OPS 01/XX

OPORD 01/XX – OPERATION SWIFT DEFENDER

(U) References:

A.   (U) CJTF OPORD 01/XX
B.   (U) US Joint Publication 3-16 Multinational Operations
C.   (U) US Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations
D.   (U) Maps:

Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU.

1.   (U) Situation:

    a.   (U) <u>Battlespace Description:</u>

        (1)   (U) <u>Area of Interest (AI</u>). The 1(ANZAC) DIV AI includes the airways and land areas of NORTH ISLAND fm CAPE REINGA in NORTH TORBIA (NT) to CAPE PALLISER in SOUTH TORBIA (ST), the TASMAN SEA (W), the COOK STRAIT (S), and the SOUTH PACIFIC OCEAN(N and E). See Appendix 5 (JIPOE) of Annex B (Int).

        (2)   (U) <u>Area of Operations (AO).</u> The 1(ANZAC) DIV AO, AO APPLE, covers ST bounded by PL LION (Mil Demarcation Line - MDL) in the N, the west coast of ST in the W and the east coast of ST in the E. Currently 1 (ANZAC) DIV forces are deploying to the AO. See Tab A (Op Overlay) to Appendix 1 (Int Estimate) and Appendix 5 (JIPOE) of Annex B (Int).

        (3)   (U) <u>Terrain:</u>

            (a)   (U) NORTH ISLAND has a 'spine' of mountain ranges running through the middle, with gentle rolling farmland on both sides. Central NORTH ISLAND is dominated by the Volcanic Plateau, an active volcanic and thermal area.

            (b)   (U) Multiple natural hazards exist, resulting fm the country's geology, weather, native wildlife, and human activity. While this terrain offers considerable challenges, they are not insurmountable.

            (c)   (U) As the mountainous terrain suggests, NORTH ISLAND lies in an area of active earthquakes and volcanism ringing the Pacific Plate. A major fault line runs through WELLINGTON. Earthquakes are sometimes felt but rarely cause damage.

      (d)   (U) Further detail is provided in Tab B (Terrain) to Appendix 1 (Int Estimate) to Annex B (Int).

    (4)   (U) <u>Weather:</u>

      (a)   (U) NORTH ISLAND lies in the Temperate Zone and has a generally mild climate with sharp regional contrasts. The rugged terrain of the country has a dramatic effect on the weather. Many parts of the country are subject to high winds and rains fol by sharp drops in temperature.

      (b)   (U) Jan and Feb are NORTH ISLAND warmest months with Jul normally the coldest. Spells of cool, damp weather occur even in the summer, fm Dec through Feb. Rainy winter days of Jun, Jul, and Aug are interspersed with days of brilliant sunshine and crisp, clear air. Oct, Nov, and Dec are particularly windy months. Winds of 100 kph are not unusual, especially in the WELLINGTON area, and on rare occasions they exceed 160 kph.

      (c)   (U) Further detail is prov in Tab C (Weather) to Appendix 1 (Int Estimate) to (Annex B (Int).

  b.   (U) <u>En Forces.</u> See Annex B for a full discussion of the Democratic People's Republic of Torbias (DPRT) forces:

    (1)   (U) <u>Background:</u>

      (a)   (U) After taking a significant beating the last time the Torbian People's Army (TPA) crossed the MDL, its remnants wdr back to recovery. After a significant reorg the DPRT was reconstituted to consist of one corps-sized force (3 Operational Support Command (OSC)) consisting of the Marine Expeditionary Force (transferred from the Western Army) and re-designated as 1st Marine Expeditionary Division known as 1 MED) and 5 and 6 MECH div's (at 80% strength) With the loss of most of its old DONOVIA equip, the DPRT is slowly being stk with equip fm OLVANA. 3 (OSC) has been the priority for receipt of OLVANA equipment. The remainder of the DPRT is largely cbt ineffective or has been tasked with internal sy within NT and is unlikely to be deployed S of the MDL.

      (b)   (U) The current sit in the W of the Indo-Pacific region involves significant US and allied forces assisting the Govt of KHORATHIDIN dislodge an OLVANA army-group spt by BAGASANTI forces fm its northern regions. Int sources believe that despite the DPRT current status the Song regime will view this current sit across the Indo-Pacific region as an opportunity to try again and reunite the two TORBIA's. ST will likely be able to only obtain ltd spt fm other nations.

    (2)   (U) <u>Current Situation.</u> 3 OSC of DPRT launched a surprise offensive against the South Torbian Republic of TORBIA Army (ROTA) on two fronts:

(a)   (U) On AABBZZ 3 OSC launched initial atks with arty barrages on ROTA HQ, comd posts and cantonment areas along the MDL. Simultaneously multiple air bases and air def sites were subjected to EW jamming and asslt by DPRT SPF.

(b)   (U) The DPRT initial atk penetrated ROTA forces along the MDL using a system of pre-prep crossing points.

(c)   (U) 5 MECH DIV breached the MDL IVO MARAMARUA (60H UD 42937 76119) swung E using State Highway (SH) 2 as its axis of adv heading for TAURANGA (60H VD 27105 29531).

(d)   (U) On reaching TAURANGA 5 MECH DIV swung S along SH 36 heading for ROTORUA (60H VC 33163 78066). Using SH 30, 5 MECH DIV continued its adv to the junction of SH 1 and SH 30 IVO ATIAMURI (60H VC 13473 55271). The DIV then pushed S where its adv culminated at TAUPO (60H VC 19755 17864).

(e)   (U) 6 MECH DIV breached the MDL IVO MEREMERE (60H UD 28767 67881) and the WAIKATO RIVER ROAD BRIDGE (60H UD 17843 70061) adv S along SH 1 heading for HAMILTON (60H UD 48365 15980). Despite initially offering stiff resistance ROTA 461 and 913 BDEs were forced to wdr S through HAMILTON after sustaining hy cas. 913 Bde wdr along SH 3 while 461 Bde continued to wdr S on SH 1.

(f)   (U) On reaching HAMILTON 6 MECH DIV continued its S adv along SH 3 to TE KUITI (60H UC 39413 54830) in pursuit of 461 and 913 BDEs.

(g)   (U) The 6 MECH DIV main body continue its adv S using SH 4 as its axis. At TE KUITI a bde detch fm the main body and headed W to the west coast in pursuit of 913 BDE where its adv culminated at MOKAU (60H TC 92962 14101).

(h)   (U) On D+10, a 24hr cease fire was agreed to by the govts of ST and NT along a cease fire line running through the centre of NORTH ISLAND.

(i)   (U) Overall DPRT losses have been li, it is assessed the op pause accompanying the ceasefire has been conducted IOT bring fwd further cmbt sups and reinforcements prior to recommencement of the offensive.

(j)   (U) With the assistance of IADS, the NTAF is able to achieve local air superiority for short pds over NT occupied territory. Fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft have been seen op in the AO prov CAS to 6 MECH DIV. Main tgt have been identified as HQ, EW sites and armd units.

(3)   (U) <u>Assessment:</u>

(a) (U) DPRT forces will continue their adv S to sec NEW PLYMOUTH (60H TB 47091 73228) and PALMERSTON NORTH (60G UA 82395 34020).

(b) (U) DPRT 1 MED forces will continue to adv NW fm NAPIER to clear SH 5 and link up with 5 MECH DIV in TAUPO. The 1 MED will also consolidate in NAPIER to enable a build-up of further marine forces to reinforce 5 MECH DIV and 6 MECH DIV.

(c) (U) Once their intermediate objectives are achieved DPRT will continue to adv S to WELLINGTON (51PTS828150). DPRT 6 MECH DIV, is assessed as the main effort and will atk S. Losses by DPRT forces have been li with 5 MECH DIV assessed at 75% str and 6 MECH DIV assessed at no more than 65% cbt effective.

(d) (U) <u>3 OSC MLCOA.</u> Intent will be to defeat ROTA/CJTF 667.2 IOT to further annex ST territory. This will be achieved by isolating ROTA/CJTF 667.2 by a rapid adv to seize WELLINGTON approaches and extension of the A2AD bubble thereby denying LoCs to ST forcing concessions at the strat lvl. This will be conducted along multiple axes IOT envelop and bypass ROTA fmns with the aim of pre-empting CTF 667.2 def prep. Furthermore SPF will coord TCA actions IOT spt 3 OSC scheme of mvr through the conduct of irregular warfare in both main battle and disruption zones. Extensive use is likely to be made of infil and air asslt IOT dislocate ROTA def psns and exploit NT's temporary local air superiority in the occupied territories. This op will likely be conducted in three phases:

    (i) (U) <u>Phase 1.</u> Destroy 46 Mot DIV and sec NAPIER (D+11 – D+20):

        (A) (U) <u>5 Mech DIV:</u>

            (I) (U) Destroy 462 Mot Bde on SH5.

            (II) (U) Clear SH5.

            (III) (U) Sec PORT OF NAPIER.

        (B) (U) <u>6 Mech DIV:</u>

            (I) (U) Fix 913 Bde (ROTA) in TARANAKI.

            (II) (U) Destroy 461 Bde (ROTA) in CENTRAL PLATEAU.

            (III) (U) Sec SH4 and NAPIER-TAIHAPE ROAD IOT enable bypass of def psns and open GLoC to NAPIER.

        (C) (U) <u>1 MED:</u>

            (I) (U) 3 OSC Reserve.

            (II)   (U) Fol and Spt 6 Mech DIV.

(ii)   (U) <u>Phase 2.</u> Adv and sec HAWKE'S BAY and MANAWATU (D+20 – D+24):

     (A) (U) <u>5 Mech DIV:</u>

          (I)   (U) Complete destruction of 462 Bde IOT open SH5 GLoCs.

          (II)   (U) Fol and Spt 1 MED.

     (B) (U) <u>6 Mech DIV:</u>

          (I)   (U) Adv on SH4 and SH1 IOT sec MANAWATU.

          (II)   (U) Isolate ROTA in PALMERSTON NORTH.

          (III) (U) Sec W approach to MANAWATU GORGE IOT open lateral LoCs.

     (C) (U) <u>1 MED:</u>

          (I)   (U) Adv S on SH2 and sec E approach to MANAWATU GORGE.

(iii) (U) <u>Phase 3.</u> Sec WELLINGTON approaches and estb A2AD IOT isolate WELLINGTON (D+24 – D+27):

     (A) (U) <u>5 Mech DIV:</u>

          (I)   (U) Fol and assume 1 MED.

          (II)   (U) Sec GLoCs.

     (B) (U) <u>6 Mech DIV:</u>

          (I)   (U) Adv on SH1 and sec approaches to WELLINGTON vic PAEKAKARIKI and TRANSMISSION GULLY.

          (II)   (U) Estb A2AD systems vic WELLINGTON IOT isolate ROTA/CTF 667.2.

     (C) (U) <u>1 MED:</u>

          (I)   (U) Adv S on SH2 and sec REMUTAKA approach to WELLINGTON.

          (II)   (U) Estb A2AD systems vic WELLINGTON IOT isolate ROTA/CTF 667.2

(iv) (U) <u>Likely Endstate.</u> 46 Mot DIV destroyed, 913 Bde isolated in TARANAKI, approaches to WELLINGTON sec IOT deny mvr room for conduct of ctr-atk by CTF 667.2. 3 OSC estb A2AD systems and adopting defensive posture IOT isolate ROTA/CTF 667.2 fm external spt and forcing favourable strategic negotiations.

(e)   (U) <u>3 OSC MDCOA.</u> As per MLCOA but 1 x Bde fm 1 MED used to conduct amphib seizure of NAPIER, thereby enabling rapid destruction of 462 Mot Bde and early switch onto SH2 axis by 1 MED. This enables the commencement of Ph 2 fm D+16 and thereby pre-empts completion of CTF 667.2 lodgement and def prep, forcing CTF 667.2 to blk 3 OSC in N WAIRARAPA and denying ability to conduct ctr-atk vic MASTERTON. Doing so likely precludes a transition to off ops given current and projected force ratios.

c.   (U) <u>Other Stakeholders.</u> Stakeholder gps identified as op in the AO:

(1)   (U) <u>OLVANA.</u> Whilst not directly involved, OLVANA is likely to prov ltd spt to NT as an extension of the OLVANA A2AD strategy. Recent reports cfm that OLVANA is prov the fol:

(a)   (U) Replacement of DPRT damaged/destroyed equip.

(b)   (U) Reduced satellite capability for FF R&S.

(c)   (U) Over-the-horizon radar.

(d)   (U) YLC-8B 3D Long-Range Anti-Stealth Surveillance Radar.

(e)   (U) One Y-8G (High New 3) Long-Range Electronic Jamming Aircraft continuing to fly under OLVANA livery.

(f)   (U) Ltd H-6 (Hong-6) Strategic Bomber sorties.

(g)   (U) Ltd J-16D EW atk aircraft sorties.

(h)   (U) Ltd HQ-9 (Hong Qi 9) 8x8 Long-Range Air Def Missile System manned by either OLVANA pers or contractors.

(2)   (U) <u>DONOVIA.</u> The provision of a battery of the S-400 Triumph (SA-21 Growler) Long-Range Surface-to-air Missile System has significantly enhanced the DPRT coastal arty system. It is highly likely that battery continues to be manned by contractors spt by DONOVIA AD mil advisors.

(3)   (U) <u>ARIANA.</u> ST int sources rpt sightings of ARIANA-manufactured UAVs in ST airspace incl:

(a)   Qasef-1 – a recon and loitering munition drone.

(b)   Mohajer-4 – a tactical UAV.

(c)   Shahed-129 – mdm altitude long-endurance UAV.

(4)   (U) <u>TANTOCO Cartel.</u> The TANTOCO Cartel is involved in almost every type of criminal acty imaginable incl drug and wpns smuggling, extortion, motor veh theft, illegal gambling, money laundering, counterfeiting, and murder-for-hire. ROT Police have estb that there is a cell op throughout ST and may be spt by DPRT SPF. Potential acty incl:

(a)   (U) Hijacking convoys to steal sups incl wpns and ammo.

       (b)   (U) Selling wpns and ammo on the black market.

       (c)   (U) Exploiting opportunities to sell drugs to CTF 667.2 pers.

       (d)   (U) Extortion of local officials in major towns and surrounds.

       (e)   (U) Refer to Appendix 1 (INT Estimate) of Annex B (Int) for further detail.

(5)   (U) <u>ST Communist Party Army (STCA).</u> An insurgency gp intent on estb a communist country based on the Marxist model, the same goal as stated by the ST Communist Party (STCP). The STCP claims that their gp has no connection to the STCA, but there are probably some members that belong to both orgs. The threat fm STCA is assessed as high and will undertake ops in spt of the DPRT in the AO. INTEL rpts indicate that they are receiving spt fm DPRT SPF. It is almost certain that STCA actions will be coord to spt 3 OSC ops down to the Bde lvl. Refer to Appendix 1 (INT Estimate) of Annex B (Int) for further detail.

(6)   (U) <u>UNITED TORBIA.</u> A counter-insurgency gp that is pro-govt and a counter-Communist org that wants to unite NT and ST with a democratically elected govt. Their potential to pose a threat is assessed as extremely low. Refer to Appendix 1 (INT Estimate) of Annex B (Int) for further detail.

(7)   (U) <u>NGO.</u> Several NGO have representation in ST and possibly AO APPLE but their capacity to prov svcs is assessed as low. It is assessed that the majority of NGO will not seek a role until post conflict. Several NGO have estb AAs in WELLINGTON and they should be expected within the AO rapidly once major combat ops have ceased. Refer to Appendix 1 (INT Estimate) of Annex B (Int) for further detail.

(8)   (U) <u>Media.</u> Prior to the commencement of hostilities there were a significant number of print, radio and television svcs avail throughout AO APPLE. Most of these svcs have since been closed and those that remain open are under DPRT con in DPRT controlled territory. All of the internet svc providers within AO APPLE were also closed. It is unlikely that any significant or independent media are op throughout AO APPLE at present. As such it is unlikely that media will be encountered on entering AO APPLE but that media can be expected build rapidly once land LOC are re-estb or major cbt has ceased. Refer to Appendix 1 (INT Estimate) of Annex B (Int) for further detail.

d.   (U) <u>Identified Interagency, Intergovt, and Non-govt Orgs.</u> The fol agencies are op in WELLINGTON, ST:

(1)   (U) US State Dept msn to ST.

(2)   (U) US Agency for International Development (USAID) with the Office of Transitions Initiatives (OTI) and the Office of Foreign Disaster Relief (OFDA).

(3)   (U) UN Country Team (UNCT).

(4) (U) UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); ST Ministry of Affairs (MIA).

(5) (U) UN World Health Organisation (WHO).

(6) (U) World Food Program (WFP).

(7) (U) The ST Red Cross (STRC) local partnership with the International Red Cross (IRC).

(8) (U) The US Central Intelligence Agency.

(9) (U) The US Defense Int Agency; Dept for Homeland Sy; and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).

(10) (U) Political Advisors (POLADS) are anticipated, but have not yet been assigned.

(11) (U) Dept of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) NZ have representatives collocated with GoST in WELLINGTON.

(12) (U) AS/NZ OGAs are anticipated, but not likely to deploy into theatre until ST has been cleared to the Cease Fire Line.

e. (U) Civilians:

(1) (U) IDP. There are substantial numbers of IDPs fleeing fm the DPRT. Whilst the majority of IDP are likely to be ST there may be NT refugees who were able to take advantage of the confusion caused by the DPRT crossing the MDL. This will place significant pressure on MSRs due to congestion restricting coalition force movts N. There is also the potential for DPRT SPF to use this as an opportunity to move S towards WELLINGTON.

(2) (U) ST civilians. It is highly likely that those ST nationals who have not been displaced will remain in loc conducting their normal daily lives. They may pose a problem to coalition force mnvr if they perceive that it will disrupt their lives and potentially cause damage to their property.

f. (U) Friendly Forces:

(1) 1 (ANZAC) DIV. Component of CJTF 667 and is comprised of a DIV HQ, 1, 3, 7, 9 Multi-Role Combat Brigade (MCB), DIV Arty Bde, 6 CS Bde, 17 CSS Bde and a Combined Aviation Regiment. Refer to Annex A: TASKORG for further detail.

(2) (U) HQ:

(a) (U) Comdr, Maj Gen, XXXXXXXX, (AS).

(b) (U) Deputy Comdr (Ops), Brig XXXXXXXXX(NZ).

(3) (U) Attached Units. IAW Refs A and B C2 arrangements are as fol:

(a) (U) 3/570 Cbt Engr Coy (US), OPCON Phs 1-3.

      (b)   (U) B/43/11 ADA (US), TACON Phs 1-3.

      (c)   (U) Q/5/11 HIMARS Bty (US), OPCON Phs 1-3.

      (d)   (U) 121st Cbt Spt Hospital (CSH) (US) TACON Phs 1-3.

(4)   (U) <u>Adjacent Units and Fmns:</u>

      (a)   (U) <u>1 Army (ROTA).</u> Undergoing reconstitution vic WELLINGTON, likely to be able to generate 2 x Mot DIV and 1 x Mech Bde by D+41.

      (b)   (U) <u>3 Army (ROTA).</u> 3 Army remains the only cbt effective element (70%) of the ST Army. 3 Army dispositions below:

           (i)   (U) <u>44 Mot DIV.</u> Tasked to sec WELLINGTON APOD/SPOD and prep def of the capital. Unlikely to be deployed fwd under any contingency due to political reqt to protect WELLINGTON.

           (ii)   (U) <u>46 Mot DIV.</u> Deployed fwd onto the ceasefire line and tasked to blk further DPRT offensives until reinf by 1 (ANZAC) DIV.

               (A)   (U) 461 Mot Bde. Estb def psns vic CENTRAL PLATEAU.

               (B)   (U) 462 Mot Bde. Estb def psns vic AHIMANAWA RANGE IOT conduct delay def on SH5 back to NAPIER.

               (C)   (U) 468 Tank Bde. Tasked as 3 Army Reserve, vic PALMERSTON NORTH.

           (iii)   (U) <u>913 Mech Bde.</u> Estb def posns on SH3 and PH 43 IOT deny DPRT adv to seize NEW PLYMOUTH.

           (iv)   (U) <u>Army Tps.</u> Task org equally between 44 and 46 Mot DIV.

(5)   (U) <u>Higher HQ Msn and Intent:</u>

      (a)   (U) <u>Higher HQ. CJTF 667:</u>

           (i)   (U) <u>Msn.</u> CJTF 667 is to defeat DPRT forces S of the MDL IOT force DPRT wdr fm the sovereign territory of ST.

           (ii)   (U) <u>Commander's Intent.</u> CJTF 667 will con ALoC/SLoC and sec WELLINGTON APOD/SPOD to enable force flow of 1 (ANZAC) DIV and spt reconstitution of ROTA. Defeat NT Southern Army offensive through conduct of delay def in HAWKES BAY and MANAWATU IOT culminate DPRT fmns and for CJFAC to gain air superiority. CFMCC estb sea con IOT isolate DPRT in ST and envelop via amphib ops. Destroy DPRT fmns in ST. Clear ST and sec Cease Fire Line. BPT sec MDL on order of coalition strat leadership. ICW GoST

conduct sec ops IOT defeat TCA. Rebuild ROTA, HOTO resp for MDL and internal sy, then commence redeployment.

    (iii) (U) <u>Method:</u>

        (A) (U) Phase I – Sec ALoC/SLoC and WELLINGTON APOD/SPOD IOT enable lodgement of CTF 667.2. Generate air and sea superiority.

        (B) (U) Phase II – Defeat DPRT in ST and restore ST territorial sovereignty.

        (C) (U) Phase III – Deter further DPRT aggression and spt ST restoration of legitimate governance.

    (iv) (U) <u>Endstate.</u> Mil conflict does not escalate beyond what is necessary to re-estb pre-conflict borders, en forces have been destroyed and do not have the capability to conduct off ops into ST, sy is restored to ST and the legitimate govt is accepted by the people allowing it to govern allowing international forces redeploy.

  (b) (U) <u>Msns of Adjacent Units:</u>

    (i) (U) <u>ROTA:</u>

        (A) (U) <u>1st Army.</u> Destroyed during previous conflict with DPRT. Undergoing reconstitution vic WELLINGTON, likely to be able to generate 2 x Mot DIV and 1 x Mech Bde by D+41. Fm DIV Ph 2 will commence off ops with 1 x DIV Fol and Spt 1 (ANZAC) DIV in AO West then sec Cease Fire Line vic WHAKATANE. Remainder of 1st Army will pursue wdr 6 Mech DIV elms on SH3 and sec CEASE FIRE LINE vic TARANAKI.

        (B) (U) <u>2nd Army.</u> Destroyed during previous conflict with DPRT. Undergoing reconstitution vic PALMERSTON NORTH. Some elms likely to become cbt effective fm D+91, with 2nd Army cbt effective ~ D+130.

        (C) <u>3rd Army:</u>

            (I) (U) Forces are at 70% CE and constitute the bulk of ROTA's remaining cbt power.

            (II) (U) <u>44 Mot DIV.</u> Tasked to sec WELLINGTON APOD/SPOD and prep def of the capital. Unlikely to be deployed fwd under any contingency due to political reqt to protect WELLINGTON.

            (III) (U) <u>46 Mot DIV.</u> Deployed on Cease Fire Line and tasked with delay def against adv DPRT fmns:

A. (U) <u>461 Mot Bde.</u> Maint def psns on SH1 and SH4 in the CENTRAL PLATEAU. Tasked to exploit restricted terrain to delay DPRT adv then estb MDP vic PALMERSTON NORTH.

B. (U) <u>462 Mot Bde.</u> Maint def psns on SH5 vic AHIMANAWA RANGES. Tasked to delay DPRT adv and retain NAPIER.

C. (U) <u>468 Tk Bde.</u> Tasked as 3 Army Res Currently loc vic PALMERSTON NORTH.

D. (U) <u>913 Mech Bde.</u> Maint def psns on SH3 and PH43 in TARANAKI. Tasked to delay DPRT adv, deny NEW PLYMOUTH and then link up w/ 46 Mot DIV vic PALMERSTON NORTH.

(IV) (U) <u>3rd Army Troops.</u> Task org to spt 44 and 46 Mot DIV tasks. Cbt power has been spread equally between the two DIVs due to the political reqt to ensure a robust def of WELLINGTON if reqd.

(V) (U) <u>3rd Army Tasks.</u> 3rd Army is tasked with retaining WELLINGTON and conducting delay def in N half of ST before HOTO to 1 (ANZAC) DIV, therefore enabling reconstitution in WELLINGTON. Fm DIV Ph 2, 3rd Army will ctr-atk 6 Mech DIV and isolate on SH1 axis IOT enable destruction of 1 MED by 1 (ANZAC) DIV. Fol isolation of 6 Mech DIV by 1 (ANZAC) envelopment of SH1, 3rd Army, ICW 1st Army will clear 6 Mech DIV back to cease fire line.

(ii) (U) <u>CFMCC.</u> Currently tasked with protecting SLoCs to CJTF 667 fwd mounting base (FMB) at GENERAL CITY IOT enable lodgement of CTF 667.2 in WELLINGTON and gd against DPRT amphib ops. Fm Ph 1 will spt CJTF 667 tgt against HPTs and prov NSFS to CTF 667.2.

(iii) (U) <u>CFACC.</u> Currently op fm fwd bases in BELESIA IOT protect ALoCs to WELLINGTON IOT protect CTF 667.2 lodgement. CFACC has commenced strike against 3 OSC S of MDL IOT target C2, CSS, and IADS IOT achieve air superiority in ST fm D+30.

(iv) (U) <u>CJSOTG.</u> Currently spt CJTF 667 tgt 3 OSC HVTs.

(c) (U) <u>Civil Considerations.</u> See Tab E (Civil Considerations) to Appendix 1 (Int Estimate) to Annex B (Int).

      (d)   (U) <u>Attachments and Detachments.</u> Refer to Annex A (Task Org).

      (e)   (U) <u>Assessments.</u>

         (i)   (U) The DPRT will ONLY deploy thermonuclear wpns to preserve the ==Song== regime.

         (ii)   (U) Joint ISR and/or coalition forces info collection assets will detect the movt of any DPRT c-atk forces of Bde str or higher.

         (iii)   (U) CFACC OSD will generate air superiority against fixed-wing threats S of the Cease Fire Line NLT D+30.

         (iv)   (U) CFACC and CFMCC will retain con of ALoCs/SLoCs to WELLINGTON APOD/SPOD throughout the op.

         (v)   (U) The DPRT has ltd C4ISR capability and or/warhead equip to conduct real-time TBM targeting of mnvr BCT.

      (f)   (U) <u>Restrictions:</u>

         (i)   (U) Cease Fire Line. No CTF 667.2 elms are to mov N of the Cease Fire Line without approval by Comd CJTF 667.

         (ii)   (U) Mil Demarcation Line (MDL). No CJTF 667 elms are to mov N of the MDL.

2.   (U) **Mission.** CTF 667.2 is to clear DPRT forces fm ST NLT D+120 IOT to enable ST forces to regain ST sovereign territory.

    a.   (U) <u>Execution:</u>

    b.   (U) <u>Commander's Intent:</u>

    (1)   (U) <u>Purpose.</u> To defeat DPRT in ST IOT destroy its capability to conduct off ops and to restore pre-war international borders.

    (2)   (U) <u>Method:</u>

      (a)   (U) <u>Decisive Event.</u> Destruction of DPRT C2 and IADS capabilities by 1 (ANZAC) DIV ctr-atk, thereby defeating DPRT through disintegration and enabling its clearance fm ST by the joint force.

      (b)   (U) <u>Shaping Events:</u>

         (i)   (U) Blk DPRT adv in HOROWHENUA and N WAIRARAPA IOT deny DPRT extension of A2AD capabilities over WELLINGTON and draw 5 Mech DIV into DIV EA.

         (ii)   (U) Destroy 5 Mech DIV in WAIRARAPA IOT culminate DPRT off potential.

         (iii)   (U) Isolate 1 MED on SH2 axis IOT enable destruction by CJTF 667.

         (iv)   (U) Blk 6 Mech DIV wdr rte on SH1 IOT turn onto SH3.

      (v)   (U) ICW ROTA Clear 6 Mech DIV fm MANAWATU IOT sec SH1 GLoCs.

      (vi) (U) ICW ROTA Clear ST to Cease Fire Line IOT sec ST territory.

      (vii) (U) BPT sec ST sovereign territory to MDL.

      (viii) (U) ICW CFMCC BPT seize PORT OF NAPIER and PORT OF NEW PLYMOUTH IOT isolate DPRT in ST.

      (ix) (U) Neutralise TCA in ST IOF GoST to restore legitimate govt to its sovereign territory.

  (c) (U) <u>Sustaining Events:</u>

      (i)   (U) Spt reconstitution of ROTA 1st and 3rd Armies IOT generate cbt power for clearance of DPRT and future sy ops.

      (ii) (U) Retain WELLINGTON IOT protect LoCs and enable faster reconstitution of ROTA.

      (iii) (U) Sec VNI in TARANAKI and HAWKES BAY IOT enable future force flow and protect GoST capability.

      (iv) (U) Sec GLoCs to APOD/SPOD IOT protect CJTF 667 sustainment.

(3) (U) <u>End State.</u> DPRT forces are defeated in ST with sovereign territory secured up to Cease Fire Line or (O/C) MDL. CTF 667.2 facilitating the reconstitution of ROTA and spt the restoration of internal sy and legitimate governance. Redeployment on Comd.

c. (U) <u>Concept of Ops.</u> OSD is to be conducted in four phs with prelim mov into TAA OP as fol:

(1) (U) Prelim (D+10 – D+22) – Complete lodgement of CTF 667.2 into ST.

(2) (U) Ph 1 (D+22 – D+34) – Blk DPRT adv S and destroy 5 Mech DIV.

(3) (U) Ph 2 (D+35 – D+90)– Clear DPRT fm ST and sec CFL.

(4) (U) Ph 3 (On Order) - Clear DPRT fm WAIKATO / BAY OF PLENTY region of ST and sec MDL.

(5) (U) Ph 4 (On Order) – Conduct STABOPS in ST and Deter DPRT.

d. (U) <u>Groupings and Tasks:</u>

(1) (U) <u>1 MCB:</u>

  (a) (U) Prelim:

      (i)   (U) Conduct admin move to AO West.

      (ii) (U) Conduct link-up with 46 Mot DIV (ROTA).

      (iii) (U) Conduct prep for battle.

    (b)   (U) <u>Ph 1:</u>

        (i)   (U) BPT clean break and RPOL 46 Mot DIV elms in AO West.

        (ii)   (U) Blk DPRT adv N of LEVIN.

        (iii) (U) Sec GLoC to APOD/SPOD.

    (c)   (U) <u>Ph 2:</u>

        (i)   (U) ICW ROTA BPT fix 6 Mech DIV in AO West IOT spt isolation of 1 MED.

        (ii)   (U)

        (iii) (U) BPT conduct off ops IOT clear DPRT fm AO West.

    (d)   (U) <u>Ph 3:</u>

        (i)   (U) BPT Conduct off ops IOT sec MDL.

    (e)   (U) <u>Ph 4:</u>

        (i)   (U) BPT conduct STABOPS within Bde sector.

        (ii)   (U) BPT sec MDL.

(2)   (U) <u>3 MCB:</u>

    (a)   (U) <u>Prelim:</u>

        (i)   (U) Complete lodgement at APOD/SPOD.

        (ii)   (U) Conduct admin mov fm APOD/SPOD to AO East (2nd OOM).

        (iii) (U) Conduct prep for battle.

    (b)   (U) <u>Ph 1:</u>

        (i)   (U) Destroy 1 MED DIV lead BTG IOT culminate 1 MED and draw 5 Mech DIV.

        (ii)   (U) Contain 5 Mech DIV in DIV EA.

        (iii) (U) BPT pursue wdr DPRT IOT destroy C2, IADS and CSS.

    (c)   (U) <u>Ph 2:</u>

        (i)   (U) BPT conduct off ops in AO East IOT destroy 1 MED and clear ST up to CFL.

        (ii)   (U) BPT HOTO AO to ROTA IOT conduct off ops in AO West.

    (d)   (U) <u>Ph 3:</u>

        (i)   (U) BPT conduct off ops IOT sec MDL.

    (e)   (U) <u>Ph 4:</u>

       (i)   (U) BPT conduct STABOPS within Bde Sector.

       (ii)   (U) BPT sec MDL.

(3)   (U) <u>7 MCB</u>:

    (a)   (U) <u>Prelim</u>:

       (i)   (U) Complete lodgement at WELLINGTON APOD/SPOD.

       (ii)   (U) Conduct prep for battle.

    (b)   (U) <u>Ph 1</u>:

       (i)   (U) On order, deploy to AO East.

       (ii)   (U) Conduct c-atk to destroy 5 Mech DIV in DIV EA.

       (iii) (U) Conduct pursuit to destroy DPRT C2, CSS, and IADS.

    (c)   (U) <u>Ph 2</u>:

       (i)   (U) BPT conduct off ops in AO East IOT destroy 1 MED and clear ST up to CFL Occupy TAA EMERALD

       (ii)   (U) BPT HOTO AO to ROTA IOT conduct off ops in AO West.

    (d)   (U) <u>Ph 3</u>:

       (i)   (U) BPT conduct off ops IOT sec MDL.

    (e)   (U) <u>Ph 4</u>:

       (i)   (U) BPT conduct STABOPS within Bde sector.

       (ii)   (U) BPT sec MDL.

(4)   (U) <u>9 MCB</u>:

    (a)   (U) <u>Prelim</u>:

       (i)   (U) Conduct admin move to AO East.

       (ii)   (U) Conduct linkup with ROTA.

       (iii) (U) Conduct prep for battle.

    (b)   (U) <u>Ph 1</u>:

       (i)   (U) Conduct delay def in AO East IOT degrade 1 MED capability.

       (ii)   (U) Contain 5 Mech DIV in DIV EA.

       (iii) (U) BPT c-atk wdr DPRT IOT destroy C2, CSS, and IADS.

    (c)   (U) <u>Ph 2</u>:

       (i)   (U) BPT conduct off ops in AO East IOT destroy 1 MED and clear ST up to CFL.

   (ii) (U) BPT HOTO AO to ROTA IOT conduct off ops in AO West.

  (d) (U) <u>Ph 3:</u>

   (i) (U) BPT conduct off ops IOT sec MDL.

  (e) (U) <u>Ph 4:</u>

   (i) (U) BPT conduct STABOPS in Bde sector.

   (ii) (U) BPT sec MDL.

(5) (U) <u>DIV Arty:</u>

 (a) (U) <u>Prelim:</u>

  (i) (U) Complete lodgement and deploy into AOs East and West.

  (ii) (U) ICW CJTF 667 neutralise DPRT C2, CSS, and IADS S of MDL IOT degrade DPRT off potential.

 (b) (U) <u>Ph 1:</u>

  (i) (U) Prov close spt to mnvr Bdes.

  (ii) (U) Strike CTF 667.2 HPTs IAW EGM (Pri: C2/CSS/IADS).

  (iii) (U) ICW CJTF 667 destroy 5 Mech DIV in DIV EA.

 (c) (U) <u>Ph 2:</u>

  (i) (U) Spt off ops IOT clear DPRT fm ST.

  (ii) (U) ICW CJTF 667 neutralise DPRT C2, CSS, and IADS IOT disintegrate.

 (d) (U) <u>Ph 3:</u>

  (i) (U) BPT spt off ops to sec MDL.

 (e) (U) <u>Ph 4:</u>

  (i) (U) BPT deter DPRT incursions across MDL.

  (ii) (U) BPT spt STABOPS in DIV AO.

(6) (U) <u>20 Regt:</u>

 (a) (U) Prov ISTAR spt in all phs. See Annex KK for further detail.

(7) (U) <u>16 ALR:</u>

 (a) (U) Prov GBAD cover to 1 (ANZAC) DIV throughout all phs.

 (b) (U) Prov GBAD cover IAW CFACC OPORD.

(8) (U) <u>Combined Aviation Regiment:</u>

 (a) (U) <u>Prelim:</u>

  (i) (U) Complete lodgement into WELLINGTON APOD.

        (ii)   (U) Screen Bde deployments into AOs.

        (iii)   (U) ICW DIV arty strike CTF 667.2 HPTs.

        (iv)   (U) Prov AME.

        (v)   (U) Prov Air Mob Spt to Bdes and DIV Tps.

   (b)   (U) Ph 1:

        (i)   (U) Gd CTF 667.2 flks in AO East.

        (ii)   (U) Destroy CTF 667.2 HPTs (C2,CSS, Fires).

        (iii) (U) Isolate 5 Mech DIV fm 1 MED reinf.

        (iv) (U) Provide AME.

        (v)   (U) Prov Air Mob Spt to Bdes and DIV Tps.

   (c)   (U) Ph 2 – 4:

        (i)   (U) Spt off ops in AO East and West.

        (ii)   (U) Spt DIV ISTAR taskings.

        (iii) (U) Strike HPTs IAW CTF 667.2 EGM.

        (iv) (U) Prov AME.

        (v)   (U) Prov Air Mob Spt to Bdes and DIV Tps.

(9)   (U) 17 CSS Bde:

   (a)   (U) Prelim:

        (i)   (U) Estb CTF 667.2 DSA in LOWER HUTT.

        (ii)   (U) Estb sup pts, maint collection point, and 1 (ANZAC) DIV CPers holding area in DSA.

   (b)   (U) Ph 1:

        (i)   (U) BPT conduct emergency resup to spt def ops in AO East and West.

        (ii)   (U) Coord delivery of mil material spt to ROTA through WELLINGTON APOD/SPOD.

   (c)   (U) Ph 2 – 4:

        (i)   (U) Reconstitute CTF 667.2 IOT enable conduct of off ops.

        (ii)   (U) BPT deploy CSST to spt DIV adv on SH1/SH2.

        (iii) (U) BPT redeploy DSA to PALMERSTON NORTH/NAPIER/TAUPO.

        (iv) (U) Coord del of mil material spt to ROTA through WELLINGTON APOD/SPOD.

(10) (U) B/43/11 ADA.

        (a)   (U) Prov area def of WELLINGTON APOD/SPOD.

(11) (U) <u>6 ESR:</u>

        (a)   (U) Prov force engr capabilities to project, protect and sustain the DIV in persistent threat environments; and be ready to prov discrete, short-notice, independent tac engr capabilities to achieve strat outcomes.

        (b)   (U) Prov engr planning and advice at the tac lvl incl the devlp of train, advise, and assist concepts in consultation with other govt agencies.

        (c)   (U) Prov force lvl survivability (explosive ordnance, CBNRD, force protection) advice and spt.

        (d)   (U) Prov line of communications devlp within a persistent threat environment.

        (e)   (U) Prov construction, svcs, rscs winning, and li watercraft spt.

        (f)   (U) Coord and manage the engr park that spts engr effort.

(12) (U) <u>1 SIG REGT:</u>

        (a)   (U) Prov comms spt to HQ 1 (ANZAC) DIV throughout prelim mov and all phs IAW Annex XX.

        (b)   (U) Maint comms with CBT BDE and DIV Tps throughout prelim mov and all phs IAW Annex XX.

(13) (U) <u>7 SIG REGT (EW).</u> Prov EW spt throughout prelim mov and all phs IAW Annex P.

(14) (U) <u>1 MI BN.</u> Prov integral int spt to HQ 1 (ANZAC) DIV and subordinate comds throughout prelim mov and all phs.

(15) (U) <u>1 MP BN:</u>

        (a)   (U) CO 1 MP BN is appointed 1 (ANZAC) DIV PM.

        (b)   (U) Prov mob spt in conjunction with 130 MEB during prelim mov and all phs.

        (c)   (U) Estb DIV CPers Holding Area detailed in Annex MM.

        (d)   (U) Further details are prov in Annex PP.

e.   (U) <u>Supporting Battlefield Operating System Concepts:</u>

(1)   (U) <u>Scheme of Mob / C-Mob.</u> Pri of effort is mob ops for clearance and maint of routes; runways/flight landing strips; and c-mob on construction of protective obs, static sy pts and restricting en movt.

(2)   (U) <u>Scheme of Info Collection.</u> See Annex L (Info Collection).

(3)   (U) <u>Scheme of Int.</u> 1 (ANZAC) DIV G2 directs int efforts and coords tasking to spt info collection in AO to answer the COMD's PIR. Info

Collection pri is on sit devlp, indications and early wng, force projection, tgt devlp, and physical and functional damage assessments. See Annex B (Int).

(4)   (U) <u>Scheme of Fires.</u> See Annex KK (Fires). TBD.

(5)   (U) <u>Scheme of Protection.</u> See Annex E (Protection). TBD.

(6)   (U) <u>Cyber Electromagnetic Activities.</u> TBD.

(7)   (U) <u>Stability Tasks.</u> TBD.

(8)   (U) <u>Assessment.</u> TBD.

f.   (U) <u>Coordinating Instructions:</u>

(1)   (U) <u>Timings:</u>

   (a)   (U) Prelim Commence – D+10.

   (b)   (U) Prelim mov complete – D+19.

   (c)   (U) H-HR – 1800h D+22.

   (d)   (U) Ph 1 complete – NLT D+34.

   (e)   (U) Ph 2 complete – NLT D+90.

   (f)   (U) Ph 3 complete – O/C.

(2)   (U) <u>Loc/Boundaries.</u> See OP overlay.

(3)   (U) <u>Routes.</u> See OP overlay.

(4)   (U) <u>Con Measures.</u> See OP overlay. Further detail is prov in Annex H.

(5)   (U) <u>ROE.</u> National policies and caveats have been cfm, and there are no impacts on cbt ops. Should any changes occur or concerns be raised re: National ROE, 1 (ANZAC) DIV G3 is to be advised by the most expeditious means. National COMD may also bring changes or concerns to the attention of the COMD 1 (ANZAC) DIV dir.

(6)   (U) <u>CPERS, Detainees.</u> The handling and disposition of PW, CPERS and detainees are to be conducted IAW Annex MM.

(7)   (U) <u>IDP.</u> The handling and disposition of IDP are to be conducted IAW Annex W.

(8)   (U) <u>CCIR:</u>

   (a)   (U) <u>PIR:</u>

      (i)   (U) Locs/str of 3 OSC's mnvr elms and the orientation of its (U) forces?

      (ii)   Timing of 3 OSC to adv to PALMERSTON NORTH /DANNEVIRKE?

      (iii)   (U) Where will 3 OSC conduct amphib ops?

      (iv)   (U) What are the locs of DTG and BTG C2 nodes?

(v) (U) Where is 3 OSC's main effort?

(vi) (U) Where are 3 OSC's IADS?

(vii) (U) Where are 3 OSC's EW systems?

(viii) (U) Where are 3 OSC's UAVs and how are they being used?

(ix) (U) Where is 3 OSC's arty?

(x) (U) What is the intended employment of 3 OSC's aviation elms?

(xi) (U) Which routes are being used as MSR/SSR/ASR to spt 3 OSC?

(xii) (U) What is the state of these routes?

(xiii) (U) What is the current status of comms and multi-media infrastructure in AO APPLE?

(xiv) (U) What DPRT SPF are known to be op in AO APPLE?

(xv) (U) What TCA and TANTOCO elm are known to be op in AO APPLE?

(b) (U) EEFI:

(i) (U) Locs.

(ii) (U) OBJ.

(iii) (U) Routes.

(iv) (U) Force composition.

(v) (U) Unit pers and log info.

(vi) (U) ROE.

(vii) (U) Intent to conduct c-atk with 7 MCB into DIV EA.

(c) (U) FFIR:

(i) (U) Status of 1 (ANZAC) DIV prep.

(ii) (U) Loc, str, and abilities of DIV Arty assets.

(iii) (U) Loss of a C2 node or severe damage to a log base that will impede 1 (ANZAC) DIV ops.

(iv) (U) Any Bde with cbt power below 70%.

(v) (U) Recognised Air Picture.

(9) (U) HPTL:

(a) (U) DTG/BTG HQs.

(b) (U) HQ-9/S-400 Btys.

(c) (U) SLC-2 Ctr-Bty Radar.

(d) (U) CSA-16 Btys.

(e) (U) CSS Bde/Bns (Bulk Fuel, CL V).

(f) (U) Z-10/19 Coy.

(g) (U) EW (JN1601/JN1105/DZ9001/R-330ZH).

(h) (U) ASN-207.

(i) (U) GSL-133 ABV.

(j) (U) PHL-90B/PHZ-89.

(k) (U) AVLB.

(10) (U) <u>PWs and Captured Persons (CPERS).</u> Handling and disposition of PWs and CPERS are to be conducted IAW Appx 1 to Annex L.

(11) (U) <u>National Responsibilities on PW/CPERS.</u> For reasons of National sensitivity and ownership of processes relating to PW/CPERS, all Coalition pers are to respect their own national procedures fol guidelines IAW the Geneva Convention.

(12) (U) <u>Custody of PW/CPERS.</u> PW/CPERS ops are a National resp. As such, it is imperative that all pers detained by Coalition forces remain in the care and custody of auth pers only. It is understood that op reqts may force acceptance of PW/CPERS fm, or tsfr to, other Allied nations of the Coalition. This shall be the exception and not the norm. Should such circumstance become necessary, only the respective National Commander or designated rep can auth the acceptance or tsfr of a PW/CPERS to/fm another nation.

(13) (U) <u>Treatment.</u> PW and CPERS are to be treated IAW all accepted international laws and conventions.

(14) (U) <u>Transfer or Release.</u> Although tac sit may oblige comd to detain pers during the conduct of ops, it is the resp of National Comd at all lvls to determine who will be categorised as a CPERS and immediately fd rel all others. Once a determination has been made to further retain the detained pers and a PW/CPERS number has been assigned, only the National Comdr of the capturing nation has the auth to rel or tsfr PW/CPERS to other nations. For the specific purpose of an inDIVidual clearly detained as a PW, there is no reqt to determine status upon capture, as PW are captured en combatants and remain in detention for the duration of hostilities. The detaining power has an obligation to make a determination of PW versus other CPERS status as soon as practical after capture.

(15) (U) <u>PW and CPERS Rpt.</u> IAW national directives, all PW or CPERS in Coalition custody shall be rpt via official means by using a PW/CPERS capture rpt.

      (16) (U) <u>PW/CPERS Holding Facilities.</u> XXX will estb theatre CPERS holding facy IVO WELLINGTON CITY. 1 MP Bn is to estb holding facy in the DSA.

      (17) (U) <u>Reports and Returns.</u> The Battle Rhythm schedule for Rpts and Rtns is to be published once the HQ 1 (ANZAC) DIV has declared OPRED.

3.   (U) <u>Admin and Log:</u>

    a.   (U) <u>Concept of Spt.</u> Spt is to be prov by maint the DSA relatively close, stepping fwd as 1 (ANZAC) DIV adv through use of CSSTs. The DSA is to be estb with a connection with CJTF 667 ESC and TCN NSE. Sup Pts (SP), a Maint Collection Pt (MCP) and DIV PW/Detainee Holding Area are to be estb in the DSA.

    b.   (U) <u>Unique National Spt.</u> Unique national spt is to be prov by NSEs. 17 CSS BDE is to facilitate TCN NSEs spt to Bdes as req.

    c.   (U) <u>Replenishment:</u>

      (1) (U) SPs are to hold three DOS and a min of one DOS of cbt sups on wheels or packed in PLS compatible containers to facilitate rapid movt. In Ph 4 the SPs are to hold seven DOS. As DSA mov fwd, 310th ESC will maint 3 DOS in the previous DSA loc to ensure spt if LOCs are compromised.

      (2) (U) <u>Locs and Opening Times of DSA, SP and MCP:</u>

         (a) <u>Ph 1.</u> LOWER HUTT, fm now.

         (b) <u>Ph 2 - 4</u>. TBD.

    d.   (U) <u>Maint, Recov and Rep.</u> TCN are resp to the rear of the DSA MCP, TCNs will by assisted in back loading by 17 CSS Bde.

    e.   (U) Med.

      (1) (U) <u>MEDEVAC.</u> Preferred MEDEVAC is by air. Combined Aviation Regiment is to prov aeromedevac svcs to Role 2/3. Evac requests are to be submitted to the PECC at DIV Main HQ using the standard nine line Med Evac Request found at Tab A, Appendix 2 Annex XX.

      (2) (U) <u>Role 1.</u> HS are to be prov by Coalition integral capabilities.

      (3) (U) <u>Role 2</u> (Enhanced). HS are to be prov by DIV R2 co-loc with DSA.

      (4) (U) <u>Role 3.</u> 121st Cbt Spt Hospital (CSH) US has been estb in WELLINGTON.

    f.   (U) <u>Log.</u> See Annex R (Log).

    g.   (U) <u>Pers.</u> See Annex R (Log).

    h.   (U) <u>HSS.</u> See Annex R (Log).

4.   (U) <u>Command and Signal:</u>

a. (U) <u>Command:</u>

   (1) (U) <u>COMD.</u> Maj Gen XXXXXX (AS)

   (2) (U) <u>DCOMD.</u> Brig XXXXXX (NZ)

   (3) (U) <u>HQ Loc.</u> See C2 overlay.

   (4) (U) <u>Succession of Comd.</u> COMD 1 (ANZAC) DIV, DCOMD 1 (ANZAC) DIV, COMD 1 MCB, COMD 3 MCB, COMD 7 MCB, COMD 9 MCB.

   (5) (U) <u>Liaison Reqts.</u> All Major Subordinate Comds (MSC) will prov two Liaison Officers (LNOs) to HQ 1 (ANZAC) DIV fm D+10.

b. (U) <u>Comms and Info Systems (CIS).</u> Effective C2 of 1 (ANZAC) DIV is highly dependent upon the flexible and interoperable CIS between Components and contributing nations.

   (1) (U) 1 SIG REGT is to:

      (a) (U) Estb force lvl CIS down to BDE HQ, incl the mgmt of network interface gateways.

      (b) (U) Coord FMN-wide CIS plans.

      (c) (U) Perform FMN spectrum mgmt.

   (2) (U) HQ 1 (ANZAC) DIV CIS is to prov sec voice, VTC and Coalition WAN (based on NATO-CENTRIXS) to prov sec email, chat and other C3 tools down to FMN lvl. Requests for extension of coalition CIS in spt of national, component or other reqts is to be coord through the HQ 1 (ANZAC) DIV G6 and funded as appropriate.

   (3) (U) Use of HN comms infrastructure to supplement mil networks is to be coord by HQ 1 (ANZAC) DIV in conjunction with G6, but contracted independently by TCN.

   (4) (U) <u>Network Ops:</u>

      (a) (U) Defensive Measures. 1 (ANZAC) DIV's networks are tgts for Computer Network Atk (CNA) by DPRT EW assets seeking to sabotage or exploit coalition info or svcs. The pri vulnerabilities are through gateways with external systems and inadvertent tsfr of viruses fm open systems. All contributing nations are resp for effective COMSEC and Computer Network Defence (CND) on all national networks and systems; these measures are vital for effective C2 and the maint of info dominance. HQ 1 (ANZAC) DIV J6 is resp for the coord of def measures and COMSEC for all 1 (ANZAC) DIV systems through the Network Ops Center loc with HQ 1 (ANZAC) DIV (deployed).

      (b) (U) <u>Offensive Measures.</u> Offensive network ops or Computer Network Atk (CNA) are not to be conducted by coalition partners against adversary networks without approval of COMD CJTF 667.

5. (U) ACKNOWLEDGE. All ack.

XXXXXXXXX

MAJGEN

COMD

ANNEXES:

Annex A   TASKORG

Annex B   Intelligence

Annex C   CONOPS Pack

Annex D   Intelligence

Annex E   Rules of Engagement

Annex F   Joint Fires and Targeting.

Annex G   Military Deception

Annex H   Airspace Control

Annex J   Force Protection

Annex K   Health Services Support

Annex L   Psychological Operations

Annex M   Operational Assessment (Not issued)

Annex O   Information Operations

Annex P   Electronic Warfare

Annex Q   Communication and Information Systems

Annex R   Logistics

Annex S   Movements

Annex U   CBRN

Annex W   Civil Military Cooperation

Annex X   Public Affairs

Annex AA   Legal (To be issued)

Annex DD   Space Operations (To be issued)

Annex EE   Engineers

Annex MM   Detainee Operations

Annex PP   Military Police

DISTRIBUTION: Special

TASK ORGANISATION

Originator	Related order	Time effective	Phases
XX 1 ANZAC CTF 667.2	1 ANZAC DIV OPORD 01	D+10	1 ANZAC DIV – All Atts – PH I-III only

Copy no	Reference
1 of 48	

CTF 667.2 (1 ANZAC)	TU 667.2.1 (1 MCB)	TU 667.2.2 (3 MCB)	TU 667.2.3 (7 MCB)	TU 667.2.4 (9 MCB)	TU 667.2.5 (Div Arty)	TU 667.2.6 6 CS Bde	TU 667.2.7 17 CSS Bde	Atts
	TE 667.2.1.1 1/15 NSW	TE 667.2.2.1 2 Cav	TE 667.2.3.1 2/14	TE 667.2.4.1 1 AR	TE 667.2.5.1 1 Regt	TE 667.2.6.1 1 MI	TU 667.2.7.1 21 TSB	B/43/11 (US)
	TE 667.2.1.2 5 RAR	TE 667.2.2.2 3 RAR	TE 667.2.3.2 6 RAR	TE 667.2.4.2 7 RAR	TE 667.2.5.2 4 Regt	TE 667.2.6.2 1 MP	TE 667.2.7.2 9 FSB	3/570 (US)
	TE 667.2.1.3 1 RNZIR	TE 667.2.2.3 5/7 RNZIR	TE 667.2.3.3 3/6 RNZIR	TE 667.2.3.3 QAMR	TE 667.2.5.3 16 Fd Regt	TE 667.2.6.3 6 ESR	TE 667.2.7.3 R2E	121st CSH (US)
	TE 667.2.1.4 9 RQR	TE 667.2.2.4 1 RAR	TE 667.2.3.4 8/9 RAR	TE 667.2.3.4 2/1 RNZIR	TE 667.2.5.4 8/12 Regt	TE 667.2.6.4 7 SIG REGT EW		
	TE 667.2.1.5 1 CER	TE 667.2.2.5 3 CER	TE 667.2.3.5 2 CER	TE 667.2.3.5 9 CER	TE 667.2.5.5 9 Regt	TE 667.2.6.5 1 SIG REGT		
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					TE 667.2.5.7 16ALR (20 STA)			

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

References:

A. ADFP2.0.1 Intelligence Procedures, 2015
B. LWD 2-1 Intelligence Staff Duties, 2013
C. Maps: Map Series S701, S702, S711, S721, S733, PHILIPPINES; Sheets TBD.

Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU.

INTRODUCTION

1. **Aim and Scope.**

a.   The aim of this Intelligence Estimate is to provide data on enemy, weather, and terrain to assist in decision-making and course of action development.

b.   The scope of this INT Estimate covers an analysis of the AO, enemy strength, and enemy capabilities that can influence the mission.

REVIEW OF THE SITUATION

2. **Political Situation.**

a.   The Region.

(1)   Relations among the nations in this region are a tense game of power. As Donovia's strategic influence has shifted to Europe and the Caucasus regions, Olvana has aggressively sought to press its will on the region. Similarly, nations such as South Torbia, Gabal, and Belesia view the shift as an opportunity to grow their influence and develop economic ties both in the region and with external partners.

(2)   Control of critical mineral and fishing resources, manufacturing, and unfettered transport of goods in the region's shipping lanes is a key point of tension for all. Within the states of the region, groups that had previously seen no opportunity for influence view the instability as a path to develop their voices.

(3)   Internal conflict is a persistent and potentially destabilising factor as governments position for legitimacy and consolidate their power. Whether expanding influence or building new power bases, the region will continue to be a driver of worldwide tensions and increasing volatility.

b. <u>Olvana.</u>

(1) The People's Republic of Olvana is a communist nation created in the mid-20th Century after several decades of internal civil conflicts and global wars. Though the government has evolved over its seven decades of existence, it is still dominated by the Olvanan Communist Party.

(2) While the government was uncompromising in its approaches to social change during the mid to late 20th Century, it has adopted a more lenient stance regarding the way it approaches domestic economic and social challenges. However current events suggest that Olvana is returning to its old ways.

(3) Today, Olvana's massive economy and modernising military have enabled it to become a regional hegemon capable of exerting tremendous pressure and influence throughout the region and across the globe.

(4) Olvana's primary strategy is to project its strength through economic activities. Olvana is the world's second largest exporter and has adopted the soft power tool of money, via investments and project funding, to expand its influence. Joint economic and political projects between Olvana and other Asian nations have been on the rise and Olvana views contrary security policies as an attempt to encircle Olvana and deny them the right to regional influence.

(5) Olvana remains the primary trading partner, ally, and patron of North Torbia. Although Olvana has upheld some of the international sanctions against North Torbia and taken some measures to squeeze it economically, including the suspension of fuel sales and restrictions on financial activities, relations appear to have thawed somewhat over a number of issues.

(6) North Torbia's complete isolation from most of the world has made its relationship with Olvana extremely critical. With decades of sanctions placed on North Torbia, Olvana has the greatest influence on the direction of its ally and is often called upon to restrain North Torbia's more irrational and threatening actions. Olvana has walked a precarious line in avoiding world condemnation and support of North Torbia.

(7) In recent years, Olvana and South Torbia have endeavored to boost their strategic and cooperative partnership in numerous sectors, as well as promoting high level relationship. Trade, tourism and multiculturalism, specifically, have been the most important factors of strengthening two countries' cooperative partnership.

(8) The relations significantly deteriorated after South Torbia announced its intentions to deploy missiles on its boundaries, a move that Olvana strongly opposed. Olvana imposed an unofficial boycott on South Torbia in an attempt to stop them from deploying the missile system. In the past five years, the two countries ended the long diplomatic dispute and have returned to diplomatic discussions regarding exchanges and cooperation in a variety of areas. All Olvanan economic and cultural bans on South Torbia have been lifted, with political and security cooperation, business and cultural exchanges between the two countries resuming.

c.   <u>North Torbia.</u>

(1)   The Democratic People's Republic of Torbia (DPRT), also called North Torbia, is one of the most militarised countries in the world, with more than half a million active duty military personnel and over two million reservists. North Torbia is a single-party, despotic state that occupies the northern half of the Island of Luzon.

(2)   It is self-described as a "self-reliant socialist republic", but its structure is deeply totalitarian, whol

(3)   ly reliant on a cult-of personality and militarism for survival. DPRT's stated mission is the unification of all of Torbia, but only under the control of the Song family whose family has ran the country since its founding.

(4)   The Modern state of North Torbia resulted from hasty negotiations between the United States and the People's Republic of Olvana following the occupation of Torbia during World War II. Planners arbitrarily divided the Torbian portion of Luzon Island roughly in half from Lingayan Gulf to Dingalan Bay, with the US governing the southern portion along with Midoro Island and Olvana the north from Baguio.

(5)   The US and its western allies left Torbia shortly after, focusing instead on the occupations of Japan and Germany and the growing frictions with Donovia. South Torbia was given independence and declared a nation on September 15, 1947, envisioned by the West to be a liberal western democracy and American ally in the Western Pacific. North Torbia recognizes and celebrates 15 September as "Torbian People's Day", the day of national independence.

(6)   The Torbian War was a formative event for North Torbia's government. Song Jin Su, along with Olvanan advisors, convinced Olvana that a North Torbian invasion of the south, the Republic of Torbia (RoT), would be quick and decisive, resulting in the island being unified under North Torbia's communist government.

(7)   North Torbia massed forces on the border and invaded in 1950, met minimal resistance from the South Torbians, and nearly completed their destruction before the United Nations (U.N.) intervention. The resulting U.N. counterattack and subsequent Olvanan intervention ultimately resulted in a stalemate that endured for nearly three more years before ceasefire terms were finally agreed upon.

(8)   The war helped to consolidate Song's power and gave rise to the idea of self-reliance that has dominated North Torbian politics since that time. The war also set into motion a series of complex diplomatic confrontations with South Torbia, Olvana, and the US that would eventually lead to North Torbia's isolation and militarism.

(9)   Following the war, Olvanan interest in North Torbia led to substantial foreign investment. The North Torbian economy and industrial base grew rapidly (much more so than South Torbia) throughout the 1950s and early 1960s.

(10)   North Torbia would eventually joint the Non-Aligned Movement, a declaration of their independence from Olvanan control and a strong endorsement of self-reliance. North Torbia was, however, still heavily dependent on Olvana as a trading partner, investor, and provider of financial and military aid.

d.   <u>South Torbia.</u>

(1)   The Republic of Torbia, also called South Torbia, is a constitutional republic that occupies most of the south half of the island of Luzon. After centuries of foreign occupation and despotic rule, South Torbia emerged in the late 20th century as one of the world's fastest growing economies, and today is one of the world's wealthiest, most stable, and most militarily powerful nations.

(2)   A massive corruption scandal that included the president has recently rocked the South Torbian government to its core, creating many questions about the stability and viability of the current republic. The South Torbian military is primarily a defensive force aimed at stopping the Democratic People's Republic of Torbia from taking over the entire country.

(3)   Many years ago, due to the fear of North Torbia, South Torbia adopted a universal military service of short duration for all its male citizens. After leaving active duty, the military veterans serve in an active or inactive reserve role as a deterrence against external threats to the country's independence.

e.   <u>Relationship between North and South Torbia.</u>

(1)   The two Torbia's have strained relations, fueled by a mutual distrust of the motives of the other. The ebb and flow between warm and cold is punctuated by pressures exerted by families who were separated when the two countries created a hard border on the island of Luzon. There are periodic attempts to thaw the relationship with families able to meet each other and South Torbian humanitarian aid delivered to the north. These initiatives are usually interrupted by the two countries coming to the brink of military confrontation or perceived affronts disrupting diplomatic efforts.

(2)   North Torbia views South Torbia as its territory, as does South Torbia see North Torbia. This impasse and the two diametrically opposed government systems all but preclude reunification of the peninsula under one banner.

f.   <u>The Road to War.</u>

(1)   In December 2015 Song Ji-Hoon, North Torbia's "Dear Leader," died of a suspected heart attack near Baguio. Amid discussions of his long-term viability, Song Chong-Su ascended to become leader of North Torbia. Song Chong-Su then conducted bloody purges of North Torbian elites he perceived as disloyal to him. Incidents of the purge included execution via mortar firing squad, public immolations, and banishment to the DPRT's extensive network of prison camps.

(2)   In April 2018 Lieutenant Colonel Min Huk Park, a North Torbian military attaché, defected to Switzerland. Park alleged that North Torbia's elites were definitely starting to feel the pinch of sanctions imposed as a result of North Torbian nuclear tests conducted in 2011 and 2014, and that Song Chong-Su was barely maintaining power. He also provided information covering the signing of contracts with Donovia for the provision of the latest SAM systems, and Olvana for the provision of internet services and access to a range of Olvanan military satellites as well as the latest ASM and SAM technology.

(3)   On 2 June 2018 various allied and neutral intelligence services report that the Torbian Central News Agency announce that an assassination attempt was made on Song Chong-Su who was visiting a high school in the city of Santiago. An explosive device was detonated in one of the classrooms killing the teacher and a number of the students. Although a visit by Song Chong-Su to this classroom was scheduled, the device was initiated before he entered the classroom. Although shaken he was not injured.

(4)   Within hours a suspect was arrested and detained by North Torbian police. Identified as XXXX he confessed to the assassination attempt and also confessed to being a member of the South Torbian Communist Army whose expressed intent is to establish a united communist Torbia based on the Marxist model. Three days later, the Torbian Central News Agency reported that "capitalist reactionaries" under the control of the "perfidious figures close to the Brilliant Successor" attempted to kill Song Chong-Su while visiting a high school in Santiago.

(5)   In a speech to the UN General Assembly the North Torbian representative denounced the assassination attempt as a South Torbian plot to destabilise North Torbia as a prelude to an invasion of North Torbia to unite the two countries under South Torbian rule. He promised that retribution would be swift.

(6)   In June 2019 South Torbian intelligence services reported that in a secret North Torbian meeting, Song Chong-Su allegedly initiated the planning for a "reunification war" in mid-2020. Various means of strategic deception were agreed upon at this time. It was unknown if Olvana and Donovia were complicit in the DPRT's war planning.

(7)   On DD MMM 20YY North Torbia launched a massed offensive across the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) which caught ROTA unprepared. TPA made rapid advances through the WAIKATO and BAY OF PLENTY regions but were halted by US CJTF as part of OPERATION BRONZE ACHILLES. Coalition forces were successful in forcing the TPA back to the MDL but extensive damage was done to South Torbian infrastructure, reputation and military power. Of 3 Armies, only the 3rd Army of ROTA has remained a combat effective force. Furthermore, subsequent lack of reconstruction has caused a drop of spt for the GoST in regional areas beyond the capital, enabling the TCA, supported by TPA SPF

(8)   On DD MMM 20YY, with the outbreak of hostilities in Khorathidin, US forces redeployed from SOUTH TORBIA, handing over responsibility for

deterrence of TPA to ROTA and CJTF 667 (ANZAC). TPA identified a window of opportunity prior to the deployment of CJTF 667 where remaining combat forces (3 OSC reconstituted utilizing Olvanan Equipment) would be utilized to seize South Torbian territory while international attention is focused on Khorathidin.

(9) On DD MMM 20YY, 3 OSC commenced offensive operations while CTF 667.2 was still in progress. 3 OSC made rapid gains and pushed ROTA back into central SOUTH TORBIA, inflicting heavy losses.

(10) On DD MMM 20YY, GoST and GoNT agreed to a 24 hour cease-fire on a line extending through TAUMARANUI – TAUPO – WHAKATANE. It is assessed TPA will utilize this time to conduct rorganisation and bring forward further supplies to enable a continued offensive.

3. **Friendly Situation.**

a. <u>Commander's Mission and Intent.</u> COMD 1 ANZAC DIV's mission is to clear TPA forces from SOUTH TORBIA NLT D+120 IOT enable South Torbian forces to regain sovereign territory in SOUTH TORBIA. COMD 1 ANZAC DIV's intent is to defeat TPA ground forces in the AO IOT destroy its capability to conduct offensive operations and to restore pre-war international borders.

b. <u>Friendly dispositions.</u>

(1) Coalition ground force dispositions are as follows:

(a) 1st Army (ROTA). Conducting reconstitution vic WELLINGTON.

(b) 2nd Army (ROTA). Destroyed during previous conflict. Unlikely to conduct reconstitution until D+130.

(c) 3rd Army(ROTA). Tasked to Secure WELLINGTON IOT protect CTF 667.2 force flow. 46 Mot Div tasked to delay 3 OSC advance IOT buy time for CTF 667.2 deployment into defensive positions in HOROWHENUA and HAWKES BAY.

(d) CTF 667.2 is conducting lodgement into WELLINGTON via ATG. Lodgement is 60% complete with 100% CE reached by D+18.

(2) Coalition naval force disposition are as follows:

(a) MTG (TU 667.1) is operating in the Philippines SEA IOT protect SLoCs between WELLINGTON and CJTF Fwd Mounting Base in GENERAL SANTOS CITY.

(b) ATG (TU 667.2) is supporting lodgment of CTF 667.2 from FMB vic GENERAL SANTOS CITY to WELLINGTON.

(c) SUBOPAUTH (TU 667.1.3) guarding SLoCs IOT protect CTF 667.2 lodgement and screening TPA Amphib Ship movement IOT block amphib aslt.

(3)   Coalition air force dispositions are as follows:

(a)   RAAF/RNZAF elements are deploying to FOBs in Belesia.

4.   **Threat Situation.** The Torbian People's Army (TPA) utilizing 3 OSC has successfully launched and offensive which has cleared ROTA from the WAIKATO/BAY OF PLENTY regions of SOUTH TORBIA.

(a)   On AABBZZ 3 OSC launched initial attacks with artillery barrages on South Torbian headquarters, command posts and cantonment areas along the MDL. Simultaneously multiple air bases and air defence sites were subjected to EW jamming and assault by TPA SPF.

(4)   The TPA initial attack penetrated ROTA forces along the MDL using a system of pre-prepared crossing points.

(5)   5 MECH DIV (IFV) breached the MDL IVO MARAMARUA (60H UD 42937 76119) swung eastward using State Highway (SH) 2 as its axis of advance heading for TAURANGA (60H VD 27105 29531).

(6)   On reaching TAURANGA 5 MECH DIV (IFV) swung south along SH 36 heading for ROTORUA (60H VC 33163 78066). Using SH 30 5 MECH DIV (IFV) continued its advance to the junction of SH 1 and SH 30 IVO ATIAMURI (60H VC 13473 55271). The Division then pushed southwards where its advance culminated at TAUPO (60H VC 19755 17864).

(b)   6 MECH DIV (IFV) breached the MDL IVO MEREMERE (60H UD 28767 67881) and the WAIKATO RIVER ROAD BRIDGE (60H UD 17843 70061) advancing southwards along SH 1 heading for HAMILTON (60H UD 48365 15980). Despite initially offering stiff resistance ROTA 461 and 913 BDEs were forced to withdraw southwards through HAMILTON after sustaining heavy casualties. 913 BDE withdrew along SH 3 while 461 BDE continued to withdraw south along SH 1.

(7)   On reaching Hamilton 6 MECH DIV (IFV) continued its southwards advance along SH 3 to TE KUITI (60H UC 39413 54830) in pursuit of 461 and 913 BDEs.

(8)   The 6 MECH DIV (IFV) main body continue its southward advance using SH 4 as its axis of advance. At TE KUITI a brigade detached from the main body and headed westwards to the west coast in pursuit of 913 BDE where its advance culminated at MOKAU (60H TC 92962 14101).

(9)   On D+10, a 24 hour cease fire was agreed to by the governments of SOUTH TORBIA and NORTH TORBIA along a cease fire line running through the North Island.

(10)   Overall TPA losses have been light, it is assessed the operational pause accompanying the ceasefire has been conducted IOT bring forward

further combat supplies and reinforcements prior to recommencement of the offensive.

(11)   With the assistance of IADS, the North Torbian air force (NTAF) is able to achieve local air superiority for short periods of time over North Torbian-occupied territory. Fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft have been seen operating in the AO providing CAS to 6 MECH DIV (APC). Main tgt have been identified as HQ, EW sites and armd units.

(c)   The North Torbian air force is able to achieve local air superiority for short periods of time over North Torbian-occupied territory. Fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft have been seen operating across the front providing CAS to TPA ground forces. Main targets are likely to be HQ, EW sites and armd units.

(d)   Friendly forces are also likely to face asymmetrical threats from TPA SPF and insurgents associated with the South Torbian Communist Party Army (TCA) as well as criminal gangs associated with the Tantoco Cartel.

5.   **Threat Mission Analysis.**

a.   <u>Assessed Level of Threat Command.</u> The most likely threat level of command to be faced by COMD 1 ANZAC DIV is at corps level, being 3 OSC.

b.   <u>Assessed Higher Aim and Higher Command Intent.</u>

   (1)   The DPRT's strategic aim is to unify North and South Torbia under the rule of Song Chong-Su. Due to perceived unrest in North Torbia and possible threats to Song's leadership, TPA land and marine forces launched an invasion of South Torbia. This invasion has been commenced despite their recent defeat for three primary reasons. First, the military support of Olvana has enabled the equipping of a Corps sized formation (3 OSC) and sufficient stockpiling to make feasible the seizure of South Torbian territory up to WELLINGTON. Second, ROTA has failed to reconstitute from the previous conflict and is therefore significantly overmatched by NORTH TORBIA. Finally, the conflict in Khorathidin has resulted in a window of opportunity for NORTH TORBIA due to the redeployment of American forces to south-east Asia and the incomplete lodgement of the ANZAC led CJTF 667.

   (2)   This invasion was justified by North Torbian allegations that South Torbia was enabling the continuation of a humanitarian crisis in the regions beyond WELLINGTON and engaging in violent repression against civilian protestors. While largely untrue and with clear evidence that protests in WAIKATO and BAY OF PLENTY were staged by TCA. North Torbian and Olvanan INFOWAR actions have supported this narrative aggressively to international audiences.

   (3)   The purpose of the invasion is to seize SOUTH TORBIAN territory and isolate the capital of WELLINGTON. NORTH TORBIA believes that by doing so the two Torbias can be united under the rule of Song Chong-Su. This will be achieved by TPA forces (most likely 3 OSC) advancing from the cease fire line on three axes, one division (most likely 5 MECH DIV) securing NAPIER in the east, one division (most likely 6 MECH DIV) securing the CENTRAL PLATEAU in the centre, and one brigade (most likely a BTG formed from 6 Mech Div) isolating ROTA forces in TARANAKI in the west. Once these intermediate objectives have been achieved, 3 OSC will then resupply and continue its advance south through the MANAWATU/HOROWHENUA and HAWKES BAY/WAIRARAPA to secure the approaches to WELLINGTON. 3 OSC will then adopt a defensive posture and emplace A2AD systems to isolate WELLINGTON from SLoC/ALoCs and make impossible any counter-offensive by South Torbian or coalition forces.

   (4)   The higher command's end state is to isolate WELLINGTON, thereby defeating ROTA and Coalition Forces and causing the collapse of the SOUTH TORBIAN government, leading to a reunification of Torbia under the rule of Song Chong Su.

c.   <u>Threat Commander's Intent.</u>

(1)   COMD 3 OSC will most likely conduct simultaneous offensive operations across multiple axes IOT enable the bypass and envelopment of forward deployed ROTA elms and the securing of multiple GLoCs to enable the advance.

(2)   The offensive will most likely be supported by significant activity by SPF and TCA who , in conjunction with airmobile raiding elements, will establish kill zones in 3 OSCs disruption zone targeting C2, CSS, Fires and interdict lines of communications. These actions will likely have two main purposes. First, they will shatter the cohesion of 46 Mot Div, enabling its destruction in close proximity to the cease fire line and thereby resulting in a faster advance. Second, they will disrupt CTF 667.2 defensive preparations outside of WELLINGTON.

(3)   It is highly likely that 3 OSC lacks the operational reach to conduct the advance in a single effort. 3 OSC will likely be required to take an operational pause during its advance to WELLINGTON. This will likely occur after the securing of NAPIER.

(4)   COMD 3 OSC's likely end state is that the command has secured the approaches to WELLINGTON and adopted a defensive posture, thereby enabkling the emplacement of TPA A2AD and fires systems in close proximity to WELLINGTON, thereby isolating WELLINGTON and setting conditions for the collapse of SOUTH TORBIA.

(5)   COMD 3 OSC's likely tasks include:

    (a)   Seize VNI in SOUTH TORBIA (PORT OF NAPIER/NEW PLYMOUTH).

    (b)   Destroy 46 Mot Div in CENTRAL PLATEAU and HAWKES BAY.

    (c)   Clear CTF 667.2 from HOROWHENUA and WAIRARAPA.

    (d)   Secure SH1 and SH2 approaches to WELLINGTON.

    (e)   Isolate WELLINGTON from LoCs.

(6)   To achieve these tasks COMD 3 OSC is likely to require 14 - 16 days.

(7)   Limitations include:

    (f)   The majority of TPA equipment is Tier 2 and Tier 3.

    (g)   At best TPA forces can only achieve a readiness state of 80 per cent.

    (h)   TPA logistic shortfalls are likely to cause 3 OSC to take an operational pause after securing CENTRAL PLATEAU and HAWKES BAY.

(8)   COMD 3 OSC's freedom of action will be provided through his employment of enablers such as INFOWAR assets including EW, IADS and drones to enable unrestricted manoeuvre by his tanks and mechanised forces.

(9)   COMD 3 OSC is unlikely to be risk averse and may be prepared to accept high casualty rates IOT achieve his aim and goals.

6. **Assessments.**

a.   The North Torbian air force is capable of achieving local air superiority over occupied territory for short periods.

b.   North Torbian SPF elm will combine with insurgents and criminal elm to establish a kill zones in the 3 OSC disruption zone.

c.   TPA logistics support is poor and 3 OSC will likely face logistics difficulties from D+20 with Cl III and Cl V (Arty).

d.   The DPRT has limited C4ISR capability and or/warhead equipment to conduct real-time TBM targeting of manoeuvre BCT.

e.   The DPRT will ONLY deploy WMD to preserve the Song regime.

ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

7.   **Analysis of the AO and AI.**

f.   Area of Interest (AI). The 1 ANZAC DIV AI includes the airways and land areas of North Island from Cape Reinga in North Torbia to Cape Palliser in South Torbia, the Tasman Sea (west), the Cook Strait (south), and the South Pacific Ocean (east). See Tab A.

g.   Area of Operations (AO). The 1 ANZAC DIV AO, AO APPLE, covers SOUTH TORBIA bounded by PL LION (MDL) in the north, the west coast of SOUTH TORBIA in the West and the east coast of SOUTH TORBIA in the east. Currently 1 ANZAC Div forces are deploying to the AO. See Tab A (Operation Overlay) to Appendix 1 and Appendix 5 (JIPOE) of Annex B (Intelligence).

h.   Terrain.

a. North Island has a 'spine' of mountain ranges running through the middle, with gentle rolling farmland on both sides. Central North Island is dominated by the Volcanic Plateau, an active volcanic and thermal area.

b. Multiple natural hazards exist, resulting from the country's geology, weather, native wildlife, and human activity. While this terrain offers considerable challenges, they are not insurmountable.

c. As the mountainous terrain suggests, North Island lies in an area of active earthquakes and volcanism ringing the Pacific Plate. A major fault line runs through Wellington. Earthquakes are sometimes felt but rarely cause damage.

i.   Weather.

a. North Island lies in the Temperate zone and has a generally mild, invigorating climate although with sharp regional contrasts. The rugged terrain of the country

has a dramatic effect on the weather. Many parts of the country are subject to high winds and rains followed by sharp drops in temperature.

b. January and February are North Island's warmest months with July normally the coldest. Spells of cool, damp weather occur even in the summer, from December through February. Rainy winter days of June, July, and August are interspersed with days of brilliant sunshine and crisp, clear air. October, November, and December are particularly windy months. Winds of 60 mph are not unusual, especially in the Wellington area, and on rare occasions they exceed 100 mph.

THREAT CAPABILITY

8. **Capabilities.**

a. General.

(1) North Torbia maintains the second largest military of the five Pacific countries, behind only Olvana. Militarily it is a dominant actor within the region, capable of conducting military action across the spectrum of operations.

(2) The North Torbian military conducts overt, covert, and clandestine operations with ripple effects across the region. Reporting suggests ties between elements of North Torbia's military and criminal groups within the region that further extends the potential to influence the entire Indo-Pacific region.

b. Land Forces.

(1) The North Torbian People's Army (TPA) is the largest and most influential of the North Torbian Armed Forces. The bulk of the TPA is located within the Northern and Southern Commands.

(2) Doctrinally, North Torbia's Southern Army is designated as the primary offensive force to accomplish the goal of reunifying of the two Torbias. Doctrinally,the TPA Northern Army has multiple roles – providing follow-on forces to a reunification attack, and conducting anti-landing operations on the northern and northeastern coasts.

(3) Due to significant losses in the recent conflict with SOUTH TORBIA and US Military Forces, the TPA has much reduced combat power. The Northern Army has been rendered combat ineffective and is incapable of much more than provision of internal security and the defence of North Torbian sovereign territory. It is unlikely it will be able to support the offensive into South Torbia. The Southern Army has been greatly reduced, but with support from OLVANA has been able to constitute the 3rd OSC consisting of 5th and 6th Mech Divisions (re-equipped with Olvanan Equipment) and 1st Marine Expeditionary Division (1 MED). This formation, with support from SPF will form the bulk of the TPA forces conducting an offensive into South Torbia.

(4) Recent reports indicate that the coastal artillery battalions have been upgraded with land-based long-range anti-ship missiles (most probably YJ-18C) and

SAMs (most probably HQ-9) to enhance North Torbia's A2AD strategy. It is likely these will initially protect North Torbian LoCs before being redeployed to isolate WELLINGTON.

(5)　The 1st Marine Expeditionary Division, with support from the TPN Western Fleet provides an amphibious, access denial/anti-landing, and littoral security capability. It is capable of conducting amphibious operations with up to 1 Bde. It is currently assessed that 1 (MED) is likely the 3 OSC reserve/2nd echelon.

(6)　The ground forces operate primarily TIER 2 equipment, though there is some Tier 3 equipment on active duty. TPA equipment readiness rate is only 80 per cent. Recently, as part of the reconstitution of 3 OSC, Olvana has provided North Torbia with some more modern systems, so the TPA does possess niche Tier 1 capabilities. This may include S-400 SAM systems. Reports also indicate that most of the TPA's EW capability has been updated with Olvanan equipment.

c.　　Naval Forces.

(1)　In recent years, the Torbian People's Navy (TPN) has greatly expanded its maritime capability. The TPN is organised as two fleets with the TPN headquarters located in San Fernando.

(2)　The Eastern fleet is responsible for the security and the defense of the eastern coastal waters. It is capable of conducting blue water operations.

(3)　The Western Fleet is responsible for the security and the defense of western coastal waters and to provide maritime amphibious support to the Marine Expeditionary Division (MED) in the Western Army and an amphibious brigade in each of the Northern and Southern Armies.

(4)　Significant support to the Torbia reunification will likely be provided by the Eastern fleet with the most likely task being the provision of coastal defence for Southern Army coastal defense and surprise attacks in the Philippine Sea.

(5)　There are also reports that at least two North Torbian-flagged container ships have been equipped with container-launched YJ-18C SSM.

d.　　Air Force.

(6)　The Torbian People's Air Force (TPAF) has been rebuilt after its destruction by USAF in the previous conflict and how possesses the ability to strike any targets within the Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO). The TPAF has one squadrons of TU-22M3M bombers kept in strategic reserve and are postured to counter any attack by South Torbia and potential coalition countries contributing to South Torbia's defence.

(7)　The TPAF also has two squadrons of J-11B fighters and two squadrons of SU-30MKK fighter-bombers that have been allocated to support early operational and tactical missions - air interdiction, close air support, and local offensive/defensive counter-air in support of TPA ground units.

9.   **Threat Doctrine.**

a.   North Torbian Army (TPA) ground force doctrine and tactics are heavily influenced by the People's Republic of Olvana and the Republic of Donovia. Due to the historical relationship of North Torbia to Olvana and Donovia, the TPA sends many of its senior NCOs abroad for training to Olvanan and Donovian military training establishments.

b.   Mass and Dispersion. The TPA seeks to concentrate its combat power at the decisive point and time while weighting the main effort. The TPA believes its forces only need a 2:1 force ratio advantage at the decisive point for successful offensive operations. The main effort seeks to operate on a narrow front, while supporting attacks disperse over a wider front to deceive their enemy about where the main attack will occur.

c.   Manoeuvrability. The terrain will canalise ground forces along MSRs. The availability of engineer assets to support maneuverability is limited within the TPA and NTMEF. The TPA uses Olvanan tactics along mobile corridors during offensive operations. Armoured and mechanised forces will likely pace two-thirds of a force forward, in the first echelon, and a little than one-third in its second attack echelon. They will attempt to break through the initial defensive line with its infantry forces, and then pass an armour or mechanised force through the gap in the lines to attack CS/CSS elements in the rear areas. In the defence, the TPA is mostly concerned with the enemy's armoured forces. They concentrate on the destruction of tanks using armour kill zones and a manoeuvre defense. A division in the defense will put approximately one-third of its units along the front lines and five-ninths in the second echelon. The remaining one-ninth of the division will serve as an anti-tank mobile reserve or as the division's counterattack force.

d.   Artillery. There are currently hundreds (estimated to be 200 to 500) of artillery-concealing caves just north of the MDL in North Torbia. These Hardened Artillery Sites (HARTS) are usually tunneled into sides of mountains. An artillery piece, such as the 220-mm Uragan 9P140, can fire from the mouth of the cave and then withdraw into the safety of the mountain to reload. These sites will be used to provide artillery support for an invasion of South Torbia or direct fire against northern cities. Due to their economic difficulties and sanctions it is likely that anywhere up to the 25% are non-functional (lack of parts, repair capabaility, etc.).

e.   Air Defence. Every soldier with a man-portable air defense system is regarded to be an air defence firing unit which provides the opportunity for ambush of enemy aircraft operating at low altitude. Ground units also employ them to set ambushes for enemy helicopters, especially those on routine logistics missions.

f.   Operational Security. The TPA keeps a close hold on all plans while distributing false information to confuse its enemies. OPSEC activities include reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, deception, counterintelligence operations, and conducting operations in inclement weather or darkness. Most of the TPA's night vision equipment is Tier 3.

g.   Adequate logistics. The TPA logistical system may be inadequate to support sustained operations. TPA doctrine calls for each commander to ensure that there are sufficient supplies to successfully complete their missions. Due to the potential supply shortages, most TPA commanders plan to use captured supplies – military and civilian – to

complete their assigned missions. TPA weapon systems such as mortars and artillery are often of a slightly larger calibre than those of their enemy, allowing the TPA to use captured military stores while denying their enemies the same option.

h.   Annihilation. TPA offensive doctrine calls for the complete destruction of enemy formations by continued pursuit, staying close to the enemy to reduce the influence of the enemy's superior artillery and close air support. Continual contact prevents the enemy from withdrawing to regroup for a future attack. The taking of terrain is secondary to the enemy's destruction.

i.   EW. Has practiced EW with several previous attacks against South Torbian GPS, hacking of websites, and attempts to steal digital currency from South Torbian currency.

j.   RISTA. Most UAS capabilities are Tier 2 or 3, but the TPA is in the process of upgrading its fleet to drones that carry cameras capable of providing real-time data back to controllers.

k.   Protection. TPA doctrine expounds maximum use of active and passive camouflage, concealment, and deception in order to prevent the enemy from locating TPA units and important static positions. North Torbia has built extensive underground facilities designed to give it an edge in wartime. More detailed information about North Torbia's Underground Bunkers is attached as Tab E.

l.   CBRN. If desperate the TPA will likely use chemical weapons during their artillery bombardments. The TPA will most likely use non-persistent agents against objectives where their soldiers may need to pass through. In areas where they do not intend to occupy, the delivery of heavy doses of persistent VX nerve agents is likely.

m.   SPF. TPA SPF will likely manoeuvre to rear areas by helicopter, plane, or via a tunnel. The TPA seeks to confuse their opponent by concentrating a force in front of them, while the SPF opens the "second front" in their enemy's rear areas by attacking combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units.

n.   Non-military-Armed Combatants. It is unlikely that any nonmilitary-armed combatants would be found in North Torbia due to gun ownership illegality. Any guns will be found in the hands of the military, the police, or other government officials. If anyone has a gun, they work for the government.

o.   TPA TTP. See Tab D (TTPs) for more detailed information covering TPA TPs.

10.   **Critical Factors Analysis.**

a.   Threat Centre of Gravity.

    (1)   The North Torbian strategic goal of occupying South Torbia is the reunification of the North and South Torbia.

    (2)   At the strategic level, North Torbia will be careful not to portray itself as an occupying aggressor but pitch the reunification story with a carefully crafted INFOWAR campaign. It will challenge the legitimacy of South Torbia, telling its story of liberation and protection of all Torbian peoples. North Torbia will

also use INFOWAR to discredit coalition forces and the South Torbian Defense Forces.

(3) The TPA (with Olvanan military support by proxy) massed sufficient combat power to conduct an integrated attack along a 75km wide front down the TARLAC-MABALACAT-MANILA and CABANATUAN-SAN MIGUEL-MANILA corridors to destroy South Torbian forces with the strategic goal of seizing Manila to force the annexation of South Torbia. The North Torbians will want to achieve this very quickly given their inadequate logistics support system.

b. Critical vulnerabilities.

(1) The terrain will canalise ground forces along MSRs. The availability of engineer assets to support maneuverability is limited within the TPA

(2) Logistics support. The TPA is only capable of sustained operations up to 72 hours. Due to the potential supply shortages, most TPA commanders will plan to use captured supplies – military and civilian – to complete their assigned missions.

(3) Equipment Age and Readiness states. The majority of North Torbian military equipment is TIER 2 or TIER 3. TPA forces have difficulty maintaining an equipment readiness levels above 80 percent. Current readiness levels are assessed at no more than 50 percent.

(4) North Torbian access to Space and Communication Infrastructure. North Torbia is heavily reliant on third party support mainly from Olvana and Donovia.

11. **Friendly critical vulnerabilities analysis.**

a. Friendly Centre of Gravity.

(1) MNFLCC OBA COG is the clearance of DPRT ground forces from the sovereign territory of SOUTH TORBIA, and the re-establishment of pre-war international borders to restore peace and security.

(2) MNFLCC OBA forces will deploy from respective home stations, coordinate operations with higher command, on order attack TPA forces, destroy their offensive, clear them in zone, and reestablish pre-war international border between North and South Torbia. MNFLCC OBA will then restore and maintain security in South Torbia until the legitimate South Torbian government is able to resume this responsibility.

(3) Military conflict is not to escalate beyond what is necessary to reestablish pre-war borders, enemy forces have been destroyed and do not have the capability to conduct offensive operations into South Torbia, security is restored to South Torbia and the legitimate government is accepted by the people allowing it to govern allowing international forces redeploy to home stations.

b. Critical Vulnerabilities.

(1)   Friendly forces and the TPA are at near-peer.

(2)   The terrain will canalise tanks and mechanised forces along MSRs requiring engineer assets to support maneuverability.

(3)   Population densities in rural areas are quite high which could hinder friendly force manoeuvrability and operations.

(4)   The movement of IDPs fleeing south will likely impede friendly force manoeuvrability along MSRs.

(5)   Friendly forces are susceptible to CBF from TPA artillery tubed and rocket artillery.

(6)   There is a lack of AD assets.

Attachments:

Tab A – Overlay
Tab B – Terrain
Tab C – Weather
Tab D – TPA TTP
Tab E – Civil Considerations (to be issued)

OPERATION SWIFT DEFENDER

1 ANZAC DIV OUTLINE PLAN

Phases

1. Prelim: Complete Lodgement of 1 (ANZAC) Div and Estb Def Posns (D-D+12)

2. Phase I – Block TPA Advance in HOROWHENUA/WAIRARAPA and Destroy 5 Mech Div (D+12 – D+24)

3. Phase II – Clear TPA and Secure Cease Fire Line (D+24-D+90)

4. Phase III (O/C) – Clear TPA and Secure MDL (D+90 onwards)

5. Phase IV – Stabilize (D+90 onwards or O/C if Phase 3 conducted)

TPA ML COA PH 1 (D+11-D+20)

Ident: X OSC Comprising:
- 5 Mech Div (70%CE)
- 6 Mech Div (70%CE)
- 1 Mar Div (90% CE)

Msn: Defeat ROTA/CJTF 667.2 IOT annex further ST territory.

Defeat Mechanism: Isolate ROTA/CJTF 667.2 by rapid adv S to WELLINGTON approaches and extension of A2AD bubble thereby denying LoCs to SOUTH TORBIA, forcing concessions at strat level.

Tasks:

- 5 Div.
    - 51 Bde Fix 462 Bde on SH5
    - Isolate 462 Bde for Destruction through conduct of airmobile/infiltration.
    - Secure PORT OF NAPIER.
- 6 Div.
    - 63 Bde fix 913 Bde on TARANAKI IOT enable envelopment by 6 Div.
    - 61 Bde destroy 2/461 and secure SH4 IOT enable bypass of SH1 in Ph 2.
    - 62/64 Bde destroy 3/461 Bde and clear SH1.
- 1 Mar Div.
    - OSC Reserve
    - Follow and Support 6 Div ME
- SPF. ICW TCA disrupt ROTA C2/CSS in depth IOT isolate 46 Mot Div for destruction

Endstate: 46 Mot Div destroyed, Napier Secure, 913 Bde isolated in Taranaki. 5 and 6 Div postured to continued adv S on SH1/SH4 and SH2.

TPA ML COA PH 2 (D+20 - D+24)

Ident: 3 OSC Comprising:
- 5 Mech Div (70%CE)
- 6 Mech Div (70%CE)
- 1 Mar Div (90% CE)

Msn: Defeat ROTA/CJTF 667.2 IOT annex further ST territory.

Defeat Mechanism: Isolate ROTA/CJTF 667.2 by rapid adv S to WELLINGTON approaches and extension of A2AD bubble thereby denying LoCs to SOUTH TORBIA, forcing concessions at strat level.

Phase 2 Tasks:

- 5 Div.
    - Complete destruction of 462 Bde IOT open SH5 GLoCs.
    - Follow and Spt 1 Mar Div
- 6 Div.
    - Adv on SH4 and SH1 IOT secure MANAWATU and isolate ROTA elms in PALMERSTON NORTH.
    - Secure W approach to MANAWATU GORGE IOT open lateral LoCs.
- 1 Mar Div.
    - Adv S on SH2 and secure E approach to MANAWATU GORGE
- SPCF.
    - ICW TCA disrupt ROTA C2/CSS in depth IOT isolate 46 Mot Div for destruction
    - ICW TCA disrupt CTF 667.2 lodgement and deployment into AOs.
    - ICW TCA acquire CTF 667.2 HVTs for strike (fires and direct action)

Endstate: ROTA N of WELLINGTON destroyed or isolated, CTF 667.2 defences pre-empted. LoCs secure for Ph 3.

TPA ML COA PH 3 (D+24 - D+27)

Ident: X OSC Comprising:
- 5 Mech Div (70%CE)
- 6 Mech Div (70%CE)
- 1 Mar Div (90% CE)

Msn: Defeat ROTA/CJTF 667.2 IOT annex further ST territory.

Defeat Mechanism: Isolate ROTA/CJTF 667.2 by rapid adv S to WELLINGTON approaches and extension of A2AD bubble thereby denying LoCs to SOUTH TORBIA, forcing concessions at strat level.

Phase 2 Tasks:

- 5 Div.
    - Follow and Spt 1 Mar Div
- 6 Div.
    - Adv on SH1 and secure approaches to WELLINGTON.
    - Establish A2AD systems vic WELLINGTON IOT Isolate ROTA/CTF 667.2
- 1 Mar Div.
    - Adv S on SH2 and secure RIMUTAKAS approach to WELLINGTON.
    - Establish A2AD systems vic WELLINGTON IOT isolate ROTA/CTF 667.2
- SPF.
    - ICW TCA disrupt CTF 667.2 lodgement and deployment into AOs.
    - ICW TCA acquire CTF 667.2 HVTs for strike (fires and direct action).

Endstate: A2AD systems established within range of WELLINGTON APOD/SPOD, thereby defeating ROTA/CTF 667.2 through isolation.

TPA MD COA

Ident: X OSC Comprising:
- 5 Mech Div (70%CE)
- 6 Mech Div (70%CE)
- 1 Mar Div (90% CE)

Msn: Defeat ROTA/CJTF 667.2 IOT annex further ST territory.

Defeat Mechanism: Isolate ROTA/CJTF 667.2 by rapid adv S to WELLINGTON approaches and extension of A2AD bubble thereby denying LoCs to SOUTH TORBIA, forcing concessions at strat level.

Tasks:

- 5 Div.
  - 51 Bde Fix 462 Bde on SH5
  - Isolate 462 Bde for Destruction through conduct of airmobile/infiltration.
  - Secure PORT OF NAPIER.
- 6 Div.
  - 63 Bde fix 913 Bde on TARANAKI IOT enable envelopment by 6 Div.
  - 61 Bde destroy 2/461 and secure SH4 IOT enable bypass of SH1 in Ph 2.
  - 62/64 Bde destroy 3/461 Bde and clear SH1 to TAIHAPE.
- 1 Mar Div.
  - Seize NAPIER IOT isolate 462 Bde (ROTA)
  - Adv on TAIHAPE-NAPIER ROAD to link up and enable early commencement of adv on SH2, thereby securing E approaches to WELLINGTON by D+12.
  - Follow and Support 6 Div ME
- SPF. ICW TCA disrupt ROTA C2/CSS in depth IOT isolate 46 Mot Div for destruction

Endstate: 46 Mot Div destroyed, Napier Secure, 913 Bde isolated in Taranaki. 6 Div postured to continued adv S on SH1/SH. 1 Mar Div commences early adv on SH2.

ROTA Start State (As at D)

Sit: ROTA remains at 30% overall CE following previous hostilities. 3rd Army remains only CE formation. Intended COA agreed with CJTF 667 is to delay from D-D+12 from Cease Fire Line to BHoL vic PALMERSTON NORTH/DANNEVIRKE. ROTA will then conduct reconstitution IOT then spt 1 (ANZAC) Div offensive ops.

- 1st Army: Undergoing reconstitution vic WELLINGTON utilising equipment provided by coalition and tpt in via SLoCs. Likely to generate 2 x Dic and 1 Mech Bde by D+30 if ALoC/SLoC remain secure. Will then support 1 (ANZAC) Div Ctr Offensive.

- 2nd Army: Destroyed in previous hostilities, unlikely to be cbt effective prior to D+120.

- 3rd Army. Tasked to secure WELLINGTON, and conduct delay defence from cease fire line. Once BHoL undergo reconstitution NLT D+26.
    - 44 Mot Div. Secure Wellington.
    - 46 Mot Div. Delay on SH1 and SH2, Retain PORT OF NAPIER. Deny TAIHAPE to NAPIER ROAD until D+8 IOT mitigate against MDCOA.
    - 913 Mech Bde. Delay on SH4, Retain NEW PLYMOUTH.
    - 468 Tk Bde. Army Reserve.
- Assessment. ROTA likely capable of achieving 12 days of delay but 46 Mot Div/913 Bde likely to be reduced to Bde/Bn str in the process. Threat of envelopment will force abandonment of NAPIER/NEW PLYMOUTH despite GoST political pressures to retain.

CTF 667.2 Prelim (D-D+12)

Sit:

- CTF 667.2 force flow into WELLINGTON continues.
  - HQ 1 (ANZAC) Div – 100%
  - 1 MCB – 100% CE preparing to deploy to HOROWHENUA IOT break clean 46 Mot Div Elms and block 6 Div Adv.
  - 9 MCB – 100% CE preparing to deploy to HAWKES BAY IOT break clean 46 Mot Div Elms and block 1 Mar Div Adv on SH2 to mitigate against MDCOA.
  - 3 MCB – 70% CE, lodgement complete NLT D+ 4, then deploy to EKETAHUNA.
  - 7 MCB – 50 % CE, lodgement complete NLT D+8, then Div Ctr-Atk force.
  - Div Arty – 100% CE.
  - 17 CSS Bde – 100% CE.
  - Div Troops – 100% CE.
  - Combined Avn Regt – 40% CE, lodgement complete NLT D+11.
- CJFMCC. ME is protection of SLoCs IOT enable lodgement of CTF 667.2. TU 667.1.3 (SUBOPAUTH) guarding against NTMEF amphib lodgement in NAPIER (MDCOA).
- CJFACC. ME is protection of ALoCs to enable CTF 667.2 force flow. SE is degradation of TPA IADS in ST territory and strike against NT maritime assets.

CTF 667.2 Phase 1 (D+12 D+24)

Phase 1. Block TPA Advance and Destroy 5 Mech Div.

Purpose: Culminate TPA offensive north IOT deny TPA the ability to emplace A2AD systems vic WELLINGTON and interdict CJTF ALoC/SLoCs. Set conditions for Counter Offensive.

Method:

Decisive. Ctr- Atk to destroy 5 Mech Div (ICW CJFACC) in div EA.

Shaping.
- Prov Clean Break to wdr 3rd Army elms IOT protect ROTA cbt power for use in Ph 2 and strengthen GoST resolve.
- Block 6 Mech Div adv on SH1 axis IOT deny ability to emplace A2AD systems and isolate from 1 Mar Div and 5 Mech Div.
- Delay and Culminate 1 Mar Div on SH2 axis North of EKETAHUNA IOT draw 5 Mech Div passage of lines.
- Degrade TPA C2/CSS/GBAD IOT enable decisive.
- Contain 5 Mech Div in Div EA IOT conduct ctr-atk.

Sustaining.
- Protect GLoCs.
- Support ROTA 1st Army reconstitution.

CTF 667.2 Phase 2 (D+24-D+90)

Phase 2. Clear TPA and Secure Cease Fire Line.

Purpose: Disintegrate TPA C2, thereby enabling securing of the Cease Fire Line and setting conditions for Ph 3 operations by denying ability to constitute an effective force.

Method:

Decisive. Destruction of 1 Mar Div in HAWKES BAY, thereby enabling envelopment of remaining TPA south of CEASE FIRE LINE.

Shaping.
- Pursue 1 Mar Div on SH2 axis IOT degrade ability to develop defensive posns.
- ICW ROTA isolate 6 Mech Div from 1 Mar Div IOT enable destruction of 1 Mar Div and envelopment via TAIHAPE-NAPIER ROAD.
- Block 6 Mech Div Wdr on SH1 IOT turn onto SH3.
- Clear 6 Mech Div from MANAWATU IOT turn onto SH3.
- ICW ROTA/CJFACC neutralise 6 Mech Div C2/CSS/Fires when wdr on SH3.
- Secure PORT OF NAPIER/NEW PLYMOUTH.
- Secure Cease Fire Line

Sustaining.
- Protect GLoCs.
- BPT estb APOD/SPOD at NAPIER/NEW PLYMOUTH.
- Redeploy DSA to spt offensive ops.
- Support ROTA 2nd Army reconstitution.

CTF 667.2 Phase 3 (O/C)

Phase 3. Clear TPA and Secure Military Demarcation Line.

Purpose: Clear TPA from sovereign territory, rapidly secure VNI, and secure MDL.

Method:

Decisive. Clear and Secure HAMILTON, thereby isolating remaining TPA elms for destruction and providing depth to def posns on MDL.

Shaping.
- Pursue 1 Mar Div (-) on SH1 IOT degrade cbt power and deny ability to constitute defense of HAMILTON.
- Seize PORT OF TAURANGA IOT protect GoST VNI.
- Clear 6 Mech Div on SH4 IOF CJFACC to interdict wdr.
- Secure MDL.

Sustaining.
- Protect GLoCs.
- BPT estb APOD/SPOD at TAURANGA.
- Redeploy DSA to spt offensive ops.
- Support ROTA 2nd Army reconstitution.

CDP: Initiation of Ph 3 is a GoST/Coalition strat decision point. Criteria to be developed but likely:
- Favourable combat ratios between CJTF 667/ROTA and TPA to enable offensive operations.
- NT WMD unlikely to be utilised.
- Olvana not likely to intervene with cbt troops to spt NT.

CTF 667.2 Phase 4 (O/C)

Phase 3. Conduct STABOPs

Purpose: Rest GoST legitimacy and security to previously occupied areas south of the Cease Fire Line.

Method:

Decisive. Control 1 (ANZAC) Div AO.

Shaping.
- Promote and develop GoST legitimacy.
- Neutralise TCA
- Support ROTA regeneration.
- Deter TPA incursion across CEASE FIRE LINE.

Sustaining.
- Protect GLoCs.
- BPT redeploy DSA.
- Secure VNI.

Note: Initiation of Ph 4 is a GoST/Coalition strat decision point. Current G5 plan for conducting stabops at conclusion of Ph 2 or Ph3 but security of MDL resp of ROTA shown to left. G5 is preparing conplan for a Ph 4 where CTF 667.2 conducts stabops and deter vic WAIKATO/BAY OF PLENTY.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT – OPERATION SWIFT DEFENDER

ANNEX E TO
1 ANZAC DIV OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

References:

A.   ADDP 3.1 Joint Fires & Effects, dated 03 AUG 20
B.   MC 362/1 NATO Rules of Engagement (ROE), dated 27 JUN 03
C.   ADDP 06.4 Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), dated 11 MAY 06
D.   Fourth Geneva Convention, dated 12 AUG 1949

1.   **General Principles.**

a.   Introduction. 1 ANZAC DIV is conducting strategic operations in South Torbia as part of CJTF 667, and as such is subject to the general regulations and guidance promulgated by the NATO ROE and the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) outlined within this Annex. The purpose of ROE is to regulate the application of military force consistent with Australian Government policies and legal obligations. 1 ANZAC DIV and all attached force elements encompassed under the CJTF 667 as part of OP SWIFT DEFENDER (OSD) are mandated by provisions within this document.

b.   Authority. The authority providing the legal framework for OSD is set out in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, South Torbia (ROT) has exercised its inherent right to self-defence detailed in Ref. A following the active hostilities and lodgment of the Democratic People's Republic of Torbia (DPRT) forces within its sovereign territory. The declaration enacted by ROT, and mandated by the UN provides authority for 1 ANZAC DIV under the provision of a declared International Armed Conflict (IAC) to take all necessary measures to carry out strategic military action up to and including the use of lethal force bound by the principles of International Law. This authorises the use of all lesser degrees of force permitted by law. Further directives regulating the use of force and activities connected to the use of force during the conduct of OSD are specified in Para. (2). Further information contained within Annex AA – Legal to 1 ANZAC DIV OPORD.

c.   ROE Definition. ROE are directives that define the circumstances, conditions, degree and manner, in which force or actions, which might be construed as provocative, may or may not be applied or taken. The ROE implemented for this operation provide the sole authority for 1 ANZAC DIV to use force. Although the ROE do not limit the inherent right of self-defence, different national approaches to the definition of self-defence may result in inconsistency between multinational forces as to where the right to use force in self-defence ends and the use of force authorised by the mission ROE begins. The ROE provides authoritative guidance on the use of military force by the ADF and NZDF as part of a multi-national force. They outline and emphasise the critical aspects of the laws of war relevant to CJTF 667.

d. <u>Geographical Application of the ROE.</u> These ROE apply within the geographical boundaries of the Area of Operations (AO) as defined in the 1 ANZAC DIV OPORD at Para. 1. a. (1) and (2).

e. <u>Self-Defence.</u> It is universally recognised that individuals and units have a right to defend themselves against attack or imminent attack.

> (1) All Force Elements (FEs) of CJTF 667 are authorised to use deadly force against persons posing an imminent threat to life. Nothing in these ROE negates the right of individual self-defence. Nothing in these ROE negates a commander's right to take all necessary and appropriate action in unit self-defence.

> (2) Within the general concept of self-defence, members of 1 ANZAC DIV have the right to use force that is necessary and proportional to defend civilians accompanying 1 ANZAC DIV, including UN personnel, and civilians who have been taken hostage by hostile forces.

f. <u>Extended Self-defence.</u> Ref B stipulates, "In keeping with the principles of the Alliance, within the general concept of self-defence, Coalition/Coalition-led forces and personnel also have the right to take appropriate measures, including the use of necessary and proportional force to defend other Coalition/Coalition-led forces and personnel from attack or from imminent attack". "Coalition led forces" include any 1 ANZAC DIV forces OPCON, TACOMD or TACON (for the time being) to CJTF 667.

g. <u>Application of ROE and the Use of Force.</u> Within this coalition for OSD, ROE are authorised by CJTF 667. The chain of command is therefore responsible to disseminate the ROE, ensure understanding, request clarifications and, seek amendments as required. The chain of command also assumes the responsibility to ensure compliance and determine incompatibilities. During the conduct of the operation the use of force principles described in Para. (2). (b) lines 1-4 will apply.

h. <u>Applicable Law.</u> The ROE applies principles of international law. The 1 ANZAC DIV's mission must be communicated and correctly perceived as being lawfully mandated by the UN. COMD CJTF 667 will engage with non-military entities mitigating any incorrect perception of Troop contributing nations (TCNs) of the Indo-Pacific Anti-Nuclear Alliance (IPANA) Coalition presence in the JFAO. Simultaneously, coordinating efforts will be conducted at the strategic level, communicating the legitimacy of this UN-mandated joint force operation.

> (1) <u>International Law.</u> The conduct of 1 ANZAC DIV is circumscribed by international law, including the applicable principles derived from the LOAC. When applicable, members of 1 ANZAC DIV also have a responsibility to obey other International treaties that affect military operations. In particular, 1 ANZAC DIV personnel must comply with the LOAC principles: distinction, military necessity, avoidance of unnecessary suffering and proportionality referenced in 2.(b) lines (1) to (4).

(2) <u>National Laws.</u> TCNs are to adhere to their national laws. They are not obliged to execute tasks or operations that would constitute a breach of their national laws. Therefore, nations must issue national restrictions, caveats and/or clarifying instructions to their members, COMD CJTF 667 and coalition partners in order to ensure compliance with national law. Any such national clarifying instructions must not be more permissive than the ROE. The normal mechanisms for notification of such national restrictions and/or clarifying instructions are FORCEPREP/Order of Battle Transfer of Authority (ORBATTOA) messages.

    (a) In the case of sending enabling forces to the CJTF 667 AO, TCN must communicate their caveats prior to deployment, facilitating an initial package of ROE being implemented for theater enablers.

    (b) Where nations have expressed caveats on involvement or the use of force, such caveats will be summarized and the resultant impact on the mission identified. The full range of national caveats held by 1 ANZAC DIV must be communicated to the operational level, analysed and applied as soon as possible. CJTF 667 Point of Contact (POC) for this activity is the CJ35.

2. **1 ANZAC DIV Authorised ROE**

a.   <u>General Outline and Application.</u> All members of 1 ANZAC DIV regardless of rank understand their individual responsibility and legal obligation to comply with the ROE and LOAC and ensure that it is complied with by all 1 ANZAC DIV FEs. All incidents or breaches are to be reported and investigated.

b. <u>Use of Force.</u> Use of force up to and including lethal force in the JFAO during the conduct of OSD is authorised for use by 1 ANZAC DIV whilst undertaking military actions in considering it complies with the fundamental principles of LOAC according to Ref. C ADDP 06.4 Law of Armed Conflict.

    (1) <u>Distinction.</u> Combat elements of 1 ANZAC DIV must distinguish between enemy forces engaged in active hostilities and civilians, and between military objects and civilian objects. Force elements may only engage enemy personnel actively participating and positively identified as combatants engaging in hostile acts or displaying hostile intent and military objects such as vehicles, equipment and structures.

    (2) <u>Military Necessity.</u> The principle of Military Necessity requires the 1 ANZAC DIV to engage in only those acts necessary to accomplish a legitimate military objective. It permits the killing of enemy combatants and other persons whose death is unavoidable. It permits the destruction of property if that destruction is imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. Destruction of property as an end in itself is a violation of International Law. Further detail in (h) Military objectives definition.

(3)   <u>Avoidance of unnecessary suffering.</u> The principle of avoiding unnecessary suffering forbids the use of means or methods of warfare which are calculated to cause suffering which is excessive in the circumstances. It has also been expressed as averting the infliction of suffering, injury or destruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military objectives. Further detail in (e) (1) Weapons not permitted.

(4)   <u>Proportionality,</u> The principle of proportionality provides a link between the concepts of military necessity and unnecessary suffering. In simple terms, the principle generally relates to the reduction of incidental injuries caused by military operations and requires that the losses and damage resulting from military action must be proportionate (i.e. not be excessive) in relation to the anticipated military advantage. The proportionality principle, together with the unnecessary suffering principle, dictates that civilians must not be made the object of attack, and that while civilian casualties may be an inevitable consequence of an attack, every effort must be made to spare them, and other parties who are non-combatants, from becoming adversely affected.

c. <u>Target definition.</u> A target is an entity or object that can be subjected to an effect. The desired effect to be generated from taking action against a target is designed to contribute to an operation. A target is considered for actions such as capture, exploit, influence, neutralise or destroy. Targets may include a geographic area, an installation, a force, equipment, an individual, a group or an entire system.

d. <u>Targeting directives.</u> Targeting is the process of identifying targets for possible engagement and determining the attack system to capture, destroy, degrade or neutralise them. The application of force by 1 ANZAC DIV during the conduct of OSD must take into account particular national and strategic objectives, operational requirements and capabilities, and international and domestic law.

e. <u>Effects.</u>

   (1) <u>Kinetic-lethal.</u> Kinetic-lethal effects include all kinetically delivered capabilities IOT achieve a lethal effect against a target. When employing lethal kinetic effects such as Guided munitions or Indirect fires, a Collateral Damage Estimate (CDE) and Battle damage assessment (BDA) are required before any deliberate effect is approved by CJTF 667.

   (2) <u>Non-kinetic lethal.</u> Non-kinetic effects comprise the use of a non-kinetically delivered capability IOT achieve a lethal effect against a target. Approval to proceed with a non-kinetic lethal effect against a target is still subject to a CDE and BDA progressed through CJTF 667 in accordance with protocols established for Kinetic-lethal effects.

   (3) <u>Weapons not permitted.</u> Certain weapons are prohibited for use in warfare and not permitted for use by 1 ANZAC DIV. The list of non-permitted weapons below is not exhaustive, however, all principles and guidelines of avoidance of unnecessary suffering must be adhered to. Further detail contained in Appendix (1) Defensive ROE Phase 0 to IV and (2) Offensive ROE Phase 0 to IV.

      (a) <u>CBRN weapons.</u> CBRN weapons of any kind are not permitted for use by and FEs of CJTF 667. This includes Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other gasses excluding CS gas. Bacteriological and Biological weapons are also forbidden.

      (b) <u>Non-detectable fragments.</u> Weapons in which the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments which in the human body escape detection by X-rays.

      (c) <u>Victim detonated land mines.</u> The Protocol prohibits the use of land mines, remotely delivered mines, or booby traps to kill civilians or to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering to soldiers. This includes Anti-pers mines, anti-tank mines and booby traps. Excludes M18 Claymore directional mines.

(d) Incendiary weapons. Refers to any weapon or munition which is primarily designed to set fire to objects or cause burn injury to people through the action of flame, heat or a combination of both produced by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered on a target. Thermobaric devices,Para flares, tracer ammunition, smoke grenades or signaling flares are exempt.

(e) Expanding Ordinance. Weapons such as irregularly shaped bullets, projectiles filled with broken glass, bullets which have been scored, have had their ends filed, have been altered or which have been smeared with any substance likely to exacerbate a trauma injury are prohibited. Hollow point bullets (those with a hard envelope that does not entirely cover the core or which have been pierced with incisions or which have had their points filed off) fall within this category of weapon.

(f) Poison. Poison or poisoned weapons are illegal because of their potential to be indiscriminate. For example, the poisoning or contamination of any source of drinking water is prohibited and the illegality is not cured by posting a notice that the water has been so contaminated or poisoned.

(g) Laser Weapons. Laser weapons are prohibited from use where they are specifically designed to cause permanent blindness. Although the use of lasers such as the LAIRD and LAID, PEC-15, NAD is not prohibited, precautions must be taken when using laser systems for other purposes in order to avoid causing permanent blindness.

(h) Environmental altering weapons. Environmental modification techniques having widespread, long lasting or severe effects are prohibited for use by 1 ANZAC DIV. Examples include defoliant chemicals (such as agent orange) used to deprive the enemy of ground cover or kill food crops. These chemicals are indiscriminate and difficult to contain, often resulting in effects to water supplies and creation of toxins dangerous to humans.

f. Personnel. There will be a large number of personnel operating within the JFAO. Prior to any engagement, they must be positively identified as enemy forces or combatants. More information detailed in (g) Hostile intent definition and Appendix (AD) to 1 ANZAC DIV OPORD – Prisoner of War and Captured Personnel handling policy.

(1) Enemy combatants. The primary belligerents in the JFAO will comprise of conventional and unconventional forces of the Torbian People's Army (TPA) specifically NTMEF, 6TH MECH DIV (APC), and 5th Mech Div (IFV) supported by the North Torbian Special Purpose Forces (NTSPF) and members of the TCA. Enemy combatants constitute legitimate military targets and use of force against enemy forces is authorised. Further detail Appendix (1) Defensive ROE Phase 0 to IV and (2) Offensive ROE Phase 0 to IV.

(2) Civilian Contractors. Civilian contractors, maintenance crews or mercenaries may be accompanying hostile armed forces and present within the JFAO during the

conduct of OSD. Civilian contractors/personnel accompanying hostile forces, taking part in hostile acts or displaying hostile intent constitute legitimate military targets. Further detail contained in Appendix (1) Defensive ROE Phase 0 to IV and (2) Offensive ROE Phase 0 to IV.

(3) <u>Irregular Groups.</u> Armed Militia or Guerilla groups may be present within the JFAO during the conduct of OSD. Non-state and Irregular actors engaging in hostile acts or displaying hostile intent constitute legitimate military targets. Further detail contained in Appendix (1) Defensive ROE Phase 0 to IV and (2) Offensive ROE Phase 0 to IV.

(4) <u>Civilians.</u> Civilian personnel in the JFAO are considered non-combatants and are protected, they must not be attacked. A civilian is only afforded special protection as a non-combatant if they do not participate in any hostile acts or display hostile intent. Further detail contained in (i.) Civilians and civilian objects.

g. <u>Hostile intent definition.</u> Hostile intent is the threat of the imminent use of force. A determination of hostile intent is based on the existence of an identifiable threat recognisable on the basis of both capability and intention. In determining whether an entity is demonstrating hostile intent, FEs will use their best judgment and consider available intelligence, political and military factors, indications and warnings, and all other relevant information concerning the capabilities of possible threats in the JFAO.

h. <u>Military Objectives definition.</u> In Ref D, Protocol 1, Art 52 to the Geneva Conventions 1945 defines a military objective as "military objectives are limited to those objects which, by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage." All targeting is to be IAW these guidelines.

i. <u>Civilians and civilian objects.</u> Civilian Infrastructure including medical and religious objects are protected from attacks. This includes logistical infrastructure such as bridges, roads, rail, ports, airports, and telecommunications infrastructure.

(1) Enemy Military religious and medical personnel, objects and equipment are also afforded special protection under these provisions provided they clearly display a Red cross or crescent and are not taking part in active hostilities. If civilian infrastructure is being used for military purposes by hostile forces, all protections are void. Particular care must be taken in the targeting of these sites.

(2) Civilian Logistical infrastructure being utilised by enemy forces in the conduct of their strategic objectives such as the items listed are considered to be legitimate military targets. Any infrastructure that makes an effective contribution to enemy military action such as local communications networks and power stations are considered military objects. Engagement of sensitive targets is subject to the Sensitive Target Approval and Review process (STAR) processed by CJTF 667.

j. <u>Offensive Support/Joint fires.</u> The Joint fires and effects coordination centre (JFECC) is responsible for the employment and coordination of joint fires encompassing IW, EW, Cyber, Naval surface fire support, Fire support from ground based weapon systems excluding small arms, air-to-surface attack. The JFECC is the POC for employment of these assets. Further information is contained within Annex F to 1 ANZAC DIV OPORD – Joint Fires, Targeting and Effects.

k. <u>Hors de combat definition.</u> Hors de combat is a term used in international law to refer to military personnel who are incapable of performing their duties during war. Examples include persons parachuting from their disabled aircraft, as well as the sick, wounded, detained or otherwise disabled. Combatants who are Hors de combat are not taking part in

hostile acts or displaying hostile intent and must be dealt with IAW the LOAC and ROE. Further detail in (n) Detention.

l. Protection of Persons and Property with Designated Special Status. Pursuant to Article 8 (1) (b) of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Medical and religious personnel, military hospitals, medical units, medical transports and medical material marked with red cross or crescent are protected unless being used for military purposes. Special provisions protect Historic, Cultural or religious sites of significance from attack unless being used by hostile forces for military purposes. A STAR is required for processing by CJTF 667 before any attack on protected sites is authorised.

m. Special instructions.

   (1) The No Strike List (NSL) is a list of entities that are protected from the effects of military operations under international law and/or rules of engagement. Objects or entities on the NSL cannot be nominated for action without further approval. If an attack on an entity or object is required to accomplish a strategic or military objective, a STAR must be raised to CJTF 667 for approval prior to the commencement of any attack.

   (2) Warning shots are not authorised for use against any targets in any circumstances by 1 ANZAC DIV.

      (a) **NZ NATIONAL CAVEAT.** NZ troops are authorized to utilize warning shots IAW national direction.

n. Detention. Combatants who are incapacitated (hors de combat) or surrender and are not engaging in hostile acts or displaying hostile intent must not be attacked. After detention, they must be treated humanely and handed off to a designated theatre CPERS collection point at the earliest practical opportunity. Further information is detailed in Appendix (AD) to 1 ANZAC DIV OPORD – Prisoner of War and Captured Personnel handling policy.

o. ROE Request /Authorisation and Implementation Procedure. Whenever ROE is believed to be unclear, clarification must be sought from higher headquarters. Any deviation from the approved ROE for 1 (ANZAC) Div, including Rules of Engagement Request (ROEREQ), Rules of Engagement Authorisation (ROEAUTH) and Rules of Engagement Implementation (ROEIMP) must engage the Target Engagement Authority (TEA) being either the CJTF or CJOPS.

p. Dissemination. The ROE for 1 ANZAC DIV will be appropriately classified to allow dissemination to all TCN. The full ROE and use of force guidance might contain sensitive material, publication of which could harm operations. 1 ANZAC DIV ROE authorisation must be accompanied by guidance in the form of a Political Policy Statement (PPS).The PPS will be complemented by Political Policy Indicators (PPIs).

q. Other Considerations. The instructions outlined below are amplifying mission-specific guidance based on international law, but must only be undertaken pursuant to 1 ANZAC DIV authorised ROE.

r.   Riot Control Means (RCM). RCM must not be used as a means of warfare. RCM may only be used at the discretion of the Appropriate Commander in the following circumstances:

   (1)   To protect the safety of 1 ANZAC DIV personnel, HN, IO, governmental organisations and / or NGO or Person with Designated Special Status (PDSS); or

   (2)   To protect the property of 1 ANZAC DIV, HA, IO, governmental organisations, NGO or PDSS; or

   (3)   Care must be taken to ensure less than lethal munitions and weapons are used correctly IAW relevant doctrine to minimise the chance of inflicting permanent injury or death.

s.   Prevention of Serious Crimes. The use of minimum force, up to and including the use of deadly force, may be used to prevent serious crimes (which includes trafficking in Human Beings) against a person, including civilian, who unlawfully commits, or is about to commit, an act which endangers life of PDSS or coalition forces, or is likely to cause serious bodily harm, in circumstances where there is no other way to prevent the act. The use of minimum force includes the authority to detain the person. All use of force in the prevention of serious crimes must be reported through the chain of command at the earliest opportunity.

t.   Soldiers' Cards. All 1 ANZAC DIV members must carry a Soldiers' Card issued by the relative Component Command or national authorities adhering to this ROE. TCN may issue translations of the Soldiers' Card issued by the Component Commands. The TCN Soldiers' Card may include national clarifying instructions in accordance with the main body of this Annex. The nationally authorised Soldiers' Card, translations of Soldiers' Card or any clarifying instructions must be developed in consultation with or disclosed to COMD 1 ANZAC DIV. No nationally authorised Soldiers' Card will permit a wider use of force than authorised by this ROE.

u.   Avoidance of Collateral Damage. In all cases, every effort must be made to minimise, to the maximum extent possible, any loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects resulting from the use of force. Collateral damage is incidental to military action and must not be excessive or disproportionate to the military advantage to be gained from the specific attack. A CDE is required before any deliberate action on a target.

v.   Prohibition against Reprisals. The punitive use of force is prohibited.

w.   Duty to Report. Each situation resulting in a detention, or involving the use of deadly force, or use of riot control means (if authorised), whether it results in casualties or not, is to be reported through the chain of command as soon as possible.

x.   Right to Position Defence. The use of force is authorised to defend a position. Further detail in Appendix 1 – Defensive ROE for Phase 0 to IV Operations.

y. <u>ROE for Open Sources.</u> Bringing ROE into the open discourse may become beneficial for many reasons (e.g. STRATCOM). Because ROE contain sensitive information, the release of which could be harmful to the mission, CJTF 667 may indicate what information is releasable to the public, parallel to ROEAUTH message, by giving guidance on Public Information (PI) policy concerning release of ROE.

ATTACHMENTS:

Appendix 1   Defensive ROE for Phase IV Operations
Appendix 2   Offensive ROE for Phase I-III Operations

DEFENSIVE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

References:

A.   MC 362/1 NATO Rules of Engagement dated 27 June 2003

B.   Status of Forces Agreement – Australia/South Torbia dated 11 April 2006

1.   The following ROE are issued under the authority of COMD CJTF 667. They have been developed and approved in consultation with the IBSAF and the Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) and are based on ROE under reference A.

2.   The ROE listed below have been designed to encompass deterrence and defensive operations by South Torbian and CJTF 667forces during OSD.

3. **Defence of Forces.**

a.   90. – The use of force up to and including deadly force for individuals and unit self defence against attack or an imminent attack is authorised. In exercising this right, individuals and units will act in accordance with national law.

b.   91. – The use of force for the defence of military property against attack or an imminent attack is authorised in accordance with national law.

c.   92. – The use of force, up to and including deadly force for the protection of South Torbian Forces and South Torbian law enforcement members stationed within the landmass of South Torbia is authorised.

d.   93.– The use of force up to and including deadly force for the defence of civilians accompanying CJTF 667forces and NGA Personnel against attack or an imminent attack is authorised. In exercising this right, individuals and units are to act in accordance with national law.

4. **Geographic Positioning of Forces.**

a.   100. – Except as otherwise authorised under Rule 101, entry into the landmass, territorial waters or airspace of North Torbia is prohibited.

b.   101. – Entry into the landmass, airspace and territorial waters of North Torbia for the purposes of conducting combat search and rescue operations is authorised.

c.   103. – Entry into the landmass, territorial waters or airspace of South Torbia can be authorised by COMD CJTF 667under reference B, which can be delegated.

d. 104. – Entry into the landmass, territorial waters or airspace of any other nation State is by consent of that State, which is to be obtained by CJTF 667.

5. **Prevention of Boarding, Detention, or Seizure of South Torbian or CJTF 667Property.**

a. 132. – The use of force, up to and including deadly force to prevent the boarding, detention or seizure of CJTF 667military, South Torbia military or civilian vessels, aircraft or vehicles containing people is authorised.

6. **Intervention in Non-Military Activities.**

a. 140. – Intervention in North Torbian flagged non-military maritime shipping to enforce the provisions of UNSCR 8869 is authorised.

b. 143. – The use of force, up to and including disabling fire to interdict North Torbian flagged shipping vessels within the designated CJTF 667Area of Operations (AO) is authorised.

c. 145. – The use of non-deadly force to detain persons for force protection purposes in South Torbia is authorised.

d. 146.– The use of non-deadly force, to disarm persons is authorised.

e. 147. – The use of non-deadly force to prevent the escape of unarmed individuals for force protection purposes is authorised.

7. **Warnings.**

a. 152. – The use of warning bursts by 1 ANZAC DIV and South Torbian air assets is prohibited.

b. 153. – The use of warning shots by 1 ANZAC DIV forces is prohibited. **NATIONAL CAVEAT: NZ Troops are authorized to use warning shots IAW nationa direction.**

c. 154.– The use of warning shots by CJTF 667maritime assets is permissible as this is seen as not using force under international maritime laws.

8. **Diversions.**

a. 161.– The ordering of diversions to all commercial and merchant shipping and aircraft for force protection purposes is authorised.

b. 164. – The ordering of diversions to any aircraft to enforce the provisions of the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) is authorised.

9. **Boarding, Detention or Seizure.**

a. 171.– Whether unopposed, uncooperative or opposed, the boarding of North Torbian flagged civilian vessels for the purposes of inspection in compliance with UNSCR 8869 is authorised.

b. 172.– Unopposed and uncooperative Boarding operations will be conducted under the provisions of Annex D of reference A.

c. 173. – Rule 143 can be relied on to facilitate opposed boardings under Rule 171.

d. 174. - The boarding of any commercial or merchant shipping vessel within the AO to determine if there has been a contravention of the arms and economic embargo established under UNSCR 8869 is authorised.

e.   181. – The detention and/or seizure of North Torbian military vessels, aircraft, vehicles, personnel, goods, cargos and/or equipment within the landmass or territorial waters of South Torbia is authorised.

f.   182 - The detention and/or seizure of Irregular Groups vessels, aircraft, vehicles, personnel, goods, cargos and/or equipment within the landmass or territorial waters of South Torbia is authorised.

g.   183. – Following the boarding of North Torbian flagged civilian vessels for inspection under Rule 171, any vessels in contravention of UNSCR 8869 is authorised to be detained and/or seized, as well as any personnel, goods, cargos and/or equipment for the purposes of enforcement of UNSCR 8869

h.   185. - Should there be compelling evidence to suggest non-conformity with the provisions of UNSCR 8869, any vessel within the CJTF 667proceeding to or from a seaport of North Torbia may be boarded, diverted, detained and/or or seized.

10. **Illumination.**

a.   221. – The illumination of suspected North Torbian Armed Forces and Irregular Groups vessels, aircraft personnel, and equipment by white light, spotlight, projectiles, or infrared means is authorised.

b.   222. - The use of laser target markers against North Torbian Armed Forces vessels, aircraft, personnel, and equipment is authorised.

c.   223. – The use of illumination for harassment operations is prohibited.

11. **Identification of Targets.**

a.   232. – Potential targets are to be identified by visual means (this may include video footage from UAS and other remote systems) **and** by one or more of the following means: IFF (or other systems that require a response from an unidentified unit); electro-optical; electronic warfare support measure; track behaviour, flight plan correlation; thermal imaging; acoustic intelligence; or other secure active/passive systems not requiring a positive response from an unidentified unit prior to an engagement.

12. **Prohibited Use of Certain Weapons.**

a.   350. – The use of riot control agents by 1 ANZAC DIV against military threats is prohibited.

b.   351. – The use of anti-personnel mines by 1 ANZAC DIV forces is prohibited.

c.   352. – The use of cluster munitions and explosive and non-explosive booby traps by 1 ANZAC DIV is prohibited.

d.   353.– The use of weapons of mass destruction to include chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear by CJTF 667is prohibited.

13. **Information Operations**

a.   361. – The control of North Torbian military information distribution mechanisms with the intent to disrupt and deny North Torbian command and control nodes is authorised.

b.   367. – The use of electronic warfare measures by CJTF 667is authorised.

c.   368.– Psychological operations directed against North Torbian military forces and Irregular Groups is authorised.

d.   369.– The use of physical military deception through the use of dummies and/or decoy equipment by CJTF 667 Forces is authorised.

14. **Use of Electronic Countermeasures (ECM).**

a.   374. The unrestricted use of ECM against North Torbian military targets and Irregular Groups is authorised.

15. **Air Operations.**

a.   400. – The use of air-to-surface and sub-surface munitions against targets belonging to the North Torbian Armed Forces is permitted.

b.   400a.- The use of air-to-surface and sub-surface munitions against Irregular Groups engaging in hostile acts or displaying hostile intent is permitted.

c.   401. – The use of precision-guided air-to-surface munitions within the JFAO is authorised.

d.   402. - Beyond visual range air-to-air engagement is permitted as long as the criteria laid out in ROE 232 are met.

OFFENSIVE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Reference:

A. MC 362/1 NATO Rules of Engagement dated 27 June 2003

1.   The following ROE are issued under the authority of COMD CJTF 667. They have been developed and approved in consultation with the CJTF 667 and the Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) and are based on extant ROE issued under reference A.

2.   The ROE listed below are designed to encompass combat operations by South Torbian Defense Forces and 1(ANZAC) Division

3. **Defence of Forces.**

a.   90. – The use of force up to and including deadly force for individuals and unit self defence against attack or an imminent attack is authorised. In exercising this right, individuals and units will act in accordance with national law.

b.   91. – The use of force for the defence of military property against attack or an imminent attack is authorised in accordance with national law.

c.   92. – The use of force, up to and including deadly force for the protection of South Torbian Defense Forces and South Torbian law enforcement members stationed within the landmass of South Torbia is authorised.

d.   93. – The use of force up to and including deadly force for the defence of civilians accompanying CJTF 667 forces, UN Personnel against attack or an imminent attack is authorised. In exercising this right, individuals and units will act in accordance with national law.

4. **Geographic Positioning of Forces.**

a.   100. – Except as otherwise authorised under Rule 101, entry into the landmass, territorial waters or airspace of North Torbia (NT) is prohibited.

b.   101. – Entry into the landmass, airspace and territorial waters of NT for the purposes of conducting combat search and rescue operations is authorised.

c.   103. – Entry into the landmass, territorial waters or airspace of South Torbia is authorised by COMD ICJTF 667 which can be delegated.

5. **Prevention of Boarding, Detention, or Seizure of South Torbian or CJTF 667 Property.**

a.   132 – The use of force, up to and including deadly force, to prevent the boarding, detention or seizure of CJTF 667 military, South Torbian military or civilian vessels under contract, carrying people is authorised.

6. **Intervention in Non-Military Activities.**

a.   140. – Intervention in NT flagged non-military maritime shipping to enforce the provisions of UNSCR 8869 is authorised.

b.   143. – The use of force, up to and including disabling fire, to interdict NT flagged vessels is authorised.

c.   145. – The use of non-deadly force to detain persons for force protection purposes in South Torbia is authorised.

d.   146. – The use of force non-deadly force, to disarm persons for force protection purposes in South Torbia is authorised.

e.   147. – The use of non-deadly force to prevent the escape of unarmed individuals for force protection purposes is authorised.

f.   148. – Intervention in South Torbian civilian law enforcement activities is prohibited.

7. **Warnings.**

a.   152. – The use of warning bursts by Australian air assets is prohibited.

b.   153. – The use of warning shots by 1 ANZAC DIV forces is prohibited.

c.   154.– The use of warning shots by CJTF 667 maritime assets is permissible as this is seen as not using force under international maritime laws.

8. **Diversions.**

a.   161. – The ordering of diversions to all commercial and private vessels, aircraft, vehicles, and persons for force protection purposes is authorised.

b.   162. – The use of force non-deadly force, to compel compliance with the ordering of diversions to all commercial and private vessels, aircraft, vehicles, and persons for force protection purposes is authorised.

9. **Boarding, Detention or Seizure.**

a.   171. – Whether unopposed, uncooperative or opposed, the boarding of NT flagged civilian vessels for the purposes of inspection in compliance with UNSCR 8869 is authorised.

b.   172. – Unopposed and uncooperative boarding operations will be conducted under the provisions of Annex D of Reference A.

c.   173. – Rule 143 can be relied on to facilitate opposed boardings under Rule 171.

d.   174. – The boarding of any commercial or merchant shipping vessel within the CJTF 667 AO to determine if there has been a contravention of the arms and economic embargo established under UNSCR 8869 is authorised.

e. <u>181.</u> – The detention and/or seizure of NT military vessels, aircraft, vehicles, personnel, goods, cargos and/or equipment within the landmass or territorial waters of South Torbia is authorised.

f. <u>182.</u> – The detention and/or seizure of Irregular Groups' engaging in hostile acts or displaying hostile intent vessels, aircraft, vehicles, personnel, goods, cargos and/or equipment within the landmass or territorial waters of South Torbia is authorised.

g. <u>183.</u> – Following the boarding of North Torbian flagged civilian vessels for inspection under Rule 171, any vessels in contravention of UNSCR 8869 is authorised to be detained and/or seized, as well as any personnel, goods, cargos and/or equipment for the purposes of enforcement of UNSCR 8869.

h. <u>185.</u> – Should there be compelling evidence to suggest non-conformity with the provisions of UNSCR 8869, any vessel within the CJTF 667 AO proceeding to or from a seaport of NT may be boarded, diverted, detained and/or seized.

i. <u>187.</u> - The use of restraints such as Flex Cuffs and mechanical restraints on PW/detainees is authorised for force protection purposes. Once brought into a secure holding area, restraints shall normally be removed, unless the tactical situation dictates otherwise.

j. <u>188.</u> - If there is doubt of PW status, CJTF 667 will treat a detainee as a PW until a competent tribunal is able to determine his/her status IAW Article 5 of *Geneva Convention III relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War* (GC III).

10. **Illumination.**

a. <u>221.</u> – The illumination of suspected NT Armed Forces vessels, aircraft, personnel, and equipment by white light, spotlight, projectiles, or infrared means is authorised.

b. <u>221a.</u> – The illumination of suspected Irregular Groups engaging in hostile acts or displaying hostile intent's vessels, aircraft, personnel, and equipment by white light, spotlight, projectiles, or infrared means is authorized.

c. <u>222.</u> – The use of laser target markers against NT Armed Force vessels, aircraft, personnel, and equipment is authorised.

d. <u>222a.</u> – The use of laser target markers against Irregular Groups engaging in hostile acts or displaying hostile intent's vessels, aircraft, personnel, and equipment by white light, spotlight, projectiles, or infrared means is authorized.

11. **Identification of Targets.**

a. <u>232.</u> - Identification is to be established visually (this may include video feed from UAS or other remote systems) **or** by at least two of the following means: IFF (or other systems that require a response from an unidentified unit); electro-optical, electronic warfare support measure; track behavior, flight plan correlation; thermal imaging; acoustic intelligence; or other secure active/passive systems not requiring a positive response from an unidentified unit prior to an engagement.

12. **Designation of Targets.**

a. 280. – Designation of targets by any means is authorised.

13. **Use of Riot Control Agents.**

a. 321. – Riot control means (RCM) must not be used as a means of warfare.

b. 322.– Use of pepper spray in self-defense and for force protection is authorised.

14. **Use of Force in Designated Operations.**

a. 337. **–** Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to prevent the commission of serious crimes that are occurring or about to occur is authorised.

b. 339. – Use of ASP batons in self-defense and for force protection is authorised.

15. **Prohibiting or Restricting Use of Specific Weapons in Designated Circumstances.**

a. 351. – The use of anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions by 1 ANZAC DIV is prohibited.

b. 352. – The use of command-detonated mines, and explosive and non-explosive booby traps by CJTF 667 is in accordance with national policy.

c. 353. – The use of weapons of mass destruction to include chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear by CJTF 667 is prohibited.

16. **Information Operations.**

a. 361. – The control of NT military information distribution mechanisms with the intent to disrupt and deny NT command and control nodes is authorised.

b. 366. – Conduct of Computer Network Attack (CNA) against NT adversary computers or computer systems that have intruded into and damaged CJTF 667 computers, computer networks, or information in CJTF 667 computers or computer networks, including actions that may result in intrusion into NT intermediary systems or networks and damage to NT systems or networks is authorised subject to COMD CJTF 667 approval.

c. 367. – The use of electronic warfare measures by CJTF 667 is authorised.

d. 368. – Psychological operations directed against NT military forces and Irregular Groups is authorised.

e. 369. – The use of physical military deception through the use of dummies and/or decoy equipment by CJTF 667 Forces is authorised.

17. **Use of Electronic Countermeasures.**

a. 374. - The unrestricted use of ECM against NT military and designated opposition force combatant targets is authorised.

18. **Mines.**

a. 380. – The laying of mines in recognised international straits is prohibited.

b. 382. – COMD CJTF 667 is the approval authority for the employment of naval mines.

19. **Action Against Suspected Submarine Contacts.**

a.　391. – Tracking submarine contact(s) within the CJTF 667 AO with shipborne and airborne sensors is authorised.

b.　393. – Prosecution to destruction against NT submarine contacts within the CJTF 667 AO is authorised.

20. **Attack.**

a.　421. – Attack against NT Armed Forces demonstrating hostile intent against CJTF 667 Forces is authorised.

b.　421a. – Attack against Irregular Groups demonstrating hostile intent against CJTF 667 Forces is authorized.

c.　422. – Attack against NT Armed Forces which commits or directly contributes to a hostile act (not constituting an actual attack) against CJTF 667 Forces is authorised.

d.　422a. – Attack against Irregular Groups which commits or directly contributes to a hostile act (not constituting an actual attack) against CJTF 667 Forces is authorised.

e.　425. – Attack against NT Armed Forces which have previously attacked, or directly contributed to an attack within the CJTF 667 AO, is authorised.

f.　425a. - Attack against Irregular Groups which have previously attacked, or directly contributed to an attack within the CJTF 667 AO, is authorised.

g.　426. - Component Commanders are authorised to judge whether an attack is the first of a series and, in this event, to attack all units constituting a continuing threat.

h.　427. - Attack on NT Armed Force military installation(s), facility(ies), equipment, unit(s) and forces within the CJTF 667 AO, which are engaged in or make an effective contribution to military activity that threatens CJTF 667 Forces person(s) or property is authorised.

APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX O TO
1 ANZAC DIV OPORD

MILITARY DECEPTION

1.   **Situation.**

a.   General. Deception will play an important role towards the achievement of military success during OPERATION SWIFT DEFENDER. North Torbian Armed Forces have invaded and occupied portions of northern South Torbia. While much of the TPA has culminated, the TPA Southern Army (-) is likely to continue offensive operations IOT isolate WELLINGTON. The lodgement and continued build-up of CJTF 667 forces in WELLINGTON signals an impending CJTF 667 defensive action and ctr-offensive. Deception operations are to be employed to manipulate the enemy's decision-making processes to set the conditions for 1 ANZAC Div and CJTF 667 success. The overall intent during Phase I is to deceive the enemy with regard to the nature of 1 ANZAC Div defensive posture as well as where the main effort for a ctr-atk will lie. In 1 ANZAC Div Phase II-III, the nature of deception will focus on what the future intentions of CJTF 667 will be IOT isolate elms of TPA for destruction. In CJTF 667.2 Phase IV, deception will be required along the northern border area of South Torbia to make the enemy believe there is a stronger defensive force protecting the border area.

b.   Enemy

   (1)   Capabilities. The North Torbian forces have the capability to employ all aspects of information warfare against friendly forces, the civilian population of South Torbia and social media writ large. North Torbia can and will continue to employ a wide range of HUMINT operatives through its SPF forces, co-opted South Torbian civilians, members of their proxies South Torbian Communist Party Army (TCA) as well as military eavesdropping and jamming assets. Whilst the North Torbian Air Force has very limited assets available to conduct EW operations, it is believed that this capability will be augmented with Olvanan capabilities by proxy.

   (2)   Vulnerabilities. AN military vulnerabilities currently include:

      (a)   Difficulties in communicating rapidly over long distances while under electronic attack.

      (b)   A preponderance of non-compatible, unprotected, off-the shelf types of electronic equipment from multiple sources.

      (c)   A heavy reliance on international media to provide the "North Torbian Story" and direct messaging to international audiences and stakeholders.

c.   Deception Targets. 1 (ANZAC) DIc intended targets are:

   (1)   Senior leadership of 3 OSC.

(2)   Senior leaders of the Song regime.

(3)   Enemy HUMINT operatives, TCA, and SPF forces operating inside of South Torbia.

b.   1 (ANZAC) Div Deception Goal. The 1 (ANZAC) Div deception effort is to portray the 1 (ANZAC) DIv main effort to be in the WEST, to protect PALMERSTON NORTH.

(1)   1 (ANZAC) Div Phase I Objective. Deceive the enemy leadership of OSC 1 that 1 (ANZAC) Div is consolidating and building up in WELLINGTON prior to advancing north on SH1 to retain PALMERSTON NORTH.

(2)   1 (ANZAC) Div Phase II Objectives.

(a)   Portray 1 MCB and ROTA Offensive Operations in MANAWATU as Main Effort IOT fix bulk of TPA cbt power on SH1 axis, thereby enabling destruction of isolated elms on SH2 and securing of PORT OF NAPIER.

(3)   CFLCC Phase III Objective. TBD.

(4)   CFLCC Phase IV Objective. Depict defence along the MDL as stronger than it is and portray main effort in the WEST in order to discourage commitment of OSC 1 reserves.

d.   Friendly Forces. Key staff in the development, execution, monitoring and assessment of the deception plan are to include:

(3)   CJTF 667 J5.

(4)   CJTF 667 J2.

(5)   1 ANZAC DIV:

(a)   1 ANZAC DIV G5, who is to coordinate all aspects of Divisional MD.

(b)   1 ANZAC DIV G2.

(c)   4 CSR

(d)   1 MI Bn.

(e)   1 EW Bn.

e.   Attachments and Detachments. Nil.

2.   **Mission.** 1 ANZAC DIV is to conduct military deception operations IOT mask friendly force intentions and influence North Torbian actions.

2.   **Execution.**

a.   General. 1 ANZAC DIV is to conduct MD IAW the coordinated CJTF 667 taskings. All deployments is to be conducted under electronic silence.

b.   Groupings and Tasks.

     (1)   1 MCB. Deploy to AO EAST under electronic silence.

     (2)   3 MCB. Deploy to AO EAST under electronic silence.

     (3)   9 MCB. Deploy to AO EAST under electronic silence.

     (4)   1 ANZAC DIV (-). Deploy to AO EAST under electronic silence.

     (5)   3 EW Bn. Demonstrate deployment of Div Arty and Div Tac HQ to AO West.

c.   Coordinating Instructions. Timings for all tasks and activities will be established as part of the task matrix at Tab A (to be issued).

d.   Assessment. BDEs and selected 1 ANZAC DIV elements are to participate in the assessment process. 1 ANZACDIV G5 MD is to prepare a daily assessment report in coordination with 1 ANZAC DIV G2 and G3 Current Operations cells to highlight the following:

     (1)   An evaluation of the deception measure(s) in place to ensure it continues to support Commander's and higher Commander's intent.

     (2)   An evaluation of how the target (enemy) is acting or not acting in response to the deception measure(s).

     (3)   Monitoring for unintended consequences of the deception measure effected.

     (4)   A determination of when criteria for termination are met.

3.   **Service Support.** Note there will be some selected ammunition dumping that occurs when the Division has completed deployments to AO WEST and AO EAST. Although it will be part of normal sustainment it will be done in daylight to support the deception of the Division adopting a defensive posture in depth behind the South Torbian 46 DIV in PALMERSTON NORTH. The ammunition is to be uploaded onto vehicles during the night.

4. **Command and Signal.**

   a.   Command.

     (1)   CJTF 667 POC for MD is J5 MD, Col XXXXXXXXX

     (2)   1 ANZAC DIV POC for MD is G5 MD, Maj XXXXXXX

     (3)   BDEs are to nominate and inform POCs for MD to 1 ANZAC DIV G5 MD.

      b.   <u>Signal.</u> No change.

Tab:

A.   Timings (To be issued)

<div align="right">
ANNEX H TO
1 ANZAC DIV OPORD
</div>

AIR & AIRSPACE CONTROL

References:

A.   CACC-OSD Air Operations Plan dated XXXXXX
B.   CACC-OSD Airspace Control Plan dated XXXXXX
C.   1 (ANZAC) DIV OPORD 01 Appendix 7 (Air Operations & Air Support) to Annex C dated XXXXXX
D.   1 (ANZAC) DIV OPORD 01 Appendix 10 (Airspace Control) to Annex C dated
E.   XXXXXX

1.   **Situation.**

a.   Enemy Forces. No change.

b.   Friendly Forces. No change.

c.   1 (ANZAC) DIV Scheme of Air Support. 1 (ANZAC) DIV is to utilize apportioned and integral air support to achieve decisive effects on North Torbian Armed Forces occupying South Torbia. Air support extends 1 (ANZAC) DIV's area of influence thus enabling 1 (ANZAC) DIV to dominate the battlespace. Specifically, air operations are to isolate North Torbian Armed Forces in South Torbia from reinforcement and resupply thus contributing to a sense of hopelessness and despair among North Torbian military leaders and soldiers. Compounding the fear of North Torbian Armed Forces, air operations is to support the defeat of the 1 Mar Div and 6 Mech Div, while destroying 5 Mech Div. Air support is to also facilitate force protection through the provision of defensive counter air (DCA) over friendly forces, gradually expanding to include the landmass of South Torbia and territorial waters. Finally, air support, both apportioned and integral to the Div, is to provide close air support (CAS) for friendly forces in contact. The 1 (ANZAC) DIV ASOC Cell is to be the point of coordination for air support within AO APPLE.

d.   1 (ANZAC) DIV Scheme of Airspace Control. Airspace usage above the Coordinating Altitude (CA) or forward of the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) is to be requested through the Div ASOC. The Div G3 Airspace Control (AC) Cell is to be the point of coordination for airspace within the Div AO. To enable coordination, the Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) is to be established in the CAOC by 1 (ANZAC) DIV. The airspace below the CA and forward of the DIVs forward boundaries (to the 1 (ANZAC) DIV forward boundary/FSCL as applicable) is to be managed by the 1 (ANZAC) DIV AC Cell using procedural airspace control methods.

e.   Supporting/Supported Relationship. 1 (ANZAC) DIV is to become the supported Component during CJTF 667 Phase II operations (Decisive Operations). During this Decisive Operations Phase (1 ANZAC DIV phases I through III), ACC-OSD air apportionment is to be weighted towards AI and CAS tasks in support of 1 (ANZAC) DIV and ultimately 1 ANZAC DIV objectives.

2.   **Mission.** Provide effective airspace control and air support control/coordination IOT ensure optimum integration of air capabilities with the execution of 1 ANZAC DIV operations aimed at the destruction of 5 MECH INF DIV (IFV) and the setting of conditions to clear all remaining TPA forces from the sovereign territory of South Torbia within boundaries.

3.   **Execution.**

a.   Commander's Intent. No Change.

b.   Concept of Operations.

    (1)   As per the 1 ANZAC DIV OPORD, 1 ANZAC is to conduct this operation in four phases:

        (a)   Phase I – Block TPA advance and destroy TPA offensive potential.

        (b)   Phase II – Clear TPA from SOUTH TORBIA and secure Cease Fire Line.

        (c)   Phase III – On Order clear TPA from WAIKATO/BAY OF PLENTY regions of SOUTH TORBIA and secure MDL.

        (d)   Phase IV – Conduct STABOPS and DETER TPA offensive actions.

    (2)   In all four phases the primary focus of air resources allocated to 1 ANZAC DIV as part of the 1 (ANZAC) DIV apportionment is to support 1 ANZAC DIV's ground scheme of manoeuvre as described in the op order main body, through the provision of a mix of AI and CAS sorties, both pre-planned and immediate.

    (3)   1 ANZAC DIV pre-planned and immediate AI missions are to consist of those that assist in the destruction of forces in SOUTH TORBIA that are not in contact with 1 ANZAC DIV or other 1 (ANZAC) DIV forces.

    (4)   1 (ANZAC) DIV is to control all AI operations within the 1 (ANZAC) DIV AO short of the FSCL (the CACC-OSD is to control all AI operations beyond the FSCL). AI allocation not required to service pre-planned AI targets are to be pushed as Killbox/immediate air interdiction (XAI) sorties.

    (5)   CAS missions consist of those that assist in the destruction of forces that are in contact with 1 ANZAC DIV or other 1 (ANZAC) DIV forces. CJFACC will allocate air sorties daily to 1 ANZAC DIV for pre-planned CAS as well as immediate CAS (XCAS) requests, based on COMD 1 (ANZAC) DIV's priorities.

    (6)   These are to supplement the available attack helicopter sorties resident within 1 ANZAC DIV and be allocated consistent with 1 ANZAC DIV's and 1 (ANZAC) DIV's priorities. Lethal CAS options are also available from some ACC-OSD ISR platforms (the priority for these assets are to be collection and SOF operations).

c.   Airspace Control. Airspace Control within 1 ANZAC DIV is to coincide with the divisional ground boundaries (below the Coordinating Altitude) in all phases governed by this OPORD. This is delegated to DIV-level for management on behalf of the CAOC through the use of the Airspace Control Measure Requests (ACMRs) process, as will be managed by the G3 AC Cell associated with the 1 ANZAC DIV Airspace Element. The ACMR process enables overall airspace management for all Coalition forces in the JOA, provides for safe aviation operations, and is to maximize the ground commander's intent for forces and effects.

d.   Air Support Priorities. 4 MND air support priorities for AI and CAS by phase are as follows:

(1)   Phase I – Block TPA Adv and Destroy 5 Mech Div.

(a)   Degradation of 1 Mar Div IOT force passage of 5 Mech Div into Div EA.

(b)   Destruction of 5 Mech Div in Div EA.

(c)   Other pre-planned CAS and AI as coordinated at BDE and DIV level through the ATO cycle

(d)   Other XAI and XCAS sorties as required to support the defence and engage targets of opportunity.

(2)   Phase II – Clear TPA from SOUTH TORBIA and secure Cease Fire Line.

(a) Interdict TPA movement between AO WEST and AO EAST IOT isolate TPA elms for destruction.

(b) Degrade TPA C2/CSS and Engineer capability IOT disintegrate cohesion of defensive mvr.

(c) Other pre-planned CAS and AI as coordinated at BDE and DIV level through the ATO cycle

(d) Other XAI and XCAS sorties as required to support the defence and engage targets of opportunity.

(3)   Phase III - TBD.

(4)   Phase IV – Conduct STABOPS.

    (a)   XAI and XCAS sorties as required to support 1 ANZAC DIV units committed to clearance operations, particularly in the area of MDL

    (b)   Pre-planned CAS and AI as coordinated at BDE and DIV level through the ATO cycle

    (c)   Other XAI sorties as required to engage targets of opportunity.

e.   Coordinating Instructions.

(1)   Air Control System. RAAF ASOSs/Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs) are aligned with and integral to all 1 ANZAC DIV echelons down to BDE level, to assist units with preplanned request process in the ATO planning cycle, as well as to submit immediate CAS requests as necessary

(2)   Joint Tactical Airstrike Requests (JTAR). Airstrike requests are to be submitted through HQ 1 ANZAC DIV NLT 1200Z hours the day prior to execution to ensure requests are included in the Air Tasking Order (ATO) if prioritized at the 1 (ANZAC) DIV level. Failure to meet the ASOC's pre-planned JTAR timeline may result in unfilled JTARs due to higher priorities in adjacent DIV AOs

(3)   Pre-planned CAS Target Nominations. Preplanned CAS are to be included in the Target Synchronization Board nominations. The JTAR numbering system is to be used. Updates to the JTAR numbering system are to be published in the SPINS. Requests for pre-planned CAS are to be submitted through JFECCs from Battalion through BDE JFECCs to 1 (ANZAC) DIV ARTY. Army Fires channels, not attached TACP personnel, are responsible for tracking and submitting pre-planned JTARs for CAS. Requests reaching 1 (ANZAC) DIV Fires after 1200Z hours are to be rejected and are to be re-submitted as immediate requests to the ASOC.

(4)   Immediate Air Support Requests. Immediate requests for air support (XAI and XCAS) are those requests made after the deadline for inclusion in the ATO, typically less than 72 hours prior to ATO execution. XCAS requests are to be routed through Army Fires channels, or by TACP via RAAF support channels. Immediate requests are sourced by the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) at 1 (ANZAC) DIV HQ. Be aware that Comd 1 (ANZAC) DIV priority of fires for unallocated CAS sorties are:

    i.   High Payoff Targets

    ii.   Time Sensitive Targets requiring rapid lethal response

    iii.   Massed Forces

    iv.   Point Targets, to include armor, buildings, tracked vehicles, and other soft targets

    v.   Moving Targets;

vi.   Interdiction targets or second echelon forces.

vii.   XCAS/XAI aircraft are to launch to a Contact Point to be on call for CAS or AI missions. In addition to XCAS and XAI, a small number of sorties are to be maintained on Ground CAS (GCAS) and Ground AI (GAI) alert. These missions are to be capable of being airborne in less than 30 minutes from notification.

(5)   CAS Execution. CAS is to be executed with a certified Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) utilizing Types I, II, and III controls, as required, IAW JP 3-09.3. Utilizing CAS to strike targets without control from a qualified JTAC is to be considered an extreme situation with enhanced probability of fratricide. The supported commander is to delegate weapons release clearance authority to his JTACs to facilitate CAS attacks .The JTAC is to provide CAS aircrew with clearance to expend ordnance and is to use the best available type of control (see SPINs).

(6)   Observer Plan. Mission planners are to ensure friendly observers are able to see the target area and report details directly to the JTAC. JTACs are a unique fires enabler and difficult to replace. Consequently, planners are to balance mission priority against JTAC safety when developing an observer plan and when considering JTAC location(s).

(7)   Requests for Forward Air Controller-Airborne (FAC-A). FAC-A support requests are to be submitted through the Brigade Air Liaison Officer (BALO) to the DALO for approval, and are to be annotated on the associated JTAR.

(8)   Requests for Specific Ordnance. Requests for specific ordnance are to be submitted through the BALO to the DALO for coordination and approval through the CAOC.

(9)   Target Updates. Location and status of targets which are moving or the exact location is not known are to be updated with the Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) collocated with the CAOC 24, 12 and six hours prior to execution.

(10) Air Reconnaissance Operations. Air RECCE targets that support operations and future planning are to be nominated through G2 channels to 1 ANZAC DIV G2 for prioritization prior to onward submission to CAOC. CFACC is to provide resources on a case-by-case basis consistent with CJTF 667 higher priorities.

(11) UAS Mission Requests. Likewise, 1 ANZAC DIV G2 is to coordinate with the CAOC for all 1 ANZAC DIV UAS mission requests requiring 1 (ANZAC) DIV airspace that are developed during the ISR Collection Working Group. The information is to be contained in a storyboard format. 1 ANZAC DIV UAS requests are to be submitted to the 1 (ANZAC) DIV G2 the day prior to execution. Any requests submitted late will require a justified task and purpose that should be briefed by the 1 ANZAC DIV G3.

(12) <u>1 ANZAC DIV Airspace Control.</u> The 1 ANZAC DIV TACP associated with Div Arty is to coordinate and integrate airspace requirements within the AO and identify/resolve airspace user conflicts.

    (a) Airspace Control (AC) responsibilities include:

        i. maintaining AC overlays and information displays, and forwarding AC overlays to the 1 (ANZAC) DIV ASOC

        ii. developing AC procedures, plans, SOPs, and annexes for the 1 ANZAC DIV divisional airspace

        iii. advising subordinate and higher headquarters of significant activities affecting airspace use and the impact of airspace control measures on the DIV ground battle

        iv. Compiling and submitting the DIV Aviation flight schedule for the following day, in accordance with CJFACC guidance, for situational awareness and de-confliction in the ATO.

    (b) <u>Airspace Control Measure Request (ACMR) process.</u> Requests for ACMs are to be submitted to the 1 ANZAC DIV G3 AC Cell to enable submission to CJFACC 72 hours prior to ACO execution. ACMRs that are not received within the timeline are to be considered immediate and are to be requested from the 1 (ANZAC) DIV G3. Approval authority for forwarding immediate requests is the 1 ANZAC DIV G3 and is based on the mission requirements. All ACMRs are to contain the following information at a minimum:

        i. A 6 digit UTM grid or ACPs to outline the operating area;

        ii. A minimum of a 500ft buffer;

        iii. Altitude boundaries;

        iv. Effective times in ZULU;

        v. Operating frequency/channel;

        vi. Purpose of the ACMR;

        vii. Accurate point of contact information (phone number and email address); and

        viii. Any special instructions/restrictions.

    (c) <u>Coordinating Altitude.</u> 18,000 ft MSL.

    (d) <u>Coordination Level.</u> 3000 ft AGL. Fixed wing aircraft are to operate 3500 ft AGL and above and rotary wing aircraft are to operate 2500 ft AGL and below.

(e) Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). The minimum vertical separation between UAS is 500 feet. The minimum vertical separation between UASs and manned aircraft is 1000 feet, unless otherwise directed or coordinated. The minimum vertical separation between manned aircraft is 500 feet. The normal altitude blocks unless otherwise coordinated or superseded by the SPINs are as indicated in Appendix 10 to Annex C of the 1 (ANZAC) DIV OPORD.

4. **Service Support.** No change.

5. **Command and Signal.** The Joint Air Request Net (JARN) is to be maintained by Div ASOC down to Coy level:

a.   Chat

b.   Voice

c.   TACP-CASS.

d.   Remainder no change.

ANNEX J TO
1 ANZAC DIV OPORD

FORCE PROTECTION

References:

A. ADDP 3.22 Force Protection 10 Mar 15
B. ADP 3-37 Protection Jul 2019
C. 1 ANZAC DIV OPORD 01

1.   **Situation**

a.   Friendly Forces. No change from Annex A.

b.   Threat and Risk Assessment.

(1)   Conventional Threats. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence). The Torbian People's Army (TPA) essentially represent a "near peer" threat with a wide range of capabilities. As they have demonstrated, they have sufficient forces capabilities to seize and control key infrastructure and large areas of terrain in a littoral environment. They do not possess the necessary capabilities to project and sustain power far past their national boundaries for extended periods of time.

(a)   3 OSC. The NT 3 OSC will comprise the primary conventional combatants for 1 ANZAC DIV.6 MECH DIV (APC). The NT 6 MECH DIV (APC) will comprise the primary conventional combatants for 1 ANZAC DIV. ZBL-09 and ZBD05 are the primary mechanised capabilities for this formation. En fires consists largely of PLZ-89, PLL-09 and PHL-90B SP artillery systems. It is anticipated that 3 OSC and spt irregular elms will extensively employ IEDs, UAVs/suicide drone swarms, Arty, EW and AD in conjunction with their organic aviation assets. It is assessed as ALMOST CERTAIN that 3 (OSC) will receive spt from TPA SPF and TCA to support their advance.

(b)   NT (Special Purpose Forces) SPF. The NT SPF is the Special Operations element of the TPA. 2 BDE sized elements exist within the TPA ORBAT. An unknown sized element of SPF has infiltrated RT and have assaulted multiple air bases and air defence sites in conjunction with EW jamming. Reports indicate that SPF are likely to support unconventional threat actors within the AO such as the TCA (detailed below in 2, b.).

(2)   Unconventional Threats. For the most part, insurgent groups within South Torbia may use Direct Action to destabilize local governments by targeting South Torbian security forces through the use of IEDs, small arms and RPGs. Insurgent groups may also take advantage of every opportunity to seize arms and other military equipment. Criminal organizations will also target South Torbian security forces (law enforcement in particular) and engage in illegal activities (drugs, robberies, corruption, etc) that contribute to further de-stabilization. Groups include:

(a) <u>Tantoco Cartel.</u> Tantoco Cartel Criminal Organisation. Originating in South Torbia (RT), the Tantoco Cartel operates across the region. The Tantoco Cartel is involved in all forms of illegal activities including drug and weapons smuggling, extortion, motor vehicle theft, illegal gambling, money laundering, counterfeiting and murder-for-hire. The RT Police have established that there are cells operating in PALMERSTON NORTH, NAPIER, and NEW PLYMOUTH. It is assessed as PROBABLE that they will be supported by NT SPF. Potential activities include:

    i.   Hijacking supply convoys to steal supplies including weapons and ammunition

    ii.   Selling weapons and ammunition on the black market

    iii.   Exploiting opportunities to sell drugs to 1 ANZAC DIV personnel

    iv.   Extortion of local officials in proximity to cells.

    v.   Refer to Appendix 1 (INT Estimate) of Annex B (Intelligence) for further detail.

(b) <u>South Torbian Communist Party Army (TCA).</u> An insurgency group intent on establishing a communist country based on the Marxist model, the same goal as stated by the South Torbian Communist Party (TCP). The TCP claims that their group has no connection to the TCA, but there are probably some members that belong to both organisations. It is almost certain that TCA will receive support from TPA SPF to support 3 OSC offensive operations. This will likely take place through direct action targeting C2, Reserves, and CSS in the 3 OSC disruption zone as well as the cuing of strike against ROTA and CTF 667.2 HVTs. Refer to Appendix 1 (INT Estimate) of Annex B (Intelligence) for further detail.

(c) <u>United Torbia(UT).</u> UT is a counter-insurgency group that is pro-government and a counter-Communist organisation that wants to unite North and South Torbia with a democratically elected government. Their potential to pose a threat is assessed as extremely low. Refer to Appendix 1 (INT Estimate) of Annex B (Intelligence) for further detail.

(3) Non-Military Threats. See also Annex K (Health Services Support):

(a) <u>Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs)/Contaminated Grounds.</u> South Torbia holds large amounts of toxic industrial chemicals for multiple purposes, including mining, production of electronic goods, water purification, wastewater management, pesticides and fertiliser to increase agricultural output.

(b) <u>Pollution.</u> South Torbia faces significant pollution problems stemming from poor industrial practices and motor vehicles. High levels of air pollution require mitigating measures to ensure 1 ANZAC DIV personnel health and safety.

(c) <u>Potable Water</u>. The majority of South Torbia's urban population has access to potable water. In rural areas people must rely on local sources such as rivers, streams and wells to obtain water for cooking, drinking and washing. The South Torbian climate creates issues with the water system. During the rainy season when the major urban area floods, especially the slums, much of the debris, trash, silt and general refuse (to include sewage) is washed into rivers and stream. The silt and debris also clogs the drainage systems and the treatment plants causing problems with the production of fresh water.

(d) <u>Sewage</u>. South Torbians that reside in the metropolitan areas, in apartments or single-family homes, have access to sewage disposal. 90 percent of residents have access to sanitation services. 85 percent of residents have access to a sewer system with the remaining using septic systems. Only approximately 10 percent of the wastewater is treated which has led to contamination of 58 percent of groundwater.

(e) <u>Disease</u>. The following diseases are known to be present in North and South Torbia:

    i.   Diarrheal diseases

    ii.   Hepatitis A

    iii.   Malaria

    iv.   Cholera

    v.   Hepatitis;

    vi.   Tuberculosis

    vii.   Shigellosis.

2.   **Mission.** 1 ANZAC DIV is to protect assigned forces IOT maintain combat power against threats and risks associated in the conduct of OPERATION SWIFT DEFENDER (OSD).

2.   **Execution.**

a.   <u>General.</u> Force Protection (FP) is the preservation of the effectiveness of mission-related military and non-military personnel, equipment, facilities, information and infrastructure deployed within or outside the AO. FP is an element of combat power and is associated with the operational function shield. It is to be integrated with the application of military force against an enemy or adversary to protect the force and preserve combat power. The following are the principles of FP: comprehensive, integrated, layered, redundant and enduring. Commanders are to develop and then implement protection systems for each phase of the operation.

b.   <u>Protection Tasks.</u> Protection tasks are to be synchronized to reduce risk, identify and mitigate vulnerabilities, and exploit opportunities. The principal protection tasks to be carried out by commanders are:

(1) Air and Missile Defence (AMD). (See Appendix 3). Large troop concentrations and sustainment facilities will be protected from North Torbian missile attacks by establishing an integrated Air Missile Defense system. Operational threats from enemy UAVs/UASs must be determined and mitigated;

(2) Personnel Recovery (PR). All 1 ANZAC DIV units and formations are to be prepared to execute or assist in the recovery of isolated personnel;

(3) Information Protection. This includes computer electronic protection, network defence and information assurance;

(4) Fratricide Avoidance. Special consideration will be given when conducting operations with South Torbian forces as their equipment is often the same as the enemy's;

(5) Operational Area Security. Units and formations are to ensure that within their sectors area security operations are conducted within capabilities. Given the irregular threat there may be no "safe rear areas";

(6) Anti-terrorism. (See Appendix 1);

(7) Survivability. Given the so-called "near peer" capability of the enemy, employing frequent movement, using concealment, deception and camouflage, and constructing fighting and protective positions needs to be more consistent than our troops are accustomed;

(8) Force Health Protection. (See Annex K);

(9) Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN). (See Annex U);

(10) Safety. Although 1 ANZAC DIV is about to undertake combat operations, casualties as a result of avoidable accidents would result in unnecessary and unacceptable casualties;

(11) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). (See Appendix 2).

c.   Protection by Phase.

(1) Preliminary Moves, Protection is to focus on AMD, operational area security, anti-terrorism and OPSEC.

(2) Phase I – Block TPA Advance and Destroy 5 Mech Div. The protection effort during this phase is to focus on OPSEC, AMD, operational area security and safety.

(3) Phase II – Advance to Cease Fire Line. The protection effort during this phase is to focus on OPSEC, AMD, operational area security and safety.

(4) Phase III – Advance to Military Demarcation Line. Protection priorities are to be AMD and fratricide avoidance as the battle becomes more fluid.

(5)   <u>Phase IV – Conduct STABOPS.</u> Protection measures during this phase are to focus on non-conventional threats: health, crime, safety, protection of captured enemy personnel, and operational area security against irregular forces/terrorism. There will be a significant requirement to coordinate protection measures with South Torbia as it assumes more responsibility for its own security. The potential for kidnapping or capture of friendly forces may likely increase significantly in this phase requiring coordination with CJTF 667's Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC).

d.   <u>Coordinating Instructions</u>

(1)   <u>Multinational Considerations.</u> 1 ANZAC DIV is a multi-national force. While the tasks related to the protection function are based on Australian Army and US Army doctrine, the tenets are applicable and relevant to other troop contributing nations (TCNs). Within the constraints of own national direction, 1 ANZAC DIV TCNs are to incorporate and adopt protection measures as ordered. If differences in interpretation or application of specific measures occur, FP and Information Conditions for example, TCNs are to advise this HQ of what national actions have been implemented. Notwithstanding, following an internal threat and risk assessment, senior national commanders may increase 1 ANZAC DIV FP measures within their national elements.

(2)   <u>Non-combatants.</u> In addition to the civilian South Torbian population, (including Internally Displaced Persons), there are numerous non-governmental/international organizations (NGOs/IOs) workers throughout South Torbia. As the protection function prioritizes 1 ANZAC DIV assigned forces, requests from civilians for protection are to be forwarded to HQ 1 ANZAC DIV for consideration. This does not preclude the requirement to respond to "serious crimes" in accordance with ROE (See Annex E Appendix 1).

(3)   <u>FP Posture.</u> The FP posture is to be based on risk management, not risk elimination. Deliberate or accidental casualties are a reality of military operations, as are material and equipment losses and an overemphasis in avoiding them will impact adversely on the achievement of the mission. Commanders therefore must balance risk within the context of mission accomplishment.

(4)   <u>Electronic Counter Measures (ECM).</u> In order to prevent mutual interference between other ECM equipment and communications systems, coordination between nations and other agencies is to be affected through Spectrum Management control.

(5)   <u>Training.</u> Personnel and units are to receive appropriate FP training, particularly in Escalation of Force procedures.

(6)   <u>Criticality Assessment.</u> Commanders at all levels are to conduct a Criticality Assessment of key assets and capabilities to establish a Critical Asset List (CAL) and a Defended Asset List (DAL). The CAL is a prioritized list of assets that should be protected. It is to be identified by the phase of the operation and approved by the relevant commander. Critical assets are

generally specific assets of such extraordinary importance that their loss or degradation would have a significant and debilitating effect on operations or the mission. The DAL is a listing of those assets from the CAL, prioritized by the commander, to be defended with the resources available. This allows the commander to apply finite protection capabilities to the most valuable assets. This should also be considered in conjunction with ROE's property with "designated special status" and personnel with "designated special status". A Critical Assessment must:

(a) Determine if critical functions or combat power can be substantially duplicated with other elements of the command or an external resource;

(b) Determine the time required to substantially duplicate key assets and capabilities in the event of temporary or permanent loss; and

(c) Set priorities for response to threats toward personnel, physical assets and information.

(7) Vulnerability Assessments (VA). Vulnerability assessments for any semi-permanent sites (FOBs, main camps, etc.) are to be held in abeyance until the later stages of Phase IV.

(8) Protection Cell. The integration of the many disparate protection tasks and systems into operations is to be conducted through a designated Protection Cell and a G3 Force Protection. At Div level the Protection Cell will be of a more formal nature and be the core for a regularly scheduled Protection Working Group (PWG). At the bde and below, a Protection Coordinator is to be designated from among the bde staff and be responsible for liaison with the Div Protection Cell and PWG. The Protection Cell is to monitor and evaluate several critical ongoing functions associated with execution for operational actions or changes that impact protection cell proponents. Some of these functions include:

(a) Ensuring that the protection focus supports the decisive operation;

(b) Reviewing and adjusting the CCIRs derived from protection tasks and systems;

(c) Reviewing changes to graphic control measures and boundaries for the increased risk of fratricide;

(d) Evaluating the effectiveness of command and control battle tracking for constraints on PR;

(e) Monitoring the employment of security forces for gaps in protection or unintended patterns;

(f) Evaluating the effectiveness of liaison personnel for protection activities;

(g) Evaluating movement coordination and control to protect critical routes;

(h) Monitoring adjacent unit coordination procedures for terrain management vulnerabilities;

(i) Monitoring readiness rates of response forces involved in fixed-site protection; and

(j) Monitoring FHP.

(9) <u>PWG.</u> A PWG is to be established at HQ 1 ANZAC DIV under an officer designated as G3 Force Protection.

(a) <u>Tasks</u>. The PWG is to:

    i. Determine likely threats and hazards from updated enemy tactics, the environment and accidents;

    ii. Determine vulnerabilities as assessed by the vulnerability assessment team;

    iii. Establish and recommends protection priorities, such as the CAL;

    iv. Provide recommendations for the CAL and DAL;

    v. Review and coordinate unit protection measures;

    vi. Recommend FPCONs and random anti-terrorism measures;

    vii. Determine required resources and make recommendations for funding and equipment fielding;

    viii. Provide input and recommendations on protection-related training;

    ix. Make recommendations to commanders on protection issues that require a decision;

    x. Focus efforts in the Operational Planning Process (OPP) to produce plans and orders;

    xi. Develop protection strategies to effectively use resources in support of a protection concept of operations;

    xii. Contribute to Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) and situational understanding;

    xiii. Identify vulnerabilities, hazards and gaps in information;

    xiv. Participate in targeting processes and the ISR synchronization process; and

    xv. Coordinate with various working groups to further synchronize protection with the other operational functions.

      (b)   <u>Composition</u>. The PWG is led by the G3 Force Protection and normally consists of:

        i.   AMD officer;

        ii.   Anti-terrorism officer;

        iii.   CBRN officer;

        iv.   Engineer officer;

        v.   EOD officer;

        vi.   OPSEC officer;

        vii.   Provost Marshal;

        viii.   Intelligence representative;

        ix.   PAO;

        x.   G-6 representative;

        xi.   Public Affairs Officer; and

        xii.   LEGAD.

3.   **<u>Service Support.</u>** See Annex R (Logistics).

4.   **<u>Command And Signal.</u>** Deviations from the prescribed FP measures, changes in threat and FP incidents are to be reported via the 1 ANZAC DIV reporting chain. CBRN incidents are to be reported to COM LCC-OSD via the LCC-OSD CBRN Warning and Reporting chain.

Appendices:

Appendix 1   - Anti-terrorism
Appendix 2   - Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Appendix 3   - Air and Missile Defence (To be issued)

HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT

References:

A. Operational Support Publication Part 2, Vol 3.1 – *Management of air quality exposure – Airborne Particulate Matter* (BO4488490)
B. Defence Health Manual Vil. 2, Part 7, Chap 10 – *Pre-deployment Health Preparation*
C. Casualty Manual (CASMNA) Chap 1, Annex B – *NOTICAS*
D. Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 2, Chap. 7 – *MEDICAS*
E. Defence Health Manual Vol. 1, Part 10, Chap. 3 – *Critical Incident Mental Health Support*
F. Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 9, Chap. 19 – *Health Management of Sexual Assault*
G. Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 7, Chap. 17 – *Post-deployment Health Requirements*
H. Defence Health Manual Vol. 3, Part 7, Chap. 11 – *Australian Defence force levels of health support in operations – dental implications*
I. Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 10, Chap. 4 – *Operational mental health screening for Defence employees*
J. Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 4, Chap. 7 –*Provision of emergency health support to civilians*
K. Operational Support Publication Vol. 3, Chap 3.11 – Deployed Health Surveillance
L. Maritime Health Logistics Instruction and Medical Allowance List *dated 19 Sep 14*
M. Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 15, Chap. 8 – *Health Materiel Manual*
N. Army Standing Instruction (P) Part 8, chap. 12 – *Supply, control, carriage, issue and administration of scheduled medication by Army non-Medical Officers, 1 Jul 16*
O. Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 1, Chap. 5 – *Management of clinical Incidents within Defence*
P. Defence Health Manual Vol. 3, Part 1, Chap. 1 – *Health care complaints and clinical incident management process*
Q. Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 15, Chap. 21 – *Health materiel support to operations*

Situation

1.   **General.** The 1 ANZAC Division is to deploy under the authority of IPANA Declaration 914, IOT achieve the military interventions as detailed in the 1 ANZAC DIV OPORD (OP SWIFT DEFENDER OPORD 01). The Desired End State remains the establishment of a sufficiently secure and stable environment in the occupied Republic of Torbia (RT) territories and improved capability of RT security forces such that state-sponsored hostilities have ceased, territorial borders are secure, humanitarian assistance programs operate unhindered and transition to an IPANA-sanctioned and/or HN follow-on security force is complete.

2.   1 ANZAC DIV will operate within the established AO and will be led by AS. Troop contributing nations currently includes Member States of IPANA. Other like-minded nations may contribute forces or provide materiel support at a future date.

As Lead Nation, Australia will provide critical force enablers, including up to R3 deployed health support.

3.   **Aim.** The aim of this Health Support Order (HSO) is to provide the concept of health support to OP SWIFT DEFENDER, and the medical requirements for AS personnel ISO the Operation.

4.   **Area of responsibility.** The Pacific region encompassing the countries of North Torbia (NT), South Torbia (RT), Belesia (BX), Gabal (GX) and Olvana (OV).

5.   **Current situation.** The island of <mark>NORTH ISLAND</mark> in the western Pacific Ocean is separated into the nation states of North Torbia and South Torbia. The primary major social event in the last century for South Torbia is the Torbian War that resulted in the division of the country and the Torbian people.

6.   Access to healthcare in the major population centres in South Torbia is generally good through a public and private health system, however still below Western Standards in most areas. In the past 20 years, some infectious degenerative diseases have risen in the Region. South Torbia is subject to many types of natural disaster, disease, and poisonous flora, and fauna.

7.   Despite relatively strict lockdown enforcements, the Region was hit hard by COVID-19 in early 2020. This further depleted an under resourced healthcare system and raised regional tensions, and security and stability concerns amidst fears of a resurgence of the virus.

8.   **Friendly health capabilities.** 1 ANZAC DIV is to operate within the established LCC-OSD AO and will be led by AS, providing up to Role 3 deployed HS through a combination of ADF and Coalition Land and Maritime capabilities, as well as tactical, forward and strategic AME through RW and FWAME capabilities. All TCNs are to deploy with a minimum of integral R1 HS capabilities. Primary Role 3 for AS casualties are to be through the NSB (Flight time from AO to Darwin <5hrs). Access to the USNS Mercy (Maritime Role 3) may be coordinated through the 1 ANZAC DIV.

a.   **USNS Mercy**. USNS Mercy is a Role 3 Hospital Ship that is recognised internationally as a neutral participant. It provides the following capacity:

   (1)   Intensive care wards: 80 beds

   (2)   Recovery wards: 20 beds

   (3)   Intermediate care wards: 280 beds

   (4)   Light care wards: 120 beds

   (5)   Limited care wards: 500 beds

   (6)   Total Patient Capacity: 1000 beds

(7)   Operating Rooms: 12

9.   Whilst all TCNs will retain overall responsibility for medical support to their troops, AS personnel and capabilities may provide HS to HN and Coalition personnel IAW the Medical Rules of Entitlement outlined in Enclosure 3.

10.   **Civilian Medical Infrastructure.** Medical infrastructure within HN is restricted. Except under emergency circumstances, and through approval of the 1 ANZAC DIV Military forces are not use HN medical facilities.

11.   **External agencies**. External agencies are defined as any agency or force not under the command and control of the 1 ANZAC DIV and they are not to be accessed for health care. These include, but are not limited to NGOs, Religious Missions and other humanitarian agencies, which may be present in the AO.

12.   **Assumptions.** All TCN personnel are to abide by comparable pre-deployment health screening measures and employ required mitigations to minimise the impact of exposure to health threats within the Region.

13.   **Limitations.** HN medical assets are extremely limited throughout the AO with primary focus on the civilian population. Except under emergency circumstances, 1 ANZAC DIV Military forces are not use HN medical facilities and Legal authorization is required before Coalition medical forces provide <u>any non-emergency care</u> to foreign nationals.

14.   In mass casualty situations, the capacity of hospitals, pharmaceuticals for advanced treatment, and detection equipment will be overwhelmed.

15.   Only decontaminated or non-infectious patients are to be transported via STRATAME unless the aircraft and receiving facilities are prepared and authorized to receive contaminated or infected casualties.

16.   **Health threat to Friendly Force Elements (FE).** Person-to-person communicable diseases, food and water borne diseases, climatic conditions and occupational hazards represent the greatest health risks to deployed personnel. Use of mitigating practices reduces the health risks in the Region to LOW in most circumstances. A health risk assessment matrix for this region is at Enclosure 1.

a.   **Air quality.** Air quality in this region may be significantly reduced. Management of ADF Activities and personnel in environments with reduced air quality is to be IAW Ref A.

b.   **Bio-scientific Capabilities and Bio-threats**. Review threat assessments for the AO regularly, but at this time there is expected to be no biological threat capabilities.

17.   **Casualty estimate. TBC**

Mission

18.   Maintain the physical and psychological well-being of FE deploying on OP SWIFT DEFENDER.

Execution

19.   The concept of health support is as follows:

a.   **Purpose.** To maintain the physical and psychological health and well-being of all FE deploying on OP SWIFT DEFENDER.

b.   **Method.** HS arrangements apply to FE deploying to the region in the following phases:

    (1)   **Force preparation.** This commences upon notification of deployment. Individuals deploying on OP SWIFT DEFENDER are required to be medically and dentally fit, individually ready, have an in-date, age-related preventive health examination and pre-deployment health screening assessment completed, IAW Ref B. Pre-deployment HS will be provided to individuals through extant Joint Health Command (JHC) Garrison Health Service arrangements. ADF Civilians deploying, must also meet pre-deployment medical and dental requirements for their deployed location. Information pertaining to the pre deployment requirements for this operation is listed at Enclosure 2 of this document.

    (2)   **Conduct of operations**. This is to be IAW this HSO, and commences upon arrival in the AO. HS will be provided to 1 ANZAC DIV personnel through a combination of ADF, coalition health assets and potentially a contracted health support solution. The placement of R2E and Role 3 deployed capabilities will achieve 10:1:2 healthcare continuum for all population at risk where possible dependent on terrain and operational conditions. 1 ANZAC DIV is to enable casualty regulation and tracking for the duration of the Operation. HQJOC Air Operations Command Aeromedical Evacuation Co-ordination Cell (AOC AECC) will coordinate the MRTA of casualties as required.

    (3)   **Post-Operational administration.** Commences once FE commence RTA administration. Information pertaining to the post deployment requirements for OP SWIFT DEFENDER is listed at Enclosure 3 of this document. Upon RTA, health support will revert to extant JHC or relevant National agency arrangements. Concludes once all medical administration and reports are finalised.

c.   **Endstate.** All personnel that deployed on OP SWIFT DEFENDER received appropriate and timely health support, have re-deployed to parent Unit locations and/or have been transferred to the care of JHC or relevant National agency for further management.

20.   **Health Force Preparation Requirements**:

a.   **First Aid.** All ADF personnel deploying to the Region should meet Service specific First Aid proficiency requirements prior to deploying.

b.   **Pre-deployment health briefs**. The mounting authority is responsible for ensuring all personnel receive relevant pre-deployment health briefs prior to departure.

21.   **Deployed Health Support**. Deployed HS for Defence personnel is as follows:

a.   **Individual/Buddy First Aid**. All personnel are to be current and competent in the provision of First Aid to single Service standards.

b.   **Role 1 HS**. Is to be provided through a combination of ADF and relevant Coalition health assets.

c.   **Role 2/2E HS**. Is to be provided through a combination of ADF and coalition health assets. The ADF will deploy up to two R2E (from 17X and Maritime R2E) scalable dependent on phase and expected dependency.

d.   **Role 3 HS.** In most cases, casualties are to be strategically evacuated to health facilities in Australia through the AECC. However, the USNS Mercy will provide an afloat Role 3 facility to be utilised at the discretion of the Casualty Regulation (CASREG) Cell.

e.   **Contracted Health Solutions.** A contracted health solution may be requested for HS upon approval by HQJOC. The following services may potentially be provided by contracted health solution:

    (1)   augmentation of R2E facilities

    (2)   coordination of emergency evacuation back to NSB

    (3)   to assist in coordination between IOs and NGOs for treatment of civilian casualties.

22   **Holding policy.** Holding policy at R1 is to be dictated by the tactical scenario and availability of RWAME. Holding policy at R2 and above is 5 days. Patients requiring medical supervision for a period longer than 5 days is to be MRTA. This may be adjusted by the 1 ANZAC DIV to manage patient flow as required.

23.   **Casualty Regulation (CASREG).** Theatre CASREG will be overseen by the 1 ANZAC DIV.

a.   **Tactical regulation.** Tactical casualty regulation is carried out by health facilities ICW the 1 ANZAC DIV.

b.   **Strategic regulation.** Regulation and movement of patients outside the AO is a HQJOC responsibility. 1 ANZAC DIV is responsible for requesting Strategic Aeromedical Evacuations (STRAT AME). Air Operations Command Aeromedical Evacuation Co-ordination Cell (AOC AECC) within HQJOC will coordinate and control all STRAT AME.

24.   **Mass Casualties (MASCAS).** All deployed units are to be prepared for a MASCAS event. This includes a MASCAS plan and conducting rehearsals. In case of a catastrophic event that creates a MASCAS situation, the principles of triage will be applied. 1 ANZAC DIV will cross-level patient load and HSS staffing.

25.   **Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC)** Depending upon which location evacuation is required, these services are to be provided by either ADF, coalition forces or civilian assets.

a.   **Surface CASEVAC.** Within the AO, only Military evacuation platforms are to be utilised.

b.   **Tactical and Forward AME.** Tactical and Forward RWAME is to be provided by ADF/CF assets.

c.   **STRATAME.** FW STRATAME is to be via the APOD at WELLINGTON in South Torbia.

26.   **Medical Return to Australia (MRTA).** The following procedures are to be followed for personnel requiring MRTA:

a.   All personnel being MRTA due to active medical problems must be managed through the STRATAME process. There are to be no administrative moves for personnel who are MRTA.

b.   A NOTICAS (IAW Ref C), MEDICAS (IAW Ref D) and STRATAME Requests are to be raised IOT facilitate the individuals movements back to Australia.

c.   All personnel subject to MRTA are to be counselled by their treating MO or CoC as to the rationale for their return and this is to be documented in their Defence e-Health System (DeHS) profile.

27.   **Dental support**. Emergency dental support is to be provided by the R2E or USNS Mercy. Any AS person requiring a greater level of dental care than can be provided in theatre will be MRTA.

28.   **Psychological support.** Psychological support is to be provided by ADF assets Psych Support Teams (PsST) based at the R2E, but capable of forward deploying. Where deemed necessary, AS individuals requiring further psychological support are to be MRTA for specialist treatment in Australia.

29.   IAW Ref E, a Critical Incident Mental Health Support (CIMHS) plan will be enacted following consultation with HQJOC J07 and 1st Psychology Unit in the event that a group or individual response is required.

30.   **Environmental Health (EH) Support**. EH support is to be provided by the R2E.

31.   **Veterinary Support.** Limited veterinary support is to be provided by the R2E. Commanders requiring veterinary services will submit requests to 1 ANZAC DIV.

32.   **Mortuary Affairs.** Mortuary affairs are not a medical function. However, the 1 ANZAC DIV assign responsibility for death certificate completion and identification of remains consistent with guidance to be published separately in the Mortuary Affairs Annex.

Groupings and Tasks

33.   **CJFMCC.** Establish R2 HS IAW the SOM and this HSO utilising below capabilities:

a.   1 x Maritime R2E

b.   USNS Mercy

34.   BPT provide Detainee Care Facility at TBA.

35.   **LCC.** BPT receive one AS CHC and one NZ CHC to provide integral Role 1 HS.

36.   **1 ANZAC DIV.** Plan, establish, and maintain HS system to support the needs of 1 ANZAC DIV including but not limited to:

a.   1 x Army R2E.

b.   1 x R3 (121 CHS).

b.   Provide HS planning and operating guidance to Service Components, Supporting Commands, and Agencies.

b.   Exercise technical control over all Military healthcare providers.

c.   Review and facilitate the update of ACSA arrangements with TCN to ensure complete medical coverage of all members of 1 ANZAC DIV regardless of country of origin.

d.   Establish and control the CASREG Cell to coordinate evacuations and regulate patient movement within and out of the JFAO.

e.   Plan and coordinate the veterinary and preventive medicine assets and systems to support veterinary and preventive medicine support requirements.

f.   Establish the Area Joint Blood Program Office to plan, manage, coordinate, and integrate the receipt, distribution, processing, storage and disposition of blood within the JFAO.

g.   Plan and ensure medical supply (Class 8) support is established and maintained in support of the HS mission and SOM.

37.   **HQJOC support**. The health directorate at HQJOC will remain alert for emerging health threats within the Region. RFIs may be submitted through the 1 ANZAC DIV. HQJOC is the approving authority for Medical Waiver and Clearance requests, IAW Enclosure 2.

38.   **JHC.** JHC is requested to:

a.   Carry out pre-deployment medical checks on FE and identify, as early as possible, those individuals who will require medical clearance prior to deployment.

b.   Submit medical clearance requests to Single Service Senior Medical Officer (SS SMO) and HQJOC J07 (where required) for approval IAW Enclosure 2, utilising Form PM631 – ADF Medical Clearance Request.

c.   Provide relevant chemoprophylaxis IAW Enclosure 1.

d.   Ensure individuals are up to date with all routine and additional vaccinations IAW Enclosure 1.

e.   Ensure individuals PHE/SHE/MEC reviews are current for the full duration of the deployment.

f.   On completion of deployment, carry out Return to Australia Medical Screens (RtAMS) IAW Ref G and issue eradication medication to any personnel not captured whilst in country as required.

g.   Carry out Post Operational Psychological Screen (POPS) and Post-Deployment Health Assessment (PDHA) three to six months post deployment IAW Ref D as

39.   **Deploying units.** Deploying units are requested to:

a.   Ensure all members nominated for deployment undergo individual pre-deployment medical checks, IAW Enclosure 2, collect medication and follow medical advice regarding chemo-prophylactic medications where required.

b.   Initiate Form PM631 – ADF Medical Clearance Request for any member with incompatible restrictions that require a 'Medical Clearance'. This is to be submitted NLT 14 days prior to deployment.

c.   Submit DCJOPS (or Delegate) Medical Waivers requests utilising Form AE889 – ADF Medical or Dental Standards Waiver Request, for mission critical personnel. This is to occur NLT 14 days before deployment for endorsement by the HQJOC.

40.   **Individual members.** Individual ADF Members are directed to:

a.   Comply with the pre and post deployment health requirements for all members deploying.

b.   Ensure they are medically and dentally fit, Individually Ready (IR) or Army Individual Readiness Notice (AIRN) compliant and have an in-date, age appropriate AD147 Comprehensive Preventive Health Examination, which does not expire before the completion of their deployment.

c.   Undergo pre-deployment health checks within the designated timeframes to ensure their medical and dental fitness for deployment.

d.   Collect their prescribed medications (if required), including any relevant chemoprophylaxis, from their Pharmacy PRIOR to deployment.

e.   Complete a Return to Australia Medical Screen (RtAMS) and Return to Australia Psychological Screen (RtAPS) within seven days of RTA at their local health facility (IAW Refs D and G) if required.

f.   Complete a Post Deployment Health Assessment (PDHA) and Post Operational Psychological Screen (POPS) three to six months post completion of their deployment if required. Non-compliance may result in inability to deploy or a delay in subsequent deployments.

g.   Adhere to individual protective measures including, but not limited to:

    (1)   Only consume potable water from approved sources

    (2)   Avoid food that may be contaminated or not fully cooked

    (3)   Observe appropriate hand hygiene practices

    (4)   Avoid prolonged contact with people with symptomatic respiratory conditions

    (5)   Comply with individual vector avoidance measures including wearing long sleeves, trousers during dusk to dawn, regular application of DEET or picaridin/icaridin-containing insect repellent; and ensure flyscreens are intact and/or use of bed nets (as relevant).

41.   **Coalition Civilians**. Civilians (APS, OGA, Media Embeds or Contractors etc.) deploying on OP SWIFT DEFENDER are to complete a PM630 Civilian Medical and Dental Pre-deployment Assessment form for their medical and dental pre-deployment checks.

42.   **Medical Rules of Entitlement (MEDROE).** HS is to be provided IAW the MEDROE at Enclosure 4. Deployed HS may be provided to ADF and Coalition members IAW bilateral SOFAs and this HSO. HS may be provided to local civilians in emergency circumstances.

43.   **Prisoners of War (PW), Civilian Internees and Detainees.** Medical care provided will be in accordance with the protocols of the Geneva Conventions governing warfare. Captured enemy medical supplies and personnel will be used to the maximum extent possible in the treatment of PW. Use of Class 8 supplies from 1 ANZAC DIV stocks is only authorised to provide the minimum accepted standard of care for PWs. Civilian Internees and Detainees will be provided medical care as appropriate and turned over to the appropriate civilian authority as soon as possible.

44.   **Local National Civilian Health Support and Humanitarian Assistance**. Unless specifically tasked to do so, there is no capacity for deployed health assets to provide designated health support or humanitarian assistance to local nationals (LN). Initial lifesaving medical treatment can be provided to the LN in the event of an emergency, IAW MEDROE. However, such treatment must only be continued until arrangements are made to transfer the patient to the local health system.

45.   **Medical documentation**. Medical documentation must be either directly inputted into DeHS during consultation or uploaded as soon as practicable for ADF members, and handed over to relevant National Agency for Coalition FE. Any clinical notes generated for civilians are to be retained by the member.

46.   Epidemiological health surveillance data is to be recorded using the approved and provided EpiTrack excel template and submitted with the weekly medical SITREP.

Administration and Logistics

47.   **Medical stores and supplies.** The supply of Class 8, blood products, cold chain management, stock holding policies and delivery locations is detailed in Annex XXXX to the OP SWIFT DEFENDER SPTORD, and will be IAW Ref Q.

48.   **Medical equipment.** Personnel are not to locally purchase, obtain or use medication or medical equipment that has not been supplied or approved by Australian or other designated health facilities. All medical equipment management, including materiel maintenance and technical regulation, is to be undertaken IAW current ADF maintenance policy.

49.   **Blood products and donation.** 1 ANZAC DIV is the Authorised Blood Control Officer and will monitor usage of all blood products within theatre. IAW Ref K, an Emergency Donor Panel (EDP) can be activated in emergency or mass casualty (MASCAS) situations if authorised by 1 ANZAC DIV. ADF members may volunteer for emergency donor panels only (i.e. not

regular donation to build a blood bank). Commanders must consider implications on combat readiness and approve any donations – noting the period of restricted duties of donors after donation (24 hours).

50.   **Medical waste.** Medical waste is to be disposed of IAW HN local arrangements or returned to Australia for disposal.

51.   **Pharmaceuticals management**. The management of pharmaceuticals is to be undertaken IAW Refs M and N.

52.   **Clinical governance.** The following clinical governance requirements are to be met by all health personnel deploying.

a.   **Currency**. The Mounting Authority is to ensure that health personnel are current and competent to perform their deployed roles IAW Single Service guidelines. This includes current AHPRA Registration and Post-graduate qualifications (where indicated).

b.   **Authorisation to carry (ATC).** IAW Ref N, the Mounting Authority is to ensure that all non-MOs carrying scheduled medications are appropriately certified as current and competent prior to deployment. All non-MOs are to carry a copy of their relevant treatment protocols at all times.

53.   **Health incident reporting**. IAW Ref O, health incidents involving ADF members as patients or health care providers are to be reported to HQJOC J07 using an AD441 Health Incident Report form.

53.   **Health care complaints**. Health care complaints are to be managed IAW Ref O. Health care complaints from ADF members are to be notified to the HQJOC J07 by email, within 24 hours.

54.   **Health Worthiness Checks**. Health Worthiness Checks will be conducted by 1 ANZAC DIV as required. Internal clinical governance audits are to be conducted for all health facilities as required. These clinical audits are to follow the National Safety and Quality Health Service (NSQHS) standards as close to possible, within limitations of their deployed environment, level of health support and staffing.

55.   **Sexual assault**. IAW Ref F, individuals reporting an alleged sexual assault are to be medically managed in country. The R2E is to be available to conduct sexual assault examinations if required.

Command and Signals

56.   Whilst OPCON of medical elements resides with the relevant Commander, TECHCON of all deployed medical elements is retained by 1 ANZAC DIV, and HQQJOC J07 retains overall TECHON of all healthcare delivery on an overseas operation. The senior medical officer

within each facility is the medical advisor to that commander and serves as the 1 ANZAC DIV representative for all matters.

57.   **Technical Control (TECHON).** HQJOC J07 retains overall technical control of health care delivery for any overseas operation. 1 ANZAC DIV is granted unrestricted DIRLAUTH with HQJOC J07.

58.   **Tactical Command.** The 1 ANZAC DIV is the senior deployed health person and has tactical command over all operational-level health issues and health care personnel.

59.   **Maritime Health**. DIRLAUTH with the Fleet Medical Officer is authorised for advice on maritime related health issues and to provide clinical advice to the ship's MO. All resultant reporting is to be through the operational chain of command.

60.   **Aviation Health.** DIRLAUTH with the Senior AVMO at RAAF Institute of Aviation Medicine (AVMED) is authorised for aviation specific health advice. All resultant reporting is to be through the operational chain of command.

61.   **SOCOMD Health**. DIRLAUTH with SOCOMD J07 is authorised for Special Operations health advice.

62.   **Reports and Returns.** The overall reporting of health incidents and issues is the responsibility of the 1 ANZAC DIV.

a.   **Health Situation Report**. A health situation report is to be provided to 1 ANZAC DIV daily including, as a minimum the following:

(1)   Significant casualties/cases

(2)   Casualty evacuations conducted

(3)   Capability issues

(4)   Health surveillance (threats).

b.   **NOTICAS**. IAW Ref C NOTICAS messages are to be raised as soon as possible by the member's CoC – this is not a health responsibility unless the member is part of the health team.

c.   **MEDICAS**. IAW Ref D, all MEDICAS notifications must be raised by an ADF MO as soon as practicable following medical incidents involving ADF personnel. Situations where access to an ADF MO is unavailable, including when communications are unavailable, the senior ADF health person will initiate the MEDICAS.

d.   NOTICAS and MEDICAS messages are to be raised when:

    (1)   An ADF/Coalition fatality occurs

    (2)   A casualty is classified as VSI, SI or Satisfactory, regardless of the mechanism of injury or illness (No medical information is to be placed on the NOTICAS)

    (3)   A member has been given greater than 72 hours Restricted Duty as a result of health issues

    (4)   A member is to be MRTA

    (5)   A member is treated for a vector borne or climate related illness

    (6)   A member is admitted to a health facility

    (7)   A member is declared Missing or has been captured (NOTICAS only).

63.   **Key Contacts.** Key contact details are as follows:

a.   HQJOC J07 - Tel: +XXXXXX

b.   HQJOC JOR Watch keeper - Tel: XXXXX

c.   HQJOC AOC AECC – Tel: XXXX

ENDORSED:

XXXXXXXXXXX

Enclosures:

1.   OP SWIFT DEFENDER Health threat assessment matrix
2.   OP SWIFT DEFENDER Pre-deployment health requirements
3.   OP SWIFT DEFENDER Post-deployment health requirements
4.   OP SWIFT DEFENDER Medical Rules of Eligibility

HEALTH THREAT ASESSMENT MATRIX - OP SWIFT DEFENDER AO		
Threat category	**Food and water-borne disease**	
Unmitigated risk	**HIGH**	
Mitigations	All personnel to be compliant with ADF routine vaccinations schedule, IAW Vaccination Manual (Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 8, chap. 12) Deploying personnel must have current Polio vaccination coverage and must BPT provide proof of vaccination. Additional vaccinations: Typhoid **Only drink commercially bottled water**, avoid local ice where possible. Avoid large reef fish and raw/incompletely cooked meat, fish and snails.	
Mitigated risk **(if all measures are effectively implemented)**	**LOW**	
Threat category	**Vector-borne disease (VBD)**	
Unmitigated risk	**HIGH**	
DENV and CHIKV	HIGH	
ZIKA	MEDIUM	Sporadic cases since 2012
JEV	HIGH	Endemic outbreaks reported
Malaria	MEDIUM	**Risk in the South Pacific region is considered HIGH**
Mitigations		

	All personnel are to employ individual protective measures - long sleeves and pants, DEET / Picaridin - containing insect repellent, use of bed nets (where possible). Where achievable, personnel should conduct permethrin dipping of all uniforms prior to deployment. All personnel should be made aware of the reproductive risks associated with Zika Virus. Personnel planning on reproduction should consult their treating GP to discuss the relevance of their travel to family planning. JEV vaccination is required for personnel deploying to this region. Recommend all personnel deploying to HIGH risk transmission areas receive chemoprophylaxis. Leptospirosis is a bacteria spread through soil and water contaminated with the urine of infected animals, and has a global distribution. Risk increases during periods of flooding. Person to person transmission is rare. Where there is an increased risk, personnel are to avoid contract with untreated water source, cover open wounds or scratches, and wash body and clothes thoroughly if exposed. **Note:** Target vectors are both day and night biting, therefore protective measures should be employed at all times.
Mitigated risk (if all measures are effectively implemented)	**LOW**
Threat category	**Sexually Transmitted Infections (STIs)**
Unmitigated risk	**HIGH** STIs including HIV are endemic throughout the region
Mitigations	Abstain from unprotected sex or other high risk activities involving exchange of or exposure to bodily fluids (including sharing of needles, body piercings/tattoos etc)
Mitigated risk (if all measures are effectively implemented)	**LOW**
Threat category	**Communicable diseases**

Unmitigated risk	**HIGH**	
Tuberculosis	HIGH	High burden (311-366/100K)
COVID-19	HIGH	
Mitigations	All personnel are to comply with ADF routine vaccination schedule IAW Vaccination Manual (Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 8, Chap. 12). Additional vaccinations: seasonal influenza vaccine and meningococcal meningitis vaccine. Tuberculosis is endemic throughout the region, post deployment screening is to be undertaken for personnel with close regular contact with a TB case; have spent 8 or more hours with a TB case in a confined environment; or deploy for 3 months or more to a country with an estimated annual TB incidence of at least 49/100K population, IAW Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 8, Chapt. 9 – Tuberculosis. COVID-19 – Cases have been reported in the region. there is low confidence in reporting and regional ability to detect, contain and respond to an outbreak; health infrastructure below Western Standards with limited capacity may impede access to emergency health support.	
Mitigated risk (if all measures are effectively implemented)	**LOW**	MITIGATED RISK OF TUBERCULOSIS: LOW **MITIGATED RISK OF COVD-19 – HIGH** if no integral health support is deployed
Threat category	**Environment**	
Unmitigated risk	**MEDIUM**	
Climatic conditions	MEDIUM	
Heat	MEDIUM	
Air quality	MEDIUM	
Mitigations	The nature of duties, climatic conditions and period of deployment are expected to exposure personnel to an increased risk of heat stress. Commanders are to ensure personnel comply with heat stress mitigations including work-rest cycles IAW SafetyMan –	

	Work Environment: Excessive Heat or Cold
	In the conduct of their duties, personnel may be exposure to environmental contaminants (e.g. hazardous chemicals, asbestos) and conditions (including reduced air quality). Personnel are to be cognisant of their safety and maintain Australian Standards. Operational Support Library Part 2, Vol. 3, Chap 3.12 Air Quality – Management of Particulate Matter Exposure provides information and guidance in the event of reduced air quality – particularly in areas affected by transboundary haze events.
Mitigated risk (if all measures are effectively implemented)	**LOW**

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP)

References:

A.   LWP-G 2-1-1 Psychological Operations, 04 Jun 18
B.   JP-3-13.2 Psychological Operations 07 January 2010
C. …….US Army FM 3-13 Inform and Influence Activities 25 January 2013
D.   Joint Publication 3-13.2 Military Information Support Operations 20 Dec 2011

1.   **<u>Situation.</u>**

a. <u>General.</u> See paragraph 1 of the OPORD main body.

b. <u>Host Nation Considerations.</u> The size of AO, the nature of the information environment and the population of South Torbia necessitates some reliance on the Host Nation's (HN) means to broadcast and disseminate messages to identified Target Audiences (TAs). South Torbia has openly agreed to cooperate with CJTF 667 formations and has granted Coalition forces access to approved state controlled media as a means to address TAs. 1 ANZAC DIV is to leverage this support.

c. <u>Threat Considerations.</u> See also Annex B (Intelligence).

      (1)   The North Torbian information environment is strongly influenced by strict censorship with the resultant self-censorship of the actors in the media domain. Consequently, the PSYOP ability to penetrate, influence and ultimately change audience behaviour is highly limited and requires indirect/intermediate audiences and methods to achieve the desired effects;

      (2)   The North Torbian regime has historically used propaganda and disinformation to influence or attempt to influence the South Torbian populace and the International Community and it is expected that they will continue such activities. The North Torbian government has mounted a carefully constructed, well-orchestrated, world-wide propaganda campaign as part of its strategic agenda. North Torbian information activities (IA) have already had some success influencing the information environment of South Torbia, mainly leveraging ethnic, political, security, and commercial issues, in an attempt to de-stabilize the South Torbian Government. North Torbian state broadcasting services and military forces undertake extensive measures to understand, paralyze, and persuade their adversaries. North Torbian military PSYOP elements provide a coordinating function for overarching information operations, including the systematic disinformation of a range of Target Audiences using multiple social media platforms.

(3)   North Torbian PSYOP products and activities are spread through an extended use of local radio, national TV, social media, Key Leader Engagements (KLE) and when agreed, interviews with foreign press. There have been indications of undercover North Torbian SPF, agents and proxies engaging with and influencing local South Torbian populations as well as International Organizations (IOs) and NGOs. It is assessed that the North Torbian government will continue to mount, both regionally and world-wide, a carefully constructed, well-orchestrated propaganda campaign in an attempt to:

    (a)   Justify its incursion into South Torbian territory

    (b)   Undermine the premise for and legitimacy of the IPANA Security and Assistance Mission

    (c)   Deny and discredit allegations leveled at North Torbia by South Torbia, the UN and the International Community

    (d)   Undermine the legitimacy and credibility of CJTF 667 and CJTF 667 as a well-organized, trained, capable, determined multinational force

    (e)   Undermine government and public support in South Torbia for CJTF 667, especially its support and cooperation as a HN

    (f)   Support claims of abuse and denial of rights of North Torbian minorities in South Torbia

    (g)   Undermine the impartiality of the International Community, state actors, and media organizations reporting on North Torbia's actions in the region.

2.   **Mission.** 1 MI BN is to conduct operations to minimize the impact of the North Torbian PSYOP narrative IOT weaken the will and efficiency of North Torbian Forces and other threat elements, while gaining, maintaining and increasing popular support for Coalition actions.

3.   **Execution.**

a.   <u>Commander's Intent</u>. PSYOPS is to operate as part of an integrated 1 ANZAC DIV Influence Activities campaign, focusing on combat PSYOP (US Army terminology Military Information Support Operations (MISO)), and perception management to multiply the effects along the operational functions of command, sense, shield, and act. COMD 1 ANZAC DIV wants to control, at the Division level, the narrative of the mission but allow formations to engage approved audiences to get messaging dominance in the AO, seize opportunities and counter the North Torbian narrative. 1 ANZAC DIV as part of CJTF 667 is to convey the perception that its presence is legitimate and that it is here to help the people of South Torbia. It must convince North Torbian Forces to the maximum extent possible that their cause is illegal and their position highly untenable.

b. Concept of Operations.

   (1) General. PSYOP/MISO are planned activities using methods of communication and other means directed at approved audiences to influence perceptions, attitudes, and behavior, affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. Operating as part of an integrated the CJTF 667 MISO campaign 1 INT BN and enablers are to contribute to Coalition achievement of Information Superiority in the Information Environment (IE) through the development of enhanced situational awareness, influence activities and exploitation of the Human Terrain (HT). PSYOP/MISO elements are to ensure coordination with South Torbian authorities to set the stage for Influence Activities to support 1 ANZAC DIV and CJTF 667 operations. Particular attention to North Torbian offensive cyber activities and attacks is required and all PSYOP/MISO elements, in close coordination with Info Ops, are to be prepared to plan and execute mitigating actions. PSYOP/MISO is to make use of existing South Torbian media. All activities and messaging are to be conducted in partnership with local authorities and South Torbian Forces. Own media capabilities for production and dissemination/broadcast require radio (including FM, Radio In a Box (RIAB) and short-wave broadcast), video/TV, print, and tactical PSYOP/MISO equipment including loudspeakers and Internet/Social Media.

   (2) Approach. PSYOP/MISO is to follow a phased, building-block approach. PSYOP/MISO will first focus on gathering atmospherics in the AO, identifying the motivations and vulnerabilities of insurgents and AN-sponsored agents, and countering North Torbian messaging. PSYOP/MISO is also to support the effort of CIMIC elements in order to facilitate the initial movements of 1 ANZAC DIV by conducting outreach programs (as possible within the limited time period) at the provincial and district level. As 1 ANZAC DIV transitions to decisive operations, the focus is to be on attaining and maintaining messaging dominance, neutralizing North Torbian messaging capacity in South Torbia, and enhancing the messaging capacity of South Torbian security forces and local governance. Then, to support stability, PSYOP/MISO is to highlight South Torbian Armed Forces' achievements and promote a safe and secure environment, thereby setting the stage for transition to a follow-on force and the redeployment of CJTF 667 and 1 ANZAC DIV.

c. PSYOP/MISO Support to 1 ANZAC DIV Scheme of Manoeuver

   (1) Preliminary Moves. PSYOP/MISO enablers are to contribute to the continuous development of a shared understanding, confirm Target Audience Analysis identification, and contribute to the Information Preparation of the Operating Environment (IPOE). PSYOP/MISO is to confirm liaison with South Torbian Governmental agencies and South Torbian Armed Forces, to ensure a coordinated approach regarding messages, utilizing dedicated slots and space in Governmental media. Concurrently, PSYOP/MISO is to mitigate the effectiveness of North Torbian propaganda and disinformation directed against 1 ANZAC DIV/CJTF 667 and South Torbia. Special attention is to be paid to the North Torbian ethnic minority in northern South Torbia. PSYOP/MISO Objectives to be stressed in this

phase are to focus on supporting Coalition unity and resolve, legitimacy and credibility of the 1 ANZAC DIV/CJTF 667, securing and maintaining South Torbian support, countering North Torbian propaganda, and attacking North Torbian Forces will to fight. PSYOP/MISO is also to support the CJTF 667 Military Deception Plan throughout;

(2) Phase I Block TPA Adv South and Destroy 5 Mech Div. PSYOP/MISO operations are to continue and consolidate activities from the Preliminary Moves. During Phase I, PSYOP/MISO operations is to begin to conduct full spectrum PSYOP/MISO operations within the Information Environment and consistent with the CJTF 667 PSYOP/MISO campaign, to contribute to the achievement of Information Supremacy and intensive support to the 1 ANZAC DIV and CJTF 667 tactical plans. This is to be conducted through combat PSYOP/MISO, counter-PSYOP, and a targeted psychological campaign. Information superiority is to be gained and maintained to ensure that the North Torbian PSYOP narrative is neutralized and its offensive posture is degraded. To support 1 ANZAC DIV/CJTF 667 decisive operations, PSYOP/MISO is to focus on degrading the morale and the cohesion of North Torbian security forces, in particular HQs, first echelon elements, tactical reserves, communication nodes and logistics centres. This approach could also indirectly influence North Torbian leadership. PSYOP/MISO is to support counter-insurgent activities by exposing the links between North Torbia and its proxies operating in South Torbia. Information Operations is to disrupt North Torbian C4I by supporting physical destruction , Electronic Warfare (EW), and PSYOP/MISO to diminish its propaganda, disrupt C2, degrade situational awareness and delay its decision-making in order to compel the withdrawal of North Torbian military forces from South Torbia.

(3) Phase II Clear TPA from SOUTH TORBIA and secure Cease Fire Line.. Same as for Phase I, plus the focus is to be on maintenance of Information Supremacy and domination of the Information Environment to reinforce 1 ANZAC DIV/CJTF 667 tactical success, bolster South Torbian resolve and support, and to deter any decrease in North Torbian compliance with the will of the International Community. Special attention is to be paid to asymmetric threats inside South Torbia during this phase. The role of the South Torbian government and South Torbian Armed Forces in supporting 1 ANZAC DIV/CJTF 667 to achieve the North Torbian withdrawal from South Torbia is to be highlighted;

(4) Phase III Clear TPA from WAIKATO/BAY OF PLENTY region in SOUTH TORBIA and secure MDL.. In this Phase PSYOP/MISO activities are to continue to build and consolidate on previous activities. PSYOP/MISO is to convince TPA KDM that CJTF 667 and ROTA will halt IOT estb previously agreed MDL. In addition, PSYOP/MISO is to support Civil Military Operations (CMO) as they start to prepare the way and lay the foundation for eventual transition to post-combat stabilization efforts.

(5) Phase IV STABOPS. Same as Phase III, in addition PSYOP/MISO is to directly support any 1 ANZAC DIV /CJTF 667 roles in stabilization activities in South

Torbia. PSYOP/MISO main effort of this phase is to be the improvement of the perception and achievements of the Government of South Torbia and the South Torbian Armed Forces. In this phase, messaging is to emphasize the successes of the Coalition in restoring South Torbian sovereignty, facilitating reconstruction and humanitarian aid, and assisting in the capacity building of local authorities. Early attention is to be paid to the capture of lessons learned and best practices, shaping regional and international perceptions of the mission and establishing a positive legacy for IPANA, CJTF 667, CJTF 667 and 1 ANZAC DIV.

d.   PSYOP/MISO Psychological Objectives (POs) and Supporting Psychological Objectives (SPOs). The following are approved POs and SPOs in the 1 ANZAC DIV AO and will be used to coordinate, integrate, synchronize and evaluate PSYOP/MISO activities. Should PSYOP/MISO elements need further POs and SPOs, they are to be forwarded to HQ 1 ANZAC DIV for approval.

(1)   Effect. Support for OSD as a legitimate mission and CJTF 667 / 1 (ANZAC) Div as legitimate, determined and capable forces is increased. PO: Increase legitimacy of campaign.

(a)   SPO: Target Audience (TA) reports enemy activity to authorities

(b)   SPO: TA decreases support to North Torbian forces

(c)   SPO: TA surrenders to CJTF 667 forces and HN security forces.

(2)   Effect. Effectiveness of North Torbian hostile propaganda and disinformation directed against CJTF 667 / CJTF 667 / 1 ANZAC DIV and South Torbia is reduced. PO: Decrease support to North Torbian campaign.

(a)   SPO: TA obeys all CJTF 667 instructions

(b)   SPO: TA reports North Torbian propaganda

(c)   SPO: TA uses CJTF 667 media for news/information.

(3)   Effect. North Torbian offensive posture directed towards South Torbia, CJTF 667, CJTF 667 and 1 ANZAC DIV is reduced. PO: Decrease of AN Armed Forces and other threat elements   activity.

(a)   SPO: TA surrenders to CJTF 667 forces

(b)   SPO: TA deserts and/or resumes a normal peaceful life.

(4)   Effect. North Torbia is compelled to withdraw from occupied South Torbian territory. (POs and SPOs are still in development).

(5)   Effect. North Torbian influence in South Torbia is degraded. PO: Decrease support for Arianian intervention.

      (a)   SPO: TA organizes/participates in anti-Arianian protests;

      (b)   SPO: TA reports on enemy activity; and

      (c)   SPO: TA openly criticizes Arianian government.

(6)   <u>Effect.</u> South Torbian civil and military authorities' legitimacy and integrity is promoted. PO:

      (a)   Increase support for South Torbian Government.

          i.   SPO: TA attends South Torbian Government sponsored meetings and events;

          ii.   SPO: TA utilizes existing national government institutions or services;

          iii.   SPO: TA joins or works for national government institutions or services;

          iv.   SPO: TA organizes/participates in pro-South Torbian rally/organizational event;

          v.   SPO: TA seeks employment with South Torbian Government

      (b)   SPO: TA sends children to school. PO: Increase in Humanitarian Assistance Activities.

          i.   SPO: TA audience participates in humanitarian aid distribution;

          ii.   SPO: TA reports aggression against humanitarian aid;

          iii.   SPO: TA publically condones humanitarian assistance;

          iv.   SPO: TA registers to voluntarily leave IDP/Refugee camps; and

          v.   SPO: TA participates in in IDP relocation/return to home programs.

(7)   <u>Effect.</u> The perception of ROTA is enhanced. PO: Increase support for AP Armed Forces.

      (a)   SPO: TA supports person enlisting in ROTA;

      (b)   SPO: TA enlists in ROTA; and

      (c)   SPO: TA re-enlists in ROTA.

e.   <u>Target Audiences (TAs).</u> The following IPANA-approved Target Audiences are authorized for PSYOP/MISO:

(1)   General populations within the AO

(2)   South Torbian political and governmental decision makers, influencers and communicators

(3)   South Torbian religious/ethnic/community/group influencers

(4)   Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Refugees

(5)   South Torbian Armed Forces

(6)   South Torbian media

(7)   North Torbian Government and North Torbian Armed Forces

(8)   North Torbian civil Institutions and political parties

(9)   North Torbian proxy forces and cyber assets operating within the AO.

f.   <u>Themes to Avoid.</u>

(1)   Any discrepancy or disagreement within the Coalition or TCNs or between the Coalition and TCNs

(2)   Any discrepancy or disagreement between CJTF 667 /TCNs and HNs

(3)   Any criticism of the UN, IPANA or other IOs

(4)   Any comments on the national policy of CJTF 667 TCNs

(5)   Any religious reference or innuendo

(6)   Any ultimatums that cannot be immediately carried out.

g.   <u>Coordinating Instructions.</u>

(1)   <u>Approval Authorities.</u>

(a)   The CJTF 667-approved PSYOP/MISO effects are the guidelines for all 1 ANZAC DIV PSYOP/MISO activities within the AO. Any requested change to these objectives must be submitted by 1 ANZAC DIV through CJTF 667 for CJTF 667 support and approval

(b)   Comd CJTF 667 is the approving authority for PSYOPS/MISO products and activities intended to achieve effects at tactical level. Approval is to be sought through HQ 1 ANZAC DIV

(c)   Operational level PSYOP/MISO effects, intentions and products are to be forwarded through HQ 1 ANZAC DIV to higher command for approval.

(2)   Attribution. 1 ANZAC DIV PSYOP/MISO activities are to acknowledge sources (white PSYOP), and all PSYOP/MISO products in the AO are to be ultimately attributable to CJTF 667 or 1 ANZAC DIV.

(3)   Product Submission. All products are to be submitted to HQ 1 ANZAC DIV together with a completed Product Action Work Sheet (PAWS) or a Series Concept Work Sheet (SCW). Action verbs are to be included on PAWS/SCW to aid in the decision making process. All Counter PSYOP   products are to be based on a detailed analysis and are to be accompanied by   a completed Source, Content, Audience, Media, Effects (SCAME) analysis. Every 30 days, all MISO elements 1 ANZAC DIV AO are to end out a consolidated file with all products approved (approved product book) over the previous month to HQ 1 ANZAC DIV. This is to ensure consistent messaging throughout the AO.

(4)   Non-targets. 1 ANZAC DIV PSYOP/MISO is not to target the international media, the UN, IPANA/IPANA TCNs, or the forces and civilian audiences of TCNs outside of the CJTF 667 AO.

(5)   Reach-Back. 1 ANZAC DIV PSYOP/MISO reach-back capability is to be coordinated with 1 INT BN.

(6)   Intelligence. PSYOP/MISO support is to identify intelligence gaps on Target Audience-related issues for further processing and feedback.

(7)   HN Assets. 1 ANZAC DIV and 1 INT BN to arrange for PSYOP/MISO access to South Torbian Government media. Private South Torbian media is to be contracted based on operational requirements and HQ 1 ANZAC DIV approval.

(8)   Influence Activities Coordination and Integration. PSYOP/MISO staff are to ensure that planning, execution and assessments are coordinated with Influence Activities at all levels.

(9)   Requests for PSYOP/MISO support. On request and with the support of HQ CJTF 667, 1 INT BN may request additional support for assets, capabilities and products from INDOPACOM providing support to HQ CJTF 667.

4.   **Service Support.**

a.   Stocking and Delivery. HQ 1 ANZAC DIV is to stock RIABs, crank radio and other approved PSYOP/MISO products to support CJTF 667-approved PSYOP effects. Requests for approved products are to be forwarded to HQ 1 ANZAC DIV. Brigade PSYOP/MISO elements are responsible for producing and stocking approved PSYOPS products/activities which do not fall under the CJTF 667-approved PSYOP effect but are in support of Brigade effects;

b.   Budgetary. TCNs are responsible for supply and maintenance of nationally owned equipment. Budgetary support requests, including that for consumable supplies, articles for mass

consumption, costs for using public media and forecasts for new programmes and projects, are to be forwarded to HQ 1 ANZAC DIV.

c.   Controlling and maintaining indigenous assets. Brigade elements are responsible for hiring and controlling their own assets.

2.   **Command and Signal.** No change to base OPORD.

<div align="right">
ANNEX O TO
1 ANZAC DIV OPORD
</div>

INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO)

References:
A. B-GG-005-004/AF-010 CF Information Operations, 1998
B. FM 3-13 Inform and Influence Activities, Jan 2013
C. Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations, Nov 2012
D. Joint Publication 3-53 Civil-Military Operations, 08 Jul 2008
E. Joint Publication 3-13.2 Military Information Support Operations 20 Dec 2011
F. North Torbia Country Study -
    https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/DATE/Pacific/North%20Torbia
G. South Torbia Country Study -
    https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/DATE/Pacific/South%20Torbia

1.   **Situation.**

a.   General. See paragraph 1 of 1 ANZAC DIV OPORD.

b.   Host Nation Civil Considerations. (See also reference G.)

    (1)   Information Environment.

        (a)   South Torbia has a thriving and relatively free information environment. Internet and television media are state-of-the-art, and the most important form of media in South Torbia.

        (b)   South Torbia's mass media operates with freedom of the press, but an anti-defamation law means journalists must continue to use self-censorship to ensure they do not face harsh penalties from the government on adverse reporting.

        (c)   The internet is the most free form of information media, with social media being the preferred means of expressing individual opinions. South Torbians have access to information from sources around the world.

    (2)   Political Environment.

        (a)   The Republic of Torbia, commonly referred to as South Torbia, is a constitutional republic. After centuries of foreign occupation and authoritarian rule, South Torbia emerged in the late 20th century as one of the world's fastest growing economies. Today it is one of the world's wealthiest, most stable, and militarily powerful nations in the region.

    (b)   South Torbia is a representative republic, with the executive and legislature elected by popular vote. The national/federal government is far more powerful and influential than provincial governments. A carefully constructed systems of checks and balances aims for long-term stability.

    (c)   The South Torbians see their government as legitimate. Protests are expected and tolerated when the government missteps or when activists are able to rally sufficient support. Unrest and protests against past government overreach and abuses are still within the collective memory of the people and encourages caution on the part of the government it faces opposition.

    (d)   Despite some corruption scandals lately, the South Torbian government attempts to govern properly and remain legitimate. Police, judicial, and political corruption is considered unacceptable by society. A vigorous media and activists provide impetus to insure criminal activity is investigated and prosecuted. While corruption exists and is never far from discussions about the government, South Torbia is viewed by most as reasonably effective in addressing issues that might delegitimize the government. This can be seen in the prosecution and conviction of a South Torbian president and other high government officials.

    (e)   North Torbia maintains a territorial claim over South Torbia. Any attempt at a negotiation between the two sides is subject to significant concessions neither side has been willing to give. Periodically, fishing rights and other water border issues reach warm diplomatic levels.

  (3)   <u>Analysis.</u>

    (f)   The size of the AO and nature of the information environment and population in South Torbia will necessitate some reliance on the HN's means to broadcast and disseminate messages to identified Target Audiences (TAs). South Torbia has agreed to cooperate with CJTF 667 and grant access to state controlled media as means to address Target Audiences.

    (g)   The presence of large numbers of South Torbian citizens displaced from their homes because of collateral damage, or fleeing in the face of hostile operations, will require careful targeting and restrictive ROE to prevent civilian casualties. Air assets may be required to conduct Non-Traditional Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (NTISR) to monitor displaced civilian movements and civil unrest/demonstrations. Existing IDP camps will need to be identified in coordination with HN, Interagency, and NGO representatives (See Appendix 2 (IDP and Refugees in South Torbia) to Annex W (Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC)).

c.   <u>Threat Considerations.</u> Also see Annex B (Intelligence).

(1)   North Torbia's government has created an extremely repressive information environment. As part of its efforts to maintain control of its population, the government controls nearly every facet of the information environment. The police-state mentality has penetrated the population to such a degree, that it is almost unheard of for non-government controlled information to be shared within the population, and thanks to the cult of personality around its leaders, most other sources are viewed as untrustworthy. While the population within North Torbia may lack access to modern information and communication technology, North Torbia's government controls a sophisticated and extremely capable INFOWAR and Cyber capability that it uses against external opposition and adversarial governments.

(2)   North Torbia considers South Torbia part of its territory with the ultimate goal to reunited all of Torbia under control by the current ruler in the DPRT. Consequently North Torbia directs its social media campaign at South Torbian citizens— not their own—as the common North Torbian cannot access the Internet. The North Torbian government attempts to manage the perception of its own people through the control of the information environment. The TPA will include the use of old school techniques such as leaflets and other propaganda methods to attempt to turn South Torbians into supporting North Torbian operations. Periodically, North Torbia drops leaflets from balloons over South Torbia to try and convince the people that their President's government is illegitimate and that Song should be ruling all of Torbia.

(4)   North Torbian military forces use its information capabilities to promote disinformation in order to manipulate public perception and maintain control. It is likely to use asymmetric techniques to counter the IPANA/CJTF 667 narrative using Information Warfare (INFOWAR). The TPA may employ proxy forces to conduct PSYOPS within South Torbia, in order to provide false information to interfere with International Organizations and NGOs.

(5)   It is expected that the TPA will continue to mount sophisticated information operations in support of their overall military campaign. During operations, the TPA is likely to use messengers, as well as Frequency-Modulated (FM) and Amplitude-Modulated (AM) radios for routine communications. The TPA and its proxies can organize a network of human intelligence (HUMINT) operatives supported with sufficient off-the-shelf electronic eavesdropping and jamming devices to interfere with friendly operations throughout the AO. Conversely the TPA's counter-battery radars are vulnerable to Electronic Warfare (EW);

(6)   The TPA's GPS jammers are capable of disrupting UAS guidance and GPS guided munitions. In addition, the TPA has demonstrated the ability to conduct Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks against South Torbian unclassified networks as well as commercial and local networks within the civilian sector. With the combination of EW and Cyberspace Operations (CO) capabilities provided by Olvana, the TPA possesses the ability to disrupt command and control.

(7) It is assessed that the North Torbian government will continue to mount, both regionally and world-wide, a carefully constructed, well-orchestrated propaganda campaign in an attempt to:

    (a) Justify its incursion into South Torbian territory

    (b) Undermine the premise for and legitimacy of the US-led IPANA mission

    (c) Deny and discredit allegations leveled at them by South Torbia, IPANA, the UN and the remainder of the International Community

    (d) Undermine the legitimacy and credibility of CJTF 667 and CTF 667.2 as a well-organized, trained, capable, determined multinational force

    (e) Undermine government and public support in South Torbia for CJTF 667, especially their support and cooperation as a HN

    (f) Support claims of abuse and denial of rights of North Torbian minorities in South Torbia

    (g) Undermine South Torbian claims and correspondingly support their claims to unify the two countries

    (h)   Undermine the impartiality of International, state actors and media organizations reporting on North Torbia's actions in the region.

d. <u>CJTF 667 Core Themes.</u>

(1) <u>Intent.</u> CJTF 667 is committed to supporting the enforcement of IPANA's resolve IOT restore South Torbian sovereign territory and create conditions for regional stability. Establishment of the security conditions envisioned by the UN will enable CJTF 667 to withdraw from an active military presence in the region.

(2) <u>Legitimacy.</u> CJTF 667 actions are based on International Law and the UN Charter. Close consultation with the UN, the regional actors and the international organizations will occur throughout the entire campaign.

(3) <u>Resolve.</u> CJTF 667 will act to enforce IPANA's commitments, UN Security Council Resolutions and support the people of South Torbia, in order to protect their rights and legitimate aspirations.

(4) <u>Cooperation.</u> CJTF 667 is cooperating within the context of a larger international response and coordinating its activities closely with a broad range of stakeholders and actors. CJTF 667's efforts are in support of the wider International Community (IC) effort to achieve a resolution to the crisis.

(5) <u>Responsibility / Necessity to Act.</u> The continuing violence and illegal actions perpetrated by the Arianian regime are the cause for the current crisis in the

region. CJTF 667 will exercise its moral obligation to protect and help those in need, independent of their race, gender, religion or ethnicity.

e. <u>CJTF 667 Strategic Guidance.</u>

(1) IO will contribute decisively to Domain Awareness, Situational Understanding and Domination of the Information Environment in support of COMD CJTF 667's and COMD LCC-OBA's plans.

(2) IO are to deny North Torbian forces and their proxy groups, insurgents, and/or North Torbian-supported criminal elements the ability to effectively command and control their forces by defeating their command, control, communications, computer and Intelligence (C4I) systems.

(3) Communications for this operation will continue in support of crisis resolution and humanitarian assistance across diplomatic, information and economic domains.

(4) Key audiences must clearly understand the CJTF 667 mission and CTF 667.2 deployment, intentions and determination to succeed. The prioritized audiences are:

(a) North Torbian civil and military leadership and opinion formers.

(b) South Torbian civil and military leadership, opinion formers and populations.

(c) Coalition members' populations and opinion formers.

2. **Mission.** Operating as part of an integrated Coalition Influence Activities campaign, Information Operations is to shape the AO to achieve Information Superiority and dominate the Information Environment through the coordinated contribution of enablers in support of the 1 ANZAC DIV mission.

3. **Execution.**

a. <u>Concept of Operations.</u>

(1) <u>Intent.</u> IO will be focused on the coordination of enablers in achieving the 1 ANZAC DIV mission to deliver synchronized effects on the will, understanding and capabilities on approved target audiences (TAs). The intent is to meet and defeat any threat to 1 ANZAC DIV's objectives by demonstrating commitment and resolve while maintaining the confidence of the population. From the outset, the expectations of the population are to be managed while countering any perceived threats to this operation. All military information activities must mitigate negative effects associated with combat operations. Every opportunity to effect decision makers and their decision making cycles is to be exploited.

(2) <u>General.</u> IO enablers are to be employed within an overall CJTF 667 Information Activities campaign, with a view to support information objectives in an aggressive and pro-active manner to maintain the IO initiative. Coordination, synchronization and de-confliction of associated enabling functions are to focus on flexible responses to consequence management and exploitation of opportunities. IO will support the mission by disrupting North Torbian C4I, diminishing the TPA's "will to fight," persuading the South Torbian civilian populace to cooperate with Coalition operations, and protecting friendly information systems;

(3) <u>IO Themes.</u>

    (a) <u>Security and Stability.</u> All South Torbians deserve freedom from violence and fear. The fight is not against the North Torbian people, but the brutal North Torbian government. The North Torbian military and people are misled by their government's lies and ambitions. CJTF 667 was authorized by IPANA to protect the territorial integrity of South Torbia and to help restore a secure and stable environment for the South Torbian people.

    (b) <u>Legitimacy.</u> The future of South Torbia is in the hands of the South Torbian people and the Atropian government. Humanitarian assistance is a high priority to the people of the South Torbia and is supported by the Commanders of South Torbian and Coalition forces. CJTF 667 is an IPANA-sanctioned mission and CJTF 667 forces are well-trained, ethical, competent, credible, acting under an IPANA mandate with the welcome support and assistance of the international community, in particular the governments of Belesia and South Torbia.

    (c) <u>Economic and Social Progress.</u> Acting in accordance with the Rule of Law, and with the support of the international community, South Torbian authorities will continue to promote effective democratic governance, and economic and social progress to the benefit of all its citizens throughout the CJTF 667 deployment and after it has withdrawn.

b.   <u>IO Objectives.</u>

(1) Promote Coalition unity, capability, and resolve.

(2) Promote the legitimacy and credibility of 1 ANZAC DIV to include the broader construct of CJTF 667.

(3) Influence the HN civil authorities, military forces, and population, as well as International Organizations and NGOs operating in the AO, to trust, support and cooperate with 1 ANZAC DIV.

(4) Promote efforts to reinforce the South Torbian population's trust and confidence in their government and military forces to help set conditions for the re-establishment of a safe and secure environment.

(5) Counter North Torbian propaganda and its narrative. Refute North Torbian justifications for its incursion into South Torbia. Disrupt the TPA's C4I and degrade its "will to fight".

(6) Protect Coalition information systems and decision-making processes by employing OPSEC and physical security to deny enemy access to friendly capabilities.

(7) Protect CJTF 667 Freedom of Movement in the Information Environment.

c.　　IO Target Audiences. The following Target Audiences are authorized for PSYOP/MISO:

(1) General populations within the AO.

(2) South Torbian political and governmental decision makers, influencers and communicators.

(3) South Torbian religious/ethnic/community/group influencers.

(4) Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Refugees.

(5) South Torbian Armed Forces.

(6) South Torbian media'

(7) The TPA, in particular in order of priority – 6 MECH INF DIV, 64 TANK BDE, and 5 MECH INF DIV.

(8) North Torbian proxy forces and cyber assets operating within the AO.

d.　　IO Tasks. Contribute to the overall CJTF 667 IO campaign through following tasks:

(1) Coordinate 1 ANZAC DIV Information Operations activities.

(2) Disrupt TPA C4I and reduce its soldiers' will to fight.

(3) Influence the local populace to cooperate with Coalition forces.

(4) Exploit North Torbian military personnel captures/surrenders.

(5) Counter North Torbian propaganda and media inaccuracies.

(6) Exploit North Torbian atrocities.

(7)   Protect friendly information systems.

(8)   Develop and coordinate target lists to disrupt, damage, and destroy North Torbian military ability to develop, produce, and disseminate propaganda activity.

(9)   Develop and coordinate target lists to disrupt TPA C4I capabilities.

(10) Conduct PSYOP to prevent local civilian interference with operations and to gain support for coalition forces.

(11) Coordinate with civil affairs for Humanitarian Assistance (HA) support.

(12) Analyze captured North Torbian targeting folders (particularly pertaining to South Torbian infrastructure and local leaders) to determine viability for use in discrediting North Torbian Nominate Captured HVI target packages for exploitation.

(13) Collect and record any evidence of enemy military use of schools, hospitals, and other prohibited sites for use in de-legitimizing the actions of the North Torbian government/military for international and local consumption.

(14) Inform national and international audiences of friendly force progress and efforts to reinforce the strength, legitimacy and good intentions of CJTF 667.

(15) Exploit any brutality by North Torbian-backed insurgent forces or criminal elements (e.g., kidnapping, torture, murder, indirect fire and IED attacks that injure civilians, and use of residential areas or protected sites as operational bases).

(16) Exploit South Torbian participation in successful IDP/refugee returns.

(17) Report locations of broadcast facilities (radio, TV, print facilities).

(18) Be prepared to conduct security area leaflet drops utilizing CJTF 667 air/aviation assets.

e.   Scheme of Manoeuvre. The 1 ANZAC DIV IO plan is to ensure centralized synchronization, integration, and coordination while remaining decentralized in execution IOT remain flexible and responsive to local requirements. By applying appropriate enablers (especially Presence, Posture and Profile (PPP), PSYOPS, CIMIC and KLE) in time and space, 1 ANZAC DIV operations will be both proactive and reactive, exploiting opportunities when they arise and performing consequence management when required:

(1)   Preliminary Moves. Completion of preparations in TAAs:

(a)   IO Effects:

i.   North Torbian Armed Forces combat effectiveness is reduced.

ii.   Armed factions and other belligerents do not interfere with deployment.

iii.   Establish an OPEN PPP when operating in South Torbia (see para 3.h.(2)(d) of this Annex).

(b)   Key IO Tasks. Tasks are to be conducted with due consideration of the ordered electronic silence:

i.   Communicate to the South Torbian population that the 1 ANZAC DIV objective is to preserve South Torbian sovereignty.

ii.   Emphasize that 1 ANZAC DIV intends to establish a safe and secure environment wherein UN organizations and NGOs can implement a comprehensive humanitarian aid program.

iii.   Condemn the North Torbian Government, armed factions and criminal elements for their unlawful actions against the people of South Torbia.

iv.   Degrade the North Torbian Armed Forces' capacity to conduct combat operations by emphasizing that 1 ANZAC DIV is a legitimate, sanctioned, offensive operation.

(2)   Phase 1 – Block TPA Advance and Destroy 5 Mech Div.

(a)   IO Effects:

i.   Military Deception Plan is successful.

ii.   Armed factions and other belligerents do not interfere with operations.

(b)   Key IO Tasks. Tasks are to be conducted with due consideration of the ordered electronic silence:

i.   Negate adversary propaganda.

ii. Demonstrate strength and deter interference by adopting CLOSED PPP initially and as required based on threat.

iii. Diminish 1 ANZAC DIV's operations effects on local population.

iv. Degrade TPA C4ISR targets.

(3) Phase 2 – Advance to Cease Fire Line.

    (a) IO Effects.

        i. North Torbian Armed Forces combat effectiveness is reduced.

        ii. Population is shielded from propaganda.

        iii. Local, Regional and Global audience understand 1 ANZAC DIV's purpose and objectives.

        iv. South Torbian resolve and support for Coalition operations is bolstered.

    (b) Key IO Tasks.

        i. Disrupt and degrade North Torbian C4I by supporting Physical Destruction (PD), Electronic Warfare (EW) and PSYOP.

        ii. Degrade North Torbian Armed Forces' capacity to conduct combat operations by emphasizing that 1 ANZAC DIV's operation is a legitimate, sanctioned, offensive operation.

        iii. Inform local, regional and global audiences of 1 ANZAC DIV's objectives and purpose to maintain cohesion to sustain military ops.

        iv. Diminish 1 ANZAC DIV's operations effects on the local population.

        v. Promote ROTA actions to strengthen South Torbian resolve.

(4) Phase 3 – Advance to MDL.

    (a) IO Effects.

        i. South Torbian resolve and support for Coalition operations is bolstered.

        ii. North Torbian Armed Forces combat effectiveness is reduced.

    iii.   Transition to Phase IV (STABOPS) is facilitated and communicated.

  (b)   <u>Key IO Tasks.</u>

       i.   Convince North Torbian Armed Forces personnel to surrender or desert, reduce their will to fight.

      ii.   Continue to disrupt and degrade North Torbian C4I.

     iii.   Inform populace of Coalition intentions and location of humanitarian assistance and services.

     iv.   Safeguard NGO/IO freedom of movement to enable humanitarian assistance and services.

      v.   Negate adversary propaganda to safeguard legitimacy of 1 ANZAC DIV's mission.

     vi.   Inform North Torbian Armed Forces and belligerents of consequences of Human Rights and LOAC violations.

    vii.   Exploit North Torbian military personnel captures/surrenders.

   viii.   Exploit North Torbian atrocities.

 (5)   <u>Phase 4 – Conduct STABOPS.</u>

  (c)   <u>IO Effects</u>.

       i.   1 ANZAC DIV's operational success is seen as essential for HA and return of IDPs.

      ii.   South Torbian local population supports 1 ANZAC DIV's stabilization efforts.

     iii.   TCA isolated from NT and civpop spt.

     iv.   Future handover to follow-on forces or South Torbian security forces is communicated.

  (d)   <u>IO Tasks</u>.

       i.   HA activities are supported and communicated.

      ii.   GoST promoted to encourage civpop spt.

     iii.   TCA narrative undermined.

iv.   TCA C4 degraded.

v.   Regional and international perceptions of the mission are shaped to establish a positive legacy for IPANA and CJTF 667.

vi.   Lessons learned and best practices are captured.

f.   <u>Main Effort.</u> During Preliminary Moves and Phase I Military Deception is the main effort. During Phases II and III it is the degradation and disruption of North Torbian Armed Forces' combat effectiveness. In Phase IV it is isolation of TCA from civpop.

g.   <u>Coordinating Instructions.</u>

(1)   <u>Targeting.</u> Uncoordinated IO activities within the targeting process can compromise 1 ANZAC DIV's operations and the CJTF 667 mission as a whole. Whether lethal or non-lethal targeting is considered, IO is to be involved in all targeting matters in order to either exploit achieved effects or to avoid/mitigate undesired effects. For more detail see Annex KK (Joint Fires and Targeting).

(2)   <u>IO Enablers.</u> IO enablers are to contribute to mission success through the following functions:

(a)   Influence Activities (IA).

(b)   <u>Psychological Operations (PSYOP).</u> Additional details in Annex L (PSYOP).

(c)   <u>Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC).</u> Close coordination between the IO and CIMIC staff elements is required for many CIMIC activities. Specifically in support of the Key Leader Engagement (KLE), Liaison with Non-Military actors, synchronizing the information activities related to reconstruction, development and governance projects, and establishing operational and tactical theatre civil assessment (TCA). CIMIC contributes to all STRATCOM, IO and Targeting related (WG & Boards) processes in HQs on all levels.   Additional details in Annex W (Civil Military Cooperation).

(d)   <u>Presence, Posture and Profile (PPP).</u> The manner in which troops interact with local populace will send an important message to this audience, which will either undermine or engender support. The message may change over time from one of serious intent to one of approachable information collector depending upon the current situation. PPP is a guide to assist forces in determining the attitude, deportment and level of security they should adopt in any given situation. Brigade commanders are best able to determine the PPP that fits their situation and local atmospherics. PPP levels will be indicated in orders as required. PPP states for ground forces are as follows:

i.   CLOSED. Threatening posture normally aimed at unsupportive or hostile targets;

    ii.   NEUTRAL. Professional/dispassionate posture normally aimed at unknown or manipulative targets; and

    iii.   OPEN. Encouraging posture normally aimed at uncommitted and neutral targets.

(e)   Military Deception (MILDEC). Additional details Appendix 2 (Military Deception) to Annex G (Land Operations);

(f)   Public Affairs (PA). PA and IO are separate but related functions. By contributing to the development of master messages and by delivering factual, true and credible information without endangering the OPSEC, PA demonstrates 4 MND's legitimacy, credibility, and resolve, while informing international TCNs, local political leadership and public opinion through the media. 4 MND formations and support elements must ensure that timely success stories are provided to PA for possible delivery to the media. Additional details in Annex X;

(g)   Computer Network Operations (CNO). Emphasis will be on Computer Network Defence (CND) and Computer Security (COMPUSEC). 1 ANZAC DIV is to support the CJTF 667 mission with Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) and/or Computer Network Attack (CNA) capabilities when necessary and if ROE allowed. IO is to coordinate with G3/5/JEMS, who has the lead for the protection of networks, and coordinate with G2/Knowledge Centre for threat assessments of adversary CNA capabilities to determine the threat to 1 ANZAC DIV Mission Secret computer networks. Based on assessments of the threat, IO is to recommend protective measures to the Commander in coordination with Communications and Information Systems Branch for assessment of impact on current operations and C2. Additional details are provided in Annex Q (CIS).

(h)   Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA). CEMA is to support Information Activities including STRATCOM, IO, PSYOPS and CIMIC by the use or employment of Electronic Attack (EA) and Electronic Defence (ED). EA could also be used, if applicable, to support 1 ANZAC DIV means of Cyber-Defence in line with ED. Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) are to be used to support 4 MND Information Activities (Messaging/Broadcasting) or to counter adversary Information Activities in conjunction with adjacent Rules of Engagement. Additional details are provided in Annex Q (CIS).

(i)   Operations Security (OPSEC).

(j)   Information Security (INFOSEC).

(k)   Counter Intelligence (CI). Additional details are provided in Appendix 4 (Counterintelligence) to Annex B (Intelligence).

(l)   Counter Command Activities (CCA).

(m)   Manoeuvre.

(n)   Physical Attack/Destruction. Whenever challenged by hostile activities, 1 ANZAC DIV is to be able to react proportionately, promptly and precisely. Physical Destruction is to be based on a clear identification of those responsible for violence against 1 ANZAC DIV and/or local populations, to avoid negative effects. Whenever a clear identification is made, 1 ANZAC DIV's reaction is to be immediate, precisely targeted and flexible to eradicate the threat and potentially deter further threats. Photos and/or video footages of any use of kinetic assets are to be systematically provided, as soon as possible, through the chain of command.

(3)   Video images (COMCAM, PA, EOD, Soldier Cam). 1 ANZAC DIV units are to employ COMCAM and other still photo/video capabilities to capture images in support of objectives and effects. Images are to be submitted for exploitation. Images desired for use by any unit are to be declassified by the unit involved in capturing the image. During crisis situations, special arrangements are to be made to transport images, video, or data from field locations to areas where images can be exploited;

(4)   Coordinating Bodies.

(a)   Information Operations Working Group. An IOWG is to be established at brigade HQs and higher. The IOWG is to be led by an IO Officer from the G3 / S3 staff designated as the IO Officer and is to take place as part of normal HQ battle rhythm. The aim of the IOWG is to analyze, coordinate, and provide recommendations to achieve integrated information operational effects. It complements and synchronizes activities from the various information-related capabilities staffs. It ensures that information, as an element of combat power, has an operational advantage to mission accomplishment. Products of the IOWG include:

i.   IO effects nested with commander's intent.

ii.   IO synchronization matrix.

iii.   Soldier and leader engagement plan.

iv.   Refined themes, messages, and talking points.

v.   Refined operational (PSYOP) products.

vi.   Targeting input.

vii.   Updated combined information overlay, IPOE.

viii.   Plans and orders update (asset allocation, resource and task).

ix.   Information requirements and long-term assessments.

(b)   IOWGs products and activities are to be coordinated with the Joint Effects Management System (JEMS) and at the division-level with the Information Operations Coordination Boards (IOCB).

4.   **Service support.**

a.   <u>Host Nations Support (HNS)</u>. Units are to identify and prioritize requirements for HNS IO support to G3/IO HQ 4 MND for coordination.

b.   <u>Movement and Transportation.</u> Requests for support see Annex S (Movements).

5.   **Command and Signal.** See Annex B (Task Organization).

Appendices:

Appendix 1   - Information Operations Synchronization Matrix

CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC WARFARE

ANNEX P TO
1 ANZAC DIV OPORD 01

References:

A.   1 ANZAC DIV OPORD 01 (OP SWIFT DEFENDER)

B.   Annex B (Intelligence) to 01 (OP SWIFT DEFENDER)

C.   Annex C (Operations) to 01 (OP SWIFT DEFENDER)

D.   ADDP 3.5 Electronic Warfare 2nd Edition 2013

E.   ADFP 6.0.4 Electromagnetic Spectrum Management 3rd Edition 2014

F.   FM 3-12 Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations April 2017

G.   Joint Publication 3-85 (Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations) 22 May 2020

 Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu.

1.   **Situation**

a.   Area of Interest. Cyberspace is a global domain consisting of interdependent networks of information technology (IT) infrastructure and data, which includes the Internet, computer systems, industrial control systems (ICS) and telecommunication networks. Cyberspace operations are critical to achieving significant operational advantages in military objectives. North Torbia's multiple courses of action may include attack vectors that exist only in cyberspace and that are not contained to a geographic location. As such the Cyber and Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) area of interest must be expanded beyond the geographic area of local interest to a global approach.

b.   Area of Operations. CEMA are conducted where North Torbia and their neighbouring nations' IT infrastructure and users of this IT infrastructure are located. Users in Olvana and South Torbia including civilians, governments, security forces, corporations and other actors depend on this IT infrastructure as well as supporting networks and systems. Due to the regional dependencies CEMA operations require targeted coordination and integration to ensure that the effects of operation directly support operational objectives and do not affect the legitimate activities required to govern the affected nations. Accordingly, CEMA operations should only be conducted within cyberspace and the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) which directly affect North Torbia's ability to conduct military operations in South Torbia, with due consideration to the collateral effect on Olvana, Belesia and Gabal.

c.   Enemy Forces

   (1)   Land Forces – Torbian People's Army (TPA)

      (a)   It is very difficult make an assessment of the C2 systems within North Torbia however given the current sanctions the equipment would consist of aged Donovian or Olvanan manufacture either Tier 2 or Tier 3 standard.

      (b)   In recent years a new nuclear command, control and communications (NC3) system supposedly using quantum encryption was reported to have been built but it is not clear whether this has been completed.

      (c)   All C3 would be controlled by fiber optic cable installed approximately 15 years ago which connects all government buildings.

      (d)   North Torbia has a long established electronic and computer warfare capability within Information Warfare battalions imbedded in each regional army group.

      (e)   North Torbia employs INFOWAR battalions, consisting of company sized specialist units for Deception, Computer Warfare/Information Attack, Perception Management, Intelligence Management, Information Influence and Electronic Warfare as well as integrated defence and service support capabilities.

      (f)   The INFOWAR Battalion within 5 and 6 Mech Divs, and 1 Mar provides both offensive and defensive capabilities, including:

          i.   Vehicle mounted ESM/ELINT (0.4-10Ghz) passive ELINT system. Data can be transmitted to remote users. Data can also be fused with other sensor systems for target location by azimuth intersection. WEASEL systems can be used in conjunction with Scorpion Jamming Systems.

          ii.   Vehicle mounted ESM/ECM/HF/VHF/UHF TRC274 Tactical Jamming Systems (Jammer effects civilian and military frequencies for GLONASS and GPS up to 150 km range).

          iii.   Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) D-4 EW/ECM (20-500MHz) UAV is launched from a zero-length launcher using solid fuel booster.

          iv.   The TPA maintains an Integrated Air Defence Systems (IADS) consisting of over 50 early-warning radar facilities overlapping coverage of the entire country with a focus on the border with South Torbia and the west coast. Many of the radar sites are built in the mountains on hydraulic lifts to protect them and conduct maintenance. Due to the mountainous terrain there are gaps in low-altitude coverage

between 300m. The IADS is fully integrated with Land Force elements to provide point defence as well as area defence.

     v.   Other (Tier 3) HF/VHF radio intercept and DF systems.

(2)   <u>Naval Forces.</u> Originally a brown water navy, the North Torbian Navy has upgraded its vessels to support amphibious and blue water opertions. Alongside coastal radar arrays there are extensive anti-ship missile and gun defenses built in the 1960s located along the coastline. No specific information regarding C2 systems is available however like all North Torbian equipment it would consist of aged Donovian and some more recent Olvanan manufacture. No indication of substantive offensive EW has been demonstrated.

(3)   <u>Air Forces</u>. North Torbian operates a wide variety of air defence equipment and has one of the densest air defence networks in the world. The air defence network is a mixture of old Donovian equipment combined with North Torbian manufactured equipment based on Donovian designs. They have old Donovian computerized anti-aircraft C2 systems combined with old radar as well as newer Olvanan phased array radars.

(4)   <u>Electronic and Intelligence Warfare.</u> North Torbia defines *chonja chinungjon*, electronic intelligence warfare (EIW) as specifically planned and integrated actions to achieve an information advantage at critical points and times. North Torbia conducts EIW at all levels of warfare - strategic, operational, and tactical - but without regard to strict definitional boundaries between these levels. While much of North Torbian EIW is conducted above the tactical level, EIW at all levels will affect all units at the tactical level. Adversaries of North Torbia will be subject to EIW irrespective of the level and degree of engagement in other operations.

(5)   <u>Cyber Attack.</u>

   (a)   For the past two decades, the government has invested significant resources into the development of their cyber-attack capabilities and has unified all the intelligence agencies and cyber units under a single command, Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) recently upgraded to a Department. The primary target of the RGB is theft from international financial institutions to support North Torbian nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

   (b)   The increasing sophistication of the North Torbian cyber operations demonstrates the governments increased emphasis on cyber-enabled economic and political warfare. North Torbia is isolated from global networks with the entire country's internet traffic tunneled through one provider, Olvana who additionally ring-fences the country via the Great Firewall of Olvana.

(c)   The current capability "gap" in conducting sustained cyber-attacks would be quickly met by pivoting human resources engaged in non-military activities. North Torbia is restricted in the acquisition of technology to a few sources, Olvana, Donovia and Ariana.

(d)   North Torbia also maintains an extensive network of offensive cyber units dispersed globally who act independently or mutually supporting based on cyber mission objectives.

(6)   <u>Computer Attack.</u>

(a)   Of the DATE Pacific countries, North Torbia maintains the second most effective computer attack capability through a large military trained and resourced Department. North Torbia has conducted successful Offensive Cyber Operations (OCO) including Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) on South Torbian government, financial, and commercial entities.

(b)   More recently North Torbia has expanded its cyber operations beyond South Torbia and commenced attacking foreign infrastructure. While it is doubtful that North Torbia could effectively penetrate major nation state-systems, it does possess a significant advantage over any regional opponent except Olvana due to the number of trained and military serving personnel at its disposal.

(c)   The military has a well-established and advanced cyber training unit producing offensive cyber soldiers regularly. However the majority of the population have limited if any cyber knowledge due to the restrictive nature of government.

(7)   <u>Information Attack.</u>

(a)   North Torbia has invested heavily in Information Attack (IA) capabilities in the region, second only to Olvana. Some of these systems are hardened whilst most are mobile. North Torbia engages in extensive information attacks on South Torbia as their own population does not have access to the Internet.

(b)   North Torbia maintains a well-trained cyber-force and will seek to actively deploy them against adversaries prior and during any combat operations. These attack vectors will produce limited results, however capabilities will continue to improve with more combat experience.

(c)   North Torbian IA will probably only be effective against non- state actors and relatively ineffective against top-tier nation states and their allies. However they are capable of sustained cyber offensive operations.

(d)   There is strong evidence that they may be assisted by Olvana and possibly Donovia in IA as Olvana and Donovia will use North Torbian cyber offensives as camouflage for their objectives and to prevent attribution.

(8)   <u>Open Source Intelligence.</u> North Torbia operates a sophisticated and extended open source intelligence program (OSINT) against South Torbia, US and other Western countries. North Torbia has mobilised a large force of government and non-government operators to act as cyber collectors, usually trained in cyberwarfare and with English language skills to collect data on internal opposition as well as potential foreign adversaries.

(9)   <u>Signals Intelligence.</u> North Torbian SIGINT predominantly operates in areas that are of high interest to the government namely the border with South Torbia. CJTF 667 can expect that North Torbian SIGINT to provide useable indications and warning, capabilities assessment and targeting intelligence. The majority of North Torbian SIGINT operators have extensive experience "real world" experience.

(10)   <u>Integrated Network and Electronic Warfare.</u>

(a)   The TPA will employ tools from both civilian and military sources as well as from assets of third-party actors. The TPA is extremely adaptive and will employ the best possible options available to them in Integrated Network and Electronic Warfare (INEW). The TPA INEW tactics focus on enemy's advanced C2 and communication systems.

The TPA has followed a combination of known Donovian and Olvanan methodology in the development of Integrated Network and Electronic Warfare (INEW) doctrine which calls for the immediate seizure of information supremacy at the beginning of a conflict or before conflict commences. This doctrine, relies on its increasingly integrated C2 systems, allowing the North Torbian Forces to co-ordinate and integrate geographically dispersed elements, especially its IADS, into a comprehensive C2 network.

(11)   <u>Asymmetric Forces.</u> North Torbia maintains a large number of government sponsored paramilitary forces. Due to the oppressive nature of the government there are no known local armed groups. If war was to occur, the government would expect all of its population to contribute in whatever manner is required.

d.   <u>Coalition Forces.</u>

    (1)   <u>CJTF 667 Integral EW.</u> A multinational force (MNFC), CJTF 667 Electronic Warfare Coordination Centre (EWCC) will conduct joint planning, coordination and control of disruption (EA – Electronic Attack), protection (EP-Electronic Protection), and monitoring (ES – Electronic Surveillance) of the EM spectrum.

    (2)   <u>CEMA in the Coalition.</u> CEMA operations must align with information operations, cyber operations (CO), EW, and spectrum management operations (SMO). EW LNOs should be embedded at CJTF 667 from each Component Command as well as each TCN. These EW LNOs will form the MNFC EWCC at HQ CJTF 667. All EW support required from another Component must be coordinated by the MNFC EWCC, although direct liaison is authorized for development of requirements. 1 (ANZAC) DIV will provide one EWO to CJTF 667 MNFC EWCC.

e.   <u>Third Party Actors</u>

    (1)   <u>Olvana.</u> Olvana has historically conducted intelligence operations in areas where it maintains or creates extensive trade relationships. Olvana uses its commercial enterprises as ways to collect and recruit people. Olvana maintains a very close relationship with North Torbia**.** Comment: It is highly likely that Olvana has ongoing intelligence operations and has penetrated some aspects of the North Torbian intelligence and security apparatuses given their use of North Torbian labour and co-existence of North Torbian cyber units on the Olvanan side of the border. Moreover, Olvana would possibly share intelligence and equipment and weapons if it can be used to assist their destabilization of the region.

    (2)   <u>Host Nation (South Torbia).</u> Over ninety percent of the population has access to the Internet such that most South Torbian's consider it a basic right. South Torbia's media is one of the most pervasive in the world including television consisting of 50 local stations covering the whole country, two national cable networks, digital cable, satellite and streaming services. The two national cable networks are South Torbian Broadcasting System and Manila Broadcasting Corporation. In addition to the private networks, the South Torbian government operates a public broadcasting network. Satellite television is broadcast by a number of providers, most originating outside South Torbia

f.   <u>Civil Considerations.</u>

    (1)   <u>Telecommunications.</u>

        (a)   The telephone infrastructure in South Torbia is one of the most advanced in the region. The speed and dependability of mobile services outstrip the fixed line infrastructure.

(b)   There are over 30 million fixed line services in use mainly by businesses and government as fixed line use in homes is declining, there are currently 60 million mobile phone subscribers with subscriptions growing by five to ten percent per year.

(c)   There are three main mobile phone providers with ST Telecom being the largest provider with over fifty-five percent of the subscribers.

(2)   Internet.

(a)   South Torbian internet is considered excellent by regional standards with apparently little divide between urban and rural areas. Many business and public spaces offer free Wi-Fi and the South Torbians believe that access will become part of official government policy.

(b)   The infrastructure has recently been upgraded in rural areas from 5 megabits per second (Mbps) to 20Mbps in rural areas and up to 100Mbps in urban areas. While urban areas are receiving updated infrastructure to wide access Internet, rural areas will be dependent on mobile access.

(c)   Non-mobile access to the Internet is provided by four Internet Service Providers. These four providers have close associations with members of government.

g.   Friendly Forces.

(1)   CJTF 667 Integral EW.

(a)   The CJTF 667 capability consists of EW assets integral to the Component Commands. Each Component has a different approach to organizing their forces in order to plan and execute EW.

(b)   A CJTF 667 Joint Frequency Management Office (JFMO) will be established to support joint planning, coordination, and control of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum for assigned forces.

(c)   A CJTF 667 multinational force (MNFC) EWCC will also be established to support joint planning, coordination, and control of disruption (EA), protection (EP), and monitoring (ES) of the EM spectrum.

(2)   Coalition Coordination.

(a)   The planning and coordination of multinational force EW is challenging because of complex security issues, different crypto equipment, differences in the training level of involved forces, and language barriers. These problems are well understood and CJTF 667 EW planners are required to balance their own national security issues against mission accomplishment.

    (b)   EW staff officers are required at CJTF 667 from each Component Command, as well as requested from each TCN. These EW staff officers will form the CJTF EWCC at HQ CJTF 667, under supervision of HQ CJTF 667 CJ3.

    (c)   Components requiring EW support from another component are encouraged to directly liaise and coordinate that support when possible, informing the MNFC EWCC planners of the results of such coordination.

    (d)   At the CJTF 667 level, EW planners must be familiar with coordination efforts across functional component lines in order to be prepared to assist and facilitate when necessary.

2.   **Mission.** 1 ANZAC DIV is to conduct full-spectrum EW operations IOT provide unimpeded access to and use of the electromagnetic environment (EME) by coalition forces for military operations.

3.   **Execution.**

a.   Scheme of Cyber Electromagnetic Activities. CFLSSS is to utilise integrated and synchronised CO, EW, and SMO to deceive the TPA, manage regional perceptions as well as deny the enemy's ability to exploit cyberspace to shape the operational environment for unified land operations. The use of CEMA is to strictly support 1 (ANZAC) DIV manoeuvres and is not to interfere with the North Torbian government's ability to govern within its territorial boundaries.

    (1)   Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO). 1 (ANZAC) DIV is to conduct DCO by detecting, identifying and responding to North Torbian offensive actions against friendly networks and the date stored in those networks. Defensive measures including counter surveillance are to be used to locate and respond to unauthorized activity on internal networks.

    (2)   Offensive Cyber Operations (OCO). Cyberspace attack capabilities are to be coordinated to support deception operations through the creation of simultaneous and complement effects. Manoeuvres are to be supported by cyberspace operations including decoying, conditioning and spoofing North Torbian information networks. Civilian social networks and unclassified regional government agencies are not to be targeted for OCO to prevent undesired collateral effects on regional government's legitimate requirements.

b.   Concept of Operations. Employment of EW resources integral to each Formation/unit is to remain within the purview of respective Formation/unit Commanders. However, management of the EM spectrum and coordination of EA, EP, and ES across two or more formations/units is to be conducted centrally at CJTF 667. A CJTF 667 Joint Restricted Frequency List

(JRFL) and CJTF 667 EMCON Plan (TBI) is to form the basis upon which 1 ANZAC DIV commanders are to develop their own EW plans.

c.   Tasks.

    (1)   HQ 1 ANZAC DIV.

        (a)   Establish and maintain a multinational EWCC (CJTF 667 EWCC) with contribution and augmentation from all Commanders and TCN.

        (b)   Establish and maintain a Joint Frequency Management Office (JFMO).

        (c)   Monitor for compliance with the JRFL and EMCON Plan by friendly EW assets and be prepared to issue a CEASE BUZZER notification as/if required.

        (d)   Recommend changes to EW operations based on emerging frequency de-confliction requirements.

        (e)   Establish ROE for EA employment, and ensure that the EA plan is in compliance with the 1 (ANZAC) DIV ROE and national ROE as appropriate.

        (f)   Establish a "chattermark" plan to ensure communications net availability in the presence of jamming, intrusion, or interference

        (g)   Establish and designate a Jamming Control Authority (JCA) to conduct in-theater coordination, employment, targeting, and de-confliction of EA and ES assets, where such employment may have an effect across more than one Component Command.

    (2)   All 1 ANZAC DIV Formations/Units.

        (a)   Provide suitably qualified EW staff officers to the CJTF 667 MNFC EWCC.

        (b)   Coordinate EW operations with other Formation/units where such operations may have an impact/effect outside own assigned area of electronic influence, ensuring that the CJTF 667 MNFC EWCC is well positioned to coordinate any such cross-Component EW resource employment.

        (c)   Request EW support directly from other Formation/units, ensuring that the CJTF 667 MNFC EWCC is well positioned to coordinate any such Cross-Component EW resource employment.

    (3)   TCN. Provide suitably qualified EW staff officers to the CJTF 667 MNFC EWCC.

d.   Coordinating Instructions.

(1)   Cross-Component. EW coordination direct liaison, with support from MNFC EWCC.

(2)   JRFL. Appendix 1.(==not issued==)

(3)   EMCON Plan. Appendix 2. (==not issued==)

(4)   J SIR Program. Appendix 3. (==not issued==)

4.   **Administration and Logistics.**

a.   Reports.

(1)   Comm Status Report. CJ6

(2)   MIJI Report. CJ3/MNFC EWCC, via JSIR-formatted messages

(3)   CEASE BUZZER Notification. JCA

b.   Reprogramming. Reprogramming of EW equipment is a national responsibility. MNFC EWCC is to be advised of any challenges or limitations that could result in fratricide so that de-confliction efforts can be coordinated.

c.   EW Support Requests. CJ3/MNFC EWCC

d.   TABOO, PROTECTED, and GUARDED Freq Requests. CJ6

e.   Joint Spectrum Management System. SPECTRUM XXI

5.   **Command and Signal.**

a.   EW Operational Authority. COMCJTF 667 remains operational authority over all EW assets and information.

b.   Technical Authority. CJ3, through the MNFC EWCC and CJ6 acts as the technical authority for coordination of access to and use of the EME.

c.   Points of Contact.

(1)   CJTF 667 HQ: MNFC EWCC

(2)   CJTF 667 JRFL: CJTF 667 CJ6

(3)   CFMCC: IWC

(4)   CFLCC: G3 CEMA

(5)   CFACC: Battlefield Coordination Detachment

(6)   CJFSOCC: IO Cell

(7)   ESC: G3 CEMA

(8)   CF Med: G3 CEMA

ATTACHMENTS:

Appendix 1   JRFL (TBI – Mission Secret)
Appendix 2   EMCON Plan (TBI – Mission Secret)
Appendix 3   JSIR Program (TBI – Mission Secret)

ANNEX Q (COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS) TO OPORD 01 1 ANZAC DIV- OPERATION SWIFT DEFENDER

(U) References:

A.   (U) CJTF OPORD 01/XX

B.   (U) 1 ANZAC DIV- OSD OPORD

C.   (U) Annex B (Intelligence) to 01 (OP SWIFT DEFENDER)

D.   (U) Annex C (Operations) to 01 (OP SWIFT DEFENDER)

E.   (U) ADFP 6.0 Communication & Information Systems Planning 2nd Edition June 2012

F.   (U) ADFP 6.0.1 Communication & Information Systems Planning 2nd Edition June 2012

G.   (U) ADFP 6.0.2 Communication & Information Systems Support to Operations 3rd Edition November 2018

H.   (U) ADFP 6.0.3 Information Assurance 2nd Edition March 2016

I.   (U) Joint Publication 6-0 (Joint Communications System) 10 June 2015 incorporating Change 01 – 04 October 2019

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU.

1.   (U) <u>Situation:</u>

   a.   (U) <u>General.</u> The Torbian People's Army (TPA), utilising 3 (OSC) have launched a surprise offensive operation against the Republic of Torbia (ST) IOT exploit the window of opportunity created by the conflict between OLVANA and other states in SOUTH-EAST ASIA. 3 (OSC) has pushed ROTA forces south of the line TAUMARANUI-TURANGI-WHAKATANE. AT D+10 both sides agreed to a 24 hour ceasefire along this line. It is almost certain that 3 (OSC) will recommence offensive operations once the 24 hours has elapsed. 1 ANZAC DIV is to be deployed to ST as part of a CJTF 667 to assist the ST government in expelling DPRT forces from ST territory.

   b.   (U) <u>Enemy.</u> See Annex B (Intelligence), to 1 ANZAC DIV – OPORD 01 and current intelligence summary (INTSUM).

      (1)   (U) <u>Threat – General.</u> See Annex B (Intelligence), to 1 ANZAC DIV – OPORD 01 and current intelligence summary (INTSUM).

      (2)   (U) <u>Threat to Signals Network:</u>

         (a)   (U) <u>Network Attack</u>. DPRT has the capability and resources to penetrate and exploit commercial networks and it is highly probable that they will disrupt ST commercial and national interests prior to

and at the commencement of hostilities. NT maintains the second most robust computer attack capability in the Pacific region through a well- trained and experienced cyber military force. DPRT has proven in recent years its ability to conduct sophisticated and well-planned cyber- attacks. DPRT ability to mount cyber-attacks are significantly greater than all other regional opponents except for Olvana who has a much greater force of military cyber personnel.

(b) (U) Electronic Warfare. DPRT utilises an Integrated Network and Electronic Warfare (INEW) doctrine which dictates the immediate seizure and control of information preceding and at the beginning of the conflict. It is predicted that ST commercial communications and information systems have been compromised to enable DPRT the ability to exploit them to maximum effect.

(c) (U) Information Warfare (IW). DPRT land forces have a specialist electronic and computer warfare units embedded within their combat forces. These units IW capabilities include electronic attack, electronic protection and electronic warfare support activities. Notable capabilities include:

(i) (U) Vehicle-mounted WEASEL 2000 (.5-10,000 MHz) signals intercept.

(ii) (U) TRC274 (HF 1.5 – 30 MHz, V/UHF 20-3,000 MHz) tactical jammer.

(iii) (U) WHIP SNAKE HF/VHF radio intercept and DF systems.

c. (U) Frequency Spectrum. Availability of frequencies will be managed by HQ LCC-OSD.

d. (U) Terrain and Weather. See Annex B (Intelligence) to 1 ANZAC DIV – OPORD 01 (OSD):

(1) (U) Effects of Terrain Relief. The extremely mountainous terrain in non-coastal areas of ST will increase reliance on satellite-based transmission systems. High Capacity Line-of-sight (HCLOS) will be restricted to avenues of approach. The placement of relays outside command post perimeters will require additional security protocols.

(2) (U) Effects of Weather. Monsoonal climate weather and typhoons may impact satellite communications and HCLOS EHF systems in low-lying areas. Average temperatures and winds are within normal operating parameters of standard communications equipment.

e. (U) Friendly Forces:

(1) (U) Higher. LCC-OSD connectivity to HQ 1 ANZAC DIV is being provided by the

(a) (U) 35 SIG BDE (US). 35 SIG BDE has established two Command Post Node (CPN) sections with HQ 1 ANZAC DIV and is prepared to move and support Main HQ and TAC HQ as required. GIOSDI

Information Grid (GIG), Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS-OSD) and MPE-OSD connectivity via satellite time division multiple access (TDMA) and frequency division multiple access (FDMA) for 1 ANZAC CIV forces is being provided by Regional Hub Node, 35 SIG BDE, located in Hawaii, USA. Six CJTF 667 Signal BN CPN assemblages are positioned in 1 ANZAC DIV and designated as LNO Data Packages. Primary C4I will remain CENTRIXS-OSD, alternate will be TACSAT. Coalition classified data sharing is through CENTRIXS-OSD. INDOPACOM J6 sponsors CENTIXS-OSD service.

(2) (U) <u>Within.</u> 1 ANZAC DIV, high capacity classified and unclassified data, voice, VTC and teletypewriter services are provided through employment of AN/TSC 85 and AN/TSC 93 mobile TACSAT terminals configured to connect LANDWARNET (LWN), with gateway interface to CENTRIXS-OSD and MPE-OSD. Blue Force Tracker connectivity is provided though BMS.

(3) (U) <u>Subordinate.</u> 1 SIG REGT CMD network operations (NETOPS) will augment 1 ANZAC DIV C6 to provide regulatory authority over 1 ANZAC DIV signal assets.

2. (U) <u>Mission.</u> 1 ANZAC DIV Signals subordinate commands are to support the provision of an integrated and synchronised command, control, communications, computer and information (C4I) services by the establishment, maintenance and protection of the signal infrastructure and architecture IOT support all phases of the operation.

3. (U) <u>Execution:</u>

a. (U) <u>Intent.</u> Provide 1 ANZAC DIV with a reliable, robust and redundant communication network providing data, voice and video capabilities throughout OSD.

b. (U) <u>Key Tasks:</u>

(1) (U) Allocate 1 ANZAC DIV communications assets to key nodes to ensure continuity and unity of command under 1 ANZAC DIV.

(2) (U) Provide and integrate NETOPS capability to ensure a flexible and robust communications network through all phases of OSD.

(3) (U) Provide a communications ability to friendly forces to ensure the unity of command and minimise the risk of fratricide.

c. (U) <u>Endstate.</u> 1 ANZAC DIV units are able to efficiently utilise unified communications architecture in order to exercise effective command and control.

d. (U) <u>Concept of Signal Support:</u>

(1) (U) <u>Prelim and Phase I.</u> EMCON 1. Movement for 1 ANZAC DIV enablers and tasked units will be supported by Tactical Hubs. Priority of use for signal command (theatre) [SC(T)] TACSAT and single channel terrestrial

frequencies will go to 1 SIG REGT NSE. All stations on listening watch throughout. Emergency Access Messages (EAM) and Defence Communications Systems (DCS) are the main signal effort.

(2) (U) <u>Phase II.</u> On order – EMCON 3. Expeditionary Signals Battalions (ESB) maintain access as directed in Phase 1. Priority of bandwidth increase and use for allocated SC(T) TACSAT frequencies and single channel terrestrial frequencies goes to XXXX MCB/Div Tps.

(3) (U) <u>Phase III.</u> EMCON 3. 1 SIG REGT and CSR's maintain access as directed in Phase II. Priority of any bandwidth increase and use allocated SC(T) TACSAT frequencies and single channel terrestrial frequencies goes to XXXX MCB/Div Tps. On order, Electronic Protection (EP), Signal Security (SIGSEC) and Information Security (INFOSEC) measures will be enhanced through this phase prohibiting access to all unclassified data, voice and VTC services for all 1 ANZAC DIV personnel. See Appendix P (Cyber Electromagnetic Activities) to 1 ANZAC DIV OPORD 01 (OSD) for coordinated CEMA instructions.

(4) (U) <u>Phase IV.</u> EMCON 3 1 SIG REGT and CSR's return to standard LWN access, including the reconnection of unclassified networks. Priority use for allocated SC(T) TACSAT and single-channel terrestrial frequencies will go to XXXXX MCB/Div Tps.

e. (U) <u>Tasks for Subordinate Units:</u>

(1) (U) <u>Tasks for all CSR:</u>

(a) (U) Provide one SIG LNO to 1 ANZAC DIV G6 NETOPS.

(b) (U) Submit requirements for additional communication assets to 1 ANZAC DIV G6.

(c) (U) Notify 1 ANZAC DIV G6 of planned CP locations for each phase.

(d) (U) Provide planned network diagrams to 1 ANZAC DIV G6.

(e) (U) Submit final Communications-Electronics Operation Instructions (CEOI) entries to 1 ANZAC DIV Frequency Manager.

(f) (U) Submit reports IAW 1 ANZAC DIV G6 SOP.

(g) (U) Place router configurations for LWN connectivity IAW NETOPS directions.

(h) (U) Install, operate, and maintain FM retransmission of the theatre MEDEVAC net within own AO.

(i) (U) Provide VoIP telephone directory to 1 ANZAC DIV and amend as required.

(2) (U) <u>1 SIG REGT:</u>

(a) (U) Place tactical hub node (THN) in standby status with the regional hub node (RHN). Direct coordination is to be authorised with 1 SIG REGT.

(b) (U) Provide NETOPS section to 1 ANZAC DIV for all phases to ensure an integrated NETOPS with 1 ANZAC DIV C6 staff.

(c) (U) Provide 2 x LNOs to X SIG BDE at the regional hub node for all phases of the operation.

   (3) <u>CSR:</u>

(a) Provide one Joint/area Signal Platoon to 1 ANZAC DIV HQ/X SIG CMP

(b) Conduct enhanced tactical installation and networking for installations at 1 ANZAC DIV.

(c) Be prepared to conduct enhanced tactical installation and networking for installations at tactical DIV HQ(s).

  f. (U) <u>Coordinating Instructions:</u>

   (1) (U) CJTF 667 reports sent to 1 ANZAC DIV G6 frequency manager for all interference issues requiring resolution (enemy and friendly).

   (2) (U) Reports are to be sent IAW 1 ANZAC DIV G6 SOP.

4. (U) <u>Sustainment:</u>

  a. (U) <u>SIG Maintenance and Support:</u>

   (1) (U) SECOMP, JNTC. CJTF 667 SIG BN.

   (2) (U) CENTRIXS-OSD.<mark>JNCC.</mark>

   (3) (U) MNF-MPE-OSD

   (4) (U) LWN. 1 ANZAC DIV NETOPS.

  b. (U) <u>Priority for Restoral:</u>

   (1) TACSAT Links.

   (2) LWN secure data.

   (3) LWN secure voice.

   (4) MPE-OSD.

   (5) CENTRIXS-OSD.

   (6) TACRAD.

  c. (U) Request for CJTF 667 CIS Services. Request for Coalition CIS will be coordinated directly through 1 ANZAC DIV G6. Requirements, as appropriate will be further staffed through the HQ CJTF 667 CJ3 to the HQ CJTF 667 CJ6 for coordination.

5. (U) <u>Command and Signal:</u>

  a. (U) <u>Operational Authority.</u> COM 1 ANZAC DIV remains operational authority over all component SIG assets and information.

b. (U) <u>Technical Authority.</u> 1 SIG REGT CMD will maintain technical authority over all CSR elm. Daily oversight will be performed by NETOPS, with direction from 1 ANZAC DIV G6.

c. (U) <u>Reports and Returns.</u> 1 ANZAC DIV G6 will provide a consolidated daily COMMSTATE to HQ CJTF 667. CSR's will provide a DSR to 1 SIG REGT CMD.

d. (U) <u>Points of Contact.</u> The primary staff POC for this annex 1 ANZAC DIV G6.

ANNEX R TO
1ANZAC DIV OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

LOGISTIC SUPPORT ORDER

References:

A.   1 ANZAC DIV OPORD 01 (Operation Swift Defender)
B.   South Torbia (ST) Country Study
C.   North Torbian (NT) Country Study
D.   Annex K to 1 ANZAC DIV OPORD 01 – Health Support Order
E.   Status of Forces Agreement – AS/ST dated 11 APR 2006

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU

1.   **Situation.**

a.   Background. See paragraph 1 of the main body of 1 ANZAC DIV OPORD 01 (Ref A) and Annex B - Intelligence.

b.   General. 17 CSS Bde is the designated Logistic Component Command (17 CSS BDE) for 1 ANZAC DIV. The 17 CSS BDE role is to provide and coordinate intimate logistic support to all 1 ANZAC DIV component commands IOT enable 1 ANZAC DIV to prosecute the strategic and operational objectives of Operation SWIFT DEFENDER (OSD).

c.   Purpose. The purpose of this Logistic Support Order is to provide a support framework for 1 ANZAC DIV. 1 ANZAC DIV will be supported by the 17 CSS BDE, concentrating in the primary SPOD in BATANGAS CITY. This Support Order also includes support to Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) and Host Nation (HN) requirements when they fall under 1 ANZAC DIV control.

d.   Operational Areas.

(1)   Area of Interest (AI). The 1 ANZAC DIV AI includes the airways and land areas of the Island of Luzon from Aparri in North Torbia to Mindoro Island in South Torbia, the Philippine Sea (east), Celebes Sea (south), and the South Olvana Sea (west).See Annex B (Intelligence).

(2)   Area of Operations (AO). The 1 ANZAC DIV AO, AO APPLE, is bound by PL LION (MDL) in the north, the boundary with 25 DIV (US) in the West and PL

JAGUAR in the south. Currently 1 ANZAC DIV forces are deploying to the AO. See Appendix 2 (Operation Overlay) to Annex C

    (3)   <u>APOD.</u> WELLINGTON AIRPORT, WELLINGTON, South Torbia.

    (4)   <u>SPOD</u>. PORT OF WELLINGTON, WELLINGTON, South Torbia.

    (5)   <u>17 CSS BDE AO.</u> The 17 CSS BDE AO is comprised of the landmass, airspace and territorial waters (12NM) of South Torbia and the sea/air lanes linking the primary APOD/SPOD within the AO and the designated NSB hub of Darwin.

e.   <u>Terrain and Man-Made Features.</u> See the South Torbia Country Study (Ref B).

f.   <u>Host Nation Considerations.</u>

    (1)   The density of urban environments has made traffic congestion a large problem resulting in a lack of urban space. As a result, South Torbia's mass transit system is robust. In theory, the public transit system is able to connect almost every part of the country.

    (2)   Currently the public transit system is centered upon a bus model, in which several bus companies provide transportation in major cities and to rural areas. While this bus model has been able to meet demand thus far, it can still take an entire day to travel distances that more modern transit forms might cover in a fraction of the time. In recognition of this challenge, the government has begun investing in rail systems that will eventually integrate into the bus structure.

    (3)   Airports range from large international airports that can handle almost any aircraft currently in operation, to small, unimproved dirt strips. Seaports are modern and can handle any modern cargo vessel; most have several platforms for the offloading of petroleum.

    (4)   The country suffers from high levels of pollution in the urban areas and the government has made policies to combat pollution in urban environments and water supplies.

    (5)   As a nation South Torbia experienced rapid urbanization throughout the country in the decades following the Torbian War. While its growing economy initially enabled urban spaces to keep pace with the development required by the growing population, they quickly began to run out of open land to develop.

    (6)   As a result of this lack of open land ST cities began to expand up creating densely populated residential buildings and areas. While the infrastructure system is stressed the economy has enabled it to adapt and update its infrastructure to an overall quality that has the services provided to the population as one of the best in the world.

g.   <u>Enemy Forces.</u> See Annex B Intelligence and NT Country Study (Ref C).

h.   <u>Host Nation Forces.</u> See ST Country Study (Ref B).

i.   <u>Friendly Logistic Forces.</u> See Appendix 1.

2.   **Mission.** 17 CSS Bde is to provide logistic support to 1 ANZAC DIV IOT sustain operations for the duration of Operation SWIFT DEFENDER.

3.   **Execution.**

a.   <u>COMD 17 CSS BDE Intent.</u>

    (1)   <u>Purpose.</u> To ensure that all 1 ANZAC DIV FE are provided with sufficient logistic support to enable the completion of operations in support of 1 ANZAC DIV objectives.

    (2)   <u>Method.</u>

        (a)   Reception and staging (RSO&I) activities will be coordinated by 17 CSS BDE Centres located in the APOD/SPOD, in conjunction with the Movements Coordination Cell (MCC), supported by the National Support Base (NSB) and ADF assets.

        (b)   Once deployed in the 1 ANZAC Div AO, logistic support will be provided along national and component lines with integral and close support assets being embedded within all components. The 17 CSS BDE is to provide general support to those FE located within the APODs/SPODs through the Force Support Group (FSG) and the Contract Management Cell (CMC).

        (c)   The 17 CSS BDE HQ is to have a live logistics cell providing oversight of general common user logistics support being provided by its subordinate organisations to all 1 ANZAC DIV FE.

        (d)   AS is to provide sustainment support for classes I (fresh rations and bulk water only), II (AS camp stores only), III, IV, VI, VII, and X. Sustainment of TCN specific class II, and classes V and IX is to be provided along national lines.

        (e)   Administrative and logistic support is to be provided IAW the following phases:

            i.   <u>Prelim Moves.</u> Staging into the AO. Main effort is to be the deployment of FE and the provision of enabling support to RSOI. Tasks include:

            ii.   <u>Phase I: Block TPA Adv and Destroy 5 Mech Div.</u> Continue spt to lodgement of CTF 667.2 and spt defensive operations on SH1 and SH2 axes. Support 7 MCB ctr-atk, and reorganization of 3 and 9 MCB IOT enable pursuit on SH2.

     iii.   <u>Phase II: Clear TPA and Secure Cease Fire Line.</u> Spt offensive operations up to Cease Fire Line. BPT spt on up to 2 axes. Redeploy DSA to spt offensive ops. Concurrently maintain APOD/SPOD and spt reconstitution of ROTA.

     iv.   <u>Phase III: On Order clear TPA from WAIKATO/BAY OF PLENTY and secure MDL.</u> Spt offensive ops up to MDL.

     v.   <u>Phase IV: STABOPS.</u> 1 ANZAC DIV will transition to STABOPS in preparation of the redeployment of FE to home locations in a staged manner. This phase will also include the finalization of all logistic support arrangements and reconstitution of all FE. Provision of enabling support to reverse RSO&I activities coordinated by the FRCs, MCC and the components. 17 CSS BDE will also need to be prepared to support stability operations should 1 ANZAC DIV transition to peacekeeping. Tasks include:

(f)   <u>End state.</u> Administrative and logistic support has been provided to ensure the successful completion of all 1 ANZAC DIV objectives. All 1 ANZAC DIV FE will have redeployed back to home locations.

b.   <u>Support Tasks.</u> Augmented by coalition log FE, 17 CSS Bde is to provide GS to 1 ANZAC DIV as follows:

(1)   <u>Throughout OSD.</u>

     (a)   Command the 17 CSS BDE.

     (b)   Liaise with Joint Logistics Command OSD

     (c)   Liaise with Logistic Lead Nation (LLN).

     (d)   Be self-supporting for the duration of OSD.

     (e)   Provide limited transport assets for the distribution of materiel (principally classes I, II, and V) to 1 ANZAC DIV FE within AO APPLE.

     (f)   Estb an Australian Forces Post Office (AFPO) at the SPOD, BATANGAS CITY, South Torbia.

     (g)   BPT estb and manage local support contracts as required.

     (h)   Provide casualty regulation, R2H facilities and support to RW AME throughout all phases.

(2)   <u>Prelim.</u>

(a) Estb a Bulk Fuel Installation (BFI) and Refueling Point Air (RPA) at the APOD

(b) Estb 1 ANZAC DIV SPT AREA (1 DSA) in TAA OPAL**.**

(c) Estb supply points (SP), maint collection point (MCP) and 1 ANZAC DIV PW holding area in 1 DSA.

(d) BPT conduct reception and personnel tracking.

(e) BPT to coordinate movement of FE, equipment and stores from NSB to the APOD/SPOD.

(f) BPT preposition fuel and Explosive Ordnance (EO) stocks where required.

(g) Establish a R2H health facility at the APOD.

(h) Establish an ASP at the APOD.

(3) Phase I.

(a) Continue to stage other FE into the AO.

(b) Provide real life support to FE.

(c) Provide bulk storage and distribution of Classes I, III, and V.

(d) Provide casualty regulation, R2H facilities and support to RW AME.

(e) Coordinate personnel training and reporting.

(4) Phase II.

(a) Continue to stage other FE into the AO.

(b) Provide real life support to FE.

(c) Provide bulk storage and distribution of Classes I, III, and V.

(d) Provide casualty regulation, R2H facilities and support to RW AME.

(e) Coordinate personnel training and reporting.

(f) BPT redeploy DSA IOT spt offensive ops.

(g) BPT estb APOD/SPOD utilizing NAPIER/NEW PLYMOUTH

(5)   Phase III.

    (h)   Continue to stage other FE into the AO.

    (i)   Provide real life support to FE.

    (j)   Provide bulk storage and distribution of Classes I, III, and V.

    (k)   Provide casualty regulation, R2H facilities and support to RW AME.

    (l)   Coordinate personnel training and reporting.

    (m)   BPT redeploy DSA IOT spt offensive ops.

    (n)   BPT estb APOD/SPOD utilizing TAURANGA.

(6)   Phase IV.

    (a)   BPT to relocate 1 DSA to PALMERSTON NORTH.

    (b)   BPT estb a Bulk Fuel Installation (BFI) and Refueling Point Air (RPA) at the DSA.

    (c)   BPT estb SP, MCP and 1 ANZAC DIV PW holding area in new loc for 1 DSA.

    (d)   Coordinate the cleaning of stores and equipment.

    (e)   Coordinate EO remediation.

    (f)   Conduct personnel tracking of departing FE.

    (g)   BPT conduct RSOI of future force rotations.

    (h)   BPT spt reconstitution of ROTA.

c.   Engineer Support. 17 CSS BDE will have assigned a Construction Squadron for general construction engineering tasks and will be co-located at the APOD.

d.   Mortuary Affairs.

(1)   1 ANZAC DIV is to retain full jurisdiction of AS/NZ personnel.

(2)   Mortuary Affairs for TCN are to fall under NSE/NCE jurisdiction after processing from the closest R2E.

(3)   Only in exceptional circumstances, such as contamination of remains, are emergency or temporary burial in the AO to be authorised. If such is required, all attempts must be made to contact 1 ANZAC DIV J1 prior to burial taking place.

(4)   Enemy casualties are to be treated IAW national policy and compliant with Geneva Conventions Article 17. Enemy casualties may be properly interred on site or gathered for burial at collection points as designated by component/formations.

(5)   In all cases, any articles of identification must be collected and returned through the J1 along with records to include burial location and description of the means used to mark the grave(s). Further details are included in Appendix 4.

e.   <u>Replacements.</u> RSO&I will be staged out of DSA for likely reinforcements anticipated at end of Ph 1 and on comd during Ph 2. Reinforcements program will be RHU coy responsibility. Fwd transport into AO IOT integrate with Bde's will be 17 Bde CSS responsibility.

f.   <u>Religious service.</u> National responsibility taking into consideration local and Host Nation sensibilities.

g.   <u>Salvage.</u> Salvage operations are a national responsibility.

h.   <u>Repair, Recovery and Back-loading.</u> Repair, recovery and back-loading of equipment is the reposnsibility of Bdes to designated Bde BLP. 17 CSSB will recover rearwards to DSA. Further backloading from APOD/SPOD is a national responsibility.

i.   <u>Contracting.</u> The Contract Management Cell (CMC) is responsible for all 1 ANZAC DIV contracts with local HN services. All requirements for contracting support are to be routed through the appropriate Component Commands to the 17 CSS BDE CMC. TCN NSE may conduct their own HN contracting arrangements, but are highly encouraged to align with 17 CSS BDE CMC efforts.

j.   <u>Distribution.</u> Distribution is to be provided through a combination of ADF, TCN and contracted assets across AO APPLE using maritime, road and air assets as appropriate.

(1)   <u>Inter-theatre distribution.</u> Distribution between the NSB and the agreed points identified below will primarily utilise contracted distribution assets. ADF distribution capabilities may be utilised when appropriate.

(2)   <u>Intra-theatre distribution.</u> Distribution from the agreed point and the JFAO is to be under JF17 CSS BDE arrangements through HQJOC.

(3)   <u>Agreed Points.</u> The Agreed Point for all personnel and materiel entering the AO is to be through the APOD/SPOD.

k.   <u>Diplomatic clearances/customs.</u> Diplomatic clearances are to be conducted IAW the SOFA at Ref E. TCN may utilise the umbrella provided under Ref E as part of 1 ANZAC DIV, or establish their own exchange of letters with South Torbia.

l.   <u>Postal.</u>

(1)   Free post is to be made available for all 1 ANZAC DIV personnel. An AFPO is to be established by 17 CSS BDE at the APOD, with mail to be serviced through service air/contracted flights and then further distribution in TCNs by respective national postal services.

(2)   The postal address for 1 ANZAC DIV will be:

> **PMKeys/Service Number (NZ) No. Rank, Initial, SURNAME**
> **Deployed Unit**
> **Operation SWIFT DEFENDER**
> **AFPO 44**
> **Darwin Mail Distribution Centre**
> **DARWIN NT 0800**

(3)   17 CSSB will establish a mail system within the theatre that enables TCN to distribute personal and national mail effectively and securely.

m.   <u>Rear Area Security (RAS).</u> Annex D (Intelligence) indicates that the rear area should not be considered secure. Threats exist from irregular forces/enemy Special Purpose Forces, deep fires and potentially enemy air. There will be force protection requirements associated with the provision of sustainment to 1 ANZAC DIV. Sustainment installations and convoys are to be protected. 17 CSS BDE is responsible for RAS of the DSA.

4.   **<u>Command and Signal.</u>**

n.   <u>COMD 17 CSS BDE.</u> Brigadier Edmonds (AS).

o.   <u>Locations.</u>

(4)   17 CSS BDE Main – APOD

(5)   17 CSS BDE Forward – 1 ANZAC DIV DSA.

p.   <u>Reporting.</u>

(1)   LOGSITREP. Logistic reporting is to use a single source report. 1 ANZAC DIV will provide 17 CSS BDE with the LOGSITREP format.

(2)   The 1 ANZAC DIV J4's intent is that the Components are to provide daily LOGSITREPs to the HQ 17 CSS BDE for situationally awareness of general logistic support and common user logistic issues and requirements.

(3)   HQ 17 CSS BDE is then to compile the LOGSITREP to be submitted to the 1 ANZAC DIV G4 as directed.

(4)   The LOGSITREP is to include logistic issues pertaining to attached FE and International Agencies as required.

(5)   PERSTAT. Personnel reporting is to be IAW Appendix 3.

(6)   Health Reporting. All health and casualty reporting will be IAW Ref D.

(7)   Point of Contact. The POC for all matters regarding this Logistic Support Order is the SO1 Plans, HQ 17 CSS BDE.

Appendices:
1.   JF17 CSS BDE C2 Diagram (TBI)
2.   Dependency Matrix (TBI)
3.   Personnel Support (TBI)
4.   Mortuary Affairs (TBI)

CIVIL MILTARY OPERATIONS

References:

A.   World Fact Book 2020 – The Republic of South Torbia as at 15 July 21
C.   HQ JOC OIE Prospects for Security and Stability in South Torbia dated 27 June 21
D.   IPANA – P Report 024/21 – Humanitarian Sit North Island 30 June 21

OVERVIEW

1.   **General.** This annex details the Civil Military Operations (CMO) objectives and activities to be undertaken in support of the land component operations. This is to support the establishment of security and stability conditions in the 1 (ANZAC) DIV AO sufficient for the transition of responsibility for security to a mandated IPANA Follow on Force (FoF) and subsequent Host Nation Military / Security forces. This annex is to be used by those elements involved in Civ-Mil activities and those whom may need to understand the Civ-Mil environment for their own BOS. All CMO intentions will be undertaken with in IO objectives and in line with the COMD's intent (here with restated);

a.   **Purpose**. Enforce IPANA Declaration 914 to re-establish South Torbian sovereignty on the island of North Island.

b.   **Method**. Deploy 1 ANZAC DIV with enablers from ADF and OGA to the 1 (ANZAC) DIV AO to prosecute Multi-Domain Operations against North Torbian elements in South Torbian sovereign territory. Coordinate WOAG and multinational efforts to enforce IPANA Declaration 914.

c.   **Endstate**. The removal of North Torbian forces from South Torbian sovereign territory, establishment of a safe and secure environment in the occupied South Torbian territories, and conditions set for the IPANA supervised transition of authority in occupied North Island territories back to the South Torbian Government.

SITUATION

2.   **Enemy**. Analysis of operational environment, threat, threat forces and assessment of likely en ops, see Intelligence, OPORD Annex B.

3.   **Friendly**. Detailed friendly forces, groupings, tasks and organisation see Operations, OPORD Annex A.

4.   **Inhabitants**. A detailed social-political and infrastructure summary of the 1 (ANZAC) DIV AO is provided in Ref A to E, and detailed in the enclosed Country Study Appendix 1. That study providing the following points as particular relevance to the 1 ANZAC DIV CMO plan for the North Island province of the nation state of South Torbia:

a.   **Population.**   The population of South Torbia is 42,380,000 based on 2020 estimates. 80% of South Torbia's population live in urban areas.

b.   **Language**. Torbian is the dominant language and official of South Torbia; it is a language shared with North Torbia, and spoken by Torbians worldwide. English is the second-most common language spoken in South Torbia. Olvanese, Arabic, and various regional languages are also spoken in specific areas inhabited by immigrants or foreign workers. In general, however, one must be versed in either Torbian or English in order to conduct business in South Torbia.

c.   **Culture and Society**. The entire country of South Torbia is composed almost exclusively of Torbian people. About 85% of the people in the country claim to be of Torbian descent. The remaining 15% is a mix of various ethnic groups from the surrounding Archipelago and ethnic Olvanans. South Torbia's thriving economy brings in a wide variety of travellers for business, and while some of them are permanent residents (but not citizens) the majority of business travellers are transient.

d.   **Religion**. Freedom of religion is enshrined in South Torbia's Constitution, and the government has made efforts to ensure that South Torbians are not constrained in how they express their faith. While the government avoids creating faith based tensions, there is still the potential for tension to exist between different communities of faith. South Torbia is home to a variety of religions and faiths. The majority of the population prescribes to Christian faiths, with an estimated 42% being Roman Catholic, and 15% belonging to Protestant denominations. While Buddhism was once the dominant faith, and continues to be an influential factor within Torbian culture, today only 7.5% of the population claim to be Buddhists. 5.5% of the population are Sunni Muslims, who adhere to the Shafi'i tradition.

e.   **Politics and Government**. South Torbia, is a constitutional republic occupying most of the south half of the island of North Island. After centuries of foreign occupation and authoritarian rule, South Torbia emerged in the late 20th century as one of the world's fastest growing economies. Today it is one of the world's wealthiest, most stable, and militarily powerful nations in the region. The modern state of South Torbia resulted from hasty negotiations between the United States and the People's Republic of Olvana following the occupation of Torbia during World War II. Planners arbitrarily divided the Torbian portion of North Island Island roughly in half from Lingayan Gulf to Dingalan Bay, with the US governing the southern portion along with Midoro Island and Olvana the north from Baguio. The US and its western allies left Torbia shortly after, focusing instead on the occupations of Japan and Germany and the growing frictions with Donovia. South Torbia was given independence and declared a nation on September 15, 1947, envisioned by the West to be a liberal western democracy and American ally in the Western Pacific. South Torbia recognizes and celebrates 15 September as "Torbia Day", the day of national independence.

f.   **Economic outlook.** South Torbia has one of the strongest economies in not only the region, but also the world. However, economic growth has slowed as the nation transitions from technologically advanced manufacturing exporters to a services-oriented market. While high youth unemployment, a rapidly aging workforce, and declining population present challenges for the South Torbian government, economic conflicts in the region run the gamut from relatively low hostility disagreements over shipping lanes to the potential for full-scale warfare, in part due to economic sanctions South Torbia joins the international community in

imposing. Potential flash points with North Torbia and Olvana influence much of South Torbia's international economic policies.

g.   **Electricity.** With limited domestic natural resources, South Torbia relies on importation of fossil fuels for generation of electricity. The government monitors the energy sector very closely in comparison with other sectors of the economy, as South Torbia must import 93% of its natural gas, oil and other fuels to produce energy. The government is making efforts to push for greater use of renewable energy and over the last decade the amount of renewable energy consumed has increased from 6.1% of the total to 23.0%. Total energy consumption mainly comes from natural gas (43%), petroleum (27%), and coal (24%). South Torbia possesses an adequate if somewhat dated refining capability.

h.   **Water Supply.** All water pipelines in South Torbia are local. Due to the heavy rain that falls in most of the country, South Torbia has an abundance of water. The local water purification plants in the urban areas transport the treated water to the homes throughout the metropolitan areas. These local water systems are not counted in the pipeline figures above. There are some water desalination plants in South Torbia, but the desalinated water is used to meet local needs in the immediate area around the desalination plant. While there have been studies conducted to use desalination as a method to provide Manila with additional water, the prohibitive cost has prevented the start of any such construction.

i.   **Fuel Supply.** South Torbia has few fossil fuel deposits on or offshore, making its economy susceptible to global energy price fluctuations and crises. The South Torbian government formed the Torbian National Oil Company (TNOC) to bring stability to the oil and natural gas supply. TNOC, which is 100% government owned, is responsible for the importation of all crude petroleum products, while processing and distribution of refined products is in the hands of the private sector. TNOC is a major player in worldwide oil and gas exploration and the development of non-Torbian natural gas fields.

j.   **Waste Treatment**. While marginally capable sewage systems exist in major metropolitan areas, sewage systems in rural areas are either antiquated or non-existent. 85% of rural South Torbians have access to a sewage system that are predominantly in form of septic systems. In the past 20 years, the government subsidized and privatized sludge removal and septic system cleaning, substantially reducing ground water contamination.

k.   **Telecommunications**. In South Torbia, most citizens have access to a telephone and listen to radio or watch television, and over 90% of the population has access to the internet. The deregulation of the telecommunications industry over 20 years ago led to major upgrades and increases of service providers for mobile, landline, internet, and other service providers. South Torbians operate approximately 30 million landlines and 60 million cell phones. The country has multiple radio stations that are both government owned and private, and broadcast religious, pop culture, and music. There are two national television network providers and approximately 50 local television providers with approximately 15 million subscribers.

l.   **Health.** This ministry is primarily responsible for overseeing public health, unemployment payments, and public assistance. Additionally, the ministry's bureaucracy provides critical reports that inform national economic and health policies. It is tasked with collecting and collating data from a number of sources on an ongoing basis that populate large databases that inform the government-mandated reports. South Torbia is subject to many types of natural disaster, disease, and poisonous flora, and fauna.

m.   **Legal System.** The judicial system of South Torbia largely mimics that of western civil law systems. The largest difference between South Torbia's legal system and many western systems is the complete absence of juries as a means to decide cases and sentencing – all decision are made by one or more judges. South Torbia also utilizes an inquisitorial system for its prosecution, giving significant power to courts and judges across the legal system.

n.   **Policing.** South Torbia fields a NPF of approximately 1,000 members who operate similar to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United States. It handles domestic national crimes. The criminally incarcerated population is approximately 100,000 people at the federal level. Of these, only about 5,000 are females. Most large cities have a local jail to hold those accused of very minor crimes. This is only until the accused can appear before a judge for crimes that usually result in a fine or sentences less than a month. If convicted, the prisoner will be transferred to a provincial jail. For rural areas, the accused is placed in pre-trial confinement at the provincial level. After conviction, the perpetrator either remains in the provincial prison or is transferred to the federal level if the sentence is over six months long.

o.   **Transportation.** The transportation architecture in South Torbia ranges from the most modern (some airports) to dirt roads that are barely passable to only four-wheeled drive vehicles forcing most people to walk. Other than interstates, roads in South Torbia are below US or Western European standards. Driving can be hazardous and becomes more hazardous at night and during the rainy season due to lack of drivers skills.

p.   **Humanitarian Situation.** Today, South Torbia meets most standards for human rights and protection of freedoms expected of developed nations. Freedom of speech, press, association, and religion are codified in the Constitution and enforced by the judiciary. Accused criminals have recognized rights, with fair and transparent trials being the norm. Human rights are an important campaign platform for those seeking political candidates. Several prominent human rights advocates have been elected to federal and provincial offices with human rights as a key proponent of their campaign. Institutional discrimination does, however, exist. Homosexuals are widely discriminated against and have no specific protection under the law, which has focused international condemnation. Non-Torbians or Torbians of mixed-parentage also see widespread discrimination, without legal recourse. In addition, the military has a reputation for abusing conscripts during their training – incidents described as "hazing" often venture into grossly inhumane treatment. Numerous scandals resulting from these incidents brought extreme public scrutiny on the military, which embarked on a comprehensive retraining and oversight program designed to curb these behaviours.

q.   **IDP Camps.** It is unknown at this stage if IDP camps have been identified in South Torbia.

r.   **IDP/Refugees Movements.**
    (1)   Population movement internal of a country produces internally displaced persons (IDP) but if the population flees across countries borders, they become refugees. Additional IDP/Refugee movement is expected on commencement of Phase 2 and additional temporary camps are expected to emerge. These movements are expected to include both those fleeing active conflict and those who have benefitted from the supported government and now fear reprisals.

(2) Greater movements of people combined with an expected deterioration of law & order and the economy during and immediately after decisive operations are likely to exacerbate existing problems within communities. This is likely to have a particular impact on women with increased incidence of rape, transactional sex and related gender based violence.

(3) The maintenance of awareness on the situation of Displaced Persons and Refugees (DPRE) in the AO is to remain a CMO responsibility.

(4) Upon ceasing of hostilities, security of movement is restored and people feel that there is sufficient law and order to protect them from attack or retaliation in their home communities, IDP/refugees will begin to return. This is expected to strain post-conflict housing availability, public services and food/water supplies.

5.   **HA and Civil Society Organisations (CSO).**

a.   Some of the IO/NGO operating across the 1 (ANZAC) DIV AO and within South Torbia are likely to manage the IDP camps once they are established. It is likely that international and other staffs who work for IO/NGO may depart or curtail their activities during military operations as they will conduct their own threat assessments and act IAW the IPANA Security Level System.

b.   Some CSO are anticipated to be in place to support HA distribution. NGO/IO will likely determine their own security criteria for entry based on information from their own sources and the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). Threat elements will likely attempt to disrupt HA supply and distribution IOT support their own agenda.

c.   Those IOs and NGOs are found in the North Island civil organisations and contact list attached as Appendix 4.

6.   **Civil Assumptions.**

a.   Heads of various sections, key stakeholders within the South Torbian government will also be based at the capital in WELLINGTON. Further, other coalition stakeholders within military and government, NGOs, and other stakeholders such as ICRC will be based in Manilla during operations.

b.   The South Torbian people in the occupied area have a neutral position yet positive sentiment towards 1 ANZAC DIV and aligned South Torbian Govt.

c.   Threat groups will leverage off the CivPop to collect information about 1 ANZAC DIV's activities.

d.   Provincial political entities are positive towards South Torbian Govt and 1 ANZAC DIV elements.

e.   Law enforcement aligned with provincial govt are also positive towards South Torbian Govt and 1 ANZAC DIV elements as well.

f. Medical services and public utilities will deteriorate less than 24hrs of the commencement of combat operations.

g. National economic aspect of country will deteriorate and will heavily rely on the informal market and local and provincial economies.

h. Liaison authority to engage with for HN government ministers resides with COMD CJTF 667.

i. IO/NGO will be capable of provision of HA and initial capacity building.

MISSION

7. **Purpose**. CMO activities are to support the 1 ANZAC DIV Mission IOT set the conditions for transition of authority to the mandated IPANA Follow on Force (FoF) supported by the international community and to minimise the impact of 1 ANZAC DIV operations on the civil population.

8. **Method**. CMO is to support the 1 ANZAC DIV mission by:

a. Undertaking direct comms and liaison, collaboration and interagency planning, actions and activities with the WOG to set the conditions for transition to the mandated IPANA FoF.

b. Supporting the IO objectives, assist in the delivery of key messages to the local population which prepares them for the return and establishment of the legitimate Govt of South Torbia with an emphasis on our intention to achieve transition to the IPANA FoF.

c. Conduct or coordinate those targeted CMO activities on the assigned persons or groups to achieve the desired effects and outcomes and control those elements with the JFAO who will interface with the pop.

d. Ensuring that 1 ANZAC DIV operations and offensive actions minimise targeted activities and collateral damage to key civil infrastructure. Where this has not been achieved, undertake such assessments and organise the repair or replacement of this damage in as orderly and responsive way as possible.

e. Ensuring that 1 ANZAC DIV operations do not create a dependency by the HN population on 1 ANZAC DIV resources.

f. Ensure the avoidance of placing additional strain upon the already fragile key civil infrastructure including assisting those FE responsible for assisting the HN Govt depts becoming re-established to provide a return to normality.

g. The provision of appropriately UNCLASS briefs to key stakeholders.

h. Assist with the provision of a secure environment that allows IO/NGO to deliver services and possible HA to the pop.

i. Coordinating with key agencies regarding IDP/Refugee movement through the 1 ANZAC Div AO so agencies are able to establish interim IDP camps if required.

j.   Facilitating the provision of Immediate Life Sustaining Aid (ILSA) through coordination with the On-Site Operational Coordination Centre (OSOCC), Other Governmental Agencies (OGA), International Organisations (IO) and NGOs.

9.   **Endstate.** Set the conditions for the transition of responsibility to the mandated IPANA FoF.

EXECUTION

10.   **Concept of Operations**.

a.   **CMO Elements**. To conduct CMO the following units and force elements will be utilised for the delivery of effects and provision of Civ-Mil influencing and informing activities as assigned and directed by the JETB. The lack of coalition forces, specifically US Mil, means that Civil Affairs (CA) teams are unavailable for tasking or use.

   (1)   The lack of CA means that the principal CMO tool will be the tactical CIMIC detachments and teams as provided from the formation CIMIC Group. These elements will be the priority task for assessments coordination of CMO effects as tasked to units and FE. It is expected that each Cbt BDE will be provided with its own CIMIC Tac Spt Team (TST). The role of CIMIC is to support the mission through three core functions:

      (a)   enhance situational understanding of the civil space;

      (b)   support/enhance decision-making; and

      (c)   conduct tactical CIMIC tasks as detailed from OPORD.

   (2)   Civ Mil Activities (CMA), any unit / sub-unit, elements or staff can be utilised for activities and duties as tasked through Ops as detailed in TASKORDs from HQs. This is inclusive of any specialist elements as attached to the formations.

   (3)   Civ Mil Liaison (CML) staff for communication and coordination between HQs and those OGA or HN departments. Any personnel as drawn from staff and headquarters and may be used and can expect tasking in any or all phases. These would be coordinated through the INFO OPS KLE cell staff assisted by the CIMIC Teams.

   (4)   Engineer Assessment Teams for reconnaissance and assessment of infrastructure and civilian capabilities. May also be required for Engr Civ Asst Program (ENGCAP) activities in later phases.

   (5)   Medical Assessment Teams for assessment and inspection of medical facilities and population health services. May also be required for Med Civ Asst Program (MEDCAP) activities in later phases.

(6) Military Police detachment Engagement Teams for investigations and assessment of detainee handling infrastructure and civilian capabilities. May also be required for Police Civ Asst Program (POLCAP) activities in later phases. It will be expected that a separate and comprehensive hand over of security arrangements will be specified. See the Military Police, OPORD Annex AD.

(7) Female Engagement Teams (FET) or Cultural Support Teams (CST) for engagement and assessment of the civil situation and population support either from specialised formed teams or those created for the operation. These teams are not to be used in the HUMINT role and if they are, must not be additionally tasked for Civ Mil activities or actions.

(8) Other IO Information Related Capabilities (IRC) units or elements which may be tasked or accompany the CMO elements as part of an IRC combined effects team. These may include but are not limited to;

   (a) The Key Leader Engagement (KLE) cell will have a close relationship with the CMO elements as they will coordinate much of the interactions between any FE and those civilian leaders and persons of influence.

   (b) Psychological Operations (PSYOP) teams may also be with CMO elements to either distribute or provided for delivery that IO product and messages for those targeted people or groups that any CivMil activities are undertaken. CMO elements may also be tasked to distribute this product as they meet with the civilian agencies and individuals allocated to so engage.

   (c) Light Electronic Warfare Teams (LEWT) may accompany CMO elements as a means of gaining movement within the AO. They may also be there to provide early warning in the event of hostile activities against FE.

   (d) Public Affairs (PA) officers or teams may also accompany or request information for input into their products and stories in spt of the FE IO campaign. They may include Combat Camera members or staff or they may request imagery as part of CMO activities.

   (e) Those staff which exist in or on the formation HQs which can facilitate civil engagement either through personal contacts (such as family, educational or business etc ties), secular contacts, medicinal contacts or any interest contacts that may provide meeting opportunity.

(9) The Dept of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) has a special relationship with defence. It may provide a liaison offr, a Policy Advisor (POLAD) to the higher headquarters who advises the COMD on strategic issues such as diplomatic negotiations, demarche exchanges, adherence to agreements and national policy interpretation. They cannot provide operational or tactical direction nor should they interpose in the manoeuvre of combat forces.

(10) Interactions with other Civil Agencies. These are defined as those non-military organisations which will exist in the battle space and may be made up on International Organisations (IOs) such as the UN, ICRC, Amnesty International

etc., Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) such as WADE, RAID, FADE, MWC, LoRD etc., and Other Government Agencies (OGA) such as AFP, DSTO, and ABF etc. It is a misconception that the Military Land Force entrusted with enforcing the IPANA mandated actions can also direct or task those civil agencies which are or may soon be present in the JFAO. The military should never task nor expect that those civ agencies will do the land forces bidding and can only set the security conditions, which enables them to do the work that they wish to do. Dialog and open communications must always be sought but influencing or exploitive actions on behalf of the force is never to be planned. Their neutrality, impartiality and organisational concern for humanity must always be respected.

b.   **Scheme of Manoeuvre**. CMO is to be conducted across all phases. 1 ANZAC DIV CMO elms and those FE tasks with CMO effects are to deploy to support 1 ANZAC DIV operations during all phases with CJTF 667 conducting a handover of CMO activities to the mandated IPANA FoF in Phase 4.

(1)   **Ph 0 Shaping (CJTF 667 phasing)**. CMO elms conduct initial liaison with key stakeholders, including HN Govt, OGA and IPANA OSOCC. Conduct mission planning for the possible assistance in population movements including the returning of IDP/Refugees. Participate in the refinement of target lists with Joint Effects and Targeting (JET) and the provision of information for the KLE engagement strategy. Gain Situational Awareness and Situational Understanding (SASU) of key civilian and humanitarian issues, threats and opportunities IOT identify potential CMO activities within the CJOA.

(2)   **Ph 1 Lodgement (CJTF 667 phasing)**. 1 ANZAC DIV is to deploy and coordinate initial assistance and response with OGA, OSOCC, IO/NGO. Allocation of CMO assets throughout the 1 (ANZAC) DIV AO is as follows:

(a)   1 ANZAC DIV – C9 CMO Dir (O6) and Staff,

(b)   1 ANZAC DIV CMO PSO (O5), Staff Brch and 1 x TST (-)

(c)   1 MCB – 1 x CIMIC TST (26);

(d)   3 MCB – 1 x CIMIC TST (26)

(e)   7 MCB – 1 x CIMIC TST (26);

(f)   9 MCB – 1 x CIMIC TST (26);

(g)   16 AVN BDE – 1 x CML Team.

(h)   17 SUST BDE – 1 x CML Team.

(4)   **Ph 2 Neutralise (CJTF 667 phasing).** Refine initial CIMIC assessments and continue Key Stakeholder Engagement (KSE). Conduct civil engagement with available HN civil authorities. Facilitate the delivery of key IO messages to local pop. BPT facilitate and control the delivery of ILSA. Coord with OGA, OSOCC, and IO/NGO for management of refugees/IDP's within the 1 (ANZAC) DIV AO.

In conjunction with OGA and OSOCC plan and facilitate the restoration of key essential services within capacity.

(5) **Ph 3 Transition and Redeployment (CJTF 667 phasing).** Conduct handover of all 1 ANZAC DIV CMO activities which are to be purposely planned and undertaken to NOT build in dependencies, to other agencies and the mandated IPANA FoF.

11. **CMO Grouping and Tasks**.

a. **Grouping**. 1 ANZAC DIV Main

(1) **Tasks all phases**:

   (a) Respond to HQ 1 (ANZAC) DIV tasking;

   (b) Establish technical control (TECHCON) with all CMO assets within the 1 (ANZAC) DIV AO;

   (c) Conduct collaborative interagency planning with OGA for stabilisation and transition activities;

   (d) Develop relationships with key stakeholder networks (Tribal, HN, OSOCC, and IO/NGO); and

   (e) Develop and maintain an UNCLAS security and South Torbia entry procedures briefing pack for IO/NGOs.

b. **Grouping:** x CBT BDE, Y CBT BDE, 1 (NZ) BDE, 17 SUST BDE..

(1) **Ph 0 Preparatory Tasks:**

   (a) Prepare for deployment;

   (b) Commence key stakeholder identification and engagement;

   (c) Confirm through KSE the locations of IPANA agencies with IO and NGO; and

   (d) Coordinate with J4 the HA needs for ILSA.

(2) **Ph 1 Shaping Tasks:**

   (a) Establish baseline data through all source reporting in support of effects 5, 6 and 7 from the Operations Assessment, including:

      (i) key civil infrastructure;

      (ii) status of essential services; and

(iii)   humanitarian situation.

(b)   Identify suitable civilian evacuation routes that are de-conflicted from initial activities and advise HQ 1 ANZAC DIV Main;

(c)   Capabilities and dispositions of key civil stakeholders (HN/IO/NGO); and

(d)   Support the delivery of IO messaging to the local population.

(3)   **Ph 2 Decisive Tasks:**

(a)   Support the conduct of mission planning.

(b)   Commence tactical CIMIC assessments in support of effects 5, 6 and 7 from the Operations Assessment, including:

(i)   key civil infrastructure;

(ii)   status of essential services;

(iii)   humanitarian situation; and

(iv)   capabilities and dispositions of key civil stakeholders (HN/IO/NGO).

(c)   Identify and engage with key stakeholders within CJOA IAW the liaison architecture to inform KLE and targeting.

(d)   Support the delivery of IO messaging to the South Torbian population.

(e)   Report incidences of alleged atrocities and Human Rights abuses and secure the location.

(f)   Facilitate the release and distribution of appropriately de-classified information to key stakeholders.

(g)   BPT spt Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation and Reintegration (DDRR) (FRAGO TBI). Tasks may include but are not limited to:

(i)   Disarming all mandated armed groups and individuals IOT support DDR plan and the 1 ANZAC DIV mandate.
(ii)   Influencing the population to support the disarmament requirement by disseminating authorised and approved DDR IO themes and messages.

(iii)   Identifying suitable disarmament /demobilisation sites, collect, store, and secure all confiscated weapons.

(iv)   Securing South Torbian Police armouries, weapons and critical infrastructure.

      (v)   Receipting surrendered/seized small arms and light weapons (SALW), storage and security of surrendered/seized SALW and EO/IED components in suitable storage facilities. Maintain inventory of surrendered weapons.

(h)   BPT to assist in the movement of disarmed combatants to demobilisation sites.

(i)   BPT transport weapons from disarmament sites to final disposal destination.

(j)   BPT conduct biometric enrolling (subject to approval).

(k)   BPT detain and secure individuals accused of serious criminal crimes and release or transfer to appropriate authorities.

(l)   BPT support requests for critical infrastructure repair after a Request for Assistance (RFA) approval and report details of effects delivered.

(m)   BPT facilitate the delivery and distribution of ILSA IAW para 4c.

(n)   BPT provide appropriately de-classified briefings to IO/NGO regarding route conditions, movement control measures and security coord protocols and mechanisms that are applicable to the entry of their land, sea and air assets.

(4)   **Ph 3 Stability Tasks**

(a)   Continue tactical CIMIC assessments in support of effects 5, 6 and 7 from the Operations Assessment, including updates on:

      (i)   Key civil infrastructure and essential services.

      (ii)   Reconstruction and development tasks.

      (iii)   Humanitarian situation.

      (iv)   HN/IO/NGO – HA, reconstruction, development, capabilities and disposition.

(b)   Maintain engagement with HN/IO/NGOs and CSO within CJOA.

(c)   Facilitate release of authorised information to key stakeholders.

(d)   BPT support requests for ILSA and critical infrastructure repair after a Request for Assistance (RFA) approval and report details of effects delivered.

(e)   BPT facilitate repatriation of refugees and displaced persons.

(f)   BPT transition responsibilities/tasks to mandated IPANA FoF.

(g)   Report on all ERW requirements as requested.

(5)   **Ph 4 Transition and Redeployment Tasks**.

(a)   Maintain engagement with HN/IO/NGOs and civil society organisations within AO.

(b)   Facilitate release of authorised information to key stakeholders.

(c)   Conduct handover of all 1 ANZAC DIV CMO activities to the legitimate national authority or authorised agencies.

12.   **Coordinating Instructions.**

a.   **Stabilization Aid Funds/Commanders' Emergency Relief Program (SAF/CERP).** 1 ANZAC DIV currently does not have an allocation of funding to implement Consent Winning Activities (CWA) and Quick Impact Projects (QIP). A request for funding has been sent to HQ LLC-OBA and further details will be released by FRAGO.

b.   **Compensation Claims.** All civilian claims for compensation are to be investigated at the command level prior to submission to the HQ 1 ANZAC DIV. Commanders are not authorized to agree to pay compensation claims. Further information is found in the Legal Annex to the OPORD.

c.   **Locally Employed Civilians (LEC).** Opportunities will exist for contracting LEC to fulfil certain functions in support of 1 ANZAC DIV efforts and base support plans. The employment of LEC is to consider the effect upon the integrity of local community structures and delivery of essential services. Formation S9 staff are to ensure coordination with HQ 1 ANZAC DIV Main during LEC employment planning phase. Guidance on payment rates is TBI. HQ 1 ANZAC DIV approval is required to employ LEC from: Police, Fire, Ambulance, Border Protection, Education Dept, Water Dept or Health Dept. This also includes specialists e.g. police/teachers and administrators.

d.   **Operations Assessment (OA).**   All CMO reporting including SITREPs, Incident Reports, CMO SITREPS and Quicklook Storyboards will be utilised in support of the 1 ANZAC DIV OA process.

e.   **Request for Assistance (RFA).** The following procedures are to be used for RFA planning and execution:

(1)   In the first instance formations are to ensure civilian agencies maximize use of their resources (either integral or contracted) before accepting RFA for consideration.

(2)   Formations are authorized to execute RFA as long as they do not prejudice the 1 ANZAC DIV mission and can be executed within formation capabilities.

      (3)   RFA that require external support are to be passed through HQ 1 ANZAC DIV for assessment, coordination and de-confliction with other civilian agencies and 1 ANZAC DIV resources.

f.   **Humanitarian Standards for Encampment Site Selection and Operation.** 1 ANZAC DIV will not be responsible for establishing IDP or refugee camps. Responsibility for the establishment of IDP/refugee camps resides with the IPANA humanitarian community. However, 1 ANZAC DIV may be required to support the movement and route security if requested by the IO / NGOs through the OSOCC.

g.   **CMO Measures of Effect.** There must also be continuous assessment of the civil dimension in order to determine measures of effectiveness (MOE) and the progress of the mission. This ongoing assessment task is performed by CIMIC assessment teams and monitored by the CMO staff. MOE refer to observable, preferably quantifiable, subjective indicators that an activity is proceeding along a desired path. A commander uses MOE to determine whether an operation is succeeding in achieving the goals of the operation according to the mission. MOE should be developed as a product of mission analysis. MOE will differ for every mission and for different phases of a mission. As the commander and staff identify specified, implied, and critical tasks, they should define what constitutes successful completion of each task. They decide how the MOE will be identified, reported and validated. They determine what action will be taken when the MOE is achieved, as well as contingency plans in case MOE are not achieved according to the original plan. MOE are not necessarily fixed and can be adjusted as the situation changes. See appendix 7.

h.   **CMO Normality Indicators**. Normality Indicators (NI) serve to measure trends and progress in the recovery of a civil society to an improved quality of life. NI measure the level of development of the civilian condition to reduce the level of dependency on the military force by the civil population and civil authorities. Data should be objective, quantifiable and collected systematically. The force commander must exploit all sources of data measuring the quality of life and recovery of the local population in the 1 (ANZAC) DIV AO, as well as the effectiveness of military operations that assist in this recovery. Direct and indirect MOE and NI should be jointly developed with civilian agencies to reinforce unity of purpose and effort in civil–military activities. It is the interface with the civilian sector that provides the means for collecting data that contributes to normality. NI should be SMART (specific, measurable, attainable, results oriented and time based), objective and comparable from occasion to occasion. Measuring only that which is easily measured, will give a false impression. Robust information management systems are required to support the delivery of worthwhile MOE and NI. See appendix 8.

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

13.   **Civilian Resource Requirements**. Arrangements will be required to provide a minimum of one APOD/SPOD access to the 1 (ANZAC) DIV AO which must remain serviceable, with apron or wharf space, to be provided to IO/NGO for delivery of HA. Ideally, this will be a separate facility from the military. It should come complete with its own aircraft / vessel handling and refuelling facilities as well as transport facilities for loading cargo.

14.   **Military Resource Requirements.**

a.   **Immediate Life Sustaining Assistance (ILSA).** ILSA is defined as the provision of small scale emergency supplies and services which are needed as a matter of extreme urgency (in-extremis) to save life or to prevent serious suffering. The provision of ILSA may be conducted without approval from HQ 1 ANZAC DIV where it can be provided within formation resources and or capability. In the main, ILSA comprises the provision of water and food however, depending on the circumstances it may also include; shelter, medical assistance (life, limb or eyesight), transport, rescue and repair of essential infrastructure. ILSA should be provided at 'arms-length' whenever possible with the direct distribution to beneficiaries undertaken by IO/NGO, HN agencies, CSO, village or tribal leader. Direct distribution of ILSA by 1 ANZAC DIV FE should only be undertaken in-extremis and as a last resort, and could be sourced from 1 ANZAC DIV supply chain. ILSA stocks will be made available to 1 ANZAC DIV formations from Ph 2 for emergency distribution to the population as required. Provision of ILSA should be in response to immediate and life threatening requirement and should not displace any current arrangements in place by NGOs. Under no circumstances should ILSA become the main source of provisioning for the population.

b.   **Bottled Water.** Water (bulk or by 5, 10 or 20 litre military jerry can) **is not** to be provided for from 1 ANZAC DIV log stocks. Commercially procured plastic 5 or 10 litre collapsible water containers in either blue or clear colour or bottled drinking water may be authorised where thirst may become the possible cause of death within the population. It will be carried in unit A and B Ech in sufficient bulk quantities and provided for upon auth from the unit Comd. Water for bathing/cleaning will **not** be provided.

c.   **Foodstuffs.** Military rations / CRP **is not** to be provided for from 1 ANZAC DIV log stocks. Limited quantities of HUMRAT prepacked high energy supplements may be available and are to be used only as a means of having an immediate relief of starvation. It will be carried in unit A and B Ech in sufficient bulk quantities and provided for upon auth from the unit Comd.

d.   **Shelter.** Shelter **is not** to be provided for unless it is necessary to provide an immediate life sustaining assistance. FE tentage or canvas especially that which is easily identified as military (coloured green, brown or camouflaged) must never be used to provide shelter to the population. Where shelter is required to protect from the elements it must be of a civilian pattern, coloured blue or white and set up away from any possible military associated facilities. Blue tarpaulins, poles and cordage will be carried in formation B Ech in sufficient bulk quantities and provided for upon auth from the formation Comd.

e.   **Medical**. Medical care and use of med supplies is to be strictly limited and is only to be used in those extreme cases where life, limb or eyesight is in danger of being lost. The application of med supplies is to be limited to those members of the FE who are trained and can provide the necessary care and support given the conditions as found in the 1 (ANZAC) DIV AO. Civilians who enter the chain of evacuation due to FE actions, must be turned over to the civil authority at the earliest opportunity. The SMO or J07 will provide the necessary decision making arrangements with the formation Comd.

f.   **Transportation**. Population movement and transportation is **not** to be done utilising 1 ANZAC DIV vehicles. Population movement is to be carried out with civilian pattern vehs and should be made off of the designated MSR. Should a requirement exist to provide life sustaining transport then the use of clearly identified ambulances/medevac ac may be requested. The auth of this will require Formation Comd approval. Under no circumstances should A vehs or armoured veh ambulances be used.

g.   **Rescue**. Any requirement to facilitate any rescue should only be undertaken where life is in danger or the pop was forced into a position of requiring rescue owing to the unintended consequences of FE activities. Rescue may be required where the pop has, in moving out of the way of FE manoeuvre, inadvertently become entrapped in the obstacles or minefields of either side. Such rescue activities will require the unit Comds approval and may extend to the use of 1 ANZAC DIV resources such as breaching and mine detection eqpt but done only after the area has been secured and cleared of en threat. Rescue activities are only to be undertaken after the force has achieved its assignment and any rescue effort must not impede the military mission.

h.   **Maintenance**. Any requirement to complete work on civilian infrastructure such as; power generators and electricity lines, water pumps, filtration units and distribution systems, sewage and sanitation works, and medical / education facilities may only be undertaken if;

   (1)   The damage to these facilities were a result of FE actions or fires,

   (2)   The damage is to public facilities and not private or commercial interests,

   (3)   The maint undertaken is sufficient to render serviceability and not surpass the normal standard for the area or facilities,

   (4)   That works has been tasked via the CMO / CIMIC team as part of the Effects battle rhythm, approved by the Comd and detailed as an OPS FRAGO or TASKO.

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

15.   **CMO Coordinating and Liaison Architecture.** TECHCON is to be established by HQ 1 ANZAC DIV from Ph 1 to all 1 ANZAC DIV staff to assist in overall coordination of CMO activity and allocation of resources. 1 ANZAC DIV is to establish comms to the 1 ANZAC DIV CMOC in DWN. 1 ANZAC DIV will remain in loc with HQ 1 ANZAC DIV for all phases.

16. **Reports and Returns.** All 1 ANZAC DIV formations and units are to ensure daily CMO SITREP is compiled and forwarded to HQ 1 ANAZAC DIV NLT 2100H daily. The format for the CMO SITREP is at Appendix 5. Significant CIMIC contacts are to be recorded as CHATREPS and forwarded on completion NLT 12h following contact. Layout is noted at Appendix 6.

17. **Communications.** CMO elements requiring interactions with the HN Govt, IPANA Agencies or IO/NGOs must come complete with civilian mobile phones, network data devices and civilian means laptop computers to be able to effectively pass and collect information from these sources. As a minimum, elements must have the following communications means;

a.   Civ Telecom land line phone with answering device and facsimile capabilities. These may need to be source in country given the power supply incompatibility with the AS power system.

b.   Civ Mobile phones for voice, text, and NGO chat app usage. The SIM cards must be sourced in country and care must be exercised given the FIS collection capabilities within that system.

c.   CIMIC PC laptops with non-military email accounts as established prior to in country operations. These can be connected to the data communications system via network devices but will also require local telecom data network SIM cards. This LAN system is to have backup capability and multifunction device capability to allow printing and scanning of documents and IO products.

d.   Those CMO elements should also come with a number of civilian two way hand held radios compatible with those used by NGOs and must have a charging capability for those power packs.

e.   Elements must come with or be provided with, Military PRR and MBTR radios for internal sigs and patrol comms. SOIs and CEOIs to be provided from the HQs elements.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Appendices:
1.   Country Brief
2.   Map of South Torbia and Provincial Boundaries.
3.   Map of Pop Tribal Demographics and Boundaries.
4.   Civil Contacts in country.
5.   CMO SITREP Format.
6.   CMO CHATREP Format.
7.   CIMIC MOE.
8.   CIMIC Normalcy Indicators.

COUNTRY BRIEF (DRAFT FRAMEWORK)

BACKGROUND

1.   The modern state of South Torbia resulted from hasty negotiations between the United States and the People's Republic of Olvana following the occupation of Torbia during World War II. Planners arbitrarily divided the Torbian portion of North Island Island roughly in half from Lingayan Gulf to Dingalan Bay, with the US governing the southern portion along with Midoro Island and Olvana the north from Baguio. The US and its western allies left Torbia shortly after, focusing instead on the occupations of Japan and Germany and the growing frictions with Donovia. South Torbia was given independence and declared a nation on September 15, 1947, envisioned by the West to be a liberal western democracy and American ally in the Western Pacific. South Torbia recognizes and celebrates 15 September as "Torbia Day", the day of national independence.

2.   Park Sung-Min, a former army general and leading figure in the Torbian wartime resistance, rose to power in the vacuum left by the departure of the US. Park was a harsh and autocratic leader that violently consolidated power and aggressively suppressed political opposition. Despite his alarmingly oppressive actions and policies, Park's staunch anti-communist positions won him the complete support from the US. This backing increased as Olvana reinforced the new communist government in North Torbia, now called the Democratic People's Republic of Torbia.

3.   The Torbian War was a watershed event for both North and South Torbia. North Torbia, led by its charismatic communist dictator Song Yang-Hwan, convinced Olvana to back an invasion of the South. Song intended to unite the island under communist rule. Supplied and trained by the Olvanans, North Torbia massed forces on the border and invaded in 1950—meeting minimal resistance from the South Torbians and nearly completing its occupation of South Torbia before intervention by South Torbia's western allies. The resulting counterattack by South Torbia and its allies and subsequent Olvanan counter-intervention ultimately resulted in a stalemate that endured for three years before both sides agreed on a ceasefire.

ETHNIC GROUPS

4.   While South Torbia still maintains a close connection to its cultural heritage and tradition, it has embraced many aspects of western culture and market capitalism. The economic growth experienced in South Torbia, paired with an increased exposure to global influences, continues to shape the social landscape within South Torbia. Whereas many countries within the region have diverse populations, South Torbia's relative homogeneity allows it to avoid many of the ethnic and social tensions that occur when different population groups experience urbanization, and increased interactions. That said, South Torbia has been experiencing a cultural evolution as younger generations gain more access to education and global influences. These outside influences create challenges between those Torbian's who seek to maintain their cultural identity, and those who wish to embrace a more global identity.

5.   The entire country of South Torbia is composed almost exclusively of Torbian people. About 85% of the people in the country claim to be of Torbian descent. The remaining 15% is a mix of various ethnic groups from the surrounding Archipelago and ethnic Olvanans. South Torbia's thriving economy brings in a wide variety of travellers for business, and while some of them are permanent residents (but not citizens) the majority of business travellers are transient.

POLITICAL AND SECURITY — INTERNAL

6.   The primary major social event in the last century for South Torbia is the Torbian War that resulted in the division of the country and the Torbian people. Torbian families were split up with many of those living in the northern part of the country fleeing to the south. When the Torbian War ended, these families were not allowed to reunite. Those that had fled to South Torbia did not want to return to the northern part of the country and those family members living in the north who wanted to join their families in the south were stopped by the North Torbian government. This family separation has now hit affected five generations, and has enhanced the sense of divide between the two societies. While perspectives in the south may vary, the older generations are more likely to still feel an emotional, and familial connection to relatives in the north, even if it has been decades sense they were last in contact. Middle aged and younger South Torbians are less likely to maintain emotional ties to relatives in the North, with the youngest generation of adults having very few linkages to the North.

7.   The adoption of democracy in South Torbia following the war was gradual, with the nation experiencing multiple setbacks. On a number of occasions the military has stepped in to exert and maintain control through force. Perhaps one of the most important domestic events that has impacted South Torbia was the rise of the democratic movement and protests that ultimately led to the end of authoritarian rule, and the re-establishment of democratic principles. The return to democracy has enabled freedom to flourish for the people and the economy has prospered. These improvements have allowed the younger South Torbians to embrace and even influence the aspects of western culture, leading to the development of a pop-culture that is uniquely South Torbian. The spread and popularity of this pop-culture influence is an example of the disparity between the quality of life for Torbians living in the south versus those living in the north. Those under 30 years of age use cell phones, enjoy music, and party in nightclubs just like their peers in other modern countries.

8.   South Torbians or those descended from South Torbian parentage, live in most developed and developing areas of the world, to include the US, Australia, Belesia, and Olvana. Those working in these countries are generally working for large corporations that are headquartered in these countries. Since the quality of life in South Torbia is not that of a developing country, remittances are not a significant part of the economy. International experience has given a large number of South Torbians an appreciation for and experience in a larger world that tends to shape their political and economic perspective.

9.   South Torbia maintains membership in international and regional organizations focused on economic, environmental, humanitarian, and other issues important to the region. Trade relations, in particular, are important to South Torbia. North Torbia and its ally, Olvana, have complicated and tense relations. North Torbia's admitted goal of reunification of the island under its control and Olvana's support of the regime pit South Torbia against the two countries. South Torbia's western alliances also create tensions.

10.   South Torbia contends its economic and security interests with small insurgency cells, criminal, and other organizations with external funding and support ties.

11.   The South Torbian Communist Army (TCA) is estimated to have fewer than 1,000 actual fighters, but they may have many more supporters throughout the country, and have the potential to expand their size if needed. Their expressed intent is to establish a communist country based on the Marxist model. While they have the same desired goal, the TCA is not officially aligned with the political South Torbian Communist Party (TCP), though there may be some membership overlap between the two groups.

12.   The Red Tigers Black Society is a major link in the illicit trade routes in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in South Torbia's neighbour, Belesia. The Red Tigers are suspected to be in direct competition with the Tantoco Cartel for control of the arms, drugs, and people trafficking markets in the region. The leadership of the Red Tigers is unknown, but their head is thought to be a member of the Olvanan community.

13.   The Tantoco Cartel is the second of the large transnational criminal organisations operating in the Indo-Pacific region with significant suspected drug and weapons markets within and around the South Torbian capital, Manilla. Their leadership is also unidentified, but strong suspicions rest on local police departments in the region.

14.   The Osongco Syndicate is a large-scale criminal network that is based on the island of Mindoro in Bongabong, led by Zikri Osongco. Osongco may sometimes work in cooperation with the Tantoco Cartel, but it is not part of the latter. The Tantoco Cartel leaves the Osongco Syndicate alone as long as their activities are confined to Mindoro. The Osongco Syndicate is primarily involved in the acquisition and sale of stolen goods and smuggling, but will not hesitate to delve into other areas on the island that can make the organization money. Possible other criminal activities include extortion and bank robbery.

POLITICAL AND SECURITY — EXTERNAL

15.   The South Torbian Government is a Member State of the Indo-Pacific Anti-Nuclear Alliance (IPANA), with its involvement in the multilateral organisation being driven by concerns over North Torbia's nuclear weapons program.

16.   South Torbia shares a border on the mainland of North Island with its primary regional opponent, North Torbia. Sharing a border with a belligerent adversary places greater attention and focus on the need for a strong and well-trained military. North Torbia is a country with a disastrous centralized economy, dilapidated industrial sector, insufficient agricultural base, malnourished military and populace, and intent on spending money on its nuclear program. Without significant aid from Olvana and Donovia, North Torbia is not able to sustain itself or prevent total collapse.

17.   Olvana's expansionist strategy has ruffled the feathers of many of its regional neighbours, including Belesia and South Torbia, but there is little expectation at present of these tensions leading to a major conflict in the immediate future. Having said that, Olvanan military activity has ramped up significantly over recent years. At present, Olvana and North Torbia are currently conducting Ex RISEN SWORD, a biannual interoperability and cooperation exercise, in the South China Sea.

18.   South Torbia's relations with Olvana are highly complex due to Olvana's economic and military support of North Torbia. During the Torbian War, a watershed event for both North and South Torbia, the northern communist state convinced Olvana to back its invasion of the South. Today, South Torbia has ambitions to be a key economic and political leader internationally. This requires it to walk a fine line as it interacts with the West and also with those deemed adversaries of the West. This is particularly true of its relationships with Olvana.

19.   South Torbia's relationship with the small island nation of Gabal is described as good. Due to its size, Gabal is not a significant trade partner. Gabal's beaches and other vacation amenities, however, attract many from South Torbia. For this reason, Gabal and South Torbia seek to maintain friendly relations. Issues erupting over violations of local laws has caused tensions, but the mutually beneficial transactional relationships insure these events receive swift attention and are easily solved diplomatically.

20.   South Torbia's relationship with other neighbouring state, Belesia, is described as good. Belesia is a major trading partner with South Torbia. Politically, there are usually no issues between the two countries. On occasion, issues involving fishing rights and other boundary concerns occur as fishermen and others stray across country borders. These are usually warm issues that are easily solved diplomatically.

21.   South Torbia has generally good relationships with the US and its allies, specific economic or territorial disputes aside. At present, there is a high level of information and personnel exchange between the South Torbian military and western powers active in the region including Australia, New Zealand, and the USA. South Torbia enjoys a good relationship with almost all the major world powers and plays a small role in mediating between adversarial countries. This tends to be in the economic realm, as it pursues its ongoing trade relations with many of the countries in the world.

APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX W TO
1 ANZAC DIV OPORD
DATED XXXX

SOUTH TORBIAN POPULATION DEMOGRAPHICS

1.   There are nine cities within South Torbia that contain a population of over 50,000.

    (a)   Wellington, population 202,700.

    (b)   Hamilton, population 160,900.

    (c)   Tauranga, population 136,700.

    (d)   Lower Hutt, population 111,500.

    (e)   Palmerston North, population 81,200.

    (f)   Napier, population 66,800.

    (g)   Porirua, population 60,200.

    (h)   Nelson, population 58,500.

    (i)   Hastings, population, 50,400.

Social Statistic	South Torbia
Primary Languages (%)	Torbian: 90% Other: 10%
Ethnic Groups (%)	Torbian: 85% Other: 15%
Major Religions (%)	Not Affiliated: 25% Roman Catholic: 42% Protestant: 15% Islam (Sunni-Shafi): 5.5% Buddhist: 7.5% Other: 5%

Literacy Rate (Older Than 15 in %)	Overall: 98.5% Male: 99.1% Female: 97.8%		
Age Distribution (%)	Age	Male	Female
	0-14	14.1%	12.5%
	15-55 (Military Age)	55.10%	50.9%
	55-64	13.10%	14.3%
	65+	15.500%	24.5%
Median Age	Overall: 44.6 Males: 43.1 Females: 46.1		
Population	42,375,386		
Annual Growth Rate	0.13%		
Birth Rate Per 1,000 People	8		
Death Rate Per 1,000 People	7.9		
Urban Population (%)	80%		
Annual Urbanization Rate	4.6% (make sure it matches discussion)		
Infant Mortality Rate Per 1000 Live Births	3.5		
Life Expectancy At Birth (Years)	Overall: 83.0 Male: 79.3 Female: 86.2		

APPENDIX 4 TO
ANNEX W TO
1 ANZAC DIV OPORD
DATED XXXX

CIVIL CONTACTS in 1 (ANZAC) DIV AO

1. **Host Nation Government Contacts**

a. Chief Minister

b. Deputy Chief Minister

c. Minister of Health

d. Chief of Police

e. Chief of Fire & Emergency Services

2. **IPANA Organisations and contacts**

a. IPANA Nuclear Non-Proliferation Body

b. IPANA Political-Security Community Council

d. IPANA Socio-Cultural Community Council

3. **International Organisations and contacts**

a. ICRC

b. Amnesty International

c. The Holy Roman Catholic Church

4. **Non-Government Organisations**

a. RAID "Reconstruction Assistance for International Disasters".

   (1) Provision of emergency shelter & Camps RAID.NGO@worldwideweb.org

   (2) This NGO uses a combination of funding means, public and govt to provide workers and infrastructure to both construct camps and run them for displaced pop. Provides Temp bldg, tentage, limited camp power and toilets.

b. FADE "Food Assistance in the Disaster Environment".

   (1) Provision of food

      FADE.NGO@worldwideweb.org

   (2) This NGO uses a combination of funding means, public and govt to provide workers and foodstuffs to both supply food, refrigeration and cooking facilities to feed a displaced pop. Provides food, cooking, kitchens, refrigeration and limited water for cleaning and cooking

c. WADE "Water Assistance in the Disaster Environment"

   (1) Provision of water WADE.NGO@worldwideweb.org

(2)   This NGO uses a combination of funding means, public and govt to provide workers and distribution systems for the winning, treating, storing and distribution of fresh and clean water to displaced pop. Provides water, purification, dist lines, storage, plumbing & heating

d.   MWC "Medicos Without Concern"

(1)   Provision of health services MWC.NGO@worldwideweb.org

(2)   This NGO uses public funding only to provide medical staff and facilities for the evacuation and treatment of medical and health issues to a displaced pop. Provides Health services

e.   LoRD "Logistics Relief in Disasters"

(1)   Provision of transport and material LORD.NGO@worldwideweb.org

(2)   This NGO uses govt funding to provide staff, vehicles, material and facilities for the movement and handling of stores, fuel and logistics to a displaced pop. Specialises in transport, maintenance, veh lift, recovery, mobile spt eqpt.

APPENDIX 5 TO
ANNEX W TO
1 ANZAC DIV OPORD
DATED XXXX

<u>CMO SITREP</u>

SUBJ: **FM/TG/ COMPONENT CMO SITREP XX/XX, DTG XXXX to DTG XXXX**

1. AO/REGION/PROVINCE
2. PREVIOUS 24HRS:
   a. OVERVIEW OF AO STATUS, INCLU SECURITY, EMERGENCY SERVICES AND GOVERNENCE SECTOR.
   b. MAJOR ACTIVITIES – SUMMARY OF INCIDENTS / EVENTS THAT AFFECTED THE CIVIL POPULATION
   c. CIVIL INTERACTION WITH AUS MILTARY FORCES.
   d. KNOWN CIVIL INTERACTION WITH OTHER FE ELEMENTS BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL.
   e. CIVIL ATTITUDES / ACTIONS TOWARDS AUS FE.
   f. CIVIL ATTITUDES TOWARDS OTHER FE.
   g. OGA/NGO/IO ACTIVITY, INCLU REQ FOR ASSISTANCE.
   h. POPULATION MOVEMENT AND EMERGENCY AID / PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS.
   i. MAIN ISSUES / CONCERNS WITHIN AO.
   j. DETAIL ANY TRENDS WITHIN CIVIL DIMENSION.
   k. IDENTIFIED OPPPORTUNITIES FOR AUS INFLUENCE.
   l. STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT CULTURAL FACILITIES / LOCATIONS.
3. NEXT 24HRS:
   a. ANTICIPATED BOTH MILITARY AND CIVIL ACTIVITIES /INCIDENTS / EVENTS THAT MAY EFFECT/INFLUENCE THE CIVIL POPULATION.
   b. PLANNED CIMIC ENGAGEMENT/ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES
   c. KNOWN CIVIL INTERACTION WITH OTHER FE BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL.
   d. EXPECTED MOVEMENT OF POPULATION AND EFFECT ON AUS FE.

CMO CHATREP

SUBJECT	CHATREP 038 OF 111050K JUL15 – SUBJECT HEADER
FROM	C/S, Unit and sub-unit
TO	For action Unit / Fmn C/S
A Collector	Military member; (Name / Position & DOBI ID)
B Info Provider	The civil actor; Name / Position / Contact details
C Location	GR / address loc collected, GR and address loc of subject reference
D **DTG**	DTG collected (discussion)
E **DTG**	DTG report written
F **Brief**	Brief description of incident event or topic discussed BLUF (Summary, key points of relevance) DISCUSSION Points discussed in the civilian providers words Questions asked or points made by collector State facts and perceptions reported not the collectors opinions COLLECTORS COMMENT (if required)
G **Source**	First-hand account (the person has first-hand knowledge) Yes/No
H Other source	Has the information come via other POC?
I Identification	POC name and contact details
J Discussion	Discussion initiated by provider or collector Y/N
K **Language**	Language used
L **Interpreter**	Identification and skill or language level

APPENDIX 7 TO
ANNEX W TO
1 ANZAC DIV OPORD
DATED XXXX

CMO MEASURES OF EFFECT

1.   CIMIC MOE. CIMIC MOE is to be developed in conjunction with major civilian participants to ensure transition success. MOE guidelines will focus on the following sectoral areas:
a.   Water winning, treatment and supply,
b.   Electricity generation and supply,
c.   Shelter and site planning,
d.   Food and Nutrition aid,
e.   Waste and sanitation,
f.   Health services,
g.   Public security,
h.   Infrastructure,
i.   Communications,
j.   Transportation,
k.   Economics, and
l.   Agriculture.

CMO Normality Indicators

1.   CIMIC Normality Indicators. Normality indicators to be grouped into categories and adapted to meet the changing requirements, e.g., political, socio-economic, cultural and technological. Guidance for development and reporting of NI listed below:

a.   Staple availability;

b.   Water;

c.   Power;

d.   Medical (Civilian);

e.   Law and Order;

f.   Infrastructure;

g.   Civil communication (freedom of speech, incl media);

h.   Education;

i.   Non-staple consumer goods available;

j.   Inflation;

k.   Sport and social activity;

l.   Unemployment;

m.   Religious;

n.   Infant mortality; and

o.   Agriculture.

p.   Sensitive Areas.

q.   FEG are to make all efforts to avoid cultural and environmentally sensitive areas.

r.   Cultural sites and environmentally sensitive areas – TBC.

ENGINEER SUPPORT

References:

A.　　1 ANZAC DIV OPORD 01 (Operation Swift Defender)
B.　　South Torbian Country Study
C.　　North Torbian Country Study

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU.

1.　　**Situation.**

a.　　Background. See paragraph 1 of the main body of 1 ANZAC DIV OPORD 01 (Ref A) and Annex B - Intelligence.

b.　　General. Engineer operations for 1 ANZAC DIV require a rapid build-up of Mobility (M)/Counter mobility (CM)/Survivability (S)/General Engineer (GE) capacity across the Combined, Joint, Interagency domain.

c.　　Purpose. The purpose of this Annex is to describe the Scheme of Engineer Operations and provide Engineer guidance at the operational level.

d.　　Engineer Intelligence. Refer to Annex B to 1 ANZAC DIV OPORD 01.

e.　　Operational Areas. See paragraph 1 of the main body of 1 ANZAC DIV OPORD 01 (Ref A).

f.　　Terrain and Man-Made Features. See the South Torbian Country Study (Ref B).

g.　　Civil Considerations

　　(1)　　Other than interstates, roads in South Torbia are below AS or US standards. Driving can be hazardous and becomes more hazardous at night and during the rainy season due to lack of drivers skills. The South Torbian government is responsible for 1,873 bridges spanning over 91,888 linear meters across the country. There are 1,864 permanent bridges covering 91,207 linear meters. 1,758 bridges covering 83,482 linear meters are constructed of concrete. 106 bridges spanning 7,725 linear meters are constructed of steel.

　　(2)　　Military traffic on road networks will be stressed due to large amounts of traffic. When South Torbians begin a road construction project they typically work on one section (direction) causing it to go to a single lane for travel with traffic moving both directions. These construction projects often take several months to complete. Densely populated urban areas are also known for having extremely

narrow streets that limit the size of vehicles that are capable of using the street. Military traffic, particular for mechanized units, may be unable to gain access to some urban areas unless they are willing to dismount.

(3)   South Torbia has a vast national road network of 6,753 km that includes 6,495 km of paved roads. The road network consists mainly of three types of national roads: primary, secondary, and tertiary. Primary interstates connect three or more major population centers with 100k or more populace. Secondary interstates connect major population centers to smaller cities. Tertiary interstates are any other road that is maintained by the national government. The South Torbian government maintains a total of 6,752 km of road networks. The break out of paving material is 3,001 km (44 percent) paved with concrete, 3,494 km (percent) paved with asphalt for a total of 6,495 km (95 percent) of national roads are paved.

(4)   The unpaved portion of national roads consists of 254 km (4 percent) gravel and 35 km (0.005 percent) earthen roads for a total of 289 km (4 percent) of unpaved roads. Most roads have heavy traffic and are viewed as dangerous because of a constant state of maintenance and reckless driving habits.

(5)   Movement in South Torbia is difficult due to mountainous terrain, dense tropical vegetation, and numerous bodies of water. Water or air transport methods are required to and between islands. Once on land, mountain ranges and steep river gorges naturally canalize movement. Heavy rains, flooding, and mud/landslides can seriously hamper troop movement during the rainy season. The presence of forests at higher elevations limits mobility and provides cover for enemy forces and smugglers, while multiple rivers and streams challenge mechanized and motorized movement in the valleys. Air operation impediments include mountain ranges, forests, steep valleys and gorges, clouds/fog/haze, and cyclonic storms.

(6)   Citizens of South Torbia hold their religion in high esteem and many religious centers and structures are considered to be very important. These structures should be avoided for targeting or used to tie-in obstacles in urban terrain.

(7)   Most rural areas cannot access all modern utilities such as potable water, electricity, and modern sewage systems. This may cause a reliance on military electrical, water and sanitation systems.

(8)   Insurgents and criminal forces operate in South Torbia and their activity has increased since the North Torbian invasion. This could lead to an increased use of IEDs, particularly on main highways and field landing strips, having a negative impact on mobility.

(9)   South Torbia contains a number of heavily populated areas including Manila, Dasmarinas, San Jose del Monte and Bacoor City. Enemy operations in these areas could result in the Host Nation seeking engineer support to provide survivability/force protection, and general engineering assistance.

h.   Enemy Engineer Forces. See Annex B Intelligence and North Torbian Country Study (Ref C).

i.   Friendly Engineer Forces. See South Torbian Country Study (Ref B).

2.   **Mission**. 1 ANZAC DIV ENGR are to provide operational mobility support to deliver specialist combat support to 1 ANZAC DIV IOT to expel all North Torbian forces from South Torbian sovereign territory to create conditions for the re-establishment of a safe and secure environment in South Torbia.

3.   **Execution.**

a.   Concept of Engineer Support.

   (1)   The engineer effort is to be centrally planned, coordinated, and executed by organic and assigned engineer units.

   (2)   Theatre planning and coordination for engineer support is to be provided by 6 ESR, supplemented by elements from 19 Chief Engineering Works. Theater-level engineering support is to be provided by 6 ESR.

   (3)   Capabilities of the Host Nation civil authorities must be effectively leveraged IOT quickly establish the Sea Port of Debarkation (SPOD) at WELLINGTON and the Air Port of Disembarkation (APOD) at the WELLINGTON Air Base to facilitate preparations for reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSO&I) activities.

   (4)   Each Combat BDE has organic engineer support to provide intimate mobility/counter-mobility/survivability support.

   (5)   RAAF Airfield Engineers (65 Sqn) are to provide intimate support to the APOD. HN engineering capability will be required during Ph 4 Transition operations to rebuild infrastructure damaged or destroyed during the conflict. This may include civilian contractors.

   (6)   1 ANZAC DIV Chief Engineer is responsible for coordinating all sustainability engineering support across the AO.

b.   Scheme of Engineer Operations. 1 ANZAC DIV Engineers are to provide and synchronise mobility, counter-mobility, survivability, sustainability and general Engineer efforts to defeat North Torbian forces and support South Torbian civil authorities. The majority of planning effort will focus around Phases 3 and 4.

c.   Priority of Engineer Effort by Phase.

   (1)   Prelim.

      (a)   Support the establishment of the SPODs and APODs at WELLINGTON.

      (b)   Support preparations for reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSO&I) activities.

      (c)   BPT support the establishment of the 1 ANZAC Div DSA vic LOWER HUTT.

   (2)   Phase 1– Block TPA Adv South and Destroy 5 Mech Div.

      (a)   Cnduct mobility/counter-mobility/survivability tasks ISO ground operations.

      (b)   Continue to support the establishment of the SPOD/APOD.

      (c)   Continue to support preparations for reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSO&I) activities.

   (3)   Phase 2 – Clear TPA from SOUTH TORBIA and secure Cease Fire Line.

      (a)   Conduct mobility/counter-mobility/survivability tasks ISO ground operations.

      (b)   Conduct battlefield clearance.

      (c)   BPT spt estb of APOD/SPOD vic NAPIER/NEW PLYMOUTH.

   (4)   Phase 3 – clear CABANATUAN and advance to MDL.

      (a)   Conduct mobility/counter-mobility/survivability tasks ISO ground operations.

      (b)   Conduct battlefield clearance.

      (c)   BPT conduct sustainability operations ISO RASO and Stability Operations.

   (5)   Phase 4 – Conduct STABOPS.

      (a)   Conduct reconstruction tasks ISO capacity building.

      (b)   Conduct battlefield clearance.

      (c)   Support the handover of engineer sites and works to civil and military authorities of respective Host Nations.

      (d)   Contribute to capacity building of South Torbian security forces.

(e) Support 1 ANZAC DIV in the conduct of relief in place and transition to a follow-on force.

(f) Support the withdrawal of 1 ANZAC DIV forces to locations directed by TCNs.

d. <u>Assignment of Additional Engineer Assets</u>. Components are to deploy with organic and assigned engineer units and assets. Engineer organizations are assigned as follows:

(1) 1 ANZAC DIV – 6 ESR, 1 MI Bn (for Geospatial support).

(2) 1 MCB – 1 CER.

(3) 3 MCB – 3 CER.

(4) 7 MCB – 7 CER.

(5) 9 MCB – 9 CER.

e. <u>Common Tasks.</u>

(1) Conduct combat engineering and general engineering support to assigned Component or formation.

(2) Maintain 1 ANZAC DIV MSRs operationally within AO APPLE.

(3) Coordinate Explosive Hazard information collection and counter-explosive hazard operations.

(4) Be prepared to assist South Torbian authorities with the repair of critical infrastructure that impacts 1 ANZAC DIV operations.

(5) BPT coordinate engineer support for humanitarian assistance and to create a safe environment in South Torbia.

(6) Liaise with Host Nation Engineers, and coordinate Host Nation engineer support in AO APPLE.

f.   Specific Tasks.

    (1)   6 ESR.

        (a)   Detach SQN OPCON to LOGLCC-OSD.

        (b)   Establish 1 ANZAC DIV policy, standards, and priorities for construction, facilities, and real estate utilization.

        (c)   Establish 1 ANZAC DIV environmental policy and standards.

        (d)   Operate the theater Explosive Hazard Coordination Centre and reporting system.

        (e)   Manage engineer reach back capabilities.

        (f)   Provide operational-level engineer support to 1 ANZAC DIV, including permanent horizontal and vertical construction, pipeline repair and construction, well-drilling, and power generation.

        (g)   Manage 1 ANZAC DIV facilities, real estate, construction, and engineer construction contracts.

    (2)   1 MI BN. Provide geospatial support to the CJTF 667.

g.   Engineer Intelligence Requirements for Planning.

    (1)   APOD and SPOD capacity, limitations, and damage.

    (2)   Extent of damage to South Torbian critical infrastructure in Panay and Palawan.

    (3)   Disruption to the Ground LOC.

    (4)   Employment of improvised explosive devices, booby-traps, and mines.

    (5)   Extent of damage or obstacles on South Torbian airfields.

    (6)   Location and disposition of North Torbian breaching and bridging assets.

    (7)   Type and location of North Torbian obstacles in South Torbia.

    (8)   Capacity, limitations, and damage of bridges over major waterways in South Torbia.

    (9)   Loss of friendly breaching and bridging assets.

    (10)   Location and extent of engineer construction materials in South Torbia.

h.   Explosive Hazards.

(1)   6 ESR is to establish an Explosive Hazards Coordination Cell (EHCC) to gather information, track, predict, distribute information on, and mitigate explosive hazards within the theater that affect force protection and mobility.

(2)   EOD within 6 ESR, CERs, Clearance Diving Teams and 65 ABRS are to conduct tactical activities to address explosive hazards. Combat engineer unit activities include the detection, reporting, breaching and clearing of minefields, and the detection, reporting, and destruction of IEDs. Only EOD units and properly qualified EOD personnel are to conduct EOD procedures against explosive ordnance, UXO, or IEDs. Attempts are to be made to render safe explosive devices for intelligence gathering efforts if the situation does not affect the local population and 1 ANZAC DIV's ability to accomplish the mission being undertaken.

(3)   IEDs/Booby-Traps. 1 ANZAC DIV is not to employ booby-traps or IEDs.

(4)   Mines. COMD 1 ANZAC Div is emplacement authority for AT mines in the AO. Artillery delivered mines and sea mines are not to be used by 1 ANZAC DIV. Anti-tank mines are to be surface laid. No AP mines are to be used.

(5)   Humanitarian Demining (HDM). Because of the threat to peace and safety, HDM has become a significant disarmament and peace operations activity. Demining is ultimately an HN responsibility; however 1 ANZAC DIV is to assist South Torbia through mine awareness education and training of HN personnel in the surveying, marking, and clearing of mines.

i.   Geospatial. Components and formations will deploy with integral terrain analysis capabilities. heater geospatial support will be provided by 1 MI Bn.

j.   Firefighting. Fire protection is to be coordinated with the Host Nation. CER are to provide close firefighting capabilities ISO RW operations. 6 ESR is responsible for 1 ANZAC DIV policy on firefighting capabilities for 1 ANZAC DIV facilities. TCNs are to develop fire prevention and protection plans for TCN-owned or rented facilities that meet 1 ANZAC DIV standards. 1 ANZAC DIV fire protection priorities are:

(1)   APOD and SPOD.

(2)   Medical facilities.

(3)   Ammunition and fuel storage installations.

(4)   1 ANZAC DIV and Component Headquarters and communication centers.

(5)   Personnel accommodation facilities.

k.   Reach back. CE is to facilitate the utilization of NSB engineer capabilities. All requests for assistance are to be passed to the CE.

l.   Facilities.

(1)   Facility planning factors include: 1 ANZAC DIV concept of operations; expected duration and intensity of operations; cost of facility; time-phased activities; and prioritizing the use of existing assets over new construction.

(2)   The six broad categories of facilities in order of priority for use are:

(a)   TCN-owned, occupied, or leased facilities; Host Nation, allied, and Coalition support where an agreement exists to provide specific types and quantities of facilities at specified times in designated locations;

(b)   TCN-owned facility substitutes pre-positioned in theater;

(c)   facilities available from commercial sources;

(d)   TCN-owned facility substitutes stored in contributing nations; and construction of facilities that are considered shortfall after an assessment of the availability of existing assets.

(3)   Contracting support should be used to augment military capabilities. Because construction is time consuming and entails the risk of not being finished in time to meet mission requirements, supported commanders should seek alternative solutions to new construction.

m.   Host Nation Support. 1 ANZAC DIV Engineers are to maximise the use of Host Nation engineer support. Host-Nation Support planning considerations include the following:

(1)   Indigenous labour

(2)   Local availability of construction materiel

(3)   Supplies, and equipment; local contractor support

(4)   Local facilities.

n.   Construction Standards.

(1)   When new construction is the only means of sourcing facility requirements, it is to be constructed either using respective TCN standards or using temporary guidelines (less than six months) found in extant Doctrine and Policy. Any exemptions for more permanent construction standards are to be approved by the 1 ANZAC DIV CE.

(2)   Expedient construction (e.g., rapid construction techniques such as pre-fabricated buildings, clamshell structures, etc.) are also to be considered as these methods

can be selectively employed with minimum time, cost, and risk to offer in-theater forces another source of required temporary facilities.

4.   **Sustainment.**

a.   Logistics, Engineer Units are to deploy with their own organic logistic support, and are to receive additional support from their supported Components and formations.

b.   Medical, Engineer Units are to deploy with their own organic medical assets (RAP), and are to receive additional support from their supported Components and formations (R1 – R3).

c.   Construction Materiel. Construction materiel is readily available for local purchase, and contracted construction capability is available.

5.   **Command and Signal.**

d.   1 ANZAC DIV Chief Engineer CE). Lieutenant Colonel XXXXXX (AS) is appointed as the 1 ANZAC DIV CE.

e.   Location. 6 SR is to establish a HQ collocated with DSA.

f.   Engineer Coordinating Boards.

(1)   The CJTF 667 Engineer Synchronisation teleconference. Fridays at 1000 hours, commencing XXXXXXX.

(2)   Required attendees:

(a)   HQ CJTF 667 J2, J3, J4, J5 Engineer staff officers,

(b)   6 ESR.

(c)   1 MI Bn.

(d)   CJFACC Engineer.

(e)   CFMCC Engineer.

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**ANNEX F TO
1 ANZAC DIV OPORD**

</div>

Fires

References:

A.   HQ ANZAC Div OPORD 01 (OPERATION SWIFT DEFENDER (OSD))

B.   CDF Targeting Directive OSD

C.   LWP-CA (OS) 5-3-2, Target Engagement, Coordination and Prediction – Duties in Action, 2020

D.   LWP-CA (OS) 5-3-1, Gun Deployment and Routine, 2014

E.   LWP-CA (OS) 5-3-3, Joint Fires and Effects Planning, Execution and Targeting (Land), 2010 AL2

1.   **Situation**. See Ref A.

a.   Terrain impact:

    (1)   Limitation on the mobility of towed artillery due to water courses, river crossings and roads;

    (2)   Cresting and dead zones for observation and fire;

    (3)   Masking for GBAD, drones and offensive air; and

    (4)   Optimising diverse built and natural terrain, and vegetation for C3D.

b.   Weather impact:

    (1)   Inclement weather limitation on visibility by all sensors;

    (2)   Consideration of use of offensive air; and

    (3)   Deterioration of ammunition, especially moisture ingress in electronic systems and propellants.

c.   Enemy:

    (1)   COA: the enemy will maximise effort to disaggregate our combat power. It will seek to dislocate combat, combat support, C2 and logistics. As a critical and limited WFF in our combat power, artillery units can expect enemy SPF and irregular forces to attempt to destroy artillery logistics and C2 systems. In particular: GBAD radar, CPs, wagon lines, ammunition points, ammunition dumps, resupply routes and assessed AMA. Ground forces are less likely to attack gun positions; these will be a priority for enemy IDF (MRL) and attack aviation.

(2)   Enemy Offensive Support Capability.

(a)   Maritime: The most likely role for DPRT Navy is providing A2AD to the TPA. Support to 3 OSC will consist of extension of AD capabilities as part of a Snow Dome to spt advance. Ship AD systems are designed for self-defence. In MDCOA DPRT Navy will protect amphib operations to seize NAPIER including provision of NSFS. As a lower priority, DPRT Navy surface vessels are able to provide surface to surface offensive support:

   i.   2 x Type -052C (Luyang II): 2 x 100mm Naval Gun.

   ii.   Type – 51G (Luda III):1 x 100mm Naval Gun.

   iii.   Type – 53H3 (Jiangwei II): 1 x Twin 100mm Naval Gun.

   iv.   Type – 052D (Luyang III):

      (A)   1 x 130mm Naval Gun.

      (B)   CJ-10 LACM.

(b)   3 OSC *(NI STA assets)*:

   i.   5 and 6 Div FA REGTs:

      (A)   51/61. 18xPLZ-05 SP 152mm How;

   ii.   5/6 AD Regt:

      (A)   51/52/61/62 AD Bn: 3 x CSA-16.

      (B)   53/54/63/64 AD Coy: 6 x PG-99.

   iii.   Light BTG FA Bn (6X Bdet)

      (A)   3 x 6 PLC-09, SP 122mm How.

      (B)   1 x 6 PH-63 107mm MRL.

   iv.   Medium BTG FA Bns (6X/6X/6X/51/52 BDet)

      (A)   3 x 6 PLL-09, SP 122mm How.

      (B)   1 x6 PHL-90B, SP 122mm MRL.

   v.   Heavy BTG FA Bn (53 BDet).

      (A)   3 x 6 PLZ-07A SP 122mm.

      (B)   1 x 6 PHZ-89, SP 122mm MRL.

vi.   1 Mar Div.

    (A)   1 Mar MRL Bn: 3 x 6 PHL-90B, SP 122mm.

    (B)   1/2/3/4 Mar FA Bns. 3 x6 PLZ-89, 1 x 6PHL-90B.

    (c)   <u>Offensive air</u>: SU-30MKK and J-11B (Flanker-L) are most likely to be used in the air-to-air battle. If used in ground attack roles, capabilities are:

        i.   <u>SU-30MKK</u>:

            (A)   <u>Kh-29 air to surface missiles</u>;

            (B)   <u>GSh 30-1 30mm cannon</u>; and

            (C)   <u>Laser and precision guided 450 kg bombs.</u>

        ii.   <u>J-11B (Flanker-L)</u>:

            (A)   <u>Free-fall cluster bombs</u>; and

            (B)   <u>GSh 30-1 30mm cannon</u>.

    (d)   <u>Attack Aviation.</u> Most likely attack aviation platforms are:

        i.   <u>Z19</u>:

            (A)   GSh-23 23mm wing mounted autocannon.

            (B)   HJ-8 AT Missiles.

        ii.   <u>Z10.</u>

            (A)   GSh-23 23mm chin mounted autocannon.

            (B)   HJ-9 AT Missiles.

d.   <u>Friendly Forces</u>.

    (1)   <u>HQ 1 ANZAC Div concept of fires</u>.

    (a)   <u>Phase I</u>:

        i.   <u>Main effort.</u> will be counter-battery and counter-fires by LR artillery, surface vessel TGM and offensive air, IOT to establish fires superiority IOT spt 7 MCB ctr-atk. 1 ANZAC must deplete 5 Div and 1 MED fires system capability by:

            (A)   cannon artillery >50%;

            (B)   MRL >30%; and

            (C)   Mortar >30%.

    ii. <u>STA main effort</u>. Locating, targeting and engaging enemy:

      (A) AD systems;

      (B) IDF systems; and

      (C) Manoeuvre C2.

    iii. <u>Supporting effort</u>. Offensive air and LR artillery will be SEAD and depletion of enemy AD systems capability IOT disaggregate the Snow Dome defence. Priorities:

      (A) Finding, targeting and destroying AD guidance and early warning radar;

      (B) AD C3 nodes;

      (C) HQ-9/S400 Bty.

      (D) CSA-16 Bty.

(b) <u>Phase II/III main effort</u>. 1 ANZAC Div:

    i. <u>DS Regt.</u> Close support to manoeuvre bde;

    ii. <u>GS Bty.</u> Depth fires, SEAD and CBF;

    iii. <u>GBAD.</u> Protect FF C2/CSS/Fires and obstacle breaching operations.

    iv. <u>Patriot</u>. Surface-to-surface missile defence.

(c) <u>Phase IV main effort.</u> 1 ANZAC Div.

    i. <u>DS Regt.</u> Close support to manoeuvre bde;

    ii. <u>GS Bty.</u> Spt CJTF 667.2 targeting, BPT deter TPA;

    iii. <u>GBAD.</u> Protect FF C2/CSS and APOD/SPOD.

    iv. <u>Patriot</u>. Surface-to-surface missile defence.

(2) Adjacent units: see Ref A.

(3) <u>ANZAC Div Field Artillery Order of Battle</u>:

(a) 1 Regt RAA (M777, 155mm How), JFECC attached to 7 MCB,

(b) 4 Regt RAA (M777, 155mm How), JFECC attached to 3 MCB.

    (c)   8/12 Regt RAA (AS9, SP 155mm How), JFECC attached to 1 MCB.

    (d)   16 Fd Regt RNZA (L119, 105mm How), JFECC attached to 9 MCB.

    (e)   9 Regt RAA (AS9, SP 155mm How), GS.

    (f)   16 Regt RAA (GBAD, NASAMS/RBS70),

    (g)   20 Regt RAA (STA), GS ANZAC Div, and

    (h)   HIMARS Bty RAA (M142 RKT) GS ANZAC Div.

(4)   <u>Attached:</u> B Bty, 1 Bn, 43 AD Regt (US): (six launchers of four MIM 104 Patriot anti-missile missiles).

Summary of IDF weapon systems 1 ANZAC Div

Delivery system	Type	Quantity	Organisations
How	M777, 155mm How	54	3 x regt
	L119, 105mm How	18	1 x regt
	AS9, 15mm SP How	36	2 x Regt
HIMARS	M143 RKT	6 launchers with 6 pods per launcher	1 x div
Mor	M252A1, 81mm Mor	54	9 x inf bn

2.   **Mission**. 1 (ANZAC) Div Arty is to provide coordinated joint offensive support, targeting and effects to 1 (ANZAC) Div to facilitate the clearance of TPA ground forces from the sovereign territory of SOUTH TORBIA.

3.   **Execution**

a.   <u>Commander's Guidance for Joint Effects, Offensive Support and Targeting</u>.

    (1)   Employ lethal and non-lethal capabilities ISO 1 ANZAC Div mission;

    (2)   JFECC HQ 1 ANZAC Div is responsible for coordinating targeting, joint offensive support to achieve effects as guided by Joint Targeting Directive issued by CDF;

    (3)   1 ANZAC Div artillery units will be centralised under Div Arty (TU 667.2.5) throughout with support relationships allocated dynamically IOT achieve flexibility;

    (4)   16 Regt RAA will provide GBAD to 1 ANZAC Div in AO APPLE;

    (5)   20 Regt RAA will provide STA ISO of 1 ANZAC Div operation in AO APPLE;

(6)   HIMARS Bty RAA will provide depth FIRES against enemy IDF, AD, armour and counter attack elements;

(7)   B Bty, 1 Bn, 43 AD Regt (US) will provide anti-missile defence to 1 ANZAC Div operation in AO APPLE

(8)   CFACC will provide BAI/CAS to support 1 ANZAC Div based on bids for AI/CAS and aircraft availability. Bids by Bde HQ through gun RHQ to JFECC.

(9)   CFMCC will provide opportunity NSFS by request through JFECC from gun RHQ.

b.   Field Artillery Groupings and Tasks – all phases:

(1)   1 Regt RAA (M777, 155mm How), JFECC attached to 7 MCB,

(2)   4 Regt RAA (M777, 155mm How), JFECC attached to 3 MCB.

(3)   8/12 Regt RAA (AS9, SP 155mm How), JFECC attached to 1 MCB.

(4)   16 Fd Regt RNZA (L119, 105mm How), JFECC attached to 9 MCB.

(5)   9 Regt RAA (AS9, SP 155mm How), GS.

c.   GBAD Grouping and Task – all phases:

(1)   16 Regt RAA - area defence lead bde; and

(2)   B Bty, 1 Bn, 43 AD Regt (US) – anti-missile defence.

d.   Air support: See Annex H to Ref A.

e.   Naval Gunfire Support: See MNFMCC OPORD

f.   STA: See 1 ANZAC Div concept of manoeuvre.

g.   Coordinating Instructions

(1)   Fire Support Coordination Measures:

(a)   Boundaries.

i.   FIRES within 500m of a boundary must be coordinated with adjacent formation or unit.

ii.   FIRES greater than 500m of a boundary is at the discretion of the formation/unit commander.

    (b)   <u>Coordinated Fire Line (CFL)</u>. Bdes are responsible for identifying and promulgating a CFL coincident with Bde phase lines. RCPs are to promulgate a trigger line 1000m short of the CFL; JFECCs must request a shift to CFL on attaining the trigger line.

    (c)   <u>Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT)</u>. Bdes are to update FLOT NLT every 30 minutes when units are on the move.

    (d)   <u>Fire Support Coordination Line. (FSCL)</u>. IAW Appendix 2.

    (e)   <u>Free Fire Areas (FFA).</u> IAW Appendix 2.

    (f)   <u>Restrictive Fire Area (RFA). IAW Appendix 2.</u>

    (g)   <u>No Fire Area (NFA)</u>. DPRT side of MDL.

(2)   <u>Joint Fires</u>

    (a)   <u>Coordination and targeting</u>. JFECC HQ 1 ANZAC Div to coordinate Joint Fires and targeting in AO see appendix 1 IAW appendix 2. Bdes may nominate targets to Div JFECC to spt mvr.

    (b)   <u>Dynamic targeting</u>. Bdes may nominate targets to JFECC to support manoeuvre.

(3)   <u>Ammunition Planning</u>. The following table provides the current ammo planning estimate to 1 ANZAC Div OSD:

    (a)   155mm – 1st lines/gun/day;

    (b)   105 mm – 1st lines/gun/day

    (c)   M142 RKT – Pods per launcher/day

    (d)   NASAMS – missiles per launcher/day

    (e)   RBS 70 – missiles per launcher/day

PHASE	HE	SMK	IR ILL	M142 RKT	RBS 70	NASAMS
I	3	0.5	0.5	6	12	12
II/III	2	0.5	0.5	6	6	6
IV	0.5	0.1	0.1	2	1	1

(4)   <u>Coordination</u>. JFECC will issue the following IAW and 1 Div JFECC SOP and other cited references:

    (a)   <u>Target Blocks</u>:

        i.   Letter prefix (see Ref B Page 7-5).

        ii.   Number allocations (see Ref B Page 7-6).

    (b)   <u>Target records</u>. Circulated around units by RCP to Div and Bde JFECC.

    (c)   <u>Target lists</u>. Circulated by 1 ANZAC Div JFECC to RCP & Regt Arty Tac.

    (d)   <u>Fire planning</u>. Ref B Chapter 6).

4.   **<u>Service support.</u>**

a.   <u>Arty Ammunition</u>: Ref C, (Chapter 9),

b.   <u>Movement and deployment</u>. See Ref C, Section 3-2, i.e.:

    (1)   DS and R units will move to designated AMA, hides, Assy Area using ARA IAW supported formation orders.

    (2)   GS and GSR will move as directed by HQ 1 ANZAC Div. ARA TBI.

5.   **<u>Command and signal</u>**.

a.   <u>Command</u>

    (1)   <u>Comd</u>.Comd TU 667.2.6 will exercise command of all Arty units.

    (2)   <u>Alternate Comd</u>. COL Effects HQ 1 ANZAC Div is alternate Comd arty units.

    (3)   <u>Location</u>s. JFECC will collocate with HQ 1 ANZAC Div Main CP.

b.   <u>Signal</u>

    (1)   Communications IAW with 1 ANZAC Div SIG OP INSTR.

    (2)   Nicknames and code words, IAW HQ 1 ANZAC Div for:

        (a)   Ready states;

        (b)   Movement (prepare for, move now); and

        (c)   Locstats.

Appendices:

Appendix 1   - Joint Targeting

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ANNEX F TO
1 ANZAC DIV OPORD
</div>

Appendix 2   - Fire Support Coordination Line Overlay

JOINT TARGETING -
OPERATION SWIFT DEFENDER

References.

A.   HQ ANZAC Div OPORD 01 (OPERATION SWIFT DEFENDER (OSD))

1.   **Situation**.

a.   General. This order sets out the agreed approach to joint fires for Op Swift Shield.

2.   **Mission.** See Ref A.

3.   **Execution.**

a.   The Targeting Process. The targeting process:

    (1)   See Tab A, Targeting Battle Rhythm.

    (2)   does not apply when exercising self-defence governed by the appropriate principles and ROE;

    (3)   does not apply immediate action is required;

    (4)   these situations are not to be used to avoid the targeting process when offensive action can be foreseen; and

    (5)   all targeting and application of joint joint are to be conducted in compliance with the ROE implemented and the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC).

b.   1 ANZAC Div Targeting Board (DTB). Comprises:

    (1)   Comd 1 ANZAC Div or delegate;

    (2)   COMD Div Arty;

    (3)   INT;

    (4)   OPS;

    (5)   LEGAL;

    (6)   LO 3rd Army (ROTA);

    (7)   JFECC secretariat.

c.   Legitimate Targets. The principle of distinction as described in International Humanitarian Law (IHL) will always be applied by commanders. Commanders at all levels

must distinguish the civilian population and objects, and combatants and military objectives. Legitimate targets are divided into two categories:

    (1)   Persons as military objectives; and

    (2)   Objects as military objectives.

d.   <u>The Doubt Rule</u>. If doubt exists about the person or object, they shall be considered civilian.

e.   <u>Dynamic Targeting</u>. The Dynamic Targeting process is applied to:

    (1)   targets of opportunity; and

    (2)   planned targets that have changed and require rapid engagement. COMD 1 ANZAC Div has pre-approved engagement of the following targets in the AO:

        (a)   IDF systems;

        (b)   GBAD systems;

        (c)   Tank units;

        (d)   AT units; and

        (e)   C2 vehicles.

<u>Tabs:</u>

Tab A	- Joint Targeting Board Battle Rhythm
Tab B	- Targeting Checklist
Tab C	- Sample Target Effects Synchronisation Matrix
Tab D	- Attack Guidance Matrix