OLVANAN MARITIME WARFARE

Doctrine, strategy, and tactics of the Olvanan People's Navy

Part 1: Strategic context and doctrine

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List of Acronyms

AAR	Air-to-Air Refuelling	**MPA**	Maritime Patrol Aircraft
AAW	Anti-Air Warfare	**OCA**	Offensive Counter-Air
AD	Air Defence	**OCP**	Olvanan Communist Party
AEW	Airborne Early Warning	**OMM**	Olvanan Maritime Militia
AGI	Auxiliary, General Intelligence	**OPA**	Olvanan People's Army
AOA	Amphibious Objective Area	**OPAF**	Olvanan People's Air Force
ASBM	Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile	**OPMC**	Olvanan People's Marine Corps
ASCM	Anti-Ship Cruise Missile	**OPN**	Olvanan People's Navy
ASuW	Anti-Surface Warfare	**OSHC**	Olvanan Strategic High Command
ASW	Anti-Submarine Warfare	**OTH**	Over-the-Horizon
CBG	Carrier Battle Group	**PRO**	People's Republic of Olvana
COLREG	International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea	**SAG**	Surface Action Group
COMINT	Communications Intelligence	**SAM**	Surface-to-Air Missile
DCA	Defensive Counter-Air	**SCS**	South China Sea
EO	Electro-optical	**SIGINT**	Signals Intelligence
IR	Infra-red	**SURTASS**	Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System
LCAC	Landing Craft, Air Cushion	**TEL**	Transporter Erector Launcher
LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict	**TOT**	Time on Target
MEZ	Missile Engagement Zone	**UAV**	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

1. Preface

1.1. Background

This document refers to the fictitious nation of Olvana, part of the Decisive Action Training Environment – Indo-Pacific (DATE-IP). DATE-IP is the common training adversary used across the Australian Defence Force and by the armies of the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand. Further information on Olvana and DATE-IP can be found at https://date.army.gov.au/

Figure 1 – DATE Indo-Pacific

1.2. Scope

The purpose of this document is to describe Olvana's doctrine for conducting maritime warfare and its underlying influences. This strategic context and doctrine shape the thinking of Olvana's military leaders and inform the tactical actions which are further explored in Part 2. The influences discussed within this document extend to national strategic objectives and include societal, cultural, and historical influences.

Part 2 of this document provides an insight into Olvanan tactics and platforms for a range of specific missions.

Research for this document has been conducted exclusively using open source intelligence sources and publicly available information relating to naval doctrine, strategy and tactics. The classification of this document is Official, in accordance with the Defence Security Principles Framework.

1.3. Country study - Olvana

The People's Republic of Olvana (PRO) is a communist nation that was founded in the mid-20th Century after several decades of internal civil conflicts and global wars. Though the government has evolved over its seven decades of existence, it is still dominated by the Olvanan Communist Party. While the government was uncompromising in its approaches to social change during the mid to late 20th Century, it has adopted a more lenient stance regarding the way it approaches domestic economic and social challenges. Today, Olvana's massive economy and modernizing military have enabled it to become a regional hegemon capable of exerting tremendous pressure and influence throughout the region and across the globe.

As the largest country in terms of size and population in the region, Olvana maintains the largest military in the Pacific region. The Olvana People's Army (OPA) is composed of not only a land force, but the Olvana People's Navy (OPN) and Olvana People's Air Force (OPAF) are subordinate to the OPA. Olvana's military has been undergoing a push to modernize its equipment and transform the way it prepares for and executes military operations. Olvana has successfully closed the technological gap that once separated it from western militaries, enabling its forces to create challenges for even the most advanced adversaries, and allowing Olvana to become a leading exporter of military technology to developing countries. The OPA active duty units operates primarily Tier 1 and 2 weapons. As new weapons are fielded by the OPA, the older Tier 3 weapons are cascaded to the reserve units or sold to other countries. The military plays a large role within Olvana's national strategy, not only in a traditional sense, but also in building influence and shaping conditions during competition.

Over the last half-century, Olvana has gradually evolved from being a primarily agrarian economy into one of the world's economic powers. The state run economy increased its emphasis on foreign trade and foreign investments. These reforms, coupled with cheap labour and mass industrialization, allowed Olvana to become a major trading partner with the world. The resultant economic growth raised the country from one of the poorest underdeveloped nations to one of the world's leading economic superpowers. Olvana uses its economic influence to shape regional and global international relations.

Olvana's sheer size, both geographic and in population, means it is an extremely socially diverse country. The Olvanan ethnicity shapes the predominant national culture, however there are a wide variety of minority groups. During the latter half of the 20th Century, the Olvanan Government took steps toward social control, seeking to assimilate all minority populations and push out religion. These efforts led to mixed results, and eventually the government began to relax its policies on forced assimilation. That said, some among the minority populations still believe that the government is seeking assimilation through economic means. While the overwhelming majority of the population embraces the Olvanan culture as it is defined by the state, it remains a friction point among minority populations. The two primary religions are Hinduism, and the traditional Olvanan Folk Religion. The Hindu population is found within the interior of the country while the Olvanan Folk Religion is practiced more in the eastern and coastal regions. In addition to these two primary religions, Olvana is also home to Muslims, Christians, and others.

The People's Republic of Olvana (PRO) maintains a large information environment, with its internet industries counted among the world's most active. Olvana is, however, one of the world's most restrictive media environments. Olvana will utilize its cyber capabilities against external opposition parties and foreign governments. Olvana will also attempt retain total control over the nation's internal information environment by suppressing dissent within the populace over all communications mediums, though the internet remains the most free and accessible.

The Olvana infrastructure is modern and continues to improve as the urbanization continues. Significant emphasis was placed on modernizing the infrastructure in the past 20 years. Olvana has a state of the art mass transit system. The Olvanan government continues to subsidize the mass transit system to increase ridership and decrease congestion on the roads and air pollution. Airports range from large international airports that can handle almost any aircraft currently in production to small, unimproved dirt strips. Seaports are modern and can handle all modern cargo vessels. The country recently suffered from high levels of pollution in the urban areas and the government has made policies to combat pollution in urban environments. Air pollution has improved significantly but ground and water pollution are still way above acceptable western levels.

Olvana is a large country located in eastern Asia that borders three major bodies of water: the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. The country's terrain varies from high mountains and green plateaus to river valleys and deltas, with climates ranging from tropical to semiarid to sub-alpine. Multiple natural hazards exits, resulting from Olvana's geology, weather, native wildlife, and human activity.

Olvanans see time as a precious resource, which is extremely important, as such they frequently apologize for taking up someone's time. They do not accept tardiness and will often arrive 30 minutes prior to an agreed time. Olvanan time management stems from the other-centric view that one should use as little of another's time as possible. The concept of karma as applied to consideration of others leads to short, concise events that begin early and end even earlier. This extremely fast-paced and time-focused culture is viewed positively by the government and has been reinforced accordingly. This has resulted in a proactive, offensive view of conflict that focuses on pre-emptive action. US personnel interacting with Olvanan military leaders will need to prepare extensively beforehand and have potential decisions pre-approved by the chain of command in order to be successful. Olvana sits within the Olvanan Time Zone (OTZ), which is seven hours ahead of Greenwich Mean Time (GMT)/Coordinated Universal Time (UTC); it does not observe Daylight Saving Time (DST).

2. Maritime-enabled National Strategic Objectives (NSOs)

Olvana maintains a very long-term planning window for international strategic objectives. These objectives began to become far more ambitious in the late 1980s and the continued success of the Olvanan economy has fuelled goals that are ever more ambitious.

The Olvanan Communist Party (OCP) maritime-enabled National Strategic Objectives (NSOs) are:

- Win without fighting;
- Re-integrate disputed island territories;
- Maintain and overtly enforce claim of maritime approaches (including dash-line claim) as sovereign waters (possessing the capability to keep the adversary outside of defined limits IOT resist invasion from the sea);
- Maritime operations and outcomes used to promote national security and the position of the OCP at home, and
- Maritime operations in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, which support the global OCP political interests and provide a constant global presence.

As far back as the 1950s, it was clear that the NSOs would require a modern and capable navy. The NSOs give rise to a maritime warfare doctrine that is largely defensive in nature, focusing on sea control within a defined area. This strategy of denial aims to ensure that competing or adversary countries are entirely unable to influence or impact claims and objectives within the stated area.

This defensive nature of this doctrine implies that offensive maritime operations will be used only to counter adversary moves against Olvanan strategic objectives. While this does not preclude offensive and pre-emptive strikes to achieve these objectives, this is not the preferred course of action. Olvana intends to develop and deploy a military that provides sufficient deterrent to enables it to achieve its own goals without intervention.

2.1. Olvana's maritime region of interest

Olvana's maritime region of interest is defined as the area proceeding from Olvana's coast out to the Second Island Chain. This region is divided into two distinct areas, referred to as the Near Seas and the Distant Seas.

Near Seas

The maritime region that extends from Olvana's coast to the First Island Chain.

Distant Seas

The maritime region that extends from the outer boundary of the First Island chain out to the Second Island Chain.


Figure 2 – Olvana's maritime region of interest

3. Societal and social influences

Two social and societal norms predominantly influence Olvana's maritime-enabled national strategic objectives and their achievement through doctrine: unanimity and collectivism. These concepts can be summarised by the following extracts from an analysis of Olvana's social landscape:

Unanimity

> The Olvanan people are a much-unified people who want to make their country great again. For many years, Olvana was at the mercy of European colonial powers and now that Olvana's economic performance has pushed them to the top of the world stage, the people want to help the country stay there.

Collectivism

> Olvana is collectivist culture where the needs of the group outweigh any individual preferences. In business and social groups, while there is commitment to the internal group, there is hostility to any outsiders. The importance of the role of one's ancestors in day to day life is significant and can impact the factors that an individual may take into account when they are making a decision.

For Olvanans, the most influential maritime ancestor is explorer Admiral Zheng He and much of the Olvanan sense of pride in their maritime heritage derives from him. Furthermore, the Olvanan people have a significant affinity with their Navy and the OCP h been using ever more ambitious Global Maritime Task Group deployments as a means to stoke patriotism back home.

Since his assumption of power, OCP Chairman Kang Wuhan has consistently pushed a narrative of Olvanan Global Supremacy. The presence of hard power on the global stage has been largely achieved through the OPN, an organisation that is fiercely loyal to Kang. The Chairman's teachings remain a major influence in their maritime doctrine, chief among which is the statement:

> 'The lazy westerner grows fat whilst the proud Olvanan worker prepares to do what is necessary to take back what is ours.'

This belief, that western culture no longer has the stomach to shed blood and treasure on the battlefield, is a cornerstone of Olvana's maritime doctrine. Many tactics are grounded in the belief that western support for war will quickly wane should sufficient casualties be inflicted in the early stages of a conflict. Likewise, it is believed that the economic cost of flighting a major war in a distant Pacific theatre will quickly lead to financial impacts the everyday western citizen is unwilling to bear. These assumptions drive the creation of distinctly Olvanan tactics, such as the targeting of units with minimal military value but will create economic effects on the adversary.

4. Historical influences

Whilst much of the Olvanan pre-1912 histories are viewed with suspicion or are discredited by the OCP, some historical events cut through this and are the source of significant patriotism. The OCP often use these stories to manipulate the national consciousness through historic validation of their objectives and plans.

Olvana's most beloved historical maritime narrative is the story and voyages of Admiral Zheng He. The OCP frequently leverages the mythos of Zheng's voyages to validate its expansionist maritime agenda and territorial claims. This historical antecedent is also regularly referenced to garner support for the significant financial impact of the OPN modernisation program over the past two decades.

An admiral and diplomat who lived 1371-1433, Zheng helped extend the maritime and commercial influence of Olvana throughout the regions bordering the Indian Ocean. He commanded seven naval expeditions almost a century before the Portuguese reached India by sailing around the southern tip of Africa.


Figure 3 – The voyages of Zheng He, 1405 - 1433

Zheng He's historical legacy is often cited as evidence that the world should not fear Olvana's growing maritime power. The global reach and supremacy of Olvana as a maritime power during Zheng's time represents the pinnacle of Olvana's position on the world stage. For half a millennium

Figure 4 – OPN growth 2000 - 2020

the country became more insular and a series of losses at the hands of the Japanese during the 19th and early 20th centuries brought the country to its geopolitical nadir.

These humiliations fuelled the rise of the OCP in the early twentieth century, as food shortages ravaged a rapidly growing population in a shrinking economy. Drawing on the prestige of Zheng He's Olvana and the maritime defeats to the Japanese, the OCP determined that future security threats could only be effectively countered with a strong Navy.

Since the 1950s, the OPN has enjoyed funding increases well ahead of the pace of economic growth. This has led to a fundamental shift in OPN capability in the last 20 years, as Olvana has built up a primarily brown water fleet into the largest naval force in the world. OCP spending on the OPN has increased at a rate not seen since the US-Soviet arms race of the 1970s and 1980s. The resulting modernisation and expansion program has succeeded in the world's largest and arguably most capable navy.

5. Olvanan military capability

5.1. Military Recapitalisation

The Olvanan Communist Party aims rely heavily on a large, modern, well-trained, equipped and networked OPN. Until recently, the Olvanan military was heavily dependent on Donovian equipment, often of the previous generation. However, since the early 2000s, Olvana has moved steadily towards on-shoring its military hardware supply. Olvana is now recognised to produce materiel that is at least as capable as the Donovian equivalents, and in many cases the Olvanan technology is superior. This is most visible in combat aircraft, guided munitions, cyber technology, and surface naval vessels.

The maritime-enabled National Strategic Objectives discussed above have guided the development of four key focus areas for the Olvanan People's Navy (OPN)

Non-contact warfare

This stipulates that weapons must be capable of being delivered outside of the adversary's sphere of influence. This has led the OPN to develop very long-range guided munitions that can be delivered by ships, aircraft, and submarines.

Long-range surveillance

The need for persistent long-range surveillance has driven the development of a vast constellation of ISR satellites providing constant coverage of the entirety of the Near and Distant Seas.

Fast, seamless networks

Capable, flexible, and redundant communication networks provide the ability to pass targeting information between assets and from strategic sources to weapon-carrying platforms quickly and without compatibility constraints.

Cyber assurance

Whilst offensive cyber is being deployed into theatre, the protective cyber technologies were developed first to assure the other focus area, particularly the networked collaborative targeting and engagement capabilities.

Once the initial four focus areas were deemed to have been achieved, the recapitalisation program focussed on replacing legacy capabilities with 5th Generation platforms, pursued a greater reliance on unmanned systems, and then focused on building scale.

5.2. Current military capability

The current strength of the Olvanan Military lies predominantly in the scale and quality of its platforms.

The industrial strength that will enable Olvana to maintain and replace platforms during a major peer conflict cannot be understated, but is beyond the scope of this paper. Additionally, the political will and tolerance for wartime causalities inherent within the Olvanan political system provides a significant comparative advantage over Western democracies.


US – Olvana Military Scorecard (1996 - 2017)

Legend for scorecards 1-9

US capabilities	Olvanan capabilities
Major advantage	Major disadvantage
Advantage	Disadvantage
Approximate parity	Approximate parity
Disadvantage	Advantage
Major disadvantage	Major advantage

Scorecard	Disputed Island Territory Conflict				South China Sea Conflict			
	1996	2003	2010	2017	1996	2003	2010	2017
1. Olvanan attacks on air bases								
2. US vs Olvanan air superiority								
3. US airspace penetration								
4. US attacks on air bases								
5. Olvanan anti-surface warfare								
6. US anti-surface warfare								
7. US counterspace								
8. Olvanan counterspace								
9. US vs Olvana cyberwar								

	Country	1996, 2003, and 2010	2017
10. Nuclear stability (confidence in secure second-strike capability)	Olvana	Low confidence	Medium confidence
	United States	High confidence	

Figure 5 – US-Olvana Military Scorecard, 1996-2017

5.3. Military capability – current focus

The scale and sophistication of the Olvanan military has now achieved the level required to enable the achievement of the maritime enabled National Strategic Objectives. The maturity of the individual services, their platforms, experience, training and assured mission sets[1] can be considered as peer or near-peer level to the United States equivalent.

Underpinning much of the OCP military confidence is the perception of the Olvanan people to accept far greater losses than a Western adversary. Thus, the tolerable losses for any given military operation are far greater than a Western democracy would accept, providing a significant advantage in a prolonged conflict. For this reason, the scale and structure of the OPN is designed to anticipate significant losses over the course of a conflict and still maintain numerical advantage in the Near Seas.

Noting Olvana's defensive strategic focus and prioritisation of Olvana's immediate strategic region, the OPN can anticipate that any potential conflict will be fought within close proximity to its own borders. When considering that such a conflict will thus take place at some distance from Western powers (notably the US, UK, and Australia), the size and capability of the Olvanan Armed Forces is sufficient to achieve the single service mission sets necessary, assuming comparable attrition on both sides.

The area of current focus is interoperability and networking across platforms, services and between strategic enablers and the services and platforms themselves.

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[1] This refers to mission sets that are predicted as achievable with acceptable probability and tolerable losses. The limits of acceptable probability and tolerable loss is unknown and likely to be variable dependent on the political and social climate and the stability of the OCP regime at any given time.

5.4. Interoperability and networking

Interoperability and networking, especially inter-service or between strategic commands, remains an area of weakness for the Olvanan military. Mission sets that rely on frictionless networking are not yet able to be completed reliably.

This vulnerability stems from the relative immaturity of the Olvanan military, exacerbated by rapid expansion over the past few decades. Capability gaps within certain platforms exacerbate this issue, notably the fourth generation aircraft which comprise the bulk of the OPAF, that were not designed to operate within a network-enabled battlespace.

These challenges have contributed to the 'siloed' nature of Olvana's armed services and significant overlap of capability development between the services. In many cases this creates a vicious cycle, with increased siloing driving independent development of systems that do not easily network with one another, exacerbating the problem. Within the maritime warfare sphere, this is most evident in the paucity of multi-role mission sets and the complexity of reassigning ships to a new task. For example, a surface action group (SAG) conducting ASuW operations will struggle to rapidly re-task to an ASW or AD mission, limiting operational flexibility.

In the case of a large-scale conflict, this disadvantage will likely be mitigated due to the nature of the probable adversary. A multilateral, multi-service adversary coalition will experience similar challenges in interoperability, communications, and networking. However, should the opposing force consist primarily of US forces or fit within a predominantly unilateral C2 structure, this would not be the case and Olvana's vulnerabilities would be exacerbated.

5.5. Maritime interoperability and networking weaknesses

The following are identified maritime mission set weaknesses and potential mitigations:

- OPMC and OPN interoperability within a large scale contested amphibious assault.
- Complex airspace de-confliction in the littoral and within Near Seas where ground-based long-range SAM and DCA exist.
- Strategic and OPAF asset surveillance and targeting – delivery to maritime assets is insufficiently assured and timely.
- Strategic assets provide cueing only, leaving the OPN platform to gain tracking and target the threat.
- OPAF/OPN combined targeting and strike is well rehearsed, but remains cumbersome and lacks stealth.
- Carrier and land based air operations are not yet integrated.
- Carriers operate best in the Distant Seas and in the entry points to the Near Seas, in order to mitigate this weakness and extend the fixed wing combat aircraft coverage.
- OPAF and strategic cueing to on-task submarines is unreliable and is often avoided.
- Numbers and positions of deployed submarines mean less cueing is required. Utilisation of nuclear powered submarines in the Distant Seas able to increase speed to meet threats.

Some areas requiring interoperability are more easily mitigated such as operational command of fixed-wing ASW aircraft squadrons being transferred from the OPAF to the Theatre ASW Commander (OPN) during operations.

6. Maritime-enabled National Strategic Objectives – responsibilities

The OCP has determined that achievement of the maritime-enabled National Strategic Objectives is the responsibility of the OPN. The Maritime Warfare Doctrine is constructed around the achievement of the NSOs and this remains the primary purpose of the OPN.

The Olvanan People's Air Force (OPAF) and Olvanan People's Army (OPA) are designated to support the OPN in the achievement of the maritime-enabled NSOs. Strategic supporting effects are orchestrated through the Olvanan Supreme High Command (OSHC), including:

- Space and satellite;
- Intelligence;
- Cyber;
- Irregular and asymmetric warfare, and
- Special forces.

The OSHC and the upper echelons of the OPA are tightly coupled, and as such the OPA generally takes primacy over the other two services. However, the strategic importance of the maritime-enabled NSOs has inverted this, with the OPN taking priority in planning and execution, with OPA and OPAF acting in a supporting role.

6.1. Olvanan People's Army maritime enabling capabilities

Land-based transporter erector launcher (TEL) platforms provide an anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) and anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) capability. These platforms are operated exclusively by the OPA, which is the primary capability provided by the OPA in support of maritime operations. Examples of these platforms include the YJ-62 ASCM, CJ-10 ASCM, and the DF-21 medium range ASBM.

Re-integration of any disputed island territories will be likely led by the OPA in concert with the Olvanan People's Marine Corps (OPMC). The OPMC forms part of the OPN and is expanding from its current strength of approximately 10,000 personnel. The OPMC is structured and resourced to conduct amphibious combat and assault operations up to and including any campaign to re-take disputed islands. Notwithstanding the OPMC contribution, the role of the OPN in such a conflict would be primarily focused on operational sea-lift, sustainment, and local sea control for the duration of the campaign.

6.2. Olvanan People's Air Force maritime enabling capabilities

The key OPAF capabilities utilised by the OPN are:

- Airborne early warning, C2 platforms, eg. KJ-2000 and KJ-3000;
- Long range surface surveillance and targeting, eg. WZ-7 Soaring Dragon, Y-8X, Y-8 MPA and H-6 families of aircraft;
- Long range ASW search and attack aircraft, eg. Y-8Q;
- Long range maritime strike aircraft carrying YJ-12 or similar ASCMs, eg. H-6 Badger, JH-7 Flying Leopard, and the in-development H-20 stealth bomber;
- Electronic warfare platforms such as EW variants of the H-6 (HD-6), Y-8GX, Y-9GX, JH7, and J-16D[2].

6.3. Irregular and asymmetric warfare enablers

Irregular and asymmetric warfare capabilities are held within the OSHC or within the Special Operations branch of the OPA. These assets can be deployed via various means into the maritime domain.

6.3.1. Olvanan Maritime Militia

The Olvanan Maritime Militia (OMM) represents a significant and flexible capability used to shape the maritime environment, especially within disputed maritime territorial areas. The OCP maintain a public position that the OMM is not controlled by the OPN or OSHC, and as such the OCP can politically distance themselves from any actions that take place.

In times of open conflict in the region the OMM can provide more than mere nuisance factor. The legal ambiguity of their status under the law of armed conflict (LOAC) can be leveraged to create tactical dilemmas and foment legal uncertainty.

6.3.2. Maritime asymmetric warfare enablers

UAVs

The OPA have successfully modified anti-personnel unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) swarms for ASuW use in the maritime domain. Detail relating to the tactical implementation of UAVs is provided in Part 2.

Hospital Ship

The Type 920 Hospital Ship *Daishan Dao* frequently deploys to sensitive areas under the guise of providing humanitarian aid. However, sources suggest that its crew and equipment commonly comprise numerous non-humanitarian capabilities, including for intelligence gathering.

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[2]A carrier based J-16D is in development and believed to be close to combat readiness.

7. Maritime strategy

The OPN derives its approach to maritime strategy in light of doctrine and the legislated requirement that it be ready to achieve the maritime-enabled NSOs (and provide support to any other NSOs) at any time, on order from the OCP. This includes the enduring mission of the OPN to prevent foreign interference with Olvanan interests within the Near Seas.

Historic Near Seas interventions from Western navies have contributed to the firmly-held belief within the OCP that Western powers will likely intervene in any attempt by Olvana to re-integrate disputed island territories.

Successful national strategy and diplomatic endeavours have resulted in a low level of threat to Olvana from rogue states and religiously- or issue-motivated extremist organisations.

The defensive nature of the maritime-enabled NSOs and the nature and capability of Olvana's perceived adversary has shaped an overarching maritime strategy of defensive counter-intervention. This has in turn predicated a focus on anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) as an overarching principle of maritime strategy. A2/AD comprises two distinct but related concepts:

Anti-access (A2)

Action intended to slow deployment of the Olvanan adversary forces into a theatre or cause the adversary to operate further from the location of conflict than they would prefer.

Area denial (AD)

Action intended to impede adversary operations within areas where Olvana cannot prevent access

To wit, anti-access prevents movement to (or entry into) a theatre, while area denial impedes manoeuvre within a theatre. Olvana is vigorously pursuing an A2/AD strategy throughout its maritime region of interest.

Olvana's maritime region of interest is defined as the area proceeding from Olvana's coast out to the Second Island Chain. This region is divided into two distinct areas, referred to as the Near Seas and the Distant Seas.

Near Seas

The maritime region that extends from Olvana's coast to the First Island Chain.

Distant Seas

The maritime region that extends from the outer boundary of the First Island chain out to the Second Island Chain.

Olvana's A2/AD strategic can be mapped directly onto the maritime region of interest. OPN strategy that A2 is achieved within the Near Seas, and AD is achieved within the Distant Seas.

The recent OPN maritime capability growth and recapitalisation along with the improved strategic military enablers (satellite, cyber, reclaimed island bases etc.) now allows an A2/AD maritime strategy within the Near and Distant Seas.

Notably, all of Olvana's disputed island territories lie within the Near Seas. This presents an opportunity for the OPN to utilise an operation to reclaim these territories as a validation of its maritime strategy. If the forced reintegration of these territories is successful, then all other strategic aims within the Near Seas can be achieved.

The OPN's capabilities, if utilised effectively, could prove to be a sufficient deterrent to enable a reintegration of disputed island territories without kinetic action. Of course, this assumes that a non-kinetic reintegration attempt would not trigger a military intervention from the United States or other adversary. Any retaliatory or first strike by an Olvanan adversary would necessarily provoke a kinetic response, likely triggering a major regional or global conflict.[3]

OPN maritime strategy has been carefully designed to eliminate the option for a restrained or limited adversary intervention. The need for an adversary to project a persistent presence into the geographically distant theatre would necessitate a large-scale response that would trigger a major conflict. This creates a strategic dilemma for any adversary, who would be forced to choose between inaction and commitment to full-scale conflict.

As discussed above, while the OPN has the lead on this element of strategic planning, significant support from the OPAF is required to achieve success. Primarily, persistent maritime surveillance and airborne strike capabilities are essential supporting capabilities that the OPN cannot achieve organically.

7.1. Olvana's potential adversaries

7.1.1. Most dangerous COA

The OPN assesses that the most dangerous adversary course of action (COA) is a massive retaliatory strike against key theatre and mainland infrastructure. Such a strike would target military, C2, and communications infrastructure across large areas of Olvana. This is only considered to be feasible if conducted by a US-led coalition force, initially comprising:

1. A nuclear ICBM strike launched from SSBNs, and/or
2. a sophisticated and widespread cyber strike,

providing sufficient disruption to enable access to theatre for conventional strike by:

3. carrier strike group (CSG) operations;
4. land-based (air and land forces), or
5. a combination of the above.

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[3] Worryingly, the OCP is reported to be 'encouraged and emboldened' by the reluctance of Western powers to respond militarily to recent Donovian aggression in Eastern Europe. There are fears that the milquetoast response of NATO to the Donovian invasion has increased the likelihood of an Olvanan invasion within the Near Seas.

The OPN takes the lead in countering components 1 and 3, and the relevant parts of component 5. However, satellite curing and land-based long-ranges SAMs would be utilised to intercept incoming missiles after launch. Following this, Olvana would retaliate with ICBM launches from land siloes and SSBNs.

OPN strategy focusses on the A2/AD measures required to prevent the adversary's follow-on conventional activities, namely components 3 and 5. A key planning assumption is that the initially strike occurs from a point of origin beyond the Distant Seas. It should be noted that the OPN cannot prevent ICBM launches from SSBNs beyond the Distant Seas.

7.1.2. Most likely COA

The OPN assesses that the most likely adversary COA is a kinetic response to an Olvanan action, such as reclamation of a disputed island territory. This response is expected to come in two distinct phases:

1. Airborne and submarine-launched strikes against airfields, naval ports, and C2 installations in the Near Seas, followed by
2. A co-ordinated attack from maritime forces marshalling in two locations – beyond the southern extremity of the Near Seas in the South China Sea, and the area south of mainland Japan. Each of the attacking fleets would include a US Navy carrier strike group and an associated coalition force. Forward basing of coalition air assets in Japan and long-range strikes from Guam would support this action.

In this scenario, the adversary would attempt to reduce Olvanan air and sea power sufficiently to enable CSG access into the Near Seas at an acceptable risk level. This would require significant bombardment of island and reef installations in the South China Sea to neutralise the ASCM/ASBM and SAM threat.

The adversary would also need to counter Olvana's significant submarine threat within the Near Seas. The OPN maintains this capability by ensuring a permanent subsurface presence in the Near and Distant Seas across its five submarine classes. Notwithstanding these enduring presence patrols, any increase in the deployment of OPN submarines to see may be a precursor for a significant Olvanan operation.

7.2. OPN A2/AD strategy

In response to the most likely and most dangerous COAs as identified above, the OPN pursues an aggressive A2/AD strategy. This is implemented in accordance with the following command guidance:

Near Seas (A2)

> All adversary military assets inside the First Island Chain or South China Sea are to be escorted, targeted or engaged.

Distant Seas (AD)

> All adversary military assets inside the Second Island Chain and northeast of Singapore are to be detected and tracked.

Figure 6 – OPN A2/AD strategy

Notably, the stated strategy is the minimum outcome required by the OPN. Ideally, the OPN seeks the ability to target and engage targets in outer reaches of the Distant Seas. This aspirational target will be facilitated by:

- Earlier indications and warnings (I&W) through more persistent surveillance assets and intelligence sources;
- Faster and more agile networked C2 systems able to pass targeting fidelity data to the weapon carrying platforms quickly;
- A greater number of persistent weapon carrying platforms possessing faster reaction times and enabled by forward basing (OPN carrier battle groups, SSNs, Unmanned Air and Sub Surface and OPAF forward basing on the various reef air fields in the SCS); and
- Increased automation of decision-making and greater clarity of orders enabling the increased decentralisation of decision making power.[4]

Noting the number, location, and disparity of technology of OPN and OPAF assets, the primary challenge with achieving the above is one of C2.

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[4] New techniques for decision-making, C2 streamlining, and command decentralisation are regularly rehearsed and validated during OPN and joint command-post exercises (CPX).

8. Conclusion

This document outlines the Olvanan strategic approach and historical context with regard to its immediate region and hegemonic competition. It provides the overarching framework for Olvanan power and application of martial force.

Part 2 of this series will discuss in-depth tactical elements that underpin the Olvanan national military paradigm, down to unit- and asset-level fidelity. Combined, these two documents provide sufficient strategic and tactical understanding of the Olvanan approach to maritime warfare.