only obtain ltd spt fm other nations.

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- (2) (U) Current Situation. 3 OSC of DPRT launched a surprise offensive against the South Torbian Republic of TORBIA Army (ROTA) on two fronts:
- (a) (U) On AABBBZ 3 OSC launched initial atks with arty barrages on ROTA HQ, comd posts and cantonment areas along the MDL. Simultaneously multiple air bases and air def sites were subjected to EW jamming and asslt by DPRT SPF.
 - (b) (U) The DPRT initial atk penetrated ROTA forces along the MDL using a system of pre-prep crossing points.
 - (c) (U) 5 MECH DIV breached the MDL IVO MARAMARUA (60H UD 42937 76119) swung E using State Highway (SH) 2 as its axis of adv heading for TAURANGA (60H VD 27105 29531).
 - (d) (U) On reaching TAURANGA 5 MECH DIV swung S along SH 36 heading for ROTORUA (60H VC 33163 78066). Using SH 30, 5 MECH DIV continued its adv to the junction of SH 1 and SH 30 IVO ATIAMURI (60H VC 13473 55271). The DIV then pushed S where its adv culminated at TAUPO (60H VC 19755 17864).
 - (e) (U) 6 MECH DIV breached the MDL IVO MEREMERE (60H UD 28767 67881) and the WAIKATO RIVER ROAD BRIDGE (60H UD 17843 70061) adv S along SH 1 heading for HAMILTON (60H UD 48365 15980). Despite initially offering stiff resistance ROTA 461 and 913 BDEs were forced to wdr S through HAMILTON after sustaining hy cas. 913 Bde wdr along SH 3 while 461 Bde continued to wdr S on SH 1.
 - (f) (U) On reaching HAMILTON 6 MECH DIV continued its S adv along SH 3 to TE KUITI (60H UC 39413 54830) in pursuit of 461 and 913 BDEs.
 - (g) (U) The 6 MECH DIV main body continue its adv S using SH 4 as its axis. At TE KUITI a bde detach fm the main body and headed W to the west coast in pursuit of 913 BDE where its adv culminated at MOKAU (60H TC 92962 14101).
 - (h) (U) On D+10, a 24hr cease fire was agreed to by the govts of ST and NT along a cease fire line running through the centre of NORTH ISLAND.
 - (i) (U) Overall DPRT losses have been light, it is assessed the op pause accompanying the ceasefire has been conducted IOT bring fwd further combat (cmbt) sups and reinforcements prior to recommencement of the offensive.
 - (j) (U) With the assistance of Integrated Air Defence Systems (IADS), the NTAF is able to achieve local air superiority for short pds over NT occupied territory. Fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft have

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been seen op in the AO prov CAS to 6 MECH DIV. Main tgt have been identified as HQ, EW sites and armd units.

- (3) (U) Assessment:
- (a) (U) DPRT forces will continue their adv S to sec NEW PLYMOUTH (60H TB 47091 73228) and PALMERSTON NORTH (60G UA 82395 34020).
 - (b) (U) DPRT 1 MED forces will continue to adv SW fm NAPIER to clear SH 5 and link up with 5 MECH DIV in TAUPU. The 1 MED will also consolidate in NAPIER to enable a build-up of further marine forces to reinforce 5 MECH DIV and 6 MECH DIV.
 - (c) (U) Once their intermediate objectives are achieved DPRT will continue to adv S to WELLINGTON (51PTS828150). DPRT 6 MECH DIV, is assessed as the main effort and will atk S. Losses by DPRT forces have been light with 5 MECH DIV assessed at 75% str and 6 MECH DIV assessed at no more than 65% cbt effective.
 - (d) (U) 3 OSC MLCOA. Intent will be to defeat ROTA/CJTF 667.2 IOT to further annex ST territory. This will be achieved by isolating ROTA/CJTF 667.2 by a rapid adv to seize WELLINGTON approaches and extension of the A2AD bubble thereby denying LoCs to ST forcing concessions at the strat lvl. This will be conducted along multiple axes IOT envelop and bypass ROTA fmns with the aim of pre-empting CTF 667.2 def prep. Furthermore SPF will coord Torbian Communist Army (TCA) actions IOT spt 3 OSC scheme of mvr through the conduct of irregular warfare in both main battle and disruption zones. Extensive use is likely to be made of infil and air asslt IOT dislocate ROTA def psns and exploit NT's temporary local air superiority in the occupied territories. This op will likely be conducted in three phases:
 - (i) (U) Phase 1. Destroy 46 Mot DIV and sec NAPIER (D+11 – D+20):
 - (A) (U) 5 Mech DIV:
 - (I) (U) Destroy 462 Mot Bde (ROTA) on SH5.
 - (II) (U) Clear SH5.
 - (III) (U) Sec PORT OF NAPIER.
 - (B) (U) 6 Mech DIV:
 - (I) (U) Fix 913 Bde (ROTA) in TARANAKI.
 - (II) (U) Destroy 461 Bde (ROTA) in CENTRAL PLATEAU.

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- (III) (U) Sec SH4 and NAPIER-TAIHAPE ROAD IOT enable bypass of def psns and open GLoC to NAPIER.
- (C) (U) 1 MED:
 - (I) (U) 3 OSC Reserve.
 - (II) (U) Fol and Spt 6 Mech DIV.
- (ii) (U) Phase 2. Adv and sec HAWKE'S BAY and MANAWATU (D+20 – D+24):
 - (A) (U) 5 Mech DIV:
 - (I) (U) Complete destruction of 462 Bde (ROTA) IOT open SH5 GLoCs.
 - (II) (U) Fol and Spt 1 MED.
 - (B) (U) 6 Mech DIV:
 - (I) (U) Adv on SH4 and SH1 IOT sec MANAWATU.
 - (II) (U) Isolate ROTA in PALMERSTON NORTH.
 - (III) (U) Sec W approach to MANAWATU GORGE IOT open lateral LoCs.
 - (C) (U) 1 MED:
 - (I) (U) Adv S on SH2 and sec E approach to MANAWATU GORGE.
- (iii) (U) Phase 3. Sec WELLINGTON approaches and estb A2AD IOT isolate WELLINGTON (D+24 – D+27):
 - (A) (U) 5 Mech DIV:
 - (I) (U) Fol and assume 1 MED.
 - (II) (U) Sec GLoCs.
 - (B) (U) 6 Mech DIV:
 - (I) (U) Adv on SH1 and sec approaches to WELLINGTON vic PAEKAKARIKI and TRANSMISSION GULLY.
 - (II) (U) Estb A2AD systems vic WELLINGTON IOT isolate ROTA/CTF 667.2.
 - (C) (U) 1 MED:
 - (I) (U) Adv S on SH2 and sec REMUTAKA approach to WELLINGTON.
 - (II) (U) Estb A2AD systems vic WELLINGTON IOT isolate ROTA/CTF 667.2

- (iv) (U) Likely Endstate. 46 Mot DIV (ROTA) destroyed, 913 Bde (ROTA) isolated in TARANAKI, approaches to WELLINGTON sec IOT deny mvr room for conduct of ctr-atk by CTF 667.2. 3 OSC estb A2AD systems and adopting defensive posture IOT isolate ROTA/CTF 667.2 fm external spt and forcing favourable strategic negotiations.
 - (e) (U) 3 OSC MDCOA. As per MLCOA but 1 x Bde fm 1 MED used to conduct amphib seizure of NAPIER, thereby enabling rapid destruction of 462 Mot Bde and early switch onto SH2 axis by 1 MED. This enables the commencement of Ph 2 fm D+16 and thereby pre-empts completion of CTF 667.2 lodgement and def prep, forcing CTF 667.2 to blk 3 OSC in N WAIRARAPA and denying ability to conduct ctr-atk vic MASTERTON. Doing so likely precludes a transition to off ops given current and projected force ratios.
 - (f) (U) Vulnerabilities.
 - (i) (U) A lack of A2AD/ C2 systems within 5 Mech DIV when isolated from other elements of 3 (OSC).
 - (ii) (U) 1 MEDs isolation on the eastern side of the lower NORTH ISLAND.
 - (iii) (U) A limited amount of MSRs on the western part of the lower NORTH ISLAND.
 - (iv) (U) DPRK inability to secure KT in its rear areas while on the defence.
 - (g) (U) Strengths.
 - (i) (U) OLVANA Support.
 - (ii) (U) Co-ordination between 3 OSC and TCA.
 - (iii) (U) Capabilities that enable infil and disruption into 1 (ANZAC) Div rear areas.
- c. (U) Other Stakeholders. Stakeholder gps identified as op in the AO:
 - (1) (U) OLVANA. Whilst not directly involved, OLVANA is likely to prov ltd spt to NT as an extension of the OLVANA A2AD strategy. Recent reports cfm that OLVANA is prov the fol:
 - (a) (U) Replacement of DPRT damaged/destroyed equip.
 - (b) (U) Reduced satellite capability for FF R&S.
 - (c) (U) Over-the-horizon radar.
 - (d) (U) YLC-8B 3D Long-Range Anti-Stealth Surveillance Radar.
 - (e) (U) One Y-8G (High New 3) Long-Range Electronic Jamming Aircraft continuing to fly under OLVANA livery.

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- (f) (U) Ltd H-6 (Hong-6) Strategic Bomber sorties.
 - (g) (U) Ltd J-16D EW atk aircraft sorties.
 - (h) (U) Ltd HQ-9 (Hong Qi 9) 8x8 Long-Range Air Def Missile System manned by either OLVANA pers or contractors.
- (2) (U) DONOVIA. The provision of a battery of the S-400 Triumph (SA-21 Growler) Long-Range Surface-to-air Missile System has significantly enhanced the DPRT coastal arty system. It is highly likely that battery continues to be manned by contractors spt by DONOVIA AD mil advisors.
- (3) (U) ARIANA. ST int sources rpt sightings of ARIANA-manufactured UAVs in ST airspace incl:
- (a) (U) Qasef-1 – a recon and loitering munition drone.
 - (b) (U) Mohajer-4 – a tactical UAV.
 - (c) (U) Shahed-129 – mdm altitude long-endurance UAV.
- (4) (U) TANTOCO Cartel. The TANTOCO Cartel is involved in almost every type of criminal acty imaginable incl drug and wpns smuggling, extortion, motor veh theft, illegal gambling, money laundering, counterfeiting, and murder-for-hire. ROT Police have estb that there is a cell op throughout ST and may be spt by DPRT SPF. Potential acty incl:
- (a) (U) Hijacking convoys to steal sups incl wpns and ammo.
 - (b) (U) Selling wpns and ammo on the black market.
 - (c) (U) Exploiting opportunities to sell drugs to CTF 667.2 pers.
 - (d) (U) Extortion of local officials in major towns and surrounds.
 - (e) (U) Refer to Appendix 1 (INT Estimate) of Annex B (Int) for further detail.
- (5) (U) ST Communist Party Army (STCA). An insurgency gp intent on estb a communist country based on the Marxist model, the same goal as stated by the ST Communist Party (STCP). The STCP claims that their gp has no connection to the STCA, but there are probably some members that belong to both orgs. The threat fm STCA is assessed as high and will undertake ops in spt of the DPRT in the AO. INTEL rpts indicate that they are receiving spt fm DPRT SPF. It is almost certain that STCA actions will be coord to spt 3 OSC ops down to the Bde lvl. Refer to Appendix 1 (INT Estimate) of Annex B (Int) for further detail.
- (6) (U) UNITED TORBIA. A counter-insurgency gp that is pro-govt and a counter-Communist org that wants to unite NT and ST with a democratically elected govt. Their potential to pose a threat is assessed as extremely low. Refer to Appendix 1 (INT Estimate) of Annex B (Int) for further detail.

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- (7) (U) NGO. Several NGO have representation in ST and possibly AO APPLE but their capacity to prov svcs is assessed as low. It is assessed that the majority of NGO will not seek a role until post conflict. Several NGO have estb AAs in WELLINGTON and they should be expected within the AO rapidly once major combat ops have ceased. Refer to Appendix 1 (INT Estimate) of Annex B (Int) for further detail.
- (8) (U) Media. Prior to the commencement of hostilities there were a significant number of print, radio and television svcs avail throughout AO APPLE. Most of these svcs have since been closed and those that remain open are under DPRT con in DPRT controlled territory. All of the internet svc providers within AO APPLE were also closed. It is unlikely that any significant or independent media are op throughout AO APPLE at present. As such it is unlikely that media will be encountered on entering AO APPLE but that media can be expected build rapidly once land LOC are re-estb or major cbt has ceased. Refer to Appendix 1 (INT Estimate) of Annex B (Int) for further detail.
- d. (U) Identified Interagency, Intergovt, and Non-govt Orgs. The fol agencies are op in WELLINGTON, ST:
 - (1) (U) US State Dept msn to ST.
 - (2) (U) US Agency for International Development (USAID) with the Office of Transitions Initiatives (OTI) and the Office of Foreign Disaster Relief (OFDA).
 - (3) (U) UN Country Team (UNCT).
 - (4) (U) UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); ST Ministry of Affairs (MIA).
 - (5) (U) UN World Health Organisation (WHO).
 - (6) (U) World Food Program (WFP).
 - (7) (U) The ST Red Cross (STRC) local partnership with the International Red Cross (IRC).
 - (8) (U) The US Central Intelligence Agency.
 - (9) (U) The US Defense Int Agency; Dept for Homeland Sy; and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).
 - (10) (U) Political Advisors (POLADS) are anticipated, but have not yet been assigned.
 - (11) (U) Dept of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) NZ have representatives collocated with GoST in WELLINGTON.
 - (12) (U) AS/NZ OGAs are anticipated, but not likely to deploy into theatre until ST has been cleared to the Cease Fire Line.
- e. (U) Civilians:

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- (1) (U) IDP. There are substantial numbers of IDPs fleeing fm the DPRT. Whilst the majority of IDP are likely to be ST there may be NT refugees who were able to take advantage of the confusion caused by the DPRT crossing the MDL. This will place significant pressure on MSRs due to congestion restricting coalition force movts N. There is also the potential for DPRT SPF to use this as an opportunity to move S towards WELLINGTON.
 - (2) (U) ST civilians. It is highly likely that those ST nationals who have not been displaced will remain in loc conducting their normal daily lives. They may pose a problem to coalition force mnvr if they perceive that it will disrupt their lives and potentially cause damage to their property.
- f. (U) Friendly Forces:
- (1) 1 (ANZAC) DIV. Component of CJTF 667 and is comprised of a DIV HQ, 1, 3, 7, 9 Multi-Role Combat Brigade (MCB), DIV Arty Bde, 6 CS Bde, 17 CSS Bde and a Combined Aviation Regiment. Refer to Annex A: TASKORG for further detail.
 - (2) (U) HQ:
 - (a) (U) Comdr, Maj Gen, COSGROVE, (AS).
 - (b) (U) Deputy Comdr (Ops), Brig JONES (NZ).
 - (3) (U) Attached Units. IAW Refs A and B C2 arrangements are as fol:
 - (a) (U) 3/570 Cbt Engr Coy (US), OPCON Phs 1-3.
 - (b) (U) B/43/11 ADA (US), TACON Phs 1-3.
 - (c) (U) Q/5/11 HIMARS Bty (US), OPCON Phs 1-3.
 - (d) (U) 121st Cbt Spt Hospital (CSH) (US) TACON Phs 1-3.
 - (4) (U) Adjacent Units and Fmns:
 - (a) (U) 1 Army (ROTA). Undergoing reconstitution vic WELLINGTON, likely to be able to generate 2 x Mot DIV and 1 x Mech Bde by D+41.
 - (b) (U) 3 Army (ROTA). 3 Army remains the only cbt effective element (70%) of the ST Army. 3 Army dispositions below:
 - (i) (U) 44 Mot DIV (ROTA). Tasked to sec WELLINGTON APOD/SPOD and prep def of the capital. Unlikely to be deployed fwd under any contingency due to political reqt to protect WELLINGTON.
 - (ii) (U) 46 Mot DIV (ROTA). Deployed fwd onto the ceasefire line and tasked to blk further DPRT offensives until reinf by 1 (ANZAC) DIV.
 - (A) (U) 461 Mot Bde (ROTA). Estb def psns vic CENTRAL PLATEAU.

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- (B) (U) 462 Mot Bde (ROTA). Estb def psns vic AHIMANAWA RANGE IOT conduct delay def on SH5 back to NAPIER.
 - (C) (U) 468 Tank Bde (ROTA). Tasked as 3 Army Reserve, vic PALMERSTON NORTH.
 - (iii) (U) 913 Mech Bde (ROTA). Estb def posns on SH3 and PH 43 IOT deny DPRT adv to seize NEW PLYMOUTH.
 - (iv) (U) Army Tps (ROTA). Task org equally between 44 and 46 Mot DIV.
- (5) (U) Higher HQ Msn and Intent:
- (a) (U) Higher HQ. CJTF 667:
 - (i) (U) Msn. CJTF 667 is to defeat DPRT forces S of the MDL IOT force DPRT wdr fm the sovereign territory of ST.
 - (ii) (U) Commander's Intent. CJTF 667 will con ALoC/SLoC and sec WELLINGTON APOD/SPOD to enable force flow of 1 (ANZAC) DIV and spt reconstitution of ROTA. Defeat NT Southern Army offensive through conduct of delay def in HAWKES BAY and MANAWATU IOT culminate DPRT fmns and for CJFAC to gain air superiority. CFMCC estb sea con IOT isolate DPRT in ST and envelop via amphib ops. Destroy DPRT fmns in ST. Clear ST and sec Cease Fire Line. BPT sec MDL on order of coalition strat leadership. ICW GoST conduct sec ops IOT defeat TCA. Rebuild ROTA, HOTO resp for MDL and internal sy, then commence redeployment.
 - (iii) (U) Method:
 - (A) (U) Phase I – Sec ALoC/SLoC and WELLINGTON APOD/SPOD IOT enable lodgement of CTF 667.2. Generate air and sea superiority.
 - (B) (U) Phase II – Defeat DPRT in ST and restore ST territorial sovereignty.
 - (C) (U) Phase III – Deter further DPRT aggression and spt ST restoration of legitimate governance.
 - (iv) (U) Endstate. Mil conflict does not escalate beyond what is necessary to re-estb pre-conflict borders, en forces have been destroyed and do not have the capability to conduct off ops into ST, sy is restored to ST and the legitimate govt is accepted by the people allowing it to govern allowing international forces redeploy.
 - (b) (U) Msns of Adjacent Units:
 - (i) (U) ROTA:

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- (A) (U) 1st Army (ROTA). Destroyed during previous conflict with DPRT. Undergoing reconstitution vic WELLINGTON, likely to be able to generate 2 x Mot DIV and 1 x Mech Bde by D+41. Fm DIV Ph 2 will commence off ops with 1 x DIV Fol and Spt 1 (ANZAC) DIV in AO West then sec Cease Fire Line vic WHAKATANE. Remainder of 1st Army will pursue wdr 6 Mech DIV elms on SH3 and sec CEASE FIRE LINE vic TARANAKI.
- (B) (U) 2nd Army (ROTA). Destroyed during previous conflict with DPRT. Undergoing reconstitution vic PALMERSTON NORTH. Some elms likely to become cbt effective fm D+91, with 2nd Army cbt effective ~ D+130.
- (C) 3rd Army (ROTA):
 - (I) (U) Forces are at 70% CE and constitute the bulk of ROTA's remaining cbt power.
 - (II) (U) 44 Mot DIV (ROTA). Tasked to sec WELLINGTON APOD/SPOD and prep def of the capital. Unlikely to be deployed fwd under any contingency due to political reqt to protect WELLINGTON.
 - (III) (U) 46 Mot DIV (ROTA). Deployed on Cease Fire Line and tasked with delay def against adv DPRT fmns:
 - A. (U) 461 Mot Bde (ROTA). Maint def psns on SH1 and SH4 in the CENTRAL PLATEAU. Tasked to exploit restricted terrain to delay DPRT adv then estb MDP vic PALMERSTON NORTH.
 - B. (U) 462 Mot Bde (ROTA). Maint def psns on SH5 vic AHIMANAWA RANGES. Tasked to delay DPRT adv and retain NAPIER.
 - C. (U) 468 Tk Bde (ROTA). Tasked as 3 Army Res Currently loc vic PALMERSTON NORTH.
 - D. (U) 913 Mech Bde (ROTA). Maint def psns on SH3 and PH43 in TARANAKI. Tasked to delay DPRT adv, deny NEW PLYMOUTH and then link up w/ 46 Mot DIV vic PALMERSTON NORTH.

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- (IV) (U) 3rd Army Troops (ROTA). Task org to spt 44 and 46 Mot DIV tasks. Cbt power has been spread equally between the two DIVs due to the political reqt to ensure a robust def of WELLINGTON if reqd.
- (V) (U) 3rd Army Tasks (ROTA). 3rd Army is tasked with retaining WELLINGTON and conducting delay def in N half of ST before HOTO to 1 (ANZAC) DIV, therefore enabling reconstitution in WELLINGTON. Fm DIV Ph 2, 3rd Army will ctr-atk 6 Mech DIV and isolate on SH1 axis IOT enable destruction of 1 MED by 1 (ANZAC) DIV. Fol isolation of 6 Mech DIV by 1 (ANZAC) envelopment of SH1, 3rd Army, ICW 1st Army will clear 6 Mech DIV back to cease fire line.
- (ii) (U) CFMCC. Currently tasked with protecting SLoCs to CJTF 667 fwd mounting base (FMB) at GENERAL CITY IOT enable lodgement of CTF 667.2 in WELLINGTON and guard against DPRT amphib ops. Fm Ph 1 will spt CJTF 667 tgt against HPTs and prov NSFS to CTF 667.2.
- (iii) (U) CFACC. Currently op fm fwd bases in BELESIA IOT protect ALoCs to WELLINGTON IOT protect CTF 667.2 lodgement. CFACC has commenced strike against 3 OSC S of MDL IOT target C2, CSS, and IADS IOT achieve air superiority in ST fm D+30.
- (iv) (U) CJSOTG. Currently spt CJTF 667 tgt 3 OSC HVTs.
- (c) (U) Civil Considerations. See Tab E (Civil Considerations) to Appendix 1 (Int Estimate) to Annex B (Int).
- (d) (U) Attachments and Detachments. Refer to Annex A (Task Org).
- (e) (U) Assessments.
 - (i) (U) The DPRT will ONLY deploy thermonuclear wpns to preserve the Song regime.
 - (ii) (U) Joint ISR and/or coalition forces info collection assets will detect the movt of any DPRT c-atk forces of Bde str or higher.
 - (iii) (U) CFACC OSD will generate air superiority against fixed-wing threats S of the Cease Fire Line NLT D+30.
 - (iv) (U) CFACC and CFMCC will retain con of ALoCs/SLoCs to WELLINGTON APOD/SPOD throughout the op.
 - (v) (U) The DPRT has ltd C4ISR capability and or/warhead equip to conduct real-time TBM targeting of mnvr BCT.

- (f) (U) Restrictions:
 - (i) (U) Cease Fire Line. No CTF 667.2 elms are to mov N of the Cease Fire Line without approval by Comd CJTF 667.
 - (ii) (U) Mil Demarcation Line (MDL). No CJTF 667 elms are to mov N of the MDL.
- 2. (U) **Mission.** CTF 667.2 is to clear DPRT forces fm ST NLT D+120 IOT to enable ST forces to regain ST sovereign territory.
 - a. (U) Execution:
 - b. (U) Commander's Intent:
 - (1) (U) Purpose. To defeat DPRT in ST IOT destroy its capability to conduct off ops and to restore pre-war international borders.
 - (2) (U) Method: The adversary COG is assessed to be 6 MECH DIV as the DPRT main effort for establishing a A2AD system to isolate WELLINGTON, thereby forcing favourable strategic negotiations. The COG will form when 46 Mot Div (ROTA) is destroyed, the HAWKES's BAY and MANAWATU are secure and approaches to WELLINGTON are secure. The CVs being targeted are the complex terrain north of EKATAHUNA for a DIV sized advance. The vulnerability of a lack of A2AD/ C2 systems within 5 Mech DIV when isolated from other elements of 3 (OSC). The vulnerability of 1 MEDs isolation on the eastern side of the lower NORTH ISLAND. The vulnerability of the limited amount of MSRs on the western part of the lower NORTH ISLAND. The vulnerability of DPRK inability to secure KT in its rear areas while on the defence. The FF COG is the ctr-atk force (7 MCB) destroying 5 MECH Div in Ph 1. The DAs which will defeat the adversary COG are:
 - (a) (U) Lodgement and force flow of CJTF 667.2 forces into WELLINGTON IOT set conditions for defensive operations.
 - (b) (U) Temporally Dislocate 5 Mech Div by culminating 1 MED north of EKETAHUNA in complex terrain during Ph 1, thereby compelling an early passage by 5 Mech Div and degrading 3 (OSC) offensive capabilities.
 - (c) (U) Disrupt 5 Mech DIV lack of A2AD/ C2 systems in WAIRARAPA during Ph 1 by blocking 3 (OSC) adv and subsequently destroy 5 Mech DIV in Div EA via 1 (ANZAC) DIV Ctr-Atk (ICW CJFACC). Denying the COGs ability to isolate WELLINGTON. Thereby setting the conditions for 1 (ANZAC) Div Ctr-Offensive.
 - (d) (U) Disrupt 1 MEDs isolation in AO EAST during Ph 2 via destruction by 1 (ANZAC) Div in the HAWKES BAY. Denying the COGs ability to gain support from the eastern axis's. Thereby enabling envelopment of remaining TPA south of CEASE FIRE LINE.

- (e) (U) Physically dislocate 6 Mech DIV in Ph 2 on limited MSR in AO WEST by blocking wdr rtes on SH1 IOT turn on SH3 (ICW ROTA). Denying the COGs ability to reconstitute and attempt to recommence off ops. Thereby defeating DPRT forces.
- (f) (U) Pre-empt the use of ST VNI vic main MSR by DPRK in Ph 2 – 4, furthermore isolating TPA forces to the south by securing the Ports of NAPIER, NEW PLYMOUTH and TAURANGA. Thereby enabling the destruction of DPRT fmns in ST and restoring ST territorial sovereignty.
- (g) (U) Secure ST to CFL or (O/C) MDL and restore legitimate govt to its sovereign territory.
- (3) (U) End State. DPRT forces are defeated in ST with sovereign territory secured up to Cease Fire Line or (O/C) MDL. CTF 667.2 facilitating the reconstitution of ROTA and spt the restoration of internal sy and legitimate governance. Redeployment on Comd.
- c. (U) Concept of Ops. Op SWIFT DEFENDER is to be conducted in four phs with prelim mov into TAA OP as fol:
 - (1) (U) Prelim (D+10 – D+22) – Complete lodgement of CTF 667.2 into ST.
 - (2) (U) Ph 1 (D+22 – D+34) – Blk DPRT adv S and destroy 5 Mech DIV.
 - (3) (U) Ph 2 (D+35 – D+90)– Clear DPRT fm ST and sec CFL.
 - (4) (U) Ph 3 (On Order) - Clear DPRT fm WAIKATO / BAY OF PLENTY region of ST and sec MDL.
 - (5) (U) Ph 4 (On Order) – Conduct STABOPS in ST and Deter DPRT.
- d. (U) Groupings and Tasks:
 - (1) (U) 1 MCB:
 - (a) (U) Prelim:
 - (i) (U) Conduct admin move to AO West.
 - (ii) (U) Conduct link-up with 46 Mot DIV (ROTA).
 - (iii) (U) Conduct prep for battle.
 - (b) (U) Ph 1:
 - (i) (U) BPT clean break and RPOL 46 Mot DIV elms in AO West.
 - (ii) (U) Blk DPRT adv N of LEVIN.
 - (iii) (U) Sec GLoC to APOD/SPOD.
 - (c) (U) Ph 2:
 - (i) (U) ICW ROTA BPT fix 6 Mech DIV in AO West IOT spt isolation of 1 MED.

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- (ii) (U) BPT conduct off ops IOT clear DPRT fm AO West.
- (d) (U) Ph 3:
 - (i) (U) BPT Conduct off ops IOT sec MDL.
- (e) (U) Ph 4:
 - (i) (U) BPT conduct STABOPS within Bde sector.
 - (ii) (U) BPT sec MDL.
- (2) (U) 3 MCB:
 - (a) (U) Prelim:
 - (i) (U) Complete lodgement at APOD/SPOD.
 - (ii) (U) Conduct admin mov fm APOD/SPOD to AO East (2nd OOM).
 - (iii) (U) Conduct prep for battle.
 - (b) (U) Ph 1:
 - (i) (U) Destroy 1 MED DIV lead BTG IOT culminate 1 MED and draw 5 Mech DIV.
 - (ii) (U) Contain 5 Mech DIV in DIV EA.
 - (iii) (U) BPT pursue wdr DPRT IOT destroy C2, IADS and CSS.
 - (c) (U) Ph 2:
 - (i) (U) BPT conduct off ops in AO East IOT destroy 1 MED and clear ST up to CFL.
 - (ii) (U) BPT HOTO AO to ROTA IOT conduct off ops in AO West.
 - (d) (U) Ph 3:
 - (i) (U) BPT conduct off ops IOT sec MDL.
 - (e) (U) Ph 4:
 - (i) (U) BPT conduct STABOPS within Bde Sector.
 - (ii) (U) BPT sec MDL.
- (3) (U) 7 MCB:
 - (a) (U) Prelim:
 - (i) (U) Complete lodgement at WELLINGTON APOD/SPOD.
 - (ii) (U) Conduct prep for battle.
 - (b) (U) Ph 1:
 - (i) (U) On order, deploy to AO East.
 - (ii) (U) Conduct c-atk to destroy 5 Mech DIV in DIV EA.

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- (iii) (U) Conduct pursuit to destroy DPRT C2, CSS, and IADS.
- (c) (U) Ph 2:
 - (i) (U) BPT conduct off ops in AO East IOT destroy 1 MED and clear ST up to CFL Occupy TAA EMERALD
 - (ii) (U) BPT HOTO AO to ROTA IOT conduct off ops in AO West.
- (d) (U) Ph 3:
 - (i) (U) BPT conduct off ops IOT sec MDL.
- (e) (U) Ph 4:
 - (i) (U) BPT conduct STABOPS within Bde sector.
 - (ii) (U) BPT sec MDL.
- (4) (U) 9 MCB:
 - (a) (U) Prelim:
 - (i) (U) Conduct admin move to AO East.
 - (ii) (U) Conduct linkup with ROTA.
 - (iii) (U) Conduct prep for battle.
 - (b) (U) Ph 1:
 - (i) (U) Conduct delay def in AO East IOT degrade 1 MED capability.
 - (ii) (U) Contain 5 Mech DIV in DIV EA.
 - (iii) (U) BPT c-atk wdr DPRT IOT destroy C2, CSS, and IADS.
 - (c) (U) Ph 2:
 - (i) (U) BPT conduct off ops in AO East IOT destroy 1 MED and clear ST up to CFL.
 - (ii) (U) BPT HOTO AO to ROTA IOT conduct off ops in AO West.
 - (d) (U) Ph 3:
 - (i) (U) BPT conduct off ops IOT sec MDL.
 - (e) (U) Ph 4:
 - (i) (U) BPT conduct STABOPS in Bde sector.
 - (ii) (U) BPT sec MDL.
- (5) (U) DIV Arty:
 - (a) (U) Prelim:

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- (i) (U) Complete lodgement and deploy into AOs East and West.
 - (ii) (U) ICW CJTF 667 neutralise DPRT C2, CSS, and IADS S of MDL IOT degrade DPRT off potential.
- (b) (U) Ph 1:
 - (i) (U) Prov close spt to mnvr Bdes.
 - (ii) (U) Strike CTF 667.2 HPTs IAW EGM (Pri: C2/CSS/IADS).
 - (iii) (U) ICW CJTF 667 destroy 5 Mech DIV in DIV EA.
- (c) (U) Ph 2:
 - (i) (U) Spt off ops IOT clear DPRT fm ST.
 - (ii) (U) ICW CJTF 667 neutralise DPRT C2, CSS, and IADS IOT disintegrate.
- (d) (U) Ph 3:
 - (i) (U) BPT spt off ops to sec MDL.
- (e) (U) Ph 4:
 - (i) (U) BPT deter DPRT incursions across MDL.
 - (ii) (U) BPT spt STABOPS in DIV AO.
- (6) (U) 20 Regt:
 - (a) (U) Prov ISTAR spt in all phs. See Annex KK for further detail.
- (7) (U) 16 ALR:
 - (a) (U) Prov GBAD cover to 1 (ANZAC) DIV throughout all phs.
 - (b) (U) Prov GBAD cover IAW CFACC OPORD.
- (8) (U) Combined Aviation Regiment:
 - (a) (U) Prelim:
 - (i) (U) Complete lodgement into WELLINGTON APOD.
 - (ii) (U) Screen Bde deployments into AOs.
 - (iii) (U) ICW DIV arty strike CTF 667.2 HPTs.
 - (iv) (U) Prov AME.
 - (v) (U) Prov Air Mob Spt to Bdes and DIV Tps.
 - (b) (U) Ph 1:
 - (i) (U) Gd CTF 667.2 flks in AO East.
 - (ii) (U) Destroy CTF 667.2 HPTs (C2,CSS, Fires).
 - (iii) (U) Isolate 5 Mech DIV fm 1 MED reinf.

- (iv) (U) Provide AME.
 - (v) (U) Prov Air Mob Spt to Bdes and DIV Tps.
- (c) (U) Ph 2 – 4:
 - (i) (U) Spt off ops in AO East and West.
 - (ii) (U) Spt DIV ISTAR taskings.
 - (iii) (U) Strike HPTs IAW CTF 667.2 EGM.
 - (iv) (U) Prov AME.
 - (v) (U) Prov Air Mob Spt to Bdes and DIV Tps.
- (9) (U) 17 CSS Bde:
 - (a) (U) Prelim:
 - (i) (U) Estb CTF 667.2 DSA in LOWER HUTT.
 - (ii) (U) Estb sup pts, maint collection point, and 1 (ANZAC) DIV CPers holding area in DSA.
 - (b) (U) Ph 1:
 - (i) (U) BPT conduct emergency resup to spt def ops in AO East and West.
 - (ii) (U) Coord delivery of mil material spt to ROTA through WELLINGTON APOD/SPOD.
 - (c) (U) Ph 2 – 4:
 - (i) (U) Reconstitute CTF 667.2 IOT enable conduct of off ops.
 - (ii) (U) BPT deploy CSST to spt DIV adv on SH1/SH2.
 - (iii) (U) BPT redeploy DSA to PALMERSTON NORTH/NAPIER/TAUPO.
 - (iv) (U) Coord del of mil material spt to ROTA through WELLINGTON APOD/SPOD.
- (10) (U) B/43/11 ADA.
 - (a) (U) Prov area def of WELLINGTON APOD/SPOD.
- (11) (U) 6 ESR:
 - (a) (U) Prov force engr capabilities to project, protect and sustain the DIV in persistent threat environments; and be ready to prov discrete, short-notice, independent tac engr capabilities to achieve strat outcomes.
 - (b) (U) Prov engr planning and advice at the tac lvl incl the devlp of train, advise, and assist concepts in consultation with other govt agencies.

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- (c) (U) Prov force lvl survivability (explosive ordnance, CBNRD, force protection) advice and spt.
- (d) (U) Prov line of communications devlp within a persistent threat environment.
- (e) (U) Prov construction, svcs, rscs winning, and li watercraft spt.
- (f) (U) Coord and manage the engr park that spts engr effort.
- (12) (U) 1 SIG REGT:
 - (a) (U) Prov comms spt to HQ 1 (ANZAC) DIV throughout prelim mov and all phs IAW Annex XX.
 - (b) (U) Maint comms with CBT BDE and DIV Tps throughout prelim mov and all phs IAW Annex XX.
- (13) (U) 7 SIG REGT (EW). Prov EW spt throughout prelim mov and all phs IAW Annex P.
- (14) (U) 1 MI BN. Prov integral int spt to HQ 1 (ANZAC) DIV and subordinate comds throughout prelim mov and all phs.
- (15) (U) 1 MP BN:
 - (a) (U) CO 1 MP BN is appointed 1 (ANZAC) DIV PM.
 - (b) (U) Prov mob spt in conjunction with 130 MEB during prelim mov and all phs.
 - (c) (U) Estb DIV CPers Holding Area detailed in Annex MM.
 - (d) (U) Further details are prov in Annex PP.
- e. (U) Supporting Battlefield Operating System Concepts:
 - (1) (U) Scheme of Mob / C-Mob. Pri of effort is mob ops for clearance and maint of routes; runways/flight landing strips; and c-mob on construction of protective obs, static sy pts and restricting en movt.
 - (2) (U) Scheme of Info Collection. See Annex L (Info Collection).
 - (3) (U) Scheme of Int. 1 (ANZAC) DIV G2 directs int efforts and coords tasking to spt info collection in AO to answer the COMD's PIR. Info Collection pri is on sit devlp, indications and early wng, force projection, tgt devlp, and physical and functional damage assessments. See Annex B (Int).
 - (4) (U) Scheme of Fires. See Annex KK (Fires). TBD.
 - (5) (U) Scheme of Protection. See Annex E (Protection). TBD.
 - (6) (U) Cyber Electromagnetic Activities. TBD.
 - (7) (U) Stability Tasks. TBD.
 - (8) (U) Assessment. TBD.

- f. (U) Coordinating Instructions:
- (1) (U) Timings:
 - (a) (U) Prelim Commence – D+10.
 - (b) (U) Prelim mov complete – D+19.
 - (c) (U) H-HR – 1800h D+22.
 - (d) (U) Ph 1 complete – NLT D+34.
 - (e) (U) Ph 2 complete – NLT D+90.
 - (f) (U) Ph 3 complete – O/C.
 - (2) (U) Loc/Boundaries. See OP overlay.
 - (3) (U) Routes. See OP overlay.
 - (4) (U) Con Measures. See OP overlay. Further detail is prov in Annex H.
 - (5) (U) ROE. National policies and caveats have been cfm, and there are no impacts on cbt ops. Should any changes occur or concerns be raised re: National ROE, 1 (ANZAC) DIV G3 is to be advised by the most expeditious means. National COMD may also bring changes or concerns to the attention of the COMD 1 (ANZAC) DIV dir.
 - (6) (U) CPERS, Detainees. The handling and disposition of PW, CPERS and detainees are to be conducted IAW Annex MM.
 - (7) (U) IDP. The handling and disposition of IDP are to be conducted IAW Annex W.
 - (8) (U) CCIR:
 - (a) (U) PIR:
 - (i) (U) Locs/str of 3 OSC's mnvr elms and the orientation of its (U) forces?
 - (ii) Timing of 3 OSC to adv to PALMERSTON NORTH /DANNEVIRKE?
 - (iii) (U) Where will 3 OSC conduct amphib ops?
 - (iv) (U) What are the locs of DTG and BTG C2 nodes?
 - (v) (U) Where is 3 OSC's main effort?
 - (vi) (U) Where are 3 OSC's IADS?
 - (vii) (U) Where are 3 OSC's EW systems?
 - (viii) (U) Where are 3 OSC's UAVs and how are they being used?
 - (ix) (U) Where is 3 OSC's arty?
 - (x) (U) What is the intended employment of 3 OSC's aviation elms?

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- (xi) (U) Which routes are being used as MSR/SSR/ASR to spt 3 OSC?
- (xii) (U) What is the state of these routes?
- (xiii) (U) What is the current status of comms and multi-media infrastructure in AO APPLE?
- (xiv) (U) What DPRT SPF are known to be op in AO APPLE?
- (xv) (U) What TCA and TANTOCO elm are known to be op in AO APPLE?
- (b) (U) EEFI:
 - (i) (U) Force composition.
 - (ii) (U) ROE.
 - (iii) (U) Intent to conduct c-atk with 7 MCB into DIV EA.
- (c) (U) FFIR:
 - (i) (U) Status of 1 (ANZAC) DIV prep.
 - (ii) (U) Loc, str, and abilities of DIV Arty assets.
 - (iii) (U) Loss of a C2 node or severe damage to a log base that will impede 1 (ANZAC) DIV ops.
 - (iv) (U) Any Bde with cbt power below 70%.
 - (v) (U) Recognised Air Picture.
- (9) (U) HPTL:
 - (a) (U) DTG/BTG HQs.
 - (b) (U) HQ-9/S-400 Btys.
 - (c) (U) SLC-2 Ctr-Bty Radar.
 - (d) (U) CSA-16 Btys.
 - (e) (U) CSS Bde/Bns (Bulk Fuel, CL V).
 - (f) (U) Z-10/19 Coy.
 - (g) (U) EW (JN1601/JN1105/DZ9001/R-330ZH).
 - (h) (U) ASN-207.
 - (i) (U) GSL-133 ABV.
 - (j) (U) PHL-90B/PHZ-89.
 - (k) (U) AVLB.
- (10) (U) PWs and Captured Persons (CPERS). Handling and disposition of PWs and CPERS are to be conducted IAW Appx 1 to Annex L.

- (11) (U) National Responsibilities on PW/CPERS. For reasons of National sensitivity and ownership of processes relating to PW/CPERS, all Coalition pers are to respect their own national procedures fol guidelines IAW the Geneva Convention.
 - (12) (U) Custody of PW/CPERS. PW/CPERS ops are a National resp. As such, it is imperative that all pers detained by Coalition forces remain in the care and custody of auth pers only. It is understood that op reqts may force acceptance of PW/CPERS fm, or tsfr to, other Allied nations of the Coalition. This shall be the exception and not the norm. Should such circumstance become necessary, only the respective National Commander or designated rep can auth the acceptance or tsfr of a PW/CPERS to/fm another nation.
 - (13) (U) Treatment. PW and CPERS are to be treated IAW all accepted international laws and conventions.
 - (14) (U) Transfer or Release. Although tac sit may oblige comd to detain pers during the conduct of ops, it is the resp of National Comd at all lvls to determine who will be categorised as a CPERS and rel all others. Once a determination has been made to further retain the detained pers and a PW/CPERS number has been assigned, only the National Comdr of the capturing nation has the auth to rel or tsfr PW/CPERS to other nations. For the specific purpose of an individual clearly detained as a PW, there is no reqt to determine status upon capture, as PW are captured en combatants and remain in detention for the duration of hostilities. The detaining power has an obligation to make a determination of PW versus other CPERS status as soon as practical after capture.
 - (15) (U) PW and CPERS Rpt. IAW national directives, all PW or CPERS in Coalition custody shall be rpt via official means by using a PW/CPERS capture rpt.
 - (16) (U) PW/CPERS Holding Facilities. 6 CS Bde will estb theatre CPERS holding facy IVO WELLINGTON CITY. 1 MP Bn is to estb holding facy in the DSA.
 - (17) (U) Reports and Returns. The Battle Rhythm schedule for Rpts and Rtns is to be published once the HQ 1 (ANZAC) DIV has declared OPRED.
3. (U) Admin and Log:
- a. (U) Concept of Spt. Spt is to be prov by maint the DSA relatively close, stepping fwd as 1 (ANZAC) DIV adv through use of CSSTs. The DSA is to be estb with a connection with CJTF 667 ESC and TCN NSE. Sup Pts (SP), a Maint Collection Pt (MCP) and DIV PW/Detainee Holding Area are to be estb in the DSA.
 - b. (U) Unique National Spt. Unique national spt is to be prov by NSEs. 17 CSS BDE is to facilitate TCN NSEs spt to Bdes as req.

- c. (U) Replenishment:
 - (1) (U) SPs are to hold three DOS and a min of one DOS of cbt sups on wheels or packed in PLS compatible containers to facilitate rapid movt. In Ph 4 the SPs are to hold seven DOS. As DSA mov fwd, 310th ESC will maint 3 DOS in the previous DSA loc to ensure spt if LOCs are compromised.
 - (2) (U) Locs and Opening Times of DSA, SP and MCP:
 - (a) Ph 1. LOWER HUTT, fm now.
 - (b) Ph 2 - 4. TBD.
- d. (U) Maint, Recov and Rep. TCN are resp to the rear of the DSA MCP, TCNs will be assisted in back loading by 17 CSS Bde.
- e. (U) Med.
 - (1) (U) MEDEVAC. Preferred MEDEVAC is by air. Combined Aviation Regiment is to prov aeromedevac svcs to Role 2/3. Evac requests are to be submitted to the PECC at DIV Main HQ using the standard nine line Med Evac Request found at Tab A, Appendix 2 Annex XX.
 - (2) (U) Role 1. HS are to be prov by Coalition integral capabilities.
 - (3) (U) Role 2 (Enhanced). HS are to be prov by DIV R2 co-loc with DSA.
 - (4) (U) Role 3. 121st Cbt Spt Hospital (CSH) US has been estb in WELLINGTON.
- f. (U) Log. See Annex R (Log).
- g. (U) Pers. See Annex R (Log).
- h. (U) HSS. See Annex R (Log).
- 4. (U) Command and Signal:
 - a. (U) Command:
 - (1) (U) COMD. Maj Gen COSGROVE (AS)
 - (2) (U) DCOMD. Brig JONES (NZ)
 - (3) (U) HQ Loc. See C2 overlay.
 - (4) (U) Succession of Comd. COMD 1 (ANZAC) DIV, DCOMD 1 (ANZAC) DIV, COMD 1 M CB, COMD 3 MCB, COMD 7 MCB, COMD 9 MCB.
 - (5) (U) Liaison Reqts. All Major Subordinate Comds (MSC) will prov two Liaison Officers (LNOs) to HQ 1 (ANZAC) DIV fm D+10.
 - b. (U) Comms and Info Systems (CIS). Effective C2 of 1 (ANZAC) DIV is highly dependent upon the flexible and interoperable CIS between Components and contributing nations.
 - (1) (U) 1 SIG REGT is to:

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- (a) (U) Estb force lvl CIS down to BDE HQ, incl the mgmt of network interface gateways.
 - (b) (U) Coord FMN-wide CIS plans.
 - (c) (U) Perform FMN spectrum mgmt.
 - (2) (U) HQ 1 (ANZAC) DIV CIS is to prov sec voice, VTC and Coalition WAN (based on NATO-CENTRIXS) to prov sec email, chat and other C3 tools down to FMN level. Requests for extension of coalition CIS in spt of national, component or other reqts is to be coord through the HQ 1 (ANZAC) DIV G6 and funded as appropriate.
 - (3) (U) Use of HN comms infrastructure to supplement mil networks is to be coord by HQ 1 (ANZAC) DIV in conjunction with G6, but contracted independently by TCN.
 - (4) (U) Network Ops:
 - (a) (U) Defensive Measures. 1 (ANZAC) DIV's networks are tgts for Computer Network Atk (CNA) by DPRT EW assets seeking to sabotage or exploit coalition info or svcs. The pri vulnerabilities are through gateways with external systems and inadvertent tsfr of viruses fm open systems. All contributing nations are resp for effective COMSEC and Computer Network Defence (CND) on all national networks and systems; these measures are vital for effective C2 and the maint of info dominance. HQ 1 (ANZAC) DIV J6 is resp for the coord of def measures and COMSEC for all 1 (ANZAC) DIV systems through the Network Ops Centre loc with HQ 1 (ANZAC) DIV (deployed).
 - (b) (U) Offensive Measures. Offensive network ops or Computer Network Atk (CNA) are not to be conducted by coalition partners against adversary networks without approval of COMD CJTF 667.
5. (U) ACKNOWLEDGE. All ack.

P. COSGROVE
MAJGEN
COMD

ANNEXES:

Annex A TASKORG

Annex B Intelligence

Annex C CONOPS Pack

Annex D Intelligence

Annex E Rules of Engagement

Annex F Joint Fires and Targeting.

Annex G Military Deception

Annex H Airspace Control

Annex J Force Protection

Annex K Health Services Support

Annex L Psychological Operations

Annex M Operational Assessment (Not issued)

Annex O Information Operations

Annex P Electronic Warfare

Annex Q Communication and Information Systems

Annex R Logistics

Annex S Movements

Annex U CBRN

Annex W Civil Military Cooperation

Annex X Public Affairs

Annex AA Legal (To be issued)

Annex DD Space Operations (To be issued)

Annex EE Engineers

Annex MM Detainee Operations

Annex PP Military Police

DISTRIBUTION: Special