CJTF 667 OPORD 01
OPERATION
STEEL SENTINEL

Version 2.0

FOREWORD

NOTE TO EXECISE DESIGNERS AND TRAINEES ON THE USE OF THE OPERATION STEEL SENTINEL DOCUMENT SUITE

1. This Foreword provides guidance and advice on the use of the OP STEEL SENTINEL (OSS) suite of documents. OSS is written with a focus on collective training from Section level (or Service equivalent) all the way to a Joint Task Force Headquarters. The intent of OSS is to enable Joint or Joint-enabled training, encompassing the full spectrum of military operations across all domains (maritime, land, air, space and cyber/information).

2. The OSS documents are designed to provide an overall narrative for a fictitious conflict in Australia's near region. OSS utilises the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) as the vehicle to enable training and the repository of information regarding the Operational Environment (OE). All DATE specific OE information can be found in the following link (recommend using Chrome):

https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/

3. Note that OSS utilises country boundaries within DATE that may have changed on ODIN post publication of the OSS suite of documents. For reference, OSS will continue to use the country boundaries shown in Figure 1 below.



Figure 1. DATE-P OSS JFAO and Country Boundaries

4. The overall theme in designing OSS is to provide a narrative (General Idea) that enables the development of scenarios for a given training objective (Special Idea). The design philosophy for OSS is ***Descriptive*** not ***Prescriptive***. Exercise designers are free to change any of the variables within OSS to suit the needs of the training audience. The OSS suite of

documentation merely ‘sets the board’ for the training audience to be exercised. There is no requirement for exercise designers to follow the Campaign Plan as described and may change the conditions for each phase to meet the training objectives.

5. The variables that can be changed include (but are not limited to):

a. OPFOR composition/equipment/location and start state during each phase

b. BLUFOR composition and C2 arrangements

c. PMESII variables to suit real-world locations (e.g. changing city/town names to reflect local training area geography)

d. Campaign Plan execution

6. Additionally, exercise designers can change the geography of the contested JFAO to suit their local conditions. For example, the island of Panay can be placed anywhere in Australia with the other islands of Belesia placed in accordance to where other training areas are located. Similarly, the island of Panay can be as large or as small as the exercise needs it to be.

7. Finally, the suite of documents for OSS is by no means complete. If exercise designers require more information or assistance in the development of further training material to enable the use of OSS, please contact the Training Adversary Systems Support Cell (TASSC), at HQ FORCOMD through the following email:

aus.dateteam@defence.gov.au

AMMENDMENTS

Version	Date	Amendment	Author
v1.0	30 Sep 20	Initial publication of OSS OPORD	Mr M. Paje
v1.1	31 Jan 21	Addition of Ph4 FRAGO Addition of Foreword to Exercise Designers	Mr M. Paje
V2.0	04 Jul 22	Reviewed for use with 2 Div	MAJ M. Paje

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CJTF 667 OPORD 01 (OPERATION STEEL SENTINEL)

References:

A. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 8868.

B. UNSCR 8869.

C. UNSCR 8873.

D. Status of Forces Agreement – Australia/Belesia

E. Belesia (BX) Country Study.

F. North Torbia (NT) Country Study.

G. South Torbia (RT) Country Study.

H. Gabal (GX) Country Study.

I. Olvana (OV) Country Study.

Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU.

1. **Situation.**

a. Background. Growing ethnic tensions in the Belesian island of Panay resulted in violence when the local government in Panay attempted to take control of the lucrative Cerium rare earth mine in San Rafael from the Olvanan registered operator. The resulting loss of life amongst the Belesian Constabulary and unknown number of mine employees has sparked unrest in the nearby city of Roxas with the violence occurring along ethnic lines with the greatest loss of life amongst the Torbian diaspora. Olvana (OV) and North Torbia (NT) have been conducting a week's long biennial exercise in the South China Sea, named Exercise RISEN SWORD. It was under the cover of this exercise that NT landed a marine force (estimated to be a Brigade) on Palawan near the sparsely populated town of El Nido, capturing the port and airfield facilities. Simultaneously, NT landed a Marine Expeditionary Brigade near the city of Roxas, Panay and captured the seaport, airport, and the San Rafael Mine. NT has claimed the justification for this act of aggression is to protect ethnic Torbians in Panay from persecution. In response to this blatant disregard for international protocols, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed UNSCR 8868 (ref A) condemning NT aggression and calling for the withdrawal of NT Forces from Belesian territory. Concurrently, Belesia (BX) landed a Brigade of troops in the south of Panay through the city of Iloilo in an attempt to force the NT forces off the island. This course of action has resulted in a stalemate with the NT Marine Expeditionary Force (NTMEF) holding the northern half of Panay centred on the city of Roxas and the BX Forces holding the area around the city of Iloilo. NT has since declared a Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) and Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the occupied islands and parts of the Sulu and South China Sea.

In an effort to allow diplomatic options to be utilised and reduce further loss of life, the UNSC passed UNSCR 8869 (ref B) calling on all Member States to enforce economic and military sanctions against NT. With NT's continued occupation of Panay and Palawan in contravention of International laws, the UNSC passed UNSCR 8873 authorising the raising of the International Belesian Security Assistance Force (IBSAF) to utilise military force to remove NT military elements on sovereign Belesian territory. Australia has volunteered to be the lead nation of the Combined Joint Task Force 667 (CJTF 667) with contributing nations including New Zealand, Fiji, Malaysia, Singapore, Tonga, PNG, Japan and Thailand. The Government of BX has consented, subject to SOFAs (ref D), to allow CJTF 667 forces to stage through their territories, to station forces, materiel and installations involved in supporting its operations and to overflights.

b. Strategic Aim. The aim of the international community is to:

(1) end North Torbian aggression towards Belesia

(2) expel all North Torbian military forces from Belesian sovereign territory

(3) create a free, safe, secure and stable environment in the region

(4) facilitate the continuation of Belesian democratic national governance and developmental programs.

c. Strategic Objectives. In order to achieve the desired end state, the strategic objectives of the international intervention include:

(1) Expel all North Torbian military forces from Belesian sovereign territory.

(2) Restore a secure and stable environment throughout the BX Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO).

(3) Effect force protection for coalition military forces deployed throughout the JFAO.

(4) Assist the government of BX to strengthen the capacities of their national security forces and institutions to enforce central control.

(5) Preserve and enforce the freedom of navigation throughout the JFAO.

(6) Support UN Agencies, International Organizations (IOs) and NGOs within capabilities and limitations in order to preserve human life and alleviate the suffering of IDPs and refugees within the JFAO.

(7) Gradually reduce the size, role and profile of the IBSAF contribution. This process will be guided by reviews of tasks, environment, threat, risks, follow-on forces and Host Nation (HN) capacities as part of a Transition and Exit Strategy that is linked to the achievement of the Desired Military Strategic End State.

d. CJTF Center of Gravity. The operational center of gravity is assessed as the CJTF offensive air capability, which allows CJTF to achieve air superiority over the JFAO and degrade North Torbian forces to the required level to allow maritime and ground operations to occur.

e. Operational Objectives. With the support and agreement of the international community, IBSAF has undertaken to end the crisis in BX by deploying a combined joint task force to BX to repel NT invading forces and restore BX territorial sovereignty. The force, hereafter referred to as the Combined Joint Task Force 667 (CJTF 667) will deploy under the authority of UNSCR 8873 (ref C). The objectives of this military intervention are as follows:

(1) Establish military superiority in the maritime and airspace within the JFAO in a manner which supports decisive operations.

(2) Conduct decisive military operations, which leads to the restoration of Belesian sovereignty in the occupied islands; stabilize the region; and deter further external aggression against BX.

(3) Assist humanitarian assistance efforts and IO/NGO activities in BX.

(4) Assist the government of BX to re-establish and maintain a safe and secure environment to facilitate the continuance of democratic government institutions and programmes.

(5) Support any applicable International Criminal Court (ICC) investigations of crimes against humanity through the preservation and collection of evidence.

f. Desired Operational End State. The Desired End State remains the establishment of a sufficiently secure and stable environment in the occupied BX islands and improved capability of BX security forces such that state-sponsored hostilities have ceased, territorial borders are secure, humanitarian assistance programs operate unhindered and transition to a UN-sanctioned and/or HN follow-on security force is complete. A safe and secure environment in BX exists when:

(1) It allows IOs and NGOs safe and unrestricted access to the BX population.

(2) It encourages the return of IDPs and refugees.

(3) It fosters the rapid re-establishment of representative government institutions.

(4) It allows economic reconstruction and development.

g. Limitations.

(1) Constraints. In conducting its operations, CJTF 667 will:

A. Minimize the use of scarce BX resources.

B. Minimize collateral damage and civilian casualties in BX.

C. Deploy to the JFAO as soon possible in a sequence coordinated by this headquarters.

D. Work closely with the UN to facilitate the work of UN agencies, IOs and NGOs.

E. Minimize the demand on BX resources.

F. Operate in accordance with the SOFA with BX (ref D).

(2) Restraints. In conducting its operations, CJTF 667 will not:

A. Disrupt the use of civilian air routes in and out of areas outside of the JFAO.

B. Adversely effect the BX economy more than is necessary.

C. Disrupt maritime traffic in the region outside of the JFAO.

h. Operational Areas.

(1) JFAO. The JFAO includes the landmasses, national air space and territorial waters of BX and the waters and associated airspaces of the Sulu Sea, the Celebes Sea north of the XX degrees latitude, Philippine Sea west of XX degrees longitude and the South China Sea east of XX degrees longitude.

(2) CFLCC Area of Operations (AO). The CFLCC AO is comprised of the landmass, airspace and territorial waters (12NM) of Panay and Palawan Islands.

i. Threat Assessment. See Annex B, as well as the Country Studies at References E to I inclusive for more detail.

(1) General. The Pacific region encompassing the countries of North Torbia (NT), South Torbia (RT), Belesia (BX), Gabal (GX) and Olvana (OV) have been involved with a tense game of power since the end of European colonisation. OV has aggressively sought to impose its position as the regional hegemon, with expansion into recognised international waters in the South China Sea. Similarly, nations such as RT, GX and BX view the shift as an opportunity to grow their influence and develop their economic ties both in the region and with external partners. Control of critical mineral and fishing resources, manufacturing, and unfettered transport of goods in the region's shipping lanes is a key point of tension for all. The border between NT and RT has been a historical flash point with both nations involved in a recent border clash that has resulted in an uneasy armistice. Within the states of the region, groups that had previously seen no opportunity for influence view the instability as a path to develop their voices. Internal conflict within each state is a persistent and potentially destabilising factor as government's position for legitimacy and consolidate their power.

(2) Country of BX. The Federated States of Belesia is a relatively new democracy in the region. The turbulence of its independence from colonial rule continues to create stability challenges throughout its many member-islands. Political turmoil, popular unrest, and widespread terrorism combine to create a volatile environment for this young federation. One of the few stabilising factors is the development of economic opportunities and trade, in particular the exploitation of BX's rich natural resources. Despite progress in this area, sufficient infrastructure and business processes have yet to be developed, hampering the further BX progress. The most significant development of the Belesian Federation Defense Force is the fomalisation and aggregation of member islands' inconsistent security efforts. This standardisation and professionalism is most evident in the establishment of a national constabulary and a national guard. Maintaining a balance between enforcing nationhood and preserving a degree of local autonomy has been the major challenge to national policy implementation and military stationing efforts.

(3) Country of NT. The Democratic People's Republic of Torbia, also called North Torbia, is one of the most militarised countries in the world, with more than half a million active duty military personnel and over two million reservists. NT's military spending is around 20% of its GDP, and about one-quarter of all adults serve in some military capacity. NT is a single-party, despotic state that occupies the northern half of the Island of Luzon. It is self-described as a 'self-reliant socialist republic', but its structure is deeply totalitarian, wholly reliant on a cult-of personality and militarism for survival.

j. Friendly Forces. CJTF 667 will operate within the established JFAO and will be led by AS. CJTF 667 consists of a HQ, JFMCC, JFLCC, JFACC (OPCON), SOTG, JFLOGCC, and ESG. Troop contributing nations currently include New Zealand, Fiji, Tonga, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. Other like-minded nations may contribute forces or provide materiel support at a future date. As Lead Nation, Australia will provide critical force enablers. AS will partner with BX in the provision of strategic-level support such as intelligence and logistics. The composition of CJTF 667 is as follows:

(1) HQ.

A. Commander, Lieutenant General, XXXXXXXX, (AS).

B. Deputy Commander (Operations), Rear Admiral XXXXXXXXXX(NZ).

(2) Joint Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC).

A. Australia – JF Maritime Component Commander and HQ; Maritime Task Group (MTG) consisting of two Air Warfare Destroyers (DDG), two Frigates (FFH), and two Diesel-Electric Submarines (SSG); and an Amphibious Task Group (ATG), consisting of two Amphibious Assault Ships (LHD), Dock Landing Ship (LSD), and a Pre-Landing Force (PLF), with associated fixed and rotary wing aircraft and a replenishment ship.

B. New Zealand – One Frigate (FFH) attached to the MTG, and one Multi-Role Vessel (MRV) attached to the ATG.

C. Japan – One Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) consisting of one Destroyer (DDH), three Landing Ships (LST), two Guided Missile Destroyers (DDG), one Diesel-Electric Submarine (SSG), and an Amphibious Ground Force based on three Army Marine Battalions.

(3) Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC).

A. Australia – JF Land Component Commander and staff JFLCC HQ, one Combat Brigade complete, one Aviation Task Group, and Division enablers.

B. New Zealand – One Mechanised Infantry Brigade complete, and one Aviation Regiment.

C. Fiji – One Infantry Battalion.

D. Indonesia/Malaysia/Tonga/PNG/Singapore/Thailand – One Infantry Battalion.

(4) Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC).

A. Australia – JF Air Component Commander and HQ, 24x F-35A Lightning II, 12x F/A-18F Super Hornets, 8x EA-18G Growlers, 3x E-7A Wedgetail, 4x P-8 Poseidon, 2x MQ-4C Triton, 4x C-17 Globemaster, 4x C-130J Hercules, 5x C-27J Spartan and 4x KC-30A Tanker. In addition, the following DCSD elms, 2x ECSS, 1x ADG Sqn, and 1x Airfield Engineer Sqn. The JFACC will be in support of CJTF 667, but will remain under command of HQJOC.

B. New Zealand – 2x P-3 Orion, and 2x C-130 Hercules.

(5) Special Operations Task Group.

A. Australia – TBA.

B. New Zealand – TBA.

(6) Joint Force Logistic Component Command (JFLOGCC).

A. Australia – JF LOG Component Commander and HQ 17 Bde, two Force Support Battalions (FSB), two Role 2 Enhanced (R2E) Field Hospitals and an Engineer Support Regiment (ESR).

B. New Zealand- National Support Element (NSE), one Combat Service Support Battalion.

C. US- USNS Mercy Hospital Ship – recognised internationally as a non-combatant

k. International Organizations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Some IOs and NGOs are currently operating in BX. Their presence is expected to increase dramatically once a more secure operating environment is created. See Annex Q for further details.

l. National Command Elements (NCE). Each troop-contributing nation (TCN) may deploy a NCE to manage national command issues. All NCEs will remain undeclared but it is anticipated that they will collocate with HQ CJTF 667, in terrain to be allocated by this HQ.

m. National Support Elements (NSE). Each TCN may deploy an NSE or equivalent capability. The headquarters of those elements will be located in General Santos City, collocated with the HQ of the JFLOGCC. JFLOGCC will retain coordinating authority over all NSEs.

n. Reserves. Each TCN has been requested to be prepared to consider requests for additional forces should the need arise. Specific forces have not been earmarked and the deployment time is estimated at 90-120 days.

o. BX. BX has agreed to act as the HN to support the deployment and staging of CJTF 667.

p. Rotation of Forces. The timeframe for OSS is situation dependent. The initial operating mandate provided by the UN is of 12 months duration, with extensions as required. The initial force deployment is to be for XX months. TCNs may plan for the rotation of forces after that period of time.

2. **Mission.** CJTF 667 conducts military operations to expel all NT forces from Belesian sovereign territory in order to create conditions for the re-establishment of a safe and secure environment in Belesia and the surrounding region.

3. **Execution.**

a. Commander's Analysis. The occupation of Belesian sovereign territory and the subjugation of Belesian citizens by the North Torbian military is an unacceptable act of aggression and will not be tolerated by the international community. This act of aggression flies in the face of international norms. To that end, the UNSC have given IBSAF (CJTF 667) the mandate to end NT occupation of BX territory and to restore the rule of law. CJTF 667 must act with resolve in meeting this UN mandate. To date, this conflict has remained localised between NT and BX. However, all subordinate commanders must understand that antagonising other neutral regional countries through unrestricted use of force can escalate into a wider conflict. It is important that our actions are conducted within international guidelines and that care to reduce collateral death and damage to non-combatants is utmost in all planning considerations. Subordinate commanders at all levels must be alert to these factors in the conduct of all of their operations, particularly as we transition from combat operations. Having said this, CJTF 667 must act in a manner which permits the rapid return to a stable economic environment, with minimal negative impact on the strategic infrastructure of BX.

b. Commander's Intent. The BX Military is a capable force that has the capacity to deal with the NT aggression effectively. However, internal politics and the unstable nature of government institutions in this young nation has meant that they have called for international assistance to dealing with NT aggression. Additionally, historic ethnic tensions between BX central authority and the various ethnic groups in the occupied territories means that BX is not able to utilise their capable military to deal with NT aggression effectively. UNSCR 8869 authorised the embargo of arms and materiel to NT. Despite the arms embargo, IBSAF does not have the authority to enforce the embargo and it is arguable that enforcing the embargo without Olvanan cooperation would be impossible. CJFT667 will utilise all forces within its command to meet the UNSCR 8873 goal of removing NT military presence in BX and establishing a safe and secure environment for the transition of authority back to BX. OSS will be a five-phase operation to meet the strategic objectives of UNSCR 8873. During all Phases CJTF 667 will be prepared to use appropriate force as required, but applied with precision and being cognizant of the need to reduce collateral damage. Phase 0 will consist of shaping operations to begin isolating politically, economically and socially the NT forces. Phase 1 will see the commencement of physically isolating the NT forces and degrading their capability in BX. Phase 2 will see the conduct of Joint Force Entry Operations. Phase 3 will begin with the decisive close combat land operations. Phase 4 will be the transition of authority to the UN and BX. At all times, we must be cognisant that the main effort is the removal of NT forces in BX. If this can be achieved during any of the stages without further bloodshed, then all effort must be taken to explore those options. All CJTF 667 Units must be prepared to transition to all phases with minimal warning. The end state is a smooth transfer of CJTF 667 responsibilities to a designated follow-on force/authority, with CJTF 667 forces returned to national control.

c. Main Effort. The main effort is the restoration of Belesian territorial sovereignty to a peaceful and stable environment.

d. Concept of Operations. OSS will be conducted in five phases as follows:

(1) Phase 0 – **Shaping** (D-60 – D-11)

A. Main Effort: Conduct shaping operations to isolate the NTMEF politically, economically and socially

B. Supporting Efforts:

1. Advance Force operations will be conducted to collect intelligence on NTMEF in JFAO
2. Establish temporal control of sea/air lanes over Southern Belesia to allow initial staging in Belesia
3. Establish Primary Sea Port of Debarkation (SPOD) at Makar Wharf, General Santos City, BX and Primary Air Port of Debarkation (APOD) at General Santos International Airport, General Santos City, BX. Prepare for reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSO&I) activities.
4. Establish a Theater Logistics Base in BX under direction of the LOGCC, which will co-ordinate the sustainment support among participating nations, component commands, HN and non-military organizations at the operational level.
5. Establish an alternate APOD at Colonel Edwin Andrews Airbase, Zamboanga, BX and an alternate SPOD at Zamboanga Port, BX.
6. Establish Role 2 Enhanced Hospital at the primary APOD.
7. When RSO&I capabilities are in place, component forces deploy into the JFAO.
8. On declaration of JFACC OPRED, it assumes OPCON over designated Belesian Air Force assets becoming the de facto ACC of the JFAO.
9. CJTF 667 will establish its HQ at Rajah Buayan Airbase, General Santos City, BX by G+XX and once LCC declares OPRED, TOA will occur to allow OPCON of coalition forces.

C. Endstate: CJTF 667 will have established in the JFAO to allow decisive actions to commence.

(2) Phase 1 – **Denial** (D-10 – D-1)

A. Main Effort: Isolate NTMEF logistically in Panay and degrade NTMEF capabilities.

B. Supporting Efforts:

1. Advance Force operations in collecting intelligence on NTMEF in JFAO.
2. Conduct interdiction of NTMEF lines of communication.
3. Conduct deception plan (e.g. ME being Palawan vice Panay).

4. Maintain temporal control of sea/air lanes in the JFAO to allow continued staging of CF in BX.
5. Degrade NTMEF capability in the JFAO.

C. Endstate: NTMEF logistic supply to Panay will have been degraded to reduce NTMEF's freedom to manoeuvre.

(3) Phase 2 – **Lodgement** (D-Day – D+2)

A. Main Effort: Conduct Joint Force Entry Operations (JFEO) into Panay.

B. Supporting Efforts:

1. Conduct deception plan to lodge in Palawan.
2. Continue to maintain temporal control of sea/air lanes within the JFAO.
3. Conduct interdiction of NTMEF lines of communication.
4. Continue to conduct shaping operations to isolate NTMEF.
5. Degrade NTMEF ground forces capability in Panay and Palawan.

C. Endstate: CJTF 667 ground elements will have successfully lodged in Panay.

(4) Phase 3 – **Neutralise** (D+3 – D+14)

A. Main Effort: Defeat NTMEF in Panay.

B. Supporting Effort:

1. Conduct JFEO into Palawan.
2. Defeat NTMEF in Palawan.
3. Continue to maintain temporal control of sea/air lanes within the JFAO.
4. Conduct Counter-Insurgency (COIN) operations.
5. Continue to conduct shaping operations to isolate NTMEF.

C. Endstate: NTMEF ground forces will have been defeated on Panay and Palawan.

(5) Phase 4 – **Transition** (D+15 onwards)

A. Main Effort: Transition to UN Peacekeeping.

B. Supporting Efforts:

1. Conduct Stability Operations (STABOPS).
2. Conduct Information Operations (IO) to support strategic messaging.
3. Conduct Freedom of Navigation Ops (FONOPS) in international waters.
4. Conduct Anti-Piracy Maritime Security (MARSEC) Patrols.

C. Endstate:

1. Transition of authority will have been conducted between CJTF 667 and UN Mission.
2. CJTF 667 will have transitioned and postured to conduct STABOPS as required.

e. Limitations.

(1) Restraints. All targeting of BX infrastructure will take into consideration the economic and humanitarian effects post conflict.

(2) Constraints. Defensive ROE will be in place prior to deployment and into BX. Revert to Offensive ROE on order.

f. Common Tasks.

(1) During all phases ensure the security of coalition air, maritime and land lines of communication.

(2) Support the BX government and established IO/NGOs in their ongoing humanitarian efforts while remaining cognizant of the need to create and maintain a safe and secure environment.

g. Groupings & Tasks. See Annex A for details on C2 and groupings.

(1) JFMCC (TG667.1).

A. Phase 0 (Shaping):

1. Coordinate the deployment of maritime forces into the JFAO.
2. Provide maritime force protection for deploying forces and sustainment shipping.
3. Establish HQ JFMCC base of operations in Zamboanga.
4. BPT to take operational control (OPCON) of designated Belesian Naval Forces.
5. BPT conduct shaping operations in the JFAO.

B. Phase I (Denial):

1. Conduct offensive operations to gain control of critical sea lanes.
2. Be prepared to (BPT) neutralize the NT navy within the JFAO with a priority on sub-surface platforms.
3. BPT participate in Joint Targeting.
4. BPT support SF operations.
5. BPT support deception plan.

C. Phase II (Lodgement):

1. Conduct Joint Force Entry Operations (JFEO) on command.
2. BPT **s**upport, in priority, SOF, land and maritime operations.
3. BPT conduct littoral operations in support of ground forces.
4. BPT participate in Joint Targeting.
5. BPT support deception plan.
6. Maintain control of critical sea-lanes.
7. Continue to conduct offensive maritime operations.

D. Phase III (Neutralise):

1. BPT participate in Joint Targeting.
2. Maintain control of critical sea lanes.
3. Continue to conduct offensive maritime operations.
4. BPT conduct maritime STABOPS.

E. Phase IV (Transition):

1. BPT handover OPCON of JFMCC functions to Belesian Navy.
2. BPT conduct maritime STABOPS.
3. BPT conduct Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS).
4. BPT conduct Anti-Piracy Maritime Security Patrols (MARSEC).

(2) <u>JFLCC (TG667.2).</u>

A. Phase 0 (Shaping):

1. Coordinate with HQ CJTF 667 and JFLOGCC the deployment of subordinate land forces into BX.
2. Establish HQ JFLCC base of operations in Gen Santos City.
3. BPT conduct shaping operations on command.
4. BPT take OPCON of designated BX land forces in JFAO.
5. BPT support SF operations.

B. Phase I (Denial):

1. BPT support defensive land operations on command.
2. Participate in Joint Targeting.
3. BPT support deception plan.
4. BPT support SF operations.

C. Phase II (Lodgement):

1. Conduct JFEO on Panay.
2. BPT assume OPCON of all designated land forces once lodged.
3. BPT support SF operations.

D. Phase III (Neutralise):

1. Defeat NTMEF on Panay.
2. BPT conduct JFEO on Palawan.
3. BPT defeat NTMEF on Palawan.
4. BPT conduct COIN/STABOPS.
5. BPT support IO/NGO efforts.
6. BPT support SF operations.

E. Phase IV (Transition):

1. Conduct COIN/STABOPS.
2. BPT support IO/NGO efforts.
3. BPT handover OPCON of JFLCC functions to Belesian Military.

(3) JFACC (TG640).

A. Phase 0 (Shaping):

1. Support BX Air Force defensive operations.
2. Coordinate the deployment of air forces to the region to include the establishment of the CAOC in BX (Gen Santos City) and assume the role of Designated Airspace Control Authority.
3. On declaration of your HQ OPRED, assume OPCON over designated Belesian Air Force assets, becoming the de facto ACC of the BX Air Command. On declaration HQ CJTF 667 OPRED, TOA back to coalition as ACC.
4. Conduct Shaping Operations.

B. Phase 1 (Denial):

1. Conduct offensive counter air operations in the JFAO.
2. Establish control of critical air lanes.
3. Neutralise NT Air Force presence in JFAO.
4. BPT support maritime strike.
5. Conduct Joint Targeting.
6. Achieve air superiority over the JFLCC AO to set the conditions for decisive lodgement and land operations.

C. Phase 2 (Lodgement):

1. Conduct offensive counter air operations in the JFAO.
2. Maintain control of critical air lanes.
3. Conduct defensive counter air.
4. Conduct Joint Targeting.
5. BPT support maritime strike.
6. Conduct CAS on request.

D. Phase 3 (Neutralise):

1. Provide CAS to ground forces.
2. Conduct offensive/defensive counter air.
3. Maintain control of critical air lanes.
4. Conduct Joint Targeting.
5. BPT support maritime strike.

E. Phase 4 (Transition):

1. BPT support IO/NGO efforts.
2. BPT handover OPCON of ACC functions to Belesian Military.

(4) SOTG (TG667.4). Tasks to be issued separately.

(5) JFLOGCC (TG667.5).

A. Phases 0 – 4:

1. Establish APOD and SPOD in BX to facilitate the deployment of CJTF 667.
2. Negotiate and arrange for HN and HN contracting support for CJTF 667.
3. Coordinate the deployment of CJTF 667 into the JFAO.
4. Conduct ongoing sustainment operations.
5. Coordinate support requirements for all component commands.
6. Coordinate engineer project planning, contract construction, real estate acquisition, environment and infrastructure support for CJTF 667.
7. Coordinate general engineering support for CJTF 667.
8. Coordinate HN engineer support.
9. BPT assist BX authorities with the repair of critical infrastructure that impacts CJTF 667 operations.
10. BPT coordinate engineer support to create a safe environment in AP.
11. Manage the deployment of Role 2 and 3 medical facilities into BX.
12. Negotiate and arrange for additional HN medical support from BX.

13. Conduct ongoing medical support for CJTF-OIG for all phases.

14. Coordinate medical support requirements for all component commands.

(6) JA/US ESG (TG667.6).

A. Phase 0 (Shaping):

1. Coordinate with HQ CJTF 667 and LOGCC the deployment of subordinate forces into BX.

2. Establish HQ ESG base of operations in Gen Santos City.

3. BPT conduct shaping operations on command.

4. BPT support SF operations.

B. Phase 1 (Denial):

1. BPT support defensive land operations on command.

2. Participate in Joint Targeting.

3. BPT support deception plan.

4. BPT support SF operations.

C. Phase 2 (Lodgement):

1. Conduct deception plan on Palawan.

2. BPT conduct JFEO on Panay.

3. BPT support SF operations.

D. Phase 3 (Neutralise):

1. Conduct JFEO on Palawan.

2. Defeat NTMEF.

3. BPT assume OPCON of all designated land forces once lodged.

4. BPT conduct COIN/STABOPS.

5. BPT support IO/NGO efforts.

6. BPT support SF operations.

E. Phase 4 (Transition):

1. Conduct COIN/STABOPS.

2. BPT support IO/NGO efforts.

h. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Timings.

A. Primary APOD and SPOD established – by XXXXXX.

B. Alternate APOD and SPOD established – by XXXXXX.

C. Theatre Support Area established in BX – by XXXXXX.

D. G Day- main body deployment for OSS begins.

E. ACC establishes air superiority over LCC AO – by XXXXXX.

F. Phase 0 operations to commence not before XXXXXX.

G. Phase I operations to commence not before XXXXXX.

H. D Day- commencement of Phase II operations.

I. R Day – Redeployment of CJTF 667 forces begins.

(2) Transfer of Authority.

A. BX Forces. BX's SHC will continue to command defensive operations until declaration of CJTF 667 OPRED (most probably coincident with JFACC OPRED). At that time, designated BX maritime, land and air combat forces will TOA OPCON to CJTF 667 for Phase 1 operations.

B. JFACC. On declaration of JFACC HQ OPRED, it will assume ACC responsibilities for the Belesian Supreme High Command (SHC) with OPCON of both deterrent early deployed AS assets and designated BX Air Force aircraft. When HQ CJTF 667 is declared OPRED, ACC will revert back to the CJTF.

C. Troop Contributing Nations. TCNs will deploy forces to the JFAO under national command arrangements but in coordination with JFLOGCC staff and the respective component command. On arrival in the JFAO and declared OPRED by respective National Commanders maritime, land, air and SOF forces will be transferred OPCON to CJTF 667 and subsequently to their component commands.

D. Sustainment Forces. Undeclared Combat Service Support resources that are not transferred OPCON as part of the combat force will be transferred TACON to JFLOGCC for space allocation, movement control, local defense and coordination. NSEs will remain under national command while deployed in BX but JFLOGCC will have coordinating authority over NSE.

(3) PWs and Captured Persons (CPERS). Handling and disposition of PWs and CPERS will be in accordance with Appx 1 to Annex L. AS has agreed to be Lead Nation on the handling and disposition of PW and CPERS.

A. National Responsibilities on PW/CPERS. For reasons of National sensitivity and ownership of processes relating to PW/CPERS, all Coalition personnel will respect their own national procedures following guidelines in accordance with the Geneva Convention:

B. Custody of PW/CPERS. PW/CPERS operations are a National responsibility. As such, it is imperative that all persons detained by Coalition personnel remain in the care and custody of authorized personnel only. It is understood that operational requirements may force acceptance of PW/CPERS from, or transfer to, other Allied nations of the Coalition. This shall be the exception and not the norm. Should such circumstance become necessary, only the respective National Commander or his designated representative can authorize the acceptance or transfer of a PW/CPERS to or from another nation.

C. Treatment. PW and CPERS are to be treated in accordance with all accepted international laws and conventions.

D. Transfer or Release. Although tactical situations may oblige commanders to detain persons during the conduct of operations, it is the responsibility of National Commanders at all levels to determine who will be categorised as a CPERS and immediately field release all others. Once a determination has been made to further retain the detained person and a PW/CPERS number has been assigned, only the National Commander of the capturing nation has the authority to release or transfer PW/CPERS to other nations. For the specific purpose of an individual clearly detained as a PW, there is no requirement to determine status upon capture, as PW are captured enemy combatants and remain in detention for the duration of hostilities. The detaining power has an obligation to make a determination of PW versus other CPERS status as soon as practical after capture.

E. PW and CPERS Reporting. In accordance with national directives, all PW or CPERS in Coalition custody shall be reported via official means by using a PW/CPERS Capture Report.

F. PW/CPERS Holding Facilities. All subordinate temporary holding facilities shall be identified and reported to the CJTF 667 Provost Marshall. Holding facilities are considered to be semi-permanent facilities used to process PW or CPERS and include formation and unit level Holding Areas and Collection Points. The following facilities will also be established:

1. CJTF 667 PW/CPERS Theatre Detention Facilities. AS will establish a PW/CPERS Theatre Detention Facility (TDF) Panay and Palawan PW/CPERS captured in the territory of BX.

2. National Collection Points/Holding Areas. These facilities will be established to facilitate the rearward passage of PW/CPERS in custody of the various nations. Nations will advise CJTF 667 of their respective locations. Nations will keep CPERS at collection points and holding areas only as long as circumstances require based on security/operational conditions, national policies and available transportation.

(4) Reports and Returns. The Battle Rhythm schedule for Reports and Returns will be published once the HQ CJTF 667 has declared OPRED.

4. **Admin and Logistics (Sustainment).**

a. Outline Concept.

(1) Sustainment support to CJTF 6674 will be coordinated and led by JFLOGCC. While TCNs retain overall responsibility for the sustainment of national formations and units, JFLOGCC retains coordinating authority.

(2) JFLOGCC will establish a Theater Support Area (TSA) within BX (Gen Santos City) in order to execute sustainment operations. Additional logistic nodes will also be setup in Zamboanga. Sustainment support during Ph 2-4 to forward FE will be the responsibility of organic logistic FE through JFLOGCC coordination. Annex R will provide more details.

(3) CJTF 667 will draw additional logistic support from National Support Base (NSB) elements from AS, principally Joint Logistics Unit – North (JLU-N), Darwin.

(4) TCN should aim to establish in-theater op-stocks sufficient for 30 days, by the completion of Phase 0 (Shaping). AS will act as lead nation for fuel and water and may utilise contractor support from BX.

(5) Component command logistic staffs are responsible for their own logistics plans and co-ordination.

b. Movements. JFLOGCC will coordinate all deployments into BX. Movement forward into Panay and Palawan during Ph 3 will be coordinated by JFLCC HQ.

c. Medical Support. The concept of Health Support (HS) is detailed within the Health Support Order at Annex AA. HS to CJTF 667 will be provided by ADF and Coalition medical capabilities coordinated by the CJTF 667 J07. HQJOC J07 retains overall technical control (TECHON) for all health care delivery on an overseas operation. While TCN will deploy with limited integral HS and retain responsibility for definitive care of their troops, provision of deployed HS to Coalition and HN personnel may occur IAW the Medical Rules of Eligibility (MEDROE) detailed in the HSO.

(1) Role 1 HS will be provided by ADF and Coalition integral capabilities.

(2) Role 2 and Role 2 (Enhanced) HS will be provided on an area support basis with the deployment of up to two R2E capabilities (from 17 Bde and RAAF – 1 EHS) scalable dependent on phase and expected dependency (with an option for Maritime R2E with the ATG).

(3) Role 3 HS will be provided by the NSB (Royal Darwin Hospital or other civilian facility) or the USNS Mercy, which will be determined and coordinated by CJTF 667 J07.

5. **Command and Signal.**

a. Command.

(1) COMD CJTF 667 – Lieutenant General XXXXXX (AS).

(2) Deputy Commander – Rear Admiral XXXXXX (NZ).

(3) COMD JFMCC – Rear Admiral XXXXXX (AS).

(4) COMD JFLCC- Major General XXXXXX (AS).

(5) COMD JFACC – Air Commodore XXXXXX (AS).

(6) COMD SOTG – Brigadier XXXXXX (AS).

(7) COMD JFLOGCC – Brigadier XXXXXX (AS).

(8) COMD JA ESG – Kaisho-Ho (Rear Admiral) XXXXXX (JA).

(9) COMD US ESG – Rear Admiral XXXXXX (US).

b. Headquarters Locations. (see C2 overlay)

(1) HQ CJTF 667 will establish at Rajah Buayan Airbase, Gen Santos, BX by XXXXXX.

(2) HQ JFMCC will establish ashore at Col Edwin Andrews Airbase, Zamboanga, BX by XXXXXX.

(3) HQ JFLCC will establish at Rajah Buayan Airbase, Gen Santos, BX by XXXXXX.

(4) HQ JFACC will establish at Bungendore, AS by XXXXXX.

(5) HQ JACCE will establish with HQ CJTF 667 by XXXXXX.

(6) HQ JFLOGCC will establish at Makar Wharf, Gen Santos, BX by XXXXXX.

(7) HQ JA ESG will establish aboard by XXXXXX.

(8) HQ US ESG will establish aboard by XXXXXX.

c. Communication and Information Systems (CIS). Effective C2 of CJTF 667 will be highly dependent upon the flexible and interoperable CIS between Components and contributing nations.

(1) CJTF 667 Sig Bn will:

A. Establish force level CIS down to Component HQs, including the management of network interface gateways.

B. Coordinate theatre-wide CIS plans.

C. Perform theatre spectrum management.

(2) CJTF 667 CIS will provide secure voice, VTC and Coalition WAN (based on NATO-CENTRIXS) to provide secure email, chat and other C3 tools down to Naval Task Group/Bde/Wing level. Requests for extension of coalition CIS in support of national, component or other requirements will be coordinated through the CJTF 667 J6 and funded as appropriate.

(3) Component commands will provide the primary CIS and command support within respective Component HQs.

(4) Use of HN communication infrastructure to supplement military networks will be coordinated by HQ CJTF 667 J6, but contracted independently by TCN.

(5) TCN are responsible for national CIS communications to NCEs and NSEs, and within national contingents.

(6) Network Operations.

A. Defensive Measures. CJTF 667 networks are targets for Computer Network Attack (CNA) by enemy seeking to sabotage or exploit coalition information or services. The primary vulnerabilities are through gateways with external systems and inadvertent transfer of viruses from open systems. All contributing nations are responsible for effective COMSEC and Computer Network Defence (CND) on all national networks and systems; these measures are vital for effective C2 and the maintenance of information dominance. CJTF 667 J6 is responsible for the coordination of defensive measures and COMSEC for all CJTF 667 systems through the Network Operations Center located with HQ CJTF 667 (deployed).

B. Offensive Measures Offensive network operations or Computer Network Attack (CNA) will not be conducted by coalition partners against adversary networks without approval of COMD CJTF 667.

ACKNOWLEDGE:

Commander's last name
Commander's rank

OFFICIAL:

Authenticator's Name
Authenticator's Position

ANNEXES:

Annex A	CJTF667 Task Organisation
Annex B	Intelligence
Annex C	Operations
Annex D	ISR
Annex E	Maritime Operations
Annex F	Land Operations
Annex G	Air Operations
Annex H	Special Operations (omitted)
Annex I	Joint Effects, Targeting and Offensive Support
Annex J	Information Operations

Annex K	Legal
Annex L	Rules of Engagement
Annex M	Military Public Affairs
Annex N	Operational Risk Management (omitted)
Annex O	Force Protection
Annex P	Blank
Annex Q	Civil-Military Operations
Annex R	Logistics Support Order
Annex S	Environmental Protection Policy (omitted)
Annex T	Orders and Supporting Document Formats
Annex U	Communications and Information Systems Support Plan
Annex V	Reports and Returns
Annex W	Visits Policy (omitted)
Annex X	Movement Orders
Annex Y	Force Preparation (omitted)
Annex Z	Evaluation and Assessment (omitted)
Annex AA	Health Support
Annex AB	Space Operations
Annex AC	Engineering Support
Annex AD	PW/CPERS Handling Policy
Annex AE	Gender Advisor Requirements

CJTF 667 C2 ORGANISATION



ANNEX B TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT PLAN

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu.

1. **Situation**

a. Characteristics of the Operational Environment (OE).

(1) See Appendix 6 and ODIN.

b. Enemy.

(1) Under the stated aim of "liberating ethnic Torbians from the oppressive governance of the Belesian government", North Torbia (NT) invaded the Belesian (BX) islands of Palawan and Panay with the NT Marine Expeditionary Force (NTMEF) landing on Palawan on (*insert date*) and Panay on (insert date). The NTMEF utilised the cover of a biennial exercise with Olvana (Ex RISEN SWORD) to muster forces to commence their OP RIGHTEOUS HARMONY, the annexation of Panay. The first phase of OP RIGHTEOUS HARMONY saw the landing of NTMEF elements to capture an old airfield and seaport in the north Palawan town of El Nido. Utilising El Nido as a logistic staging base, within 24hrs NT landed (utilising amphibious and heli-borne troops) and captured the seaport, airport and other key locations of the northern Panayan city of Roxas. Roxas was the scene a few months earlier of rioting, which resulted in the deaths of over one hundred ethnic Torbians. Little effective resistance was encountered during the capture of El Nido and Roxas. It is estimated that the NTMEF has landed a Marine Brigade (4th Marine Bde) in El Nido and established a logistic node to support operations on Panay. The NTMEF HQ is also identified to have setup in El Nido to better coordinate C2 and sustainment operations. The NTMEF is estimated to have landed a reinforced Marine Brigade (3rd Marine Bde) in Panay. Shortly after taking control of Roxas, the 3rd Marine Bde has advanced south and established a defensive line approximately 40km south of Roxas. Conveniently, this defensive line incorporates the San Rafael Mine complex, a key strategic asset in Panay that produces a large quantity of rare earth metals, notably Cerium.

(2) In response to the capture of Roxas, the Belesian Federation Defence Forces (BFDF) landed a Brigade (12th Infantry Bde) in the southern Panayan city of Iloilo. The 12th Bde is a light infantry unit with minimal motorisation, so could be deployed at a relatively short notice. However, the 12 Bde does not have the combat power to defeat the NTMEF 3rd Marine Bde. Initial advances north from Iloilo by the BFDF 12th Bde was stopped short of the NTMEF defensive line and has since resulted in a stalemate with the majority of the 12th Bde holding defensive positions around Iloilo to secure the sea and airport.

(3) The NTMEF has declared a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) over northern Palawan, half of Panay and the sea and air lanes connecting the two islands. The NTMEF has reinforced their hold in Palawan and Panay with SU-30MKK fighter-bombers, and J-11B fighters, along with active patrolling in the Sulu Sea between Palawan and Panay. Aside from organic elements within the two NTMEF Marine Brigades, there have been reports of

HQ-16 SAMs, 122mm MLR batteries and other NTMEF Division troops in El Nido and Roxas. It appears that not all NT Marine Expeditionary Division elements have been deployed to Palawan or Panay. The remaining two Marine Brigades are reported to still be in North Torbia and it is estimated that the NT armed forces do not want to escalate this conflict wider. These two Marine Brigades may also be kept back as a strategic reserve to reinforce the deployed Marine Brigades as required. Identified NT Naval elements patrolling the sea-lanes within the declared TEZ include 1x Type 052D (Luyang III) destroyer, 2x Type 052C (Luyang II) destroyers, 1x Type 051G (Luda) destroyer, 2x Type 054A (Jiangkai II) frigates, 1x Type 053H3 (Jiangwei II) frigate, and 2x Type 053 (Jianghu V) frigates. Whilst not observed, it is assessed that an unknown number of up to three Yuan and Song class diesel-electric submarines (SSG) are operating in and around the sea-lanes between Palawan and Panay. Combat Air Patrols of fighter aircraft have been observed operating out of El Nido and Roxas in addition to rotary wing traffic of Z9 helicopters.

(4) Overall, the NTMEF are well trained and capable of conducting combined arms and joint operations and are capable of limited power projection in the region. The land forces of the NTMEF is designed for quick deployment and are therefore lacking in heavier armour, but makes up for this deficiency in a larger number of combat units within each Marine Brigade. It is expected that the 3rd Marine Brigade in Panay will have been augmented with additional Divisional troops such as an MRL Battery, an HQ-16 SAM AD Battery and significant Engineer troops. Similarly, the NTMEF maritime and air capabilities are also significant and capable with several platforms of Tier 1 or 2 capability (<15 years old). Additionally, all NTMEF assets are under a unified command similar to a JTF based on the Marine Division HQ. It is noted that NT has significantly more forces on the mainland, but is postured along the North and South Torbian border. NT sees a conflict with South Torbia (RT) as the more dangerous possibility and will keep the bulk of its forces poised for a possible RT attack (from their viewpoint). Consequently, we can expect that NT's considerable strike capabilities on the mainland will not be utilised in the conflict in BX as they are held in reserve for a possible RT attack.

(5) Enemy Strengths

(a) General. NT maintains the second largest military of the five Pacific countries, only behind Olvana. Militarily, it is a dominant actor within the region, capable of conducting military action across the spectrum of operations. The NT military conducts overt, covert, and clandestine operations with ripple effects across the region. Reporting also suggests ties between elements of NT's military and criminal and terror groups within the region, which further extends the potential for a global threat.

(b) Army. The Torbian People's Army (TPA) is the largest and most influential of the NT Armed Forces. With compulsory national service, the TPA has a large number of military trained personnel from which to draw upon. This reflects the stated nature of the TPA goal as the reunification of the two Torbias. The bulk of the TPA is located within the Southern and Northern Commands. The Western Command has the only credible non-land based power projection capability through the NT Marine Division. This Marine Division reflects the NT shift to power projection

and is therefore well equipped with Tier 1, 2 and 3 equipment. The Marine Division is slightly different to other TPA Divisions in that it has more Mechanised Infantry Battalions per Brigade (4 vs 3). However, this is offset by having lighter armoured vehicles than their non-marine counterparts.

(c) Air Force. The Torbian Peoples Air Force (TPAF) is a capable organisation that is able to strike any targets within the JFAO. The TPAF has two squadrons of TU-22 bombers that can reach any target within the JFAO. However, these assets are kept in strategic reserve and are primarily postured to counter any attack by South Torbia. Instead, for OP RIGHTEOUS HARMONY, two squadrons of J-11 fighters and two squadrons of SU-30MKK fighter-bombers have been allocated to support the NTMEF. Additional AEW&C, surveillance and tanker support is provided. One squadron of J-11 and SU-30MKK is operating out of El Nido, with the other squadrons operating out of the Roxas airport.

(d) Navy. In recent years, the Torbian Peoples Navy (TPN) has greatly expanded its maritime capability. In order to project power and maintain logistic support, the TPN has provided significant support to OP RIGHTEOUS HARMONY. The focus of the TPN in support of the NTMEF is to secure the sea-lanes in and around the contested islands of Panay and Palawan. The single Luyang III destroyer assigned to the NTMEF is a significant threat to all aircraft in the TEZ. The NTMEF also recognises the importance of the Luyang III and has kept this ship in the South China Sea to secure the link between NT and El Nido, but also out of harm's way from possible RT attack.

(6) Enemy Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities.

(a) Army. The terrain (tropical) of Panay and Palawan means that travel of armoured vehicles is restricted and will tend to canalize ground forces along MSRs. The availability of engineer assets to support maneuverability is limited within the NTMEF. It is expected that the 3rd Marine Brigade will have limited engineer support assets. This is alleviated somewhat with the amphibious and light armour nature of the NTMEF. This light amphibious armour nature of the NTMEF will mean that the use of heavy armour by friendly forces will provide overmatch in most tactical situations.

(b) Air Force: In the event of full-scale combat engagement by modern air forces, the TPAF would not be able to accomplish more than local air parity for a short period. The TPAF ability to project force against NT's neighbors is not only a source of national prestige but represents a significant investment on the part of the National Command Authority (NCA). The NT NCA is unlikely to risk more than a token loss to a superior force. The training and equipment of the TPAF is below the level of CJTF 667. Additionally, any strike aircraft from mainland NT will have to fly a circuitous route along the South China Sea avoiding Sth Torbian (RT) airspace, which will reduce their ability to dominate the TEZ. Instead, the TPAF will have to rely on forces staged out of Palawan and Panay in order to maintain dominance over the TEZ.

(c) Navy. The TPN has a relatively long line of communication from Panay, through Palawan back to NT. The TPN ability to enforce the TEZ will be limited in the

relatively close waters of the north Sulu Sea. Being close to RT waters also means that they will have concerns regarding RT naval vessels monitoring their movements. Finally, the TPN has invested heavily in its naval vessels and will be reluctant to expose these assets to complete loss. Hence, it is expected that their most valuable naval surface vessels will likely remain in the South China Sea with lower tiered vessels operating in the Sulu Sea (with the exception of their SSGs).

(7) Enemy Courses of Action (COAs)

(a) Most Likely Course of Action. The strategic goal of the NT occupation of Panay and Palawan is for a political solution to foster Panayan independence under NT sponsorship and not to escalate the conflict further. This means that at the strategic level, NT will be careful not to portray itself as an occupying aggressor. It is likely that NT will limit its military presence on Panay and Palawan to that of a Marine Division and supporting maritime and air elements. It is highly unlikely that NT will reinforce the Marine Brigade on Panay with additional ground elements but holding enough combat power to deter or defeat any offensive attacks by Coalition Forces. In the event of CF landing ground forces on Panay, the NTMEF will utilise SPF and local insurgents to disrupt CJTF 667 activities before using maneuver to defeat or cause attrition to CJTF elements. The NTMEF will continue to maintain the TEZ with combat air patrols and surface warship patrols. They will remain in a defensive posture until hostilities commence. Additionally, the NTMEF will likely aim to cause attrition of CJTF 667 in order to force a diplomatic solution. The NTMEF will use information warfare to discredit CJTF 667 and BX Defense Forces, challenge the legitimacy the BX government, tell its "liberation of ethnic Torbians" story and promote its claim to support Panayan independence.

(b) Most Dangerous Course of Action. The NTMEF will reinforce the ground forces on Panay with an additional Marine Brigade (likely the 1st Marine Brigade as the 2nd is currently under strength and on a lower readiness cycle). With that amount of combat power, the NTMEF may be able to capture the southern city of Iloilo and occupy the entire island of Panay. If Coalition Forces have been successful in degrading NTMEF capability prior to ground operations, the NTMEF may commit to capturing Iloilo with just the 3rd Marine Brigade or commit to attacking CJTF 667 ground forces before the Land Component can commence offensive operations on Panay. The NTMEF will use information warfare to discredit CJTF 667 and BX Defense Forces, challenge the legitimacy of the BX government, tell its "liberation of ethnic Torbians" story and promote its claim to support Panayan independence.

c. Friendly Forces.

(1) Coalition Intelligence Capability. Coalition intelligence organizations, including those nested within the CJTF will provide all-source intelligence utilising all possible means, including the establishment of a Multi-National intelligence operations center that will serve as a central all-source intelligence fusion center supporting operations in the JFAO.

2. **Mission**

a. Coalition intelligence conducts intelligence operations in order to enable operations against NTMEF and affiliated groups in Panay and Palawan within the JFAO.

3. **Execution**

a. Concept of Intelligence Operations. Coalition intelligence will conduct intelligence support to operations to enhance Indications and Warning (I&W) and situational awareness in the region. Intelligence support will focus along three lines of effort to achieve objectives in BX. Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) will be modified to support emerging operations and will drive intelligence operations during the execution of this plan.

b. Purpose. Coalition intelligence will support a long term, comprehensive approach. Intelligence assessments must account for and connect all factors within the political, military, economic, social, infrastructural, information, physical environment and time domains (PMESII-PT) - and actors influencing the dynamics in the JFAO and Area of Interest (AOI). The main priorities are to provide threat I&W to Coalition forces, identify and exploit opportunities that achieve optimal results against the enemy, and provide kinetic and non-kinetic targeting information leading to mission success.

c. Method. Coalition intelligence capabilities organise and conduct intelligence operations that drive collection, production and analysis, contributions to target development, reporting, and collaboration with partners to provide timely and actionable support to the CJTF while maintaining support to the Coalition's ongoing operations in the JFAO. In order to achieve this, the Coalition intelligence architecture must synchronize and share information that produces comprehensive intelligence assessments. Working with partner nations, the Coalition will employ all intelligence capabilities and provide timely and relevant intelligence in order to support operations. Three primary intelligence Lines of Effort complement each other and remain constant throughout each phase of the operation.

(1) Intelligence Lines of Effort (LOEs).

(a) Intelligence Line of Effort I – ISR and Collection. This line of effort focuses on collection coordination of Coalition ISR capabilities across the JFAO. This LOE seeks to synchronize the collection effort in order to satisfy operational and intelligence requirements and continue to update and refine the operational environment. LOE I monitors the JFAO and AOI for I&W, builds situational awareness, supports targeting operations, and conducts battle damage assessments (BDA).

(b) Intelligence Line of Effort II – Analysis and Production. This LOE is designed to ensure a common comprehensive understanding of the operational environment and to support kinetic and non-kinetic targeting operations within the JFAO. LOE II focuses on multisource analysis encompassing PMESII-PT, which satisfies operational, and intelligence requirements.

(c) Intelligence Line of Effort III – Information Sharing. LOE III enables a comprehensive Coalition approach to defeat the NTMEF. This LOE seeks to ensure information sharing to the maximum extent possible allowed or in accordance with each partner nation's perspective, national policies and laws. Information sharing is critical to this effort and must be placed within key nodes of Coalition intelligence enterprise.

(2) Intelligence Phasing.

(a) Intelligence Support to CJTF 667. Intelligence support to CJTF 667 to defeat NTMEF is tied to five operational phases. This section will identify the main activities of intelligence support LOEs and integrate them into each respective phase.

1. Phase 0 – Shaping. During this Phase, the main effort of intelligence operations will be to support ISR collection efforts. This phase will see the deployment of critical advance force operation assets along with the utilization of HUMINT, SIGINT and other intelligence gathering assets to confirm NTMEF force disposition and intent, and inform the targeting process. The intelligence effort will also support the CJTF main effort of non-kinetic shaping operations.

2. Phase 1 - Denial. This Phase will see the main effort of intelligence operations supporting kinetic effects against NTMEF high value targets. Intelligence operations will focus in supporting the targeting process and the analysis of information gathered through ISR assets to inform the commencement of Phase 2. Joint Coalition intelligence organizations will also provide support to kinetic and non-kinetic strikes.

3. Phase 2 – Lodgement. The main effort for intelligence operations during this phase will be to continue to analyse information from all sources to support the lodgement of ground forces into Panay. It is important that I&W for NTMEF movement and intent be closely monitored. This is a critical phase of operation, as failure to achieve lodgement into Panay will mean the overall failure of the mission. Joint intelligence assets will also support the CJTF deception plan of staging amphibious forces off Palawan to make the NTMEF believe the CJTF main effort is the recapture of Palawan.

4. Phase 3 - Neutralise. During this phase the main effort of the intelligence operations shifts to supporting the execution of CJTF offensive ground operations and the lodgment of ground forces in Palawan. As NTMEF ground forces are defeated in Panay and Palawan, the main effort will shift from direct action against the NTMEF to operations against indigenous hostile forces inside Panay and Palawan. Despite the main effort shift to supporting indigenous forces, intelligence support will still likely be required to support CJTF 667 and BX Defense Forces as they hold territory regained from the invading NTMEF. Intelligence support to targeting, I&W, ISR, and OE refinement will continue throughout this phase as well.

5. Phase 4 - Transition. During this phase, the main effort conducts continuing ISR operations in order to monitor the situation and identify threats towards a safe and secure environment.

(3) Intelligence Tasks.

(a) Common Tasks to Coalition Intelligence Organizations.

1. Allocate resources and funding to support intelligence operations specified in the base plan.

2. Monitor I&W for threats to Coalition partners and partner interests.
3. Develop and refine ISR and I&W process to support mission requirements by phase.
4. Support Advise and Assist (AA), Build Partner Capacity (BPC), Key Leader Engagements (KLEs), Humanitarian Assistance (HA), and Force Protection as necessary by phase.
5. Assist the development of CJTF organic intelligence capabilities by phase.
6. Provide reach-back capability to deployed forces, as necessary.
7. Produce and disseminate intelligence summaries, Battle Damage Reports, ISR Collection Plan, and ad hoc intelligence products.
8. Shape allocation and apportionment of theater collection assets to support collection priorities and Campaign Plan objectives.
9. Establish the necessary intelligence architecture to support Coalition Military Campaign Plan.
10. Provide and receive Coalition partner liaisons to and from the CJTF.
11. Enable intelligence training that supports regional partners' actions against enemy threats to include Advise and Assist (AA), Build Partner Capacity (BPC), and engagement (OAAs) missions.
12. Identify shortfalls to improve existing intelligence organization, architecture and procedures to optimize collaboration and synchronize orientation, collection, rapid fusion, and timely dissemination of intelligence.
13. Submit and process intelligence requirements throughout the implementation of this plan for intelligence needs and support to planning.
14. Task and synchronize ISR collection assets to satisfy Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs).
15. Identify and recommend opportunities for Coalition intelligence exchanges and training to further develop and refine regional partner forces, as needed.
16. Support kinetic and non-kinetic targeting operations during appropriate phases of this plan.

(4) Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs).

(a) What is the threat to CJTF 667 operations within the JFAO?

(b) What is the threat to CJTF 667 land operations within the JFAO?

(c) What is the threat to CJTF 667 air operations within the JFAO?

(d) What is the threat to CJTF 667 maritime operations within the JFAO?

(e) What is the threat to CJTF 667 Lines of Communication, specifically with respect to choke points?

(f) How will NT info-war operations affect CJTF 667?

(g) What are the environmental (incl. PMESII) factors that could affect CJTF 667 operations within the JFAO?

(h) What is the intent and capacity of BX Defense Forces to provide external and internal security, maintain operational readiness, sustain interoperability with CJTF 667 forces and defend against NTMEF?

(i) What are the threats to BX and other authorized citizens, interests and infrastructure?

(j) Where have the Visayan People's Front (VPF) and other hostile elements positioned their leaders, C2 facilities, interior lines and concentrations of manpower and supplies?

(k) What is the capacity of NTMEF to include VPF in BX (Panay) to sustain their offensive campaign, gain territory and control the population?

(l) What are the intentions of VPF regarding their opposition to the government of BX and incentives to support and cooperate with CJTF 667 activities?

(m) What are the intentions of NTMEF with respect to their posturing and potential employment of chemical /biological weapons and the associated impact on CJTF 667 operations?

(n) What are the intentions of NTMEF and leadership with respect to own assembly/use of chemical/biological weapons?

(5) Intelligence Activities.

(a) Collection Management (CM). Collection activities will focus on the PIRs and emerging intelligence gaps and will be conducted and deconflicted in accordance with established national policies and procedures, and subsequently published CJTF guidance. Each respective Coalition member will determine an appropriate level of support for its respective theatre collection assets. Wherever possible, Coalition intelligence will participate in collection management working group forums in order to synchronize Coalition and ISR operations.

(b) Analysis and Production (A&P). Coalition intelligence will analyse, produce, and provide current intelligence and assessments in support of PIRs and provide collateral releasable products to other partners as required.

(c) Dissemination and Information Sharing. The Coalition will seek to allow greater sharing of intelligence on a more regular basis; however, disclosure decisions must be in accordance with each partner nation's policies. Safeguarding of information remains a responsibility of each Coalition member in order to prevent unauthorized release.

4. **Sustainment**.

a. Shortfalls and Limiting Factors. Primary shortfalls include intelligence resources needed to protect the force and ground-based collection assets that cannot access the JFAO due to operational restrictions.

5. **Command and Signal**

a. Communications. See Annex U.

Appendices

Appendix 1 - Signals Intelligence
Appendix 2 - Human Intelligence
Appendix 3 - Counterintelligence
Appendix 4 - Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment

APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX B TO
CJTF OPORD
DATED XXXXXX3

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE

References:

A. CJTF 667 OPORD 01 – OP STEEL SENTINEL

B. Annex B – Intelligence to CJTF OPORD

Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU

1. **Situation**. This appendix provides a general statement of responsibility and planning guidance for the use of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) resources. See para 1 of ref A, or ref B for further information.

2. **Mission**. SIGINT organisations and forces conduct collection activities to satisfy intelligence needs of CJTF 667 through all phases of OP STEEL SENTINEL (OSS).

3. **Execution.**

a. Concept of Operations.

(1) Conduct cryptologic operations.

(2) Commence SIGINT operations in support of preparation and employment into the Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO).

b. Responsibilities.

(1) CJTF J-2.

(a) Determine intelligence staffing requirements.

(b) Coordinate Liaison Officer (LNO) and personnel requirements between the subordinate Commands, Coalition partners and the Analysis and Control Element (ACE).

(c) Prepare a SIGINT summary every 24 hours.

(d) Conduct emitter mapping and relay information within 15 minutes of receipt.

(e) Responsible for intelligence oversight and must:

1. Safeguard the rights and privacy of CJTF 667 personnel in accordance with National policies, as well as relevant Signals Intelligence Directives, policies, and intelligence oversight in all operations involving collection processing, dissemination, and retention of SIGINT.

2. Ensure Chain of Command and command staff awareness of intelligence oversight for SIGINT operations.

3. Coordinate with the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) for access to national managed databases.

4. Ensure the unit handles SIGINT as required by policy and guidance provided by ASD and ADF oversight.

5. Ensure SIGINT information is not disseminated outside of SIGINT reporting channels or the SIGINT production chain and that SIGINT technical or production information is not shared except by established procedures.

(f) Review the information needs for the JFAO and respond to those needs and other advisory taskings.

(g) Collect, record, decrypt, and analyze target signals.

(h) Conduct time-sensitive reporting and analytical collaboration of previously unevaluated and non-disseminated SIGINT. The SIGINT section may issue the following reports as delegated by ASD:

1. Tactical Reports (TACREP), and ELINT Reports.

2. Report distress signals.

(i) Notify command and HQJOC of an immediate threat to national security that requires National Security Committee (NSC) attention.

(2) Subordinate Units.

(a) Deploy SIGINT collection teams.

(b) Deploy assets to provide SIGINT mission management, collection, processing, analysis, and reporting; high frequency direction finding; and to establish communications with theater subscribers.

(c) Identify and allocate collection teams to maximize collection capabilities.

(d) Report the employment, targets, and status of assigned SIGINT assets to CJTF HQ.

(e) Report all TACREPs and ELINT to CJTF HQ and to National Databases within 10 minutes of identification.

(f) Send an equipment status report every 12 hours to CJTF.

(g) Prepare a SIGINT Summary every 24 hours to CJTF.

(h) Prepare Informal Technical Notes that answer commander's priority intelligence requirements and submit to higher commands as appropriate.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) National signal intelligence support requirements and advisory tasking of SIGINT collection assets shall be coordinated through CJTF 667 ACE Chief.

(2) Monitor and report via established secure communications mediums.

4. **Sustainment**. TBA.

5. **Command and Signal**.

a. The ASD shall continue to exercise SIGINT Operational Tasking Authority (SOTA) over the SIGINT assets until SOTA is delegated to CJTF 667.

b. Communications Systems.

(1) The cryptologic communications architecture shall include:

(a) TBA

(2) The SIGINT section has access to the following communications networks:

(a) TBA

(3) Coalition Networks as applicable.

APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX B TO
CJTF OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU

1. **Situation**.

a. Refer to base OPORD.

b. Assumptions.

(1) HUMINT uses humans as both sources and collectors of intelligence information. It includes, but is not limited to, the gathering of foreign intelligence information through observation, elicitation, exploitation, debriefing or the acquisition of material and documents.

(2) HUMINT assets will be employed by national collectors before and during execution of this OPORD.

(3) All HUMINT operations conducted by CJTF 667 personnel are directed and coordinated by the CJTF 667 Chief, HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC).

2. **Mission**. HUMINT organisations and forces shall conduct collection activities to satisfy intelligence needs of CJTF 667.

3. **Execution**.

a. Organisation.

(1) Elements of HUMINT organisation assigned to, or OPCON to CJTF 667 and its subordinate commands before and during this operation are tasked to collect information in response to Information Operations (IOs) and Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs).

(2) Specific language qualifications and technical skills will be identified to the J2.

b. Concept of Operations. Overt and clandestine HUMINT operations will be managed through J-2 channels.

c. Tasks.

(1) Subordinate commands will ensure that information derived from HUMINT operations is reported through channels to CJTF HQ J-2.

(2) Exploitation of EPW/civilian detainees (DETs) and debriefing of refugees/internally displaced persons:

(a) To ensure maximum intelligence exploitation, subordinate units shall prepare plans and procedural instructions required for the screening, identification, segregation, and treatment of detainees, apprehended agents, defectors, and inhabitants.

(b) Exploitation of detainees shall be coordinated with counterintelligence, psychological operations, and other detainee exploitation operations.

(c) All interrogations will be conducted according to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. All detainees shall be accorded humane treatment and interrogations shall not interfere with necessary medical treatment.

(d) Within 48 hours, the extent of the source's knowledge of priority intelligence information shall be determined and reported to J2 HOC.

(3) Captured Documents.

(a) Subordinate commands shall develop procedural instructions to ensure documents are expeditiously processed, exploited for their tactical intelligence value, and subsequently evacuated to the appropriate echelon that can fully exploit them.

(b) Technical documents of material design shall be evacuated with the equipment or with photographs of the equipment when possible.

(4) Captured Materiel.

(a) Subordinate commands shall develop procedural instructions to ensure that acquired foreign materiel is properly protected and fully exploited by qualified personnel.

(b) Procedures shall be established to turn over captured weapons, munitions, documents, and equipment that are not required for further exploitation to the host nation government.

(5) Provide support to and maintain mutual activities with other Coalition intelligence collection activities such as Weapons and Signals Intelligence. Coordination between HUMINT and other intelligence collection activities will be conducted in order to utilize a multi-discipline approach to intelligence collection. All intelligence collection activities will be coordinated with the CJTF collection manager.

(6) Debriefing of Returnees.

(a) Subordinate commands will conduct an intelligence debriefing of Coalition military personnel upon their return to National control.

(b) Debriefings will be conducted in accordance with survival, evasion, resistance and escape (SERE) regulations.

(c) Intelligence debriefings of returnees must be in coordination with SERE and Counterintelligence (CI) personnel, pending National approval.

(d) Coalition personnel will be debriefed by appropriate SERE/CI personnel from the allied soldier's country where possible.

(7) Requirements and Reporting.

(a) Upon execution of this OPORD, HUMINT organisations shall submit their acquisition of material and documents plans to the CJTF J2.

(b) HUMINT reports will be prepared and forwarded through HUMINT channels in Intelligence Information Reports (IIR) format. Reports of immediate tactical value shall be sent to CJTF subordinate commands.

(c) CJTF 667 will validate all HUMINT requirements within the JFAO.

(d) Requirements for validation shall be nominated through collection management channels.

d. Coordination. HUMINT liaison with the Belesian government or military is the responsibility of the CJTF J2.

4. **Sustainment**.

a. Transportation. Transportation requirements for HUMINT personnel are the responsibility of the supported command.

b. Billeting. Billeting requirements for HUMINT personnel in support of the OPORD are the responsibility of the supported command.

c. Clothing. CJTF HUMINT personnel are not authorized to use civilian clothing except when it is deemed advantageous to the mission and only within areas in control of CJTF 667 forces. The CJTF J2 is the approval authority for exceptions to this policy. All other HUMINT personnel operating in support of this operation will comply with the clothing policies of their organisations/National policy.

d. Equipment. Equipment requirements for HUMINT teams are the responsibility of the supporting command IAW National policy. HUMINT teams will be issued the equipment required in order to accomplish their military mission IAW National requirements, e.g. automation systems, communication devices, etc.

e. Operational or Contingency Funds. These will be managed in accordance with authorised accounting procedures as outlined by existing regulations and National caveats.

5. **Command and Signal**. Refer to base OPORD and Annex U (CIS Support).

APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX B TO
CJTF OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

References: Refer to Annex B (Intelligence).

Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU

1. **Situation**.

a. Foreign Intelligence and Security Services (FISS).

(1) Threat. Hostile Intelligence Services (HIS) conventional and irregular forces operating within the JFAO are capable of significant Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection. SPF and /or irregular intelligence operatives may use “third parties" in an attempt to impede, disrupt, and/or degrade friendly operations.

(2) Counterintelligence (CI) matters concerning citizens of other countries shall be handled IAWexisting agreements between Australia (operating as lead nation for Intelligence/Counterintelligence) and each country's respective government.

b. Friendly.

(1) AS National Agencies.

(a) Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS). ASIS provides in-country support in the form of introduction to host-nation security officials, database support, general advice, and assistance. ASIS provides strategic, operational, and tactical area intelligence within means and capabilities.

(b) Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). DFAT provides in-country support by providing information regarding known terrorist threats and information on numbers and location of AS citizens living/visiting the country.

(c) Australian Signals Directorate (ASD). ASD provides Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) support and cryptologic support group to CJTF 667, as required, and assists in developing effective electronic warfare strategies while advising the commands of potential losses in intelligence capability.

(d) Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation (AGAO). AGAO provides geospatial data on the Operating Environment in Belesia, which includes specialised mapping and geospatial imagery analysis support.

(2) Coalition Assets, Agencies and Organisations

(a) Dependent upon exercise and supporting National structure.

(3) Command CI Structure.

(a) The CJTF 667 counterintelligence structure consists of CJTF, Subordinate Commands, Coalition Partners, and other agencies.

(b) CJTF J2 coordinates requests for and monitors CI activities of AS national agencies and supporting forces to ensure CI coverage within the JFAO.

(c) CJTF Counterintelligence Staff Officer (CISO) assists and advises the CJTF by functioning as the Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority (CICA). The CICA conducts liaison with all friendly agencies that have CI capabilities and/or functions in the JFAO. Coordination will ensure receipt of appropriate information required to support this OPORD when executed.

2. **Mission**. Provide for the receipt and dissemination of counterintelligence information in a coordinated and timely manner.

3. **Execution**.

a. Concept of Operations. CICA shall summarise the scope and objectives of obtaining and disseminating counterintelligence information in the CJTF.

b. Procedures.

(1) Subordinate commands will ensure adequate procedures are established in their respective commands.

(2) Except in cases where it is believed they may be mistreated, or where National policy of a Coalition partner differs, ensure hostile forces, paramilitary deserters, defectors, refugees, and similar persons are remanded to host government authorities once initial interview is completed. Combatants shall be segregated from non-combatant evacuees at the earliest time possible based upon situation and circumstances of coming under CJTF control.

(3) After interrogation by appropriate forces, and where National policy allows, remand internees/detainees to host-nation custody.

(4) Expedite to parent command for debriefing of captured, missing, or detained personnel returned to friendly control. Essential life-saving or pain reduction medical treatment for those requiring it shall take precedence over debriefing.

(5) Submit counterintelligence plans, programs, and projects to CICA for review before implementation.

(6) Counterintelligence matters concerning citizens of countries in the Coalition are handled IAWexisting agreements between Australia and the concerned nation.

c. Tasks

(1) Counterintelligence Collection and Reporting.

(a) Targets. Priority Information Requirements (PIR) and a thorough review of available CI reports will determine targets. Targets will include, but are not limited to, personalities, as well as installations, organisations, groups, documents, and materials.

(b) Priorities. CJTF 667 priorities shall take precedence when assigning targets and collection missions. CICA shall consider other requests on an individual basis.

(2) Counterintelligence Analysis and Production.

(a) Investigative Memorandum for Record and Reports of Investigation shall be written in conjunction with routine non-critical investigative actions. Initial, interim, and terminal spot reports shall be submitted, as required, for critical non-routine actions.

(b) Subordinate commands shall maintain liaison with intelligence agencies in their areas of responsibility to ensure timely receipt and dissemination of counterintelligence information bearing on military operations specified in this plan.

(c) Responsibility of CJTF 667 is to ensure commanders are advised of available counterintelligence capabilities and resources.

(d) CI operations are coordinated throughout the planning stage with OPSEC staff officer.

(e) Submit CI plans, programs, and projects through CICA for review before implementation.

(f) Publications, reports, and communications that contain classified information shall be marked, controlled, transmitted, and safeguarded IAWService Components' security regulations.

(3) Counterintelligence Investigations. All incidents conducted by organisations or personalities directed against Australian or Coalition forces, which could disrupt operations, and/or activities, shall be investigated.

(4) Counterintelligence Operations. Tactical Exploitation and CI Source Operations. Prepare detailed and coordinated plans for seizure and exploitation of counterintelligence targets. Target lists should include responsibilities for:

(a) Interrogation of hostile force detainees and defectors;

(b) Screening indigenous refugees, displaced persons, and detained suspects;

(c) Debriefing of Coalition personnel who evade, escape, or are released from hostile force control; and

(d) Exploiting captured hostile force documents and materiel.

4. **Sustainment**. Refer to base OPORD and Annex R (Logistic Support Order).

5. **Command and Signal**. Refer to base OPORD and Annex U (CIS Support).

APPENDIX 4 TO
ANNEX B TO
CJTF OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

OPERATION STEEL SENTINEL

JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Step 1


Operational Environment
Olvana
Area of Interest
North Torbia
South Torbia
Gabal
Belesia
Joint Force Area of Operations

Belesia

Capital	Davao
Ethnic groups	•Mindanaoan Sulu: 55% •Cebuan Sulu: 14% •Olvanese: 23% •Torbian: 7% •Other: 1%
Population	59.9 Million
Religion	•87% Muslim •10% Christian •3% Buddhist
Type of Government	Presidential Republic
State Forces	98,500
Total Area	99,926 sq mi (258,807 km^2)
Total GDP	$209.5 Bn
Miscellaneous	Relatively new democracy emerged from colonialism
	Volatile arena of political unrest and terrorism

Gabal

Capital	Coron
Ethnic groups	•Gabalian: 94% •Belesian: 2% •Olvanese: 2% •EU/Australian: 1% •Other 1%
Population	84,190
Religion	•68.0% Protestant •24.1% Roman Catholic •4.7% Buddhist •3.2% Other/None
Type of Government	Parliamentary Democracy
State Forces	5,000
Total Area	617 sq mi (1,597 km^2)
Total GDP	$0.5 Bn
Miscellaneous	Deeply federalized along historical tribal lines
	Relies on international trade/ security agreements

South Torbia

Capital	Manila
Ethnic groups	•Torbian: 100%
Population	42.4 Million
Religion	•61.3% Buddhist •19.1% Atheist/Agnostic •5.6% Christian •4.7% Confucian •2.9% Muslim •6.4 % Other
Type of Government	Constitutional Republic
State Forces	405,000
Total Area	17,622 sq mi (45,641 km^2)
Total GDP	$1,800 Bn
Miscellaneous	One of the wealthiest and most stable nations
	Historical friction with North Torbia

North Torbia

Capital	Baguio
Ethnic groups	•Torbian: 99.8% •Olvanese: 0.2%
Population	13.0 Million
Religion	•Officially irreligious
Type of Government	Autocratic Totalitarianism
State Forces	675,000
Total Area	21,517 sq mi (55,729 km²)
Total GDP	$10.1 Bn
Miscellaneous	Personality cult obsessed with state survival
	Historical friction with South Torbia

Olvana

Capital	Shanghai
Ethnic groups	•Peelee: 92% •Beihai: 2% •Baiyan: 1% •Other: 5%
Population	1.1 Billion
Religion	•79.8% Hindu •14.2% Muslim •2.3% Christian •1.7% Sikh •2.0% Other/None
Type of Government	Socialist
State Forces	1,500,000
Total Area	1,394,197 sq mi (3,610,956 km^2)
Total GDP	$9,600 Bn
Miscellaneous	Very strong connections with global economy
	Seeks political and military leadership in the region

Roxas
Panay
Iloilo
Antique
Malay
Buruanga
Ibajay
Tangalan
Libertad
Pandan
Kalibo
Aklan
Sebaste
Batan
Balete
Altavas
Roxas City
Ivisan
Carles
Pilar
Estancia
Batad
Capiz
Libacao
Culasi
Mambusao
Maayon
Dumalag
Tibiao
Tapaz
Dumarao
Sara
Concepcion
Barbaza
San Rafael
Ajuy
Laua-an
Calinog
Passi
Lambunao
Dueñas
Barotac Viejo
Antique
Iloilo
Anilao
Janiuay
Pototan
Manapla
Cadiz
Patnongon
Barotac Nuevo
Victorias
Sagay
Cabatuan
San Remigio
Santa Barbara
Escalante
Sibalom
Leon
Pavia
Silay
San Jose
Negros Occidental
Talisay
Igbaras
Iloilo City
Toboso
Hamtic
Bacolod
Tigbauan
Miagao
Murcia
Calatrava
San Joaquin
San Lorenzo
Bago
Nueva Valencia
San Carlos
Tobias Fornier
Guimaras
La Carlota
Anini-y
Canlaon
Pontevedra
Toledo

OFFICIAL

El Nido
Palawan
Taytay
San Vicente
Dumaran
Araceli
Roxas
Puerto Princesa
Aborlan
Agutaya
Palawan
Cuyo
Palawan
Cagayancillo
Balasia


Gabal
El Nido
Palawan
Sulu Sea
Roxas
Panay
Iloilo


Mindanao
Zamboanga
Davao
Gen Santos
City

Human Terrain (Mindanao)

Human Terrain (Panay)

Human Terrain (Palawan)

CJTF Named Area of Interest (NAI) Overview


North Torbia
South Torbia
Gabal
Belesia
NAI 0001
NAI 0002
NAI 0003

Sth Torbia
Gabel
NAI 0009
NAI 0010
NAI 0013
NAI 0008
NAI 0004
NAI 0005
NAI 0006
NAI 0007
NAI 0012
NAI 0011
Roxas
El Nido
Panay
Iloilo
Palawan
Sulu Sea
Puerto Princesa
Lat: --° --' --", Lon: --° --' --"
50 km

NAI 0019
NAI 0014
NAI 0018
NAI 0023
NAI 0017
NAI 0016
NAI 0015
NAI 0022
NAI 0020
NAI 0021
Panay
Roxas City
Iloilo City
Bacolod

NAI	Description	Grid NE (Lat/Lon)	Grid NW (Lat/Lon)	Grid SW (Lat/Lon)	Grid SE (Lat/Lon)
0001	Sea Lines of Communication – Sth China Sea	17deg 0’ N, 119deg 20’ E	17deg N, 119deg 45’ E	12deg 50’ N, 119deg 45’ E	12deg 50’ N, 119deg 20’ E
0002	Sea Lines of Communication – Sth China Sea	12deg 15’ N, 119deg 12’ E	12deg 22; N, 118deg 39’ E	11deg 34’ N, 118deg 29’ E	11deg 26 N, 119deg 01’ E
0003	Sea Lines of Communication – Philippine Sea	16deg 50’ N, 123deg 24’ E	16deg 26’ N, 122deg 42’ E	12deg 56’ N, 124deg 53’ E	13deg 20’ N, 125deg 31’ E
0004	SAG 1 Patrol AO	11deg 18’ N, 119deg 13’ E	11deg 39’ N, 118deg 11’E	10deg 34’ N, 117deg 43’ E	10deg 12’N, 118deg 43’ E
0005	Sea Lane – Gabal / Linapacan Is	11deg 33’ N, 120deg 03’ E	11deg 40’ N, 119deg 51’ E	11deg 43’N, 119deg 47’ E	11deg 27’ N, 119deg 59’ E
0006	Sea Lane – Linapacan / Palawan Is	11deg 19’ N, 119deg 51’ E	11deg 27’ N, 119deg 39’ E	11deg 20’ N, 119deg 34’ E	11deg 12’ N, 119deg 47’ E
0007	El Nido SPOD/APOD	11deg 14’ N, 119deg 26’ E	11deg 14’ N, 119deg 20’ E	11deg 6’ N, 119deg 20’ E	11deg 6’ N, 119deg 26’ E
0008	Sea Lane – Nth Panay / Romblon Is	12deg 7’ N, 122deg 06’ E	12deg 7’ N, 121deg, 49’ E	11deg 55’ N, 121deg 49’ E	11deg’ 55 N, 122deg 06’ E
0009	Sea Lane – Romblon Is / Sth Torbia	12deg 42’ N, 122deg 02’ E	12deg 46’ N, 121deg 51’ E	12deg 34’ N, 121deg 46’ E	12deg 29’ N, 121deg 57’ E
0010	Sea Lane – Samar / Sorsargon	12deg 37’ N, 124deg 19’ E	12deg 41’ N, 124deg 10’ E	12deg 30’ N, 124deg 04’ E	12deg 25’ N, 124deg 12’ E
0011	Sea Lane – Sth Panay / Negros Is	10deg, 32’ N, 122deg 15’ E	10deg 20’ N, 121deg 59’ E	09deg 55’ N, 122deg 21’ E	10deg 07’ N, 122deg 36’ E
0012	Sea Lane – Nth Panay / Negros Is	11deg 28’ N, 123deg 27’ E	11deg 15’ N, 123deg 10’ E	10deg 58’ N, 123deg 10’ E	11deg 10’ N, 123deg 42’ E
0013	Sea Lane – Nth Panay	11deg 57’ N, 123deg 01’ E	11deg 57’ N, 122deg 22’ E	11deg 45’ N, 122deg 22’ E	11deg 45’ N, 123deg 01’ E
0014	Roxas City APOD/SPOD	11deg 36’ N, 122deg 48’ E	11deg 36’ N, 122deg 42’ E	11deg 32’ N, 122deg 42’ E	11deg 32’ N, 122deg 48’ E

NAI	Description	Grid NE (MGRS)	Grid NW (MGRS)	Grid SW (MGRS)	Grid SE (MGRS)
0015	San Rafael Mine	11deg 12’ N, 122deg 51’ E	11deg 12’ N, 122deg 47’ E	11deg 08’ N, 122deg 47’ E	11deg 08’ N, 122deg 51’ E
0016	Panay MSR vic Passi	11deg 11’ N, 122deg 41’ E	11deg 11’ N, 122deg 38’ E	11deg 02’ N, 122deg 36’ E	11deg 01’ N, 122deg 30’ E
0017	Panay MSR vic Calinog	11deg 09’ N, 122deg 33’ E	11deg 10’ N, 122deg 30’ E	11deg 04’ N, 122deg 28’ E	11deg 03’ N, 122deg 32’ E
0018	Panay MSR vic Cuartero	11deg 25’ N, 122deg 42’ E	11deg 25’ N, 122deg 38’ E	11deg 16’ N, 122deg 38’ E	11deg 16’ N, 122deg 42’ E
0019	Panay MSR vic Tangalan	11deg 49’ N, 122deg 12’ E	11deg 47’ N, 122deg 10’ E	11deg 40’ N, 122deg 18’ E	11deg 42’ N, 122deg 20’ E
0020	Potential JFEO site - Banate	11deg 01’ N, 122deg 51’ E	11deg 01’ N, 122deg 47’ E	10deg 58’ N, 122deg 47’ E	10deg 58’ N, 122deg 51’ E
0021	Iloilo SPOD	10deg 44’ N, 122deg 36’ E	10deg 44’ N, 122deg 31’ E	10deg 40’ N, 122deg 31’ E	10deg 40’ N, 122deg 36’ E
0022	Iloilo APOD	10deg 51’ N, 122deg 31’ E	10deg 51 N, 122deg 28’ E	10deg 48’ N, 122deg 28’ E	10deg 48’ N, 122deg 31’ E
0023	Panay MSR vic Tibiao	11deg 21’ N, 122deg 04’ E	11deg, 21’ N, 122deg 01’ E	11deg 13’ N, 122deg 01’ E	11deg 13’ N, 122deg 04’ E

Step 2

Maritime Effects

- Hydrographic
- Littoral
- Maritime Logistic

Primary SPOD
Makar Wharf, General Santos City

Primary staging port for:

- ATG
- ESG (JA/US)

Alternate SPOD
Zamboanga Port, Zamboanga City

Primary staging port for:

- JFMCC HQ
- MTG
- USNS Mercy

Lat: 6°54'11"N, Lon: 122°4'19"E

50 m

Alternate SPOD
Davao Port, Davao City

- Potential staging port
- Not likely to be utilised by CJTF

Lat: 7°7'33"N, Lon: 125°39'48"E

100 m

Panay SPOD
Iloilo Port, Iloilo City

- Currently under BX control
- Likely landing area for non-ATG forces

Panay SPOD
Culasi Port, Roxas City



- Currently under NT control
- Shallow water will restrict size of ship berthing



Panay SPOD
Caticlan Port, Caticlan

- Currently under NT control
- Relatively deep water
- Likely primary SPOD for NTMEF

Lat: 11.9280, Lon: 121.9503

50 m

Palawan SPOD
El Nido Port, El Nido

- Currently under NT control
- Shallow water will restrict size of ship berthing



Time & Space (Indicative)

Maritime Transit Times (8kts)				
	Darwin	**General Santos City**	**Zamboanga**	**Iloilo**
Darwin	N/A	1160NM (6 days)	1275NM (6 days 14hrs)	1480NM (7 days 17hrs)
General Santos City	1160NM (6 days)	N/A	189NM (1 day)	320NM (1 day 14hrs)
Zamboanga	1275NM (6 days 14hrs)	189NM (1 day)	N/A	234NM (1 day 5hrs)
Iloilo	1480NM (7 days 17hrs)	320NM (1 day 14hrs)	234NM (1 day 5hrs)	N/A

Air **Effects**

- POL
- Air traffic
- Air Navigation / Traffic Control



- Runway: 10,500ft long
- Can be used by:
  - C-17
  - C-130J
  - C-27

Primary APOD
General Santos Airport, General Santos City

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Alternate APOD
Rajah Buayan Airbase, General Santos City

- Runway: 5,500ft long
- Can be used by:
  - C-27

Alternate APOD
Colonel Edwin Andrews Airbase, Zamboanga

- Runway: 8,500ft long
- Will base RAAF Strike:
  - F-35A
  - F/A-18F
  - EA-18G
- Current BFAF:
  - 12x F-16C

Alternate APOD
Davao International Airport, Davao City

- Runway: 10,000ft long
- Current BFAF:
  - 12x SU30MKK

Panay APOD
Iloilo Airport, Iloilo City

- Runway: 8,500ft long
- Currently under BX control
- Limited air traffic due to NT SAM umbrella

Lat: 10.8313, Lon: 122.4961

200 m

- Runway: 6,00ft long
- Currently under NT control
- Operating TPAF aircraft:
  - SU-30MKK
  - J-11B
  - Z-9
  - KA-28

Lat: 11.6007, Lon: 122.7493

200 m

Panay APOD
Roxas Airport, Roxas City

- Runway: 5,00ft long
- Currently under NT control
- No known TPAF aircraft operating from airport

Panay APOD
Godofredo Ramos Airport, Caticlan

Palawan APOD
El Nido Airfield, El Nido



- Runway: 3,600ft long
- Currently under NT control
- NTMEF HQ location
- Primary LOG node
- Indicators show NTMEF is extending the runway
- Operating TPAF:
  - SU-30MKK
  - J-11B

Time & Space (Indicative)

Air Transit Times (300kts)				
	Darwin	**General Santos City**	**Zamboanga**	**Iloilo**
Darwin	N/A	1160NM (4hrs)	1275NM (4hrs 15min)	1480NM (5hrs)
General Santos City	1160NM (4hrs)	N/A	189NM (40mins)	320NM (1hr)
Zamboanga	1275NM (4hrs 15min)	189NM (40mins)	N/A	234NM (45mins)
Iloilo	1480NM (5hrs)	320NM (1hr)	234NM (45mins)	N/A

BELESIAN FEDERATION AIR FORCE	
SU-30MKK MULTI-ROLE FIGHTER	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	2
Weapons	1x 30mm GSh-1 Autocannon Various weapon systems on multiple hard points
Mass	34500kg (max T/O weight)
Speed	Mach 2
Range	3000km
Ceiling	17300m
Sensors	ASP-PVD-21 Helmet mounted sight Slotted Planar Array Radar
Protection	ECM
Notes	BFAF operating 12x SU-30MKK over Mindanao NTMEF also known to be operating SU-30MKK in JFAO

BELESIAN FEDERATION AIR FORCE	
F-16C MULTI-ROLE FIGHTER	
Manufacturer	USA
Crew	1
Weapons	1x 20mm Cannon Various weapon systems on multiple hard points
Mass	19187kg (max T/O weight)
Speed	Mach 2
Range	4217km (ferry)
Ceiling	15000m
Sensors	AN/APG-68 Radar Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System
Protection	ECM
Notes	BFAF operating 12x F-16C over Mindanao

Belesian Federation Air Force Bed Down

- BFAF Fighter aircraft are providing DCA CAP over Mindanao
- BFAF postured defensive and will not likely conduct OCA against NTMEF
- 12x F-16 based in Zamboanga APOD
- 12x SU30MKK based in Davao APOD

Land Effects (Panay)

- Vegetation
  - Thick jungle vegetation along the western side
  - Farmlands and sub-tropical forests along the lowlands
- Topography
  - Panay is bisected by the Central Panay Mountain Range close to the west coast
    - Highest peak is Mt Madia-as (2,117m)
  - There are may rivers with the longest being the Panay River
  - Most of the population is concentrated on the central and eastern part of the island (lowlands)
  - The eastern lowlands contain many farms (sugarcane and rice)
- Assessment
  - Heavy vehicles may be restricted in movement to MSR
  - Will require engineer support to traverse along lowland areas (create/reinforce bridges)
  - Wet season will restrict movement significantly



Land Effects (Panay)

- Urban
  - Iloilo City (pop - 448,000) - Provincial capital
  - Roxas City (pop – 167,000)
- Logistical hubs
  - See APOD/SPOD data for Panay
  - Single railway linking Roxas and Iloilo originally used for sugarcane produce transportation
- POL sites
- Infrastructure

San Rafael Mine
San Rafael, Panay



- Cerium Mine
- Former Copper-Gold Mine
- Ore Processing Facility located onsite
- Major economic income for Panay

Land Effects (Palawan)

- Vegetation
- Elevation
- Urban
- Logistical hubs
- POL sites
- Infrastructure

Land Effects (Mindanao)

- Vegetation
- Elevation
- Urban
- Logistical hubs
- POL sites
- Infrastructure

Space Effects

- GPS
  - GPS and GLONASS available throughout the region
- Comms

Weather Effects - Belesia

- Two seasons: Wet and Dry
  - Dry season Dec – May
  - Wet Season Jun – Nov
- Region is susceptible to tropical typhoons during the wet season
  - Typhoons are regular and generally occur during Jul to Oct
  - On average Belesia is hit by 9 typhoons/year of varying strength
- Temperature is relatively constant all year as expected in a tropical climate







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Step 3

North Torbian Marine Expeditionary Force



North Torbian Marine Brigade



NTMEF Assessment

NTMEF

- C2 based on JTF construct – unified command chain
- Well trained and equipped compared to the rest of the TPA
  - Main platforms are 5-20 years old
- Service in the NT Marine Division is seen as prestigious and sought after
- Expect Officer Cadre to be well trained and motivated
- NTMEF capabilities are comparable to ADF

Non-State Actors (Insurgents)

Visayan Peoples Front (VSF)

- Insurgent organisation based in Belesia (approx. 300 active members)
- Committed to the establishment of an independent entity composed of the islands of Panay, Negros, Cebu and Bohol from the Belesian Federation
- Predominantly a Christian organisation seeking to create a Christian nation
- Has been active in aiding NTMEF in Panay to achieve political goals
    - Prominently aided the NTMEF in securing the San Rafael Mine
- Likely to actively oppose CF in region

Non-State Actors (Insurgents)

Free Sulu Movement (FSM)

- Conglomeration of anti-federation and independence factions on the Belesian archipelago (approx. 200 active members)
- The group seeks to break free from the alleged over reach of Belesian central government
- Predominantly a secular organisation
- Has links to criminal organisations and will commit criminal acts to support political goals
- Is not know to be actively supporting the NTMEF in either Panay or Palawan
- May oppose CF in region if CJTF mission does not support political goals

Non-State Actors (Criminal)

Black Societies

- Criminal networks based in Olvana but operating across the Belesian archipelago (approx. 250 active members)
- This criminal network is normally a family affair, with each family staying local to avoid conflict with other groups
- This criminal network is involved in:
  - Armed Robbery
  - Racketeering
  - Smuggling
  - Narcotics Trafficking
  - Prostitution
  - Gambling
  - Contract Killings
- Will not likely be a threat to CF but may leverage off CF presence in Belesia

Non-State Actors (Criminal)

Tantoco Cartel

- Criminal cartel founded in South Torbia (approx. 950 active members)
- Operates across the region (even within Nth Torbia)
- Involved in most criminal activities including:
  - Drug and Weapons Smuggling
  - Extortion
  - Motor Vehicle Theft
  - Illegal Gambling
  - Money Laundering
  - Counterfeiting
  - Contract Killing
  - Piracy
- Has clashed with Black Society network over territory
- Will not likely be a threat to CF but may leverage off CF presence in Belesia

Chungjang (Lieutenant General) Song Jong-Yeol
Commander 1st Marine Division



DOB	13 Sep 67
Nationality	North Torbian
Service / Organisation	TPA
Birthplace	Baguio, North Torbia
Education	Torbian Military Academy (Baguio) – 1989 (commissioned into Infantry) Song Yang-Hwan Military College – 2008 Olvanan National Defense University – 2012
Religion	N/A
Marital Status	Married – spouse unknown Children – unknown
Personality Traits	• Known to be details focussed • Allows freedom of action for subordinate commanders • Does not follow doctrine rigidly (reputation for breaking rules) • Ambitious and charismatic
Biography	Song Jong-Yeol is a distant relative of Song Chong-Su (current ruling Torbian leader). He has used his political connections to rise up the ranks. This has allowed Song to be more brazen in his actions, giving him a 'maverick' reputation within the TPA

Taejwa (Senior Colonel) Ran Sung-Min
Chief of Staff 1st Marine Division



DOB	26 Jan 1975
Nationality	North Torbian
Service / Organisation	TPA
Birthplace	Santiago, North Torbia
Education	Torbian Military Academy (Baguio) – 1996 (commissioned into Artillery)
Religion	N/A
Marital Status	Unknown
Personality Traits	• Sycophantic • Orthodox in thinking • Adheres rigidly to doctrinal tenets
Biography	Not much is known about Ran Sung-Min. Ran has followed his mentor, Song Jong-Yeol, through various postings and is deeply loyal to him. His adherence to TPA doctrine has a stabilising effect on many of Song Jong-Yeol's more creative thinking process

Sojang (Major General) Yun Jun-Yeong
Air Component Commander



DOB	03 Jul 1970
Nationality	North Torbian
Service / Organisation	TPAF
Birthplace	Baguio, North Torbia
Education	Torbian Air Academy (Tuguegarao) – 1991 (trained as a fighter pilot) Song Yang-Hwan Military College – 2010
Religion	Buddhist
Marital Status	Married (1995) – Yun So-Yi (nee Pong) Children - 2 sons (15 and 10 yrs)
Personality Traits	• Creative thinker • Aggressive
Biography	Yun Jun-Yeong is known as an aggressive commander with incidents relating to border clashes between the TPAF and ROTAF aircraft under Yun's command. He has not shied away from provoking incidents or backing down from what he sees as an insult to TPAF 'honour'

Sojang (Rear Admiral) Roe Il-Seong
Maritime Component Commander



DOB	25 Aug 1969
Nationality	North Torbian
Service / Organisation	TPN
Birthplace	Candon, North Torbia
Education	Torbian Naval Academy (San Fernando) – 1990 Song Yang-Hwan Military College – 2009
Religion	N/A
Marital Status	Married – spouse unknown Children - unknown
Personality Traits	• Conventional thinking • Places high value on traditions and customs • Strict disciplinarian • Cautious by nature
Biography	Roe Il-Seong has led a typical Naval career with the majority of his career spent on surface warships (Destroyers). He is known to be a strict disciplinarian with reports of harsh punishments meted out for relatively minor infractions by his crew during his time as a ship captain.

Taejwa (Senior Colonel) Kim Youn-Hwan
Commander 3rd Marine Brigade



DOB	15 Oct 1971
Nationality	North Torbian
Service / Organisation	TPA
Birthplace	Santiago, North Torbia
Education	Torbian Military Academy (Baguio) – 1993 (commissioned into Infantry) Song Yang-Hwan Military College – 2015
Religion	N/A
Marital Status	Married 1996 – Kim Sujin (nee Pu) Children – 1 son (12 yrs)
Personality Traits	• Creative thinker • Charismatic • Confident bordering on arrogant
Biography	Kim You-Hwan has shown himself to be one of the 1st Marine Division's most tactically able brigade commanders. Kim is known to be eloquent and charismatic. He instils strong loyalty from subordinates and is popular with his troops. This confidence means that at times he may be reluctant to listen to alternative views if his mind is already set on a course of action

Chungjwa (Lieutenant Colonel) Hae Kyung
Chief of Staff 3rd Marine Brigade



DOB	11 April 1976
Nationality	North Torbian
Service / Organisation	TPA
Birthplace	Gonzaga, North Torbia
Education	Torbian Military Academy (Baguio) – 2000 (commissioned into Engineers)
Religion	Christian
Marital Status	Single
Personality Traits	• Meticulous and process driven • Socially awkward
Biography	Not much is known about Hae Kyung. His family is from a poor fishing village in the north of the country. This poor background has meant that the few public interactions he has been seen, he has exhibited poor social interaction. It is believed that he has risen up the ranks due to his diligent and meticulous nature.

Chungjwa (Lieutenant Colonel) Nan Sung-Jin
Commander 31st Battalion, 3rd Marine Brigade



DOB	01 Jul 1980
Nationality	North Torbian
Service / Organisation	TPA
Birthplace	Santiago, North Torbia
Education	Torbian Military Academy (Baguio) – 2002 (commissioned into Infantry)
Religion	N/A
Marital Status	Married 2007 – Spouse unknown Children – unknown
Personality Traits	• Methodical • Orthodox thinking
Biography	Not much is known about Nan Sung-Jin. Very little media profile or appearance

Chungjwa (Lieutenant Colonel) Kim Seong-Ho
Commander 32nd Battalion, 3rd Marine Brigade



DOB	14 May 1982
Nationality	North Torbian
Service / Organisation	TPA
Birthplace	Baguio, North Torbia
Education	Torbian Military Academy (Baguio) – 2004 (commissioned into Infantry)
Religion	N/A
Marital Status	Married 2009 – spouse unknown
Personality Traits	• Innovative / Unorthodox • Outspoken / Charismatic
Biography	Kim Seong-Ho is a distant relative of Kim Youn-Hwan (Comd 3rd Marine Bde). Kim's rise up the ranks has been noteworthy for his outspoken views on how to employ marine infantry. Kim is known to have written essays on expeditionary warfare submitted to the Military Academy. His political connections means that his rise up the TPA hierarchy is almost assured.

Chungjwa (Lieutenant Colonel) Sim Min-Su
Commander 33rd Battalion, 3rd Marine Brigade



DOB	13 Jan 1980
Nationality	North Torbian
Service / Organisation	TPA
Birthplace	Cervantes, North Torbia
Education	Torbian Military Academy (Baguio) – 2002 (commissioned into Infantry)
Religion	N/A
Marital Status	Married 2005 – spouse unknown Children - unknown
Personality Traits	• Conventional thinking • Charismatic
Biography	Sim Min-Su is more known for his out of uniform activities than his military prowess. Sim is known amongst his peers as a womaniser despite his marital status. Not much is known about his military career in as much as there is nothing that shows any form of brilliance.

Chungjwa (Lieutenant Colonel) Kam Du-Ho
Commander 34th Battalion, 3rd Marine Brigade



DOB	13 Mar 1984
Nationality	North Torbian
Service / Organisation	TPA
Birthplace	Tabuk, North Torbia
Education	Torbian Military Academy (Baguio) – 2006 (commissioned into Infantry)
Religion	N/A
Marital Status	Single
Personality Traits	• Sycophant • Ambitious / Politically connected
Biography	Kam Du-Ho is the youngest of 3rd Marine Brigades battalion commanders and is suspected of gaining the position due to his Party political connections. There is very little confidence in his abilities by Kim Youn-Hwan (3rd Bde Commander).

Chungjwa (Lieutenant Colonel) Hwan Tonghyon
Commander 3rd Tank Battalion, 3rd Marine Brigade



DOB	06 Jun 1980
Nationality	North Torbian
Service / Organisation	TPA
Birthplace	Cauayan, North Torbia
Education	Torbian Military Academy (Baguio) – 2002 (commissioned into Armour)
Religion	Buddhist
Marital Status	Married – spouse unknown Children - unknown
Personality Traits	• Aggressive, diligent • Competent and Tactically proficient • Well read on warfare
Biography	Hwan Tonghyon exhibits a keen interest in the study of warfare. He has submitted several essays on the tactical use of armour on the battlefield to the Military Academy and his profile is well known amongst his peers.

Taejwa (Senior Colonel) P'yong Young-Jae
Commander 4th Marine Brigade



DOB	11 Nov 1970
Nationality	North Torbian
Service / Organisation	TPA
Birthplace	Baguio, North Torbia
Education	Torbian Military Academy (Baguio) – 1992 (commissioned into Infantry) Song Yang-Hwan Military College – 2016
Religion	N/A
Marital Status	Married 1997 – P'yong Yoon-Ji
Personality Traits	• Meticulous • Disciplinarian • Orthodox thinking
Biography	P'yong Young-Jae is known as a strict commander who follows doctrine to the letter. If there is a rule/SOP/doctrine pertaining to a specific aspect of military service, he will follow it with very little deviation. He expects his subordinates to follow the same set of rules meticulously with punishments meted out for minor infractions. P'yong is known to be extremely loyal to the Song family and NT government.

Niko (pseudonym - real name unknown)

Commander – Free Sulu Movement



DOB	
Nationality	Belesian
Service / Organisation	FSM
Birthplace	
Education	
Religion	
Marital Status	
Personality Traits	
Biography	

Alarico Sanchez

Second-in-command – Visayan People's Front



DOB	13 Apr 1992
Nationality	Belesian (Panayan)
Service / Organisation	VPF
Birthplace	Roxas City, Belesia
Education	Qi Yang Kuen Academy
Religion	N/A
Marital Status	
Personality Traits	
Biography	

Eddie Ramos

Finance/Logistics - Visayan People's Front



DOB	06 Mar 1968
Nationality	Belesian
Service / Organisation	VPF (CEO Libas Fisherman's Co-operative)
Birthplace	Roxas City, Belesia
Education	Tanque Nacional High School
Religion	Christian (Catholic)
Marital Status	Married
Personality Traits	• Prone to violence/brutality • Anti-authority/establishment sentiment, but very patriarchal • Impulsive, secretive
Biography	Born into a large fishing family, Eddie grew up under the guidance of his mother after his father and step-father were lost at sea in successive storms. Eddie holds very strong anti-local authority sentiments but holds close ties with his local church. Due to the lack of a strong paternal influence, Eddie often resorts to violence and brutality to resolve disputes. Eddie is suspected of being associated with the VPF. It is not known whether Eddie holds strong sentiments towards the West.

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY	
ZBD-05 AMPHIBIOUS INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLE	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	3
Weapons	30mm Main Gun Hong Jian-73C ATGM 7.62mm Type 80 Coax MG
Mass	26.5t
Speed	65km/h
Sensors	Computerised FCS
Protection	Up to 30mm Armour
Notes	Capacity to carry 10 passengers Amphibious up to Sea State 4 Also known as VN-18 Primary combat vehicle for NTMEF Marine Brigades
WEG Link	ZBD-05_(ZBD-2000)_Olvanan_Amphibious_Infantry_Fighting_Vehicle

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY	
TYPE 63A AMPHIBIOUS LIGHT TANK	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	4
Weapons	105mm Rifled Gun HJ-8 ATGM 12.7mm MG 7.62mm Coax MG
Mass	20t
Speed	75km/h
Sensors	Computerised FCS
Protection	Up to 25mm Armour
Notes	Amphibious Different variants may or may not have the ATGM
WEG Link	Type_63A_(ZTS-63A)_Olvanan_Amphibious_Light_Tank

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY	
TYPE 89 SELF PROPELLED HOWITZER	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	5
Weapons	122mm (L32) Howitzer (18-21km range) 12.7mm HMG
Mass	20t
Speed	60km/h
Sensors	FCS and gun stabilisation
Protection	Armour protection up to small arms fire and shell slinters
Notes	Amphibious (with floatation devices) Also known as PLZ-89 122mm Howitzer max eff range – 21km
WEG Link	Type 89 (PLZ-89) Olvanan 122mm Self-Propelled Howitzer

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY	
M2008 122MM MULTIPLE LAUNCH ROCKET SYSTEM	
Manufacturer	North Torbia
Crew	5
Weapons	122mm HE Rocket
Mass	13.7t
Speed	75km/h
Sensors	PG-1M Panoramic Telescope
Protection	Nil
Notes	Based on BM-21 platform Mounted on Ural 375-D 6x6 wheeled truck Max effective firing range – 21km (32.7km with Olvanan Type 90A rockets)
WEG Link	M2008_North_Torbian_122mm_Multiple_Rocket_Launcher_(MRL)

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY	
TYPE 90B SELF PROPELLED MULTIPLE LAUNCH ROCKET SYSTEM	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	5
Weapons	Fire Dragon 40 122mm HE Rocket (40km range)
Mass	23t
Speed	85km/h
Sensors	Computerised FCS Fire Dragon Rocket – GPS guidance
Protection	Nil
Notes	40 rockets can be loaded in less than 3 mins
WEG Link	Type_90B_Olvanan_122mm_Self-Propelled_Multiple_Launch_Rocket_System

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY	
ZLT-05 AMPHIBIOUS LIGHT TANK	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	4
Weapons	ZTS63A 105mm Main Gun ATGM HJ-73 Red Arrow 7.62mm Coax MG 12.7mm HMG
Mass	28.5t
Speed	65km/h
Sensors	Computerised FCS
Protection	Up to 30mm Armour
Notes	Derived from ZBD-2000 family of tracked amphibious assault vehicles
WEG Link	ZTD-05_(ZBD-2000)_Olvanan_Amphibious_Light_Tank

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY	
MT-55A SELF PROPELLED ARMOURED BRIDGE LAYER	
Manufacturer	Czechoslovakia
Crew	2
Weapons	N/A
Mass	36t
Speed	50km/h
Sensors	N/A
Protection	Similar to T-55 MBT
Notes	Scissors type bridge system Bridge capacity – 50t Gap width – 17m
WEG Link	MT-55A Czechoslovakian Self-Propelled Armoured Bridgelayer

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY	
TMM TRUCK MOUNTED SCISSOR BRIDGE	
Manufacturer	Donovia
Crew	3
Weapons	N/A
Mass	19t
Speed	55km/h
Sensors	N/A
Protection	Nil
Notes	Scissors type bridge system Bridge capacity – 50t Normally 4x TMM are used to span 40m gap
WEG Link	TMM_Donovian_Truck-Mounted_Scissors_Bridge

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY	
GMZ-3 TRACKED MINE LAYING VEHICLE	
Manufacturer	Donovia
Crew	3
Weapons	7.62mm MG
Mass	28.5t
Speed	60km/h
Sensors	N/A
Protection	Applique armour available
Notes	Mine laying system can lay AT mines through a cluster dispersing mechanism or through rear plough and conveyor
WEG Link	GMZ-3_Donovian_Tracked_Minelaying_Vehicle

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY	
UMZ 6x6 SCATTERABLE MINE LAYING SYSTEM	
Manufacturer	Donovia
Crew	2
Weapons	n/a
Mass	10t
Speed	80km/h
Sensors	N/A
Protection	Nil
Notes	Mine laying system is carried on a 6x6 truck Scatter able mines include: • PFM-1S AP • POM-2 AP • PTM-3 AT
WEG Link	UMZ_Donovian_6x6_Scatterable_Minelaying_System

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY	
HQ-16 MEDIUM RANGE SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE SYSTEM	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	?
Weapons	Unknown missile designation but similar to 9M38 Missile Max Alt: 10km Min Alt: 100m Max Range vs Aircraft: 40km
Mass	15t
Speed	85km/h
Sensors	IFF with radar (Search Radar Guidance Vehicle) Max Range: 150km Max Alt: 20km
Protection	Protection from small arms and shell splinters
Notes	Land based version of the HHQ-16 used on naval vessels Also known as LY-80 (export version)
WEG Link	HQ-16_Olvanan_6x6_Medium-Range_Surface-to-Air_Missile_System

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY	
HQ-17A SHORT RANGE SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE SYSTEM	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	3
Weapons	9M330 Missile x16 Max Alt: 6km Max Range vs Aircraft: 12km
Mass	30t
Speed	80km/h
Sensors	IFF with radar (Search Radar Guidance Vehicle) Max Range: 25km (detection range) 15km (tracking range)
Protection	Protection from small arms and shell splinters
Notes	Organic within AD Bn of MAR Bde
WEG Link	HQ-17A_(FM-2000)_Olvanan_Short-Range_Air_Defense_Missile_System

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY	
PGZ-07 35mm SELF-PROPELLES ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	3
Weapons	2x 35mm Cannons Max Range: 4000m
Mass	35t
Speed	55km/h
Sensors	Computerised FCS (cannot fire on the move)
Protection	Protection from small arms and shell splinters
Notes	Also known as PGZ-09 Can target low to med altitude, FW, RW, UAS and cruise missiles System can connect via data-link with other systems
WEG Link	PGZ-07::PGZ-09_(Type_07)_Olvanan_35mm_Self-Propelled_Anti-Aircraft_Gun

TORBIAN PEOPLES NAVY	
Z-9WA HARBIN MULTI-ROLE HELICOPTER	
Manufacturer	Olvana (based on original French design)
Crew	2 + 9-12 troops
Weapons	2x fixed 23mm Guns or 12.7mm HMG 2x Pylons permit mounting up to 8 ATGMs or 2x Rocket pods
Mass	4100kg (combat weight)
Speed	305km/h
Range	1000km (ferry)
Ceiling	4500m
Sensors	Fire control radar Laser designator
Protection	Nil armour ECM / Chaff-Flare Dispenser
Notes	Also known as WZ-09
WEG Link	Z-9_Harbin_(WZ-9)_Olvanan_Medium_Multi-Role_Helicopter

TORBIAN PEOPLES NAVY	
WZ-19 RECONAISSANCE/ATTACK HELICOPTER	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	2
Weapons	1x GSh-23L Autocannon TY-90 AAM HJ-8 ATGM
Mass	4082kg (max T/O weight)
Speed	280km/h
Range	4hrs
Ceiling	4500m
Sensors	Fire control radar (millimetre wave) Laser designator Hemet mounted sights
Protection	ECM / Chaff-Flare Dispenser
Notes	Modified Z-9
WEG Link	Z-19 (WZ-19) Olvanan Reconnaissance::Attack Helicopter

TORBIAN PEOPLES NAVY	
KA-28 ANTI-SUBMARINE HELICOPTER	
Manufacturer	Donovia
Crew	2 + 1-3 Sensor Operators or 16 passengers
Weapons	1x Torpedo (AT-1M/VTT-1/UMGT-1/APR-2) 10x PLAB Anti-sub bombs
Mass	11000kg (max T/O weight)
Speed	250km/h
Range	800km (cruise range)
Ceiling	6000m
Sensors	Submarine search radar
Protection	Nil
Notes	Primary role is ASW, but can provide troop lift Unique contra-rotor design
WEG Link	Ka-28_Donovian_Anti-Submarine_Helicopter

TORBIAN PEOPLES AIR FORCE	
SU-30MKK MULTI-ROLE FIGHTER	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	2
Weapons	1x 30mm GSh-1 Autocannon Various weapon systems on multiple hard points
Mass	34500kg (max T/O weight)
Speed	Mach 2
Range	3000km
Ceiling	17300m
Sensors	ASP-PVD-21 Helmet mounted sight Slotted Planar Array Radar
Protection	ECM
Notes	Based on Donovian SU-27 NTMEF known to be operating 24x SU-30MKK in JFAO
WEG Link	Su-30MKK (Flanker-G) Donovian Multirole Fighter Aircraft

TORBIAN PEOPLES AIR FORCE	
J-11B AIR SUPERIORITY FIGHTER	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	1
Weapons	1x 30mm GSh-1 Autocannon Various weapon systems on 10x hard points
Mass	33000kg (max T/O weight)
Speed	Mach 2.1
Range	3530km
Ceiling	19000m
Sensors	AESA Radar NSts-27 Helmet Mounted Sight
Protection	ECM pods
Notes	Based on Donovian SU-27 NTMEF known to be operating 24x J-11B in JFAO
WEG Link	J-11B_(Flanker-L)_Olvanan_Air_Superiority_Fighter

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY / NAVY	
ASN-207 MEDIUM ALTITUDE LONG ENDURANCE UAV	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	Nil
Weapons/Payload	JN-1102 ECM suite TPN version includes Comms Relay package
Mass	UNK
Speed	UNK
Range	600km operational radius
Ceiling	UNK
Sensors	Electro-Optical packaged based on Israeli system
Protection	Nil
Notes	Requires EQ2102 Vehicle for transportation and launch
WEG Link	ASN-207_Olvanan_MALE_Unmanned_Aerial_Vehicle_(UAV)

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY / NAVY	
S-100 UAV	
Manufacturer	Austria (Schiebel)
Crew	Nil
Weapons/Payload	Multiple sensor suites including: Laser Designator, LIDAR, GPR, FLIR
Mass	200kg (55kg Payload)
Speed	220km/h
Range	6hrs
Ceiling	5500m
Sensors	See payload
Protection	Nil
Notes	UCAV variant being developed
WEG Link	Camcopter S-100 Austrian Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)

TORBIAN PEOPLES NAVY	
TYPE 052D LUYANG III CLASS DESTROYER	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	280
Weapons	1x 130mm PJ-38 Naval Gun 2x 30mm Type 730 Gatling CIWS 64 Cell Vertical Launcher System: • HHQ-9 SAM • YJ-18 SSM • CY-5 ASW 6x Yu-7 Torpedos
Displacement	8000t
Speed	30kts
Range	4500nm
Sensors	1x Type 346 Multifunction AESA radar 1x Type 518 L-band air-surveillance radar
Aircraft	1-2x Z-9WA or KA-28
Notes	NTMEF known to be operating 1x Type 052D in JFAO
WEG Link	Type_052D_Class_(Luyank_III-Class)_Olvanan_Destroyer

TORBIAN PEOPLES NAVY	
TYPE 052C LUYANG II CLASS DESTROYER	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	280
Weapons	1x 100mm Type 210 Naval Guns 2x 30mm Type 730 Gatling CIWS 48 Cell HQ-9 SAM Vertical Launcher System 2x YJ-62 SSM Launchers 2x Yu-7 Torpedo Tubes
Displacement	6500t
Speed	29kts
Range	6000nm
Sensors	1x Type 346 Multifunction AESA radar 1x Type 517 air-surveillance radar 1x Type 366 FCR
Aircraft	1 x Z-9WA or KA-28
Notes	NTMEF known to be operating 2x Type 052C in JFAO
WEG Link	Type_052C_Class_(Luyang_II_Class)_Olvanan_Destroyer

TORBIAN PEOPLES NAVY	
TYPE 051G LUDA III CLASS DESTROYER	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	280
Weapons	2x 100mm Naval Guns 1x DARDO 40mm CIWS 4x Twin YJ-8 ASM Launchers 1x HQ-7 SAM Launcher Yu-7 Torpedo Tubes
Displacement	3670t
Speed	32kts
Range	2970nm
Sensors	1x Type 354 Air and Surface Search radar DUBV-23 Sonar
Aircraft	Nil
Notes	NTMEF known to be operating 1x Type 051G in JFAO
WEG Link	Type_051G_(Luda_III_Class)_Olvanan_Destroyer

TORBIAN PEOPLES NAVY	
TYPE 054A JIANGKAI CLASS MULTI-ROLE FRIGATE	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	165
Weapons	1x Twin 37mm AA Gun 2x 30mm Type 730 Gatling CIWS 32 Cell HQ-16 SAM Vertical Launcher System 2x Quad YJ-83 SSM Launchers 2x Yu-7 Torpedo Launchers
Displacement	4053t
Speed	27kts
Range	8000nm
Sensors	1x Type 382 Air Search radar (planar array) 1x Type 344 FCR Sonar Systems
Aircraft	1 x Z-9WA or KA-28
Notes	NTMEF known to be operating 2x Type 054A I JFAO
WEG Link	Type_054A_frigate

TORBIAN PEOPLES NAVY	
TYPE 053H3 JIANGWEI II CLASS AIR DEFENCE FRIGATE	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	168
Weapons	1x Twin 100mm Naval Gun 1x 37mm Type 76A AA Gun 8x Twin YJ-83 ASM Launchers 1x HQ-7 SAM Launcher 2x Yu-7 Torpedo Launchers
Displacement	2393t
Speed	16kts
Range	5800nm
Sensors	DUBV-83 Sonar Type 354 Air & Surface Radar Type 360 Air & Surface Radar Type 517H-1 Air Search Radar
Aircraft	1 x Z-9WA
Notes	NTMEF known to be operating 1x Type 053H3 in JFAO
WEG Link	Type_053H3_Class_(Jiangwei_II_Class)_Olvanan_Frigate

TORBIAN PEOPLES NAVY	
TYPE 053H1G JIANGHU V CLASS FRIGATE	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	160-200
Weapons	1x Twin 100mm Naval Gun 1x 37mm Type 76A AA Gun 8x Twin YJ-83 ASM Launchers 1x HQ-7 SAM Launcher 2x Yu-7 Torpedo Launchers
Displacement	2000t
Speed	34kts
Range	4000nm
Sensors	DUBV-23 Sonar Type 354 Air & Surface Radar Type 360 Air & Surface Radar Type 517H-1 Air Search Radar
Aircraft	Nil
Notes	NTMEF known to be operating 2x Type 053H1G in JFAO
WEG Link	Type 053H1G Class (Jianghu-V Class) Olvanan Frigate

TORBIAN PEOPLES NAVY	
TYPE 039 SONG CLASS DIESEL-ELECTRIC SUBMARINE	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	60
Weapons	C-801 ASCM 6x 533mm Torpedo Tubes • Yu-5 Wire-Guided Torpedo
Displacement	1992t (surfaced) 2250t (submerged)
Speed	15kts (surfaced) 22kts (submerged)
Range	73nm (electric)
Sensors	Thales TSM-2233 Eledone Passive Bow Sonar Thales TSM2255 Fenelon Passive Flank Sonar
Notes	NTMEF known to be operating 3x Type 039 in JFAO
WEG Link	Type 039 Class (Song-Class) Olvanan Diesel-Electric Submarine

TORBIAN PEOPLES NAVY	
TYPE 075 YUSHEN CLASS LANDING HELICOPTER DOCK	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	1000 crew 1200 embarked forces
Weapons	2x H/PJ-11 30mm CIWS 4x HHQ-10 SAM Launchers
Displacement	40000t
Speed	23kts
Range	UNK
Sensors	UNK
Aircraft/Landing Craft	30x Z-9WA or KA-28 or Z-8 4x Type 726A LCAC
Notes	NTMEF known to be operating 2x Type 075 Due to the prestige and vulnerability of an LHD, the Type 075s will likely remain outside of JFAO
WEG Link	Type_075_landing_helicopter_dock

TORBIAN PEOPLES NAVY	
TYPE 071 YUZHAO CLASS LANDING PLATFORM DOCK	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	300 crew 800 embarked forces
Weapons	1x 76mm Naval Gun 4x 30mm CIWS
Displacement	25000t
Speed	25kts
Range	10000nm
Sensors	Type 360 Air/Surface Radar Type 364 Air search Radar Type 344 FCR
Aircraft/Landing Craft	4x Z-9WA or KA-28 4x Type 726A LCAC
Notes	NTMEF known to be operating 6x Type 071 in the JFAO
WEG Link	Type 071 Class (Yuzhao) Olvanan Amphibious Transport Dock

TORBIAN PEOPLES NAVY	
TYPE 072A YUTING II CLASS LANDING SHIP	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	104 crew 250 embarked forces
Weapons	1x Twin 37mm Naval Gun
Displacement	4800t
Speed	21kts
Range	3000nm
Sensors	UNK
Aircraft/Landing Craft	1x Z-9WA or KA-28 4x LCAC
Notes	NTMEF known to be operating 6x Type 072A in the JFAO
WEG Link	Type 072A Class (Yuting II Class) Olvanan Landing Ship

FREE SULU MOVEMENT / TANTOCO CARTEL	
BK-10 FAST ATTACK CRAFT	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	2 crew 12 passengers
Weapons	No fixed weapons systems
Displacement	4.5t
Speed	40kts
Range	?
Sensors	UNK
Aircraft/Landing Craft	Nil
Notes	Free Sulu Movement and Tantoco Cartel known to operate variants to support piracy activities in Sulu Sea
WEG Link	BK-10_Class_Olvanan_Fast_Attack_Craft_(Assault_Boat)

Step 4



Situation

Enemy (North Torbia):

- North Torbian Marine Expeditionary Force (**NTMEF**) elements have lodged in Panay and Palawan
- NTMEF 4th MAR Bde lodged in El Nido and refurbished WW2 port and airfield being used as a staging base for movement into Panay
- NTMEF 3rd MAR Bde in Panay have secured the city of Roxas and San Rafael Mine complex
- Pro-NT insurgents (Visayan Peoples Front - VPF) have aided NT in securing strategic locations in Panay
- Surface and sub-surface sea elements are operating in the Sulu and Sth China Sea
    - 1x Type 052D Luyang III (DDG)
    - 2x Type 052C Luyang II (DDG)
    - 1x Type 051G Luda (DDG)
    - 2x Type 054A Jiangkai II (FFH)
    - 1x Type 053H3 Jiangwei II (FFH)
    - 2x Type 053 Jianghu V (FFG)
    - 3x Type 039 Song (SSK)
- Combat air elements operating out of El Nido Airfield (12x SU-30MKK, 12x J-11B) and Roxas Airport (12x SU-30MKK, 12x J-11B, 12x Z-9, and 6x Z-19)
- Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ – also referred to as ADIZ/MEZ) declared over occupied islands and connecting sea/air lanes

- Strategic Goals
    - Seek political solution to establish Panay ‘independence’ (annexation) under NT sponsorship
    - Seek to maintain destabilised region to set the conditions for annexation of Panay
    - Control of ‘rare earth metals’ supply in region

- Tactical Goals
    - NTMEF will likely secure positions within Panay and Palawan and may reinforce presence in region
    - Secure sea/air lines of communications/supply between Roxas-El Nido-North Torbia
    - Maintain and defend TEZ over occupied territories and sea/air lanes
    - No intent to escalate conflict beyond occupied islands


Cubal
South China Sea
SAG 1
1x Luyang III DDG
1x Jiangkai II FFH
G
SAG 2
1x Luyang II DDG
1x Jiangkai II FFH
1x Jianghu V FFG
Roxas
San Rafael Mine
El Nido
Panay
TEZ
SAG 3
1x Luyang II DDG
1x Luda DDG
1x Jiangwei II FFH
1x Jianghu V FFG
Iloilo
Palawan
G
Sulu Sea

Situation (Panay)

- NTMEF 3rd Marine Bde have secured SPOD and APOD within Roxas City and Caticlan
- NTMEF, with help from the Visayan Peoples Front (VPF) have captured the San Rafael Mine complex
- NTMEF have established a mobile defensive position southwest of the San Rafael Mine and north of the city of Iloilo
- Belesian 12th Inf Bde, after landing in Iloilo, attempted to advance north to destroy NTMEF
- A stalemate has ensued with Belesian Forces defending positions around Iloilo
- North Torbian Forces control all northern approaches to Panay
- Belesia has access to Iloilo City SPOD/APOD



Situation

Host Nation (Belesia):

- Strategic Goals
  - Seeks UN support to reinstate Belesian authority over Panay and Palawan
  - Seeks not to antagonise ethnic Panayan citizens into independence actions
  - Seeks to maintain fragile cohesion of Belesian Federation
- Tactical Goals
  - Deployed 12th Inf Bde into Panay to defend Iloilo and remove NTMEF presence
  - Belesian Forces were not able to dislodge NTMEF and are satisfied with defending positions around Iloilo
  - Will maintain current military commitments within own borders

Neutral Nation (Gabal):

- Strategic Goals
  - Remain neutral
  - Reduce impact of potential humanitarian crisis in region within borders
- Tactical Goals
  - Defend sovereign territory within means (lack of military capability means that defending sea and air lanes is ineffective)

Neutral Nation (South Torbia):

- Strategic Goals
  - Maintain recent armistice with North Torbia after last border skirmish in previous year
  - Remain neutral
- Tactical Goals
  - Defend against any border incursions

Neutral Nation (Olvana):

- Strategic Goals
  - Maintain position as the regional hegemon
  - Defend interests in the region (incl economic interests)
  - Remain outwardly neutral in the conflict (abstained during the UNSCR vote)
- Tactical Goals
  - Maintain strong military presence in the South China Sea
  - Will defend interests in the South China Sea with military force



NTMEF MLCOA (Panay)

- ME:
  - Secure Roxas APOD/SPOD
- SE:
  - Secure San Rafael Mine
  - Block any advances North from Iloilo along MSRs
  - Reinforce 3rd MAR Bde with additional Div Troops



NTMEF MDCOA (Panay)

- ME:
  - Seize Iloilo APOD/SPOD
- SE:
  - Neutralise Belesian 12th Bde
  - Secure San Rafael Mine
  - Secure Roxas APOD/SPOD
  - Reinforce 3rd MAR Bde with additional MAR Bde and Div Troops

NTMEF MLCOA (Palawan)

- ME:
  - Secure El Nido APOD/SPOD
- SE:
  - Maintain LOC back to NT

Assessed Enemy Critical Factors / Decisive Points

Critical Factors

- North Torbia will have long supply lines that cannot overfly South Torbian territory
  - This has necessitated the capture of a staging base in Palawan
  - Supply lines will have to traverse through international waters in the South China Sea and Sulu Sea
- NT JTF(Div) Command will be located in Palawan
  - Sizeable force will be located in Palawan to protect this vital logistic node (4th Marine Bde)
- The long supply lines from North Torbia to Panay mean that enemy lines of communication are vulnerable to interdiction and disruption
- North Torbia is relying on local Panayan support to maintain legitimacy of invasion
  - North Torbia will foment Panayan dissatisfaction with Belesian Federation and spur independence movement

Decisive Points

- Reinforce the ground forces in Panay with an additional NTMEF Div troops
- Potential capture of Iloilo
- Set conditions for favourable political solution
- Set conditions for the independence of Panay (under North Torbian / Olvanan auspices) from Belesian Federation by exploiting historical ethnic tensions

Assessed Enemy Centre of Gravity

Strategic

- North Torbia's Strategic CoG is the moral narrative that their occupation of Belesian territory is to protect ethnic Torbians from persecution in Belesia and their ability to control and maintain that narrative

Operational

- North Torbia's ability to sustain projected power in the region
- Ability to control the sea/air lanes
- The physical manifestation of this CoG are:
  - Surface and sub-surface naval capability
  - Combat aircraft operating out of Palawan and Panay
  - Logistics node at Palawan

Tactical

- TBA

Assumptions and IRs

OPERATION STEEL SENTINEL

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

CJOPS Intent

- **Commander's Intent**
  - **Purpose.** Enforce UNSCR 8873 to re-establish Belesian sovereignty in Panay and Palawan
  - **Method.** Deploy CJTF 667 with enablers from ADF and OGA to the JFAO to prosecute Multi-Domain Operations against North Torbian elements in Belesian sovereign territory. Coordinate WOAG and multinational efforts to enforce UNSCR 8873
  - **Endstate.** The removal of North Torbian forces from Belesian sovereign territory, establishment of a safe and secure environment in the occupied Belesian territories, and conditions set for the UN supervised transition of authority in Panay and Palawan back to the Belesian Government

Critical Assumptions

- Critical Assumptions
  - CJTF 667 will be a single rotation deployment
  - Minimum mass of Defence capability must remain in AUS for national defence
  - CJTF 667 will include FE from other nations
  - Full SOFA and cooperation with Belesia to allow staging of Coalition Forces (CF) from Belesian territory
  - CJTF 667 will not have complete operational command of all Host Nations (Belesian) Forces within the AO
    - CJTF 667 will have Operational Control of designated Belesian Forces
    - Belesian Forces will only be involved in a defensive capacity
  - Olvana will remain neutral as long as CF does not threaten Olvanan interests in the region (e.g. no staging of CF out of South China Sea)
  - South Torbia will remain strictly neutral due to previous armistice with North Torbia and will vigorously defend its territory (incl EEZ) from ALL incursions
  - Gabal has no means of enforcing sovereign territory



Situation

Enemy (North Torbia):

- North Torbian Marine Expeditionary Force (**NTMEF**) elements have lodged in Panay and Palawan
- NTMEF 4th MAR Bde lodged in El Nido and refurbished disused WW2 port and airfield being used as a staging base for movement into Panay
- NTMEF 3rd MAR Bde in Panay have secured the city of Roxas and San Rafael Mine complex
- Pro-NT insurgents (Visayan Peoples Front - VPF) have aided NT in securing strategic locations in Panay
- Surface and sub-surface sea elements are operating in the Sulu and Sth China Sea
  - 1x Type 052D Luyang III (DDG)
  - 2x Type 052C Luyang II (DDG)
  - 1x Type 051G Luda (DDG)
  - 2x Type 054A Jiankai II (FFG)
  - 1x Type 053H3 Jiangwei II (FFH)
  - 2x Type 053 Jianghu V (FFH)
  - 3x Type 039 Song (SSK)
- Combat air elements operating out of El Nido Airfield (12x SU-30MKK, 12x J-11B) and Roxas Airport (12x SU-30MKK, 12x J-11B, 12x Z-9, and 6x Z-19)
- Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) declared over occupied islands and connecting sea/air lanes

- Strategic Goals
  - Seek political solution to establish Panay 'independence' (annexation) under NT sponsorship
  - Seek to maintain destabilised region to set the conditions for annexation of Panay
  - Control of 'rare earth metals' supply in region

- Tactical Goals
  - NTMEF will likely secure positions within Panay and Palawan and may reinforce presence in region
  - Secure sea/air lines of communications/supply between Roxas/El Nido/North Torbia
  - Maintain and defend TEZ over occupied territories and sea/air lanes
  - No intent to escalate conflict beyond occupied islands


Cebu
South China Sea
Roxas
El Nido
San Rafael Mine
Panay
TEZ
Iloilo
Palawan
Sulu Sea

Situation (Panay)

- NTMEF 3rd Marine Bde have secured SPOD and APOD within Roxas City
- NTMEF, with help from the Visayan Peoples Front (VPF) have captured the San Rafael Mine complex
- NTMEF have established a mobile defensive position southwest of the San Rafael Mine and north of the city of Iloilo
- Belesian 12th Inf Bde, after landing in Iloilo, attempted to advance north to destroy NTMEF
- A stalemate has ensued with Belesian Forces defending positions around Iloilo
- North Torbian Forces control all northern approaches to Panay
- Belesia has access to Iloilo City SPOD/APOD



Situation

Host Nation (Belesia):

- Strategic Goals
  - Seeks UN support to reinstate Belesian authority over Panay and Palawan
  - Seeks not to antagonise ethnic Panayan citizens into independence actions
  - Seeks to maintain fragile cohesion of Belesian Federation
- Tactical Goals
  - Deployed 12th Inf Bde into Panay to defend Iloilo and remove NTMEF presence
  - Belesian Forces were not able to dislodge NTMEF and are satisfied with defending positions around Iloilo
  - Will maintain current military commitments within own borders

Neutral Nation (Gabal):

- Strategic Goals
  - Remain neutral
  - Reduce impact of potential humanitarian crisis in region within borders
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- Strategic Goals
  - Maintain recent armistice with North Torbia after last border skirmish in previous year
  - Remain neutral
- Tactical Goals
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- Strategic Goals
  - Maintain position as the regional hegemon
  - Defend interests in the region (incl economic interests)
  - Remain outwardly neutral in the conflict (abstained during the UNSCR vote)
- Tactical Goals
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Assessed Enemy Critical Factors / Decisive Points

Critical Factors

- North Torbia will have long supply lines that cannot overfly South Torbian territory
  - This has necessitated the capture of a staging base in Palawan
  - Supply lines will have to traverse through international waters in the South China Sea and Sulu Sea
- NT JTF(Div) Command will be located in Palawan
  - Sizeable force will be located in Palawan to protect this vital logistic node (4th Marine Bde)
- The long supply lines from North Torbia to Panay mean that enemy lines of communication are vulnerable to interdiction and disruption
- North Torbia is relying on local Panayan support to maintain legitimacy of invasion
  - North Torbia will foment Panayan dissatisfaction with Belesian Federation and spur independence movement

Decisive Points

- Reinforce the ground forces in Panay with an additional NTMEF Div troops
- Potential capture of Iloilo
- Set conditions for favourable political solution
- Set conditions for the independence of Panay (under North Torbian / Olvanan auspices) from Belesian Federation by exploiting historical ethnic tensions

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- North Torbia's Strategic CoG is the moral narrative that their occupation of Belesian territory is to protect ethnic Torbians from persecution in Belesia and their ability to control and maintain that narrative

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- North Torbia's ability to sustain projected power in the region
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  - Surface and sub-surface naval capability
  - Combat aircraft operating out of Palawan and Panay
  - Logistics node at Palawan

Tactical

- TBA

COMD CJTF 667 Intent

- **Commander's Intent**
  - **Purpose.** Enforce UNSCR 8873 to re-establish Belesian sovereignty in Panay and Palawan
  - **Method.** Removal of North Torbian forces in Belesian territory through decisive action utilising the full effects of Multi-Domain (Joint) Operations
  - **Endstate.** The removal of North Torbian forces from Belesia and conditions set for the UN supervised transition of authority in Panay and Palawan to the Belesian Government

LINES OF OPERATION



Decisive Points ?

1. Enemy dispositions in JFAO are defined/confirmed
2. Coalition Forces have temporal control of sea/air lanes to enable staging forces into Belesia
3. Coalition Forces have staged enough combat power in the JFAO to prosecute decisive actions
4. Coalition Forces have successfully executed the deception plan
5. NTMEF have been successfully isolated logistically on Panay
6. NTMEF isolated politically and socially from the local population on Panay
7. Coalition Forces have conducted JFEO successfully
8. Advance Forces have successfully transitioned operations
9. NTMEF is defeated in JFAO
10. Coalition Forces have transition of authority to UN

Objectives OBJ

1. Deny NTMEF sustainment on Panay
2. Estb safe and secure environment in occupied Belesian territories
3. Degrade Enemy Strategic CoG

CONOPS OUTLINE – OP STEEL SENTINEL

Phase 0 - Shaping

Main Effort
- Conduct Shaping Ops to isolate NTMEF
  - Political
  - Economic
  - Social

Supporting Effort
- Adv Force operations gathering OPFOR intelligence
- Establish temporal control of Sea/Air lanes in JFAO
- Staging forces into JFAO

Phase 1 - Denial

Main Effort
- Isolate NTMEF logistically on Panay

Supporting Effort
- Adv Force operations gathering OPFOR intelligence
- Conduct interdiction of NTMEF lines of communication
- Staging forces into JFAO
- Conduct Shaping Ops to isolate NTMEF
- Conduct deception plan

Phase 2 - Lodgement

Main Effort
- Conduct Joint Force Entry Ops into Panay

Supporting Effort
- Maintain temporal Sea/Air lanes control
- Conduct Shaping Ops to isolate NTMEF

Phase 3 – Neutralise

Main Effort
- Defeat NTMEF in Panay

Supporting Effort
- Conduct JFEO on Palawan
- Defeat NTMEF in Palawan
- Conduct COIN
- Maintain temporal Sea/Air lanes control
- Conduct Shaping Ops to isolate NTMEF

Phase 4 - Transition

Main Effort
- Transition to UN Peacekeeping

Supporting Effort
- Stability Operations

Sequel #2 – Panay Independence

Main Effort
- UN Peace Enforcement

Supporting Effort
- Anti-Piracy (MARSEC)
- Freedom of Navigation Ops (FONOPS)
- Reconstruction

Branch #1 - Escalation

- Wider regional conflict escalation with active involvement of:
  - Olvana
  - South Torbia
  - USA
  - Regional Actors

Branch #2 / Sequel #1 - HADR

- Regional HADR Response to:
  - Typhoon
  - Earthquake / Tsunami
  - Volcanic Eruption
  - Pandemic
  - Internally Displaced Persons
  - Economic Collapse

C2 and Groupings

See separate CJTF 667 C2 Diagram for more detail



Scheme of Manoeuvre

Phase 0 – Shaping (D-60 – D-11)

Main Effort:

- Conduct Shaping Operations to isolate NTMEF:
  - Politically
  - Economically
  - Socially
- This will be achieved through Whole-of-Australian-Government and international efforts utilising the information/cyber and space domains

Supporting Efforts:

- Advance Force operations in collecting intelligence on NTMEF in JFAO
- Control of sea/air lanes in Southern Belesia to allow initial staging in Belesia
- Staging of Coalition Forces in JFAO
  - Pri APOD – Gen Santos International Airport, General Santos City
  - Pri SPOD – Makar Wharf, General Santos City
  - Alt APOD – Col Edwin Andrews Airbase, Zamboanga
  - Alt SPOD – Zamboanga Port

Endstate:

- CJTF 667 will have been established in the JFAO to allow decisive actions to commence



Scheme of Manoeuvre

Phase 1 – Denial (D-10 – D-1)

Main Effort:

- Isolate NTMEF logistically in Panay and degrade capability

Supporting Efforts:

- Advance Force operations in collecting intelligence on NTMEF in JFAO
- Conduct interdiction of NTMEF lines of communication
- Degrade NTMEF capability in JFAO
- Conduct deception plan (e.g. ME being Palawan vice Panay)
- Temporal control of sea/air lanes in the JFAO to allow initial staging in Belesia
- Staging of Coalition Forces in JFAO
    - Pri APOD – General Santos International Airport, General Santos City
    - Pri SPOD – Makar Wharf, General Santos City
    - Alt APOD – Col Edwin Andrews Airbase, Zamboanga
    - Alt SPOD – Zamboanga Port

Endstate:

- NTMEF logistic supply to Panay will have been degraded to reduce NTMEF's freedom to manoeuvre



Scheme of Manoeuvre

Phase 2 – Lodgement (D-Day – D+2)

Main Effort:

- Conduct Joint Force Entry Operations into Panay

Supporting Efforts:

- Conduct Joint Force Entry Operations deception plan on Palawan
- Maintain temporal control of sea/air lanes within the JFAO
- Conduct interdiction of NTMEF lines of communication
- Continue to conduct shaping operations to isolate NTMEF
- Degrade NTMEF ground forces capability in Panay

Endstate:

- CJTF 667 ground elements will have lodged successfully in Panay



Scheme of Manoeuvre

Phase 3 – Neutralise (D+3 – D+14)

Main Effort:

- Defeat NTMEF in Panay

Supporting Efforts:

- Conduct JFEO into Palawan
  - Defeat NTMEF in Palawan
- Maintain temporal control of sea/air lanes within the JFAO
- Conduct COIN operations
- Continue to conduct shaping operations to isolate NTMEF

Endstate:

- NTMEF ground forces will have been defeated on Panay and Palawan



Scheme of Manoeuvre Phase 3 – Neutralise (D+3 – D+14)



Scheme of Manoeuvre

Phase 4 – Transition (D+15 onwards)

Main Effort:

- Transition to UN Peacekeeping

Supporting Efforts:

- Stability Operations
- Information Operations to support strategic messaging
- Freedom of Navigation Ops (FONOPS) in international waters
- Anti-Piracy Maritime Security Patrols (MARSEC)
- Reconstruction Efforts

Endstate:

- Transition of authority will have been conducted between CJTF 667 and UN Mission / HN Security
- CJTF 667 will have been transitioned and postured to conduct stability operations as required

Concept for Intelligence Operations

Collection

- All available intelligence gathering assets across all domains will be utilised including:
  - HUMINT
  - ELINT
  - SIGINT

Link to PIR

- TBA

Counterintelligence

- TBA

Concept for Personnel / Logistics / Health

Personnel

- All personnel will concentrate in Darwin as the initial Force concentration prior to departing for the JFAO where possible
- Standard Force Preparation pre-deployment will be conducted by all personnel
- Regular rotations of formed bodies will not be expected
  - All personnel expected to deploy for the duration of the Operation
  - Reinforcements will be expected as individuals where critical trades are required or as formed bodies
    - Readying Cbt Bde is expected to provide reinforcing personnel / formed bodies on 72hr NTM

Logistics

- LOGCC and 3rd line logistic node will be based at APOD Gen Santos
- Additional logistic node will be deployed to support air and sea operations out of SPOD Zamboanga
- NSB elements to provide priority support to CJTF 667 OPDEM
- All NSB support will be through JLU-N Darwin
- CJTF 667 will maintain 30 DOS of CL I/III/V and 5 DOS of all other class of supply
  - CJTF667 may be able to draw on CL I supply from Belesia

Health Support

- Ground elements will have integral Role 1 (R1) at Formation level
- Role 2 Enhanced (R2E) facilities will be located at APOD Gen Santos (1 EHS) with a 2nd R2E to forward deploy to Iloilo during Ph 2 (2 GHB)
- Additional R2E will deploy organic with LHDs during Ph 2
- UNSC Mercy (R3) will be deployed to the SPOD Zamboanga and forward deployed as required
- Role 4 (R4) is designated as Royal Darwin Hospital – also designated as National Support Base (NSB)
- RW AME will deploy forward from APOD. FW AME will deploy from APOD to NSB
- Local (Belesian) medical facilities will only be utilised in extremis
  - Primary responsibility to treat civilian casualties

Communications and Information Systems

Space

- TBA

Datalinks

- TBA

Coordination

- TBA

Command and Signal

Command

- Succession of Command
  - COMD CJTF 667
  - Deputy COMD CJTF 667
  - MCC
  - LCC

Signals

- TBA

Vulnerabilities and Risks

Phase 0

- TBA

Phase 1

- TBA

Phase 2

- TBA

Phase 3

- TBA

Phase 4

- TBA

ANNEX I TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

JOINT EFFECTS, TARGETING AND OFFENSIVE SUPPORT

References:

A. ADDP 3.1 Joint Fires and Effects (Ag 2018)
B. ADFP 3.1.1 Joint Fires and Effects Procedures (Ag 2018)
C. ADDP 3.14 Targeting (Jl 2018)
D. ADFP 3.14.2 Targeting Procedures (Jul. 2018)
E. LWP-CA (OS) 5-3-3 Joint Fires and Effects – Planning, Execution and Targeting (Land)
F. CDF Targeting Directive (OP STEEL SENTINEL)
G. *CJOP Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List*
H. *ROE*
I. *Air tasking Order* ***

Time Zone used Throughout the Order: Zulu

1. Situation.

a. Enemy. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) to CJTF 667 OPORD (OPERATION STEEL SENTINEL), DTG. Enemy forces based on North Torbian Marine Expeditionary Force (NTMEF) with other NT irregular forces operating in the JFAO.

(1) **FIRES capability**:

(a) ***Maritime:*** Up to 4xNGS capable DDG / FFH with 5-inch main armament, Ship-borne anti-ship missile to be withheld for ASuW, utilisation for coastal target suppression to be avoided. SSG to be used primarily for ASuW, ASW and ISR.

(b) ***Land:***

1. NTMEF brigade-size group on PANAY:

A. **DIV TP**: (?) BTY MRL (6 x 122mm M2008 TRK);
BTY SAM (3 x HQ 16).

B. **BN(-)**: 2 x HOW BTY (12 x 122mm PLZ89 TRK;
BTY MRL (6 x 122mmm Type 903 WHL).

C. **BN**: 3 x AD BTY (6 x HQ 17 CSA 15 launcher; 12 x 35mm SP AAA PGX 07).

D. **TA**: sound ranging.

E. **Mortars**: 3 x Mech Inf Bn each with mor bty of 6 x M37 82mm mor (total 18 x 82mm mor).

2. NTMEF battalion-size group on PALAWAN:

A. **DIV TP**: (?) BTY SAM (3 x HQ 16)**HOW BTY** (1 FA BN): (6 x 122mm PLZ89 TRK).

B. **Mortars**: Mech Inf Bn MOR BTY 6 x M37 82mm.

(c) ***Offensive Air:*** Available across JTFAO, 24x S-30 MKK multi-role (12-PANAY, 12-PALAWAN), 6x Z-19 RW gunships (PANAY).

(2) **Terrain, Implications for Joint Effects, Targeting and Offensive Support: TBC.**

(3) **Weather, Implications for Joint Effects, Targeting and Offensive Support: TBC.**

b. Friendly Forces. Refer to Annex A (Task Organisation) and paragraph 1j (Friendly Forces) to CJTF 667 OPORD (OPERATION STEEL SENTINEL), DTG.

2. **Mission**. JTF 667 assigned offensive fire support, EW, IO and targeting units are to deliver joint effects, lethal and non-lethal, in BX JFAO in order to isolate, contain and expel NTMEF.

3. **Execution**.

Commander's Effects Intent:

Purpose. Reinforce, amplify and expand capacity of BX to expel NTMEF (NT) from BX sovereign territory.

Method. The following Joint Effects will support the line of operation:

(a) ***Main Effort***. Support the restoration of BX territorial sovereignty by applying lethal and non-lethal joint offensive support and targeting capabilities.

(b) ***Supporting Effort***s:

1. Intelligence-led Surveillance and Target Acquisition across JTFAO to identify high-vale (HVT) and high pay-off targets (HPT).

2. Application of kinetic and non-kinetic systems to priority HPT/HVT to deplete NTMEF in JTFAO leading to their explosion from BX sovereign territory.

3. Interdict sea/air lanes between NT and BX to isolate NTMEF.

4. Cyber Operations to deplete NT ICT operational and tactical ICT capability.

5. Information Operations to garner and maintain support for JTF operation to repel NT from BX sovereign Territory and fulfill requirements of UN Resolutions.

6. Establish protective operations to counter NTMEF efforts to prevent CJTF achievement of its mission.

End State. CJTF 667 has established operational supremacy in JTFAO that friendly operations are able to expel NTMEF from BX sovereign territory and NTMEF cannot interfere with or operations.

Guidance for Joint Effects. Employ lethal and non-lethal capabilities to achieve prioritised effects that contribute directly to the achievement of strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. NTMEF have established positions in PALAWAN and PANAY requiring JTF 667 to fix NT forces in Phases 0 & 1. The priority of effort in Phases 0 & 1 will be information operations, cyber operations, maritime operations and air support operations. Phase 2 and beyond will commence the incorporation of ground-based fire support in the joint offensive fire support system. JFECC will be established and responsible for the effective application of capability in the JTFAO.

Targets and priorities. CJTF will base deliberate and dynamic targeting plans on CJOP's Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List (JIPTL), which is based on the Strategic Effects and Targeting Board Directive:

(a) Identify HVT/HPT and method of engagement:

1. Kinetic/Lethal;
2. Kinetic/Non-Lethal;
3. Non-Kinetic/Lethal; and
4. Non-Kinetic/Non-Lethal.

(b) Indicate deliberate schedule and on-call target;

(c) Designate:

1. Joint Target List;
2. No-Strike List; and
3. Restricted Target List.

c. Concept of Operations. Refer to paragraph 3d, Concept of Operations, to CJTF 667 OPORD (OPERATION STEEL SENTINEL), DTG.

d. Concept of Joint Effects. The CJFT JFECC coordinates, synchronises, and controls the employment of joint fires. Joint fires focus on NTMEF in JTFAO affecting CJTF operations. Joint fires provide decisive effects against the NTMEF, anything less is unacceptable. Initially, joint fires focus on shaping operations to isolate NT forces in PALAWAN and PANAY from potential reinforcement and sustainment, setting the conditions for the explosion of the enemy. As clearance operations commence, joint fires strike deep into the NT's combat formations and command and control structure, this enhancing the sense of isolation of forces on PALAWAN and PANAY. Use of NGS, ground-based systems and offensive air support will require establishment of air superiority in the JFTAO across all Phases, therefore SEAD will be a priority activity.

(1) Phase 0 - **Shaping**

(a) Concept of Joint Effects. JTF 667 joint fire support will shape the battlespace by degrading NTMEF on PALAWAN and PANAY by isolating them from potential reinforcement and sustainment. The effort will be focus of JFMCC and JFACC. SOTG will provide observation, communication and liaison on PALAWAN and PANAY for joint fire support actions during this phase.

(b) Task. CFMCC and CFACC set the conditions for Phase 2 and beyond operations through interdiction of NT LOC and depletion of NT operational capability on

PALAWAN and PANAY. Joint fires initially isolate NT through defeat of their operational-level command and control and disruption of lines of communication. Maintain air superiority over JTF in BX gradually expanding to include areas in PALAWAN and PANAY currently under NT control.

(c) Purpose. To set the conditions for successful JTF build p and operational lodgements in JTFAO by depleting NT ability to establish in BX.

(d) Execution. JTF 667 JFECC will coordinate AI and maritime operations over sea and air lanes between NT & BX. In addition, JFECC will coordinate STA and joint offensive support to locate and attack HPT and HVT IAW Target Lists: C2, FIRES, GBAD, aircraft and communication nodes on PALAWAN and PANAY. Employ J-SEAD to support the expansion of air superiority over PALAWAN and PANAY currently held by NT forces. IO focuses on convincing NT leadership that further resistance is futile and to cease combat operations. IO garners and maintains public support of JTF-OSS while continuing to undermine public support and legitimacy of the NT. Priority of fires is the provision of offensive air support and NGS.

(e) Assessment. NT air defence destroyed, command and control neutralised and ground-based fire support reduced to 50%. NT leadership wavering in its resolve and incapable of providing responsive fires. NT unable to develop its operations or interfere with ours.

(f) Targeting Priorities.

1. Interdict sea and air LOC.
2. Neutralise NT C2 on PALAWAN and PANAY.
3. Destroy ground-based air defence on PALAWAN and PANAY.
4. Neutralise manoeuvre formations capable of interfering with amphibious lodgment sites.

(g) JTF 667 Air Apportionment.

1. Defensive Counter Air (DCA) – 15%
2. Offensive Counter Air (OCA) – 20%
3. Air Interdiction (AI) – 40%
4. SEAD – 20%
5. CAS – 5%.

(h) JTF 667 CAS Distribution:

1. TG667.4
2. TG640
3. TG667.1.

(2) Phase 1 – **Denial**.

(a) Concept of Joint Effects. JTF 667 joint fire support continue to shape the battlespace by degrading NTMEF on PALAWAN and PANAY by isolating them from potential reinforcement and sustainment as well as escalating actions on NT targets on PANAY. The effort will be focus of JFMCC and JFACC. SOTG will provide observation, communication and liaison on PALAWAN and PANAY for joint fire support actions during this phase. Maintain air superiority over JTFAO and begins to extend into PALAWAN and PANAY.

(b) Task. CFMCC and CFACC continue to set the conditions for Phase 2 and beyond operations through interdiction of NT LOC and depletion of NT operational capability on PALAWAN and PANAY. Joint fires initially isolate NT through defeat of their operational-level C2 and disruption of lines of communication. Maintain air superiority, extending to include areas in PANAY currently under NT control.

(c) Purpose. Set the conditions for the destruction of NT as a fighting force.

(d) Execution. JTF 667 JFECC will coordinate STA and joint offensive support to locate and attack HPT and HVT IAW Target List: C2, FIRES, GBAD, aircraft and communication nodes in PALAWAN and PANAY. J-SEAD is employed to support the expansion of air superiority over JTFAO currently held by NT forces and, when able, to support AI operations over sea and air lanes between NT & BX. IO focuses on convincing NT leadership that further resistance is futile and to cease combat operations. IO garners and maintains public support of JTF-OSS while continuing to undermine public support and legitimacy of the NT. Priority of fires is the provision of offensive air support and NGS.

(e) Assessment. NT ground formations rendered combat ineffective. NT forces on PALAWAN and PANAY isolated and disconnected from LOC from NT. Local populace remains supportive of JTF 667 OSS and actions while resolve of NT leadership continues to degrade.

(f) Targeting Priorities.

1. Neutralise NT C2 on PALAWAN and PANAY.
2. Destroy ground-based air defence on PALAWAN and PANAY.
3. Neutralise manoeuvre formations capable of interfering with amphibious lodgment sites.
4. Deny sea and air LOC to NT on PALAWAN and PANAY.

(g) JTF-OIG Air Apportionment.

1. DCA – 15%
2. OCA – 20%
3. AI – 30%
4. SEAD – 15%
5. Counter Fires – 15%

6. CAS - 5%.

(h) JFLCC CAS Distribution.

1. TG667.4

2. TG640.

(3) Phase 2 – **Lodgement**.

(a) Concept of Joint Effects. JTF 667 joint fire support will focus on denying NT forces on PANAY from interfering with the disembarkation at ILOILO and the amphibious lodgment in SOUTHEASTERN area of PANAY. This is include neutralising all maritime, air and ground approaches to the lodgement sites. Joint effects are to ensure such supremacy in the battlespace that NT forces' freedom of manoeuvre is denied and that JTF 667 freedom of manoeuvre is maximised. Effort will shift to CFLCC operations on PANAY and preparation for a lodgment IVO EL NIDO on PALAWAN. SOTG will provide observation, communication and liaison on PALAWAN and PANAY for joint fire support actions during this phase. CFACC maintain air superiority over PALAWAN and PANAY.

(b) Task. JTF 667 continue to set the conditions for Phase 3 and beyond operations through destruction NT IOT deplete NT operational capability on PALAWAN and PANAY. Joint fires initially deny NT ability to repel maritime and amphibious lodgements on PANAy and PALAWAN through annihilation of armour, IDF and anti-shipping capabilities. Continue to disrupt C2 and lines of communication. Maintain air superiority over PANAY and PALAWAN.

(c) Purpose. Ensure successful lodgement on NT held islands in JFTAO and set the conditions for a breakout from beachheads on PANAY and PALAWAN to defeat NT forces.

(d) Execution. JTF 667 JFECC will coordinate STA and joint offensive support to locate and attack HPT and HVT IAW Target List: C2, FIRES, armour, GBAD, aircraft and communication nodes in PALAWAN and PANAY. J-SEAD is employed to support the maintain air superiority over JTFAO currently held by NT forces and, when able, to support AI operations over sea and air lanes between NT & BX. IO focuses on convincing BX population in PANAY and PALAWAN that liberation from NT is imminent to eliminate any support to NT. NT. Convince NT leadership that further resistance is futile and to cease combat operations. Priority of fires is the provision of offensive air support, IDF and NGS

(e) Assessment. NT ground formations rendered combat ineffective by the destruction of armour and IDF systems. NT forces on PALAWAN and PANAY isolated and disconnected from LOC from NT. Local populace remains supportive of JTF 667 OSS and actions while resolve of NT leadership continues to degrade.

(f) Targeting Priorities.

1. Destroy ground-based air defence on PALAWAN and PANAY

2. Neutralise NT ground, air and maritime capabilities to eliminate interference with amphibious lodgment sites, beachheads and breakout

3. Destroy NT armour on PALAWAN and PANAY

4. Destroy NT C2 on PALAWAN and PANAY

5. Destroy NT IDF on PALAWAN and PANAY

6. Deny sea and air LOC to NT on PALAWAN and PANAY.

(g) JTF-OIG Air Apportionment.

1. DCA – 5%
2. OCA – 20%
3. AI – 10%
4. SEAD – 5%
5. Counter Fires – 30%
6. CAS - 30%

(h) JFLCC CAS Distribution.

1. TG667.4
2. TG640

(4) Phase 3- **Neutralise**

(a) Concept of Joint Effects. JTF 667 joint fire support will incorporate ground-based systems and continue to shape the battlespace by degrading NTMEF in JTFAO. Effort is by isolating them from potential reinforcement and sustainment as well as escalating actions on NT targets on PANAY and supporting deception plan on PALAWAN. JFLCC and SOTG will provide observation, communication and liaison on in JFTAO for joint fire support actions during this phase.

(b) Task. JTF 667 joint fire support to provide support to defeat NTMEF in JTFAO, concurrently denying se of LOC to NT air and sea craft.

(c) Purpose. Defeat of NT forces on PANAY and PALAWAN and set the conditions for the conduct of COIN operations.

(d) Execution. JTF 667 JFECC will coordinate STA and joint offensive support to locate and attack HPT and HVT IAW Target List: C2, FIRES, GBAD, aircraft and communication nodes in PALAWAN and PANAY. J-SEAD will continue to assure of air superiority over JTFAO and support AI operations over sea and air lanes between NT & BX. IO focuses on convincing NT leadership that further resistance is futile and to cease combat operations. IO garners and maintains public support of JTF-OSS while continuing to undermine public support and legitimacy of the NT. Priority of joint fire support effort is defeat of NTMEF on PANAY; secondary effort is support to JFEO on PALAWAN.

(e) Assessment. NT ground formations defeated on PALAWAN and PANAY. Isolate NT forces LOC from NT to prevent extraction. Local populace remains supportive of JTF 667 OSS and actions while resolve of NT leadership continues to degrade.

(f) Targeting Priorities.

1. Neutralise NT C2 on PALAWAN and PANAY.
2. Destroy ground-based air defence on PALAWAN and PANAY.
3. Destroy manoeuvre formations and nits in JTFAO.

4. Deny sea and air LOC to NT on PALAWAN and PANAY.

(g) JTF-OSS Air Apportionment.

1. DCA – 5%
2. OCA – 20%
3. AI – 10%
4. SEAD – 15%
5. Counter Fires – 15%
6. CAS - 35%.

(h) JFLCC CAS Distribution.

1. ME – defeat NTMEF in PANAY.
2. Operations on and around PALAWAN.
3. COIN operations.

(5) Phase 4 - **Transition.**

(a) Concept of Joint Effects. Joint fires are prepared to counter any threats posed by the NTMEF (NT and insurgency). Joint fires concurrently support transition to N Peacekeeping operations while simultaneously maintaining the capability to interdict LOC between BX and NT.

(b) Task. CFMCC BPT intercept NT shipping along LOC and provide NGS to maintain BX territorial integrity. CFACC BPT enforce NFZ over LOC. CFLCC BPT execute joint fires as necessary throughout the AO to maintain territorial integrity in support of COIN operations.

(c) Purpose. Establish the military conditions necessary for the transition to N-led Peacekeeping operations without node external or internal threat.

(d) Execution. JTF 667 JFECC will coordinate operational targeting focusing on non-lethal / non-kinetic methods while BPT coordinate kinetic/lethal fire support for COIN operations. IO focuses on stabilising BX and supporting transition to N Peacekeeping. IO also to convince insurgency that resistance is futile and to cease combat operations. IO garners and maintains public support of JTF-OSS while continuing to undermine public support and legitimacy of the insurgency. Priority of joint fire support effort is defeat of insurgency on PANAY and PALAWAN.

(e) Assessment. NTMEF pose no immediate offensive threat to BX.

(f) Targeting Priorities. TBD.

(g) CJTF-OIG Air Apportionment.

1. DCA – 50%
2. OCA – 0%
3. AI – 30%
4. SEAD – 0%

5. CAS – 20%.

(h) CFLCC CAS Distribution.

1. COIN Operations
2. Operations in support of UN.

e. JFMCC (TG667.1) Maritime Operations

(1) General. JFMCC will be located in General Santos City, BX. JFMCC supports joint targeting effort and provide surface-to-surface (NGS) in support of JFLCC operations.

(2) CJTF 667 Intent for Sea Power. Isolate NT forces in JTFAO by denying NT se of sea and air LOC. Support JFLCC and SOTG to fix and destroy NTMEF in JTFAO.

f. JFACC (TG640) Air Operations.

(1) General. JFACC will be located in General Santos City, BX. Allocate sorties based on apportionment guidance received CJTF 667-OSS. JFACC initially maintains air superiority over JTFAO while setting the conditions for the expansion of air superiority into LOC to isolate NTMEF in PANAY and PALAWAN. Conduct CAS in support of JFLCC defeat of NTMEF in JTFAO.

(2) CJTF 667 Intent for Airpower. Maintain air superiority as necessary to allow for freedom of manoeuvre, provide CAS for troops in contact, and conduct shaping operations via AI. Cyber Ops/EW.

g. Artillery Support.

(1) Organisation for Combat.

(a) Phase 0 (Shaping).

1. Arty Tac HQ and JFECC – DJFHQ/HQ 1 Division.
2. 20 Regiment (RISTA) in support targeting.
3. 16 Regiment (air/land) in support VLAD.
4. AS & NZ Regiment in location BPT in direct support CJTF.
5. AS Regiment JFET in direct support SOTG 667.4.

(b) Phase 1 (Clear).

1. Arty Tac HQ and JFECC – DJFHQ.
2. 20 Regiment (RISTA) in support targeting.
3. 16 Regiment (air/land) in support VLAD.
4. AS & NZ Regiment in direct support JFLCC.
5. AS Regiment JFET in direct support SOTG 667.4.

(c) Phase 2 (Lodgement)

1. Arty Tac HQ and JFECC – DJFHQ.
2. 20 Regiment (RISTA) in support targeting.
3. 16 Regiment (air/land) in support VLAD.
4. AS & NZ Regiment in direct support JFLCC.
5. AS Regiment JFET in direct support SOTG 667.4.

(d) Phase 3 (Neutralise).

1. Arty Tac HQ and JFECC – DJFHQ.
2. 20 Regiment (RISTA) in support targeting.
3. 16 Regiment (air/land) in support VLAD.
4. AS & NZ Regiment in direct support JFLCC
5. AS Regiment JFET in direct support SOTG 667.4

(e) Phase 4 (Stabilise).

1. Arty Tac HQ and JFECC – DJFHQ
2. 20 Regiment (RISTA) in support targeting
3. 16 Regiment (air/land) in support VLAD
4. AS & NZ Regiment in direct support JFLCC
5. AS Regiment JFET in direct support SOTG 667.4.

h. Naval Surface Fires. All missions are vetted through the Joint Targeting Coordination Board. All NGS requests through Arty Tac HQ

i. Target Acquisition/Counterfire. JFLCC retains control over 20 Regiment and 16 Regiment assets. 20 Regiment TAC HQ is designated the JFLCC Counter fire Headquarters.

j. Information Operations/Nonlethal Fires. Information operations and nonlethal fires objectives, effects, and priorities are coordinated through the CJTF-OSS Information Operations Working Group.

k. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Joint Fires Element. CJTF-OSS J-3 establishes the Joint Fires Element to assist in the planning, coordination, and synchronization of fires in the JTFOA.

(2) Target Lists. TBI.

(3) Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCM). TBI.

(4) Fire Support Coordination Lines. TBI.

(5) Coordinated Fire Lines. TBI.

(6) No Fire Area. NFA TBI.

(7) SPINS. Applies to all CJTF fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft (including all AV) operating in the JTFOA.

(8) Airspace Control. JFLCC, JFMCC, and SOTG must be included in the Airspace Control Plan (ACP) as they all have organic aviation and small AV assets.

(9) Air Tasking Order. TBI.

4. **Sustainment**.

a. Logistics. Refer to Annex R (Logistic Support Order) to OPORD 01 (OPERATION STEEL SENTINEL), DTG...

b. Ammunition. The following minimum Class V CSRs are in effect:

(1) NZ Field Regiment:

(a) 105 mm (HE ./c fuse PD & CVT)

(b) 105 mm (WP)

(c) 105 mm (ILLUM)

(d) 105 mm (HES).

(2) AS Regiment

(a) 155 mm (HE ./c fuse PD & CVT)

(b) 155 mm (HE RAP)

(c) 155 mm (DPICM)

(d) 155 mm (HC SMK)

(e) 155 mm (Excalibur)

(f) 155 mm (HES).

5. **Command and Signal**.

a. C2.

(1) Locations. Arty Tac HQ located with CJTF.

(2) Succession of Command. Per SOP.

(3) Stats.

(a) AS Regiment in direct spport AS Brigade.

(b) NZ Regiment in direct spport to NZ Brigade.

(c) 0 Regiment in direct spport to CJTF.

(4) Reports and Returns. Refer to Annex V .

b. Signal. Refer to paragraph 5.c. OPORD 01 (OPERATION STEEL SENTINEL), DTG.)


Battle Rhythm
Higher COMD & HQ Briefing Schedule
Air Tasking Cycle (ATC)
JIPTL (kinetic & non-kinetic effects)
CMO
PSYOP
CNO
EW/ECM
DECEP
HUMINT
ELINT
UAV ISR
SIGINT
MASINT
JFires
ASUG
NGFS
GBAD
JLOG
JMOV
JMED
MAINT
IOWG
Info Ops
CMWG
Collection Mngr
OSWG
Offensive Spt
JEWG
Joint Effects
JECB
Coord Board
Decision
Decision
Comd
Guide
Decision
& Force
Apportion
-ment
LOG PREVENTION
Reports and Returns
Sustainment
& LOG WG
LSCB
Target
Tracking
Effects
Co-ord
Project
Progress
ORDERS
via,
FRAGO
or
TASKO
Next
days
Effects,
Activities
and
Targets

ANNEX K TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
DATED XXXXX

LEGAL

References:
A. UN Security Council Resolution 8873 (UNSCR 8873)
B. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Australia-Belesia, 11 April 2006

Introduction

1. The legal basis for any warlike operation is generally under the auspices of the United Nations (and in particular the Security Council) and/or the invitation and consent of the Government of the Host State. The nature of the operation will generally determine whether an international agreement/arrangement is required.

2. Diplomatic clearances will generally suffice for low key activities such as port visits, KLE or the attendance of ADF personnel to certain events or command post exercises. Whereas more complex or sustained operations are likely to be supported by an international agreement/arrangement which address the scope and basis for ADF activities and the privileges and immunities for participating personnel.

3. In the absence of any invitation or consent by a nation state, GoAS will ordinarily require either a UN or regional mandate to conduct relevant operations in that state.

Legal Basis

4. In the case of Operation Steel Sentinel (OSS) and the presence of Australian and other Coalition Forces (CJTF 667) in Belesia, that mandate is prescribed under UNSCR 8873 (ref A). Specifically, the Security Counsel has authorised the establishment and deployment of a multinational military force in Belesia – International Belesian Security Assistance Force (IBSAF). The IBSAF's mandate is end the state-initiated hostile action by North Torbia and other belligerents, with the following objectives:

a. The expulsion of North Torbian forces from Belesian territory, the restoration and maintenance of Belesian sovereignty and the deterrence of any further external aggression against Belesian sovereign territory.

b. The preservation of human life and the alleviation of suffering for affected populations within Belesia, including the facilitation of humanitarian aid programs.

c. The re-establishment of a safe and secure environment in Belesia within which the national government can pursue its own programs for national development, peace and prosperity.

5. IBSAF is to work within the following parameters:

a. Overall command and control to be exercised by Australia with initial troop contributing nations of Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, and Indonesia, and augmented by resources (all types) of other member states.

b. The primary focus of operations to be within the territorial boundaries of Belesia. Operations elsewhere may be conducted if required to support or achieve the objectives set out in paragraph 4 above. All operations within Belesia to be undertaken in full coordination and cooperation with Belesian authorities and forces, cognisant of the sovereign authority of the Government of Belesia, its Departments, Agencies and officials.

c. Be established, deployed and conduct operations in Belesia for an initial period of twelve (12) months post arrival in theatre with extensions and/or termination of activities to be determined by the Security Council.

d. Coalition military operations are to minimise any adverse environmental and economic impacts in Belesia and in the Pacific more broadly to facilitate a rapid return to peacetime conditions and the commencement of follow-on development activities after the cessation of hostilities.

6. IBSAF is also required to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in Belesia. IBSAF members must also immediately inform their chain of command of any measures taken to protect civilians and civilian populated areas so that reporting obligations to the Security Council can be complied with.

International Agreement/Arrangements

7. HQJOC Legal will be consulted during the early planning/scoping of any operation in the Asia-Pacific region to ascertain whether existing international agreements or arrangements can support the proposed operation or whether instruments/agreements will need to be drafted. All international agreements and arrangements must be cleared by the Directorate of International Government Agreements and Arrangements (DIGAA) and may require broader consultation beyond HQJOC to inform their content.

8. As a general guide, international agreements/arrangements can include clauses that work to manage risk in the areas of:

a. use of deadly force

b. enforcement of Total Exclusion Zones

c. rules of engagement

d. use of force to maintain peace and stability over a civilian populace

e. handling of PW/CPERS

f. handling of IDP

g. carrying out of infrastructure works

h. rendering of medical/pharmaceutical assistance

i. deployment of personnel for the purposes of engaging in force protection

j. deployment of personnel for the rendering of logistical support.

9. In short, an international agreement or arrangement will be required for any significant event or situation that normally requires special permissions, licences or authorisation by the Requesting State or relevant nation requiring support/assistance.

General Provisions in SOFA

10. The standard provisions in a SOFA or international agreement/arrangement *generally* cover the following but are determined on a case by case basis:

a. criminal jurisdiction

b. civil claims

c. investigations

d. entry/departure requirements

e. freedom of movement

f. use of services and facilities

g. communications

h. security measures

i. uniform and carriage of arms

j. use of services and facilities

k. recognition of licences/qualifications.

11. The AS/BX SOFA of 2006 (Ref B) provides the basis of relationships between the forces of CJTF 667 and Belesia. Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) to CJTF 667 may fall under the general provisions under Ref B, but may enact their own SOFA with Belesia.

General Considerations Rule of Engagement

12. The mission specific ROE are detailed in Annex L to this OPORD.

13. **Use of force in self defence.** Use of force in self-defence must be reasonable in light of the danger posed, the level of the force must be necessary to avert the threat and the use of force must be limited in its intensity and duration to that which is reasonably necessary in the circumstances. Where circumstances permit the use of force is to be graduated.

14. **Interaction with the local population.** Where the ADF tasking is likely to involve interaction with the local population, including in support of local law enforcement, it may require ADF personnel to restrict the movement of civilians. In these circumstances careful consideration of appropriate mission specific ROE will likely be required.

15. **Targeting.** Annex I to this OPORD provides details on constraints or procedures for the conduct of targeting activities and generation of effects.

Interoperability arrangements between ADF and coalition partners

16. AS and other coalition forces generally operate under national lines, i.e. their own national ROE. Interoperability between ADF and coalition forces will generally be enhanced with a combined Authorities Matrix and Decision Support Matrix which reflects any differences across the force. TCN will comply with the CJTF 667 ROE or National Command Authority ROE whichever is the stricter.

17. It is anticipated that ADF and coalition forces will cooperate with each other in relation to an investigations of any accident or incident and that investigations or subsequent inquiries may be conducted jointly or in parallel along national lines. In circumstances where an investigation is to be conducted by a coalition partner, HQJOC Legal should be engaged.

Legal Support

18. **Legal Assistance to ADF personnel.** Legal assistance can be sought through either: the legal officer (if any) force assigned to the specific operation/activity; or otherwise, through HQJOC SO2 Legal.

19. **Legal Support to Commander.** Legal support to command can be sought through either: the legal officer (if any) force assigned to the HQ CJTF; or otherwise, through HQJOC SO2 Legal Domestic Operations.

ANNEX L TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT – OPERATION STEEL SENTINEL

References:
A. MC 362/1 NATO Rules of Engagement (ROE), dated 27 JUN 03
B. San Remo Handbook on Rules of Engagement, dated 09 NOV 09
C. UN Security Council Resolution 8869 dated XXXXXXX
D. UN Security Council Resolution 8873 dated XXXXXXX

1. General Principles

a. Introduction. The United Nations, has issued policy and military guidance on the strategic objectives for operations in Belesia. For the International Belesian Security Assistance Force (IBSAF), it has been decided to adopt NATO principles and procedures, with the San Remo Manual for Rules of Engagement for the promulgation and amendment of ROE. General guidance in relation to NATO ROE, is set out in Ref A, with further clarification of San Remo ROE at Ref B. When referring to IBSAF, this reference shall encompass Combined Joint Task Force-Operation 667 (CJTF 667) and all attached force elements. COMD CJTF 667 is referred to as COMD IBSAF in this document.

b. Authority. The authority providing the legal framework for the operation is set out in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) in accordance with Refs B and D. Any changes to this ROE shall be authorised by CJOPS with Coalition partner input. The current authority provides for IBSAF to take all necessary measures to carry out the tasks listed in UNSCRs 8869 and 8873, including the use of deadly force in order to fulfil its mission.

c. ROE Definition. ROE are directives that define the circumstances, conditions, degree and manner, in which force or actions, which might be construed as provocative, may or may not be applied or taken. The ROE implemented for this operation provide the sole authority for IBSAF to use force. Although the ROE do not limit the inherent right of self-defence, different national approaches to the definition of self-defence may result in inconsistency between multinational forces as to where the right to use force in self-defence ends and the use of force authorised by the mission ROE begins.

d. Geographical Application of the ROE. These ROE apply within the geographical boundaries of the JFAO as defined in the CJTF 667 OPORD at paragraphs 1.h.(1) and (2).

e. Self-Defence. Nothing in these ROE shall negate a commander's right to take all necessary action for unit and individual self-defence.

(1) Individuals and units have a right to defend themselves against attack or an imminent attack.

(a) In exercising this right, individuals and units will act in accordance with national law. Therefore more detailed and specific guidance from Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) applicable for their respective forces will be required.

(b) Self-defence is the use of such necessary and proportional force, including deadly force, to defend against an attack or an imminent attack.

(c) The principles of necessity and proportionality, together with terms "imminent" and "attack" defined in Ref. A para 7 will apply for all IBSAF.

(2) Within the general concept of self-defence, IBSAF have the right to use force that is necessary and proportional to defend civilians accompanying IBSAF, including UN personnel, and civilians who have been taken hostage.

f. Extended Self-defence. Ref A stipulates, "In keeping with the principles of the Alliance, within the general concept of self-defence, Coalition/Coalition-led forces and personnel also have the right to take appropriate measures, including the use of necessary and proportional force to defend other Coalition/Coalition-led forces and personnel from attack or from imminent attack". "Coalition led forces" include any IBSAF forces OPCON, TACOMD or TACON (for the time being) to CJTF 667.

g. Application of ROE and the Use of Force. Within this coalition for Operation STEEL SENTINEL, ROE are authorised by IBSAF. The chain of command is therefore responsible to disseminate the ROE, ensure understanding, request clarifications and, seek amendments as required. The chain of command also assumes the responsibility to ensure compliance and determine incompatibilities. During the conduct of the operation the use of force principles described in Ref A para 10-12 apply.

h. Applicable Law. The ROE applies principles of international law. The IBSAF mission must be communicated and correctly perceived as being lawfully requested/mandated by the UN. COMD IBSAF will engage with non-military entities mitigating any incorrect perception of the Coalition presence in the Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO) (once authority to coordinate is delegated). Simultaneously, coordinating efforts will be conducted at the strategic level, communicating the legitimacy of this UN-sanctioned operation.

(1) International Law. The conduct of IBSAF is circumscribed by international law, including the applicable principles derived from the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). When applicable, IBSAF also have a responsibility to obey other International treaties that affect military operations. In particular, IBSAF must comply with the LOAC principles: distinction, military necessity, proportionality, and humanity.

(2) National Laws. TCNs shall adhere to their national laws. They are not obliged to execute tasks or operations that would constitute a breach of their national laws. Therefore, nations should issue national restrictions, caveats and/or clarifying instructions to their members, COMD IBSAF and coalition partners in order to ensure compliance with national law. Any such national clarifying instructions must not be more permissive than the ROE. The normal mechanisms for notification of such national restrictions and/or clarifying instructions are FORCEPREP/Order of Battle Transfer of Authority (ORBATTOA) messages.

(a) In the case of sending enabling forces to the JFAO, TCN should communicate their caveats prior to deployment, facilitating an initial package of ROE being implemented for theater enablers.

(b) Where nations have expressed caveats on involvement or the use of force, such caveats will be summarized and the resultant impact on the mission identified. The full range of national caveats held by IBSAF should be communicated to the operational level, analyzed and applied as soon as possible. IBSAF Point of Contact (POC) for this activity is the CJ35.

2. **IBSAF Authorised ROE**

a. General Outline and Application. IBSAF authorised ROE enable the successful execution of the mission, while safeguarding all forces. They apply to all IBSAF elements, and can only be deviated from on the basis of national caveats or restrictions.

b. ROE Request /Authorisation and Implementation Procedure. The procedures to request, authorise, and implement ROE are set out in Ref A.

c. ROE Changes and Supplemental ROE. The ROE authorised by the IBSAF are found in ROE Authorization Messages (ROEAUTHs) and implemented by COMD IBSAF in ROE Implementation Messages (ROEIMPLs) may only be changed with the approval of CJOPS. Any limitation or restriction in its application of LOAC that is viewed as a potential threat to the safety of the force and/or the successful conduct of the mission should be addressed upon discovery and reported up the chain of command. Supplemental ROE measures that may be required due to changes in the operational situation or otherwise may be submitted in a ROE Request Message (ROEREQ). This includes requests for ROE previously requested but denied, new or additional ROE.

d. Dissemination. The ROE for IBSAF will be appropriately classified to allow dissemination to all TCN. The full ROE and use of force guidance might contain sensitive material, publication of which could harm operations. IBSAF ROE authorisation should be accompanied by guidance in the form of a Political Policy Statement (PPS).The PPS should be complemented by Political Policy Indicators (PPIs).

e. Protection of Persons and Property with Designated Special Status. Persons with Designated Special Status (PDSS) and Property with Designated Special Status (PRDSS) may be protected against hostile intent or hostile acts only pursuant to ROE. The authority to designate PDSS or PRDSS is restricted to COMD IBSAF.

3. Other Considerations. The instructions outlined below are amplifying mission-specific guidance based on international law, but should only be undertaken pursuant to IBSAF authorised ROE:

a. Detention. Persons may be detained as a force protection measure to prevent them from conducting acts against Coalition forces, Host Nation Security Forces (HNSF) or the HN civilian population. COMD IBSAF guidance on actions to be taken when detaining persons can be found in Annex AD and must be adhered to by all IBSAF elements involved in detention.

b. Riot Control Means. Riot control means (RCM) must not be used as a means of warfare. RCM may only be used at the discretion of the Appropriate Commander in the following circumstances:

(1) To protect the safety of IBSAF personnel, HN, IO, governmental organisations and / or NGO or PDSS; or

(2) To protect the property of IBSAF, HA, IO, governmental organisations, NGO or PDSS; or

c. Prevention of Serious Crimes. The use of minimum force, up to and including the use of deadly force, may be used to prevent serious crimes (which includes trafficking in Human Beings) against a person, including civilian, who unlawfully commits, or is about to commit, an act which endangers life of PDSS or coalition forces, or is likely to cause serious bodily harm, in circumstances where there is no other way to prevent the act. The use of minimum force includes the authority to detain the person. All use of force in the prevention of serious crimes must be reported through the chain of command at the earliest opportunity.

d. Soldiers' Cards. All IBSAF members must carry a Soldiers' Card issued by the relative Component Command or national authorities adhering to this ROE. TCN may issue translations of the Soldiers' Card issued by the Component Commands. The TCN Soldiers' Card may include national clarifying instructions in accordance with the main body of this Annex. The nationally authorised Soldiers' Card, translations of Soldiers' Card or any clarifying instructions must be developed in consultation with or disclosed to COMD IBSAF. No nationally authorised Soldiers' Card will permit a wider use of force than authorised by this ROE.

e. Avoidance of Collateral Damage. In all cases, every effort should be made to minimize, to the maximum extent possible, any loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects resulting from the use of force. Collateral damage is incidental to military action and must not be excessive or disproportionate to the military advantage to be gained from the specific attack.

f. Prohibition against Reprisals. The punitive use of force is prohibited.

g. Duty to Report. Each situation resulting in a detention, or involving the use of deadly force, or use of riot control means (if authorised), whether it results in casualties or not, is to be reported through the chain of command as soon as possible.

h. Right to Position Defence. The use of force is authorised to defend a position.

i. ROE for Open Sources. Bringing ROE into the open discourse may become beneficial for many reasons (e.g. STRATCOM). Because ROE contain sensitive information, the release of which could be harmful to the mission, IBSAF may indicate what information is releasable to the public, parallel to ROEAUTH message, by giving guidance on Public Information (PI) policy concerning release of ROE.

ATTACHMENTS:

Appendix 1 Defensive ROE for Phase 0 and IV Operations
Appendix 2 Offensive ROE for Phase I-III Operations

APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX L TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

DEFENSIVE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

References:

A. MC 362/1 NATO Rules of Engagement dated 27 June 2003

B. Status of Forces Agreement – Australia/Belesia dated 11 April 2006

1. The following ROE are issued under the authority of COMD IBSAF. They have been developed and approved in consultation with the IBSAF and the Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) and are based on ROE under reference A.

2. The ROE listed below were designed to encompass deterrence and defensive operations by Belesian and CJTF 667 forces during Phases 0 (Shaping) and 4 (Transition).

3. **Defence of Forces.**

a. 90. – The use of force up to and including deadly force for individuals and unit self defence against attack or an imminent attack is authorised. In exercising this right, individuals and units will act in accordance with national law.

b. 91. – The use of force for the defence of military property against attack or an imminent attack is authorised in accordance with national law.

c. 92. – The use of force, up to and including deadly force for the protection of Belesian Defense Forces and Belesian law enforcement members stationed within the landmass of Belesia is authorised.

d. 93.– The use of force up to and including deadly force for the defence of civilians accompanying CJTF667 forces, UN Personnel against attack or an imminent attack is authorised. In exercising this right, individuals and units will act in accordance with national law.

4. **Geographic Positioning of Forces.**

a. 100. – Except as otherwise authorised under Rule 101, entry into the landmass, territorial waters or airspace of North Torbia is prohibited.

b. 101. – Entry into the landmass, airspace and territorial waters of North Torbia for the purposes of conducting combat search and rescue operations is authorised.

c. 103. – Entry into the landmass, territorial waters or airspace of Belesian can be authorised by COMD IBSAF under reference B, which can be delegated.

d. 104. – Entry into the landmass, territorial waters or airspace of any other nation State is by consent of that State, which is to be obtained by IBSAF.

5. **Prevention of Boarding, Detention, or Seizure of Belesian or CJTF 667 Property.**

a. 132. – The use of force, up to and including deadly force to prevent the boarding, detention or seizure of IBSAF military, Belesian military or civilian vessels, aircraft or vehicles containing people is authorised.

6. **Intervention in Non-Military Activities.**

a. 140. – Intervention in North Torbian flagged non-military maritime shipping to enforce the provisions of UNSCR 8869 is authorised.

b. 143. – The use of force, up to and including disabling fire to interdict North Torbian flagged shipping vessels within the designated Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO) is authorised.

c. 145. – The use of non-deadly force to detain persons for force protection purposes in Belesia is authorised.

d. 146.– The use of non-deadly force, to disarm persons is authorised.

e. 147. – The use of non-deadly force to prevent the escape of unarmed individuals for force protection purposes is authorised.

7. **Warnings.**

a. 152. – The use of warning bursts by IBSAF and Belesian air assets is prohibited.

b. 153. – The use of warning shots by IBSAF land based forces is prohibited.

c. 154.– The use of warning shots by IBSAF maritime assets is permissible as this is seen as not using force under international maritime laws.

8. **Diversions.**

a. 161.– The ordering of diversions to all commercial and merchant shipping and aircraft for force protection purposes is authorised.

b. 164. – The ordering of diversions to any aircraft to enforce the provisions of the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) is authorised.

9. **Boarding, Detention or Seizure.**

a. 171.– Whether unopposed, uncooperative or opposed, the boarding of North Torbian flagged civilian vessels for the purposes of inspection in compliance with UNSCR 8869 is authorised.

b. 172.– Unopposed and uncooperative Boarding operations will be conducted under the provisions of Annex D of reference A.

c. 173. – Rule 143 can be relied on to facilitate opposed boardings under Rule 171.

d. 174. - The boarding of any commercial or merchant shipping vessel within the JFAO to determine if there has been a contravention of the arms and economic embargo established under UNSCR 8869 is authorised.

e. 181. – The detention and/or seizure of North Torbian military vessels, aircraft, vehicles, personnel, goods, cargos and/or equipment within the landmass or territorial waters of Belesia is authorised.

f. 183. – Following the boarding of North Torbian flagged civilian vessels for inspection under Rule 171, any vessels in contravention of UNSCR 8869 is authorised to be detained and/or seized, as well as any personnel, goods, cargos and/or equipment for the purposes of enforcement of UNSCR 8869

g. 185. - Should there be compelling evidence to suggest non-conformity with the provisions of UNSCR 8869, any vessel within the IBSAF JFAO proceeding to or from a seaport of North Torbia may be boarded, diverted, detained and/or or seized.

10. **Illumination.**

a. 221. – The illumination of suspected North Torbian Armed Forces vessels, aircraft personnel, and equipment by white light, spotlight, projectiles, or infrared means is authorised.

b. 222. - The use of laser target markers against North Torbian Armed Forces vessels, aircraft, personnel, and equipment is authorised.

c. 223. – The use of illumination for harassment operations is prohibited.

11. **Identification of Targets.**

a. 232. – Potential targets are to be identified by visual means (this may include video footage from UAS and other remote systems) **and** by one or more of the following means: IFF (or other systems that require a response from an unidentified unit); electro-optical; electronic warfare support measure; track behaviour, flight plan correlation; thermal imaging; acoustic intelligence; or other secure active/passive systems not requiring a positive response from an unidentified unit prior to an engagement.

12. **Prohibited Use of Certain Weapons.**

a. 350. – The use of riot control agents by IBSAF against military threats is prohibited.

b. 351. – The use of anti-personnel mines by CJTF 667 forces is prohibited.

c. 352. – The use of cluster munitions and explosive and non-explosive booby traps by IBSAF is prohibited.

d. 353.– The use of weapons of mass destruction to include chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear by IBSAF is prohibited.

13. **Information Operations**

a. 361. – The control of North Torbian military information distribution mechanisms with the intent to disrupt and deny North Torbian command and control nodes is authorised.

b. 367. – The use of electronic warfare measures by IBSAF is authorised.

c. 368.– Psychological operations directed against North Torbian military forces is authorised.

d. 369.– The use of physical military deception through the use of dummies and/or decoy equipment by IBSAF and Belesian Defense Forces is authorised.

14. **Use of Electronic Countermeasures (ECM).**

a. 374. The unrestricted use of ECM against North Torbian military targets is authorised.

15. **Air Operations.**

a. 400. – The use of air-to-surface and sub-surface munitions against targets belonging to the North Torbian Armed Forces is permitted.

b. 401. – The use of precision-guided air-to-surface munitions within the JFAO is authorised.

c. 402. - Beyond visual range air-to-air engagement is permitted as long as the criteria laid out in ROE 232 are met.

APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX L TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

OFFENSIVE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Reference:

A. MC 362/1 NATO Rules of Engagement dated 27 June 2003

1. The following ROE are issued under the authority of COMD IBSAF. They have been developed and approved in consultation with the IBSAF and the Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) and are based on extant ROE issued under reference A.

2. The ROE listed below are designed to encompass combat operations by Belesian (BX) Defense Forces and IBSAF during Phases 1 (Denial), 2 (Lodgement), and 3 (Dominate).

3. **Defence of Forces.**

a. 90. – The use of force up to and including deadly force for individuals and unit self defence against attack or an imminent attack is authorised. In exercising this right, individuals and units will act in accordance with national law.

b. 91. – The use of force for the defence of military property against attack or an imminent attack is authorised in accordance with national law.

c. 92. – The use of force, up to and including deadly force for the protection of BX Defense Forces and BX law enforcement members stationed within the landmass of BX is authorised.

d. 93. – The use of force up to and including deadly force for the defence of civilians accompanying CJTF667 forces, UN Personnel against attack or an imminent attack is authorised. In exercising this right, individuals and units will act in accordance with national law.

4. **Geographic Positioning of Forces.**

a. 100. – Except as otherwise authorised under Rule 101, entry into the landmass, territorial waters or airspace of North Torbia (NT) is prohibited.

b. 101. – Entry into the landmass, airspace and territorial waters of NT for the purposes of conducting combat search and rescue operations is authorised.

c. 103. – Entry into the landmass, territorial waters or airspace of BX can be authorised by COMD IBSAF under extant SOFA, which can be delegated.

5. **Prevention of Boarding, Detention, or Seizure of BX or CJTF 667 Property.**

a. 132 – The use of force, up to and including deadly force, to prevent the boarding, detention or seizure of IBSAF military, BX military or civilian vessels under contract, carrying people is authorised.

6. **Intervention in Non-Military Activities.**

a. 140. – Intervention in NT flagged non-military maritime shipping to enforce the provisions of UNSCR 8869 is authorised.

b. 143. – The use of force, up to and including disabling fire, to interdict NT flagged vessels is authorised.

c. 145. – The use of non-deadly force to detain persons for force protection purposes in BX is authorised.

d. 146. – The use of force non-deadly force, to disarm persons for force protection purposes in BX is authorised.

e. 147. – The use of non-deadly force to prevent the escape of unarmed individuals for force protection purposes is authorised.

f. 148. – Intervention in BX civilian law enforcement activities is prohibited.

7. **Warnings.**

a. 152. – The use of warning bursts by IBSAF and Belesian air assets is prohibited.

b. 153. – The use of warning shots by IBSAF land based forces is prohibited.

c. 154.– The use of warning shots by IBSAF maritime assets is permissible as this is seen as not using force under international maritime laws.

8. **Diversions.**

a. 161. – The ordering of diversions to all commercial and private vessels, aircraft, vehicles, and persons for force protection purposes is authorised.

b. 162. – The use of force non-deadly force, to compel compliance with the ordering of diversions to all commercial and private vessels, aircraft, vehicles, and persons for force protection purposes is authorised.

9. **Boarding, Detention or Seizure.**

a. 171. – Whether unopposed, uncooperative or opposed, the boarding of NT flagged civilian vessels for the purposes of inspection in compliance with UNSCR 8869 is authorised.

b. 172. – Unopposed and uncooperative boarding operations will be conducted under the provisions of Annex D of Reference A.

c. 173. – Rule 143 can be relied on to facilitate opposed boardings under Rule 171.

d. 174. – The boarding of any commercial or merchant shipping vessel within the JFAO to determine if there has been a contravention of the arms and economic embargo established under UNSCR 8869 is authorised.

e. 181. – The detention and/or seizure of NT military vessels, aircraft, vehicles, personnel, goods, cargos and/or equipment within the landmass or territorial waters of BX is authorised.

f. 183. – Following the boarding of North Torbian flagged civilian vessels for inspection under Rule 171, any vessels in contravention of UNSCR 8869 is authorised to be detained and/or seized, as well as any personnel, goods, cargos and/or equipment for the purposes of enforcement of UNSCR 8869.

g. 185. – Should there be compelling evidence to suggest non-conformity with the provisions of UNSCR 8869, any vessel within the IBSAF JFAO proceeding to or from a seaport of NT may be boarded, diverted, detained and/or seized.

h. 187. - The use of restraints such as Flex Cuffs and mechanical restraints on PW/detainees is authorised for force protection purposes. Once brought into a secure holding area, restraints shall normally be removed, unless the tactical situation dictates otherwise.

i. 188. - If there is doubt of PW status, IBSAF will treat a detainee as a PW until a competent tribunal is able to determine his/her status IAW Article 5 of *Geneva Convention III relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War* (GC III).

10. **Illumination.**

a. 221. – The illumination of suspected NT Armed Forces vessels, aircraft, personnel, and equipment by white light, spotlight, projectiles, or infrared means is authorised.

b. 222. – The use of laser target markers against NT Armed Force vessels, aircraft, personnel, and equipment is authorised.

11. **Identification of Targets.**

a. 232. - Identification is to be established visually (this may include video feed from UAS or other remote systems) **or** by at least two of the following means: IFF (or other systems that require a response from an unidentified unit); electro-optical, electronic warfare support measure; track behavior, flight plan correlation; thermal imaging; acoustic intelligence; or other secure active/passive systems not requiring a positive response from an unidentified unit prior to an engagement.

12. **Designation of Targets.**

a. 280. – Designation of targets by any means is authorised.

13. **Use of Riot Control Agents.**

a. 321. – Riot control means (RCM) must not be used as a means of warfare.

b. 322.– Use of pepper spray in self-defense and for force protection is authorised.

14. **Use of Force in Designated Operations.**

a. 337. **–** Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to prevent the commission of serious crimes that are occurring or about to occur is authorised.

b. 339. – Use of ASP batons in self-defense and for force protection is authorised.

15. **Prohibiting or Restricting Use of Specific Weapons in Designated Circumstances.**

a. 351. – The use of anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions by IBSAF is prohibited.

b. 352. – The use of command-detonated mines, and explosive and non-explosive booby traps by IBSAF is in accordance with national policy.

c. 353. – The use of weapons of mass destruction to include chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear by IBSAF is prohibited.

16. **Information Operations.**

a. 361. – The control of NT military information distribution mechanisms with the intent to disrupt and deny NT command and control nodes is authorised.

b. 366. – Conduct of Computer Network Attack (CNA) against NT adversary computers or computer systems that have intruded into and damaged IBSAF computers, computer networks, or information in IBSAF computers or computer networks, including actions that may result in intrusion into NT intermediary systems or networks and damage to NT systems or networks is authorised subject to COMD IBSAF approval.

c. 367. – The use of electronic warfare measures by IBSAF is authorised.

d. 368. – Psychological operations directed against NT military forces is authorised.

e. 369. – The use of physical military deception through the use of dummies and/or decoy equipment by IBSAF and BX Defense Forces is authorised.

17. **Use of Electronic Countermeasures.**

a. 374. - The unrestricted use of ECM against NT military and designated opposition force combatant targets is authorised.

18. **Mines.**

a. 380. – The laying of mines in recognised international straits is prohibited.

b. 382. – COMD CJTF 667 is the approval authority for the employment of naval mines.

19. **Action Against Suspected Submarine Contacts.**

a. 391. – Tracking submarine contact(s) within the IBSAF JFAO with shipborne and airborne sensors is authorised.

b. 393. – Prosecution to destruction against NT submarine contacts within the IBSAF JFAO is authorised.

20. **Attack.**

a. 421. – Attack against NT Armed Forces demonstrating hostile intent against IBSAF or BX Defense Forces is authorised.

b. 422. – Attack against NT Armed Forces which commits or directly contributes to a hostile act (not constituting an actual attack) against IBSAF or BX Defence Forces is authorised.

c. 425. – Attack against NT Armed Forces which have previously attacked, or directly contributed to an attack within the JFAO, is authorised.

d. 426. - Component Commanders are authorised to judge whether an attack is the first of a series and, in this event, to attack all units constituting a continuing threat.

e. 427. - Attack on NT Armed Force military installation(s), facility(ies), equipment, unit(s) and forces within the JFAO, which are engaged in or make an effective contribution to military activity that threatens IBSAF or BX Defense Forces person(s) or property is authorised.

ANNEX M TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

MILITARY PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Reference: ADFP 3.13.2 Military Public Affairs 14 Feb 2020

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu.

1. **Situation**

a. Background. See paragraph 1 of the main body of CJTF 667 OPORD 01, Annex B (Intelligence), Annex J (Information Operations) and Annex Q (Civil-Military Operations).

b. General. The Military Public Affairs (MPA) office is assigned as a Command Advisory Group section (J09) to CJTF 667. MPA provides timely and accurate information in support of the Commander's objectives for strategic communication. MPA informs, educates and counters misinformation with respect to key audiences (both civilian and military) regarding CJTF 667 objectives, accomplishments and challenges. By engaging local and international media, as well as through social media, MPA is able to disseminate key themes and messages to a wide audience in order to engender and maintain support for CJTF 667 and to correct misinformation in the public domain. Via spoken and written word and through still and video images, MPA represents a trusted and powerful tool to reach diverse audiences. Robust and effective MPA activities are fundamental to CJTF 667's ability to proactively communicate to audiences in a truthful and timely manner. MPA aims to be 'first with the truth,' providing the facts regarding ongoing events and military and humanitarian activities, and by assisting the media in reporting accurately by providing context. It also informs public perception and opinion by providing reliable, timely and accurate information to local and international media, while monitoring media outlets to ensure that information is disseminated. Media monitoring collects reports from all open sources in order to disseminate a complete picture of media coverage to assist Key Leader Engagement in decision-making and ensure consistency with other MPA organisations throughout the Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO). All components of CJTF 667 as well as Host Nations' armed forces and IO and NGOs are primary sources regarding security-related and humanitarian issues. This annex provides policy guidance and tasking concerning the public affairs coverage of CJTF 667 operations. It includes coordinating instructions for releasing information and visual products, news coverage, media support and, support of the internal information and outreach engagement programs.

c. Communication in the Information Environment.

(1) Host Nation. Belesia's state-run and public media compete with private and opposition publications and broadcasters. Internet, television and mobile phone networks are more accessible to much of the population in the JFAO, notably in urban areas. TV is the most-popular medium. In more isolated rural areas and islands, traditional communication print and media remain the most influential communication tools. Belesian government bodies are in the lead for shaping and influencing their publics' opinions regarding progress made in re-establishing regional development and security. CJTF 667 will deliver support and assistance in this area to local authorities. CJTF 667

MPA effort is aimed at attaining and maintaining popular support for the mission at the higher level by explaining the goals and legitimacy of the UN-sanctioned IBSAF mission and of CJTF 667's intentions, actions and achievements as well as by developing a media campaign based on success stories that appeal to the public.

(2) International Media. All personnel must understand the power of the international media and the importance they play in maintaining support for ongoing operations. The international media, to include traditional journalists, documentarians and reputable bloggers, will significantly influence western public and political opinion. The international media is strongly augmented by local stringers, who will accompany the other local media representatives at media functions. These stringers will feed the international media from Coalition events as well as from adversary spokespersons.

(3) North Torbia. Transparency in political and social debate is subject to extremely tight governmental control in Nth Torbia, resulting in the populace being extremely hard to influence from external government and organisation. The Nth Torbian government continues to use a wide range of media as an integral part of its activities to influence the populace and international actors. Nth Torbia and its affiliated partners and proxies will attempt to shape the information environment based on their interests.

d. Core Audiences.

(1) Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) members, countries and regional policymakers, opinion leaders, publics, service members, and families.

(2) Regional, national, and international News Media Representatives (NMRs).

(3) Belesian and Nth Torbian publics.

(4) CJTF 667 TCN service members and civilian staff.

(5) Host Nations Defence Forces.

(6) International Organisations (IO) and NGOs.

e. Assumptions.

(1) The Nth Torbian government and the Nth Torbian Armed Forces can be expected to mount a massive, carefully constructed, well-orchestrated, worldwide propaganda campaign as part of its military campaign.

(2) Nth Torbia will use political, economic, cultural, and military issues and events as opportunities to discredit Coalition resolve, military capability and intentions in the free press. Nth Torbia will use the media to further its propaganda goal to weaken public support and confidence in Coalition military resolve and/or intentions.

(3) Non-state organisations and proxies associated with Nth Torbia can be expected to use the media to further their goals.

2. **Mission**. CJTF 667 plans and executes active communications and military public affairs activities in support of Operation STEEL SENTINEL in order to provide responsive, timely, and accurate information about CJTF 667 activities to both domestic and foreign audiences and to counter enemy misinformation in order to support the goals and objectives of the Commander.

3. **Execution.**

a. Concept of Operations. MPA policy is maximum disclosure with minimum delay, but consistent with operational security and Privacy Act provisions. MPA will assist in the creation of conditions that maintain Coalition integrity and the confidence of TCNs as well as the International Community in CJTF 667 operations by:

(1) Providing timely information and news products that demonstrate the core messages;

(2) Providing timely information about CJTF 667 operations to public and news media representatives and facilitate news media operations;

(3) Providing internal command information programs and products to keep units and family members informed;

(4) Countering effects of Nth Torbian propaganda attempts through an active MPA posture by informing and educating external and internal publics of the actual situation and facts;

(5) Conducting media embed program consistent with AS and/or TCN media embed directives;

(6) Facilitating outreach engagement initiatives to inform and educate local, national and international opinion leaders, academics, and defence-issues analysts; and

(7) Maintaining and managing CJTF 667 social media.

b. MPA Effects.

(1) CJTF 667 is recognised as a regional stabilising force by national and international audiences.

(2) TCNs and public audiences receive timely updates of CJTF 667 mission progress and significant events to include enemy and friendly casualty status without compromising operational security.

(3) International recognition and support for the IBSAF Coalition is strong and unwavering.

(4) Nth Torbian propaganda is effectively countered by increased accurate and independent reporting from international, national, and local news agencies.

(5) International public understands that Nth Torbian people are not the targets of CJTF 667 military efforts.

(6) CJTF 667 forces and TCNs are informed of mission progress and critical issues of force protection and safety and efforts to sustain health, welfare, and morale.

(7) Increased reporting of defeats suffered by Nth Torbian military forces by international, national, and local media.

(8) Key audiences recognise CJTF 667 will transition authority to follow-on forces or Host Nations for stability or peace support operations once security conditions permit.

c. CJTF 667 MPA Tasks.

(1) Coordinate across the CJTF 667 staff sections and Component Commands to synchronize communications efforts.

(2) Provide MPA guidance to Component Commands.

(3) Prepare for media coverage throughout all phases of the operation, including social media coverage and support to outreach engagement initiatives.

(4) Plan for and support the media embed program.

(5) Inform public of IBSAF initiatives and diplomatic stances.

(6) Coordinate with national reps of TCNs as appropriate.

(7) Consolidate daily CJTF 667 MPA SITREP.

(8) Inform public in order to support CJTF 667 mission and objectives.

(9) Illustrate CJTF 667 units' capabilities and resolve, as well as their professionalism through external and internal media coverage, social media outlets, and visual imagery

(10) Support internal communications efforts to reach and inform internal audiences and protect them from enemy misinformation and propaganda.

d. MPA Support to Inform and Influence Activities.

(1) Coordinate daily messages and talking points consistent with strategic objectives.

(2) Coordinate efforts to counter Nth Torbian propaganda by having international news media presence in critical locations to accurately report events.

(3) Coordinate to ensure MPA activities do not compromise or conflict with CJTF 667 Information Operations.

(4) Coordinate and focus media attention on operational and strategic isolation of Nth Torbian regime, destruction of Nth Torbian military capability in Belesia, and CJTF 667 humanitarian assistance efforts.

e. Coordinating Instructions to Component Command and Subordinate Units PAOs.

(1) All Component Commands will submit daily Public Affairs Situation Reports (PASITREP) to CJTF 667 PAO. CJTF 667 PAO will consolidate all reports.

(2) Keep CJTF 667 Public Affairs Officer (PAO) informed of any critical information requirements such as media requests, military and civilian casualties, large-scale/significant incidents, injuries to PAO personnel or NMRs.

(3) Lead, plan, coordinate, and conduct operational and tactical MPA activities within their AOs.

(4) Obtain still and video imagery of events/activities and send to CJTF 667 PAO for approval and release.

(5) Safeguard classified information and imagery by retaining the release authority at the military public affairs office.

(6) Key Leader Engagements (KLE) are critical to the success of all MPA operations. They should be used as frequently and in as many situations and mediums as possible.

(7) Provide military public affairs support to the CJTF 667 command to highlight the successes of the operation to Target Audiences through internal and external media coverage, KLE, and visual imagery.

(8) Keep CJTF 667 military personnel and family members informed; provide the local and International audiences truthful information through News and TCN Department of Defence Media Representatives.

(9) Support higher level MPA plans to counter misinformation, gain, and maintain the support of the Local and International Communities and deter further Nth Torbian aggression.

(10) Be prepared to receive media embeds and provide support to media during the operation.

(11) Designate Unit Public Affairs Representatives (UPAR) for each Bn sized element. UPARs are responsible for briefing commanders on current Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) and ensuring PAG is disseminated and units are prepared to facilitate media engagements. All appropriate military personnel should be provided with Talking Points prior to media engagements to help facilitate communication synchronization and ensure they understand the overarching intent on the mission.

(12) Ensure that subordinate commanders and MPA personnel are familiar with communications, transportation and other media support requirements; approved PAG and ground rules concerning this operation.

(13) Do not interfere with News Media Representatives (NMR) as long as they do not interfere with the execution of the mission or threaten to violate OPSEC.

(14) Advise CJTF 667 PAO immediately of news media exposure to classified information or any possible media ground rules violations.

(15) CJTF 667 personnel are not authorised to confiscate media cameras, film, audio/videotape, or reporter's notebooks. Any questions regarding the specific application of this policy should be referred to the CJTF 667 PAO.

(16) All entitled media are to have approved credentials before joining any unit with CJTF 667 PAO task organisation. Lists of accredited and registered media will be provided to the Component Command and subordinate PAOs on a daily basis.

(17) Provide CJTF 667 PAO with a press kit for their Component or unit, to include a formation/unit fact sheet and Commander's biography with photo.

(18) Utilize best practices in media interviews when talking to reporters (see Appendix 1).

(19) Following official announcement of deployment, units may acknowledge they have been notified for a deployment; however, they may not release specific details that may violate OPSEC. Commanders are encouraged to release information if appropriate and PAOs should be prepared to address media requests in support of family readiness efforts.

(20) In the event of a large scale incident, critical information leak, capture/kill of a key leader, or mass casualty situation which may require communications consequence management, all key information (5W's) must be forwarded immediately to CJTF 667 PAO.

(21) In the event of a crisis, the CJTF 667 PAO will coordinate with higher headquarters to determine release authority and appropriate public statements to make.

(22) Requests for public affairs information (RFIs). Submit all RFIs to CJTF 667.

(23) Support for News Media Representatives.

(a) Media Escort.

1. Accreditation. Requirements for accreditation will be established by the Coalition/national-level defence agencies and supported by CJTF 667 PAO. As a minimum, the CJTF 667 J09 will institute procedures to determine the legitimacy of individuals as *bona fide* media representatives entitled to receive support afforded by TCN and CJTF 667 forces. News media representatives must have passports and working visas identifying them as journalists to fulfill CJTF 667 accreditation requirements.
2. Assignment. CJTF 667 J09, in consultation with subordinate unit PAOs, will determine the assignment of NMR to specific subordinate units within the JFAO to preclude overloading any single unit. Where possible, media representatives will be assigned to their preferred location.
3. Facilities. CJTF 667 units will provide media embeds with adequate accommodation, meals, and transportation.
4. Inoculations. NMR accompanying CJTF 667 in the field will be required to have the same inoculations, at their own expense, administered to military personnel participating in the operations.
5. Communications. CJTF 667 and major subordinate commands will provide communications services free of charge to civilian media representatives when commercial facilities are not available. Transmission by military communication facilities will be on a non-interference basis. News media will be advised of the status of their traffic.
6. Courier Flights. Courier flights may carry news material to appropriate processing or distribution points on a non-interference basis without charge. News media will be informed of the status of their material.
7. Transportation. CJTF 667 will provide accredited media representatives with military transportation into and within the JFAO when such travel is in connection with assignments to cover the operation and when commercial transportation is restricted into the area or unavailable.

(b) Security. The presence of news media representatives in operational areas will require the following considerations concerning security:

1. Procedures will be implemented to preclude the unauthorised release of classified or sensitive information. NMRs violating embargo agreements will be immediately dis-embedded.

2. Media representatives can access operations, intelligence, and other classified areas only in case of strong need and under strict escort and control.

3. Individuals are not authorised to release information to media nor are they permitted to agree to a personal interview without prior coordination with the PAO supporting that unit or command. When the PAO has coordinated the media visit, personnel may grant media requests for interviews and provide only unclassified information in interviews, briefings, and written materials. Do not make "off the record" statements to media representatives.

(c) Audio-Visual. CJTF 667 will assist the media as necessary in obtaining audio-visual coverage.

(d) Embedded media will abide by established ground rules on releasable and non-releasable information.

4. **Sustainment.**

a. Administration. Media are required to carry their own equipment.

b. Logistics.

(1) Non-embedded media (Unilateral) covering our operations should be "self-sustaining". CJTF 667 PAO will coordinate additional logistical support to media as required. Intent is to maximize use of Host Nation Support (HNS). Host Nation Contract Support is used if support/service is not available through military logistic means or through HNS.

(2) Media embeds will have their own protective equipment. Military embeds will be provided with military transportation (ground or air) into and within the JFAO while covering the operation.

(3) Embedded NMRs will be entitled to medical care provided to CJTF 667 personnel in the event of life threatening injuries.

5. **Command and Signal.**

a. Media will use commercial means of communications if available. If commercial lines are not available, official military means will be authorised. Military satellite transmission facilities can be provided when operationally feasible.

b. Media may use independent satellite uplinks for transmission of products from field locations when the on- scene commander determines transmission will not violate OPSEC or compromise an ongoing operation.

c. CJTF 667 PAO co-locates with CJTF 667 HQ.

ATTACHMENTS:

Appendix 1 Best Practices in Media Interviews

APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX M TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

BEST PRACTICES IN MEDIA INTERVIEWS

1. Task Units and Elements may discuss general capabilities and training they have recently conducted.

2. Military members should "stay in their lanes" when discussing daily operations, duties, and responsibilities and should not discuss specific aspects of the units, including number of personnel, shortages, and/or equipment.

3. Military members should **not** discuss or speculate on how the unit might be employed.

4. **No** discussion of operational details, plans, or possible future operations.

5. **No** discussion of exact unit deployment destination to include arrival/departure locations.

6. Do talk about the training we do.

7. Do **not** discuss specifics of Rules of Engagement.

8. Do talk about your job and what you do.

9. Leaders - Do talk about your members and unit/formation.

10. Everything is on the record.

11. Deal in the facts – do **not** speculate or address hypothetical questions.

12. **Avoid** speculating or commenting on things "outside your lane", such as other governments or government officials.

13. Do **not** discuss classified information. The media is not the enemy, but remember OPSEC. If not sure, say "Due to Operational Security, I cannot discuss that subject."

ANNEX O TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

FORCE PROTECTION

Reference: ADDP 3.22 Force Protection 2015

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu

1. Situation.

a. Background. See paragraph 1 of the main body of CJTF 667 OPORD 01 and Annex B (Intelligence).

(1) General. Commanders and staffs synchronise, integrate, and organize capabilities and resources throughout the operations process to preserve combat power and the freedom of action and to mitigate the effects of threats and hazards. Protection safeguards the force, personnel (combatants and non-combatants), systems, and physical assets of coalition partners. Survivability refers to the capacity, fitness, or tendency to remain alive or in existence. For the military, survivability is about much more than mere survival - it is also about remaining effective. Military forces are composed of personnel and physical assets, each having their own inherent survivability qualities or capabilities that permit them to avoid or withstand hostile actions or environmental conditions while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission. Force Protection is one of the six warfighting functions which include Command, Situational Understanding, Force Generation and Sustainment, Force Projection and Force Application.

(2) Force Protection (FP). Force protection is defined as preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against ADF personnel, resources, facilities, and critical information (see Ref A). FP measures may be defensive (active and passive), offensive and recuperative measures.

b. Protection within the Operations Process. The synchronisation, integration, and organization of capabilities and resources to preserve combat power from the effects of threats and hazards are essential. The ability to protect and preserve the force and secure the area of operations is vital in seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative. Protection emphasises the importance of planning and expanding our protection priorities, to include protecting coalition partners, civilian populations, equipment, resources, infrastructure, and cultural landmarks across the range of military operations. It focuses on adapting our force to better leverage, integrate, and synchronise capabilities and better understand operational environments. It emphasises the need for all ADF members to identify, prevent, or mitigate threats and hazards. Mutually supporting and overlapping protection capabilities through operational and tactical level actions better respond, and recover from threat and hazard effects and to deter, counterattack, neutralize, and defeat the threats.

c. Protection Principles. The following principles of protection provide military professionals with a context for implementing protection efforts, developing schemes of protection, and allocating resources:

(1) Command Responsibility. FP is a function of command. Commanders at all levels are responsible and accountable for the protection of their assets. Subordinate commanders may use their discretion in imposing additional FP measures, but may not reduce the measures imposed by this HQ without prior approval.

(2) Risk Management. Risk Management is the coordinated activities to direct and control the Joint Force with regards to risk. Risk management ensures that risk is managed effectively, efficiently and coherently across the Joint Force.

(3) Coordination. FP must be fully coordinated across all components, multi-agency and multinational elements. It is essential to coordinate FP planning at the strategic, operational and tactical levels in order to ensure a unified approach and mitigate vulnerabilities that might otherwise be exploited by a threat.

(4) Integrated**.** FP is integrated with other activities, systems, efforts, and capabilities associated with unified joint operations to provide strength and structure to the overall effort. Integration must occur vertically and horizontally with coalition partners throughout the operations process.

(5) Economy. Excessive allocation of resources for FP may remove capabilities needed to accomplish the mission. Economical use of FP capabilities allows the commander to focus resources on the protection of those assets that are deemed critical to operational effectiveness and mission success.

(6) Prioritisation. There will always be insufficient resources to protect every asset against every threat all of the time. Priority should be given to centres of gravity, both tangible and intangible.

(7) Flexibility. FP policies and measures must have the flexibility and agility to respond to rapidly changing threats, within resource limitations.

(8) Layered**.** FP capabilities are arranged using a layered approach to provide strength and depth. Layering reduces the destructive effect of a threat or hazard through the dispersion of energy or the culmination of the force.

(9) Redundant. Protection efforts are often redundant anywhere that a vulnerability or a critical point of failure is identified. Redundancy ensures that specific activities, systems, efforts, and capabilities that are critical for the success of the overall protection effort have a secondary or auxiliary effort of equal or greater capability.

(10) Enduring**.** Protection capabilities are ongoing activities for maintaining the objectives of preserving combat power, populations, partners, essential equipment, resources, and critical infrastructure in every phase of an operation.

d. Threat and Risk Assessment.

(1) Conventional threats. See Annex B. The North Torbian Marine Expeditionary Forces (NTMEF) essentially represent a "near peer" threat with a wide range of capabilities. As they have demonstrated, they have sufficient forces capabilities to seize and control key infrastructure and large areas of terrain in a littoral environment. They also possess the necessary capabilities to project and sustain power beyond their national boundaries. Whilst the Torbian People's Army (TPA) is known to hold quantities of CBRN capabilities, it is highly unlikely they will utilise these weapons during this conflict.

(2) Unconventional Threats.

(a) Visayan Peoples Front (VPF) Insurgents. The VPF is an armed insurgent group committed to establishing an independent entity composed of the islands of Panay, Negros, Cebu and Bohol. Over time, the group, which originally sought the creation of a separate secular state, demanded the exclusion of Muslims and creation of a Christian nation. The VPF has aided the NTMEF in securing key infrastructure and installations during the early stages of NT occupation of Panay. Levels of cooperation between the NTMEF and the VPF at this time is unknown.

(b) Free Sulu Movement (FSM) Separatists. The FSM is a conglomeration of anti-federation factions of the Belesian archipelago. The group seeks to break free of the alleged overreach of the Belesian central government and abuses of the Belesian Federation National Guard. The FSM is not known to be actively supporting the NTMEF in Panay or Palawan.

(c) Satu Pulau Satu Negara (SPSN) Insurgents. SPSN (roughly translated to One Island, One Nation) believes that all of Luzon should be united under a single national flag. They mainly restrict their actions on Luzon and are not expected to be a significant threat in the CJTF 667 JFAO.

(d) Black Societies Criminal Network. The Black Societies Criminal Network is based mainly in Olvana with networks and interests in Belesia and surrounding nations. This criminal network is involved in armed robbery, racketeering, smuggling, narcotics trafficking, prostitution, gambling, and contract killings. The Black Societies will not involve themselves directly in the current conflict but may capitalise on demand through black market operations.

(e) Tantoco Cartel Criminal Organisation. Originating in South Torbia (RT), the Tantoco Cartel operates across the region with networks and interests in Olvana and Belesia. Like the Black Society, the Tantoco Cartel is involved in all forms of illegal activities. Recent expansion into Belesia and Olvana has resulted in turf disputes with the Black Society.

(3) Non-Military Threats. See also CJTF 667 OPORD 01 Annex AA (Health Support).

(a) Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs) / Contaminated Grounds. BX holds large amounts of toxic industrial chemicals for multiple purposes, including mining, production of electronic goods, water purification, wastewater management, pesticides and fertiliser to increase agricultural output. A mine collapse in Panay a

few years ago resulted in a release of 20.6 million tons of waste water into a nearby river.

(b) Pollution. BX faces significant pollution problems stemming from poor industrial practices. High levels of air pollution require mitigating measures to ensure CJTF 667 members health and safety.

(c) Potable Water. The majority of the BX archipelago's urban population has access to potable water. In rural areas people must rely on local sources such as rivers, streams and wells to obtain water for cooking, drinking and washing. Currently, about 90% of all Belesians can access potable water. All water sources are considered potentially contaminated and not potable until tested.

(d) Sewage. Seventy-five percent of the population has access to improved sanitation, predominantly in the developed urban areas. Even in the cities, this does not always equate to fixing plumbing in residences, but also includes improved latrines. The lack of universal or adequate sanitation contributes to the high rate of infectious disease spread, especially in the dense urban environments.

(e) Disease. The following diseases are known to be present in BX:

1. Diarrheal diseases;
2. Hepatitis A;
3. Malaria;
4. Cutaneous Leishmaniasis;
5. Leptospirosis;
6. Schistosomiasis;
7. Hepatitis;
8. Tuberculosis; and
9. Q Fever.

2. Mission. CJTF 667 will protect the force and conserves combat power against threats and risks associated with the conduct of operations throughout Operation STEEL SENTINEL.

3. Execution.

a. General. Commanders must deliberately plan and integrate the application of military force against an adversary while protecting the force and preserving combat power. Commanders develop protection systems for each phase of an operation or major activity. They integrate and synchronise FP tasks to reduce risk, mitigate identified vulnerabilities, and act on opportunity. When properly integrated and synchronised, the tasks and systems that comprise the FP warfighting function effectively protect the force, enhance the preservation of combat power, and increase the probability of mission success.

b. Risk. The FP posture should be based on risk management, not risk elimination. Deliberate or accidental casualties are a reality of military operations, as are material and equipment losses and an overemphasis in avoiding them may impact adversely on the achievement of the mission. The component commanders therefore must balance risk within the context of mission accomplishment. Component commanders should establish FP awareness within their staffs and provide suitable advice and direction to subordinate units. FP functions should be fully integrated and coordinated in the operational planning process from the outset.

c. Tasks Throughout. Component Commands conduct FP operations to protect the force and conserve combat power in the JFAO. Large troop concentrations and sustainment facilities shall be protected from NT missile/CBRN attacks by establishing an integrated Air Missile Defense system with the BX Defense Force. Vulnerability assessments are to be conducted for staging areas, C2 nodes, and MSRs / ASRs concerning threats from CBRN, IEDs, missile attacks and other indirect fires as well as direct attack throughout this operation. Friendly air superiority must be achieved as soon as possible. Operational threats from enemy UAVs/UASs must be determined and mitigated. We must take clear measures and undertake effective coordination to ensure inter-operability between various TCNs within CJTF 667 and with BX Defense Forces. The implementation of successful FP measures will be particularly important for safeguarding the CJTF 667 Center of Gravity (our strike aircraft capability). Supporting tasks of the FP warfighting function include:

(1) Conduct operational area security.

(2) Employ safety techniques (including fratricide avoidance).

(3) Implement OPSEC.

(4) Provide intelligence support to protection.

(5) Implement physical security procedures.

(6) Apply anti-terrorism (AT) measures.

(7) Conduct law and order.

(8) Conduct survivability operations.

(9) Provide force health protection.

(10) Conduct chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) operations.

(11) Provide explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and protection support.

(12) Coordinate air and missile defense.

(13) Conduct personnel recovery.

(14) Conduct internment and resettlement.

d. Protection by Phase of OP STEEL SENTINEL.

(1) Phase 0 - Shaping. This Phase will see CJTF 667 forces begin to stage into the JFAO. The main effort during this phase will be the commencement of shaping operations to isolate the NTMEF politically, economically and socially. FP during this phase will be to secure air superiority over Mindanao, and in particular the designated APODs and SPODs. The FP effort will emphasize OPSEC and safety measures, but will also

address local area security and survivability operations of the APODs/SPODs. CJTF 667 forces are vulnerable to cyber-attacks and information warfare as C4I systems are established throughout the JFAO, requiring an ongoing focus on cyber security.

(2) Phase 1- Denial. This phase will see the commencement of offensive kinetic operations by CJTF 667. The main effort will be to isolate the NTMEF logistically in Panay and degrade NTMEF capability. This phase will require securing the critical sea and air lanes within the JFAO. FP will focus on preserving sea and air power to ensure control of critical sea/air lanes at a time chosen for the commencement of Phase 2. FP will be aided by a deception plan to make the NTMEF think that the main effort will concentrate on Palawan instead of Panay. Protection to be enhanced by OPSEC.

(3) Phase 2 - Lodgement. This phase will see the lodgement of ground forces in Panay as the main effort. Amphibious landings will be conducted on Panay along with landings at an established APOD/SPOD. FP will focus on maintaining control of the sea and air lanes over and around Panay. Protection to be enhanced by OPSEC, measures to eliminate fratricide during forward passage of lines with BX forces already on Panay, and deception measures portraying a lodgement on Palawan as main effort for as long as possible.

(4) Phase 3 - Neutralise. This phase will see decisive land operations take place on Panay. The aim of this phase is to defeat the NTMEF on Panay. A secondary lodgement on Palawan will also occur to defeat NTMEF on Palawan. Protection to be enhanced by control of all sea and air lanes around Panay and Palawan and consideration for CBRN threats to be factored into daily MOPP states.

(5) Phase 4 – Transition. This phase will see the transition of authority from CJTF 667 to either a UN sanctioned Peacekeeping Force or a follow on HN force. It will be expected that CJTF 667 FE will remain to conduct Stability Operations until a replacement force can take over. Protection measures will begin to put greater emphasis on non-conventional threats, law and order, health, crime, drugs, safety, protection of captured enemy personnel, operational area security, physical security, antiterrorism and on coordination of FP measures with Host Nation. The potential for kidnapping or capture of friendly forces increases significantly in this phase requiring the establishment of a Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC). Key risks to CJTF 667 forces throughout this phase include accidents caused by fatigue or failure to adhere to published SOPs and standards. The BX government assumes responsibility for their own security and infrastructure maintenance.

e. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Electronic Counter Measures (ECM). In order to prevent mutual interference between other ECM equipment and communications systems, coordination between nations and other agencies is required for Spectrum Management control.

(2) Training. Personnel and units are to receive appropriate FP training, particularly in Escalation of Force procedures.

(3) Vulnerability Assessments (VA). In order to ensure that FP measures meet required standards, site assessments must be conducted for any semi-permanent sites (FOBs, main camps, etc.). The assessments routinely involve sites visits with interviews with key specialists and inspection of all FP related procedures and infrastructure, ranging from defensive positions through classified document handling procedures to food hygiene. The process is intended to be consultative and can be used by site commanders to reinforce their cases for improvements to their FP posture.

(4) Protection Working Groups. Protection Working Groups have been established at HQ CJTF 667 and at subordinate Component Commands.

4. Sustainment. See Annex R to CJTF 667 OPORD 01.

5. Command and Signal.

a. Command. FP measures issued by COMD CJTF 667 are valid for all Coalition members and facilities in the JFAO. Nevertheless, following a threat and risk assessment, Senior National Commanders may increase FP measures within their national elements.

b. Reporting. Deviations from the prescribed FP measures, changes in threat, and FP incidents are to be reported via the CJTF 667 reporting chain. CBRN incidents are to be reported to COMD CJTF 667 via the CJTF 667 CBRN Warning and Reporting chain.

ANNEX J TO
HQ CJTF 667
OPORD 01/20

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

References

A. Joint Media and Communications Directive 01/2020, MSC dated 15 July 2019
B. Joint Targeting Directive 01/2020 Defence Minister – Joint Effects Guidelines
C. United Nations Security Council Resolution 8873 dated 01May20
D. Joint Information Operations Policy CJOPS dated 14May20
E. Information Operations Support - Planning Directive, dated 05 Jun 2020
F. Multi-National Headquarters SOP and Operating Instrs dated May 2020

SITUATION

1. General. Information Operations (IO) is the integration, synchronisation and coordination of two or more non-kinetic means through a number of Information Related Capabilities (IRC) that generate and sustain a targeted information advantage. An information advantage is a favourable information situation relative to a group, organisation or adversary. IO includes both influencing the decision-making of actors while protecting our own information and decision-making. These include:

a. Shaping and Influencing (S&I) (at the strategic level);

b. Information Operations (IO) (at the operational level); and

c. Inform and Influence Actions (IIA) (at the tactical level).

2. The IRCs are the tools, capabilities or processes, which can have effects of a physical, functional, temporal or psychological nature upon target systems and/or target audiences (an individual group selected for an effect). The IRCs have many extended sub elements to them but all work towards the same aim as the main component under the direction of IO. All actions are integrated into the overall campaign plan and are applicable from Phase 0 to Phase 4 of an operation and must be planned accordingly and not added later. Achievement of Australia's national aims and national strategic objectives, as stated in Ref A, within the South Pacific region rests heavily on CJTF 667 ability to synchronise and integrate the Info Ops BOS activities with CJTF 667 Manoeuvre BOS and Offensive Support BOS activities. This Info Ops Annex provides the non-kinetic guidance for the CJTF 667 OPLAN IAW Ref B.

3. Adversary Forces. For analysis of operational environment, threat, threat forces and assessment of likely en ops, see OPORD Annex B, Intelligence. In summary, regional actors including North Torbian (NT) are competing for resources within the South Pacific region. It is using regional instability as justification for military intervention and the annexation of Panay and Palawan island provinces from the sovereign state of Belesia. NT government (GoNT) and military (Torbian People's Army – TPA)) forces are heavily engaged in air, land and sea operations and shaping and influencing effects across the northern most island province of Panay, in an undermining attempt to separate it from its nation state of Belesia. This has necessitated the United

Nations assembly to pronounce a Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 8873, noted as Ref C, to re-establish the Government of Belesian (GoB) sovereignty in both islands of Panay and Palawan. However, TPA information operations activities have been undertaken for some time and have had the desired effect on the population and will take some determination to change. This is especially true given TPA IO elements have an additional IRC in their organisation and which has been actively deployed. That of terrorism. This non-kinetic IRC has the capability of producing both lethal and non-lethal effects and is very successful.

4. Friendly Forces. For information and organisations of detailed friendly forces, groupings, tasks and capabilities, see OPORD Annex C, Operations. Those friendly force IRC planners, staff and elements to be made available to CJTF 667 IO Branch, include but are not limited to, those below noted;

a. Civil Military Operations (CMO) elements and components including the provisions and coordination of Civil Affairs (CA) staff and teams (coalition resource) Civil Aid Programs (CAP), Civil Military Actions or Activities (CMA) and tactical Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) teams.

b. Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) elements and components including the provision of Radio in a Box (RIAB) broadcast staff and eqpt and speaker announcement / material delivery teams.

c. Electronic Warfare (EW) elements and components including air strike capabilities (EA-18 Growler sorties) and ground Direction Finding and Radio Intercept (LEWT) teams.

d. Key Leader Engagement (KLE) cell for the creation of the liaison architecture and assignment and coordination of Force Elements (FE) for the implementation of the KLE plan.

e. Media and Public Affairs (MPA) officers, staff and combat camera teams (CCT) to be coordinated with IO to achieve the COMD's desired Public Relations (PR) effect as detailed in the strategic communications directive and the MPA plan. This includes media liaison and release of approved targeted public information.

f. Computer Network Operations (CNO) staff and teams to advise on strategic effects and assist with protection measures. Its strike capability is not advised and will be noted in the strategic S&I Plan.

g. Deception (DECEP) staff and units to create and implement the larger operational manoeuvre decep plan and the coordination of tactical level deception activities. This includes but is not limited to cam and concealment, dummy sites and decoy wpns, false electronic signatures and the staging of false activities and lures.

h. Operational Security (OPSEC) staff and teams to advise on OPSEC measures to protect EEFIs and monitor, investigate and report on OPSEC violations for further actions.

i. Presence, Posture and Profile (PPP) activities will be a matter for all FE units and members adherence to follow IAW established procedures, orders, instructions and the PPP plan.

j. Protective Security (PS) staff and Rear Security, Regimental Provost and Military Police FE to work towards the PS plan.

k. Information Assurance (IA) activities to secure ICT hardware and software, networks and routers, data servers and information, and systems access protection measures IAW Information System Security Procedures (ISSP).

l. Offensive Support (OS) elements along with Joint Fires (JF) units and systems which support the Manoeuvre BOS but with whom can be leveraged non-lethal effects such as show of force, fire power demonstrations or destruction of material IAW synchronised effects plan.

m. Evidentiary Imagery (EI) staff and elements capable or capturing before and after activities imagery, such as bomb damage assessment to counter that which may be used against FE by adversary.

n. Military to Military (M2M) networking cell for the creation of the communications and information architecture between deploy allied and host nation military force units and HQs, and the publishing of this data for the implementation of the M2M Plan. M2M should not be confused with the Liaison Officer function as prescribed in the C2 BOS.

o. Special Technical Operations (STO) staff and elements for the creation and delivery of those special non-kinetic effects, both lethal and nonlethal which may be tactically or operationally employed IAW the STO Plan.

p. Other related staff and organisations as detailed by the Comd to achieve a desired effect on a target using the means at their disposal. These include resources inside and outside of the JFAO.

MISSION

5. Information Operations are to be conducted in support of the CJTF 667 mission of conducting military operations to expel all TPA forces from Panay and Belesian sovereign territory, in order to create conditions for the re-establishment of a safe and secure environment in Belesia and the surrounding region in accordance with the provisions of the UNSCR 8873.

EXECUTION

6. **Commanders Intent.**

a. **Purpose**. The purpose of CJTF IO within Panay is to DEGRADE adversary information and information systems whilst protecting and enhancing CJTF information and information systems.

b. **Method**. IO will support the CJTF 667 mission in accordance with the IRC taskings as noted in Ref D, through performance of the following inform and influence actions:

(1) PROTECT CJTF legitimacy, information and information systems IOT ENABLE CJTF 667 operations.

(2) INFORM Panay civil population of TPA subversion/atrocities IOT UNDERMINE TPA actions and narrative.

(3) DEGRADE enemy forces and belligerent actors within Panay IOT ENHANCE GoB and Panay authorities.

(4) INFLUENCE Panay civil population to reconcile IOT ASSIST GoB to re-establish law and order.

c. **End state.** All foreign actors have been rejected by Panay civpop, belligerent groups degraded to ineffectiveness, community groups commencing reconciliation, GoB endorsed and supported as legitimate authority and CJTF preparing to conduct retrograde actions.

7. **Concept of Operations.**

a. **Joint Essential Effects.** The desired CJTF joint essential effects are as follows:

(1) **1. PROMOTE GoB and CJTF legitimacy.** The immediate acquisition of the dominant narrative within Panay is essential to achieving specified national strategic aims. IOT facilitate the below listed joint essential effects, CJTF and GoB legitimacy are a crucial platform that will both prevent further NT involvement and undermine TPA shaping and influencing actions.

(2) **2. ISOLATE Panay from foreign influence.** IOT allow Panay to return to normal patterns of life, external destabilising influences that are affecting the internal security of Panay must be isolated. If belligerent groups within Panay are unable to communicate and resupply, their influence on the battle space will be dramatically reduced.

(3) **3. DEGRADE belligerent actors within Panay.** Once belligerent groups are isolated from supply and support, these groups must be systematically degraded to reduce their impact on CJTF and GoB operations. This will be achieved through synchronisation of direct and indirect kinetic and non-kinetic CJTF actions to dislocate and neutralise belligerent actors in Panay.

(4) **4. ASSIST GoB to re-establish law and order.** The degradation of belligerent groups alone will not be sufficient to allow transition of Panay to HN control. The enhancement of local security forces and government authorities will be essential to the achievement of the CJTF end state.

b. **Joint Effects Tasks (JETs).** In line with the joint essential effects listed above, the approved JETs are as follows:

(1) **1.1 PROMOTE CJTF legitimacy.** Throughout this operation, it is essential that CJTF legitimacy is maintained both IOT maintain public support in Panay and AS and to counter pro-NT narratives that seek to undermine CJTF presence.

(2) **1.2 ENHANCE GoB legitimacy.** IOT achieve the end state it is essential that both the Panay CIVPOP and the international community accept the reinstated GoB. Therefore, CJTF is to facilitate every opportunity to enhance the GoB's reputation to further counter the NT negative narrative.

(3) **1.3 UNDERMINE NT legitimacy.** IOT prevent NT force projection and escalation, it is essential that the NT narrative is dismantled at every opportunity using facts and examples of NT and TPA influence within Panay. This will undermine NT's political standing in the region and reduce their impact on shaping regional and global opinion.

(4) **1.4 EXPOSE TPA atrocities and regional shaping actions.** Linkages to activities within the TPA shaping and influencing activities will further degrade NT's political position and enhance the CJTF narrative.

(5). **2.1 DISLOCATE TPA within Panay.** Where possible, CJTF 667 seeks to physically and functionally dislocate TPA forces through non-kinetic actions and non-lethal effects IOT activate TPA withdrawal triggers and avoid kinetic engagement with CJTF elements.

(6) **2.2 ISOLATE TPA from NT support.** The establishment of air and naval blockades will prevent TPA provision of materiel and logistic support from/to NT which can be exploited to create command dilemmas for senior TPA leadership and to influence subsequent TPA actions.

(7) **2.3 ISOLATE TPA, Insurgents and Auxiliaries from support bases.** Concurrent isolation of belligerent groups within Panay from local, regional and transnational support will deny these groups the ability to remain below the detection threshold and enable CJTF targeting.

(8) **3.1 EXPOSE TPA destabilising actions.** IOT influence Panay CIVPOP to expose belligerent groups concealed within their midst, links to TPA shaping and influencing within Panay are an important platform for the dismantling of belligerent group support.

(9) **3.2 INFORM Panay CIVPOP of atrocities.** Continual exposure of belligerent group activities against the Panay CIVPOP and GoB will contribute to the isolation of subversive elements from the population.

(10) **3.3 ISOLATE TPA, Insurgents and Auxiliaries from Panay CIVPOP.** In addition to INFORM effects, CJTF must undertake non-kinetic actions to cause these groups to isolate themselves from the population IOT allow targeting.

(11) **3.4 SHAPE TPA, Insurgents and Auxiliaries into CJTF EAs.** Once clearly isolated from Panay CIVPOP, the CJTF needs to shape these groups into a time and place of its own choosing IOT neutralise them.

(12) **4.1 ENHANCE Panay authorities.** IOT ensure that Panay establishments have the capabilities required to assume control of Panay, CJTF 667 must progressively enhance host nation authorities in preparation for transition.

(13) **4.2 ENHANCE ethnic relations.** A significant factor of instability within Panay is the state of relations between the various ethnic groups. By improving these relations at the local and national level, CJTF 667 will reduce a significant threat to Panay ability to maintain control of the population.

(14) **4.3 PROTECT vulnerable populations within Panay.** In concert with international conventions, treaties and obligations, CJTF 667 must understand its responsibilities with regard to UNSCR1325, 1612, 1674, 1820 and 2242 in addition to the culture and values beliefs within Panay society.

(15) **4.4 PROTECT critical infrastructure within Panay.** The legitimacy of both CJTF667 and GoB will rest on the CJTFs ability to maintain essential services, utilities and amenities to maintain or return to normal patterns of life. CJTF 667 must ensure these services are not targeted, collaterally protected and maintained where possible throughout this operation. That which is not, must be repaired or replaced as soon as practically possible and have a minimise military involvement in maintaining function.

c. **Approved Target Audiences (TA).** As advised in the Target Directive, Ref B, the approved CJTF TAs are as follows:

(1) **TA 1: Government of Belesia (GoB).** This TA includes all members of local, regional and national government in all capacities. The GoB is deemed critical to the success of OP STEEL SENTINEL as it is the basis for the implementation of UNSCR 8873 and provides CJTF 667 its legitimacy and authority.

(2) **TA 2: Panay Civilian Population (CIVPOP).** This includes all ethnic groups collectively IOT build understanding, unity and social cohesion. This TA will be essential to the success of OP STEEL SENTINEL as it is the they who must ultimately endorse the GoB and CJTF 667 and comply with Panay authorities whilst denying foreign and belligerent actor influence within the community.

(3) **TA 3: Panay local Authorities.** This includes all law enforcement (police), emergency services (fire, rescue, ambulance), security organisations (customs, sheriff, bailiff) and regulatory arms of government that regulate, oversee, enforce and maintain rule of law within Panay. A holistic, WoG approach to the reformation and enhancement of Panay institutions is deemed critical to the strengthening of the government and the long term restoration of law and order.

(4) **TA 4: NT CIVPOP.** This TA is restricted to those groups within NT IOT influence support to the NT Government. The degree of public support for NT's political position will directly influence the likelihood of military incursion or TPA employment.

(5) **TA 5: International Civilian Population (INTNPOP).** This TA is restricted to those groups external to the Belesian Islands IOT influence support to the NT Government. The degree of public awareness of NT and TPA's shaping and influencing actions within the region will directly influence perceptions of CJTF 667 legitimacy, regional diplomacy and lobbying of the UN, placing increased political pressure on both TPA and NT.

(6) **TA 6: TPA.** This includes enlisted ranks through to senior command levels. The TPA poses a significant threat and is likely to deliberately seek opportunities to escalate its involvement in Panay based on CJTF activities. CJTF 667 must not present opportunities for TPA to dominate the narrative by claiming that CJTF 667 is manoeuvring aggressively, must try to influence peaceful TPA withdrawal from the disputed region and if unsuccessful must convince the TPA that it cannot win any military contest on either practical or moral grounds. This is to be further developed into a surrender strategy during the combat ops phase.

(7) **TA 7: Insurgents.** This includes members through to senior leader levels. The Insurgents are predominantly from the Visayan People's Front and are being used by NT as a force to divide the community, incite violence and promote propaganda as a platform/screen for subsequent TPA and TPA SF activities. The chaos and optics that the Insurgents provide NT are essential to NT's ability to retain the initiative and maintain the dominant narrative within Panay, therefore the degradation and dismantling of the Insurgency will present a significant operational and messaging victory for CJTF 667.

(8) **TA 8: NT Auxiliaries.** This includes interested parties through to organisers and instigators. The Auxiliaries include privately funded security firms (such as the Wagner Group) used to provide security to the San Rafael Mine. The debunking of Auxiliary propaganda and countering of violence and influencing actions is crucial to establishing a safe political environment for Panay to work towards the desired end state.

(9) **TA 9: Potential Ethnic Extremist Groups .** The use of revenge and violence against radical elements of the ethnic community threatens to further exacerbate ethnic tensions, legitimise the ethnic nationalist agenda and demonise reconciliation attempts by ethnic leaders. As such, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of the any armed ethnic persons or groups is critical to the establishment of CJTF and GoB legitimacy.

(10) **TA 10: Government of NT (GoNT).** This includes members of national government in all capacities. The purpose of CJTF 667 messaging to the GoNT is to convince the GoNT that the ANZAC coalition cannot be politically or militarily defeated and is the predominant political and military entity within the region. This intent is designed to contain TPA's regional

expansion agenda and to demonstrate ANZAC capabilities IOT deter future aggression towards other Pacific Nations.

d. **Approved Operational Themes.** The approved CJTF themes are as follows:

(1) CJTF 667 is here at the invitation of the GoB to enforce UNSCR 8873 and to protect the Panay people.

(2) The current destabilised situation in Panay is the result of NT intervention and TPA influences assisted by local radicals.

(3) Panay's future rests on dialogue, not violence. All aspects of the Panay community are encouraged to leave the past behind and move towards a brighter future together.

(4) CJTF 667 looks forward to working with the GoB and the Panay people to restore Panay to prosperity and success.

e. **Key Messages.** The key messages aligned with the approved CJTF themes are as follows:

(1) CJTF 667 is here to help. Please work with coalition forces to allow them to assist the Panay government.

(2) If you see something, say something; report any suspicious activity to local authorities. Do not take action yourself.

(3) Violence is being used to drive Panayians apart; talking between community groups is the key to the future.

(4) CJTF 667 looks forward to working with the government and the community to return life in Panay to normal.

(5) Do not take up arms or support those that do. Law and order will be restored and criminal acts will be punished under law.

8. **Groupings and Tasks.**

a. **CMO.** CJTF 667 will be supported by CMO from the operational to the tactical level to plan and conduct PROMOTE, ENHANCE, INFORM and INFLUENCE actions in support of the force. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 1.

b. **PSYOPS.** Tactical PSYOPS Teams (TPT) will be held at the operational level for distribution to tactical formations at the direction of the commander. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 2.

c. **EW.** Electromagnetic and directed energy will be used to SCREEN, DENY, DISRUPT, INTERDICT and DEGRADE adversary communications and emissions across the EM spectrum. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 3.

d. **KLE.** Key WoG representatives from DFAT, AFP, OGA and Defence will foster strategic outcomes through engagement with the relevant Panay stakeholders. Additional guidance and engagement instrument of authority is contained within Appendix 4.

e. **MPA.** PAOs and detachments will operate from HQ CJTF 667 and tactical HQs across Panay under guidance from JOC. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 5.

f. **CNO.** May be proliferated at the operational and strategic level to attack, defend and exploit information and data networks from the National Support base within Australia and New Zealand. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 6.

g. **DECEP.** Deception activities will be coordinated at the operational level by HQ CJTF 667 supported by elements of JOC within Australia. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 7.

h. **OPSEC.** All formations and units are responsible for the maintenance of OPSEC. Specific guidance is contained within Appendix 8.

i. **PPP.** Force postures will be dictated by the developing situation on the ground tempered by the achievement of national strategic aims when security permits. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 9.

j. **PS.** Force Protection Elements (FPE) will be allocated to key strategic points of entry (SPOE) within Panay, whilst Reserve components of the LCC will provide tactical commanders an organic protective security asset for use within tactical AOs. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 10.

k. **Information Assurance (IA**). IA activities will be coordinated at the operational level by HQ CJTF 667 supported by elements of the National Support base within Australia. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 11.

l. **Offensive Support (OS) / Destruction**. Elements of conventional naval, air and land manoeuvre will be combined with Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) assets to facilitate strategic destruction effects. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 12.

m. **Evidentiary Imagery (EI).** All images captured that are of an operational nature should be forwarded to MPA through respective formation Chains of Command, and opportunities to leverage the dominant narrative should be exploited. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 13.

n. **Military to Military Networking (M2M).** An extensive network of inter service, inter coalition and inter Panay contacts and liaison officers (LOs) has been established throughout CJTF 667, the Belesian Defence Force and Australian/New Zealand strategic commands. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 14.

o. **Special Technical Operations (STO).** Specific technical personnel and equipment is available for request from the National Support base within Australia and New Zealand

to achieve selected military objectives. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 15.

9. **Coordinating Instructions**

a. It is incumbent on the Operational Headquarters to ensure adequate control and support/taskings are organised for the IRCs. The coordination of which begins with the IRC's elements meeting in their respective working group and discuss the issues and progression of their task and effect deliver on their assigned targets. These targets being assigned from the Joint Prioritised Integrated Target List as (JPITL) maintained by the Joint Fires and Effects Coordination Centre (JFECC). The results of which and suggestions for future targets/effects will be then brought forward by their applicable operations staff to the Information Operations Work Group (IOWG). The SO2 IO will then collate the Measures of Performance (MOP) and the Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) and synchronise them at the Joint Effects Working Group (JEWG). At the JEWG, staffed by the SO2 JEffects will be the SO2 Joint Fires, intelligence rep, legal rep, targeting officer and other staff involved in the targeting process. After the discussions and proposals are advised, these will be brought to the Joint Effects Target Board (JETB) where the Comd or his delegate will approve the actions, apportion resources and if required, task elements via Fragmentary or Task Order (FRAGO for assigned FE or TASKO for resources not found on the ORBAT) to achieve effects. The times and frequency of these meetings and work groups will be advise by way of a HQ Battle Rhythm (B2C2WG).

b. IRCs are expected to conduct their own work groups and have a trained staff member provide inputs and exchange information coherently as the IRCs Subject Matter Expert (SME). The SME maybe required to attend at the JEWG or to the COMD's JETB but should not attend as a regular matter of course. Conversely, where an order is to be struck for an action or activity, the SME can assist in drafting the order and give advance warning of the order to their respective IRC elements.

c. In some cases where the sensitivity of the desired effect or the secrecy surrounding the chosen target exists, the IRC tactical element may not necessarily be inform of the higher order impact or the true target for the desired effect. IRCs are expected to conduct their activities with a minimum of information and should report all aspects of their task using the communications chain in accordance with command and signals reporting requirements. Timings for which are TBA.

d. MOPs and MOEs assist in the accomplishment of the assessment process by qualifying or quantifying the intangible attributes of the information environment. The MOP for any one action should be whether or not the TA was exposed to the IO action or activity. MOEs should be observable, to aid with collection; quantifiable, to increase objectivity; precise to ensure accuracy; and correlated with the progress of the operation to attain timeliness. Indicators are crucial because they aid the joint IO plan in informing MOEs and should be identifiable and reported on by all IRCs. Information of effects and measures can be found in Ref E.

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

10. **Log Arrangements and Resupply**

a. The prudent and general log rule for all IRC tactical teams and elements is self-sufficiency. When employed in the AO, all IRC elements with teams or staffs must have their own logistics and transportation resources and be capable of sustained ops for periods from 72 hrs to 7 days without the need for resupply. If resupply is required then the parent unit of the IRC team is to make the necessary arrangements. Contingency plans for emergencies such as break down, veh recovery or comms failures must be detailed in a units patrol TTPs and orders.

b. All IRCs with actual tactical elements, will retain responsibility for the provision of daily sustainment or for organising that resupply with a unit with control of the AO where the team operates. Where the element is seconded to a formation HQs for a task, then it is to come under administrative control of the HQs support unit. Where an element is in location of a forward combat unit then administrative arrangements may be made with that unit for sustainment. Care must be used when assigning command and control arrangements while elements are in a units location or under their responsibility for security. It is expected that elements may have to provide assistance to a supporting unit and it may even be necessary for them to be incorporated into the watch routine and perimeter security plan.

c. The IO staff in the HQs are to become the technical administrative leader for IRC staff or cells as maybe assigned to the HQs. As such, the IO staff branch of that HQ are expected to have an administrative officer / NCO capable of sorting the working and living arrangements of these members whilst attached to the HQs. These staff should come as self-contained as possible but there is an expectation that their pers welfare and basic office needs will be meet by the staff in IO to ensure maximum efficiency of their staff function. However, as the SME for their IRC, the HQs will have an expectation that special to needs items such as laptops and software or systems access will be brought with the SME or sorted out with that staff member prior to assignment.

11. **Tpt Arrangements and Movements.**

a. IRC tactical elements and teams are also expected to come with their own intrinsic transportation to move them into and around the assigned AO. Where this transport is not compatible with the organisation assigned or doesn’t meet the protection or mobility needs of the team, then arrangements detailing the transportation requirements are to be created and tasked to the forward unit. This may also include the assignment of security to the team as well. The IRC teams will be expected to organise veh resupply and light recovery and should a vehicle require replacement, that IRCs unit remains responsible.

b. Staff assigned as SME to a HQs are to be carried and transported by the HQs in its vehicles and transport means when the HQ moves. Should a SME arrive with intrinsic transportation, arrangements should immediately be made for that vehicles resupply and recovery arrangements. The HQs has responsibility for the veh but should not expect to have control or use of that resource unless arrangements can be mutually organised and agreed to.

12. **Admin Support Arrangements**.

a. As for the logistical arrangements, tactical teams remain the responsibility of their higher IRC organisation for admin support. The exception being health care. Should a tac team member become a cas, especially in the fwd area, then they are to enter the chain of evacuation by the best means possible with consideration given towards their condition and severity.

b. Staff attached to the HQs will be treated as for the arrangements of the permanent HQs staff.

COMMAND AND SIGNALS

13. **Command.**

a. The Principle Command staff of the formations are;

(1) COMD CJTF 667 is LTGEN XXXXX (AS).

(2) DEPCOMD CJTF 776 Corp is MAJGEN XXXXXX (NZ)

(3) COS CJTF 667 is BRIG XXXXXX

(4) COMD LCC (1 ANZAC DIV) is MAJGEN XXXXXX (AS)

(5) DEPCOMD LCC (1 ANZAC DIV) is BRIG XXXXXX (AS).

(6) COS LCC (1 ANZAC DIV) is COL XXXXXX (AS).

b. Those listed in para a above are all listed as having full Target Authorisation. Changes to this list are to be promulgated as made.

14. **Headquarters Locations.**

a. HQ CJTF 667

(1) FWD HQ Located at; TBA

(2) MAIN HQ Located at; General Santos City APOD

(3) REAR HQ Located at; TBA

b. LCC (HQ 1 ANZAC DIV)

(1) TAC HQ Located at; Iloilo APOD (Ph 3 – 4)

(2) FWD HQ Located at; HMAS Canberra/Adelaide (Ph 2 – 4)

(3) MAIN HQ Located at; Iloilo SPOD (Ph 3 – 4)

(4) REAR HQ Located at; General Santos City APOD (all Phases)

15. **Communication and Information Systems (CIS).**

a. Main Comms to be provided by secure link as follows;

(1) Phone (voice and message) over secure VOIP.

(2) Data (email and chat) over secure VOIP.

(3) Line (voice) over secure microwave.

(4) Radio (voice) over secure HF guard.

16. **Signals.**

a. Frequencies, rotating call signs and net identifiers to be published and changed on schedule IAW CEOI.

b. All reports and returns are to be compiled and transmitted IAW Ref F.

17. **Acknowledge.**

Appendices:

1 CMO Plan.

2 PSYOPS Plan

3 EW Plan.

4 KLE Plan.

5 MPA Plan.

6 CNO Plan.

7 DECEP Plan.

8 OPSEC Plan.

9 PPP Plan.

10 PS Plan.

11 IA Plan.

12 OS/Destruction Plan.

13 EI Plan.

14 M2M Plan.

15 STO Plan.

ANNEX Q TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

CIVIL MILTARY OPERATIONS

References:

A. World Fact Book 2020 – The Republic of Belesia as at 8 Nov 18
B. Panay District Supplement as at 1 Jan 18
C. Palawan District Supplement as at 13 Jan 18
D. HQ JOC OIE Prospects for Security and Stability in Belesia dated 30Oct19
E. UNHC – P Report 008/19 – Humanitarian Sit Panay Isles dated 25 Oct 19

OVERVIEW

1. **General.** This annex details the Civil Military Operations (CMO) objectives and activities to be undertaken in support of the land component operations. This is to support the establishment of security and stability conditions in the JFAO sufficient for the transition of responsibility for security to a mandated UN Follow on Force (FoF) and subsequent Host Nation Military / Security forces. This annex is to be used by those elements involved in Civ-Mil activities and those whom may need to understand the Civ-Mil environment for their own BOS. All CMO intentions will be undertaken with in IO objectives and in line with the COMD's intent (here with restated);

a. **Purpose**. Enforce UNSCR 8873 to re-establish Belesian sovereignty in Panay and Palawan.

b. **Method**. Deploy CJTF 667 with enablers from ADF and OGA to the JFAO to prosecute Multi-Domain Operations against North Torbian elements in Belesian sovereign territory. Coordinate WOAG and multinational efforts to enforce UNSCR 8873.

c. **Endstate**. The removal of North Torbian forces from Belesian sovereign territory, establishment of a safe and secure environment in the occupied Belesian territories, and conditions set for the UN supervised transition of authority in Panay and Palawan back to the Belesian Government

SITUATION

2. **Enemy**. Analysis of operational environment, threat, threat forces and assessment of likely en ops, see Intelligence, OPORD Annex B.

3. **Friendly**. Detailed friendly forces, groupings, tasks and organisation see Operations, OPORD Annex C.

4. **Inhabitants**. A detailed social-political and infrastructure summary of the JFAO is provided in Ref A to E, and detailed in the enclosed Country Study Appendix 1. That study providing the following points as particular relevance to the CJTF 667 CMO plan for the Panay Island province of the nation state of Belesia:

a. **Population.** The population of Belesia is 109,000,000 based on July 2016 estimates. The pop in Panay is 4,301,000 (2015) which is spread throughout the island's urban and rural area with pop centres noted in Panay Map Appendix 2 and as follows;

(1) Kalibo; pop 574,000 capital of province of Aclan supporting 17 smaller towns.

(2) San Rafael; pop 582,000 capital of province of Antiq supporting 18 towns.

(3) Roxas; pop 761,000 capital of province of Apiz supporting 16 towns.

(4) Iloilo City; pop 2,384,000 capital of province of Iloilo supporting 42 towns.

b. **Language**. Panay has three official languages, Tok Belesia, Tagalog and English although Tagalog is seldom used by the younger generations. English is the language of government, education and business. Tok Belesia, a Melanesian pidgin similar in nature to Papua New Guinea Tok Pisin and Vanuatu Bislama. It is the lingua franca. There are a number of indigenous languages spoken which belong to various linguistic groups. The number of speakers of these languages has steadily dwindled in recent decades. FE should be able to communicate with the pop in English, especially the younger people without need of translators.

c. **Culture and Society**. Within Panay there are four ethnic groups, Panayan 48%, Torbian 32%, Olvanan 18%, and European 2%. Within each of these groups a number of clans or extended family groups exist. Each of these clans historically operated within a defined territory as noted in Panay Map attached as Appendix 3, moving throughout their home lands. While a homogeneous and multicultural population, FE should still exercise caution when dealing with tribal issues as this is still a strong bond within Panay society.

d. **Religion**. The Roman Catholic Church (RCC) is the major religion in Panay, being a de facto provider of many public services a more functional government would ordinarily supply. The RCC has strong and deep roots within most communities both religious and secular, and its international character has led to some suspicion that factions within the local cathedral communities might be partisan actors or at least being logistical links for Olvana and Torbia. The influence the RCC has over the population, almost 65% are active parishioners, can not be overstated. A highly religious society means that care must be taken by the FE to not be seen to be contrary to the church or its symbology.

e. **Politics and Government**. Following the 1967 announcement of the government to grant Panay self-governance no later than 1972, elections to a popular assembly were held in 1971. The Panay District Assembly consists of 40 members with 10 members elected by each of the 4 districts and is headed by a parliament based out of the capital Iloilo City. The government still operates on a small “pay for services” scheme to get work done. This is often and incorrectly referred to as corruption, but is not. It is the recognised method of getting govt work done. This is not to be confused with the graft and payouts done by the mining sector of business as this money goes straight to elected members and not into the government supply.

f. **Economic outlook.** Successive Panay governments have overseen the exploitation of the islands natural resources with a light hand, generally granting concessions, specifically mining, in a resource bidding war that if successful would see Panay gain high economic benefits. The commercial and industrial businesses which thrive in Panay have worked out that small wages and pay offs to politicians can lead to high profit. These commercial interests need careful handling. The FE can expect that commercial enterprises will be quick

to exploit the situation and it is anticipated that claims and compensation will be sought as the security circumstances improve.

g. **Electricity.** Panay has a coal fired power generator located on the outskirts of each of the provincial centres. Power is reasonably well provided for but suffers from high demand shortages especially during peak periods, resulting in outages of a few hours. Energy is supplied as 240-250v 60Hz cycle which is broken into 110-120v in the homes and buildings with power within the pop. Breakdowns in coal delivery can also disrupt supply sometimes lasting in outages of days. Critical infrastructure has backup generators but these are also subject to outage due to disruptions in diesel fuel supply. FE should not expect to be able to tap into and utilise the civilian electricity grid and must come self-contained with its own generator power supply and fuel to run it.

h. **Water Supply.** All towns draw their town water from underground aquifers and the larger rivers which runs through them. The water quality can run from an A to C rating. Supply during the dry season may also cause shortages. Given the low quality and lack of quantity, FE must bring its own purification and water supply systems.

i. **Fuel Supply.** Panay is bisected by the AMADA Natural Gas Pipeline, which is a significant infrastructure of considerable value to the national Belesian government. Natural gas is the fuel of choice for the pop needs being used for everything from cooking to powering vehicles and generators. Fuel supply of both diesel and petrol is provided from refineries in Belesia which can result in shortages due to the problems of shipping and distribution. Fuel supplies for FE will not be possible from inside Panay and CSS & LOG should not plan to get these from in country with care taken to not cause shortages to the pop.

j. **Waste Treatment**. Regional centres have a rudimentary and inefficient sewage systems with the more remote areas generally have individual house septic systems. This has in past caused fouling of the water supply which then causes health concerns with the pop. The FE needs to be cognisant that its waste disposal systems and programs do not cause environmental issues nor exacerbate problems with the existing infrastructure.

k. **Telecommunications**. A high **s**tandard of telephone, mobile phone and internet connections are available across the whole island and high data capability available in regional centres. Remote rural areas are for the most part available with various levels of reliability. It is well known that the phone infrastructure was built by the MISO Telecom company and that while a reliable and well used system, can be intercepted and be used as an information and intelligence source. Phones which use the local system will be subject to foreign intelligence service information collection activities. It is important for rebuilding of the country so must be protected from kinetic or non-kinetic disruption in all phases.

l. **Health.** The island's civilian health services and support infrastructure, based on hospitals at the provincial centres. Nationals generally seek treatment for major medical treatment in Belesia in preference to the Panay health service. FE should not expect to be able to use the civilian infrastructure and can expect requests for support when they are located in country.

m. **Legal System.** Justice is administered by the national authority, which was generally only concerned with serious crimes. Local issues are generally handled by provincial

magistrates or city judges. Given the CJTF will operate under the provisions of the UNSCR 8873 and an extant SOFA, FE should have very limited dealings with the Panay legal system. Legislative issues including the SOFA and ROE are to be found with the Legal OPORD Annex K.

n. **Policing.** Under national rule, a semi-professional constabulary force of approximately 100 officers was trained in basic policing skills. Following self autonomy this small department was expanded and now has some 5,000 members. A Police Proficiency and Capability report is expected from the AFP on the competencies and shortfalls of this law enforcement agency. It is to be found with the Military Police OPORD Annex AD. The expectation is that the countries police force will return and provide the necessary law enforcement activities on cessation of hostilities.

o. **Transportation.** Panay has a well-developed, albeit not extensive road system. Road haulage operations are a key component of the success of the Panay economy. Care must therefore be exercised by FE to ensure damage to the roads by either offensive support actions (deliberate or dynamic) or ground force usage, is kept to a minimum. Where damage occurs, it is to be reported immediately and repaired as soon as practically possible. The low weight rate (40t classification) of most highways and bridges will see the use of the roads by the heavy A veh fleet and larger logistics vehicle fleet severely curtailed.

p. **Humanitarian Situation.** United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator – Panay **(**UNHC-P) reporting at Ref F estimates approximately 40,000 IDP's are scattered throughout Panay as a result of increased activities by the enemy who have a sophisticated public communications and information operation. These are moved as the camps reach capacity or if the reason for the displacement ceases. In most cases, the camps successfully re-integrate the IDPs back to their home locations.

q. **IDP Camps.** The following IDP camps may have been identified in Panay:

(1) Province of Aclan: Two camps; *Toora to the east & Minnus* adjacent to Kalibo.

(2) Province of Antiq; Two camps; *Casmare* and San Rafael.

(3) Province of Capiz. Three camps; *Erine, Ranka and Nurra*.

(4) Province of Iloilo: Two camps; *Adland and Iloilo*.

r. **IDP/Refugees Movements.**

(1) Population movement internal of a country produces internally displaced persons (IDP) but if the population flees across countries borders, they become refugees. Additional IDP/Refugee movement is expected on commencement of Phase 2 and additional temporary camps are expected to emerge. These movements are expected to include both those fleeing active conflict and those who have benefitted from the supported government and now fear reprisals.

(2) Greater movements of people combined with an expected deterioration of law & order and the economy during and immediately after decisive operations are likely

to exacerbate existing problems within communities. This is likely to have a particular impact on women with increased incidence of rape, transactional sex and related gender based violence.

(3) The maintenance of awareness on the situation of Displaced Persons and Refugees (DPRE) in the AO will remain a CMO responsibility.

(4) Upon ceasing of hostilities, security of movement is restored and people feel that there is sufficient law and order to protect them from attack or retaliation in their home communities, IDP/refugees will begin to return. This is expected to strain post-conflict housing availability, public services and food/water supplies.

5. **HA and Civil Society Organisations (CSO).**

a. Some of the IO/NGO operating across the CJOA and within Belesia are managing the IDP camps. It is likely that international and other staffs who work for IO/NGO may depart or curtail their activities during military operations as they will conduct their own threat assessments and act IAW the UN Security Level System.

b. Some CSO are anticipated to be in place to support HA distribution. NGO/IO will likely determine their own security criteria for entry based on information from their own sources and the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). Threat elements will likely attempt to disrupt HA supply and distribution IOT support their own agenda.

c. Those IOs and NGOs are found in the Panay civil organisations and contact list attached as Appendix 4.

6. **Civil Assumptions.**

a. Heads of various sections, key stakeholders within the Panay government will also be based at the capital in Iloilo. Further, other coalition stakeholders within military and government, NGOs, and other stakeholders such as ICRC will be based in Iloilo during operations.

b. The Panay people in the occupied area have a neutral position yet positive sentiment towards the CJTF and aligned Panay Govt.

c. Threat groups will leverage off the CivPop to collect on the CJTF/ADF activities.

d. Provincial political entities are positive towards Panay Govt and CJTF elements.

e. Law enforcement aligned with provincial govt are also positive towards Panay Govt and CJTF elements as well.

f. Medical services and public utilities will deteriorate less than 24hrs of the commencement of combat operations.

g. National economic aspect of country will deteriorate and will heavily rely on the informal market and local and provincial economies.

h. Liaison authority to engage with for HN government ministers resides with CJOPS.

i. IO/NGO will be capable of provision of HA and initial capacity building.

MISSION

7. **Purpose**. CMO activities will support the CJTF 667 Mission in order to set the conditions for transition of authority to the mandated UN Follow on Force (FoF) supported by the international community and to minimise the impact of CJTF 667 operations on the civil population.

8. **Method**. CMO will support the CJTF 667 mission by:

a. Undertaking direct comms and liaison, collaboration and interagency planning, actions and activities with the WOG to set the conditions for transition to the mandated UN FoF.

b. Supporting the IO objectives, assist in the delivery of key messages to the local population which prepares them for the return and establishment of the legitimate Govt of Belesia with an emphasis on our intention to achieve transition to the UN FoF.

c. Conduct or coordinate those targeted CMO activities on the assigned persons or groups to achieve the desired effects and outcomes and control those elements with the JFAO who will interface with the pop.

d. Ensuring that CJTF 667 operations and offensive actions minimise targeted activities and collateral damage to key civil infrastructure. Where this has not been achieved, undertake such assessments and organise the repair or replacement of this damage in as orderly and responsive way as possible.

e. Ensuring that CJTF operations do not create a dependency by the HN population on CJTF resources.

f. Ensure the avoidance of placing additional strain upon the already fragile key civil infrastructure including assisting those FE responsible for assisting the HN Govt depts becoming re-established to provide a return to normality.

g. The provision of appropriately UNCLASS briefs to key stakeholders.

h. Assist with the provision of a secure environment that allows IO/NGO to deliver services and possible HA to the pop.

i. Coordinating with key agencies regarding IDP/Refugee movement through the CJOA so agencies are able to establish interim IDP camps if required.

j. Facilitating the provision of Immediate Life Sustaining Aid (ILSA) through coordination with the On-Site Operational Coordination Centre (OSOCC), Other Governmental Agencies (OGA), International Organisations (IO) and NGOs.

9. **Endstate.** Set the conditions for the transition of responsibility to the mandated UN FoF.

EXECUTION

10. **Concept of Operations**.

a. **CMO Elements**. To conduct CMO the following units and force elements will be utilised for the delivery of effects and provision of Civ-Mil influencing and informing activities as assigned and directed by the JETB. The lack of coalition forces, specifically US Mil, means that Civil Affairs (CA) teams are unavailable for tasking or use.

(1) The lack of CA means that the principal CMO tool will be the tactical CIMIC detachments and teams as provided from the formation CIMIC Group. These elements will be the priority task for assessments coordination of CMO effects as tasked to units and FE. It is expected that each Cbt Bde will be provided with its own CIMIC Tac Spt Tm (TST). The role of CIMIC is to support the mission through three core functions:

(a) enhance situational understanding of the civil space.

(b) support/enhance decision-making, and

(c) conduct tactical CIMIC tasks as detailed from OPORD.

(2) Civ Mil Activities (CMA), any unit / sub-unit, elements or staff can be utilised for activities and duties as tasked through Ops as detailed in TASKORDs from HQs. This is inclusive of any specialist elements as attached to the formations.

(3) Civ Mil Liaison (CML) staff for communication and coordination between HQs and those OGA or HN departments. Any personnel as drawn from staff and headquarters and may be used and can expect tasking in any or all phases. These would be coordinated through the Info Ops KLE cell staff assisted by the CIMIC Teams.

(4) Engineer Assessment Teams for reconnaissance and assessment of infrastructure and civilian capabilities. May also be required for Engr Civ Asst Program (ENGCAP) activities in later phases.

(5) Medical Assessment Teams for assessment and inspection of medical facilities and population health services. May also be required for Med Civ Asst Program (MEDCAP) activities in later phases.

(6) Military Police detachment Engagement Teams for investigations and assessment of detainee handling infrastructure and civilian capabilities. May also be required for Police Civ Asst Program (POLCAP) activities in later phases. It will be expected that a separate and comprehensive hand over of security arrangements will be specified. See the Military Police, OPORD Annex AD.

(7) Female Engagement Teams (FET) or Cultural Support Teams (CST) for engagement and assessment of the civil situation and population support either from specialised formed teams or those created for the operation. These teams are not to be used in the HUMINT role and if they are, must not be additionally tasked for Civ Mil activities or actions.

(8) Other IO Information Related Capabilities (IRC) units or elements which may be tasked or accompany the CMO elements as part of an IRC combined effects team. These may include but are not limited to;

(a) The Key Leader Engagement (KLE) cell will have a close relationship with the CMO elements as they will coordinate much of the interactions between any FE and those civilian leaders and persons of influence.

(b) Psychological Operations (PSYOP) teams may also be with CMO elements to either distribute or provided for delivery that IO product and messages for those targeted people or groups that any CivMil activities are undertaken. CMO elements may also be tasked to distribute this product as they meet with the civilian agencies and individuals allocated to so engage.

(c) Light Electronic Warfare Teams (LEWT) may accompany CMO elements as a means of gaining movement within the AO. They may also be there to provide early warning in the event of hostile activities against FE.

(d) Public Affairs (PA) officers or teams may also accompany or request information for input into their products and stories in spt of the FE IO campaign. They may include Combat Camera members or staff or they may request imagery as part of CMO activities.

(e) Those staff which exist in or on the formation HQs which can facilitate civil engagement either through personal contacts (such as family, educational or business etc ties), secular contacts, medicinal contacts or any interest contacts that may provide meeting opportunity.

(9) The Dept of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) has a special relationship with defence. It may provide a liaison offr, a Policy Advisor (POLAD) to the higher headquarters who advises the COMD on strategic issues such as diplomatic negotiations, demarche exchanges, adherence to agreements such as the Montreaux document or Ottawa agreement and national policy interpretation. They can not provide operational or tactical direction nor should they interpose in the manoeuvre of combat forces.

(10) Interactions with other Civil Agencies. These are defined as those non military organisations which will exist in the battle space and may be made up on International Organisations (IOs) such as the UN, ICRC, Amnesty International etc, Non Government Organisations (NGOs) such as WADE, RAID, FADE, MWC, LoRD etc, and Other Government Agencies (OGA) such as AFP, DSTO, ABF etc. It is a misconception that the Military Land Force entrusted with enforcing the UN mandated actions can also direct or task those civil agencies

which are or may soon be present in the JFAO. The military should never task nor expect that those civ agencies will do the land forces bidding and can only set the security conditions, which enables them to do the work that they wish to do. Dialog and open communications must always be sought but influencing or exploitive actions on behalf of the force is never to be planned. Their neutrality, impartiality and organisational concern for humanity must always be respected.

b. **Scheme of Manoeuvre**. CMO will be conducted across all phases. CJTF 667 CMO elms and those FE tasks with CMO effects will deploy to support CJTF 667 operations during all phases with CTF 667 conducting a handover of CMO activities to the mandated UN FoF in Phase 5.

(1) **Ph 0 Shaping**. CMO elms conduct initial liaison with key stakeholders, including HNGovt, OGA and UN OSOCC. Conduct mission planning for the possible assistance in population movements including the returning of IDP/Refugees. Participate in the refinement of target lists with Joint Effects and Targeting (JET) and the provision of information for the KLE engagement strategy.

(2) **Ph 1 Denial.** Gain Situational Awareness and Situational Understanding (SASU) of key civilian and humanitarian issues, threats and opportunities IOT identify potential CMO activities within the CJOA.

(3) **Ph 2 Lodgement**. CJTF 667 J9 will deploy with HQ CJTF 667. J9 will coordinate initial assistance and response with OGA, OSOCC, IO/NGO. Allocation of CMO assets throughout the CJOA is as follows:

(a) CJTF 667 – C9 CMO Dir (O6) and Staff,

(b) TG 667.2 – J9 CMO PSO (O5), Staff Brch and 1 x TST (-)

(c) TG 667.2.1 (AS BDE) – 1 x CIMIC TST (26);

(d) TG 667.2.2 (NZ BDE) – 1 x CIMIC TST (26);

(e) TG 667.2.3 (AVN BDE) – 1 x CML Tm (from 667.2 TST).

(4) **Ph 3 Neutralise.** Refine initial CIMIC assessments and continue Key Stakeholder Engagement (KSE). Conduct civil engagement with available HN civil authorities. Facilitate the delivery of key IO messages to local population. BPT facilitate and control the delivery of ILSA. Coord with OGA, OSOCC, and IO/NGO for the management of refugees/IDP's within the AO. In conjunction with OGA and OSOCC plan and facilitate the restoration of key essential services within capacity.

(5) **Ph 4 Transition and Redeployment.** Conduct handover of all CJTF 667 CMO activities which will be purposely planned and undertaken to NOT build in dependencies, to other agencies and the mandated UN FoF.

11. **CMO Grouping and Tasks**.

a. **Grouping**. HQ CJTF 667 C9 Main

(1) **Tasks all phases**:

(a) Respond to HQJOC tasking;

(b) Establish technical control (TECHCON) with all CMO assets within the CJOA;

(c) Conduct collaborative interagency planning with OGA for stabilisation and transition activities;

(d) Develop relationships with key stakeholder networks (Tribal, HN, OSOCC, and IO/NGO); and

(e) Develop and maintain an UNCLAS security and Belesia entry procedures briefing pack for IO/NGOs.

b. **Grouping:** TU 667.2.1 (O/O), TU 667.2.2 and TU 667.2.3.

(1) **Ph 0 Preparatory Tasks:**

(a) Prepare for deployment;

(b) Commence key stakeholder identification and engagement;

(c) Confirm through KSE the locations of UN agencies with IO and NGO; and

(d) Coordinate with J4 the HA needs for ILSA.

(2) **Ph 1 Shaping Tasks:**

(a) Establish baseline data through all source reporting in support of effects 5, 6 and 7 from the Operations Assessment, including:

(i) key civil infrastructure;

(ii) status of essential services; and

(iii) humanitarian situation.

(b) identify suitable civilian evacuation routes that are de-conflicted from initial activities and advise HQ J9 Main;

(c) Capabilities and dispositions of key civil stakeholders (HN/IO/NGO); and

(d) support the delivery of IO messaging to the local population.

(3) **Ph 2 Decisive Tasks:**

(a) Support the conduct of mission planning.

(b) Commence tactical CIMIC assessments in support of effects 5, 6 and 7 from the Operations Assessment, including:

(i) key civil infrastructure;

(ii) status of essential services;

(iii) humanitarian situation; and

(iv) capabilities and dispositions of key civil stakeholders (HN/IO/NGO).

(c) Identify and engage with key stakeholders within CJOA IAW the liaison architecture to inform KLE and targeting.

(d) Support the delivery of IO messaging to the Belesia population.

(e) Report incidences of alleged atrocities and Human Rights abuses and secure the location.

(f) Facilitate the release and distribution of appropriately de-classified information to key stakeholders.

(g) BPT spt Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation and Reintegration (DDRR) (FRAGO TBI). Tasks may include but are not limited to:

(i) disarming all mandated armed groups and individuals IOT support DDR plan and the CJTF 667 mandate;

(ii) influencing the population to support the disarmament requirement by disseminating authorised and approved DDR IO themes and messages;

(iii) identifying suitable disarmament /demobilisation sites, collect, store, and secure all confiscated weapons;

(iv) securing Panay Police armouries, weapons and critical infrastructure;

(v) receipting surrendered/seized small arms and light weapons (SALW), storage and security of surrendered/seized SALW and EO/IED components in suitable storage facilities. maintain inventory of surrendered weapons;

(h) BPT to assist in the movement of disarmed combatants to demobilisation sites;

(i) BPT transport weapons from disarmament sites to final disposal destination;

(j) BPT conduct biometric enrolling (subject to approval);

(k) BPT detain and secure individuals accused of serious criminal crimes and release or transfer to appropriate authorities.

(l) BPT support requests for critical infrastructure repair after a Request for Assistance (RFA) approval and report details of effects delivered.

(m) BPT facilitate the delivery and distribution of ILSA IAW para 4c.

(n) BPT provide appropriately de-classified briefings to IO/NGO regarding route conditions, movement control measures and security coord protocols and mechanisms that are applicable to the entry of their land, sea and air assets.

(4) **Ph 3 Stability Tasks**

(a) Continue tactical CIMIC assessments in support of effects 5, 6 and 7 from the Operations Assessment, including updates on:

(i) key civil infrastructure and essential services;

(ii) reconstruction and development tasks;

(iii) humanitarian situation; and

(iv) HN/IO/NGO – HA, reconstruction, development, capabilities and disposition.

(b) Maintain engagement with HN/IO/NGOs and CSO within CJOA.

(c) Facilitate release of authorised information to key stakeholders.

(d) BPT support requests for ILSA and critical infrastructure repair after a Request for Assistance (RFA) approval and report details of effects delivered.

(e) BPT facilitate repatriation of refugee's and displaced persons.

(f) BPT transition responsibilities/tasks to mandated UN FoF.

(g) Report on all ERW requirements as requested.

(5) **Ph 4 Transition and Redeployment Tasks**.

(a) Maintain engagement with HN/IO/NGOs and civil society organisations within AO.

(b) Facilitate release of authorised information to key stakeholders.

(c) Conduct handover of all CJTF 667 CMO activities to the legitimate national authority or authorised agencies.

12. **Coordinating Instructions.**

a. **Stabilization Aid Funds/Commanders' Emergency Relief Program (SAF/CERP).** CJTF 667 currently does not have an allocation of funding to implement Consent Winning Activities (CWA) and Quick Impact Projects (QIP). A request for funding has been sent to HQJOC and further details will be released by FRAGO.

b. **Compensation Claims.** All civilian claims for compensation are to be investigated at the command level prior to submission to the HQ CJTF 667 J06. Commanders are not authorized to agree to pay compensation claims. Further information is found in the Legal Annex to the OPORD.

c. **Locally Employed Civilians (LEC).** Opportunities will exist for contracting LEC to fulfil certain functions in support of CJTF 667 efforts and base support plans. The employment of LEC is to consider the effect upon the integrity of local community structures and delivery of essential services. Formation S9 staff are to ensure coordination with HQCJTF 667 J9 Main during LEC employment planning phase. Guidance on payment rates is TBI. HQCJTF 667 J9 approval is required to employ LEC from: Police, Fire, Ambulance, Border Protection, Education Dept, Water Dept or Health Dept. This also includes specialists e.g. police/teachers and administrators.

d. **Operations Assessment (OA).** All CMO reporting including SITREPs, Incident Reports, CMO SITREPS and Quicklook Storyboards will be utilised in support of the CJTF 667 OA process.

e. **Request for Assistance (RFA).** The following procedures are to be used for RFA planning and execution:

(1) In the first instance formations are to ensure civilian agencies maximize use of their resources (either integral or contracted) before accepting RFA for consideration.

(2) Formations are authorized to execute RFA as long as they do not prejudice the CJTF 667 mission and can be executed within formation capabilities.

(3) RFA that require external support are to be passed through CJTF 667 J9 for assessment, coordination and de-confliction with other civilian agencies and CJTF resources.

f. **Humanitarian Standards for Encampment Site Selection and Operation.** CJTF 667 will not be responsible for establishing IDP or refugee camps. Responsibility for the establishment of IDP/refugee camps resides with the UN humanitarian community. However,

CJTF 667 may be required to support the movement and route security if requested by the IO / NGOs through the OSOCC.

g. **CMO Measures of Effect.** There must also be continuous assessment of the civil dimension in order to determine measures of effectiveness (MOE) and the progress of the mission. This ongoing assessment task is performed by CIMIC assessment teams and monitored by the CMO staff. MOE refer to observable, preferably quantifiable, subjective indicators that an activity is proceeding along a desired path. A commander uses MOE to determine whether an operation is succeeding in achieving the goals of the operation according to the mission. MOE should be developed as a product of mission analysis. MOE will differ for every mission and for different phases of a mission. As the commander and staff identify specified, implied, and critical tasks, they should define what constitutes successful completion of each task. They decide how the MOE will be identified, reported and validated. They determine what action will be taken when the MOE is achieved, as well as contingency plans in case MOE are not achieved according to the original plan. MOE are not necessarily fixed and can be adjusted as the situation changes. See appendix 7.

h. **CMO Normality Indicators**. Normality Indicators (NI) serve to measure trends and progress in the recovery of a civil society to an improved quality of life. NI measure the level of development of the civilian condition to reduce the level of dependency on the military force by the civil population and civil authorities. Data should be objective, quantifiable and collected systematically. The force commander must exploit all sources of data measuring the quality of life and recovery of the local population in the JFAO, as well as the effectiveness of military operations that assist in this recovery. Direct and indirect MOE and NI should be jointly developed with civilian agencies to reinforce unity of purpose and effort in civil–military activities. It is the interface with the civilian sector that provides the means for collecting data that contributes to normality. NI should be SMART (specific, measurable, attainable, results oriented and time based), objective and comparable from occasion to occasion. Measuring only that which is easily measured, will give a false impression. Robust information management systems are required to support the delivery of worthwhile MOE and NI. See appendix 8.

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

13. **Civilian Resource Requirements**. Arrangements will be required to provide a minimum of one APOD/SPOD access to the AO which must remain serviceable, with apron or wharf space, to be provided to IO/NGO for delivery of HA. Ideally, this will be a separate facility from the military. It should come complete with its own aircraft / vessel handling and refuelling facilities as well as transport facilities for loading cargo.

14. **Military Resource Requirements.**

a. **ILSA** Immediate Life Sustaining Assistance is defined as the provision of small scale emergency supplies and services which are needed as a matter of extreme urgency (in-extremis) to save life or to prevent serious suffering. The provision of ILSA may be conducted without approval from CJTF 667 HQ where it can be provided within formation resources and or capability. In the main, ILSA comprises the provision of water and food however, depending on the circumstances it may also include; shelter, medical assistance (life, limb or eyesight), transport, rescue and repair of essential infrastructure. ILSA should be

provided at ‘arms length’ whenever possible with the direct distribution to beneficiaries undertaken by IO/NGO, HN agencies, CSO, village or tribal leader. Direct distribution of ILSA by CJTF FE should only be undertaken in-extremis and as a last resort. could be sourced from CJTF 667 supply chain. ILSA stocks will be made available to CJTF 667 formations from Ph 2 for emergency distribution to the population as required. Provision of ILSA should be in response to immediate and life threatening requirement and should not displace any current arrangements in place by NGOs. Under no circumstances should ILSA become the main source of provisioning for the population.

b. **Bottled Water.** Water (bulk or by 5, 10 or 20 litre military jerry can) **is not** to be provided for from CJTF log stocks. Commercially procured plastic 5 or 10 litre collapsible water containers in either blue or clear colour and bottled drinking water may be authorised where thirst may become the possible cause of death within the population. It will be carried in unit A and B Ech in sufficient bulk quantities and provided for upon auth from the unit Comd. Water for bathing/cleaning will **not** be provided.

c. **Foodstuffs.** Military rations / CRP **is not** to be provided for from CJTF log stocks. Limited quantities of HUMRAT prepacked high energy supplements may be available and are to be used only as a means of having an immediate relief of starvation. It will be carried in unit A and B Ech in sufficient bulk quantities and provided for upon auth from the unit Comd.

d. **Shelter.** Shelter **is not** to be provided for unless it is necessary to provide an immediate life sustaining assistance. FE tentage or canvas, especially that which is easily identified as military (coloured green, brown or camouflaged) must never be used to provide shelter to the population. Where shelter is required to protect from the elements it must be of a civilian pattern, coloured blue or white and set up away from any possible military associated facilities. Blue tarpaulins, poles and cordage will be carried in formation B Ech in sufficient bulk quantities and provided for upon auth from the formation Comd.

e. **Medical**. Medical care and use of med supplies is to be strictly limited and is only to be used in those extreme cases where life, limb or eyesight is in danger of being lost. The application of med supplies is to be limited to those members of the FE who are trained and can provide the necessary care and support given the conditions as found in the JFAO. Civilians who enter the chain of evacuation due to FE actions, must be turned over to the civil authority at the earliest opportunity. The SMO or J07 will provide the necessary decision making arrangements with the formation Comd.

f. **Transportation**. Pop movement and transportation is **not** to be done utilising any military vehicle of the CJTF. Pop movement is to be carried out with civilian pattern vehs and should be made off of the designated MSR. Should a requirement exist to provide life sustaining transport then the use of clearly identified ambulances / medevac ac may be requested. The auth of this will require Formation Comd approval. Under no circumstances should A vehs or armoured veh ambulances be used.

g. **Rescue**. Any requirement to facilitate any rescue should only be undertaken where life is in danger or the pop was forced into a position of requiring rescue owing to the unintended consequences of FE activities. Rescue may be required where the pop has, in moving out of the way of FE manoeuvre, inadvertently become entrapped in the obstacles or minefields of either side. Such rescue activities will require the unit Comds approval and may extend to the

use of CJTF resources such as breaching and mine detection eqpt but done only after the area has been secured and cleared of en threat. The rescue activities are only to be undertaken after the force has achieved its assignment and any rescue effort must not impede the military mission.

h. **Maintenance**. Any requirement to complete work on civilian infrastructure such as; power generators and electricity lines, water pumps, filtration units and distribution systems, sewage and sanitation works, and medical / education facilities may only be undertaken if;

(1) The damage to these facilities were a result of FE actions or fires,

(2) The damage is to public facilities and not private or commercial interests,

(3) The maint undertaken is sufficient to render serviceability and not surpass the normal standard for the area or facilities.

(4) That works has been tasked via the CMO / CIMIC team as part of the Effects battle rhythm, approved by the Comd and detailed as an OPS FRAGO or TASKO.

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

15. **CMO Coordinating and Liaison Architecture.** TECHCON will be established by HQ CTF 667 J9 from Ph 1 to all CJTF 667 Bde S9 staff to assist in overall coordination of CMO activity and allocation of resources. CJTF 667 J9 will establish comms to the CJTF CMOC in DWN. CJTF 667 J9 will remain in loc with HQ CJTF 667 for all phases.

16. **Reports and Returns.** All CJTF 667 Bde S9 are to ensure daily CMO SITREP is compiled and forwarded to HQ JTF 667 JOR NLT 2100H daily. The format for the CMO SITREP is at Appendix 5. Significant CIMIC contacts are to be recorded as CHATREPS and forwarded on completion NLT 12h following contact. Layout is noted at Appendix 6.

17. **Communications.** CMO elements requiring interactions with the HN Govt, UN Agencies or IO/NGOs must come complete with civilian mobile phones, network data devices and civilian means laptop computers to be able to effectively pass and collect information from these sources. As a minimum, elements must have the following communications means;

a. Civ Telecom land line phone with answering device and facsimile capabilities. These may need to be source in country given the power supply incompatibility with the AS power system.

b. Civ Mobile phones for voice, text, and NGO chat app usage. The SIM cards must be sourced in country and care must be exercised given the FIS collection capabilities within that system.

c. CIMIC PC laptops with non military email accounts as established prior to in country operations. These can be connected to the data communications system via network devices but will also require local telecom data network SIM cards. This LAN system is to have

backup capability and multifunction device capability to allow printing and scanning of documents and IO products.

d. Those CMO elements should also come with a number of civilian two way hand held radios compatible with those used by NGOs and must have a charging capability for those power packs.

e. Elements must come with or be provided with, Military PRR and MBTR radios for internal sigs and patrol comms. SOIs and CEOIs to be provided from the HQs elements.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Appendices:
1. Country Brief
2. Map of Panay City and Provincial Boundaries.
3. Map of Pop Tribal Demographics and Boundaries.
4. Civil Contacts in country.
5. CMO SITREP Format.
6. CMO CHATREP Format.
7. CIMIC MOE.
8. CIMIC Normalcy Indicators.

Appendix 1 to
ANNEX Q TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
Dated XXJUL 20

COUNTRY BRIEF (DRAFT FRAMEWORK)

BACKGROUND

1. The island of Panay was formerly a possession of the Skolkan Empire along with Palawan, Cebu, Negros, and Bohol. After the empire's collapse in the early 20th century, Panay declared independence but was subsequently absorbed into the Belesian Federation after a period as a protectorate of Torrike, former seat of the Skolkan Empire. Panay's two main population centres are Roxas in the north and Iloilo in the south. Panay is also home to the San Rafael Cerium mine, where one of the world's few concentrated rare earth mineral deposits is located. Since its shift from gold ore extraction to Cerium mining, San Rafael has both created opportunities and exacerbated local ethno-social tensions as well as becoming a focus of regional power competition.

2. Panay has never been a willing member of the Belesian Federation being culturally distinct owing to its history of Skolkan influence. Over the years, strong separatist sentiment has periodically escalated into violent revolt, a frequent and costly irritant for the Belesian government. Despite this, they have been loth to grant independence, partly from unwillingness to compromise the territorial integrity of their young state, and partly owing to the revenues generated by the San Rafael mine. These tensions culminated in the 1972 massacre of some one hundred and forty four during ethnic clashes with the Belesian paramilitary police officers. This event, dubbed "The Ash Wednesday Massacres", resulted in Panay being granted autonomous home rule. Relations between the local Panay government and Belesian central authorities have yet to be normalised, and Ash Wednesday has become a frequent catchcry for separatist elements in Panay.

3. Panayan internal politics are no less fraught. The mine, which is integral to the local economy, is largely worked by Torbian immigrants who have to some extent monopolised mining employment on the island. While the mine itself is owned by Panay (and therefore nominally by Belesia), much of the plant and infrastructure was acquired through Olvanan investment. The Torbian immigrant population is the most sizeable ethnic minority, making up some 32% of the island's total population, having arrived in Panay shortly after WWII as indentured labour for the San Rafael mine during its gold extraction period. A small Olvanan diaspora, mainly concentrated in Roxas around Olvanatown and the recently established Olvanan trade mission set up to safeguard Olvanan interests in San Rafael, is the next largest ethnic minority. The remaining bulk of the island's population identify as Panayan.

ETHNIC GROUPS

4. Panayan: The Panayan people share a common heritage with the broader Belesian population, but are culturally distinct. This is partly owing to their position near the Western hinterland of the archipelago which has a high concentration of unmixed indigenous tribes, but is mostly to do with the fact that Panay is majority Christian, the island having been largely insulated from the spread of Islam through the region in the 15th century by Skolkan

rule. This has led to significant differences in culture, custom, and world view between the inhabitants of Panay and the rest of the Belesian Federation. The majority of Panayans feel marginalised by the majority Islamic Belesian state, and despite a heavy Christian presence within the Belesian military, the Christians of Panay feel disadvantaged and sometimes persecuted by their Muslim neighbours. This disaffection has allowed the Visayan People's Front (VPF), a separatist Christian armed insurgent group, to maintain a strong presence on the island.

5. Torbian: The Torbian diaspora has a long history in Belesia in general and Panay in particular, many Belesians having mixed Torbian ancestry. The Torbian population on Panay, however, has failed to integrate into Panayan society. Given their size, making up one third of the local population, Torbians on Panay have been a largely self-sustaining, self-referential community. While their original status as indentured labour is no longer in effect, the Torbians on Panay remain an underclass, being economically disadvantaged even relative to the high levels of youth and rural poverty in the region, and driven into insularity by periodic racial scapegoating over their long history on the island. This has led to the Torbian population demonstrating unusually high levels of ethnic tribalism, which acts to drive a further wedge between them and the indigenous population of Panay.

6. Olvanan: The Olvanan diaspora in Belesia possesses disproportionate social and economic power, and the Olvanan minority on Panay is no exception. Despite making up only a small percentage of Panay's population, Olvanans own a sizeable chunk of the island's wealth and are significantly overrepresented within the island's educated, business and property owning middle class. This has led to a long history of mistrust and resentment between the Panayan and Olvanan populations, not helped by the history of antagonism between their two nations. These tensions have been further exacerbated by the recent upsurge in Olvanan activity on the island, the Olvanan government having invested heavily in roads, ports, and other mine related infrastructure. This investment has come at the cost of punishing royalties and loan repayments overseen by the recently established Olvanan trade mission in Roxas. The mine, Olvanatown, and especially the trade mission have become symbolic targets for Panayan resentment of the far more prosperous Olvanan minority.

POLITICAL AND SECURITY — INTERNAL

7. The autonomous government of Panay is a small, beleaguered, and highly corrupt institution with a poor record in delivering services, especially to the Torbian community centred on the San Rafael mine. Poor governance and lack of interest has resulted in the Panayan government having little to no monopoly of force outside Roxas and Iloilo. The tense nature of relations with Belesia has meant that not only has the BF been extremely unwilling to involve itself in Panayan affairs at any level, it has also resulted in the island being effectively cut off from services and other benefits available to Federation members. Conversely, significant revenues from the San Rafael mine flow out to the BF government as part of the home rule agreement, and this has led to increased levels of resentment amongst Panayans towards the rest of Belesia. This coupled with the memory of The Ash Wednesday Massacres has made the Belesian authorities deeply reluctant to intervene overtly in Panayan affairs.

8. The Roman Catholic Church is a major player in Panay, being a de facto provider of many services a more functional government would ordinarily supply. The RCC has strong

and deep roots within most Panayan communities both religious and secular, and its international character has led to some suspicion that factions within the local cathedral communities might be partisan actors or at least logistical links for Olvana and Torbia.

9. Given the marginalisation of the Torbian population on Panay, the Torbian community has become largely self-sufficient in terms of service delivery and security. Localised committees organise essential services such as garbage collection and education, and what little policing and security which exists is administered via small localised militias formed from past and present private security contractors hired either by the Olvanan trade mission or the historical owners of the mine. This has led to what is effectively a Torbian enclave in the immediate environs of the mine, with smaller satellite enclaves existing in the major population centres.

10. The Olvanan trade mission represents a syndicate of Olvanan SOEs which, between them, own the major port facilities in both Roxas and Iloilo, the main trunk roads linking these ports with the San Rafael mining complex, and large gated precincts in Roxas, Iloilo, and San Rafael in which technical and trade personnel, mostly Olvanans, are housed. They also have major interests in the power distribution and generation networks and telecommunications infrastructure of Panay. This unusually heavy level of investment arises from the fact that the San Rafael mine makes up a significant percentage (12%) of Olvana's total rare earth metal inflows, the securing of which is a key Olvanan strategic goal. The segregated nature of the Olvanan footprint, and the relative prosperity of Olvanans in Panay, is a major source of tension and conflict.

11. Given Panay's position near the western extremity of Belesia, the island has always acted as a throughpoint for regional licit and illicit trade. Crime levels in Belesia are considered high, and Panay is no exception. The principle criminal enterprises involve smuggling of people, goods, and/or illicit drugs. Local crime syndicates, Olvanan Black Societies, and the Tantoco Cartel are highly active in the region. The traffic in drugs, uncustomed goods, and labour slaves (mostly Torbian) is estimated to be worth over $XX billion dollars per annum. It can sometimes be difficult to disambiguate Olvanan and Panayan criminal organisations from legitimate centres of power, especially at a local level.

12. The Visayan People's Front is a Christian separatist insurgent militia committed to establishing an independent entity composed of the islands of Panay, Negros, Cebu, and Bohol. Whilst the Panayan government is not one hundred percent aligned with their goals, there is sufficient crossover, especially with regard to ethno-religious commonalities, to make the relationship between Panayan authorities and the VPF highly ambiguous. Additionally, given the general poverty of the island and its role in illicit trade routes, the VPF has developed a significant degree of interoperability with local and Olvanan criminal syndicates, often turning to smuggling and piracy for fundraising purposes. Along with the heavy presence of Wagner Group PMCs, VPF militants are frequently used as armed security for various criminal and even some legitimate groups across Panay.

13. The Wagner Group has a heavy footprint in Panay. The general inability of government to maintain law and order unaided, combined with the Wagner Group being the principal contractor providing security for the Olvanan SOEs associated with the San Rafael mine, means that Wagner Group PMCs are a significant armed body existing within the security matrix of the island of Panay. Given that most Wagner Group operatives in the region are of

Torbian descent, there is significant crossover between the Torbian immigrant community and Wagner Group personnel.

14. The Red Tigers Black Society is a major link in the illicit trade route that runs through access points north and south of Palawan, as well as elsewhere. The Red Tigers are suspected to be in direct competition with the Tantoco Cartel for control of the arms, drugs, and people trafficking markets within the region. The leadership of the Red Tigers is unknown, but given the general character of the group, their head is thought to be a member of the Olvanan community.

15. The Tantoco Cartel is the second of the large transnational criminal organisations operating in the area, with significant suspected drug and weapons markets within and around the San Rafael mine and Torbian workers' ghetto. Their leadership is also unidentified, but strong suspicions rest on the local police department. It is also thought that the Tantoco Cartel is the vector for most Wagner Group recruitment which occurs off island.

POLITICAL AND SECURITY — EXTERNAL

16. The Local Panayan Government has a UN mandate for independence, but is in reality a semi-autonomous member of the Belesian Federation. This complicates Panay's external security situation, creating a triangle effect between Panay, Belesia, and the external power in question.

17. At this point in time, Belesia is embroiled in an EEZ dispute with neighbouring South Torbia, a major aspect of which concerns the San Rafael mine. This has led to a number of minor cross maritime border incidents between Panay/Belesia and South Torbia.

18. Belesian relations with Olvana, a regional hegemon within easy reach, are highly complex. On the one hand, Olvanan investment is eagerly sought after by all of the islands of the Belesian Federation, including and especially Panay. On the other hand, however, the strategic interests of the two nations often clash, and Olvana and Belesia are currently embroiled in maritime territorial disputes, both nations frequently conducting provocative FONOPS. Panay itself is increasingly at odds with Olvana over what is perceived to be Olvana's rapacious financial exploitation of the San Rafael mine.

19. Belesia's relationship with the small island nation of Gabal is described as good. Gabal's neutrality and relative unimportance help to facilitate this.

20. In the broader region, North and South Torbia are experiencing a periodic cooling of their perennial conflict. This has freed South Torbia to pursue its other claims and disputes and is the cause of South Torbia's current intense focus on its disputes with Belesia/Panay. Belesia is one of the few nations which has cordial relations with North Torbia.

21. Olvana's expansionist strategy has ruffled the feathers of many of its regional neighbours, including Belesia and South Torbia, but there is little expectation at present of these tensions leading to a major conflict in the immediate future. Having said that, Olvanan military activity has ramped up significantly over recent years. At present, Olvana and North Torbia are currently conducting Ex RISEN SWORD, a biannual interoperability and

cooperation exercise, in the South China Sea west of Palawan Island and just outside Belesia's EEZ.

22. Belesia has generally good relationships with the US and its allies, specific economic or territorial disputes aside. At present, there is a high level of information and personnel exchange between the Belesian military and western powers active in the region including Australia, New Zealand, and the USA. Panay itself maintains close ties with Torrike, though these are generally considered to consist more of a sense of historical kinship rather than any more tangible relationship of exchange.

Appendix 2 to
ANNEX Q TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
Dated XXJUL 20

PANAY COUNTRY MAP



Appendix 3 to
ANNEX Q TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
Dated XXJUL 20

PANAY POPULATION DEMOGRAPHICS

Appendix 4 to
ANNEX Q TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
Dated XXJUL 20

CIVIL CONTACTS in JFAO

1. **Host Nation Government Contacts**

a. Chief Minister

b. Deputy Chief Minister

c. Minister of Health

d. Chief of Police

e. Chief of Fire & Emergency Services

2. **UN Organisations and contacts**

a. SRSG

b. UNHCR

c. UNWFP

d. UNPKO

e. UNPOL

3. **International Organisations and contacts**

a. ICRC

b. Amnesty International

c. The Holy Roman Catholic Church

4. **Non Government Organisations**

a. RAID “Reconstruction Assistance for International Disasters".

(1) Provision of emergency shelter & Camps RAID.NGO@worldwideweb.org

(2) This NGO uses a combination of funding means, public and govt to provide workers and infrastructure to both construct camps and run them for displaced pop. Provides Temp bldg, tentage, limited camp power and toilets.

b. FADE “Food Assistance in the Disaster Environment".

(1) Provision of food

FADE.NGO@worldwideweb.org

(2) This NGO uses a combination of funding means, public and govt to provide workers and foodstuffs to both supply food, refrigeration and cooking facilities to feed a displaced pop. Provides food, cooking, kitchens, refrigeration and limited water for cleaning and cooking

c. WADE “Water Assistance in the Disaster Environment"

(1) Provision of water WADE.NGO@worldwideweb.org

(2) This NGO uses a combination of funding means, public and govt to provide workers and distribution systems for the winning, treating, storing and distribution of fresh and clean water to displaced pop. Provides water, purification, dist lines, storage, plumbing & heating

d. MWC “Medicos Without Concern"

(1) Provision of health services MWC.NGO@worldwideweb.org

(2) This NGO uses public funding only to provide medical staff and facilities for the evacuation and treatment of medical and health issues to a displaced pop. Provides Health services

e. LoRD “Logistics Relief in Disasters"

(1) Provision of transport and material LORD.NGO@worldwideweb.org

(2) This NGO uses govt funding to provide staff, vehicles, material and facilities for the movement and handling of stores, fuel and logistics to a displaced pop. Specialises in transport, maintenance, veh lift, recovery, mobile spt eqpt.

Appendix 5 to
ANNEX Q TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
Dated XXJUL 20

CMO SITREP

SUBJ: FM/TG/ COMPONENT CMO SITREP XX/XX, DTG XXXX to DTG XXXX

1. AO/REGION/PROVINCE
2. PREVIOUS 24HRS:
    a. OVERVIEW OF AO STATUS, INCLU SECURITY, EMERGENCY SERVICES AND GOVERNENCE SECTOR.
    b. MAJOR ACTIVITIES – SUMMARY OF INCIDENTS / EVENTS THAT AFFECTED THE CIVIL POPULATION
    c. CIVIL INTERACTION WITH AUS MILTARY FORCES.
    d. KNOWN CIVIL INTERACTION WITH OTHER FE ELEMENTS BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL.
    e. CIVIL ATTITUDES / ACTIONS TOWARDS AUS FE.
    f. CIVIL ATTITUDES TOWARDS OTHER FE.
    g. OGA/NGO/IO ACTIVITY, INCLU REQ FOR ASSISTANCE.
    h. POPULATION MOVEMENT AND EMERGENCY AID / PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS.
    i. MAIN ISSUES / CONCERNS WITHIN AO.
    j. DETAIL ANY TRENDS WITHIN CIVIL DIMENSION.
    k. IDENTIFIED OPPPORTUNITIES FOR AUS INFLUENCE.
    l. STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT CULTURAL FACILITIES / LOCATIONS.
3. NEXT 24HRS:
    a. ANTICIPATED BOTH MILITARY AND CIVIL ACTIVITIES /INCIDENTS / EVENTS THAT MAY EFFECT/INFLUENCE THE CIVIL POPULATION.
    b. PLANNED CIMIC ENGAGEMENT/ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES
    c. KNOWN CIVIL INTERACTION WITH OTHER FE BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL.
    d. EXPECTED MOVEMENT OF POPULATION AND EFFECT ON AUS FE.

Appendix 6 to
ANNEX Q TO
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Dated XXJUL 20

CMO CHATREP

SUBJECT	CHATREP 038 OF 111050K JUL15 – SUBJECT HEADER
FROM	C/S, Unit and sub-unit
TO	For action Unit / Fmn C/S
A Collector	Military member; (Name / Position & DOBI ID)
B Info Provider	The civil actor; Name / Position / Contact details
C Location	GR / address loc collected, GR and address loc of subject reference
D **DTG**	DTG collected (discussion)
E **DTG**	DTG report written
F **Brief**	Brief description of incident event or topic discussed BLUF (Summary, key points of relevance) DISCUSSION Points discussed in the civilian providers words Questions asked or points made by collector State facts and perceptions reported not the collectors opinions COLLECTORS COMMENT (if required)
G **Source**	First-hand account (the person has first-hand knowledge) Yes/No
H **Other source**	Has the information come via other POC?
I **Identification**	POC name and contact details
J **Discussion**	Discussion initiated by provider or collector Y/N
K **Language**	Language used
L **Interpreter**	Identification and skill or language level

Appendix 7 to
ANNEX Q TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
Dated XXJUL 20

CMO MEASURES OF EFFECT

1. CIMIC MOE. CIMIC MOE is to be developed in conjunction with major civilian participants to ensure transition success. MOE guidelines will focus on the following sectoral areas:

a. Water winning, treatment and supply,
b. Electricity generation and supply,
c. Shelter and site planning,
d. Food and Nutrition aid,
e. Waste and sanitation,
f. Health services,
g. Public security,
h. Infrastructure,
i. Communications,
j. Transportation,
k. Economics, and
l. Agriculture.

Appendix 8 to
ANNEX Q TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
Dated XXJUL 20

CMO Normality Indicators

1. CIMIC Normality Indicators. Normality indicators to be grouped into categories and adapted to meet the changing requirements, eg, political, socio-economic, cultural and technological. Guidance for development and reporting of NI listed below:

a. Staple availability;

b. Water;

c. Power;

d. Medical (Civilian);

e. Law and Order;

f. Infrastructure;

g. Civil communication (freedom of speech, incl media);

h. Education;

i. Non-staple consumer goods available;

j. Inflation;

k. Sport and social activity;

l. Unemployment;

m. Religious;

n. Infant mortality; and

o. Agriculture.

p. Sensitive Areas.

q. FEG are to make all efforts to avoid cultural and environmentally sensitive areas.

r. Cultural sites and environmentally sensitive areas – TBC.

ANNEX R TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

LOGISTIC SUPPORT ORDER

References:

A. CJTF 667 OPORD 01 (Operation Steel Sentinel)
B. Belesian (BX) Country Study
C. North Torbian (NT) Country Study
D. Annex AA to CJTF 667 OPORD 01 – Health Support Order
E. Status of Forces Agreement – AS/BX dated 11 Apr 06

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU.

1. **Situation.**

a. Background. See paragraph 1 of the main body of CJTF 667 OPORD 01 (Ref A) and Annex B - Intelligence.

b. General. The Joint Force Logistic Component Command (JFLOGCC) is a Component Command under CJTF 667. The JFLOGCC role is to provide and coordinate intimate logistic support to all CJTF 667 component commands in order to prosecute the strategic and operational objectives of Operation STEEL SENTINEL (OSS).

c. Purpose. The purpose of this Logistic Support Order is to provide a support framework for CJTF 667. CJTF 667 will be supported by the JFLOGCC, concentrating in the primary APOD in General Santos City. This Support Order also includes support to Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) and Host Nation (HN) requirements when they fall under CJTF 667 control.

d. Operational Areas.

(1) Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO). The JFAO includes the landmasses, national air space and territorial waters of Belesia (BX), the Sulu Sea, parts of the Celebes Sea, the Philippine Sea and the South China Sea. The landmass, airspace and territorial waters of Gabal (GX) and South Torbia (RT) remain neutral and are excluded from the JFAO.

(2) Primary APOD. General Santos International Airport, General Santos City, BX.

(3) Alternate APOD. Colonel Edwin Andrews Airbase, Zamboanga, BX.

(4) Primary SPOD. Makar Wharf, General Santos City, BX.

(5) Alternate SPOD. Zamboanga Port, BX.

(6) JFLOGCC Area of Operations (AO). The JFLOGCC AO is comprised of the landmass, airspace and territorial waters (12NM) of BX and the sea/air lanes linking the primary APOD/SPOD within the JFAO and the designated NSB hub of Darwin.

e. Terrain and Man-Made Features. See the BX Country Study (Ref B).

f. Host Nation Considerations

(1) As an island nation, BX relies on a network of regular maritime ferry and domestic air services to move personnel and freight amongst its various islands. Typically, the maritime ferry services are the primary means of inter-island transportation. BX road networks on the larger islands are mainly paved. However, there are numerous unimproved dirt and gravel roads throughout the area, especially on the smaller islands, or islands with a small population. Rural roads do not receive proper maintenance, leaving them susceptible to damage from the weather and neglect. The monsoonal season also has a drastic effect on the inland roads with communities at times being cut off and isolated during severe weather. BX is currently constructing a railway network in Mindanao, connecting all the major cities, but will not see operational service for at least another 5 years. There is a nascent railway connecting the cities of Iloilo and Roxas on Panay, but has not seen operations since 1985.

(2) Most of the region, particularly rural areas, cannot access all modern utilities such as potable water, electricity, and modern sewage systems. This will cause a reliance on military electrical, water and sanitation systems.

g. Enemy Forces. See Annex B Intelligence and NT Country Study (Ref C).

h. Host Nation Forces. See Belesian Country Study (Ref B).

i. Friendly Logistic Forces. See Appendix 1.

2. **Mission.** JFLOGCC will provide logistic support to CJTF 667 and Component Commands IOT sustain operations for the duration of Operation STEEL SENTINEL.

3. **Execution.**

a. COMD JFLOGCC Intent.

(1) Purpose. To ensure that all CJTF 667 components are provided with sufficient logistic support to enable the completion of operations in support of CJTF 667 objectives.

(2) Method. Reception and staging (RSO&I) activities will be coordinated by Joint Force Reception Centres (JFRC) located in the Primary and Alternate APOD/SPOD, in conjunction with the Joint Movements Coordination Cell (JMCC) and supported by the National Support Base (NSB) and ADF assets. Once deployed in the JFAO, logistic support will be provided along national and component lines with integral and close support assets being embedded within all components. The JFLOGCC will provide general support to those FE located within the APODs/SPODs through the Force Support Group (FSG) and the Joint Contract Management Cell (JCMC). The JFLOGCC HQ will have a live logistics cell providing oversight of general common user logistics support being provided by its subordinate organisations to all CJTF 667 FE. AS will provide sustainment support for classes I (fresh rations and bulk water only), II (AS camp stores only), III, IV, VI, VII, and X. Sustainment of TCN specific class II, and classes V and IX will be provided along national lines. Administrative and logistic support will be provided IAW the following phases:

(a) Phase 0: Shaping (D-60 – D-11). Staging into the JFAO. Main effort will be the deployment of FE and the provision of enabling support to RSO&I activities coordinated by the JFRCs, JMCC and components. Additional tasks include:

1. Reception and personnel tracking.
2. Movement of FE, equipment and stores from NSB to the staging APODs/SPODs.
3. Prepositioning of fuel and Explosive Ordnance (EO) stocks where required.
4. Provision of casualty regulation, Role 2 health facilities and support to Rotary Wing (RW) Aero-Medical Evacuation (AME).

(b) Phase 1: Denial (D-10 – D-1). This phase will see the sustainment of decisive action occurring with maritime and air operations establishing control of critical air and sea lanes within the JFAO. In conjunction with sustaining the maritime and air offensive operations, the supporting effort will continue to stage other FE into the JFAO. Additional logistic tasks include:

1. The provision of real life support to FE.
2. Bulk storage and distribution of classes I, III, and V.
3. Management of local support contracts.
4. Provision of casualty regulation, Role 2 health facilities and support to RW AME.
5. Personnel training and reporting.

(c) Phase 2: Lodgement (D-Day – D+2). This phase will see the lodgement of ground forces into the contested island of Panay. Logistic support will continue to be provided through organic and embedded logistic units within each component. Main effort will be the preparation for forward push of critical class I, III and V stores into Panay through an APOD/SPOD as soon as possible and also through Logistics Over The Shore (LOTS) operations with the JFMCC ATG.

(d) Phase 3: Neutralise (D+3 – D+14). This phase will see decisive action on the island of Panay to defeat the North Torbian Forces. Main effort for JFLOGCC during this phase will be the forward ‘push’ of class I, III, and V stores to land FE. A secondary landing of FE into Palawan will require logistic support during this phase.

(e) Phase 4: Transition (D+15 onwards). This phase will see the redeployment of FE to home locations in a staged manner. This phase will also include the finalization of all logistic support arrangements and reconstitution of all FE. Provision of enabling support to reverse RSO&I activities coordinated by the JFRCs, JMCC and the components. The JFLOGCC will also need to be prepared to support stability operations should CJTF 667 transition to peacekeeping. Additional tasks include:

1. Cleaning of stores and equipment.
2. EO remediation.

3. Personnel tracking of departing FE.

4. Continued provision of casualty regulation, Role 2 health facilities and support to RW AME.

(3) Endstate. Administrative and logistic support has been provided to ensure the successful completion of all CJTF 667 objectives. All CJTF 667 FE will have redeployed back to home locations.

b. Logistic support statement by Component. Logistic support to components will be characterized by the following:

(1) JFMCC. HQ JFMCC will be located at the APOD in Zamboanga, BX. Maritime units are to deploy with sufficient stocks to meet OVP requirements IAW single Service and national guidance. The provision of logistic support services will occur through a combination of Replenishment at Sea (RAS), coalition mutual logistic support, direct support from logistic nodes in the JFAO, dedicated shore-based RW support and local contractual arrangements with the HN.

(2) JFLCC. HQ JFLCC will be co-located with HQ CJTF 667 at the APOD, General Santos City, BX. The major JFLCC elements will be the X AS Cbt Bde, the X NZ Cbt Bde, the X AS Avn Bde, and Divisional Troops. The bulk of the JFLCC will stage out of the APOD at General Santos City. Some JFLCC FE will be embarked aboard the Amphibious Task Group (ATG) during Ph 1 and 2. The JFLCC concept of support is:

(a) FE will deploy with integral medical (Role 1) and logistic support assets.

(b) Close logistic support will be provided by X Combat Service Support Battalion (X CSSB).

(c) General health support will be provided by the deployable Role 2 Enhanced (Role 2E) health assets (more detail covered in Ref D).

(d) General support will be provided to the JFLCC through the Force Support Group (FSG).

(e) Class V is to be provided along national lines and positioned at the Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) established in the APOD at General Santos City, BX.

(3) JFACC. HQ JFACC (and CAOC) is located with HQJOC and is supported logistically under extant arrangements. The CTUs under JFACC are based by APOD location; Zamboanga and General Santos City, BX, and Darwin, AS. JFACC FE will deploy with integral logistic support elements. Close support will be provided at each base. General support will be provided by an expeditionary Combat Support Element (Squadron) allocated to each base. The Combat Support Elements deployed to Zamboanga, BX will also establish a Role 2 Enhanced field hospital.

(4) SOTG. The SOTG HQ will be located at the APOD, General Santos City, BX. SOTG will deploy with integral close logistic support. General logistic support will be supported by onsite logistic elements from the JFLOGCC.

(5) JFLOGCC. HQ JFLOGCC will be formed around 17 CSS Bde, augmented by coalition logistic FE and will be based out of the APOD in General Santos City, BX. JFLOGCC will provide general support to all JTF 667 FE. The JFLOGCC is to:

(a) Establish a Bulk Fuel Installation (BFI) and Refueling Point Air (RPA) at the two designated APODs during Ph 0.

(b) Establish a BFI and RPA at the APOD, Iloilo, BX during Phase 2.

(c) Establish a R2E health facility at APOD, General Santos City, BX during Ph 0.

(d) Establish a R2E health facility at APOD, Zamboanga, BX during Ph 0.

(e) Establish an ASP at both APODs.

(f) Provide limited transport assets for the distribution of materiel (principally classes I, II, and V) to JTF 667 FE within the JFAO.

(g) Be self-supporting for the duration of OSS.

(h) Establish an Australian Forces Post Office (AFPO) at APOD, General Santos City, BX.

(6) Engineer Support. JFLOGCC will have assigned a Construction Squadron for general construction engineering tasks and will be co-located at the APOD, General Santos City, BX.

c. Groupings. See Annex A for the C2 construct.

d. Mortuary Affairs. CJTF 667 will retain full jurisdiction of AS personnel. Mortuary Affairs for TCN will fall under NSE/NCE jurisdiction after processing from the closest R2E. Only in exceptional circumstances, such as contamination of remains, will emergency or temporary burial in the JFAO will be authorised. If such is required, all attempts must be made to contact CJTF 667 J1 prior to burial taking place. Enemy casualties are to be treated IAW national policy and compliant with Geneva Conventions Article 17. Enemy casualties may be properly interred on site or gathered for burial at collection points as designated by component/formations. In all cases, any articles of identification must be collected and returned through the J1 along with records to include burial location and description of the means used to mark the grave(s). Further details are included in Appendix 4.

e. Replacements. Whilst OSS is not expected to last long enough to require replacements beyond the UN mandate of 12 months, any replacements for personnel will be a national responsibility.

f. Religious service. National responsibility taking into consideration local and Host Nation sensibilities.

g. Salvage. Salvage operations are a national responsibility.

h. Repair, Recovery and Back-loading. Repair, recovery and back-loading of equipment will be a national responsibility. JFLOGCC will have a limited capacity to assist in the rearward movement of equipment.

i. Contracting. The JCMC will be responsible for all CJTF 667 contracts with local HN services. All requirements for contracting support are to be routed through the appropriate Component Commands to the JFLOGCC JCMC. TCN NSE may conduct their own HN contracting arrangements, but are highly encouraged to align with JCMC efforts.

j. Distribution. Distribution will be provided through a combination of ADF, TCN and contracted assets across the JFAO, primarily by maritime, but using road and air assets as appropriate.

(1) Inter-theatre distribution. Distribution between the NSB and the agreed points identified below will primarily utilise contracted distribution assets. ADF distribution capabilities may be utilised when appropriate.

(2) Intra-theatre distribution. Distribution from the agreed point and the JFAO is to be under JFLOGCC arrangements through HQJOC.

(3) Agreed Points. The Agreed Point for all personnel and materiel into the JFAO will be through the APOD/SPOD, General Santos City, BX.

k. Diplomatic clearances / customs. Diplomatic clearances will be IAW the SOFA in Ref E. TCN may utilise the umbrella provided under Ref E as part of CJTF 667, or establish their own exchange of letters with BX.

l. Postal. Free post will be made available for all CJTF 667 mail between the JFAO and AS. An AFPO will be established by the JFLOGCC at the APODs, with mail to be serviced through service air / contracted flights and then further distribution in AS by Australia Post. The postal address for CJTF 667 will be:

PMKeys No. Rank, Initial, SURNAME
Deployed Unit
Operation STEEL SENTINEL
AFPO 44
Darwin Mail Distribution Centre
DARWIN NT 0800

4. **Command and Signal.**

a. COMD JFLOGCC – Brigadier XXXXXX (AS) is appointed as the Joint Force Logistic Commander.

b. Location. COMD JFLOGCC will establish at General Santos City, BX with CJTF HQ by XXXXXX.

c. Reporting.

(1) LOGSITREP. Logistic reporting will utilise a single source report. CJTF 667 will provide JFLOGCC with the LOGSITREP format. The CJTF 667 J4's intent is that the Components are to provide daily LOGSITREPs to the HQ JFLOGCC for situationally awareness of general logistic support and common user logistic issues and requirements. The HQ JFLOGCC will then compile the LOGSITREP to be submitted to the CJTF J4 and HQ JOC as directed. LOGSITREP is to include logistic issues pertaining to attached FE and International Agencies as required.

(2) PERSTAT. Personnel reporting is to be IAW Appendix 3.

(3) Health Reporting. All health and casualty reporting will be IAW Ref D.

(4) Point of Contact. The POC for all matters regarding this Logistic Support Order is the SO1 Plans, HQ JFLOGCC.

Appendices:

1. JFLOGCC C2 Diagram
2. Dependency Matrix (TBI)
3. Personnel Support
4. Mortuary Affairs

APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX R TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

JFLOGCC C2 DIAGRAM



APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX R TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

PERSONNEL SUPPORT

References:

A. ADF Pay and Conditions Manual (PACMAN)
B. Military Personnel Policy Manual (MILPERSMAN) Part 3, Chapter 1 – *Australian Defence Policy on Individual Readiness*
C. CJOPS Directive 67/16 – *Direction to Personnel Deploying on CJOPS Operations and Exercises*
D. Military Personnel Policy Manual (MILPERSMAN) Part 5 – *Performance Appraisal and Promotion*
E. Defence Casualty and Bereavement Support Manual (DCBSM)

Overview

1. This appendix provides guidance on personnel support for ADF and AS members during Operation STEEL SENTINEL (OSS). Personnel support for coalition and Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) will be under national responsibility. Where it is not defined in this appendix, all other personnel support and administration will be IAW Reference A.

Personnel Management

2. Contributing Services and parent units are responsible for ensuring personnel force assigned (FA) to OSS comply with References B and C, and relevant Single-Service instructions/directive prior to Deployment Order or equivalent (DEPORD) being issued.

3. **OSD**. An Operational Staffing Document (OSD) will be coordinated at HQHOC. Services are allocated positions within an OSD for which they have a staffing liability and are to nominate suitable candidates. ADF members will be force-assigned to CJTF 667 for the duration of the deployment and cease IAW DEPORDs issued.

4. **Personnel Tracking**. All ADF personnel within the CJTF 667 Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO) are to be tracked through the use of the PMKeyS Activity Log. Parent units are to ensure all personnel have a PMKeyS Activity Log entry for OSS. All movement in and out of the JFAO is to be entered into the Activity Log on occurrence.

5. **Performance Appraisal Reporting (PAR).** Reference D outlines the policy in relation to performance appraisals in the ADF. Personnel FA to OSS are to observe the following reporting requirements:

a. Navy and Army PARs are to be raised for periods of observation of four months or longer for SECAT 6-7 and SERVOP C personnel. If less than the minimum, Supplementary Reports are only required for Navy personnel. Parent unit supervisors are encouraged to seek input from supervisors of the Army members to include in the PARs.

b. Personnel FA to OSS who observe Air Force subordinates for 20 days or more should endeavour to consult with the subordinate and their parent unit supervisor on who is to raise

the Personnel Performance Report (PPR). It is likely the case that Air Force personnel who deploy should request feedback from their OSS supervisors to send to their parent unit supervisor for incorporation into the PPRs.

6. **Incident Reporting**. All notifiable incidents and serious incidents requiring staff action or national/Service notification are to be staffed without delay to the HQ CJTF 667 J1. Serious incidents include any matter that affects C2 issues, capability, morale or welfare which cannot be resolved at component level and/or require national/Service policy guidance.

7. **Discipline**. Investigations of discipline-related notifiable incidents will be coordinated by the HQ CJTF 667 J1 (with support from the J06 Legal) and conducted by ADFIS investigators. All disciplinary matters will be reported and conducted IAW national and Service arrangements.

8. **Unacceptable Behaviour**. Allegations of unacceptable behaviour are to be dealt with IAW extant ADF policies, and in addition to normal reporting requirements, are to be reported to the HQ CJTF 667 J1. Serious allegations or command issues are to be reported to the HQ CJTF 667 JOR. Should an allegation remain unresolved on RTA, HQJOC is requested to ensure that the complainant's parent unit is provided with all relevant information to allow them to take carriage of the complaint.

9. **Alcohol Consumption**. Consuming alcohol is a legal and socially acceptable Australian custom. When controlled and used in moderation, alcohol normally presents no problems to individuals, society or the ADF. However, the misuse of alcohol can have serious operational, personal, health and safety implications. Authority to consume alcohol will be determined by COMD CJTF 667 IAW local laws and local garrison policies.

10. **Notification of Casualties (NOTICAS)**. NOTICAS reporting must be completed IAW Reference E for the following events:

a. a casualty is classified as Very Seriously Injured (VSI), Seriously Injured (SI) or Satisfactory

b. where a member is to be Medical RTA (MRTA)

c. where a member is declared missing

d. a member is admitted to a health facility.

11. Requests to initiate actions under the Australians Dangerously Ill (AUSDIL) Scheme are to be noted in the NOTICAS and undertaken IAW Reference E.

12. **Leave**. Recreation Leave will not be granted for ADF personnel during OSS.

13. **Unscheduled Return to Australia (RTA)**. An unscheduled RTA is a return which is neither planned nor consistent with the member's DEPORD. Unscheduled RTA will generally fall into one of the following categories:

a. **Compulsory Cancellation of Force Assignment (CCFA)**. Members may be returned from operations for administrative or disciplinary reasons, at the discretion of COMD CJTF 667 or at the request of a Service Chief.

b. **Service required CCFA**. On occasion the Services may require the cancellation of a member's FA for issues relating to the member's performance, behaviour or conduct which occurred prior to FA to CJTF 667, but which were identified after FA occurred. In these circumstances, the Service should immediately notify HQJOC that they are considering CCFA for the member in question.

c. **Compassionate RTA**. Reference A describes entitlements to and conditions applicable for compassionate leave and travel. The approving authority for COPAS RTA is COMD CJTF 667.

d. **Early RTA (ERTA)**. ERTA may be approved for Service Raise, Train, Sustain (RTS) purposes at the request of the Service Chief.

e. **Medical RTA (MRTA)**. MRTA is used for members who can no longer be retained operationally due to medical reasons.

Morale, Welfare and Recreation

14. **Provision of amenities**. Recreational and retail amenities will be provided at each staging APOD/SPOD. Services such as internet will be limited depending on OPSEC and available bandwidth.

15. **Family support**. Support for families of deployed members is available through the member's home unit, the National Welfare Coordination Centre (NWCC) and Defence Community Organisation (DCO). Prior to deployment, home unit COs are to ensure that all deployed member's PMKeyS records are up to date. Additional support will be provided through the parent Unit Welfare Plan.

16. **Voting in Australian Elections**. Members are to ensure that they comply with Australian Electoral Commission requirements for voting while overseas. Members may enrol as a general postal voter prior to an election being called. Postal vote applications will be competed as part of pre-deployment admin. Postal staff will be responsible for the distribution and collation of postal votes for the CJTF.

APPENDIX 4 TO
ANNEX R TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

MORTUARY AFFAIRS

References:

A. ADFP 1.1.1 – *Mortuary Affairs* Edition 2
B. Defence Casualty and Bereavement Support Manual (DCBSM)
C. DEFLOGMAN, Part 2, Vol 8, Chap 7 – *Defence Compliance with Australian Biosecurity Measures*

Overview

1. Support to Operation STEEL SENTINEL (OSS) will involve the risk of AS casualties and death. The purpose of this appendix is to detail the policy for the repatriation of all AS CJTF 667 deaths back to Australia. Repatriation of deceased remains from TCNs will be under national responsibility though CJTF 667 will provide assistance as much as possible. References A to C provide specific guidance. Due to the warlike nature of OSS, the ability to adhere to these processes in a timely manner may be difficult, but all effort must be made to ensure that this process is completed.

Notification and Reporting

2. The immediate action for notification in the event of a FATALCAS is to occur as follows:

a. voice notification to COMD CJTF 667 (or his representative)

b. voice notification to HQJOC JOR

c. FATALCAS message – format detailed in Reference B.

3. Any death is a notifiable incident and will be investigated accordingly.

4. Formal identification of the deceased can only be made by qualified forensic specialists; however, for the purposes of notification and to meet reporting requirements, tentative identification of the deceased may occur when:

a. the death is witnessed

b. the deceased is wearing identification

c. the deceased is recognised by comrades

d. there is no fragmentation or disfigurement of the remains.

Immediate Actions at the Incident Site

5. In the event of a fatality, the legal jurisdiction under which the Human Remains (HR) will fall will depend on the circumstances of death and military, legal and diplomatic authorities. Unless these authorities impose contrary arrangements, the remains are to be retained under ADF jurisdiction with Australian Defence Force Investigative Service (ADFIS) taking the lead, and are not to be handed over to local authorities.

Fact Finding

6. COMD CJTF 667 is to ensure that:

a. An officer not below the rank of CAPT (O3) and not directly linked to the death completes a Defence Incident Record (DIR) and conducts an immediate Fact Finding report.

b. The Reporting of Fact Finding process is not to interfere with securing the scene of death or the subsequent Service Police (SP) investigation.

Securing the Incident Scene and Collecting Forensic Evidence

7. The incident site should be protected and preserved in order to facilitate any subsequent enquiry or investigation where and when the tactical situation allows. The first members on the scene will apply REACT principles IAW Reference B and assume control until relieved by an incident commander or SP. ADFIS will be responsible for the collection and preservation of all essential material connected with the death, which may include the recovery of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and weapons.

Identification of Remains

8. All ADF personnel are to wear ADF identification tags (stamped with PMKeyS number) and are to ensure that they carry their Defence ID card at all times. A tentative identification of a body may be conducted based on ADF identification tags.

9. Formal identification of remains for return to Next of Kin (NOK) and deceased estate management is to only be conducted by qualified forensic specialists. Commanders and unit personnel may assist in tentative identification as a result of their close association at the time of the incident, or being a witness to the incident; or the presence of personal effects on the remains; however, this is only to be considered as an unconfirmed identification. Preservation of remains, personal effects and Tertiary Identified Material will assist in the process of formal identification at a later stage. Military identification tags present on the deceased at the time of death assists in the tentative identification only and are not to be removed from the remains.

10. The formal identification process will usually occur in an Australian civilian mortuary, under the auspices of the State Coroner. The complexity of the incident and the operational environment may require this identification to be conducted in the JFAO to facilitate the repatriation of the remains. Remains will not be released to families without positive identification conducted by qualified personnel.

Viewing of Remains

11. Viewing of remains is only to be carried out by those personnel directly involved in the case management of, or preparation of the remains for identification and repatriation. ADFIS will strictly control access to the mortuary facility. The viewing of remains by family or other with a close emotional attachment to the deceased is not to occur. Any such requests for a viewing are to be referred to COMD CJTF 667.

Mass Casualties/Disaster Victim Identification (DVI)

12. In the event of a mass casualty incident or an incident where an ADF death has occurred, and scientific identification of remains is required either because of fragmentation, burns or mingling with foreign remains, a discrete DVI operation id to be formed. In such an incident, COMD CJTF 667 or his delegate Component Commander will remain the incident commander where tactically feasible.

13. Unqualified personnel should not attempt to associate partial remains with a particular deceased member. As with whole remains, formal identification of partial remains can only be conducted by qualified personnel. Where a casualty or body parts are not able to be immediately identified, they should be segregated and individually marked with a label clearly showing that they are unidentified. Where the number of casualties is five or greater, remains should not be labelled other than with numbers to avoid misidentification of remains. ADFIS will be responsible for the management and processing of all forensic material, including unidentified remains.

Mortuary Affairs Officer (MAO) Responsibilities

14. The MAO for CJTF 667 will be the J1. The MAO is to:

a. determine, in conjunction with the J07, the appropriate levels of AS mortuary supplies and equipment in location

b. provide advice to COMD CJTF 667 on priority of support for assets in the recovery and repatriation of AS remains

c. provide support and assistance to ADF investigators and other key stakeholders on the status of AS deceased personnel

d. monitor the movement of AS remains and regular reporting to HQ CJTF 667

e. coordinate data on the status of deceased and missing personnel.

Repatriation Procedures

15. Repatriation of AS remains is the responsibility of COMD CJTF 667 IAW Reference B. Where applicable, AS remains should be handled under the following procedures IAW Reference B. Wherever possible, ADFIS will conduct all necessary procedures to ensure evidential continuity from the overseas location to handover in AS to the appointed coroner:

a. as soon as the HR is released from the incident scene, the remains should be placed into a remains pouch and an identification label should be affixed to the pouch and remains.

b. where an approved label is not immediately available, an interim label should be used. As a minimum, the label should list name, rank, PMKeyS number, unit, nationality and religious preference of the deceased (if known as per the deceased identification tags)

c. if a remain pouch is unavailable as suitable replacement should be used to cover the remains prior to evacuation

d. ensure the member's identification tags stay with the remains until repatriation has been completed to mortuary facilities

e. all personal items in the vicinity should be preserved, however any item not found on the body should not be shrouded with the body and should be packaged separately (this includes identification tags if they are not attached to the body).

16. Where possible, a chaplain of the denomination of the deceased is to be notified to provide ritual/rites to the deceased.

Escort of Remains

13. COMD CJTF 667 is to ensure that the remains are accompanied from the mortuary collection point to the handover to the coroner's representative in Australia by at least two escort officers, one being ADFIS or a SP member to maintain chain of custody for evidentiary reasons and an AS member of the deceased member's unit not below the rank of SGT or equivalent. In the case of multiple deaths and subsequent repatriation, the Provost Marshall, ADF is the determining authority for the number and rank of Service Police escorts.

14. The selection of personnel to act as a unit escort is to comply with the guidelines in Reference A with the additional requirement that family members are not to act as escorts. Escorts are not required to view the remains.

15. Requests for Family representatives to escort. Requests for family representatives to accompany HR on a repatriation flight will not be approved. While mindful of the reasoning behind such requests, advice should be given to the requesting family by either Service HQ or HQJOC representatives that approval will not be granted.

Certifying Cause of Death

16. The examining Medical Officer (MO) may not be able to ascertain the cause of death without a post-mortem. In this case, the MO will be required to provide written certification that death has occurred and the cause of death is to be ascertained by post-mortem at a later stage.

17. An appropriately qualified medical doctor may sign a certificate of death as a competent authority. As signed certificate of death is to contain the statement that the deceased member was a member of the ADF who died while on service, is of the same force and effect as a certificate signed by a duly qualified medical practitioner of the State or Territory in which the death occurred.

Post-Mortem

18. It is in the wider ADF interest to have the option of performing Post-Mortem Examination (PME) in order to clarify the exact cause of death and for this to be conducted in AS. Where mass casualties of AS members occur, and the remains are under ADF control, COMD CJTF 667 will seek immediate guidance from HQJOC if they believe that the PME should be carried out in theatre. It should be noted that there may be other circumstances other than casualty situations where post-mortem is determined not to be necessary, however, this will be determined after consultation with the nominated AS Coroner.

Movement to Australia

19. COMD CJTF 667 remains responsible for movement of remains as per Reference B, and will ensure that HQJOC is notified of arrival times of aircraft into AS.

20. HQJOC will notify 1 JMU on receipt of a FATALCAS from COMD CJTF 667 of the requirement for repatriation of HR in order to:

a. accommodate Department of Agriculture and Water Resources (DAWR) requirement for a minimum 72hrs notice prior to arrival of HR

b. enable effective movement planning and timely issue of WNGO and MOVREQ.

21. Each situation is to be managed individually, with the primary aim of being to expedite the deceased member's return to AS while cognisant of the ADF's requirements to conduct any ADFIS investigation. MAO in concert with ADFIS and movement staff are to ensure:

a. remains are to be stored at a constant cool temperature between 1 and 4 degrees Celsius to assist in preservation of the HR

b. if this is not possible, the remains can be embalmed or stored in a freezer if there is no other option to room temperature storage. Embalming impacts on the ability to complete PME in AS and should be avoided wherever possible. Approval to embalm is to be given by the J07 HQ CJTF 667.

c. where the remains are to be repatriated to AS by the ADF using civilian transport, liaison is to be established with DFAT, through the local mission, to ensure all appropriate local requirements are met.

d. no item, including medical devices are to be removed from the HR unless deemed necessary for investigative or safety reasons. ADFIS should record and seek approval if removal of medical devices is deemed essential

e. in circumstances where repatriation is not via Service Air, a representative of the Australian Mission is to be present at the sealing of the casket. This will occur once identification has been confirmed by the ADFIS escort through confirmation of the transfer documentation and identification tags with the casket and remains pouch.

Australian National Flag (ANF) and Caskets

22. COMD CJTF 667 will be responsible for ensuring a casket is provided for the repatriation of remains regardless of the source of air movement. COMD CJTF 667 or the Unit Escort Officer will ensure that an ANF is available to drape the casket and that it is correctly draped throughout the journey. Where it is not practical to drape the casket during movement to the Point of Disembarkation (POD), it must be draped when loading at the Point of Embarkation and prior to unload at the POD.

Repatriation of Personal Effects

23. Reference A contains further details on the management of personal effects (PE) of the deceased. It is the responsibility of COMD CJTF 667 to repatriate the personal effects to AS. It is preferred that the personal effects accompany the body to AS where possible. All valuables including jewellery and cash are to be catalogued and packaged for transport to AS. This is conducted in conjunction with the escorts. PE are not to change custodian at any time without a detailed check and written receipt of items.

Actions in Australia on Repatriation

24. A number of actions are required to be undertaken within AS. These actions are as follows:

a. ceremonial reception of the HR at the POD in AS is the responsibility of the deceased's parent Service.

b. formal handover of the deceased to the nominated coroner in AS will take place under the technical guidance of the Service Police.

c. Service HQ is responsible for all required administrative arrangements on arrival of the HR in AS, including Public Affairs

COMD CJTF 667 Follow-On Actions

25. COMD CJTF 667 will conduct follow-on actions required of the MAO as part of the FATALCAS management process IAW Reference B.

ANNEX T TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

ORDERS AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENT FORMATS

1. General. The table below identifies the Orders and Supporting Documents most commonly used by CJTF 667 and subordinate Commands. The list may be amended by COMD CJTF 667 at any point during the operation. Unless otherwise indicated all Orders and Supporting Documents are applicable to Commands, Formations, Units and Elements assigned, attached, OPCON or TACON to CJTF 667.

Document	Objective Link	Notes
Strategic Assessment	Strategic Assessment Format	
Warning Order	Warning Order Format	
Planning Order	Planning Order Format	
Alert Order	Alert Order Format	
Operational Order	Operational Order Format	
Execute Order	Execute Order Format	

2. Additional templates for Orders and Supporting Documents can be found in the following link:

a. http://collab/army/1div/HQ1DIV/Collaboration/SitePages/SOP_Endorsed_Page.aspx

ANNEX U TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

COMMUNICATIONS INFORMATION SYSTEMS SUPPORT PLAN

Reference: ADDP 6.0.2 CIS Support to Operations 05 Jun 17

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu.

1. **Situation.** See CJTF 667 OPORD 01 paragraph 1.

2. **Mission.** XX Force Communications Unit (XX FCU), in direct support to HQ CJTF 667, installs, operates and maintains CJTF 667 communication and information system packages and coordinates C4I support for Operation STEEL ENTINEL by establishing the signal architecture to support all phases of the operation and preparing CJTF 667 for contingency missions and follow-on combat operations.

3. **Execution.**

a. Concept of Operations. Signal Operations are conducted by phases in order to build reliable and redundant network architecture in support of all CJTF 667 Component Command nodes. CJTF will employ combat radio systems (CRS) at all levels of command. CRS are the primary means of networking and interoperability below Bde level. Primary and alternate means of communications are outlined by phase. CIS support will follow guidelines from Ref A.

b. Troop Contributing Nations (TCN). TCN are responsible for the planning and provision of CRS at Brigade (or equivalent) and below using national systems and cryptographic keys. TCNs are to submit requests for frequencies to the J6.

c. Emission Control (EMCON). EMCON protocols will be assigned by the J6 when/as needed during phases which will require deception.

d. Spectrum Management. CJTF 667 J6 is the force level authority for the Joint Restricted Frequencies List (JRFL).

e. Mission Partner Environment (MPE). MPE Rel AUS-IDN-MYS-SGP-NZL will be the primary mission system for HQ CJTF 667 and Component Commands.

(1) Local Area Network. Contributing nations are to build local area networks and wide area network elements IAW Joint Mission Entry Instructions (JMEI) to be issued SEPCOR. All MPE networks will be federated through the MPE Hub located at CJTF HQ.

(2) Coalition Wide Area Network (CWAN). Nations are responsible for providing bearer and aggregation systems compliant with JMEI IOT access MPE Hub. Nations can either provide their own MPE bearer at CJTF HQ or access CWAN TDMA.

(3) Mission Services. Collaboration, chat and instant messaging services will be hosted on MPE Hub and managed by J3 IM.

(4) Gateways. Nations are not permitted to operate gateways between CJTF HQ MPE and national classified systems or the internet.

f. Cyber Security. The Coalition Network Operations and Security Centre (CNOSC) is the technical authority for Cyber Security and Defensive Cyber Operations on MPE. Nations are responsible for accreditation and cyber security monitoring on national systems.

(1) Data Transfers. The CNOSC is the approval authority for all data transfers between MPE and national systems.

(2) Incident Response and Reporting. The MND-AT Incident Response Plan will be issued via SEPCOR. Nations are to report cyber incidents on all networks to CNOSC for analysis and dissemination to CJTF forces.

g. Situational Awareness. The CJTF HQ Recognised Theatre Picture (RTP) will be held on MPE. MPE will provide CJTF HQ with access to the Recognised Air Picture (RAP), Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP), and the Recognised Land Picture (RLP).

(1) Network Integration. Components are responsible for integration and exchange of track data between MPE and national digital SA/BFT systems. Nations without digital systems are to input tracks manually.

(2) Track Management. Component Commands are responsible to the J3 for track management including promotion of tracks to CJTF HQ. J3 is responsible for promotion and demotion of tracks between RLP, RAP and RMP

h. **Phase 0: Shaping**.

(1) This phase begins with the initial staging to CJTF 667 Force Elements (FE) into the Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO). HQ CJTF 667 J6 will conduct network engineering and preparations in support of the operational and tactical plan. This phase includes link-up, liaison, and interface with in-place Belesian Defense Forces (BDF), the deployment of CJTF 667 FCU support elements to the CJTF APOD and SPOD in General Santos City, BX.

(2) This phase includes the configuration and preparation of the MPE for use in support of the CJTF 667 Command Post.

(3) One Joint Network Node (JNN) will be assigned to the APOD in Zamboanga, BX. All other available signal assets will be deployed to APOD, General Santos City and staged for onward movement as needed.

(4) This phase ends once all signal equipment is integrated into the CJTF 667 network, and staged forward to connect each of JFMCC, JFLCC, JFACC, JFSOTG, ESG and JFLOGCC.

i. **Phase 1: Denial**.

(1) This phase focuses and sustains the theater network support to HQ CJTF 667 and its subordinate Component Commands. CJTF 667 air and maritime FE will commence decisive action to deny the air and sea lanes within the JFAO to all NTMEF in order to isolate NTMEF in Panay.

(2) Main Effort (ME): Provision of robust Control Networks to enable Joint Manoeuvre

(3) Supporting Effort (SE): CIS support to J2 Information Exchange Requirements in order to enable current operations.

j. **Phase 2: Lodgement**.

(1) This phase will see the lodgement of land forces onto Panay. It is expected that JFLCC HQ will be established aboard an LHD. FCU will have established links with JFLCC and JFMCC HQs to enable effective communications and situational awareness with CJTF HQ.

(2) ME: Provision of robust Control Networks to enable Joint Manoeuvre

(3) SE: CIS support to J2 Information Exchange Requirements in order to enable current operations.

k. **Phase 3: Neutralise**.

(1) This phase will see decisive land operations to defeat the NTMEF in Panay. Simultaneously, a lodgement will also occur on Palawan by the ESG.

(2) ME: Provision of robust Control Networks to enable Joint Manoeuvre

(3) SE: CIS support to J2 Information Exchange Requirements in order to enable current operations.

l. **Phase 4: Transition**.

(1) On order. This phase will see the CJTF transition to Stability Operations in preparation to hand over responsibilities to a UN led peacekeeping force or to Host Nation security forces. Key tasks during this phase include maintaining the JNTC architecture. Key Engineering tasks include re-configuration, power analysis, and jump configuration of SECOMP, GRRIP and GUS equipment to facilitate maximum mobility and survivability. Primary will remain CENTRIXS-OIG, alternate will be TACSAT.

(2) ME: Continue to support CJTF HQ and Component Command HQ with CIS capabilities.

(3) SE: BPT to integrate CIS with follow on peacekeeping forces or HN security forces.

ANNEX V TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

REPORTS AND RETURNS

1. General. The table below identifies the reports most commonly used by CJTF 667 and subordinate Commands. The list may be amended by COMD CJTF 667 at any point during the operation. Unless otherwise indicated all reports are applicable to Commands, Formations, Units and Elements assigned, attached, OPCON or TACON to CJTF 667.

Reports	Acronym	Objective Link	Notes
CSS Reports & Returns	CSS RPTS RTN	CSS Reports and Returns	
Personnel Stats	PERSTAT	Personnel Stats	
Logistic Stats	LOGSTAT	Logistic Stats	
Reinforcement Demand	REODEM	Reinforcement Demand	
Operational Demand – Priority Demand	OPDEM-PRIDEM	Operational Demand - Priority Demand	
CSS State - Daily	CSS STAT	CSS State - Daily	
Amphibious State - Daily	AMPHIB STAT	Amphibious State - Daily	
Bulk Petroleum State	PETSTAT	Bulk Petroleum State	
Movement Request Acceptance/Refusal	MOVAR	Movement Request Acceptance/Refusal	
Service Staff Demand	SERVSTAFFDEM	Service Staff Demand	
Distribution Point Request	DISTPNTREQ	Distribution Point Request	
Forward Arming & Refueling Point Request	FARPREQ	Forward Arming and Refueling Point Request	
Bath Request	BATHREQ	Bath Request	
Maritime State - Daily	MARSTAT	Maritime State - Daily	
Critical Systems Report	CRITSYSREP	Critical Systems Report	
Logistics Contract and Host Nation Support Report	CHREP	Logistics Contract and Host Nation Support Report	
Logistic Situation Report	LOGSITREP	Logistic Situation Report	

Movement Report	MOVREP	Movement Report	
Boundary Clearance-Transit	BDRYAOEXTTRANSITREQ	Boundary Clearance-Transit	
Communications Status	COMMSTAT	Communications Status	
Communications Report	COMMREP	Communications Report	
Communications Situation Report	COMMS SITREP	Communications Situation Report	
Incident Report	INCIDENT OPREP	Incident Report	
Operational Status Report	OPREPSTAT	Operational Status Report	
Location Status Report	LOCSTAT	Location Status Report	
Patrol Forecast and Activity Program	PTLFORECASTANDACTYPGM	Patrol Forecast and Activity Program	
Patrol Recon Report	PTLRECONREP	Patrol Recon Report	
Situation Report	SITREP	Situation Report	
Land Operations Summary	LANDOPSUM	Land Operations Summary	
Chat Report	CHATREP	Chat Report	
Patrol Brief Format	PTLBRF	Patrol Brief Format	
Marry-Up Report	MARUPREP	Marry-Up Report	
Public Affairs Situation Report	PA SITREP	Public Affairs Situation Report	
Road Space Request	RDSPACEREQ	Road Space Request	
Movement Request	MOVREQ	Movement Request	
Operational Demand	OPDEM	Operational Demand	
Road Condition Report	RDCONDREP	Road Condition Report	
Rules of Engagement Request	ROEREQ	Rules of Engagement Request	
Transfer Request	TRANSREQ	Transfer Request	
Air Transport Acceptance/Refusal	TRANSAR	Air Transport Acceptance/Refusal	
CASEVAC 9 Liner	CASEVAC	CASEVAC 9 Liner	

CASEVAC Dustoff	CASEVAC-DUSTOFF	CASEVAC Dustoff	
NOTICAS-FATALCAS	NOTICAS-FATALCAS	NOTICAS-FATALCAS	
Airfield Report	AIRFLDREP	Airfield Report	
ECM Request	ECMREQ	ECM Request	
Electronic Support Measure Request	ESMREQ	ESM Request	
Electronic Warfare Report	EWREP	Electronic Warfare Report	
Electronic Warfare Summary	EWSUM	Electronic Warfare Summary	
Tactical Interrogation Report	TACINTERROGREP	Tactical Interrogation Report	
Intelligence Report	INTREP	Intelligence Report	
Intelligence Summary	INTSUM	Intelligence Summary	
PW Capture Report	PWCAPTUREREP	PW Capture Report	
Standard Interference Jamming Warning Report	SIJWR	Standard Interference Jamming Warning Report	
Preliminary Technical Report	PRETECHREP	Preliminary Technical Report	
Counter Intelligence Summary	CISUM	Counter Intelligence Summary	
Security Intelligence Report	SYINTREP	Security Intelligence Report	
Potential Intelligence Collector Warning	PICWARNING	Potential Intelligence Collector Warning	
ISTAREW Sync Matrix	ISTAREW SYNC	ISTAREW Sync Matrix	
Forward Line of Own Troops	FLOT	Forward Line of Own Troops	
Fire Support Coordination Line	FSCL	Fire Support Coordination Line	
Bomb/Mortar/Shell Report	BOM-MORT-SHELREP	Bomb/Mortar/Shell Report	
Air Recon Request	AIRRECONREQ	Air Recon Request	
Air Support Request	AIRSUPREQ	Air Support Request	
Air Space Request	ACMREQ	Air Space Request	

Air Space Control Order	ACO	Air Space Control Order	
Air Task Order	AIRTASKOR	Air Task Order	
Time Over Target Message	TOTMSG	Time Over Target Message	
Hostile Aircraft Report	HOSTAIRREP	Hostile Aircraft Report	
Mission Report	MISREP	Mission Report	
Recon Exploitation Report	RECCEXREP	Recon Exploitation Report	
Naval Gunfire Support Request	NGSREQMSG	Naval Gunfire Support Request	
EOD 10 Liner	EOD 10 LINER	EOD 10 Liner	
Sapper Demand	SAPDEM	Sapper Demand	

2. Additional templates for reports and returns can be found in the following link:

   a. http://collab/army/1div/HQ1DIV/Collaboration/SitePages/SOP_Endorsed_Page.aspx?InitialTabId=Ribbon%2EDocument&VisibilityContext=WSSTabPersistence

ANNEX AA TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

OPERATION STEEL SENTINEL HEALTH SUPPORT ORDER

References:

A. Operational Support Publication Part 2, Vol 3.1 – *Management of air quality exposure – Airborne Particulate Matter* (BO4488490)
B. Defence Health Manual Vil. 2, Part 7, Chap 10 – *Pre-deployment Health Preparation*
C. Casualty Manual (CASMNA) Chap 1, Annex B – *NOTICAS*
D. Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 2, Chap. 7 – *MEDICAS*
E. Defence Health Manual Vol. 1, Part 10, Chap. 3 – *Critical Incident Mental Health Support*
F. Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 9, Chap. 19 – *Health Management of Sexual Assault*
G. Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 7, Chap. 17 – *Post-deployment Health Requirements*
H. Defence Health Manual Vol. 3, Part 7, Chap. 11 – *Australian Defence force levels of health support in operations – dental implications*
I. Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 10, Chap. 4 – *Operational mental health screening for Defence employees*
J. Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 4, Chap. 7 –*Provision of emergency health support to civilians*
K. Operational Support Publication Vol. 3, Chap 3.11 – Deployed Health Surveillance
L. Maritime Health Logistics Instruction and Medical Allowance List *dated 19 Sep 14*
M. Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 15, Chap. 8 – *Health Materiel Manual*
N. Army Standing Instruction (P) Part 8, chap. 12 – *Supply, control, carriage, issue and administration of scheduled medication by Army non-Medical Officers, 1 Jul 16*
O. Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 1, Chap. 5 – *Management of clinical Incidents within Defence*
P. Defence Health Manual Vol. 3, Part 1, Chap. 1 – *Health care complaints and clinical incident management process*
Q. Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 15, Chap. 21 – *Health materiel support to operations*

Situation

1. **General.** The Combined Joint Task Force 667 (CJTF 667) will deploy under the authority of UNSCR 8873, IOT achieve the military interventions as detailed in this OPORD (OP STEEL SENTINEL OPORD 01). The Desired End State remains the establishment of a sufficiently secure and stable environment in the occupied BX islands and improved capability of BX security forces such that state-sponsored hostilities have ceased, territorial borders are secure, humanitarian assistance programs operate unhindered and transition to a UN-sanctioned and/or HN follow-on security force is complete.

2. CJTF 667 will operate within the established JFAO and will be led by AS. CJTF 667 consists of a HQ, JFMCC, JFLCC, JFACC (OPCON), SOTG, JFLOGCC, and ESG. Troop contributing nations currently include New Zealand, Fiji, Tonga, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. Other like-minded nations may contribute forces or

provide materiel support at a future date. As Lead Nation, Australia will provide critical force enablers, including up to R3 deployed health support.

3. **Aim.** The aim of this Health Support Order (HSO) is to provide the concept of health support to OP STEEL SENTINEL, and the medical requirements for AS personnel ISO the Operation.

4. **Area of responsibility.** The Pacific region encompassing the countries of North Torbia (NT), South Torbia (RT), Belesia (BX), Gabal (GX) and Olvana (OV).

5. **Current situation.** The Region is made up of thousands of islands, the climate is generally tropical maritime with a relatively cool season from Dec to Feb and a hot humid, rainy season with monsoons common during Summer months. Average temperatures generally range between 20-30 degrees Celsius, but can drop as low as 12 degrees Celsius in some locations**.**

6. Access to healthcare in the major population centres is generally good through a public and private health system, however still below Western Standards in most areas. In the past 20 years, some infectious degenerative diseases have risen in the Region. Many locals are still living in remote and hard to reach areas where it is difficult to deliver the health services they need, and the scarcity of doctors, nurses and midwives add to the poor health delivery system in these areas.

7. Despite relatively strict lockdown enforcements, the Region was hit hard by COVID-19 in early 2020. This further depleted an under resourced healthcare system and raised regional tensions, and security and stability concerns amidst fears of a resurgence of the virus.

8. **Friendly health capabilities.** CJTF 667 will operate within the established JFAO and will be led by AS, providing up to Role 3 deployed HS through a combination of ADF and Coalition Land and Maritime capabilities, as well as tactical, forward and strategic AME through RW and FWAME capabilities. All TCNs will deploy with a minimum of integral R1 HS capabilities. Primary Role 3 for AS casualties will be through the NSB (Flight time from AO to Darwin <5hrs). Access to the USNS Mercy (Maritime Role 3) may be coordinated through the CJTF 667 J07.

a. **USNS Mercy**. USNS Mercy is a Role 3 Hospital Ship that is recognised internationally as a neutral participant. It provides the following capacity:

(1) Intensive care wards: 80 beds

(2) Recovery wards: 20 beds

(3) Intermediate care wards: 280 beds

(4) Light care wards: 120 beds

(5) Limited care wards: 500 beds

(6) Total Patient Capacity: 1000 beds

(7) Operating Rooms: 12

9. Whilst all TCNs will retain overall responsibility for medical support to their troops, AS personnel and capabilities may provide HS to HN and Coalition personnel IAW the Medical Rules of Entitlement outlined in Enclosure 3.

10. **Civilian Medical Infrastructure.** Medical infrastructure within HN is restricted. Except under emergency circumstances, and through approval of the CJTF 667 J07 Military forces will not use HN medical facilities.

11. **External agencies**. External agencies are defined as any agency or force not under the command and control of the CJTF 667 J07, and they are not to be accessed for health care. These include, but are not limited to NGOs, Religious Missions and other humanitarian agencies, which may be present in the AO.

12. **Assumptions.** All TCN personnel will abide by comparable pre-deployment health screening measures and employ required mitigations to minimise the impact of exposure to health threats within the Region.

13. **Limitations.** HN medical assets are extremely limited throughout the AO with primary focus on the civilian population. Except under emergency circumstances, CJTF 667 Military forces will not use HN medical facilities and Legal authorization is required before Coalition medical forces provide any non-emergency care to foreign nationals

14. In mass casualty situations, the capacity of hospitals, pharmaceuticals for advanced treatment, and detection equipment will be overwhelmed.

15. Only decontaminated or non-infectious patients will be transported via STRATAME unless the aircraft and receiving facilities are prepared and authorized to receive contaminated or infected casualties

16. **Health threat to Friendly Force Elements (FE).** Person-to-person communicable diseases, food and water borne diseases, climatic conditions and occupational hazards represent the greatest health risks to deployed personnel. Use of mitigating practices reduces the health risks in the Region to LOW in most circumstances. A health risk assessment matrix for this region is at Enclosure 1.

a. **Air quality.** Air quality in this region may be significantly reduced. Management of ADF Activities and personnel in environments with reduced air quality is to be IAW Ref A.

b. **Bio-scientific Capabilities and Bio-threats**. Review threat assessments for the AO regularly, but at this time there is expected to be no biological threat capabilities.

17. **Casualty estimate.** **TBC**

Mission

18. Maintain the physical and psychological well-being of FE deploying on OP STEEL SENTINEL.

Execution

19. The concept of health support is as follows:

a. **Purpose.** To maintain the physical and psychological health and well-being of all FE deploying on OP STEEL SETINEL.

b. **Method.** HS arrangements apply to FE deploying to the region in the following phases:

(1) **Force preparation.** This commences upon notification of deployment. Individuals deploying on OP STEEL SENTIEL are required to be medically and dentally fit, individually ready, have an in-date, age-related preventive health examination and pre-deployment health screening assessment completed, IAW Ref B. Pre-deployment HS will be provided to individuals through extant Joint Health Command (JHC) Garrison Health Service arrangements. ADF Civilians deploying, must also meet pre-deployment medical and dental requirements for their deployed location. Information pertaining to the pre deployment requirements for this operation is listed at Enclosure 2 of this document.

(2) **Conduct of operations**. This is to be IAW this HSO, and commences upon arrival in the AO. HS will be provided to CJTF 667 personnel through a combination of ADF, coalition health assets and potentially a contracted health support solution. The placement of R2E and Role 3 deployed capabilities will achieve 10:1:2 healthcare continuum for all population at risk where possible dependent on terrain and operational conditions. CJTF 667 J07 is to enable casualty regulation and tracking for the duration of the Operation. HQJOC Air Operations Command Aeromedical Evacuation Co-ordination Cell (AOC AECC) will coordinate the MRTA of casualties as required.

(3) **Post-Operational administration.** Commences once FE commence RTA administration. Information pertaining to the post deployment requirements for OP STEEL SENTINEL is listed at Enclosure 3 of this document. Upon RTA, health support will revert to extant JHC or relevant National agency arrangements. Concludes once all medical administration and reports are finalised.

c. **Endstate.** All personnel that deployed on OP STEEL SENTINEL received appropriate and timely health support, have re-deployed to parent Unit locations and/or have been transferred to the care of JHC or relevant National agency for further management.

20. **Health Force Preparation Requirements**:

a. **First Aid.** All ADF personnel deploying to the Region should meet Service specific First Aid proficiency requirements prior to deploying.

b. **Pre-deployment health briefs**. The mounting authority is responsible for ensuring all personnel receive relevant pre-deployment health briefs prior to departure.

21. **Deployed Health Support**. Deployed HS for Defence personnel is as follows:

a. **Individual/Buddy First Aid**. All personnel are to be current and competent in the provision of First Aid to single Service standards.

b. **Role 1 HS**. Will be provided through a combination of ADF and relevant Coalition health assets.

c. **Role 2/2E HS**. Will be provided through a combination of ADF and coalition health assets. The ADF will deploy up to two R2E (from 17X and 1EHS RAAF) scalable dependent on phase and expected dependency *(with option to deploy Maritime R2E)*.

d. **Role 3 HS.** In most cases, casualties will be strategically evacuated to health facilities in Australia through the AECC. However, the USNS Mercy will provide an afloat Role 3 facility to be utilised at the discretion of the Casualty Regulation (CASREG) Cell.

e. **Contracted Health Solutions.** A contracted health solution may be requested for HS upon approval by HQJOC. The following services may potentially be provided by contracted health solution:

(1) augmentation of R2E facilities

(2) coordination of emergency evacuation back to NSB

(3) to assist in coordination between IOs and NGOs for treatment of civilian casualties.

22 **Holding policy.** Holding policy at R1 will be dictated by the tactical scenario and availability of RWAME. Holding policy at R2 and above is 5 days. Patients requiring medical supervision for a period longer than 5 days will be MRTA. This may be adjusted by the CJTF 667 J07 to manage patient flow as required.

23. **Casualty Regulation (CASREG).** Theatre CASREG will be overseen by the CJTF 667 J07 CASREG Cell.

a. **Tactical regulation.** Tactical casualty regulation is carried out by health facilities ICW the CJTF 667 J07 CASREG Cell.

b. **Strategic regulation.** Regulation and movement of patients outside the AO is a HQJOC responsibility. CJTF 667 J07 is responsible for requesting Strategic Aeromedical Evacuations (STRAT AME). Air Operations Command Aeromedical Evacuation Co-ordination Cell (AOC AECC) within HQJOC will coordinate and control all STRAT AME.

24. **Mass Casualties (MASCAS).** All deployed units must be prepared for a MASCAS event. This includes a MASCAS plan and conducting rehearsals. In case of a catastrophic event that creates a MASCAS situation, the principles of triage will be applied. CJTF 667 J07 CASREF Cell will cross-level patient load and HSS staffing.

25. **Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC)** Depending upon which location evacuation is required, these services will be provided by either ADF, coalition forces or civilian assets.

a. **Surface CASEVAC.** Within the AO, only Military evacuation platforms will be utilised.

b. **Tactical and Forward AME.** Tactical and Forward RWAME will be provided by ADF/CF assets.

c. **STRATAME.** FW STRATAME will be via the APOD at General Santos International Airport, with an alternate APOD at Colonel Edwin Andrews Airbase, Zamboanga, BX.

26. **Medical Return to Australia (MRTA).** The following procedures are to be followed for personnel requiring MRTA:

a. All personnel being MRTA due to active medical problems must be managed through the STRATAME process. There are to be no administrative moves for personnel who are MRTA.

b. A NOTICAS (IAW Ref C), MEDICAS (IAW Ref D) and STRATAME Requests are to be raised IOT facilitate the individuals movements back to Australia.

c. All personnel subject to MRTA are to be counselled by their treating MO or CoC as to the rationale for their return and this is to be documented in their Defence e-Health System (DeHS) profile.

27. **Dental support**. Emergency dental support will be provided by the R2E or USNS Mercy. Any AS person requiring a greater level of dental care than can be provided in theatre will be MRTA.

28. **Psychological support.** Psychological support will be provided by ADF assets Psych Support Teams (PsST) based at the R2E, but capable of forward deploying. Where deemed necessary, AS individuals requiring further psychological support will be MRTA for specialist treatment in Australia.

29. IAW Ref E, a Critical Incident Mental Health Support (CIMHS) plan will be enacted following consultation with HQJOC J07 and 1st Psychology Unit in the event that a group or individual response is required.

30. **Environmental Health (EH) Support**. EH support will be provided by the R2E.

31. **Veterinary Support.** Limited veterinary support will be provided by the R2E. Commanders requiring veterinary services will submit requests to CJTF 667 J07.

32. **Mortuary Affairs.** Mortuary affairs are not a medical function. However, the CJTF 667 J07 will assign responsibility for death certificate completion and identification of remains consistent with guidance to be published separately in the Mortuary Affairs Annex.

Groupings and Tasks

33. **LOGCC.** Establish R2/3 HS IAW the SOM and this HSO utilising below capabilities:

a. 1 x Army R2E

b. 1 x RAAF R2E

c. USNS Mercy

34. BPT provide Detainee Care Facility at TBA.

35. **LCC.** BPT receive one AS CHC and one NZ CHC to provide integral Role 1 HS.

36. **CJTF 667 J07.** Plan, establish, and maintain HS system to support the needs of CJTF 667 force. Including but not limited to:

a. Provide HS planning and operating guidance to Service Components, Supporting Commands, and Agencies.

b. Exercise technical control over all Military healthcare providers.

c. Review and facilitate the update of ACSA arrangements with TCN to ensure complete medical coverage of all members of CJTF 667 regardless of country of origin.

d. Establish and control the CASREG Cell to coordinate evacuations and regulate patient movement within and out of the JFAO.

e. Plan and coordinate the veterinary and preventive medicine assets and systems to support veterinary and preventive medicine support requirements.

f. Establish the Area Joint Blood Program Office to plan, manage, coordinate, and integrate the receipt, distribution, processing, storage and disposition of blood within the JFAO.

g. Plan and ensure medical supply (Class 8) support is established and maintained in support of the HS mission and SOM.

37. **HQJOC support**. The health directorate at HQJOC will remain alert for emerging health threats within the Region. RFIs may be submitted through the CJTF 667 J07. HQJOC is the approving authority for Medical Waiver and Clearance requests, IAW Enclosure 2.

38. **JHC.** JHC is requested to:

a. Carry out pre-deployment medical checks on FE and identify, as early as possible, those individuals who will require medical clearance prior to deployment.

b. Submit medical clearance requests to Single Service Senior Medical Officer (SS SMO) and HQJOC J07 (where required) for approval IAW Enclosure 2, utilising Form PM631 – ADF Medical Clearance Request.

c. Provide relevant chemoprophylaxis IAW Enclosure 1.

d. Ensure individuals are up to date with all routine and additional vaccinations IAW Enclosure 1.

e. Ensure individuals PHE/SHE/MEC reviews are current for the full duration of the deployment.

f. On completion of deployment, carry out Return to Australia Medical Screens (RtAMS) IAW Ref G and issue eradication medication to any personnel not captured whilst in country as required.

g. Carry out Post Operational Psychological Screen (POPS) and Post-Deployment Health Assessment (PDHA) three to six months post deployment IAW Ref D as

39. **Deploying units.** Deploying units are requested to:

a. Ensure all members nominated for deployment undergo individual pre-deployment medical checks, IAW Enclosure 2, collect medication and follow medical advice regarding chemo-prophylactic medications where required.

b. Initiate Form PM631 – ADF Medical Clearance Request for any member with incompatible restrictions that require a ‘Medical Clearance’. This is to be submitted NLT 14 days prior to deployment.

c. Submit DCJOPS (or Delegate) Medical Waivers requests utilising Form AE889 – ADF Medical or Dental Standards Waiver Request, for mission critical personnel. This is to occur NLT 14 days before deployment for endorsement by the HQJOC.

40. **Individual members.** Individual ADF Members are directed to:

a. Comply with the pre and post deployment health requirements for all members deploying.

b. Ensure they are medically and dentally fit, Individually Ready (IR) or Army Individual Readiness Notice (AIRN) compliant and have an in-date, age appropriate AD147 Comprehensive Preventive Health Examination, which does not expire before the completion of their deployment.

c. Undergo pre-deployment health checks within the designated timeframes to ensure their medical and dental fitness for deployment.

d. Collect their prescribed medications (if required), including any relevant chemoprophylaxis, from their Pharmacy PRIOR to deployment.

e. Complete a Return to Australia Medical Screen (RtAMS) and Return to Australia Psychological Screen (RtAPS) within seven days of RTA at their local health facility (IAW Refs D and G) if required.

f. Complete a Post Deployment Health Assessment (PDHA) and Post Operational Psychological Screen (POPS) three to six months post completion of their deployment if required. Non-compliance may result in inability to deploy or a delay in subsequent deployments.

g. Adhere to individual protective measures including, but not limited to:

(1) Only consume potable water from approved sources

(2) Avoid food that may be contaminated or not fully cooked

(3) Observe appropriate hand hygiene practices

(4) Avoid prolonged contact with people with symptomatic respiratory conditions

(5) Comply with individual vector avoidance measures including wearing long sleeves, trousers during dusk to dawn, regular application of DEET or picaridin/icaridin-containing insect repellent; and ensure flyscreens are intact and/or use of bed nets (as relevant)

41. **Coalition Civilians**. Civilians (APS, OGA, Media Embeds or Contractors etc) deploying on OP STEEL SENTINEL are to complete a PM630 Civilian Medical and Dental Pre-deployment Assessment form for their medical and dental pre-deployment checks

42. **Medical Rules of Entitlement (MEDROE).** HS is to be provided IAW the MEDROE at Enclosure 4. Deployed HS may be provided to ADF and Coalition members IAW bilateral SOFAs and this HSO. HS may be provided to local civilians in emergency circumstances.

43. **Prisoners of War (PW), Civilian Internees and Detainees.** Medical care provided will be in accordance with the protocols of the Geneva Conventions governing warfare. Captured enemy medical supplies and personnel will be used to the maximum extent possible in the treatment of PW. Use of Class 8 supplies from CJTF 667 stocks is only authorised to provide the minimum accepted standard of care for PWs. Civilian Internees and Detainees will be provided medical care as appropriate and turned over to the appropriate civilian authority as soon as possible.

44. **Local National Civilian Health Support and Humanitarian Assistance**. Unless specifically tasked to do so, there is no capacity for deployed health assets to provide designated health support or humanitarian assistance to local nationals (LN). Initial lifesaving medical treatment can be provided to the LN in the event of an emergency, IAW MEDROE. However, such treatment must only be continued until arrangements are made to transfer the patient to the local health system.

45. **Medical documentation**. Medical documentation must be either directly inputted into DeHS during consultation or uploaded as soon as practicable for ADF members, and handed over to relevant National Agency for Coalition FE. Any clinical notes generated for civilians are to be retained by the member.

46. Epidemiological health surveillance data is to be recorded using the approved and provided EpiTrack excel template and submitted with the weekly medical SITREP.

Administration and Logistics

47. **Medical stores and supplies.** The supply of Class 8, blood products, cold chain management, stock holding policies and delivery locations is detailed in Annex XXX to the OP STEEL SENTINEL SPTORD, and will be IAW Ref Q.

48. **Medical equipment.** Personnel are not to locally purchase, obtain or use medication or medical equipment that has not been supplied or approved by Australian or other designated health facilities. All medical equipment management, including materiel maintenance and technical regulation, is to be undertaken IAW current ADF maintenance policy.

49. **Blood products and donation.** CJTF 667 J07 is the Authorised Blood Control Officer and will monitor usage of all blood products within theatre. IAW Ref K, an Emergency Donor Panel (EDP) can be activated in emergency or mass casualty (MASCAS) situations if authorised by CJTF 667 J07. ADF members may volunteer for emergency donor panels only (i.e. not regular donation to build a blood bank). Commanders must consider implications on combat readiness and approve any donations – noting the period of restricted duties of donors after donation (24 hours).

50. **Medical waste.** Medical waste is to be disposed of IAW HN local arrangements or returned to Australia for disposal.

51. **Pharmaceuticals management**. The management of pharmaceuticals is to be undertaken IAW Refs M and N.

52. **Clinical governance.** The following clinical governance requirements are to be met by all health personnel deploying.

a. **Currency**. The Mounting Authority is to ensure that health personnel are current and competent to perform their deployed roles IAW Single Service guidelines. This includes current AHPRA Registration and Post-graduate qualifications (where indicated).

b. **Authorisation to carry (ATC).** IAW Ref N, the Mounting Authority is to ensure that all non-MOs carrying scheduled medications are appropriately certified as current and competent prior to deployment. All non-MOs are to carry a copy of their relevant treatment protocols at all times.

53. **Health incident reporting**. IAW Ref O, health incidents involving ADF members as patients or health care providers are to be reported to HQJOC J07 using an AD441 Health Incident Report form.

53. **Health care complaints**. Health care complaints are to be managed IAW Ref O. Health care complaints from ADF members are to be notified to the HQJOC J07 by email, within 24 hours.

54. **Health Worthiness Checks**. Health Worthiness Checks will be conducted by CJTF 667 J07 as required. Internal clinical governance audits are to be conducted for all health facilities as required. These clinical audits are to follow the National Safety and Quality Health Service (NSQHS) standards as close to possible, within limitations of their deployed environment, level of health support and staffing.

55. **Sexual assault**. IAW Ref F, individuals reporting an alleged sexual assault will be medically managed in country. The R2E will be able to conduct sexual assault examinations if required.

Command and Signals

56. Whilst OPCON of medical elements resides with the relevant TG Commander, TECHCON of all deployed medical elements is retained by CJTF 667 J07, and HQQJOC J07 retains overall TECHON of all healthcare delivery on an overseas operation. The senior medical officer within each facility is the medical advisor to that commander and serves as the CJTF 667 J07's representative for all matters

57. **Technical Control (TECHON)**. HQJOC J07 retains overall technical control of health care delivery for any overseas operation. CJTF 667 J07 is granted unrestricted DIRLAUTH with HQJOC J07.

58. **Tactical Command.** The CJTF44 J07 is the senior deployed health person and has tactical command over all operational-level health issues and health care personnel.

59. **Maritime Health**. DIRLAUTH with the Fleet Medical Officer is authorised for advice on maritime related health issues and to provide clinical advice to the ship's MO. All resultant reporting is to be through the operational chain of command.

60. **Aviation Health.** DIRLAUTH with the Senior AVMO at RAAF Institute of Aviation Medicine (AVMED) is authorised for aviation specific health advice. All resultant reporting is to be through the operational chain of command.

61. **SOCOMD Health**. DIRLAUTH with SOCOMD J07 is authorised for Special Operations health advice.

62. **Reports and Returns.** The overall reporting of health incidents and issues is the responsibility of the CJTF 667 J07.

a. **Health Situation Report**. A health situation report is to be provided to CJTF 667 J07 daily including, as a minimum the following:

   (1) Significant casualties/cases

   (2) Casualty evacuations conducted

   (3) Capability issues

   (4) Health surveillance (threats).

b. **NOTICAS**. IAW Ref C NOTICAS messages are to be raised as soon as possible by the member's CoC – this is not a health responsibility unless the member is part of the health team.

c. **MEDICAS**. IAW Ref D, all MEDICAS notifications must be raised by an ADF MO as soon as practicable following medical incidents involving ADF personnel. Situations where access to an ADF MO is unavailable, including when communications are unavailable, the senior ADF health person will initiate the MEDICAS.

d. NOTICAS and MEDICAS messages are to be raised when:

   (1) An ADF/Coalition fatality occurs

(2) A casualty is classified as VSI, SI or Satisfactory, regardless of the mechanism of injury or illness (No medical information is to be placed on the NOTICAS)

(3) A member has been given greater than 72 hours Restricted Duty as a result of health issues

(4) A member is to be MRTA

(5) A member is treated for a vector borne or climate related illness

(6) A member is admitted to a health facility

(7) A member is declared Missing or has been captured (NOTICAS only).

63. **Key Contacts.** Key contact details are as follows:

a. HQJOC J07 - Tel: +XXXXXX

b. HQJOC JOR Watch keeper - Tel: XXXXX

c. HQJOC AOC AECC – Tel: XXXX

ENDORSED:

XXXXXXXXXXX

Enclosures:

1. OP STEEL SENTINEL Health threat assessment matrix
2. OP STEEL SENTINEL Pre-deployment health requirements
3. OP STEEL SENTINEL Post-deployment health requirements
4. OP STEEL SENTINEL Medical Rules of Eligibility

ENCLOSURE 1 TO
HEALTH SUPPORT ORDER
OP STEEL SENTINEL
Dated: XXXXXX

HEALTH THREAT ASESSMENT MATRIX - OP STEEL SENTINEL AO		
Threat category	**Food and water-borne disease**	
Unmitigated risk	**HIGH**	
Mitigations	All personnel to be compliant with ADF routine vaccinations schedule, IAW Vaccination Manual (Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 8, chap. 12) Deploying personnel must have current Polio vaccination coverage and must BPT provide proof of vaccination. Additional vaccinations: Typhoid **Only drink commercially bottled water**, avoid local ice where possible. Avoid large reef fish and raw/incompletely cooked meat, fish and snails.	
Mitigated risk (if all measures are effectively implemented)	**LOW**	
Threat category	**Vector-borne disease (VBD)**	
Unmitigated risk	**HIGH**	
DENV and CHIKV	HIGH	
ZIKA	MEDIUM	Sporadic cases since 2012
JEV	HIGH	Endemic outbreaks reported
Malaria	MEDIUM	**Risk in this region South Palawan is considered HIGH**
Mitigations	All personnel are to employ individual protective measures - long sleeves and pants, DEET / Picaridin - containing insect repellent, use of bed nets (where possible). Where achievable, personnel should conduct permethrin dipping of all uniforms prior to	

	deployment. All personnel should be made aware of the reproductive risks associated with Zika Virus. Personnel planning on reproduction should consult their treating GP to discuss the relevance of their travel to family planning. JEV vaccination is required for personnel deploying to this region. Recommend all personnel deploying to HIGH risk transmission areas receive chemoprophylaxis. Leptospirosis is a bacteria spread through soil and water contaminated with the urine of infected animals, and has a global distribution. Risk increases during periods of flooding. Person to person transmission is rare. Where there is an increased risk, personnel are to avoid contract with untreated water source, cover open wounds or scratches, and wash body and clothes thoroughly if exposed. **Note:** Target vectors are both day and night biting, therefore protective measures should be employed at all times.	
Mitigated risk (if all measures are effectively implemented)	**LOW**	
Threat category	**Sexually Transmitted Infections (STIs)**	
Unmitigated risk	**HIGH**	STIs including HIV are endemic throughout the region
Mitigations	Abstain from unprotected sex or other high risk activities involving exchange of or exposure to bodily fluids (including sharing of needles, body piercings/tattoos etc)	
Mitigated risk (if all measures are effectively implemented)	**LOW**	
Threat category	**Communicable diseases**	
Unmitigated risk	**HIGH**	

Tuberculosis	HIGH	High burden (311-366/100K)
COVID-19	HIGH	
Mitigations	All personnel are to comply with ADF routine vaccination schedule IAW Vaccination Manual (Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 8, Chap. 12). Additional vaccinations: seasonal influenza vaccine and meningococcal meningitis vaccine. Tuberculosis is endemic throughout the region, post deployment screening is to be undertaken for personnel with close regular contact with a TB case; have spent 8 or more hours with a TB case in a confined environment; or deploy for 3 months or more to a country with an estimated annual TB incidence of at least 49/100K population, IAW Defence Health Manual Vol. 2, Part 8, Chapt. 9 – Tuberculosis. COVID-19 – Cases have been reported in the region. there is low confidence in reporting and regional ability to detect, contain and respond to an outbreak; health infrastructure below Western Standards with limited capacity may impede access to emergency health support.	
Mitigated risk (if all measures are effectively implemented)	**LOW**	MITIGATED RISK OF TUBERCULOSIS: LOW **MITIGATED RISK OF COVD-19 – HIGH** if no integral health support is deployed
Threat category	**Environment**	
Unmitigated risk	**MEDIUM**	
Climatic conditions	MEDIUM	
Heat	MEDIUM	
Air quality	MEDIUM	
Mitigations	The nature of duties, climatic conditions and period of deployment are expected to exposure personnel to an increased risk of heat stress. Commanders are to ensure personnel comply with heat stress mitigations including work-rest cycles IAW SafetyMan – Work Environment: Excessive Heat or Cold In the conduct of their duties, personnel may be exposure to environmental contaminants (e.g. hazardous chemicals, asbestos)	

	and conditions (including reduced air quality). Personnel are to be cognisant of their safety and maintain Australian Standards. Operational Support Library Part 2, Vol. 3, Chap 3.12 Air Quality – Management of Particulate Matter Exposure provides information and guidance in the event of reduced air quality – particularly in areas affected by transboundary haze events.	
Mitigated risk (if all measures are effectively implemented)	**LOW**	

ANNEX AB TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

SPACE OPERATIONS

References:

A. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, Oct 1967

B. *The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space*, Dec 1968

C. *The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects*, Sep 1972

D. *The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space*, Sep 1976

E. *The Agreement Governing the Activities of State on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies*, Jul 1984

1. **Situation**.

a. North Torbia (NT).

(1) Space Capabilities. While possessing a growing indigenous space capability, NT's threat space capabilities will continue to be augmented to a more robust standard by those state/non-state actors willing to provide or disseminate technology to NT.

(a) Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RISTA). RISTA is viewed as the single-most important function for the NT military. Thus, NT forces typically commit significant resources to RISTA-related operations, which are usually aggressive with overlapping redundancy in the intelligence disciplines. NT has access to a government owned and operated low resolution imaging satellite. To further supplement its Image Intelligence (IMINT) requirements, the NT military regularly purchases commercial imagery from other countries. This more robust use of space-based ISR will be dependent upon the nations or non-state actors friendly to NT willing to provide access to satellite imagery possessing more adequate persistence of re-visit time. More likely however, NT will supplement its indigenous capability by accessing commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) vendors or technologies. The risk to operations escalates with quality of the collectors and the persistence of coverage of the Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO).

(b) Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT). NT's military is believed to use commercial L-band receivers that are reciprocal with Global Positioning System (GPS), the Donovian Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), or the Olvanan BeiDou Navigation Satellite (BDS) system for navigation. This highlights the significance of multi-use technologies, utilising technologies designed for the commercial sector yet adaptable to support military objectives. Actual use of space-based PNT in employment is directly related to the technological sophistication of NT's forces. At this time, it is not expected that NT will place an undue emphasis/reliance on space-based Position and Navigation

for use in navigation and timing. That said, NT will continue to leverage GPS, GLONASS, or BDS. It is likely that GPS also provides the backbone for timing for services such as SATCOM.

(c) SATCOM. NT is in the early stages of manufacturing their own satellites. Presently, NT operates one earth observation satellite that utilizes X-Band transponders to communicate images for download while in a sun-synchronous polar orbit. This satellite is projected to be operational for at least four to eight years, and is claimed to be used for agriculture, mapping, utilities management, and urban planning. NT may also be using satellites from Olvana, Donovia and other nations to advance its weapons research programs.

(2) Counter-Space Capabilities. Counter Space capabilities are a set of capabilities that NT may use to deny Coalition space effects:

(a) ISR. NT knows its ability to negate threats from the US, Coalition, and other more sophisticated opponents is extremely limited, even given their current launch/surface-to-surface capabilities. NT may attack sensors, links or ground stations as a tactical last resort or where enemy sensors appear poorly defended or unguarded within the JFAO. Any such NT attack would require extensive denial and deception techniques to close the distance from launch point to target. The ability to counter Coalition use of space-based ISR is wholly dependent on NT's ability to maintain space situational awareness (SSA). As it is unlikely that NT has the capability for or access to sophisticated SSA, the threat from NT for ISR counter-space will be minimal.

(b) PNT. The ability to counter Coalition use of space-based PNT will be dependent on NT's access to COTS technology or jammers acquired from Olvana, other vendor nations or third parties.

(c) SATCOM. The ability to counter Coalition use of space-based SATCOM is determinant on technological sophistication of NT. NT will likely access available COTS technologies in an attempt to block or deny access to SATCOM. However, in order for wide denial of access to be successful, it would require access to infrastructure and international links not currently, or likely to be at their disposal. Additionally, NT will be careful in that utilising broadband jamming and SATCOM denial does not antagonise South Torbia into joining the conflict.

(3) Launch Capability. The North Torbian Space Agency, the government organisation with primary responsibility for space operations, has a very limited capacity to conduct launches with very limited payloads.

b. Coalition Forces.

(1) General. Australia is a signatory to five legally binding space specific treaties (Refs A – E) which dictates how the space domain is utilised. For most nations, the civilian and commercial segments dominate space operations. Therefore, civilian space agencies have often taken the leadership role for space. Generally, these civilian space agencies will not involve themselves in active conflict zones. However, there may be agreements and procedures in place for them to support military operations.

(2) Space Capabilities. Coalition forces use a wide range of space-based ISR assets, typically from allied nations under extant arrangements, through to the use of COTS vendors or technologies. Use of space based PNT and SATCOM by the Coalition is ubiquitous at all levels; denial of this capability would be debilitating.

(3) Counter-Space Capabilities. Coalition forces will have access to counter-PNT, SATCOM, and ISR capabilities but not within the outer space domain. The Coalition can leverage existing legislation from respective governments to interrupt or restrict service by commercial satellite imagery providers over the JFAO.

(4) Host Nation (HN).

(a) Belesia (BX). As a less technologically developed country, BX relies on third party satellite services, leasing commercial Ku-band transponders from larger, more developed countries. This capability may also be used to support government and military operations. BX commercially purchases global positioning receivers that support commercial needs as well as military navigation and targeting operations.

c. Olvana (OV).

(1) Satellite Telecommunications. Olvana is the largest, most dominant country in the region, possessing a wide range of satellite capabilities. Most are suited for dual-use by the Olvanan military. Currently, Olvana operates seven commercial telecommunications satellites utilising Ku-band transponders in a geostationary orbit. All satellites are powered by solar array panels. These commercial satellites may be used to support military operations when necessary. Additionally, the Olvanan People's Army (OPA) operates four communication satellites using Ku and C band transponders. The satellites are in a geostationary orbit powered by solar array antenna. The OV government also leases bandwidth from commercial satellite companies that support government and military operations when necessary.

(2) Navigation. OV has an established history in the development and use of navigation satellite systems. Currently, OV operates 16 navigation satellite systems using E-band transponders (BDS). The combined systems create a network of navigation services and provide regional coverage of the Asia-Pacific region. The services are free to civilian and licensed to the OV government and military.

(3) Implications. The widespread and robust OV space assets and capabilities will complicate, and in some cases hinder, CJTF 667 space/counter-space operations. In particular the possibility that NT could utilize OV space assets to mitigate Coalition counter-space operations cannot be discounted.

2. **Mission**. COMD CJTF 667 coordinates the employment and defence of identified allied space services supporting the stated overall mission and, on order, deny the enemy freedom of action derived via space capabilities.

3. **Execution.**

a. General. The use of space capabilities is a significant force multiplier when properly integrated within CJTF 667 operations. The success of CJTF 667 operations partially depends on using space capabilities to monitor Maritime, Land and Air operations and must be protected, coordinated and synchronised in an efficient manner. In order to achieve optimal space support, space capabilities whose effects emanate from and through space from military, national, civil, commercial, and multinational providers will be integrated into the planning and execution cycle of the CJTF 667 campaign.

b. Intent. COMD CJTF 667 will take advantage of the Coalition's asymmetric advantage in space by fully integrating and synchronizing operations within the atmosphere with space-based capabilities made available for mission execution. As such, it is intended to establish a Space Coordination Authority (SCA) function within the JFACC (AOSC) that will provide the necessary coordination of space operations with subordinate commands at the HQJOC level. The role of SCA function within the JFACC is to primarily coordinate space employment, defense planning and coordination via the Components of the headquarters staff with assistance and input from the maritime, land, air, and special operations components. COMD CJTF 667 will defend space capabilities within the atmosphere above and the geographic territory within the JFAO to the maximum legal extent possible. When deemed necessary to create conditions for success, COMD CJTF 667 will deny the enemy freedom of action derived from space capabilities within the boundaries established by the rules of engagement.

c. Concept of Operations. Component Commanders will establish Space Support Elements (SSEs) staffed by qualified Space Operations Officer(s) (SOOs). SSEs/SOOs will form part of the SCA Working Group (SCAWG) to plan, coordinate, and synchronize and resource space operations.

d. Tasks.

(1) SCA. The SCA will be established as a staff function within the JFACC. Tasks:

(a) Chair the SCA Working Group (SCAWG).

(b) Integrate space capabilities.

(c) Plan, coordinate, and synchronize space operations in the JFAO and ensuring inputs from Components are incorporated.

(d) Maintain situational awareness of theater space operations, and coordinating with the Component Commands to integrate theater space operations.

(e) Provide consolidated space requirements through COMD CJTF 667 for coordination as required.

(f) Produce a Joint Prioritized Space Effect List (JPSEL) to be included into the normal decision cycle/battle rhythm of the HQ. The JPSEL will be included for recommendation at the Joint Coordination Working Group, and for decision at the Joint Coordination Board.

(g) Produce the Joint Space Situational Awareness Picture (JSSAP), as relevant to the JOA.

(2) SSE:

(a) Provide tactical and operational space planning and support to subordinate headquarters.

(b) Advise on space force enhancement and space control mission areas.

(c) Advise on availability and use of military/civil/commercial space-based assets.

(d) Advise regarding the capabilities, limitations, and status of missile warning systems.

(e) Produce space support annex and space input to planning and orders.

(f) Participate in initial targeting process.

(g) Advise regarding space support to Information Operations (IO).

(h) Provide space support products and services.

(i) Synchronize space operations and effects.

(j) Recommend/coordinate for additional space support and force structure.

(k) Coordinate with higher headquarters space element.

(l) SOO. The SOO is responsible for providing space-related operational support and expertise on space capabilities to Component Commanders. The SOO integrates space force enhancement and space control operations, and supports both deliberate and crisis action planning. The SOO is charged to:

1. Provide space-based expertise and services.
2. Maintain space situational awareness.
3. Identify prioritized enduring and emerging space requirements to the HQ CJTF 667 via the SCAWG.
4. Report any interference or other unplanned outages to military mission enabling space services to the HQ CJTF 667 JOC or HQ CJTF 667 J35 Space SME as soon as possible.
5. Identify possible target sets that enable space services/effects to the enemy.

4. **Sustainment.** No change.

5. **Command and Signal.**

a. Space Support Requests (SSRs) should be passed to the HQ CJTF 667.

b. Space capabilities are provided via a Community of Shared Interest. COMD CJTF 667 does not directly control space assets, but will coordinate space effects from participating space providers for planning and execution.

ANNEX AC TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

ENGINEER SUPPORT

References:

A. CJTF 667 OPORD 01 (Operation Steel Sentinel)
B. Belesian (BX) Country Study
C. North Torbian (NT) Country Study

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU.

1. **Situation.**

a. Background. See paragraph 1 of the main body of CJTF 667 OPORD 01 (Ref A) and Annex B - Intelligence.

b. General. Engineer operations for CJTF 667 require a rapid build-up of Mobility (M)/Counter mobility (CM)/Survivability (S)/General Engineer (GE) capacity across the Combined, Joint, Interagency domain .

c. Purpose. The purpose of this Annex is to describe the Scheme of Engineer Operations and provide Engineer guidance at the operational level.

d. Engineer Intelligence. Refer to Annex B to CJTF 667 OPORD 01.

e. Operational Areas.

(1) Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO). The JFAO includes the landmasses, national air space and territorial waters of Belesia (BX), the Sulu Sea, parts of the Celebes Sea, the Philippine Sea and the South China Sea. The landmass, airspace and territorial waters of Gabal (GX) and South Torbia (RT) remain neutral and are excluded from the JFAO.

(2) JFLCC Area of Operations (AO). The JFLCC AO is comprised of the landmass, airspace and territorial waters (12NM) of BX.

f. Terrain and Man-Made Features. See the BX Country Study (Ref B).

g. Civil Considerations

(1) As an island nation, BX relies on a network of regular maritime ferry and domestic air services to move personnel and freight amongst its various islands. Typically, the maritime ferry services are the primary means of inter-island transportation. BX roads networks on the larger islands are mainly paved. However, there are numerous unimproved dirt and gravel roads throughout the area, especially on the smaller islands, or islands with a small population. Disrupting mobility would be easily affected by damaging paved roads through the use of IEDs or cratering charges. Rural roads do not receive proper maintenance, leaving them susceptible to damage from the weather and neglect. The monsoonal season also has a drastic effect on the inland roads with communities at time being cut off and isolated during severe weather. BX is currently constructing a railway network in Mindanao, connecting all the major cities, but will not see operational service for at least another 5 years. There is a nascent railway connecting the cities of Iloilo and Roxas on Panay, but has not seen operations since 1985.

(2) Citizens of BX hold their religion in high esteem and many religious centers and structures are considered to be very important. These structures should be avoided for targeting or used to tie-in obstacles in urban terrain.

(3) Most of the region, particularly rural areas, cannot access all modern utilities such as potable water, electricity, and modern sewage systems. This will cause a reliance on military electrical, water and sanitation systems.

(4) Paramilitary, insurgent, and guerilla forces operate in BX. This could lead to an increased use of IEDs in Panay, particularly on main highways and field landing strips, having a negative impact on mobility.

(5) BX contains a number of heavily populated areas such as the cities on Panay. Enemy operations in these areas could result in the Host Nation asking for engineers to provide survivability/force protection, and general engineering assistance.

h. Enemy Engineer Forces. See Annex B Intelligence and NT Country Study (Ref C).

i. Friendly Engineer Forces. See Belesian Country Study (Ref B).

2. **Mission.** CJTF 667 conducts military operations to expel all NT forces from Belesian sovereign territory in order to create conditions for the re-establishment of a safe and secure environment in Belesia and the surrounding region.

3. **Execution.**

a. Concept of Engineer Support. The Coalition engineer effort will be centrally planned and coordinated, and executed by the Component organic and assigned engineers. Theatre planning and coordination for engineer support will be provided by the Joint Force Engineer, supplemented by elements from 19 Chief Engineering Works. Theater-level engineering support will be provided by 6th Engineer Support Regiment (6 ESR) as part of the JFLCC. Capabilities of the Host Nation civil authorities must be effectively leveraged in order to quickly establish the Sea Port of Debarkation (SPOD) and Air Port of Disembarkation (APOD) at General Santos City and Zamboanga to facilitate preparations for reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSO&I) activities. Each Combat Bde within the JFLCC will have organic engineer support to provide intimate mobility/counter-mobility/survivability support. RAAF Airfield Engineers (65 Sqn) will provide intimate support to the APODs through the Combat Support Squadrons assigned to each APOD. HN engineering capability will be required during Ph 4 Transition operations to rebuild infrastructure damaged or destroyed during the conflict. This may include civilian contractors. The Joint Force Engineer will be responsible for coordinating all sustainability engineering support across the JFAO.

b. Scheme of Engineer Operations. CJTF 667 Engineers will provide and synchronise mobility, counter-mobility, survivability, sustainability and general Engineer efforts to defeat NT forces and support BX civil authorities. The majority of planning effort will focus around Phases 3 and 4.

c. Priority of Engineer Effort by Phase.

(1) Phase 0 – Deployment.

(a) Support the establishment of the SPODs and APODs at General Santos City and Zamboanga.

(b) Support preparations for reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSO&I) activities.

(c) Support the establishment of the Theatre Logistics Area in BX (General Santos City).

(2) Phase 1– Denial.

(a) Continue to support the establishment of the SPODs and APODs at General Santos City and Zamboanga.

(b) Continue to support preparations for reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSO&I) activities.

(3) Phase 2 – Lodgement

(a) Support the establishment of a beachhead on Panay.

(b) Support the establishment of an APOD/SPOD in Iloilo.

(c) BPT conduct mobility/counter-mobility/survivability tasks ISO ground operations.

(4) Phase 3 – Neutralise

(a) Conduct mobility/counter-mobility/survivability tasks ISO ground operations.

(b) Conduct battlefield clearance.

(c) BPT conduct sustainability operations ISO RASO and Stability Operations.

(5) Phase 4 – Transition.

(a) Conduct reconstruction tasks ISO capacity building.

(b) Conduct battlefield clearance.

(c) Support the handover of engineer sites and works to civil and military authorities of respective Host Nations.

(d) Contribute to capacity building of Belesian security forces.

(e) Support CJTF 667 in the conduct of relief in place and transition to a follow-on force.

(f) Support the withdrawal of CJTF 667 forces to locations directed by TCNs.

d. Assignment of Additional Engineer Assets. Components will deploy with organic and assigned engineer units and assets. Engineer organizations are assigned as follows:

(1) JFLCC. 6 ESR, 1 Int Bn (5 Coy for Geospatial support).

(2) JFLCC/AS BDE. X CER.

(3) JFLCC/NZ BDE. X CER.

(4) JFLOGCC. XXX Construction Squadron.

(5) JFMCC. X Clearance Diving Team.

(6) ESG. X CER.

(7) JFACC. 65 Squadron.

e. Common Tasks.

(1) Conduct combat engineering and general engineering support to assigned Component or formation.

(2) Maintain CJTF 667 MSRs operational within assigned AOs.

(3) Coordinate Explosive Hazard information collection and counter-explosive hazard operations.

(4) Be prepared to assist BX authorities with the repair of critical infrastructure that impacts CJTF 667 operations.

(5) Be prepared to coordinate engineer support for humanitarian assistance and to create a safe environment in BX.

(6) Liaise with Host Nation Engineers, and coordinate Host Nation engineer support in AOs.

f. Specific Tasks.

(1) 6 ESR.

(a) Establish CJTF 667 policy, standards, and priorities for construction, facilities, and real estate utilization.

(b) Establish CJTF 667 environmental policy and standards.

(c) Operate the theater Explosive Hazard Coordination Centre and reporting system.

(d) Manage engineer reach back capabilities.

(e) Provide theatre-level engineer support to CJTF 667, including permanent horizontal and vertical construction, pipeline repair and construction, well-drilling, and power generation.

(f) Manage CJTF 667 facilities, real estate, construction, and engineer construction contracts.

(2) 1 Int Bn

(a) Provide geospatial support to the CJTF 667 (5 Coy (Topo)).

g. Engineer Intelligence Requirements for Planning.

(1) APOD and SPOD capacity, limitations, and damage.

(2) Extent of damage to BX critical infrastructure in Panay and Palawan.

(3) Disruption to the Ground LOC.

(4) Employment of improvised explosive devices, booby-traps, and mines.

(5) Extent of damage or obstacles on BX airfields.

(6) Location and disposition of NT breaching and bridging assets.

(7) Type and location of NT obstacles in Panay and Palawan.

(8) Capacity, limitations, and damage of bridges over major waterways in Panay and Palawan.

(9) Loss of friendly breaching and bridging assets.

(10) Location and extent of engineer construction materials in BX.

h. Explosive Hazards.

(1) 6 ESR will establish an Explosive Hazards Coordination Cell (EHCC) to gather information, track, predict, distribute information on, and mitigate explosive hazards within the theater that affect force protection and mobility.

(2) EOD within 6 ESR, CERs, Clearance Diving Teams and 65 Sqn will conduct tactical activities to address explosive hazards. Combat engineer unit activities include the detection, reporting, breaching and clearing of minefields, and the detection, reporting, and destruction of IEDs. Only EOD units and properly qualified EOD personnel shall conduct EOD procedures against explosive ordnance, UXO, or IEDs. Attempts will be made to render safe explosive devices for intelligence gathering efforts if the situation does not affect the local population and CJTF 667 ability to accomplish the mission being undertaken.

(3) IEDs/Booby-Traps. CJTF 667 will not employ booby-traps or IEDs.

(4) Mines. COMD CFLCC is emplacement authority for AT mines in the CFLCC AO. Artillery delivered mines and sea mines will not be utilised by CJTF 667. Anti-tank mines will be surface laid. No AP mines will be utilised.

(5) Humanitarian Demining (HDM). Because of the threat to peace and safety, HDM has become a significant disarmament and peace operations activity. Demining is ultimately an HN responsibility; however, CJTF 667 may assist BX through mine awareness education and training of HN personnel in the surveying, marking, and clearing of mines.

i. Geospatial. Components and formations will deploy with integral terrain analysis capabilities. heater geospatial support will be provided by 5 Coy, 1 Int Bn.

j. Firefighting. CFACC and CFMCC will deploy with organic firefighting capabilities, as will the National Support Elements from TCNs. Fire protection will be coordinated with the Host Nations. The CER will provide close firefighting capabilities ISO RW operations. 6 ESR will be responsible for CJTF 667 policy on firefighting capabilities for CJTF 667 facilities. TCNs will develop fire prevention and protection plans for TCN-owned or rented facilities that meet CJTF-667 standards. CJTF-OIG fire protection priorities are:

(1) APODs and SPODs.

(2) Medical facilities.

(3) Ammunition and fuel storage installations.

(4) CJTF 667 and Component Headquarters and communication centers.

(5) CFACC airfields.

(6) Personnel accommodation facilities.

k. Reach back. The Joint Force Engineer will facilitate the utilization of NSB engineer capabilities. All requests for assistance will be passed to the Joint Force Engineer.

l. Facilities.

(1) Facility planning factors include: CJTF 667 concept of operations; expected duration and intensity of operations; cost of facility; time-phased activities; and prioritizing the use of existing assets over new construction.

(2) The six broad categories of facilities in order of priority for use are: TCN-owned, occupied, or leased facilities; Host Nation, allied, and Coalition support where an agreement exists to provide specific types and quantities of facilities at specified times in designated locations; TCN-owned facility substitutes pre-positioned in theater; facilities available from commercial sources; TCN-owned facility substitutes stored in contributing nations; and construction of facilities that are considered shortfall after an assessment of the availability of existing assets.

(3) Contracting support should be used to augment military capabilities. Because construction is time consuming and entails the risk of not being finished in time to meet mission requirements, supported commanders should seek alternative solutions to new construction.

m. Host Nation Support. CJTF 667 Engineers will maximise the use of Host Nation engineer support. Host-Nation Support planning considerations include the following: indigenous labor; local availability of construction materiel, supplies, and equipment; local contractor support; and local facilities.

n. Construction Standards.

(1) When new construction is the only means of sourcing facility requirements, it will be constructed either using respective TCN standards or using temporary guidelines (less than six months) found in extant Doctrine and Policy. Any exemptions for more permanent construction standards must be approved by the CJTF 667 Engineer.

(2) Expedient construction (e.g., rapid construction techniques such as pre-fabricated buildings, clamshell structures, etc.) should also be considered as these methods can be selectively employed with minimum time, cost, and risk to offer in-theater forces another source of required temporary facilities.

4. **Sustainment.**

a. Logistics. Engineer Units will deploy with their own organic logistic support, and will receive additional support from their supported Components and formations.

b. Medical. Engineer Units will deploy with their own organic medical assets (RAP), and will receive additional support from their supported Components and formations (R1 – R3).

c. Construction Materiel. Construction materiel is readily available for local purchase, and contracted construction capability is available.

5. **Command and Signal.**

a. CJTF 667 Engineer – Colonel XXXXXX (AS) is appointed as the Joint Force Engineer.

b. Location. Joint Force Engineer will establish at General Santos City, BX with CJTF HQ by XXXXXX.

c. Engineer Coordinating Boards.

(1) The CJTF 667 Engineer Synchronisation teleconference. Fridays at 1000 hours, commencing XXXXXXX. Required attendees: HQJOC, HQ CJTF 667 J2, J3, J4, J5 Engineer staff officers, 6 ESR, 1 Int Bn, 65 Sqn, JFMCC Engineer.

ANNEX R TO
CJTF 667 OPORD 01
DATED XXXXXX

PRISONER OF WAR AND CAPTURED PERSONNEL HANDLING PROCEDURES

1. **Introduction**. This document provides direction and clarification regarding the procedures to be used when detaining captured personnel (CPERS in accordance with the Geneva Conventions (GC) and Additional Protocol I (API) within the CJTF 667 Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO). Consideration must be given at all times as to the status of the CPERS, the gathering of evidence at the point of apprehension (PoA) in support of any allegation to facilitate the collection of intelligence or subsequent prosecution under Coalition or Host Nation (HN) judicial systems, where relevant.

2. **General**. Individuals may be detained as a force protection measure to prevent them from conducting acts against Coalition forces, Host Nation Security Forces (HNSF) or the HN civilian population. Once the threat has been removed or neutralised, the on-site commander must determine if the CPERS should be released, transferred to a national temporary holding facility, or, if they are lawful combatants of belligerent forces, detained as enemy prisoners of war (PW) and transferred to a PW holding area or detention facility. The detention process to be followed is dependent on the category in which the CPERS fall, as follows:

a. Unprivileged Combatant (also referred to as unlawful combatant). A member of a terrorist group who has committed or has the intent to commit a hostile act against Coalition forces, HNSF, HN government personnel or civilians. Unprivileged combatants are essentially criminals whose acts exceed normal private criminal activity.

b. Criminals. Pirates, members of a criminal gang, etc. CPERS in this category should be treated in the same manner as unprivileged combatants.

c. Personnel temporarily detained for Force Protection Measures. These are persons detained or temporarily held by Coalition forces that, for no apparent reason and no necessarily intentionally, interfere with operations and pose no threat to the Coalition forces. Such persons may be detained or held on site and released immediately if it is determined by the on-site commander that they no longer pose a threat to the mission or the force. Examples of such persons can be farmers non-violently defending their fields or property, civilians in the way of Coalition forces, etc. Proper judgement must be used to not evacuate such persons if they are not deemed to be a continued threat to the Coalition.

d. PW. PW are defined under Art. 4 of the GC III. GC III will apply as a matter of law when, and if, the security situation escalates to an international armed conflict. These include combatants, persons accompanying the armed forces (civilian contractors, maintenance crews), members of crew of merchant marine or aircraft, war correspondents and medical personnel accompanying the force. Combatants include members of an armed force or militias and members of other volunteer forces providing they meet the following four criteria:

(1) Carry arms openly.

(2) Having a fixed and distinctive emblem recognisable at a distance.

(3) Subject to responsible command of NT.

(4) Abide by the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).

e. Determination of Status. Where GC III and API apply as a matter of law, persons detained by Coalition forces are presumed to be entitled to PW status, until the status is determined. Should any doubt about a person's status remain, the person's status shall be determined by a properly constituted status tribunal. The specific conduct and composition of status tribunals will be defined in the national law of each contributing nation. Questions concerning PW status determination under GC III should be directed to the CJTF 667 Legal Advisor and national legal advisors, as appropriate.

f. Criminal prosecution. If the CPERS are not lawful combatants and have committed, or attempted to commit, an attack against Coalition, HNSF or another authority of the government of the HN, evidence relating to the actions and conduct will be required in support of any subsequent criminal prosecution. If there are no grounds for further detention, the individual must be released.

g. Common Capture Report (COMCAPREP). A COMCAPREP must be compiled and submitted through the chain of command for all persons who have been detailed (whether entitled to PW status or not).

h. Detention operations lead. Wherever possible, HNSF should lead on detention operations. Coalition forces may carry out detention operations where it is impossible for the HNSF to do so, or in the event that abuse of the CPERS by HNSF is feared or suspected, or where it is agreed that Coalition forces should take the lead (e.g. intelligence-led operations).

i. Persons under the age of 18. Children under the age of 18 (or persons suspected to be under the age of 18) should not be detained unless categorically necessary to prevent imminent danger to Coalition forces. Wherever possible, if children are detained they should be kept within the family groups or should otherwise not be accommodated with adult detainees.

j. Protection of female detainees. Female detainees must be accommodated separately to male detainees, except in circumstances where a family group is detained. Detained family groups, are to be kept separately from other detainees wherever possible. Further guidance is provided in Annex AE Gender Advisor Requirements.

k. Timeline. In general, no more than 96 hrs should pass between the CPERS point of apprehension (PoA) and their subsequent arrival at a national temporary holding facility. This timeline exists in order to allow for difficult tactical situations where immediate transfer is not possible.

3. **Application of National Policy**. Coalition forces remain subject to their individual national law, policies, and directives. Where such laws, policies, or directives diverge from CJTF 667 policies or directives, the more restrictive will apply. Divergent policies should be identified through the Troop Contributing Nation's (TCN's) Provost Marshal (PM) to the CJTF 667 PM to be de-conflicted. National policy shall always be followed in the first instance with respect to detention; however, the recovery of evidence requirements should be adopted as 'best-practice.'

4. **Guidance**.

a. Decision to Detain. The decision to detain a person or persons is based on actions or evidence at the scene. Detention must be reported to CJTF 667 HQ as soon as practicable using the format at Appendix 1. Criminal activities of a localized nature (e.g. petty theft) that are not serious crimes do not warrant detention by Coalition forces. Local law enforcement remains the responsibility of the HNSF, if purely criminal activity is observed. Nevertheless, Coalition ROE permits intervention and the use of force by Coalition forces where a serious crime (such as armed robbery, sexual assault, assault) is observed by Coalition elements. Where Coalition forces intervene in such circumstances, every effort shall be made to report to and involve the HNSF at the earliest possible opportunity as well as the appropriate reporting through the chain of command. CJTF 667 force elements can detain for one or any combination of the following reasons:

(1) Force protection.

(2) Mission accomplishment.

(3) Observance of a serious crime.

(4) Self-defence.

b. Detention Process. National responsibility applies.

c. Use of Military or Service Police (MP). MP should be made available for advice regarding detention and should be consulted prior to any situation where detention is a likely outcome. However, detention remains a unit and a chain of command responsibility. In general, and as a best practice, MP should not accept custody or responsibility for CPERS until they are delivered to a formation collection point by the detaining unit/soldier. MP provides Commanders with a transparent investigative and governance capability that can be tasked to ensure that CPERS are handled in accordance with national and Coalition policy. When MP are directly supporting detention, they should be used for:

(1) Search of personnel, property, and any scene, with the assistance of the detaining unit.

(2) Advice on what items are of evidential value and then the physical recovery and exhibiting of all items of evidential value, with the assistance of the detaining unit and other specialist requirements (ATO/EOD/C-IED) as required.

(3) Assistance with the recording of detaining soldier and detaining call sign statements of evidence.

(4) Training of Force Element personnel in search, detention, and evidence handling procedures.

(5) Advice on all detention matters.

(6) Oversight of Task Force-level facilities, when tasked and within means and capabilities.

5. **Searches**. The search of a dwelling is the responsibility of the on-site commander, based upon a reasonable interpretation of the information available at that time and should be cleared through the respective HQs. When MP are available, they should take the lead on searching, with the detaining Force Elements in support.

6. **Evidence Requirements**. For those persons not classified as PW, effective collection, transfer and storage of detainee-related evidence is essential to effective prosecution of criminal acts and helps strengthen the rule of law:

a. Statements. These are additional to the statement on the Capture Card, which only provides a summary of events. In the absence of MP, statements can be recorded by the onsite commander but must include statements of all personnel involved in the capture. There is no format for this statement, but at a minimum shall contain the following statements:

(1) Apprehending soldier,

(2) Qualified Tactical questioner,

(3) Interpreter (witness and ICOM chatter).

(4) Any local national information who observed the event (if possible and through interpreter).

(5) Statements from all Coalition unit witnesses.

b. Photographs. (ideally in electronic format)

(1) CPERS with apprehending soldier and a visible name/number board in photo.

(2) The Point of Apprehension (PoA), identifying the grid reference and name of location.

(3) The CPERS at the PoA with all physical evidence recovered, clearly visible in any photographs. This should include any forensic evidence if possible and where the tactical situation permits.

(4) Weapons, drugs, large amounts of money or any other items which may indicate criminal activity.

(5) Vehicles (if applicable) with registration number (license plate) clearly visible.

c. Property of evidentiary value. This can include, but is not limited to:

(1) Mobile phones should be retained in the exact state in which it was found. It should not be switched off, nor should anyone call the last number or answer any incoming calls.

(2) CPERS notebooks, maps, notes or other documents found on the individual.

(3) Photocopies of patrol notebooks and notes pertaining to the situation which led to the capture of the individual.

(4) Small arms (must be cleared and made-safe).

(5) Suspected IED components (wires, cables, batteries, spider boxes, etc.).

(6) Forensic evidence (EXPRAY swab).

(7) Any other item that the detaining call sign may deem necessary.

d. Chain of Custody. As a best practice, the detaining soldier should escort the CPERS to the appropriate collection point. If this is not possible, then the statements from all those involved should accompany the CPERS, escort, and all evidence. If this procedure is not followed, it will likely result in the detainee being released due to insufficient evidence for continued detention or transfer. Is important to maintain chain of custody for both the CPERS and the evidence gathered on the CPERS.

7. **Use of Force**. The ROE at Annex L to the OPORD identifies the appropriate levels of force to be used when handling CPERS. It is essential that Coalition Force Elements understand that the Use of Force for controlling CPERS is dependent on the category in which the individual falls. Lethal force can be used to detain and prevent escape of PW, but not criminals and unlawful combatants. The minimum amount of force necessary must be applied to detain an individual and when dealing with any CPERS. For detained criminals and unlawful combatants, lethal force can only be used to remove an imminent threat to human life (self defence). For all CPERS, once under control, no further force shall be used, unless absolutely necessary to prevent escape, injury or in self defence.

8. **Restraint**. Flex cuffs are the primary approved method of restraining detainees and, whenever possible, hands shall be cuffed in the front of the body and shall be regularly checked in order to ensure that they are not harming the CPERS. Hooding is strictly forbidden. In circumstances where it is necessary to protect sensitive information or for force protection measures, blacked-out goggles may be applied. As soon as the reason for restricting CPERS' vision has passed, the goggles must be removed. *In extremis*, a blindfold may be used, provided it does not cover the mouth or nose or otherwise restrict the CPERS' ability to breathe. Sound attenuation devices may also be used if the tactical situation permits.

9. **Reports and Returns**. Timely provision of accurate reports and returns is critical to the onward movement and subsequent detention of CPERS. Coalition Force Elements are to report the detention of CPERS at the earliest opportunity using the following tools:

a. Common Capture Report (COMCAPREP). Appendix 1. Immediately upon detention a COMCAPREP shall be submitted to CJTF 667 Ops.

(1) Designator of capturing unit.

(2) DTG of capture (DDTTTTZMMYY).

(3) Location of capture (UTM grid reference).

(4) Numbers of PWs/detainees captured. (O/N/S/C)(M/F)(NNNN).

(5) Captured enemy documents (CDOC).

(6) Captured enemy equipment (CE).

(7) Circumstances of the capture.

(8) Other points of intelligence interest.

(9) Location of capturing unit at time of COMCAPREP (UTM grid reference).

(10) Evacuation intentions.

b. The COMCAPREP should be filled out and securely attached to the CPERS. It must record all changes of custody and stay with the CPERS up to the Collection Point where other tracking methods can be established, or up to a point where the holding nation can securely control the identity of the CPERS in their custody.

c. CPERS Internment Serial Number (ISN). Upon receipt of the CPERS ISN, CJTF PM will issue an Internment Serial Number (as per Appendix 2) to capturing units. These numbers are to be added to the COMCAPREP and must be reported to the higher HQ PM on a daily basis if updated.

10. **Injured CPERS**. Where necessary, medical treatment is to be given to the same standard as that given to injured Coalition soldiers. Priority of treatment is to be assessed on medical grounds alone. If injured detainees are to remain in custody after immediate medical treatment, evidence justifying their continued detention must be provided.

11. **Humane Treatment, Abuse, and Prohibited Acts**. CPERS must not be subject to intimidation, humiliation, or acts of violence. Inhuman or degrading treatment including torture is strictly forbidden, illegal, and must be investigated. It is the detaining Force Element's responsibility, and that of the on-site commander, to ensure that CPERS are properly treated. This responsibility includes preventing, stopping, and reporting incidents of abuse by either Coalition forces or HNSF and does not end until the CPERS is released. Allegations or suspicions of abuse must be reported to the CJTF 667 PM, via national PMs. Food and drink shall be given at regular intervals and, whenever possible, CPERS will be provided with protection from adverse conditions and the elements. Where necessary, medical treatment is to be given to the same standard as that given to injured or sick Coalition soldiers. Priority of treatment is to be assessed on medical grounds alone.

12. **Tactical Questioning (TQ)**. TQ of CPERS can only be carried out by qualified, current personnel in accordance with national training and policy. The following types of conditioning are expressly prohibited:

a. Hooding.

b. Physical punishment.

c. Stress positions.

d. Intentional sleep deprivation.

e. Withdrawal of food, water, or medical treatment.

f. Degrading treatment, sexual embarrassment/assault, or religious taunting.

g. The use of white noise.

13. **Authority on Detainees**. CPERS (other than those with a PW status) captured by Coalition forces must understand that the authority on captured detainees remains with the state and not with the capturing nation. As an example, a criminal captured by Coalition forces in Belesia will remain under the law enforcement authority of Belesia and must be transferred as soon as practicable to a recognized Belesian authority. It is therefore important to not remove the CPERS from the state in which captured as this could create a political situation where the CPERS could claim refugee status in the new state.

14. **Evacuation to a Different Country**. There may arise emergency circumstances where CPERS need to be evacuated directly from one country to another, for example from Belesia to Australia, such as where Role 3 or higher medical care is required for the injured CPERS. In any circumstance where evacuation of CPERS to a different country may be required, COMD CJTF 667 shall be advised in order to coordinate this requirement with applicable national authorities.

15. **Release**. CPERS should be released at the PoA only if the reason for the original detention is no longer valid and the threat posed against Coalition forces is unlikely to continue. A record of release must be maintained in the patrol notebook and details passed to the appropriate higher HQ. Under no circumstance should CPERS be transferred directly to HNSF without first passing through the National temporary holding facility.

16. **HNSF/Coalition Joint Operations**. If Coalition forces are on a joint operation with HNSF, the HNSF shall normally handle any CPERS. If the commander of the Coalition element believes that the CPERS will be mistreated, or that HNSF are unable to safely and correctly facilitate the detention process, the CPERS is to be processed by Coalition forces in accordance with the procedures outlined in this document.

17. **Points of Contact**.

a. CJTF 667 Provost Marshal.

b. CJTF 667 Legal Advisor.

Appendices:

1. Common Capture Report
2. CPERS Internment Serial Numbers
3. Capture Report and Personal Effects Registry

APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX AD TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

COMMON CAPTURE REPORT

1. **COMCAPREP**. The COMCAPREP is a standard NATO message which nations have agreed to its use through their ratification of AJP 2.5. CJTF 667 uses this standard NATO message for all PW/Detainee reporting.

2. **Purpose of the Report**. The purpose of the report is to:

   a. Alert the J2/G2/N2 organisations of the possible capture of a potential source of information.

   b. Alert the PW Holding Organisation (PWHO) to the capture of PW/Detainees so that arrangements for the movement care and disposal of the PW/Detainee can be put in effect.

3. **Completion of the Report**. Capturing units are to complete the COMCAPREP as fully as the circumstances allow but the evacuation of PW/Detainees should not be delayed by the requirement for the completion of a COMCAPREP. Where the Capturing Unit has the ability to categorise PW/Detainee this should be done and the category noted in the COMCAPREP. Reports are originated at the unit level, staffed through their respective HQ.

4. **Format of the COMCAPREP**. The format of the COMCAPREP is below:

COMCAPREP Template

1. Designator of Capturing Unit.

2. Date/Time Group of Capture.

D	D	T	T	T	T	Z	M	M	M	Y	Y

3. Location of Capture (UTM Grid Reference).

N	N	A	A	A	N	N	N	N	N	N

4. Numbers of PW Captured.

O/N/S/C	M/F	N	N	N	N

5. Captured Enemy Documents (CDOC). Free text listing of the numbers, type and nationality of the documents.

6. Captured Enemy Equipment (CE). Free text listing of the numbers, type and nationality of the equipment.

7. Circumstances of Capture. Free text statement of such details as; size of force, direction of movement, speed of movement, etc.

8. Other Points of Intelligence Interest. Free text statement of such details as; PW nationality, service branch, unit, function, position, categorization.

9. Location at Time of Report (UTM Grid Reference).

N	N	A	A	A	N	N	N	N	N	N

10. Evacuation Intentions. To what location, when and by what means it is intended to evacuate the PW/Detainee.

KEY:
N - Numerical Character except in the first field where it is the designator for NCO.
A - Alphabetical Character.
D - Day.
T - Time.
M - Month except where it is the designator for male.
Y - Year.
O - Officer.
S - Soldier.
C - Other Personnel.

APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX AD TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

CAPTURED PERS INTERNMENT SERIAL NUMBER

1. **Allocation of CPERS Internment Serial Numbers (ISN)**. Every CPERS is allocated a unique serial number to enable his identification and tracking by the PW Holding Organisation (PWHO) throughout the period of his internment. The ISN represents various items of data about the CPERS and an explanation of the content of the ISN is set out in this Appendix to enable the ISN to be read and, if necessary, to be generated without the assistance of IT.

2. **Explanation of the ISN 14-Character Alphanumeric Group**. The breakdown of the characters is as follows:

a. Positions 1 and 2 - Country Codes. STANAG 1059 contains a listing of two-character alphabetic codes representing every country in the world. It also contains a cross reference to the two and three letter International Standards Organization codes used by the ICRC. AS, NZ, US, FJ, JN, MY, TH and ID are the primary country codes for the TCN members of CJTF 667.

b. Positions 3 and 4 - Superior Unit or Formation Identifying Codes. A two character alphanumeric code representing the unit or formation to which the capturing unit is subordinate. These Codes will be promulgated by the relevant higher command for the particular operation. For OP STEEL SENTINEL, 3L will represent CJTF 667.

c. Positions 5 to 10 - Number. A six digit roll up number generated by the unit or Prisoner of War Records Unit (PWRU) allocating the ISN (100000-199999 for 1 ID, 200000-299999 for JFLCC, 300000-399999 for JFMCC, 400000 - 499999 for ESG and 500000 and up controlled by CJTF 667).

d. Positions 11 and 12 – Identifying Nation. A two character alphabetical code from STANAG 1059/AJP 2.5 identifying the nation to which the CPERS owed allegiance (e.g. NT for North Torbia)

e. Position 13 –Status. A single character indicating the status of the CPERS as follows:

Value	Meaning
O	Officer
S	Other Rank
M	Retained Medical Personnel
R	Retained Religious Personnel
C	Civilian

f. Position 14 –Gender Code. A single character indicating the sex of the CPERS:

Value	Meaning
F	Female
M	Male

3. **Example of an Internment Serial Number**. An ISN of AS XX100864NTSM translates as:
   a. AS - Australia is the capturing nation.
   b. XX Capturing Unit was under full command of X Bde.
   c. 100864 A unique number from a block allocated to the unit.
   d. NT The CPERS owes his allegiance to Ariana.
   e. S The CPERS is a Non-Commissioned Member.
   f. M The CPERS is male.
4. Returns on used Internment Serial Numbers are due to the CJTF 667 PM on a daily basis.

NOTE: Although NATO ISN numbers were developed for CPERS with a PW status only, CJTF 667 will use this ISN format to include all CPERS to include those that are not categorized as PW.

APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX R TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

CAPTURE REPORT – PERSONAL EFFECTS REGISTRY

INTERNMENT SERIAL NUMBER (_____)
Allotment from CJTF 667 then used at Bde level)C A 8 M 1 0 0 0 0 0 W I(O,S,M,R,C)(M/F)

Captured Personnel Information (CPers)			
Name	**Rank**	**Service Number**	**Service and Unit**
Where captured (Grid Ref)		**Nationality**	
DTG of Capture		**Direction Heading**	
Other members of group (Names/Rk/Svc No or Internment Serial Number)			

Particulars of the Capturing Coalition Force Member			
Name	**Rank**	**Service Number**	**Service and Unit**
Reason of capture :			
Witnesses/Comments		_____ Signature Date Time	

Personal Effects seized at Point of Apprehension (PoA)	

Water provided to CPers			**Meals provided to CPers**		
Date	Time	Quantity/Comments	Date	Time	Quantity/Comments

Chain of Custody of CPers				
Date	Time	Transferred to :	Accepting Unit Signature	Losing Unit Signature

ANNEX AE TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

GENDER ADVISOR REQUIREMENTS

References:
A. CDF WNGO XX/20 – OP STEEL SENTINEL
B. OPLAN STEEL SENTINEL – XX/20
C. CDF ROEAUTH Serial 2 – OP STEEL SENTINEL - 2020
D. BX Country Gender Assessment 2020
E. UNSCR 1325, Women Peace and Security – 2000
F. UNSCR 1612, Children and Armed Conflict – 2005
G. UNSCR 1674, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict – 2006
H. UNSCR 1820, Women, Peace and Security – Conflict related Sexual and Gender Based Violence – 2008
I. UNSCR 2331, Human Trafficking – 2016
J. Australian National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2012-2018
K. CJOPS Directive 41/2014, Operationalising UNSCR 1325, Women, Peace and Security
L. ADDP 3.20, The Military Contribution to Humanitarian Operations – 2013

Situation

1. Operation STEEL SENTINEL is the codeword allocated to the ADF operation to counter the threat to Australian (AS) interests and Belesia (BX) sovereignty from North Torbian (NT) and Olvanan (OV) aggression. CDF advised the minister of defence that NT had begun preparations that would place North Torbian (NTMF) and Olvana Military Forces (OVMF) in a position to be able to threaten BX sovereignty. Analysis indicated that military action against BX in the immediate future is probable. As a result, the Government of BX (GOBX) has requested Government of Australia (GOAS) assistance/military intervention to counter the direct threat from NTMF and OVMF.

2. Concern lies around Palawan (PAL) for its use as a staging post for further NTMF military action against BX, particularly noting the landing of advance forces during biennial exercise RISEN SWORD with OVMF. As a result, all commanders are to have a good understanding of Ref E and how it applies to OP STEEL SENTINEL.

3. In keeping with Refs E-I and Ref D, a significant gender concern lies in possible humanitarian violations throughout the conflict of OP STEEL SENTINEL. A number of key issues, obtained from Ref D, are to be noted by Commanders and force elements throughout the conduct of OP STEEL SENTINEL:

a. Medium levels of gender based domestic violence, not only throughout BX and the AIG, but specifically on Palawan have been historically evident. In times of armed conflict, incidents have been seen to increase.

b. The possible increase in Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) noting the already high levels of domestic violence in the region. Although BX is a signatory of the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women; instances continue to occur with limited reporting.

c. Significant presence of Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), welfare groups including CARE, UNHCR and the Red Cross may already be in country. These groups will be able to provide a more comprehensive assessment of the situation and any gender issues, and are to be engaged to gain a full understanding of the situation. This will allow BX to continue to maintain sovereignty, utilising ADF assets in an assistance role. In all instances DFAT are to be liaised with to ensure alignment with government intent.

Mission

4. On Order, the ADF is to deploy to the area in order to counter the threat to BX sovereign territory and restore regional security and stability.

Execution

5. IAW Ref A, the mission end state is that NT and OV threat to BX sovereign territory is negated. This evolved from the establishment of a sufficiently secure and stable environment in the occupied BX islands and improved capability of BX security forces such that state-sponsored hostilities have ceased, territorial borders are secure, humanitarian assistance programs operate unhindered and transition to a UN-sanctioned and/or HN follow-on security force is complete.

Groupings and Tasks

6. It is anticipated OP STEEL SENTINEL will be conducted in five phases

7. **Phase 0 - Shaping**.

a. Force Elements are to conduct pre-deployment training on Gender awareness to all personnel, with focus on the mandatory reporting requirements as outlined later in this document.

b. Allocated a GENAD in the Operational Manning Document. The GENAD is to be a special advisor to command on the implementation of the gender perspective into planning, execution and assessment of ongoing operations, including Participation, Prevention, Protection and Perspective IAW Ref E. The GENAD is to be allocated in the J0 branch.

c. Force Elements are to appoint Gender Focal Points (GFP) such that gender is considered at all levels of planning and integration throughout the operation, providing feedback to the GENAD as appropriate

d. JTF 667 is to identify key stakeholders in the AO, and through DFAT, instigate liaison to ensure the execution of the operation is in keeping with the local government intent.

e. Collection of data including but not limited to sexual disaggregated data, cultural considerations and breakdowns and health statistics.

f. A Gender Analysis is to be completed and included in the planning phase to ensure all avenues are considered and an emphasis is placed on PNG self-ability rebuild.

8. **Phase 1 and 2 – Denial and Lodgement.**

a. All units, force elements and headquarters are to continue to monitor and report, ensuring a gender perspective is placed on all operations conducted within the region.

b. An ongoing gender analysis is conducted, particularly noting the concerns raised in Para 2 and 3. This will be important, with a focus on the ability to empower the local population through a gender perspective to promote self-sustainability.

c. Be prepared to conduct NEO operations IAW Ref L, liaising closely with DFAT and other key stakeholders in any subsequent planning or operation, ensuring a gender perspective is applied at all times.

9. **Phase 3 - Neutralise.**

a. Continue ongoing gender analysis, informing command as the operation progresses.

b. Composition of Key Leadership Engagement teams, patrol and stationing teams are to consider the gender focus. They are to be generated to include female representation as appropriate.

c. Maintain engagement with key stakeholders to ensure consistent gender messaging and actions are conducted throughout.

d. A gender perspective is to be applied to all kinetic and non-kinetic targets, both deliberate and dynamic, to ensure consistent messaging and promoting PNG sovereignty.

e. Continue to liaise with host nation to support nation building in preparation for transition to phase IV.

f. Be prepared to conduct pastoral care support to own forces in the event of humanitarian crimes incident.

10. **Phase 4 – Transition**

a. Continue to provide support and training to host nation in gender awareness and maintaining a gender perspective.

b. Continue engagement with NGO and key stakeholders to support progression to UN mission

c. Be prepared to conduct pastoral care support to own forces in the event of humanitarian crimes incident.

d. Conduct an analysis on the gender perspective as conducted throughout the operation and provide a report in conjunction to the Post Operation Report as detailed later in this document

ADMIN AND LOG

11. **Reports and Returns**

a. ADF commanders and personnel are obligated to report any breach or allegation of breach to any of the following:

i. The Law of Armed Conflict

ii. Rules of Engagement

iii. Non-compliance to international law

iv. Non-compliance to domestic law

v. Abuse of Human Rights

b. IAW Refs F and G, the following are to be reported if observed or alleged:

i. Grave Violations against children

ii. SGBV, including conflict related SGBV

iii. Sexual exploitation and abuse

iv. Violence against civilians in situations of armed conflict

v. Human trafficking by any party to an armed conflict or within an area of operations

c. Of particular note children are vulnerable during times of armed conflict, due to their trusting nature, gender roles and usually disempowered position within the community. This is particularly evident in OP STEEL SENTINEL, with approximately 22% of the population below the age of 19. All ADF personnel are to remain vigilant, and report any of the six grave violations against children as detailed in Ref F and as follows:

i. Killing and maiming of children

ii. Recruitment and use of children

iii. Rape and sexual violence against children

iv. Abduction of children

v. Attacks against schools or hospitals

vi. Denial of humanitarian access for children

12. All reports are to be made IAW format detailed at Annex XXX.

COMMAND

13. The GENAD is to be inserted at the J0 level as a dedicated advisor to command with no secondary duties.

ANNEX D TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

JOINT FORCES MARITIME COMPONENT COMMANDER CONOPS

References:

A. CJTF 667 Operations Order, of XXX Aug 2020
B. OP STEEL SENTINEL Concept of Operations, of XXX Aug 2020
C. EXERCISE FLOATING FORTRESS 20, of 28 July 2020
D. UNSCR 88668
E. UNSCR 8869
F. UNSCR 8873
G. CCJTF 667 Rules of Engagement, of XXX Aug 2020

Background

1. The Australian Defence Force has historically enjoyed a close working relationship with the Belesian Armed Forces. Part of this successful bilateral agreement has been the biennial exercises conducted between the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and Belesian Navy (BN), under the auspice of Exercise FLOATING FORTRESS. The most recent iteration, FLOATING FORTRESS 2018, saw the BN and RAN conduct 3 weeks of increasingly intensive Maritime interdiction and warfare scenarios off the coast of Darwin. These exercises have increased interoperability between the two Navies, whilst continuing to provide support and stability to the region. These exercises are seen as key in strengthening international relations, whilst providing training to both the RAN and BN commensurate to counter any perceived ongoing threat.

2. An increase of North Torbian (NT) armed forces has been observed over the previous years, as has an increase in bilateral exercises with Olvana (OV). The increase in military armament, particularly from a maritime perspective, has caused great concern amongst the Belesian Government. This is further compounded by a number of reclaimed islands off the coast of Panay, which have been claimed under the auspice of historical use. Complicated by the location of NT owned and operated oil and gas drilling rigs, what were once rocks and reefs in the region have been built to such a state that they can support runways, small ports and infrastructure to mount Coastal Defence Cruise Missiles (CDCM) sites. The foundation of the Cerium rare-earth mineral mine in Panay by Olvanan registered owners in the region of San Rafael has continued to cause concern amongst the Belesian Government, with sovereignty issues causing angst within the Belesian government. With the significant increase in military hardware by NT, and the increased ties to Olvanan Military, concern lies in an overt attempt to claim Panay by NT.

3. In order to maintain an overt presence within the region, it was agreed to by the Australian and Belesian Government's that Exercise FLOATING FORTRESS 20, programmed to take place between 28 Sept – 23 Oct 20, would take place. The premise behind this was to ensure a military presence would remain in the area to dissuade any overt attempt by either NT or OV to claim the region. As contained within Ref C, the exercise was to provide mutual training opportunities to both RAN and BN units, increasing in complexity across all domains of

warfare. HMAS *Anzac* is half-way through this exercise with a variety of Belesian Observers and units, and is best placed to act as a forward liaison.

Situation

4. The situation remains IAW ref A. On 03 August 2020, a radical group from the local claiming to be in support of the local Panay government tried to seize the mine in San Rafael. This resulted in significant loss of life, primarily amongst the Belesian Constabulary, including an unknown number of miners and associated employees. Due to the mines close ties with the community, this unrest has overflowed to the nearby city of Roxas, resulting in a large number of ethnic based violence towards NT personnel, as they are seen as the aggressor having killed Belesian personnel.

5. NT and OV have been conducting Exercise RISEN SWORD in the nearby South China Sea, and it was under this guise that NT landed a battalion worth of personnel near the city of Roxas in order to quell the violence. This has resulted in the capture and subsequent loss of the airport, sea port and the San Rafael mine. In an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council, UNSCR 8868 condemning NT action was signed and promulgated. Subsequently NT instigated an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) and Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) as described below. Further diplomatic channels have broken down, resulting in UNSCRs 8869, 8873 and raising the International Belesian Security Assistance Force (IBSAF) otherwise known as CJTF 667.

4. With this occurring during the conduct of EXERCISE FLOATING FORTRESS 20, *Anzac* remains best place to provide an initial maritime presence on behalf of CJTF 667, with further supplementation as outlined in subsequent paragraphs and orders. Initial concern lies in the location and disposition of NT maritime units, and it remains unknown whether OV will render assistance to NT through maritime unit support. The known disposition of NT assets has been reported SEPCOR and will continue to be updated as the situation develops.

Mission

5. The CCJTF 667 mission is as follows:

On order, CJTF 667 is to conduct military operations to expel all NT forces from Belesian sovereign territory in order to create conditions for the re-establishment of a safe and secure environment in Belesia and the surrounding region.

6. The Maritime Component Commander mission is as follows:

On Order, TG 667.1 is to provide the necessary maritime effects to support the military operations to expel all NT forces from Belesian sovereign territory. It is to contribute to land and air missions as directed and be prepared to take all measures necessary to expel NT maritime forces from the AO.

Zones and Areas

7. **Area of Operation**. The area of operation is IAW Ref A, and is bound by the area encompassing the top left corner XX XX.XXS; YYY YY.YYE and bottom right corner of XX XX.XXS; YYY YY.YYE.

8. **Maritime Exclusion Zone**. The claimed Maritime Exclusion Zone is not recognized by CCJTF667 and CTG 667.10. This area is bound by the area encompassing top left corner XX XX.XXS; YYY YY.YYE and bottom right corner of XX XX.XXS; YYY YY.YYE.

9. **Air Defence Identification Zone**. The claimed Air Defence Identification Zone is not recognized by CCJTF667 and CTG 667.10. This area is bound by the area encompassing top left corner XX XX.XXS; YYY YY.YYE and bottom right corner of XX XX.XXS; YYY YY.YYE.

Execution

10. **Targetable Threats.** Noting the NT/OV exercise RISEN SWORD completed on 02 Oct 20, it is anticipated significant resupply and maintenance will need to be completed by NT units before they can deploy into the area. Whilst this will initially have a complimentary effect on CJTF 667 maritime units, it is anticipated this benefit will begin to diminish as OP STEEL SENTINEL progresses.

11. Units are to adhere to the Rules of Engagement (ROE) in force at the time when conducting operations, and are not to act outside the active ROE at Ref G unless explicitly directed by CCJTF 667. The following threats are targetable whilst located within the AO:

a. Open hostilities by NT Forces towards civilians or CJTF 667 personnel

b. Open hostilities by OV forces towards civilians or CJTF 667 personnel

c. Prohibited imports and exports

d. Illegal Exploitation of Belesian Natural Resources by NT vessels

e. Illegal Activities in protected areas

f. Maritime Terrorism

g. Maritime operations that materially improve or safeguard NT hold on Belesian sovereign territories examples are, but not limited to, mining or the construction of coastal defences

h. Piracy, Violence or Robbery at Sea

12. At all times, the main effort is the restoration of Belesian territory sovereignty and a peaceful and stable environment.

13. Specific unit and task group direction will be provided via an OPGEN passed SEPCOR in order to provide the most current operational intent, instruction and guidance for on scene commanders to effectively complete the mission. These will be released by CTG 667.1 as required via secure military messaging. Further details will be passed in due course.

Assigned Units

14. IAW Ref A, the following units are anticipated to comprise TG 667.1 through the course of the Operation. Units will arrive and depart as described in the OPGEN, and via TASKORDs:

Australian Forces

a. 3 x Anzac Class FFHs comprised of HMA Ships *Anzac, Parramatta* and *Ballarat* each equipped with 1 x MH 60-R

b. 2 x Hobart Class DDGs comprised of HMA Ships *Brisbane* and *Sydney* each equipped with 1 x MH 60-R

c. 2 x Adelaide Class LHDs comprised of HMA Ships *Adelaide* and *Canberra* each organically equipped with 2 x MRH 90

d. 1 x LSD – HMAS *Choules* with 1 x MRH 90 embarked

e. 1 x AO/AOR – from HMA Ships *Sirius, Supply or Stalwart*

f. 1 x Collins Class SSG HMAS *Waller*

g. 2 x MHC

h. 2 x Patrol Boat

i. 1 x Hydrographic Survey Vessel

j. 1 x Clearance Dive Team embarked in one of the LHD with an element deployable to the SSG as necessary.

New Zealand

a. 1 x Anzac Class FFH HMNZS *Te Kaha* with 1 x SH-2G Super Seasprite embarked

b. 1 x Multi-Role Vessel (MRV) HMNZS *Canterbury*

Japan

a. 1 x Hyuga Class DDH, JS *Hyuga* with 9 x SH-60K and 1 x MCH-101 embarked

b. 3 x Osumi class LST, Japanese Ships *Osumi*, *Shimokita* and *Kunisaki*, each with 2 x CH-47

c. 2 x Atago Class DDG, Japanese Ships *Atago* and *Ashigara*

d. 1 x Soryu Class SSG, JS *Shoryu*.

Belesia

a. Forces as available

Concept of Operations

15. In order to maintain the objectives outlined within Refs A and D-F, it is anticipated the maritime component of OP STEEL SENTINEL will be broken into five phases. This will ensure there is consistency between all Land, Air and Maritime components, while being complimentary with Refs A and B. A maritime line of operation can be obtained at Appendix 1

16. **Phase 0 – Shaping**. This phase will take place from now until ordered. This phase is to be considered the normal state of affairs and as such, no overt action is to be conducted without express authority or approval from CCJTF 667. Throughout the shaping phase, the following actions are to occur:

a. Conduct Exercise FLOATING FORTRESS. This is paramount in continuing the presence operations being conducted in Belesian waters

b. Integration of BN through Exercise FLOATING FORTRESS and ad hoc engagements. This is to provide a consolidated front and allows for smoother transition through to Transition Phase

c. Establishment HQ JFMCC base of operations in Zamboanga.

d. Embark CTG elements in units as required for Exercise FLOATING FORTRESS with repatriation to HQ JFMCC on completion of the exercise, or as required

e. Units as directed BPT conduct maritime presence and force protection of designated shipping

f. Units as directed to assume to 48hrs notice to embark personnel, equipment and stores as required for amphibious lodgment in follow on phasing

g. Units as directed assume 24hrs notice to move for Sea Combat Operations within the JFAO

h. Units as directed BPT conduct shaping operations within the JFAO

i. Units as directed BPT conduct Freedom of Navigation Operations

j. Units as directed BPT conduct HADR support

17. Phase 0 will be complete when ordered by CCJTF 667, or should hostilities from NT or OV forces occur towards CJTF 667 personnel or civilians

18. **Phase 1 – Denial**. This phase will commence on order, and will be used to secure the necessary maritime approaches to Panay, whilst negating NT military influence over the region. Tasks are as follows:

a. Units to continue to support BN activities to counter NT influence within Panay.

b. Units as directed embark personnel, equipment and stores required for amphibious lodgment, commencing transit on order.

c. Units as directed conduct Force Integration Training (FIT) enroute to JFAO

d. Units as directed sail to conduct shaping operations within the JFAO

e. Units to secure necessary Sea Lines of Communication as directed within the JFAO

f. Units as directed secure local sea control of designated areas within the JFAO in preparation for follow on tasking

g. Units to conduct ASW surveillance in order to sufficiently threat reduce the likelihood of the presence of unfriendly sub-surface units within the JFAO

h. Units BPT secure local air control of designated areas ISO TF 640 tasking and follow on phases

i. Units as directed BPT conduct NEO of Australian Nationals and approved foreign nationals

j. Units as directed BPT neutralize NT units within the JFAO, as determined by CCJTF 667

k. Units as directed BPT conduct Joint Fires in support of troop movements

l. Units as directed BPT support SF operations

m. Units as directed BPT employ deception measures, including feints, displays, demonstrations, ruses and other means as directed by CCJTF 667

n. Units as directed BPT conduct Freedom of Navigation Operations

o. Units as directed BPT conduct HADR support

19. Phase 1 will be completed once Sea Lines Of Communication (SLOC), Air Lines Of Communication (ALOC) are achieved, directed local Sea and Air Control is achieved and forces are positioned to conduct an amphibious landing onto Panay ISO IBSAF.

20. **Phase 2 – Lodgment**. This phase will commence on order and involve the lodgment of amphibious units onto Panay to support Belesian Armed Forces. Tasks are as follows:

a. Continue to integrate BN elements into CJTF 667 operations to support smooth transition to stability operations

b. On order, units are to establish Amphibious Operating Area

c. On order, units are to commence lodgment of ground forces at designated APOD and SPOD

d. Neutralise NT maritime elements in order to maintain local Sea Control of designated areas

e. Neutralise NT air elements in order to maintain local Air Control ISO TG 640 operations

f. Units as directed BTP neutralize NT maritime, air and land elements as required to support amphibious lodgment and SLOC/ALOC maintenance

g. Units as directed BPT support littoral operations in support of ground forces

h. Units as directed BPT employ deception measures, including feints, displays, demonstrations, ruses and other means as directed by CCJTF 667

i. Units as directed BPT conduct Freedom of Navigation Operations

j. Units as directed BPT conduct HADR support

21. Phase 2 is complete when ground forces have been successfully lodged, or the requirement for lodgment is negated due to NT forces withdrawing from Panay.

22. **Phase 3 – Neutralisation**. This phase will commence on completion of the amphibious operation, and will encompass the expelling of NT military elements from Panay in concert with Belesian military forces. Tasks are as follows:

a. Neutralise NT maritime assets within the JFAO

b. Maintain established SLOC

c. Maintain established ALOC ISO TG 640 operations

d. Maintain local Sea Control of designated areas

e. Maintain sustainment operations of CJTF 667 forces, including refueling, re-ammunition and victualling as required to sustained maintain operations

f. Units as directed BPT support littoral operations in support of ground forces

g. Units as directed to conduct mine clearance operations

h. Units as directed BPT conduct Freedom of Navigation Operations

i. Units as directed BPT conduct HADR support

23. Phase 3 will be completed when NT maritime forces have been expelled from the JFAO and conditions are set to transition to local stability and enforcement operations.

24. **Phase 4 – Transition**. This phase will commence on order, once all NT maritime elements have been expelled from the JFAO. This phase will work in conjunction with both TGs 667.2 and 640 to ensure Belesia is in a state to commence transition from CJTF 667 control to host nation control. Tasks are as follows:

a. On order, commence redeployment of units including amphibious task group and non-essential maritime forces

b. Conduct maritime support operations in order to facilitate training and consolidation of BN forces

c. On order, hand over OPCON of JFMCC functions to BN

d. Units as directed BPT conduct Freedom of Navigation Operations

e. Units as directed to conduct anti-piracy and maritime counter terrorism patrols

f. Units as directed to conduct mine and unexploded ordnance clearance

g. Units as directed BPT conduct HADR support

25. Phase 4 will be completed once all CTG 667.1 units have redeployed to respective host nations and Belesian sovereignty and authority is restored to the island of Panay. Phase 4 may be extended as it is reliant on host nation support, however the intent is to not remain in a protracted situation outside the historical maritime interactions both nations have enjoyed.

Operational End State

26. The overall end state remains the neutralization of North Torbian aggression, the re-instatement of Belesian sovereignty over Belesian islands and region, and the transition to UN-sanctioned and/or HN follow-on security force is complete.

Administration and Logistics

27. All administration requirements are outlined within the respective annexes of Ref A. All units deploying are to ensure their personnel remain deployment ready (IR and MAAT compliant) as no waivers will be given for this deployment. Should units be unable to support missions IAW the relevant Operating and Support intent (OSI) document due to manning or equipment restrictions, they are to bring these to the attention of CTG 667.1 at the first available opportunity.

28. All logistics requirements will be outlined through respective orders, with further supplementation provided in due course. All units are to follow the logistic requirements as outlined in the respective annexes contained Ref A. Should any discrepancy occur concerns are to be raised through the appropriate command at first available opportunity.

Command and Signal

29. **Reporting Requirements**. Reporting requirements, including timings will be outlined within the respective OPGEN to be signaled SEPCOR. Reports are to be made via formal messaging format (OPREP) and followed by Sametime Chat messaging. Further clarification will be provided within the OPGEN. Notwithstanding, should any Commanding Officer be unsure as to whether an incident or activity needs to be reported, they are to contact JFMCC at first available opportunity.

30. **Tasking**. All tasking will occur through the use of Warning Orders, (WARNORDs), Execution Orders (EXECUTOs) and Tasking Orders (TASKORDs). These will be released as required throughout the course of OP STEEL SENTINEL by CTG 667.1 and JFMCC as appropriate. All units are to be cognizant they may be tasked IAW their OSI, and are to be ready to support to achieve the mission.

31. **Battle Rhythm**. A Battle Rhythm will be promulgated in the OPGEN. All units are to adhere to the reporting cycle as determined within the battle rhythm, as returns from units will have a direct impact on the ability to provide support to other CJTF 667 assets or operations. Information flow will be through the use of WIMS, DIMS and as required intelligence injects. As the operation matures the battle rhythm may change, and this will be coordinated through DIMs.

32. **Communications**. An OPTASK COMMS will be released by the senior ship prior to departure, with all units to ensure appropriate holdings as directed within the document. All units are to ensure they appropriately man national and coalition networks throughout the operation, reporting all defects or non-compliances through normal reporting chains

Summary

33. Operation STEEL SENTINEL marks an important display of joint and multi-national cooperation not only to North Torbia, but to the rest of the world. The maritime component is key in ensuring our land forces can not only achieve their objectives, but be confident that they can conduct operations uninhibited by maritime threats. The integration with Beleisan Naval forces throughout the entire operation is paramount, as they will be the custodians of Panay on completion. By providing support and guidance, we can ensure a peaceful and prosperous resolution, strengthening Belesian ties with the international community.

S. Kerr, AO, CSC, CSM
RADM, RAN
CJFMCC

Jul 20

Appendix

1. JFMCC Line of Operation

ANNEX L TO
CJTF 667 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

References:

A. MC 362/1 NATO Rules of Engagement (ROE), of 23 JUL 03
B. San Remo Handbook on Rules of Engagement, of 09 Nov 2009
C. UN Security Council Resolution 8869 of XXXXXXX
D. UN Security Council Resolution 8873 of XXXXXXX

General Principles

1. **Introduction**. In the conduct of military operations, military forces are authorised to use force in self-defence, pursuant to authorised Rules of Engagement (ROE) or under the application of the Law of Armed Conflict. The right to use force in self-defence is universally considered to be an inherent right and is not restricted by ROE. The United Nations, has issued policy and military guidance on the strategic objectives for operations in Belesia. For the International Belesian Security Assistance Force (IBSAF), it has been decided to adopt NATO principles and procedures, with the Sanremo Manual for Rules of Engagement for the promulgation and amendment of ROE. General guidance in relation to NATO ROE, is set out in Ref A, with further clarification of Sanremo ROE at Ref B. The following ROE is issued under the authority of Commander Combined Joint Task Force 667 (CCJTF 667) for use by CJTF 667 during the conduct of OP STEEL SENTINEL.

2. **Authority**. The authority providing the legal framework for the operation is set out in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) in accordance with Refs C and D. The current authority provides for IBSAF to take all necessary measures to carry out the tasks listed in UNSCRs 8869 and 8873.

3. **ROE Definition.** ROE are directives that define the circumstances, conditions, degree and manner, in which force or actions, which might be construed as provocative, may or may not be applied or taken. The ROE implemented for this operation provide the sole authority for IBSAF to use force. Although the ROE do not limit the inherent right of self-defence, different national approaches to the definition of self-defence may result in inconsistency between multinational forces as to where the right to use force in self-defence ends and the use of force authorised by the mission ROE package begins.

4. **Self-Defence.** Nothing in this ROE shall negate a commander's right to take all necessary action for unit and individual self-defence.

a. Individuals and units have a right to defend themselves against attack or an imminent attack. In exercising this right, individuals and units will act in accordance with national law. Therefore more detailed and specific guidance from Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) applicable for their respective forces will be required. Self-defence is the use of such necessary and proportional force, including deadly force, to defend against an attack or an imminent attack.

The principles of necessity and proportionality, together with terms “imminent” and “attack” defined in Ref. A para 7 will apply for all CJTF 667 forces.

b. Within the general concept of self-defence, JTF 667 forces have the right to use force that is necessary and proportional to defend civilians accompanying JTF 667 forces, including UN personnel, who have been taken hostage.

5. **Extended Self-defence.** Ref A stipulates, “In keeping with the principles of the Alliance, within the general concept of self-defence, Coalition/Coalition-led forces and personnel also have the right to take appropriate measures, including the use of necessary and proportional force to defend other Coalition/Coalition-led forces and personnel from attack or from imminent attack”. As regards “Coalition led forces”, UN has approved an interpretation that would include any IBSAF forces OPCON, TACOMD or TACON (for the time being) to Combined Joint Task Force-Operation 667 (CJTF 667)

6. **Application of ROE and the Use of Force.** Within this coalition for Operation STEEL SENTINEL, ROE are authorised by CCJTF 667 for use by the IBSAF. This implies that the chain of command has been involved and has taken the responsibility to disseminate them, ensure understanding, request clarifications and, seek amendments as required. The chain of command also assumes the responsibility to ensure compliance and determine incompatibilities. During the conduct of the operation the use of force principles described in Ref A para 10-12 apply.

7. **Applicable Law.** CJTF 667 forces are, by NATO and UN doctrine, following international law and reflect the ROE package requested. The IBSAF/CJTF 667 mission must be communicated and perceived as being lawfully requested by the UN. CCJTF 667 will engage with non-military entities mitigating any incorrect perception of the Coalition presence in the Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO) (once authority to coordinate is delegated). Simultaneously, coordinating efforts will be conducted at the strategic level, communicating the legitimacy of this UN-sanctioned operation.

a. **International Law.** The conduct of CJTF 667 forces is circumscribed by international law, including the applicable principles derived from the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). When applicable, CJTF 667 forces also have a responsibility to obey other International treaties that affect military operations. In particular, CJTF 667 forces must comply with the LOAC principles: distinction, military necessity, proportionality, and humanity.

b. **National Laws.** TCNs shall adhere to their national laws. They are not obliged to execute tasks or operations that would constitute a breach of their national laws. Therefore, nations should issue national restrictions and/or clarifying instructions in order to ensure compliance with national law. Any such national clarifying instructions should be minimised and must not be more permissive than the ROE authorised for this operation. When national laws are at variance with the CJTF 667 ROE or a nation’s caveats or clarifying instructions have the effect of limiting CJTF 667 ROE, nations must inform CCJTF 667 of any inconsistencies as early as possible. The normal mechanisms for notification of such national restrictions and/or clarifying instructions are FORCEPREP/Order of Battle Transfer of Authority (ORBATTOA)

messages. In the case of sending enabling forces to the JFAO, TCN should communicate their caveats prior to that, facilitating an initial package of ROE being implemented for theater enablers. Where nations have expressed caveats on involvement or the use of force, such caveats will be summarized and the resultant impact on the mission identified. The full range of national caveats held by IBSAF should be communicated to the operational level, analyzed and applied as soon as possible. CJTF 667 Point of Contact (POC) for this activity is the CJ35.

8. **Area of Responsibility.** These ROE will be extant for the area bounded by the following coordinates:

a. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

9. **Duty to Report.** Each situation resulting in a detention, or involving the use of deadly force, or use of riot control means (if authorised), whether it results in casualties or not, is to be reported through the chain of command as soon as possible.

10. **Avoidance of Collateral Damage.** In all cases, CJTF 667 forces should make every effort to minimize, to the maximum extent possible, any loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects resulting from their use of force. Collateral damage shall never be deliberate, but is instead incidental to military action, even if foreseeable. The key is that such unintended damage must not be excessive or disproportionate to the military advantage to be gained from the specific act or attack.

11. **ROE Changes and Supplemental ROE**. The ROE authorised for the IBSAF are found below and implemented by CCJTF 667. Any limitation or restriction that is viewed as a potential threat to the safety of the force and/or the successful conduct of the mission should be addressed immediately upon discovery and reported up the chain of command. Supplemental ROE measures that may be required due to changes in the operational situation or otherwise may be submitted in a ROE Request Message (ROEREQ). This includes requests for ROE previously requested but denied, new or additional ROE.

Authorised ROE

2. **USE OF FORCE IN INDIVIDUAL SELF-DEFENCE**

a. 10C – Use of force, up to and including deadly force in individual self-defence is permitted.

b. 10E – use of force, up to and including deadly force, in defence of property where there is a likelihood that destruction of, or damage to, that property will lead to an imminent threat to life of CJTF 667 personnel and/or specified persons is permitted. Specified persons are:

(1) Civilians
(2) Neutral Shipping
(3) Neutral Aircraft
(4) Individuals ad hors de combat
(5) Individuals designated by CCJTF 667 as requiring protection

(a) specified person loses their status if they commit a hostile act against or demonstrates hostile intent towards CJTF 667 personnel or other specified persons

3. USE OF FORCE IN INDIVIDUAL SELF-DEFENCE

a. 11C - Use of force, up to and including *deadly force*, in *unit self-defence* of CJTF 667 units is permitted.

4. USE OF FORCE FOR THE PROTECTION OF OTHERS

a. 12B – Use of force, up to and including *deadly force,* for the protection of others specified others is permitted. Specified others are:

(1) Belesian Personnel
(2) Belesian Vessels
(3) Belesian Aircraft
(4) Belesian Vehicles
(5) Individuals ad hors de combat
(6) Individuals designated by CCJTF 667 as requiring protection
(a) specified person loses their status if they commit a hostile act against or demonstrates hostile intent towards CJTF 667 personnel or other specified persons

5. USE OF FORCE FOR MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT

a. 20A – Use of *non-deadly force* to accomplish the mission is permitted.

b. 20D – Use of force, up to and including *non-deadly force,* to counter force used to interfere with the mission is permitted.

6. PROTECTION OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF PERSONS

a. 21E – Use of *non-deadly force,* to prevent interference with the freedom of movement of unarmed personnel attempting to escape a force protection area is permitted

7. PREVENTION OF INTERFERENCE WITH SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT

a. 22C – Use of force, up to and including *deadly force* to prevent unauthorised *boarding* of Belesian and civilian vessels and aircraft is permitted.

8. WARNING SHOTS

a. 23A – Firing of *warning shots* is prohibited. This is to be read in conjunction with 23C.

b. 23C – Firing of *warning shots* by Maritime Force Elements is permitted. Warning shots in this context are considered an international signal, not a use of force

9. DISABLING FIRE

a. 24D – Use of *disabling fire* to compel compliance with boarding operations in support of UNSCR 8869 is permitted with CCJTF 667 approval

10. SEARCH AND DETENTION OF PERSONNEL

a. 25B – Search of persons embarking on CJTF 667 vessels or aircraft or entering into a pre-embarkation area is permitted.

b. 25I – Use of non-deadly force to detain persons engaged in illegal activity is permitted with CCJTF 667 approval.

c. 25M – Use of non-deadly force to temporarily restrain or isolate an Australian National or approved Foreign National for security purposes embarked in a CJTF 667 vessel, aircraft or vehicle or within a pre-embarkation area, is permitted with on-scene commander approval.

(1) This rule does not authorise the restraint or isolation of an Australian National or approved Foreign National who is eligible but unwilling to be evacuated and who can leave safely

11. NEUTRALS

a. 32B – Interference with the activities of neutrals in accordance with the law of armed conflict for the purposes of conforming to UNSCR 8869 is permitted.

12. USE OF FORCE TO PROTECT PROPERTY

a. 40B – Use of non-deadly force to protect property belonging to Belesia, CJTF 667 or required for the execution of OP STEEL SENTINEL is permitted.

13. INSPECTION, SEIZURE AND DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY

a. 42F – The seizure of North Torbian vessels, aircraft, vehicles, goods, cargos and/or equipment within the landmass or littoral waters of Belesia for the purposes of enforcing UNSCR 8869 is permitted.

b. 42G – Use of non-deadly force to seize North Torbian vessels, aircraft, vehicles, goods, cargos and/or equipment within the landmass or littoral waters of Belesia for the purposes of enforcing UNSCR 8869 is permitted.

14. GEOGRAPHIC POSITIONING

a. 50A – Entry into the landmass, airspace or territorial waters of North Torbia by CJTF 667 air, land and naval forces is prohibited.

b. 50B – Approach closer than 12 nautical miles to North Torbia claimed islands off the coast of Panay is permitted with CCJTF 667 approval.

c. 50D – Entry into the landmass, airspace and littoral waters of North Torbia for the purposes of conducting combat search and rescue operations is permitted with CCJTF 667 approval.

15. **GROUND RECONNAISSANCE**

a. 51B – Conduct of ground reconnaissance in Belesia is permitted

16. **AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE**

a. 52D – Aerial reconnaissance against North Torbian and Olvanan Military Forces is permitted

b. 52E – Aerial reconnaissance over Belesia is permitted

17. **RELATIVE POSITIONING OF OWN FORCES**

a. 53D – Within the limitations placed in 50A,50B, and 50D, unrestricted positioning of CJTF 667 and Belesian land and naval forces relative to any North Torbian forces occupying the sovereign territory, airspace and/or littoral waters of Belesia is permitted.

18. **EXERCISING IN THE PRESENCE OF A POTENTIAL ADVERSARY**

a. 54B – The conduct of exercises in the presence of Olvanan and North Torbian military forces is permitted

19. **DIVERSIONS**

a. 55E – Ordering of diversions to all commercial and private vehicles, and persons on land for force protection purposes is authorized.

b. 55F – Ordering of diversions to any aircraft to enforce the provisions of the Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) is authorised.

c. 55H – Ordering of diversions and other instructions to ships suspected of operating in breach of UNSCR 8869 is permitted

d. 55J – Use of *non-deadly force* to compel compliance with 55E, 55F and 55H is permitted

20. **ZONES**

a. 57C – The use of force, up to and including *deadly force*, within a designated force protection area to disarm persons is permitted.

21. **FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION**

a. 58B - Exercise of freedom of navigation in the North Torbian claimed maritime exclusion zone is permitted

b. 58D - Use of force, up to *non-lethal force*, to assert navigational freedoms is permitted

22. **WARNINGS**

a. 60B – Use of warnings is permitted

b. 60D – Energizing of Fire Control RADAR as a means of warning is permitted

23. **HARASSMENT**

a. 61A – Harassment is prohibited

24. **SHADOWING, MARKING AND SURVEILLANCE**

a. 62 B – Shadowing is permitted

(1) Shadowing means observing and (not necessarily continuously) maintaining contact with an object

b. 62 D – Marking of hostile and unidentified contacts is permitted

(1) Marking means to maintain contact of a target from such a position that the marking unit or marker has an immediate offensive capability

(2) An authorisation to mark a target does not imply an authorisation to engage

c. 62 E – Conduct of surveillance is permitted

25. **SENSORS AND ILLUMINATION**

a. 63B – The illumination of North Torbian and Olvanan military vessels, aircraft, personnel, and equipment by white light, spotlight, projectiles, or infrared means is permitted.

b. 63C – The use of laser designators against North Torbian and Olvanan vessels, aircraft personnel, and equipment is permitted.

c. 63I – Unrestricted use of sensors is permitted

26. **AUTHORITY TO CARRY WEAPONS**

a. 70F – Carrying of weapons by members of CJTF 667 is permitted

b. 70G – Use of CJTF 667 weapons systems by members of CJTF 667 is permitted

27. **USE OF LAND MINES**

a. 80B – Use of anti-personnel mines is prohibited.

b. 80F – Use of command detonated mines by CJTF 667 personnel is permitted in accordance with National ROE.

28. **USE OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS**

a. 81A – Use of cluster munitions is prohibited.

29. **USE OF BOBBY TRAPS**

a. 82C – Use of explosive booby traps by CJTF 667 is permitted in accordance with National ROE.

30. **MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT**

a. 90E – Use of *non-deadly force* to effect hot pursuit is permitted

b. 90G – Use *of non-deadly force* to halt non-innocent passage in Belesian territorial seas is permitted with CTG 667.1 approval

31. **ACTION AGAINST SUSPECTED SUBMARINE CONTACTS**

a. 91B – Continuous tracking of North Torbia and Olvanan submarine contacts by active and passive means is permitted.

b. 91F – Use of warnings to induce North Torbian, Olvanan or unidentified submarine contacts to surface is permitted.

32. **NAVAL MINES**

a. 92A – Use of Naval Mines is prohibited.

b. 92F – The removal, sweeping or neutralization of naval mines in the JFAO is permitted.

33. **BOARDING**

a. 93D – Compliant boarding of North Torbian flagged civilian, commercial and merchant vessels in accordance with UNSCR 8869 is permitted.

b. 93G – Non-compliant boarding of North Torbian flagged civilian, commercial and merchant vessels in accordance with UNSCR 8869 is permitted.

c. 93I – Level 1-3 opposed boarding of North Torbian flagged civilian, commercial and merchant vessels in accordance with UNSCR 8869 is permitted with CTG 667.1 approval.

d. 93J – Level 4-6 opposed boarding of North Torbian flagged civilian, commercial and merchant vessels in accordance with UNSCR 8869 is permitted with National approval and CCJTF 667 concurrence.

34. **USE OF FORCE IN ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES INCLUDING LAW ENFORCEMENT**

a. 110A – Law enforcement assistance to Belesian Law Enforcement authorities is prohibited.

35. **RIOT CONTROL AGENTS**

a. 121A – Use of all riot control agents is prohibited.

36. **ELECTRONIC WARFARE MEASURES**

a. 130C – Use of Electronic Warfare Measures is permitted.

37. **PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS**

a. 132B - Psychological operations broadcasts to North Torbian and Olvanan Military Forces over radio channels, television channels, social media and web pages are permitted.

b. 132C - Use of computer, email and telephone systems to communicate approved messages to North Torbian and Olvanan Military Forces is permitted with CCJTF 667 approval.

38. **MILITARY DECEPTION**

a. 133B – When authorised by CCJTF 667, the use of military physical deception through the use of dummy or decoy equipment against North Torbian and Olvanan Military Forces is permitted.

DORMANT ROE

39. The following rules are only to be enacted when expressly ordered via written approval from CCJTF 667. Until such a time, the following rules remain dormant.

40. Upon activation of the dormant ROE, both the standing ROE and dormant rules become active. Should any confusion exist, units are to seek immediate clarification through their chain of command to headquarters.

41. SEARCH AND DETENTION OF PERSONS

a. 25H – Detention of North Torbian and Olvanan military personnel and civilians directly participating in hostilities is permitted.

42. ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY OBJECTIVES INCLUDING HOSTILE FORCES

a. 30A – Attach on declared hostile forces and other military objectives within the identified JFAO is permitted. Hostile forces are:

(1) Combatants of the North Torbia and Olvana armed forces
(2) Civilians taking a direct part in hostile activities
(3) Targetable members of designated organised armed groups
(4) Civilians operating vessels and aircraft may be taking direct part in hostilities
(5) Organised armed groups as designated by CCJTF 667

43. IDENTIFICATION OF TARGETS

a. 31F – Use of information from other CJTF 667 units for target identification is permitted

b. 31G – Identification of a hostile air target must be by visual means or by one of the following means:

(1) Contact showing unambiguous electronic indicators belonging to a hostile military combatant; or
(2) Contact operating in formation with a contact identified as hostile , or
(3) Contact originating from a surface contact identified as hostile, or
(4) Three or more of the following means:
    i. Thermal imaging
    ii. Electro-optical
    iii. Data-link information
    iv. Track origin
    v. Track behavior
    vi. Flight path correlation
    vii. EW support measures
    viii. Lack of identification friend or foe (IFF)
    ix. Other identification means not requiring a response

c. 31H – Identification of a hostile surface target must be by visual means or one of the following means:

(1) Contact closing with friendly forces showing unambiguous electronic or acoustic indicators belonging to a hostile military combatant, or/
(2) Contact designated as hostile by JFACC/CCJTF 667 or other delegated authority, or
(3) Three or more of the following means:
  (a) Thermal imaging
  (b) Electro-optical
  (c) Data-link information
  (d) Track origin
  (e) Track behavior
  (f) EW support measures
  (g) Other identification means not requiring a response

d. 31I – Identification of a hostile sub-surface contact must be by visual means or by one of the following means:

(1) Contact showing unambiguous electronic indicators belonging to a hostile military combatant, or
(2) Three or more of the following means:
  (a) Thermal imaging
  (b) Electro-optical
  (c) Track behavior
  (d) Electronic intercept intelligence
  (e) Data link information
  (f) Acoustic analysis
  (g) Magnetic signature
  (h) A contact not within a designated water space management area
  (i) Contact non-responsive to warnings within a designated water space area
  (j) EW support measures
  (k) Other identification means not requiring a response

e. 31J – Identification of a hostile land contact must be by visual means or by one of the following means:

(1) Contact showing unambiguous electronic indicators belonging to a hostile military combatant, or
(2) Contact operating in formation with a contact identified as hostile , or
(3) Contact originating from a military establishment identified as hostile, or
(4) Two or more of the following means:
  i. Thermal imaging
  ii. Electro-optical
  iii. Contact behavior
  iv. EW support measures
  v. Other identification means not requiring a response

44. **DUAL USE TARGETS**

a. 33A – Kinetic effects on dual use targets and infrastructure is permitted with CCJTF 667 approval

b. 33B – Non-kinetic effects on dual use targets and infrastructure is permitted with DCCJTF 667 approval

45. INSPECTION, SEIZURE AND DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY

a. 42H – The use of force, up to and including *deadly force* to seize North Torbian vessels, aircraft, vehicles, goods, cargos and/or equipment within the landmass or littoral waters of Belesia is permitted

46. MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT

a. 90H – Use of force, up to and including *deadly force*, to halt non-innocent passage in the Belesian Territorial Seas is permitted with CTG 667.1 approval.

47. ACTION AGAINST SUSPECTED SUBMARINE CONTACTS

a. 91G – Use of *non-deadly force* to induce North Torbian or Olvanan Defence Force submarines or unidentified submarine contacts to surface or leave the JFAO is permitted.

(1) This rule is to be read in conjunction with rule 30A which authorises the engagement of hostile forces

b. 91H – Use of force, up to and including *deadly force*, to induce North Torbian or Olvanan Defence Force submarine contacts to surface or leave the JFAO is permitted with CTG 667.10 approval.

(1) This rule is to be read in conjunction with rule 30A which authorises the engagement of hostile forces

48. NAVAL MINES

a. 92D – Stopping, boarding and searching of vessels within the JFAO when there are reasonable grounds to suspect the vessel is carrying or laying mines is permitted with CTG 667.1 approval

49. USE OF AIR TO SURFACE MUNITIONS

a. 100E – The use of air to surface munitions against identified hostile targets is permitted.

(1) This rule is to be read in conjunction with rule 30A which authorises the engagement of hostile forces

50. USE OF AIR TO SUB SURFACE MUNITIONS

a. 101B – The use of air to sub-surface munitions against identified hostile targets is permitted

(1) This rule is to be read in conjunction with rule 30A which authorises the engagement of hostile forces

51. AIR TO AIR ENGAGEMENTS

a. 102B – Beyond visual range air-to-air engagement of hostile aircraft is permitted

(1) This rule is to be read in conjunction with rule 30A which authorises the engagement of hostile forces

52. COMPUTER NETWORK OPERATIONS

a. 131B – When authorised by CCJTF 667, Computer Network Attack (CNA) against North Torbian and Olvanan adversary computers or computer systems that have intruded into and damaged CJTF 667 computers, computer networks, or information in CJTF 667 computers or computer networks, including actions that may result in intrusion into NT intermediary systems or networks and damage to NT systems or networks is permitted.

CTG 667.1 LOO



DECISIVE POINTS:

1. Situational Understanding Developed
2. Exercise FLOATING FORTRESS completed
3. HQ JFMCC established
4. CTG 667 embarked
5. Embarkation of forces Completed
6. Force Integration Training Completed
7. Force Projection into JFAO Commenced
8. SLOC in JFAO Secured
9. ALOC in JFAO Secured
10. NT interdicted
11. NEO Conducted
12. Local Sea Control Established
13. Local Air Control Established
14. AOA Established
15. Ground Forces Landed
16. Training and Support Force Established
17. Enduring Support to Belesia Provided
18. Regional Security Transitioned to Beleisan Security
19. AS and NZ FE Redeployed

CDPs:

1. Units ready to deploy
2. HADR Conducted
3. NT Aggression to CJTF667 Forces
4. NEO Required
5. NT Martitme Forces Neutralised

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HQ TG 667.2
Gen Santos City, BX
Date-time group of signature
Message reference number

HQ 1 DIV TASK GROUP 667.2 OPORD 01 (OPERATION CERIUM STEAL)

References:

A. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 8868.

B. UNSCR 8869.

C. UNSCR 8873.

D. Status of Forces Agreement – Australia/Belesia

E. Belesia (BX) Country Study.

F. North Torbia (NT) Country Study.

G. South Torbia (RT) Country Study.

H. Gabal (GX) Country Study.

I. Olvana (OV) Country Study.

J. CJTF 667 OPORD 01 (OP STEEL SENTINEL)

Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU.

1. **Situation.**

a. Background. Growing ethnic tensions in the Belesian island of PANAY resulted in violence when the local government in PANAY attempted to take control of the lucrative Cerium rare earth mine in San Rafael from the Olvanan registered operator. The resulting loss of life amongst the Belesian Constabulary and unknown number of mine employees has sparked unrest in the nearby city of ROXAS. Violence has occurred along ethnic lines with the greatest loss of life amongst the Torbian diaspora. Olvana (OV) and North Torbia (NT) had been conducting a week's long biennial exercise in the South China Sea, named Exercise RISEN SWORD. It was under the cover of this exercise that NT lodged an amphibious force (estimated to be a Marine Brigade plus Divisional enablers) on Palawan near the sparsely populated town of El Nido, capturing the port and airfield facilities. Simultaneously, NT landed a Marine Expeditionary Force (estimated to be the 3rd Marine BDE plus DIV enablers) near the city of ROXAS, PANAY and captured the seaport, airport, and the San Rafael Mine. NT has claimed the justification for this act of aggression is to protect ethnic Torbians in PANAY from persecution. In addition, a pro-NT Visayan Peoples Front (VPF) insurgent group has commenced insurgency operations ISO of NTMEF in PANAY. In response to this blatant disregard for international protocols, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed UNSCR 8868 (ref A) condemning NT aggression and calling for the withdrawal of NT Forces from Belesian territory. Concurrently, Belesia (BX) landed a Brigade of troops in the south of PANAY through the city of ILOILO in

an attempt to force the NT forces off the island. This course of action has resulted in a stalemate with the NT Marine Expeditionary Force (NTMEF) holding the northern half of PANAY centred on the city of ROXAS and SAN RAFAEL, and the BX Forces holding the area around ILOILO. NT has since declared a Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) and Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the occupied islands and parts of the Sulu and South China Sea. In an effort to allow diplomatic options to be utilised and reduce further loss of life, the UNSC passed UNSCR 8869 (ref B) calling on all Member States to enforce economic and military sanctions against NT. With NT's continued occupation of PANAY and Palawan in contravention of International laws, the UNSC passed UNSCR 8873 (Ref C) authorising the raising of the International Belesian Security Assistance Force (IBSAF) to utilise military force to remove NT military elements on sovereign Belesian territory. The Australian government has volunteered to be the lead nation of the Combined Joint Task Force 667 (CJTF 667) with contributing nations including New Zealand and Fiji. The Government of BX has consented, subject to SOFAs (ref D), to allow CJTF 667 forces to stage through their territories, to station forces, materiel and installations involved in supporting its operations and to conduct overflights.

b. Strategic Aim. The aim of the international community is to:

(1) end North Torbian aggression towards Belesia

(2) expulsion of all North Torbian military forces from Belesian sovereign territory

(3) creation of a free, safe, secure and stable environment in the region

(4) continuation of Belesian democratic national governance and developmental programs.

c. Strategic Objectives. In order to achieve the desired end state, the strategic objectives of the international intervention include:

(1) Expel all North Torbian military forces from BX sovereign territory.

(2) Restore a secure and stable environment throughout the BX Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO).

(3) Effect force protection for coalition military forces deployed throughout the JFAO.

(4) Assist the government of BX to strengthen the capacities of their national security forces and institutions to enforce central control.

(5) Preserve and enforce the freedom of navigation throughout the JFAO.

(6) Support UN Agencies, International Organizations (IOs) and NGOs within capabilities and limitations in order to preserve human life and alleviate the suffering of IDPs and refugees within the JFAO.

(7) Gradually reduce the size, role and profile of the IBSAF contribution. This process will be guided by reviews of tasks, environment, threat, risks, follow-on forces and Host Nation (HN) capacities as part of a Transition and Exit Strategy that is linked to the achievement of the Desired Military Strategic End State.

d. Operational Objectives. With the support and agreement of the international community, IBSAF has undertaken to end the crisis in BX by deploying a combined joint task force to BX to

repel NT invading forces and restore BX territorial sovereignty. The force, hereafter referred to as the Combined Joint Task Force 667 (CJTF 667) will deploy under the authority of UNSCR 8873 (ref C). The objectives of this military intervention are as follows:

(1) Establish military superiority in the maritime and airspace within the JFAO in a manner which supports decisive operations.

(2) Conduct decisive military operations, which leads to the restoration of BX sovereignty in the occupied islands; stabilise the region; and deter further external aggression against BX.

(3) Assist humanitarian efforts and IO/NGO activities in BX.

(4) Assist the government of BX to re-establish and maintain a safe and secure environment to facilitate the continuance of democratic government institutions and programmes.

(5) Support any applicable International Criminal Court (ICC) investigations of crimes against humanity through the preservation and collection of evidence.

e. To this end, a ground force, designated TG 667.2 is to deploy to the BX island of PANAY to expel NTMEF from the island, defeat the ongoing insurgency and to return control to the BX authorities.

f. Desired Operational End State. The Desired End State remains the establishment of a sufficiently secure and stable environment on the island of PANAY and improved capability of BX security forces such that state-sponsored hostilities have ceased, irregular insurgency has been controlled and territorial borders are secure, humanitarian assistance programs operate unhindered and transition to an UN-sanctioned and/or HN follow-on security force is complete. A safe and secure environment in PANAY exists when:

(1) Insurgency activities have ceased

(2) It allows IOs and NGOs safe and unrestricted access to the BX population.

(3) It encourages the return of IDPs and refugees.

(4) It fosters the rapid re-establishment of representative government institutions.

(5) It allows economic reconstruction and development.

g. Limitations.

(1) Constraints. In conducting its operations, TG 667.2 will:

A. Minimise the use of scarce BX resources.

B. Minimise collateral damage and civilian casualties on PANAY.

C. Deploy to the AO as soon possible in a sequence coordinated by CJTF HQ.

D. Work closely with the UN to facilitate the work of UN agencies, IOs and NGOs.

E. Operate in accordance with the SOFA with BX (ref D).

(2) Restraints. In conducting its operations, TG 667.2 will not:

A. Adversely affect the civilian population of PANAY more than is required

B. Kinetically target the San Rafael mine complex.

C. Adversely effect the BX economy more than is necessary.

D. Disrupt port operations in ILOILO more than necessary.

E. Damage ROXAS infrastructure more than is necessary

h. Operational Areas.

(1) AO FANNING. The AO includes the landmass, national air space and territorial waters of the BX island of PANAY (out to 12nm off the coast).

i. Threat Assessment. See Annex B, as well as the Country Studies at References E to I inclusive for more detail.

(1) General. NT has projected forces onto the BX island of PANAY IOT control the mineral resources, and to provide a viable alternate government that seeks to protect the Torbian minority of PANAY.

(2) NTMEF located on PANAY. The principle land component of the NTMEF located on PANAY is the 3 Marine BDE Task Group (BTG) supplemented with DIV troops. The HQ is located in the city of ROXAS in the N of PANAY. One MAR BDET is in mobile defence IVO the SAN RAFAEL mine, One MAR BDET is conducting mobile defence IVO PASSI, a third MAR MBET is located in SARA, and the fourth is defending IVO CUARTERO. The MAR Tank Bn is in reserve IVO ROXAS to CATK any AS advance N from ILOILO or landing forces on the E coast. Recent intelligence suggests that the 3 Marine BDE has been reinforced with a Tank Coy equipped with T-72Bs. The NTMEF is positioned to prevent the return of control to the BX authorities IOT to gain time to legitimise their occupation through Information Warfare. 3 MAR BDE is supported by a BN size organisation of insurgents from the Visayan Peoples Front:

A. HQ

1. Commander, *Taejwa* (Senior Colonel) **Kim Youn-Hwan**
2. Chief of Staff, *Chungjwa* (Lieutenant Colonel) **Hae Kyung**

B. DIV Troops.

1. AD assets in defence of ROXAS airfield,
2. COY $^{(+)}$ from 1 CBT ENG BN
3. BTY MLRS
4. DIV comms assets (including EW).
5. ELMS from DIV INFOWAR BN
6. ELMS from DIV MAT SUP BN

C. Land Component. 3 Marine BDE.

D. Air Component. NTMEF has located significant air assets at ROXAS.

1. 12 SU-30MKK (FLANKER-G) Strike Fighter

2. 12 J-11B (FLANKER-L) Air Superiority Fighter
3. 12 KA-28 (HELIX-A) Anti-submarine Helicopter
4. 6 Z-19 Recon/Attack Helicopter

E. Insurgents. One BN size elm of the Visayan Peoples Front.

j. Friendly Forces. TG 667.2 will operate within the established AO and will be led by AS. TG 667.2 consists of a HQ, TU667.2.1 (X BDE), TU667.2.2 (Y BDE), TU667.2.3 (16 AVN BDE), BX 12th BDE (OPCON) and DIV Troops. Other like-minded nations may contribute forces or provide materiel support at a future date. As Lead Nation, AS will provide critical force enablers. AS will partner with BX in the provision of strategic-level support such as intelligence and logistics. The composition of TG 667.2 is as follows:

(1) HQ.

A. Commander, Major General, XXXXXXXX, (AS).

B. Deputy Commander (Operations), Brigadier XXXXXXXXXX(AS).

(2) Task Unit 667.2.1 (X BDE).

(3) Task Unit 667.2.2 (Y BDE).

(4) Task unit 667.2.3 (16 AVN BDE).

(5) DIV Enablers (see TASK ORG at Annex A)

(6) Belesian 12 INF BDE (Light) OPCON.

k. TG667.1.2 will provide naval vessels to complete the lodgement of TG 667.2 on PANAY

l. TG667.1.1 will provide protection to TG 667.1.2 during the passage of sea lines.

m. Detailed ORBAT is shown in Annex A.

n. International Organizations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Some IOs and NGOs are currently operating in BX. Their presence is expected to increase dramatically once a more secure operating environment is created. See Annex Q of the Ref J for further details.

o. BX. BX has agreed to act as the HN to support the deployment and staging of TG 667.2

p. Rotation of Forces. The timeframe for OSS is situation dependent. The initial operating mandate provided by the UN is of 12 months duration, with extensions as required. The initial force deployment is to be for 6 months. TCNs may plan for the rotation of forces after that period of time.

2. **Mission.** TG 667.2 is to conduct lodgement and subsequent land operations to defeat all NTMEF forces in PANAY on order IOT to create conditions for expulsion of all NT forces from BELESIA.

3. **Execution.**

a. Commander's Analysis. The occupation of Belesian sovereign territory and the subjugation of Belesian citizens in PANAY by the North Torbian military is an unacceptable act of aggression and will not be tolerated by the international community. This act of aggression flies

in the face of international norms. To that end, TG 667.2 will land on and conduct land combat operations within the BX island of PANAY IOT eject the NTMEF currently located there. To date, this conflict has remained localised between NT and BX. However, all subordinate commanders must understand that antagonising other neutral regional countries through unrestricted use of force can escalate into a wider conflict. It is important that our actions are conducted within international guidelines and that in all planning considerations, utmost care is taken to reduce collateral death and damage to non-combatants. Subordinate commanders at all levels must be alert to these factors in the conduct of all of their operations, particularly during the transition from combat operations.

b. Commander's Intent. The Belesian Federation Defense Force (BFDF) is a capable force that has the capacity to deal with the NT aggression effectively. However, internal politics and the unstable nature of government institutions in this young nation has meant that they have requested international support to assist in dealing with NT aggression. Additionally, historic ethnic tensions between BX central authority and the various ethnic groups, supported by an existing insurgency in the occupied territories means that BX is not able to utilise their capable military to deal with NT aggression effectively. TG 667.2, supported by CJTF667, will utilise all forces within its command to meet the UNSCR 8873 goal of removing NT military presence in PANAY and the establishment of a safe and secure environment for the transition of authority back to BX.

A. Purpose: Defeat NTMEF and insurgency forces located on PANAY.

B. Method: Operation CERIUM STEAL will be a three-phase operation, with a preliminary phase, nested within Operation STEEL SENTINEL (OSS). Phase 0 will see the preparation of all ground forces for lodgment onto PANAY (including embarkation on maritime assets). Phase 1 will consist of an amphibious and air lodgement of the TG onto PANAY. Phase 2 will result in the Neutralisation of the NTMEF by dislocating and then defeating them in battle. During Phase 2, X BDE will ADV N and defeat NTMEF forces loc IVO of PASSI, and cut-off LoC to the alternate APOD/SPOD in CATICLAN. This will dislocate the NTMEF forces IVO ROXAS and set the conditions for Y BDE to decisively defeat these forces in detail and secure ROXAS. Phase 3 will be the transition of authority back to the BX government. At all times, we must be cognisant that the main effort is the removal of NT forces in BX. If this can be achieved during any of the stages without further bloodshed, then all effort must be taken to explore those options.

C. Endstate: The liberation of PANAY, removal of NTMEF forces, the establishment of a safe and secure environment in PANAY, and the conditions set for a UN supervised transition of authority to the BX Government.

c. Main Effort. The main effort is the defeat of NTMEF on PANAY by the capture of ROXAS.

d. Centre of Gravity. The TG COG is assessed as being its manoeuvre units which provide the mobility and firepower to overmatch and dislocate the lighter armour of 3 MAR BDE

e. Concept of Operations. OP Cerium Steal will be conducted in three phases as follows:

(1) Phase 1 – **Lodgement** (D-Day – D+2)

A. Main Effort:

1. Conduct lodgement into the city of ILOILO

B. Supporting Efforts:

1. Dislocate NT forces by conducting lodgement into BANATE by Y Bde
2. Conduct IW effects to counter NT/Insurgent IW.
3. Conduct passage of lines with BX forces in ILOILO
4. BPT take OPCON of Belesian ground forces
5. Initiate comms with Belesian Govt reps in PANAY
6. Initiate comms with NGO located in PANAY
7. Conduct SF recon operations on HVTs
8. Conduct interdiction of NTMEF lines of communication in PANAY
9. Continue to conduct shaping operations to isolate NTMEF
10. Degrade NTMEF ground forces capability in PANAY

C. Endstate:

1. TG 667.2 elms have successfully lodged in PANAY and taken up positions in preparation for phase 2.

(2) Phase 2 – **Neutralise** (D+3 – D+14)

A. Main Effort:

1. Defeat NTMEF forces located on PANAY.

B. Supporting Effort:

1. Conduct advance from ILOILO to capture PASSI
2. Conduct advance from BANATE to capture ROXAS
3. Defeat insurgency forces
4. Secure the SAN RAFAEL Mine
5. Secure the CATICLAN APOD/SPOD
6. Conduct Counter-Insurgency (COIN) operations
7. Continue to conduct shaping operations to isolate NTMEF

C. Endstate:

1. NTMEF ground forces will have been defeated on PANAY

(3) Phase 3 – **Transition** (D+15 onwards)

A. Main Effort:

1. Transition to UN Peacekeeping

B. Supporting Efforts:

1. Conduct Stability Operations (STABOPS)

2. Conduct Information Operations (IO) to support strategic messaging
3. Neutralise any remaining elms of the VPF

C. Endstate:

1. Transition of authority will have been conducted between TG 667.2 and UN Mission
2. TG 667.2 will have transitioned and postured to conduct STABOPS as required

f. Limitations.

(1) Restraints.

A. All targeting of BX infrastructure will take into consideration the economic and humanitarian effects post conflict – see Targeting Directive at Annex I of Ref J.

(2) Constraints.

A. Defensive ROE will be in place prior to deployment and into BX. Offensive ROE will be on order.

g. Common Tasks.

(1) During all phases ensure the security of coalition air, maritime and land lines of communication.

(2) Support the BX government and established IO/NGOs in their ongoing humanitarian efforts while remaining cognisant of the need to create and maintain a safe and secure environment.

h. Groupings & Tasks. See Annex A for details on C2 and groupings

(1) JFLCC TG 667.2

A. Phase 1 (Lodgement)

1. Coordinate with HQ CJTF 667, JFMCC and JFLOGCC the deployment of subordinate land forces into PANAY.
2. Coordinate with CJTF 667 air and naval support required
3. Assume OPCON of all BX land forces in PANAY
4. Initiate contact with BX Govt reps in PANAY
5. Initiate contact with NGO reps in PANAY

B. Phase 2 (Neutralise)

1. COMD all land forces in PANAY
2. Develop liaison with BX Govt officials IOT arrange transition
3. Develop liaison with NGO in PANAY IOT facilitate management of internal refugees
4. Coordinate SF operations in PANAY

C. Phase 3 (Transition)

1. BPT conduct COIN/STABOPS
2. BPT to hand over to BFDF
3. BPT support BX Govt during transition
4. BPT support NGO

(2) TG 667.2 DIV Troops:

A. 1 Int BN

1. Prov Int support to TG 667.2 and subordinate commands

B. 20 Regt RAA

1. All Phases – target acquisition in support of targeting direction

C. 16 REGT (AD)

1. Provide AD IAW AOC OPORD

D. 7 SIG REGT (EW)

1. Provide EW support IAW App 1 to Annex B to Ref J

E. 1 MP BN

1. All Phases – provide general Military Police support

F. BG XXXXXX (ARES)

1. Provide security to primary APOD/SPOD (ILOILO) on order.

G. 1 SIG REGT

1. Provide comms support

H. 6 ESR

1. Provide force engineering capabilities to project, protect and sustain the Joint Force in persistent threat environments; and be ready to provide discrete, short-notice, independent tactical engineering capabilities to achieve strategic outcomes.
2. The command and control (Force Engineer) of whole-of-theatre engineering, including attached coalition force elements
3. Engineer planning and advice at the theatre level; including the development of train, advise, and assist concepts in consultation with other government agencies
4. Force level survivability (explosive ordnance, CBNRD, force protection) advice and support
5. Line of communications development within a persistent threat environment
6. Theatre level construction, services, resources winning, and light watercraft support

7. Coordination and management of a theatre-level (Joint Task Force/Divisional) engineer park that supports the whole-of-theatre engineer effort

I. MLRS Bty

1. Provide FS IAW JTEOS OPORD

J. 35 Water Tpt Sqn

1. Provide logistic support as per Log Plan

(3) TU 667.2.1 – X BDE.

A. Phase 1 (Lodgement):

1. Secure SPOD (ILOILO Port)
2. Secure APOD (ILOILO Airport)
3. Establish comms and LO with BX 12 INF BDE
4. Assume defensive posns N of ILOILO prior to commencing ADV to N.

B. Phase 2 (Neutralise):

1. Conduct FPL with BX 12 Inf Bde
2. Adc N along Route GREEN / ORANGE towards PASSI
3. Neutralise / Isolate NT BDET vic PASSI
4. Secure Route BLUE
5. BPT Secure the CATICLAN APOD/SPOD
6. BPT secure the SAN RAFAEL Mine Complex
7. BPT neutralise insurgency
8. BPT participate in Joint Targeting
9. BPT support SF operations
10. BPT support deception plan

C. Phase 3 (Transition):

1. Conduct STABOPS within PASSI and boundaries
2. BPT to hand over to BFDF
3. BPT support BX Govt during transition
4. BPT support NGO in humanitarian assistance tasks

(4) TU 667.2.2 - Y BDE.

A. Phase 1 (Lodgement):

1. Conduct landing IVO BANATE.
2. Secure SPOD
3. Clear NTMEF from immediate area.

4. Establish liaison with any BFDF in the area
5. BPT support SF operations
6. BPT support NGO in humanitarian assistance tasks

B. Phase 2 (Neutralise):

1. Adv N and secure SAN RAFAEL Mine Complex
2. Adv NW along Route RED towards ESTANCIA
3. Clear NT BDET IVO SARA
4. Neutralise / Contain NT BDET IVO ESTANCIA
5. Secure ROXAS
6. BPT support BX Govt members as required
7. BPT support SF operations
8. BPT support NGO in humanitarian assistance tasks

C. Phase 3 (Transition):

1. Conduct STABOPS within boundaries
2. BPT to hand over to BFDF
3. BPT support BX Govt during transition
4. BPT support NGO humanitarian tasks

(5) TU 667.2.3 (AVN BDE).

A. Phase 1 (Lodgement):

1. Support lodgement of TU 667.2.1 in securing SPOD/APOD
2. Support lodgement of TU 667.2.2
3. BPT conduct recon tasks ISO of TG 667.2

B. Phase 2 (Neutralise):

1. Conduct recon tasks ISO TU 667.2.1
2. Destroy NTMEF armour concentrations when identified
3. Conduct AMO ISO TU 667.2.2
4. Conduct AME as required

C. Phase 3 (Transition):

1. Assist in conduct of STABOPS/COIN.
2. BPT Conduct AMO/patrols as required
3. BPT assist BFDF as required
4. BPT assist NGO in conduct of Humanitarian assistance operations

(6) SOTG (TG 667.4). Tasks to be issued separately.

(7) BFDF 12 INF BDE.

A. Phase 1 (Lodgement):

1. Maintain security of ILOILO APOD/SPOD
2. Prov CT to secure BANATE SPOD
3. Maintain defensive lines around ILOILO

B. Phase 2 (Neutralise):

1. Relocate to SAN JOSE
2. Adv north along Route YELLOW
3. Secure CATICLAN APOD/SPOD
4. Maintain security of ILOILO APOD/SPOD

C. Phase 3 (Transition):

1. BPT conduct STABOPS in CATICLAN

i. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Routes, Boundaries and Control Measures

A. See Op Overlay Annex C

(2) Timings.

A. Phase 1 Operation Cerium Steal to commence NB completion of OSS Phase One (Denial) is complete.

B. SPOD ILOILO secure – by D+1.

C. APOD ILOILO secure – by D+1

D. SPOD BANATE secure – by D+2

E. Lodgement complete in PANAY – by D+3.

F. Phase two will commence on order once the following conditions have been met:

1. SPODs and APODs are secure.
2. Supplies sufficient for 5 days are landed in ILOILO APOD.

G. NTMEF cleared from SAN RAFAEL Mine by D+12.

H. NTMEF cleared from ROXAS by D+14.

I. NTMEF cleared from CATICLAN by D+16.

J. Phase three will commence on order when the following conditions have been met:

1. NTMEF cleared from PANAY.
2. Insurgency has been controlled

K. Transition complete TBA.

(3) Joint effects, targeting and offensive support

A. IAW Annex I of Ref J

B. COL EFFECTs TG HQ is responsible authority

(4) Services Support

A. IAW Annex R of Ref J

(5) Transfer of Authority.

A. BX Forces. BX's SHC will continue to command defensive operations until declaration of CJTF 667 OPRED (most probably coincident with JFACC OPRED). At that time, designated BX land combat forces in PANAY will TOA OPCON to TG 667.2.

B. BX GOVT. BX GOVT will regain command of its forces on PANAY post-transition. This will be coord by HQ CJTF667.

(6) PWs and Captured Persons (CPERS). Handling and disposition of PWs and CPERS will be in accordance with to Annex AD to Ref J. AS has agreed to be Lead Nation on the handling and disposition of PW and CPERS.

A. National Responsibilities on PW/CPERS. For reasons of National sensitivity and ownership of processes relating to PW/CPERS, all Coalition personnel will respect their own national procedures following guidelines in accordance with the Geneva Convention:

B. Custody of PW/CPERS. PW/CPERS operations are a National responsibility. As such, it is imperative that all persons detained by Coalition personnel remain in the care and custody of authorised personnel only. It is understood that operational requirements may force acceptance of PW/CPERS from, or transfer to, other Allied nations of the Coalition. This shall be the exception and not the norm. Should such circumstance become necessary, only the respective National Commander or his designated representative can authorize the acceptance or transfer of a PW/CPERS to or from another nation.

C. Treatment. PW and CPERS are to be treated in accordance with all accepted international laws and conventions.

D. Transfer or Release. Although tactical situations may oblige commanders to detain persons during the conduct of operations, it is the responsibility of National Commanders at all levels to determine who will be categorised as a CPERS and immediately field release all others. Once a determination has been made to further retain the detained person and a PW/CPERS number has been assigned, only the National Commander of the capturing nation has the authority to release or transfer PW/CPERS to other nations. For the specific purpose of an individual clearly detained as a PW, there is no requirement to determine status upon capture, as PW are captured enemy combatants and remain in detention for the duration of hostilities. The detaining power has an obligation to make a determination of PW versus other CPERS status as soon as practical after capture.

E. PW and CPERS Reporting. In accordance with national directives, all PW or CPERS in Coalition custody shall be reported via official means by using a PW/CPERS Capture Report.

F. PW/CPERS Holding Facilities. TG 667.2 will establish holding facilities in PANAY. The locations of facilities will be reported to CJTF667 when established. This facility is to be considered temporary until declared otherwise by CJTF667 HQ.

(7) Reports and Returns. The Battle Rhythm schedule for Reports and Returns will be published once the HQ CJTF 667 has declared OPRED.

4. **Admin and Logistics (Sustainment).**

a. Outline Concept.

(1) Sustainment support to TG 667.2 will be coordinated and led by HQ TG 667.2 in conjunction with JFLOGCC. While TCNs retain overall responsibility for the sustainment of national formations and units, JFLOGCC retains coordinating authority.

(2) HQ TG 776.2 will establish a Theater Support Area (TSA) within PANAY adjacent to the SPOD/APOD (ILOILO) in order to execute sustainment operations. Additional logistic nodes will also be set up as required such as at COLLINSVILLE once the ATG has lodged. Sustainment support during OSS Ph 2-4 to forward FE will be the responsibility of organic logistic FE through JFLOGCC coordination. Annex R to Ref J will provide more details.

(3) HQ TG 667.2 will draw additional logistic support from JFLOGCC as required.

(4) TG 667.2 will deploy to PANAY with sufficient Op stock for 15 days. TU will deploy with sufficient for 10 days.

b. Movements. Movement forward into PANAY post D-Day will be coordinated by JFLOGCC HQ. Movement within PANAY will be coord by HQ TG 667.2

c. Medical Support. The concept of Health Support (HS) is detailed within the Health Support Order (HSO) at Annex AA to Ref J. HS to TG 667.2 will be provided by ADF and Coalition medical capabilities coordinated by the CJTF 667 J07. HQJOC J07 retains overall technical control (TECHON) for all health care delivery on an overseas operation. While TCN will deploy with limited integral HS and retain responsibility for definitive care of their troops, provision of deployed HS to Coalition and HN personnel may occur IAW the Medical Rules of Eligibility (MEDROE) detailed in the HSO.

(1) Role 1 HS will be provided by ADF and Coalition integral capabilities.

(2) Role 2 and Role 2 (Enhanced) HS will be provided by deployment of health services personnel into ILOILO.

(3) Role 3 HS will be provided by the NSB (Royal Darwin Hospital or other civilian facility) or the USNS Mercy, which will be determined and coordinated by CJTF 667 J07.

5. **Command and Signal.**

a. Command.

A. Commander, Major General, XXXXXXXX, (AS).

B. Deputy Commander (Operations), Brigadier XXXXXXXXXX (AS).

b. BX Forces in PANAY (principally 12 INF BDE) are to be OPCON to TG 667.2 from commencement of phase one.

c. Headquarters Locations. (see C2 overlay)

(1) HQ TG 667.2 will establish at ILOILO APOD, BX by D+1.

d. Communication and Information Systems (CIS). Effective C2 of TG 667.2 will be highly dependent upon the flexible and interoperable CIS between Components and contributing nations.

(1) TF 667.2 Sig REGT will:

A. Establish force level CIS down to TF HQs, including the management of network interface gateways

B. Coordinate theatre-wide CIS plans

C. Perform theatre spectrum management

(2) HQ TG 667.2 CIS will provide secure voice, VTC and Coalition WAN (based on NATO-CENTRIXS) to provide secure email, chat and other C3 tools down to TU level. Requests for extension of coalition CIS in support of national, component or other requirements will be coordinated through the CJTF 667 J6 and funded as appropriate.

(3) Use of HN communication infrastructure to supplement military networks will be coordinated by HQ TG 667.2 in conjunction with HQ CJTF 667 J6, but contracted independently by TCN.

(4) Network Operations.

A. Defensive Measures. TG 667.2 networks are targets for Computer Network Attack (CNA) by enemy seeking to sabotage or exploit coalition information or services. The primary vulnerabilities are through gateways with external systems and inadvertent transfer of viruses from open systems. All contributing nations are responsible for effective COMSEC and Computer Network Defence (CND) on all national networks and systems; these measures are vital for effective C2 and the maintenance of information dominance. TG 667.2 J6 is responsible for the coordination of defensive measures and COMSEC for all TG 667.2 systems through the Network Operations Center located with HQ TG 667.2 (deployed).

B. Offensive Measures Offensive network operations or Computer Network Attack (CNA) will not be conducted by coalition partners against adversary networks without approval of COMD CJTF 667.

ACKNOWLEDGE:

Commander's last name
Commander's rank

OFFICIAL:

Authenticator's Name
Authenticator's Position

ANNEXES:

Annex A	TG 667.2 Task Organisation
Annex B	Intelligence
Annex C	Operations

CJTF 667 C2 ORGANISATION



ANNEX B TO
TG 667.2 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT PLAN

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu.

1. **Situation**

a. Characteristics of the Operational Environment (OE).

(1) See Appendix 4 and ODIN.

b. Enemy.

(1) Under the stated aim of "liberating ethnic Torbians from the oppressive governance of the Belesian government", North Torbia (NT) invaded the Belesian (BX) islands of Palawan and Panay with the NT Marine Expeditionary Force (NTMEF) landing on Palawan on (*insert date*) and Panay on (insert date). The NTMEF utilised the cover of a biennial exercise with Olvana (Ex RISEN SWORD) to muster forces to commence their OP RIGHTEOUS HARMONY, the annexation of Panay. The first phase of OP RIGHTEOUS HARMONY saw the landing of NTMEF elements to capture an old airfield and seaport in the north Palawan town of El Nido. Utilising El Nido as a logistic staging base, within 24hrs NT landed (utilising amphibious and heli-borne troops) and captured the seaport, airport and other key locations of the northern Panayan city of Roxas. A few months earlier, Roxas was the scene of rioting, which resulted in the deaths of over one hundred ethnic Torbians. Little effective resistance was encountered during the capture of El Nido and Roxas. It is estimated that the NTMEF has landed a Marine Brigade Task Group (4th Marine BTG) in El Nido and established a logistic node to support operations on Panay. The NTMEF HQ is also identified to have setup in El Nido to better coordinate C2 and sustainment operations. The NTMEF is estimated to have landed a reinforced Marine Brigade Task Group (3rd Marine BTG) in Panay. Shortly after taking control of Roxas, the 3rd Marine BTG has advanced south to Charters Towers and Ravenswood and established a defensive line. Conveniently, this defensive line incorporates the San Rafael Mine complex, a key strategic asset in Panay that produces a large quantity of rare earth metals, notably Cerium.

(2) In response to the capture of Roxas, the Belesian Federation Defence Forces (BFDF) landed a Brigade (12th Infantry Bde) in the southern Panayan city of Iloilo. The 12th Bde is a light infantry unit, so could be deployed at a relatively short notice. However, the 12 Bde does not have the combat power to defeat the NTMEF 3rd Marine BTG. Initial advances north from Iloilo by the BFDF 12th Bde were stopped short of the NTMEF defensive line which has since resulted in a stalemate with the majority of the 12th Bde holding defensive positions around Iloilo to secure the sea and airport.

(3) The NTMEF has declared a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) over northern Palawan, half of Panay and the sea and air lanes connecting the two islands. The NTMEF has reinforced their hold in Palawan and Panay with SU-30MKK fighter-bombers, and J-11B fighters, along with active patrolling in the Sulu Sea between Palawan and Panay. Aside from organic elements within the two NTMEF Marine BTGs, there have been reports of HQ-16 SAMs, 122mm MLR batteries and other NTMEF Division troops in El Nido and

Roxas. It appears that not all NT Marine Expeditionary Division elements have been deployed to Palawan or Panay. The remaining two Marine BTGs are reported to still be in North Torbia and it is estimated that the NT armed forces do not want to escalate this conflict wider. These two Marine BTGs may also be kept back as a strategic reserve to reinforce the deployed Marine BTGs as required. Identified NT Naval elements patrolling the sea-lanes within the declared TEZ include 1x Type 052D (Luyang III) destroyer, 2x Type 052C (Luyang II) destroyers, 1x Type 051G (Luda) destroyer, 2x Type 054A (Jiangkai II) frigates, 1x Type 053H3 (Jiangwei II) frigate, and 2x Type 053 (Jianghu V) frigates. Whilst not observed, it is assessed that an unknown number of up to three Song class diesel-electric submarines (SSG) are operating in and around the sea-lanes between Palawan and Panay. Combat Air Patrols of fighter aircraft have been observed operating out of El Nido and Roxas in addition to rotary wing traffic of Z9 helicopters.

(4) Overall, the NTMEF are well trained and capable of conducting combined arms and joint operations and are capable of limited power projection in the region. The land forces of the NTMEF are designed for quick deployment and are therefore lacking in heavier armour, but make up for this deficiency in a larger number of combat units within each Marine BTG. It is expected that the 3rd Marine BTG in Panay has been augmented with additional Divisional troops such as a Tank Coy of T-72Bs, an MRL Battery, an HQ-16 SAM AD Battery and significant Engineer troops. Similarly, the NTMEF maritime and air capabilities are also substantial and capable with several platforms of Tier 1 or 2 capability (<15 years old). Additionally, all NTMEF assets are under a unified command similar to a JTF based on the Marine Division HQ. It is noted that NT has significantly more forces on the mainland, but is postured along the North and South Torbian border. NT sees a conflict with South Torbia (Republic of Torbia - RT) as the more dangerous possibility and will keep the bulk of its forces poised for a possible RT attack. Consequently, we can expect that NT's considerable strike capabilities on the mainland will not be utilised in the conflict in BX as they are held in reserve for a possible RT attack.

(5) Enemy Strengths

(a) General. NT maintains the second largest military of the five Pacific countries, only behind Olvana. Militarily, it is a dominant actor within the region, capable of conducting military action across the spectrum of operations. The NT military conducts overt, covert, and clandestine operations with ripple effects across the region. Reporting also suggests ties between elements of NT's military and criminal and terror groups within the region, which further extends the potential for a global threat.

(b) Army. The Torbian People's Army (TPA) is the largest and most influential of the NT Armed Forces. With compulsory national service, the TPA has a large number of military trained personnel from which to draw upon. This reflects the stated nature of the TPA goal as the reunification of the two Torbias. The bulk of the TPA is located within the Southern and Northern Commands. The Western Command has the only credible non-land based power projection capability through the NT Marine Division. This Marine Division reflects the NT shift to power projection and is therefore well equipped with Tier 1, 2 and 3 equipment. The Marine Division

is slightly different to other TPA Divisions in that it has more Mechanised Infantry Battalions per Brigade (4 vs 3). However, this is offset by having lighter armoured vehicles than their non-marine counterparts.

(c) Air Force. The Torbian Peoples Air Force (TPAF) is a capable organisation that is able to strike any targets within the region. The TPAF has two squadrons of TU-22 bombers that can reach any target within the JFAO. However, these assets are kept in strategic reserve and are primarily postured to counter any attack by South Torbia. Instead, for OP RIGHTEOUS HARMONY, two squadrons of J-11 fighters and two squadrons of SU-30MKK fighter-bombers have been allocated to support the NTMEF. Additional AEW&C, surveillance and tanker support is provided. One squadron of J-11 and SU-30MKK is operating out of El Nido, with the other squadrons operating out of the Roxas airport.

(d) Navy. In recent years, the Torbian Peoples Navy (TPN) has greatly expanded its maritime capability. In order to project power and maintain logistic support, the TPN has provided significant support to OP RIGHTEOUS HARMONY. The focus of the TPN in support of the NTMEF is to secure the sea-lanes in and around the contested islands of Panay and Palawan. The single Luyang III destroyer assigned to the NTMEF is a significant threat to all aircraft in the TEZ. The NTMEF also recognises the importance of the Luyang III and has kept this ship in the South China Sea to secure the link between NT and El Nido, but also out of harm's way from possible RT attack.

(6) Enemy Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities.

(a) Army. The terrain (tropical) of Panay and Palawan means that travel of armoured vehicles is restricted during the wet season and will tend to canalize ground forces along MSRs. The availability of engineer assets to support maneuverability is limited within the NTMEF. It is expected that the 3rd Marine Brigade will have limited engineer support assets. This is alleviated somewhat with the amphibious and light armour nature of the NTMEF. This light amphibious armour nature of the NTMEF will mean that the use of heavy armour by friendly forces will provide overmatch in most tactical situations. The 3rd Marine BTG has recently been reinforced by a Tank Coy from the 6th Mech Division (Southern Army) consisting of T-72B MBT.

(b) Air Force: In the event of full-scale combat engagement by modern air forces, the TPAF would not be able to accomplish more than local air parity for a short period. The TPAF ability to project force against NT's neighbors is not only a source of national prestige but represents a significant investment on the part of the National Command Authority (NCA). The NT NCA is unlikely to risk more than a token loss to a superior force. The training and equipment of the TPAF is below the level of CJTF 667. Additionally, any strike aircraft from mainland NT will have to fly a circuitous route along the South China Sea avoiding Sth Torbian (RT) airspace, which will reduce their ability to dominate the TEZ. Instead, the TPAF will have to rely on forces staged out of Palawan and Panay in order to maintain dominance over the TEZ.

(c) Navy. The TPN has a relatively long line of communication from Panay, through Palawan back to NT. The TPN ability to enforce the TEZ will be limited in the relatively close waters of the north Sulu Sea. Being close to RT waters also means that they will have concerns regarding RT naval vessels monitoring their movements. Finally, the TPN has invested heavily in its naval vessels and will be reluctant to expose these assets to complete loss. Hence, it is expected that their most valuable naval surface vessels will likely remain in the South China Sea with lower tiered vessels operating in the Sulu Sea (with the exception of their SSGs).

(7) Enemy Courses of Action (COAs)

(a) Most Likely Course of Action. The strategic goal of the NT occupation of Panay and Palawan is for a political solution to foster Panayan independence under NT sponsorship and not to escalate the conflict further. This means that at the strategic level, NT will be careful not to portray itself as an occupying aggressor. It is likely that NT will limit its military presence on Panay and Palawan to that of a Marine Division and supporting maritime and air elements. It is highly unlikely that NT will reinforce the Marine BTG on Panay with significant additional ground elements, but holding enough combat power to deter or defeat any offensive attacks by Coalition Forces. In the event of CF landing ground forces on Panay, the NTMEF will utilise SPF and local insurgents to disrupt TG 667.2 activities before using maneuver and fortified defensive positions to defeat or cause attrition to TG 667.2 elements. The NTMEF will continue to maintain the TEZ with combat air patrols and surface warship patrols. They will remain in a defensive posture until hostilities commence. Additionally, the NTMEF will likely aim to cause attrition of TG 667.2 in order to force a diplomatic solution. The NTMEF will use information warfare to discredit TG 667.2 and BX Defense Forces, challenge the legitimacy the BX government, tell its "liberation of ethnic Torbians" story and promote its claim to support Panayan independence.

(b) Most Dangerous Course of Action. The NTMEF will reinforce the ground forces on Panay with an additional Marine BTG (likely the 2nd Marine BTG as the 1st is currently under strength and on a lower readiness cycle). With that amount of combat power, the NTMEF may be able to capture the southern city of Iloilo and occupy the entire island of Panay. If Coalition Forces have been successful in degrading NTMEF capability prior to ground operations, the NTMEF may commit to capturing Iloilo with just the 3rd Marine BTG or commit to attacking TG 667.2 ground forces before the Land Component can commence offensive operations on Panay. The NTMEF will use information warfare to discredit TG 667.2 and BX Defense Forces, challenge the legitimacy of the BX government, tell its "liberation of ethnic Torbians" story and promote its claim to support Panayan independence.

c. Friendly Forces.

(1) Coalition Intelligence Capability. Coalition intelligence organizations, including those nested within the CJTF will provide all-source intelligence utilising all possible means, including the establishment of a Multi-National intelligence operations center that will serve as a central all-source intelligence fusion center supporting operations in the JFAO.

2. **Mission**

a. TG 667.2 intelligence conducts intelligence operations in order to enable operations against the 3rd Marine BTG and affiliated groups in Panay.

3. **Execution**

a. Concept of Intelligence Operations. TG 667.2 intelligence will conduct intelligence support to operations to enhance Indications and Warning (I&W) and situational awareness in the region. Intelligence support will focus along three lines of effort to achieve objectives in BX. Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) will be modified to support emerging operations and will drive intelligence operations during the execution of this plan.

b. Purpose. TG 667.2 intelligence will support a long term, comprehensive approach. Intelligence assessments must account for and connect all factors within the political, military, economic, social, infrastructural, information, physical environment and time domains (PMESII-PT) - and actors influencing the dynamics in the Div Area of Interest (AOI). The main priorities are to provide threat I&W to Coalition forces, identify and exploit opportunities that achieve optimal results against the enemy, and provide kinetic and non-kinetic targeting information leading to mission success.

c. Method. TG 667.2 intelligence capabilities organise and conduct intelligence operations that drive collection, production and analysis, contributions to target development, reporting, and collaboration with partners to provide timely and actionable support to TG 667.2 while maintaining support to the Coalition's ongoing operations in the AO. In order to achieve this, the TG 667.2 intelligence architecture must synchronize and share information that produces comprehensive intelligence assessments. Working with partner nations, TG 667.2 will employ all intelligence capabilities and provide timely and relevant intelligence in order to support operations. Three primary intelligence Lines of Effort complement each other and remain constant throughout each phase of the operation.

(1) Intelligence Lines of Effort (LOEs).

(a) Intelligence Line of Effort I – ISR and Collection. This line of effort focuses on collection coordination of Coalition ISR capabilities across the JFAO. This LOE seeks to synchronize the collection effort in order to satisfy operational and intelligence requirements and continue to update and refine the operational environment. LOE I monitors the JFAO and AOI for I&W, builds situational awareness, supports targeting operations, and conducts battle damage assessments (BDA).

(b) Intelligence Line of Effort II – Analysis and Production. This LOE is designed to ensure a common comprehensive understanding of the operational environment and to support kinetic and non-kinetic targeting operations within the JFAO. LOE II focuses on multisource analysis encompassing PMESII-PT, which satisfies operational, and intelligence requirements.

(c) Intelligence Line of Effort III – Information Sharing. LOE III enables a comprehensive Coalition approach to defeat the NTMEF. This LOE seeks to ensure information sharing to the maximum extent possible allowed or in accordance with each partner nation's perspective, national policies and laws. Information sharing is

critical to this effort and must be placed within key nodes of Coalition intelligence enterprise.

(2) Intelligence Phasing.

(a) Intelligence Support to TG 667.2. Intelligence support to TG 667.2 to defeat the 3rd Marine BTG is tied to the four operational phases of OP CERIUM STEAL. This section will identify the main activities of intelligence support LOEs and integrate them into each respective phase.

1. Phase 0 – Shaping. During this Phase, the main effort of intelligence operations will be to support ISR collection efforts. This phase will see the deployment of critical advance force operation assets along with the utilization of HUMINT, SIGINT and other intelligence gathering assets to confirm 3rd Marine BTG force disposition and intent, and inform the targeting process. The intelligence effort will also support the CJTF main effort of non-kinetic shaping operations.

2. Phase 1 – Lodgement. The main effort for intelligence operations during this phase will be to continue to analyse information from all sources to support the lodgement of ground forces into Panay. It is important that I&W for NTMEF movement and intent be closely monitored. This is a critical phase of operation, as failure to achieve lodgement into Panay will mean the overall failure of the mission. Joint intelligence assets will also support the TG 667.2 deception plan of staging amphibious forces off Panay to make the NTMEF believe the TG 667.2 ATG main effort is the landing of ground forces on the Panayan NE coast, closer to Roxas.

3. Phase 2 - Neutralise. During this phase the main effort of the intelligence operations shifts to supporting the execution of TG 667.2 offensive ground operations. As NTMEF ground forces are defeated in Panay, the main effort will shift from direct action against the NTMEF to operations against indigenous hostile forces inside Panay. Despite the main effort shift to supporting indigenous forces, intelligence support will still likely be required to support TG 667.2 and BX Defense Forces as they hold territory regained from the invading NTMEF. Intelligence support to targeting, I&W, ISR, and OE refinement will continue throughout this phase as well.

4. Phase 3 - Transition. During this phase, the main effort conducts continuing ISR operations in order to monitor the situation and identify threats towards a safe and secure environment.

(3) Intelligence Tasks.

(a) Common Tasks to TG 667.2 Intelligence Cells.

1. Allocate resources and funding to support intelligence operations specified in the base plan.

2. Monitor I&W for threats to Coalition partners and partner interests.

3. Develop and refine ISR and I&W process to support mission requirements by phase.

4. Support Advise and Assist (AA), Build Partner Capacity (BPC), Key Leader Engagements (KLEs), Humanitarian Assistance (HA), and Force Protection as necessary by phase.
5. Assist the development of TG 667.2 organic intelligence capabilities by phase.
6. Provide reach-back capability to deployed forces, as necessary.
7. Produce and disseminate intelligence summaries, Battle Damage Reports, ISR Collection Plan, and ad hoc intelligence products.
8. Shape allocation and apportionment of theater collection assets to support collection priorities and Campaign Plan objectives.
9. Establish the necessary intelligence architecture to support the TG 667.2 CONOPS.
10. Provide and receive Coalition partner liaisons to and from the TG.
11. Enable intelligence training that supports regional partners' actions against enemy threats to include Advise and Assist (AA), Build Partner Capacity (BPC), and engagement (OAAs) missions.
12. Identify shortfalls to improve existing intelligence organisations, architecture and procedures to optimise collaboration and synchronise orientation, collection, rapid fusion, and timely dissemination of intelligence.
13. Submit and process intelligence requirements throughout the implementation of this plan for intelligence needs and support to planning.
14. Task and synchronise ISR collection assets to satisfy Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs).
15. Identify and recommend opportunities for Coalition intelligence exchanges and training to further develop and refine regional partner forces, as needed.
16. Support kinetic and non-kinetic targeting operations during appropriate phases of this plan.

(4) Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs).

(a) What is the threat to TG 667.2 operations within the AO?

(b) What is the threat to TG 667.2 land operations within the AO?

(c) What is the threat to TG 667.2 rotary wing operations within the AO?

(d) What is the threat to TG 667.2 Lines of Communication, specifically with respect to choke points?

(e) How will NT info-war operations affect TG 667.2?

(f) What are the environmental (incl. PMESII) factors that could affect TG 667.2 operations within the AO?

(g) What is the intent and capacity of BX Defense Forces to provide external and internal security, maintain operational readiness, sustain interoperability with TG 667.2 forces and defend against NTMEF?

(h) What are the threats in Panay and other authorised citizens, interests and infrastructure?

(i) Where have the Visayan People's Front (VPF) and other hostile elements positioned their leaders, C2 facilities, interior lines and concentrations of manpower and supplies?

(j) What is the capacity of NTMEF to include VPF in BX (Panay) to sustain their offensive campaign, gain territory and control the population?

(k) What are the intentions of VPF regarding their opposition to the government of BX and incentives to support and cooperate with TG 667.2 activities?

(l) What are the intentions of NTMEF with respect to their posturing and potential employment of chemical /biological weapons and the associated impact on TG 667.2 operations?

(m) What are the intentions of NTMEF and leadership with respect to own assembly/use of chemical/biological weapons?

(5) Intelligence Activities.

(a) Collection Management (CM). Collection activities will focus on the PIRs and emerging intelligence gaps and will be conducted and deconflicted in accordance with established national policies and procedures, and subsequently published CJTF guidance. Each respective Coalition member will determine an appropriate level of support for its respective theatre collection assets. Wherever possible, Coalition intelligence will participate in collection management working group forums in order to synchronise Coalition and ISR operations.

(b) Analysis and Production (A&P). Coalition intelligence will analyse, produce, and provide current intelligence and assessments in support of PIRs and provide collateral releasable products to other partners as required.

(c) Dissemination and Information Sharing. The Coalition will seek to allow greater sharing of intelligence on a more regular basis; however, disclosure decisions must be in accordance with each partner nation's policies. Safeguarding of information remains a responsibility of each Coalition member in order to prevent unauthorised release.

4. **Sustainment**.

a. Shortfalls and Limiting Factors. Primary shortfalls include intelligence resources needed to protect the force and ground-based collection assets that cannot access the AO due to operational restrictions.

5. **Command and Signal**

a. Communications. See Annex U to CJTF 667 OPORD 01.

Appendices

Appendix 1 - Signals Intelligence (Omitted)
Appendix 2 - Human Intelligence (Omitted)

Appendix 3 - Counterintelligence (Omitted)
Appendix 4 - Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

APPENDIX 4 TO
ANNEX B TO
TG 667.2 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

OPERATION CERIUM STEAL

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

Step 1


Operational Environment
Olvana
Area of Interest
North Torbia
South Torbia
Gabal
Belesia
Joint Force Area of Operations

Belesia

Capital	Davao
Ethnic groups	•Mindanaoan Sulu: 55% •Cebuan Sulu: 14% •Olvanese: 23% •Torbian: 7% •Other: 1%
Population	59.9 Million
Religion	•87% Muslim •10% Christian •3% Buddhist
Type of Government	Presidential Republic
State Forces	98,500
Total Area	99,926 sq mi (258,807 km^2)
Total GDP	$209.5 Bn
Miscellaneous	Relatively new democracy emerged from colonialism
	Volatile arena of political unrest and terrorism

Gabal

Capital	Coron
Ethnic groups	•Gabalian: 94% •Belesian: 2% •Olvanese: 2% •EU/Australian: 1% •Other 1%
Population	84,190
Religion	•68.0% Protestant •24.1% Roman Catholic •4.7% Buddhist •3.2% Other/None
Type of Government	Parliamentary Democracy
State Forces	5,000
Total Area	617 sq mi (1,597 km^2)
Total GDP	$0.5 Bn
Miscellaneous	Deeply federalized along historical tribal lines
	Relies on international trade/ security agreements

South Torbia

Capital	Manila
Ethnic groups	•Torbian: 100%
Population	42.4 Million
Religion	•61.3% Buddhist •19.1% Atheist/Agnostic •5.6% Christian •4.7% Confucian •2.9% Muslim •6.4 % Other
Type of Government	Constitutional Republic
State Forces	405,000
Total Area	17,622 sq mi (45,641 km^2)
Total GDP	$1,800 Bn
Miscellaneous	One of the wealthiest and most stable nations
	Historical friction with North Torbia

North Torbia

Capital	Baguio
Ethnic groups	•Torbian: 99.8% •Olvanese: 0.2%
Population	13.0 Million
Religion	•Officially irreligious
Type of Government	Autocratic Totalitarianism
State Forces	675,000
Total Area	21,517 sq mi (55,729 km²)
Total GDP	$10.1 Bn
Miscellaneous	Personality cult obsessed with state survival
	Historical friction with South Torbia

Olvana

Capital	Shanghai
Ethnic groups	•Peelee: 92% •Beihai: 2% •Baiyan: 1% •Other: 5%
Population	1.1 Billion
Religion	•79.8% Hindu •14.2% Muslim •2.3% Christian •1.7% Sikh •2.0% Other/None
Type of Government	Socialist
State Forces	1,500,000
Total Area	1,394,197 sq mi (3,610,956 km^2)
Total GDP	$9,600 Bn
Miscellaneous	Very strong connections with global economy
	Seeks political and military leadership in the region

Roxas
Panay
Iloilo
Antique
Malay
Buruanga
Ibajay
Tangalan
Libertad
Pandan
Kalibo
Aklan
Sebaste
Batan
Balete
Altavas
Roxas City
Ivisan
Carles
Pilar
Estancia
Batad
Capiz
Libacao
Culasi
Mambusao
Maayon
Dumalag
Tibiao
Tapaz
Dumarao
Sara
Concepcion
Barbaza
San Rafael
Ajuy
Laua-an
Calinog
Passi
Lambunao
Dueñas
Barotac Viejo
Iloilo
Anilao
Janiuay
Pototan
Patnongon
Barotac Nuevo
Cabatuan
San Remigio
Santa Barbara
Sibalom
Leon
Pavia
San Jose
Hamtic
Igbaras
Iloilo City
Tigbauan
Miagao
San Joaquin
Tobias Fornier
Anini-y
San Lorenzo
Nueva Valencia
Guimaras
Manapla
Cadiz
Victorias
Sagay
Escalante
Silay
Talisay
Negros Occidental
Toboso
Bacolod
Murcia
Calatrava
Bago
San Carlos
La Carlota
Canlaon
Pontevedra
Toledo

El Nido
Palawan
Taytay
San Vicente
Dumaran
Araceli
Roxas
Puerto Princesa
Aborlan
Agutaya
Palawan
Cuyo
Palawan
Cagayancillo
Balasia

OFFICIAL




Mindanao
Zamboanga
Davao
Gen Santos City

Human Terrain (Panay)

TG 667.2 Named Area of Interest (NAI) Overview


North Torbia
South Torbia
Gabal
Belesia
NAI 0001
NAI 0002
NAI 0003

Sth Torbia
Gabel
NAI 0009
NAI 0010
NAI 0013
NAI 0008
NAI 0004
NAI 0005
NAI 0006
NAI 0007
NAI 0012
NAI 0011
Roxas
El Nido
Panay
Iloilo
Palawan
Sulu Sea
Puerto Princesa
Lat: --° --' --", Lon: --° --' --"
50 km

NAI 0019
NAI 0014
NAI 0018
NAI 0023
NAI 0017
NAI 0016
NAI 0015
NAI 0022
NAI 0020
NAI 0021
Panay
Roxas City
Iloilo City
Bacolod

NAI	Description	Grid NE (Lat/Lon)	Grid NW (Lat/Lon)	Grid SW (Lat/Lon)	Grid SE (Lat/Lon)
0001	Sea Lines of Communication – Sth China Sea	17deg 0' N, 119deg 20' E	17deg N, 119deg 45' E	12deg 50' N, 119deg 45' E	12deg 50' N, 119deg 20' E
0002	Sea Lines of Communication – Sth China Sea	12deg 15' N, 119deg 12' E	12deg 22; N, 118deg 39' E	11deg 34' N, 118deg 29' E	11deg 26 N, 119deg 01' E
0003	Sea Lines of Communication – Philippine Sea	16deg 50' N, 123deg 24' E	16deg 26' N, 122deg 42' E	12deg 56' N, 124deg 53' E	13deg 20' N, 125deg 31' E
0004	SAG 1 Patrol AO	11deg 18' N, 119deg 13' E	11deg 39' N, 118deg 11'E	10deg 34' N, 117deg 43' E	10deg 12'N, 118deg 43' E
0005	Sea Lane – Gabal / Linapacan Is	11deg 33' N, 120deg 03' E	11deg 40' N, 119deg 51' E	11deg 43'N, 119deg 47' E	11deg 27' N, 119deg 59' E
0006	Sea Lane – Linapacan / Palawan Is	11deg 19' N, 119deg 51' E	11deg 27' N, 119deg 39' E	11deg 20' N, 119deg 34' E	11deg 12' N, 119deg 47' E
0007	El Nido SPOD/APOD	11deg 14' N, 119deg 26' E	11deg 14' N, 119deg 20' E	11deg 6' N, 119deg 20' E	11deg 6' N, 119deg 26' E
0008	Sea Lane – Nth Panay / Romblon Is	12deg 7' N, 122deg 06' E	12deg 7' N, 121deg, 49' E	11deg 55' N, 121deg 49' E	11deg' 55 N, 122deg 06' E
0009	Sea Lane – Romblon Is / Sth Torbia	12deg 42' N, 122deg 02' E	12deg 46' N, 121deg 51' E	12deg 34' N, 121deg 46' E	12deg 29' N, 121deg 57' E
0010	Sea Lane – Samar / Sorsargon	12deg 37' N, 124deg 19' E	12deg 41' N, 124deg 10' E	12deg 30' N, 124deg 04' E	12deg 25' N, 124deg 12' E
0011	Sea Lane – Sth Panay / Negros Is	10deg, 32' N, 122deg 15' E	10deg 20' N, 121deg 59' E	09deg 55' N, 122deg 21' E	10deg 07' N, 122deg 36' E
0012	Sea Lane – Nth Panay / Negros Is	11deg 28' N, 123deg 27' E	11deg 15' N, 123deg 10' E	10deg 58' N, 123deg 10' E	11deg 10' N, 123deg 42' E
0013	Sea Lane – Nth Panay	11deg 57' N, 123deg 01' E	11deg 57' N, 122deg 22' E	11deg 45' N, 122deg 22' E	11deg 45' N, 123deg 01' E
0014	Roxas City APOD/SPOD	11deg 36' N, 122deg 48' E	11deg 36' N, 122deg 42' E	11deg 32' N, 122deg 42' E	11deg 32' N, 122deg 48' E

NAI	Description	Grid NE (MGRS)	Grid NW (MGRS)	Grid SW (MGRS)	Grid SE (MGRS)
0015	San Rafael Mine	11deg 12’ N, 122deg 51’ E	11deg 12’ N, 122deg 47’ E	11deg 08’ N, 122deg 47’ E	11deg 08’ N, 122deg 51’ E
0016	Panay MSR vic Passi	11deg 11’ N, 122deg 41’ E	11deg 11’ N, 122deg 38’ E	11deg 02’ N, 122deg 36’ E	11deg 01’ N, 122deg 30’ E
0017	Panay MSR vic Calinog	11deg 09’ N, 122deg 33’ E	11deg 10’ N, 122deg 30’ E	11deg 04’ N, 122deg 28’ E	11deg 03’ N, 122deg 32’ E
0018	Panay MSR vic Cuartero	11deg 25’ N, 122deg 42’ E	11deg 25’ N, 122deg 38’ E	11deg 16’ N, 122deg 38’ E	11deg 16’ N, 122deg 42’ E
0019	Panay MSR vic Tangalan	11deg 49’ N, 122deg 12’ E	11deg 47’ N, 122deg 10’ E	11deg 40’ N, 122deg 18’ E	11deg 42’ N, 122deg 20’ E
0020	Potential JFEO site - Banate	11deg 01’ N, 122deg 51’ E	11deg 01’ N, 122deg 47’ E	10deg 58’ N, 122deg 47’ E	10deg 58’ N, 122deg 51’ E
0021	Iloilo SPOD	10deg 44’ N, 122deg 36’ E	10deg 44’ N, 122deg 31’ E	10deg 40’ N, 122deg 31’ E	10deg 40’ N, 122deg 36’ E
0022	Iloilo APOD	10deg 51’ N, 122deg 31’ E	10deg 51 N, 122deg 28’ E	10deg 48’ N, 122deg 28’ E	10deg 48’ N, 122deg 31’ E
0023	Panay MSR vic Tibiao	11deg 21’ N, 122deg 04’ E	11deg, 21’ N, 122deg 01’ E	11deg 13’ N, 122deg 01’ E	11deg 13’ N, 122deg 04’ E

Step 2

Maritime Effects

- Hydrographic
- Littoral
- Maritime Logistic

Primary SPOD
Makar Wharf, General Santos City

Primary staging port for:

- ATG
- ESG (JA/US)

Alternate SPOD
Zamboanga Port, Zamboanga City

Primary staging port for:

- JFMCC HQ
- MTG
- USNS Mercy

Lat: 6°54'11"N, Lon: 122°4'19"E

50 m

Alternate SPOD
Davao Port, Davao City

- Potential staging port
- Not likely to be utilised by CJTF

Lat: 7°7'33"N, Lon: 125°39'48"E

100 m

Panay SPOD
Iloilo Port, Iloilo City

- Currently under BX control
- Likely landing area for non-ATG forces

Panay SPOD
Culasi Port, Roxas City

- Currently under NT control
- Shallow water will restrict size of ship berthing

Panay SPOD
Caticlan Port, Caticlan

- Currently under NT control
- Relatively deep water
- Likely primary SPOD for NTMEF

Lat: 11.9280, Lon: 121.9503

50 m

Palawan SPOD
El Nido Port, El Nido

- Currently under NT control
- Shallow water will restrict size of ship berthing



Time & Space (Indicative)

Maritime Transit Times (8kts)				
	Darwin	**General Santos City**	**Zamboanga**	**Iloilo**
Darwin	N/A	1160NM (6 days)	1275NM (6 days 14hrs)	1480NM (7 days 17hrs)
General Santos City	1160NM (6 days)	N/A	189NM (1 day)	320NM (1 day 14hrs)
Zamboanga	1275NM (6 days 14hrs)	189NM (1 day)	N/A	234NM (1 day 5hrs)
Iloilo	1480NM (7 days 17hrs)	320NM (1 day 14hrs)	234NM (1 day 5hrs)	N/A

Air **Effects**

- POL
- Air traffic
- Air Navigation / Traffic Control



- Runway: 10,500ft long
- Can be used by:
  - C-17
  - C-130J
  - C-27

Primary APOD
General Santos Airport, General Santos City

OFFICIAL

Alternate APOD
Rajah Buayan Airbase, General Santos City

- Runway: 5,500ft long
- Can be used by:
  - C-27

Alternate APOD
Colonel Edwin Andrews Airbase, Zamboanga

- Runway: 8,500ft long
- Will base RAAF Strike:
  - F-35A
  - F/A-18F
  - EA-18G
- Current BFAF:
  - 12x F-16C

Alternate APOD
Davao International Airport, Davao City



- Runway: 10,000ft long
- Current BFAF:
  - 12x SU30MKK

Panay APOD
Iloilo Airport, Iloilo City

- Runway: 8,500ft long
- Currently under BX control
- Limited air traffic due to NT SAM umbrella

Lat: 10.8313, Lon: 122.4961

200 m

- Runway: 6,00ft long
- Currently under NT control
- Operating TPAF aircraft:
  - SU-30MKK
  - J-11B
  - Z-9
  - KA-28

Lat: 11.6007, Lon: 122.7493

200 m

Panay APOD
Roxas Airport, Roxas City

- Runway: 5,00ft long
- Currently under NT control
- No known TPAF aircraft operating from airport

Panay APOD
Godofredo Ramos Airport, Caticlan

Palawan APOD
El Nido Airfield, El Nido



- Runway: 3,600ft long
- Currently under NT control
- NTMEF HQ location
- Primary LOG node
- Indicators show NTMEF is extending the runway
- Operating TPAF:
  - SU-30MKK
  - J-11B

Time & Space (Indicative)

Air Transit Times (300kts)				
	Darwin	**General Santos City**	**Zamboanga**	**Iloilo**
Darwin	N/A	1160NM (4hrs)	1275NM (4hrs 15min)	1480NM (5hrs)
General Santos City	1160NM (4hrs)	N/A	189NM (40mins)	320NM (1hr)
Zamboanga	1275NM (4hrs 15min)	189NM (40mins)	N/A	234NM (45mins)
Iloilo	1480NM (5hrs)	320NM (1hr)	234NM (45mins)	N/A

Space Effects

- GPS
  - GPS and GLONASS available throughout the region
- Comms

Weather Effects - Belesia

- Two seasons: Wet and Dry
  - Dry season Dec – May
  - Wet Season Jun – Nov
- Region is susceptible to tropical typhoons during the wet season
  - Typhoons are regular and generally occur during Jul to Oct
  - On average Belesia is hit by 9 typhoons/year of varying strength
- Temperature is relatively constant all year as expected in a tropical climate







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Step 3

North Torbian Marine Expeditionary Force



North Torbian 3rd Marine Brigade



NTMEF Assessment

NTMEF

- C2 based on JTF construct – unified command chain
- Well trained and equipped compared to the rest of the TPA
  - Main platforms are 5-20 years old
- Service in the NT Marine Division is seen as prestigious and sought after
- Expect Officer Cadre to be well trained and motivated
- NTMEF capabilities are comparable to ADF

Non-State Actors (Insurgents)

Visayan Peoples Front (VSF)

- Insurgent organisation based in Belesia (approx. 300 active members)
- Committed to the establishment of an independent entity composed of the islands of Panay, Negros, Cebu and Bohol from the Belesian Federation
- Predominantly a Christian organisation seeking to create a Christian nation
- Has been active in aiding NTMEF in Panay to achieve political goals
    - Prominently aided the NTMEF in securing the San Rafael Mine
- Likely to actively oppose CF in region

Non-State Actors (Insurgents)

Free Sulu Movement (FSM)

- Conglomeration of anti-federation and independence factions on the Belesian archipelago (approx. 200 active members)
- The group seeks to break free from the alleged over reach of Belesian central government
- Predominantly a secular organisation
- Has links to criminal organisations and will commit criminal acts to support political goals
- Is not know to be actively supporting the NTMEF in either Panay or Palawan
- May oppose CF in region if CJTF mission does not support political goals

Non-State Actors (Criminal)

Black Societies

- Criminal networks based in Olvana but operating across the Belesian archipelago (approx. 250 active members)
- This criminal network is normally a family affair, with each family staying local to avoid conflict with other groups
- This criminal network is involved in:
  - Armed Robbery
  - Racketeering
  - Smuggling
  - Narcotics Trafficking
  - Prostitution
  - Gambling
  - Contract Killings
- Will not likely be a threat to CF but may leverage off CF presence in Belesia

Non-State Actors (Criminal)

Tantoco Cartel

- Criminal cartel founded in South Torbia (approx. 950 active members)
- Operates across the region (even within Nth Torbia)
- Involved in most criminal activities including:
  - Drug and Weapons Smuggling
  - Extortion
  - Motor Vehicle Theft
  - Illegal Gambling
  - Money Laundering
  - Counterfeiting
  - Contract Killing
  - Piracy
- Has clashed with Black Society network over territory
- Will not likely be a threat to CF but may leverage off CF presence in Belesia

Taejwa (Senior Colonel) Kim Youn-Hwan
Commander 3rd Marine Brigade



DOB	15 Oct 1971
Nationality	North Torbian
Service / Organisation	TPA
Birthplace	Santiago, North Torbia
Education	Torbian Military Academy (Baguio) – 1993 (commissioned into Infantry) Song Yang-Hwan Military College – 2015
Religion	N/A
Marital Status	Married 1996 – Kim Sujin (nee Pu) Children – 1 son (12 yrs)
Personality Traits	• Creative thinker • Charismatic • Confident bordering on arrogant
Biography	Kim You-Hwan has shown himself to be one of the 1st Marine Division's most tactically able brigade commanders. Kim is known to be eloquent and charismatic. He instils strong loyalty from subordinates and is popular with his troops. This confidence means that at times he may be reluctant to listen to alternative views if his mind is already set on a course of action

Chungjwa (Lieutenant Colonel) Hae Kyung
Chief of Staff 3rd Marine Brigade



DOB	11 April 1976
Nationality	North Torbian
Service / Organisation	TPA
Birthplace	Gonzaga, North Torbia
Education	Torbian Military Academy (Baguio) – 2000 (commissioned into Engineers)
Religion	Christian
Marital Status	Single
Personality Traits	• Meticulous and process driven • Socially awkward
Biography	Not much is known about Hae Kyung. His family is from a poor fishing village in the north of the country. This poor background has meant that the few public interactions he has been seen, he has exhibited poor social interaction. It is believed that he has risen up the ranks due to his diligent and meticulous nature.

Chungjwa (Lieutenant Colonel) Nan Sung-Jin
Commander 31st Battalion, 3rd Marine Brigade



DOB	01 Jul 1980
Nationality	North Torbian
Service / Organisation	TPA
Birthplace	Santiago, North Torbia
Education	Torbian Military Academy (Baguio) – 2002 (commissioned into Infantry)
Religion	N/A
Marital Status	Married 2007 – Spouse unknown Children – unknown
Personality Traits	• Methodical • Orthodox thinking
Biography	Not much is known about Nan Sung-Jin. Very little media profile or appearance

Chungjwa (Lieutenant Colonel) Kim Seong-Ho
Commander 32nd Battalion, 3rd Marine Brigade



DOB	14 May 1982
Nationality	North Torbian
Service / Organisation	TPA
Birthplace	Baguio, North Torbia
Education	Torbian Military Academy (Baguio) – 2004 (commissioned into Infantry)
Religion	N/A
Marital Status	Married 2009 – spouse unknown
Personality Traits	• Innovative / Unorthodox • Outspoken / Charismatic
Biography	Kim Seong-Ho is a distant relative of Kim Youn-Hwan (Comd 3rd Marine Bde). Kim's rise up the ranks has been noteworthy for his outspoken views on how to employ marine infantry. Kim is known to have written essays on expeditionary warfare submitted to the Military Academy. His political connections means that his rise up the TPA hierarchy is almost assured.

Chungjwa (Lieutenant Colonel) Sim Min-Su
Commander 33rd Battalion, 3rd Marine Brigade



DOB	13 Jan 1980
Nationality	North Torbian
Service / Organisation	TPA
Birthplace	Cervantes, North Torbia
Education	Torbian Military Academy (Baguio) – 2002 (commissioned into Infantry)
Religion	N/A
Marital Status	Married 2005 – spouse unknown Children - unknown
Personality Traits	• Conventional thinking • Charismatic
Biography	Sim Min-Su is more known for his out of uniform activities than his military prowess. Sim is known amongst his peers as a womaniser despite his marital status. Not much is known about his military career in as much as there is nothing that shows any form of brilliance.

Chungjwa (Lieutenant Colonel) Kam Du-Ho
Commander 34th Battalion, 3rd Marine Brigade



DOB	13 Mar 1984
Nationality	North Torbian
Service / Organisation	TPA
Birthplace	Tabuk, North Torbia
Education	Torbian Military Academy (Baguio) – 2006 (commissioned into Infantry)
Religion	N/A
Marital Status	Single
Personality Traits	• Sycophant • Ambitious / Politically connected
Biography	Kam Du-Ho is the youngest of 3rd Marine Brigades battalion commanders and is suspected of gaining the position due to his Party political connections. There is very little confidence in his abilities by Kim Youn-Hwan (3rd Bde Commander).

Chungjwa (Lieutenant Colonel) Hwan Tonghyon
Commander 3rd Tank Battalion, 3rd Marine Brigade



DOB	06 Jun 1980
Nationality	North Torbian
Service / Organisation	TPA
Birthplace	Cauayan, North Torbia
Education	Torbian Military Academy (Baguio) – 2002 (commissioned into Armour)
Religion	Buddhist
Marital Status	Married – spouse unknown Children - unknown
Personality Traits	• Aggressive, diligent • Competent and Tactically proficient • Well read on warfare
Biography	Hwan Tonghyon exhibits a keen interest in the study of warfare. He has submitted several essays on the tactical use of armour on the battlefield to the Military Academy and his profile is well known amongst his peers.

Niko (pseudonym - real name unknown)

Commander – Free Sulu Movement



DOB	
Nationality	Belesian
Service / Organisation	FSM
Birthplace	
Education	
Religion	
Marital Status	
Personality Traits	
Biography	

Alarico Sanchez

Second-in-command – Visayan People's Front



DOB	13 Apr 1992
Nationality	Belesian (Panayan)
Service / Organisation	VPF
Birthplace	Roxas City, Belesia
Education	Qi Yang Kuen Academy
Religion	N/A
Marital Status	
Personality Traits	
Biography	

Eddie Ramos

Finance/Logistics - Visayan People's Front



DOB	06 Mar 1968
Nationality	Belesian
Service / Organisation	VPF (CEO Libas Fisherman's Co-operative)
Birthplace	Roxas City, Belesia
Education	Tanque Nacional High School
Religion	Christian (Catholic)
Marital Status	Married
Personality Traits	• Prone to violence/brutality • Anti-authority/establishment sentiment, but very patriarchal • Impulsive, secretive
Biography	Born into a large fishing family, Eddie grew up under the guidance of his mother after his father and step-father were lost at sea in successive storms. Eddie holds very strong anti-local authority sentiments but holds close ties with his local church. Due to the lack of a strong paternal influence, Eddie often resorts to violence and brutality to resolve disputes. Eddie is suspected of being associated with the VPF. It is not known whether Eddie holds strong sentiments towards the West.

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY	
ZBD-05 AMPHIBIOUS INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLE	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	3
Weapons	30mm Main Gun Hong Jian-73C ATGM 7.62mm Type 80 Coax MG
Mass	26.5t
Speed	65km/h
Sensors	Computerised FCS
Protection	Up to 30mm Armour
Notes	Capacity to carry 10 passengers Amphibious up to Sea State 4 Also known as VN-18 Primary combat vehicle for NTMEF Marine Brigades
WEG Link	ZBD-05_(ZBD-2000)_Olvanan_Amphibious_Infantry_Fighting_Vehicle

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY	
TYPE 63A AMPHIBIOUS LIGHT TANK	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	4
Weapons	105mm Rifled Gun HJ-8 ATGM 12.7mm MG 7.62mm Coax MG
Mass	20t
Speed	75km/h
Sensors	Computerised FCS
Protection	Up to 25mm Armour
Notes	Amphibious Different variants may or may not have the ATGM
WEG Link	Type_63A_(ZTS-63A)_Olvanan_Amphibious_Light_Tank

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY	
T-72B MAIN BATTLE TANK	
Manufacturer	Donovia
Crew	3
Weapons	125mm Smoothbore Gun AT-11 ATGM 12.7mm MG 7.62mm Coax MG
Mass	41t
Speed	60km/h
Sensors	Thermal Computerised FCS
Protection	Up to 500mm Armour Explosive Reactive Armour
Notes	
WEG Link	T-72B_Donovian_Main_Battle_Tank_(MBT)

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY	
TYPE 89 SELF PROPELLED HOWITZER	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	5
Weapons	122mm (L32) Howitzer (18-21km range) 12.7mm HMG
Mass	20t
Speed	60km/h
Sensors	FCS and gun stabilisation
Protection	Armour protection up to small arms fire and shell slinters
Notes	Amphibious (with floatation devices) Also known as PLZ-89 122mm Howitzer max eff range – 21km
WEG Link	Type 89 (PLZ-89) Olvanan 122mm Self-Propelled Howitzer

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY	
M2008 122MM MULTIPLE LAUNCH ROCKET SYSTEM	
Manufacturer	North Torbia
Crew	5
Weapons	122mm HE Rocket
Mass	13.7t
Speed	75km/h
Sensors	PG-1M Panoramic Telescope
Protection	Nil
Notes	Based on BM-21 platform Mounted on Ural 375-D 6x6 wheeled truck Max effective firing range – 21km (32.7km with Olvanan Type 90A rockets)
WEG Link	M2008_North_Torbian_122mm_Multiple_Rocket_Launcher_(MRL)

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY	
TYPE 90B SELF PROPELLED MULTIPLE LAUNCH ROCKET SYSTEM	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	5
Weapons	Fire Dragon 40 122mm HE Rocket (40km range)
Mass	23t
Speed	85km/h
Sensors	Computerised FCS Fire Dragon Rocket – GPS guidance
Protection	Nil
Notes	40 rockets can be loaded in less than 3 mins
WEG Link	Type_90B_Olvanan_122mm_Self-Propelled_Multiple_Launch_Rocket_System

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY	
ZLT-05 AMPHIBIOUS LIGHT TANK	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	4
Weapons	ZTS63A 105mm Main Gun ATGM HJ-73 Red Arrow 7.62mm Coax MG 12.7mm HMG
Mass	28.5t
Speed	65km/h
Sensors	Computerised FCS
Protection	Up to 30mm Armour
Notes	Derived from ZBD-2000 family of tracked amphibious assault vehicles
WEG Link	ZTD-05_(ZBD-2000)_Olvanan_Amphibious_Light_Tank

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY	
MT-55A SELF PROPELLED ARMOURED BRIDGE LAYER	
Manufacturer	Czechoslovakia
Crew	2
Weapons	N/A
Mass	36t
Speed	50km/h
Sensors	N/A
Protection	Similar to T-55 MBT
Notes	Scissors type bridge system Bridge capacity – 50t Gap width – 17m
WEG Link	MT-55A Czechoslovakian Self-Propelled Armoured Bridgelayer

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY	
TMM TRUCK MOUNTED SCISSOR BRIDGE	
Manufacturer	Donovia
Crew	3
Weapons	N/A
Mass	19t
Speed	55km/h
Sensors	N/A
Protection	Nil
Notes	Scissors type bridge system Bridge capacity – 50t Normally 4x TMM are used to span 40m gap
WEG Link	TMM_Donovian_Truck-Mounted_Scissors_Bridge

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY	
GMZ-3 TRACKED MINE LAYING VEHICLE	
Manufacturer	Donovia
Crew	3
Weapons	7.62mm MG
Mass	28.5t
Speed	60km/h
Sensors	N/A
Protection	Applique armour available
Notes	Mine laying system can lay AT mines through a cluster dispersing mechanism or through rear plough and conveyor
WEG Link	GMZ-3_Donovian_Tracked_Minelaying_Vehicle

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY	
UMZ 6x6 SCATTERABLE MINE LAYING SYSTEM	
Manufacturer	Donovia
Crew	2
Weapons	n/a
Mass	10t
Speed	80km/h
Sensors	N/A
Protection	Nil
Notes	Mine laying system is carried on a 6x6 truck Scatter able mines include: • PFM-1S AP • POM-2 AP • PTM-3 AT
WEG Link	UMZ_Donovian_6x6_Scatterable_Minelaying_System

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY	
HQ-16 MEDIUM RANGE SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE SYSTEM	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	?
Weapons	Unknown missile designation but similar to 9M38 Missile Max Alt: 10km Min Alt: 100m Max Range vs Aircraft: 40km
Mass	15t
Speed	85km/h
Sensors	IFF with radar (Search Radar Guidance Vehicle) Max Range: 150km Max Alt: 20km
Protection	Protection from small arms and shell splinters
Notes	Land based version of the HHQ-16 used on naval vessels Also known as LY-80 (export version)
WEG Link	HQ-16_Olvanan_6x6_Medium-Range_Surface-to-Air_Missile_System

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY	
HQ-17A SHORT RANGE SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE SYSTEM	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	3
Weapons	9M330 Missile x16 Max Alt: 6km Max Range vs Aircraft: 12km
Mass	30t
Speed	80km/h
Sensors	IFF with radar (Search Radar Guidance Vehicle) Max Range: 25km (detection range) 15km (tracking range)
Protection	Protection from small arms and shell splinters
Notes	Organic within AD Bn of MAR Bde
WEG Link	HQ-17A_(FM-2000)_Olvanan_Short-Range_Air_Defense_Missile_System

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY	
PGZ-07 35mm SELF-PROPELLES ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	3
Weapons	2x 35mm Cannons Max Range: 4000m
Mass	35t
Speed	55km/h
Sensors	Computerised FCS (cannot fire on the move)
Protection	Protection from small arms and shell splinters
Notes	Also known as PGZ-09 Can target low to med altitude, FW, RW, UAS and cruise missiles System can connect via data-link with other systems
WEG Link	PGZ-07::PGZ-09_(Type_07)_Olvanan_35mm_Self-Propelled_Anti-Aircraft_Gun

TORBIAN PEOPLES NAVY	
Z-9WA HARBIN MULTI-ROLE HELICOPTER	
Manufacturer	Olvana (based on original French design)
Crew	2 + 9-12 troops
Weapons	2x fixed 23mm Guns or 12.7mm HMG 2x Pylons permit mounting up to 8 ATGMs or 2x Rocket pods
Mass	4100kg (combat weight)
Speed	305km/h
Range	1000km (ferry)
Ceiling	4500m
Sensors	Fire control radar Laser designator
Protection	Nil armour ECM / Chaff-Flare Dispenser
Notes	Also known as WZ-09
WEG Link	Z-9_Harbin_(WZ-9)_Olvanan_Medium_Multi-Role_Helicopter

TORBIAN PEOPLES NAVY	
WZ-19 RECONAISSANCE/ATTACK HELICOPTER	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	2
Weapons	1x GSh-23L Autocannon TY-90 AAM HJ-8 ATGM
Mass	4082kg (max T/O weight)
Speed	280km/h
Range	4hrs
Ceiling	4500m
Sensors	Fire control radar (millimetre wave) Laser designator Hemet mounted sights
Protection	ECM / Chaff-Flare Dispenser
Notes	Modified Z-9
WEG Link	Z-19_(WZ-19)_Olvanan_Reconnaissance::Attack_Helicopter

TORBIAN PEOPLES NAVY	
KA-28 ANTI-SUBMARINE HELICOPTER	
Manufacturer	Donovia
Crew	2 + 1-3 Sensor Operators or 16 passengers
Weapons	1x Torpedo (AT-1M/VTT-1/UMGT-1/APR-2) 10x PLAB Anti-sub bombs
Mass	11000kg (max T/O weight)
Speed	250km/h
Range	800km (cruise range)
Ceiling	6000m
Sensors	Submarine search radar
Protection	Nil
Notes	Primary role is ASW, but can provide troop lift Unique contra-rotor design
WEG Link	Ka-28_Donovian_Anti-Submarine_Helicopter

TORBIAN PEOPLES AIR FORCE	
SU-30MKK MULTI-ROLE FIGHTER	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	2
Weapons	1x 30mm GSh-1 Autocannon Various weapon systems on multiple hard points
Mass	34500kg (max T/O weight)
Speed	Mach 2
Range	3000km
Ceiling	17300m
Sensors	ASP-PVD-21 Helmet mounted sight Slotted Planar Array Radar
Protection	ECM
Notes	Based on Donovian SU-27 NTMEF known to be operating 24x SU-30MKK in JFAO
WEG Link	Su-30MKK (Flanker-G) Donovian Multirole Fighter Aircraft

TORBIAN PEOPLES AIR FORCE	
J-11B AIR SUPERIORITY FIGHTER	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	1
Weapons	1x 30mm GSh-1 Autocannon Various weapon systems on 10x hard points
Mass	33000kg (max T/O weight)
Speed	Mach 2.1
Range	3530km
Ceiling	19000m
Sensors	AESA Radar NSts-27 Helmet Mounted Sight
Protection	ECM pods
Notes	Based on Donovian SU-27 NTMEF known to be operating 24x J-11B in JFAO
WEG Link	J-11B_(Flanker-L)_Olvanan_Air_Superiority_Fighter

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY / NAVY	
ASN-207 MEDIUM ALTITUDE LONG ENDURANCE UAV	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	Nil
Weapons/Payload	JN-1102 ECM suite TPN version includes Comms Relay package
Mass	UNK
Speed	UNK
Range	600km operational radius
Ceiling	UNK
Sensors	Electro-Optical packaged based on Israeli system
Protection	Nil
Notes	Requires EQ2102 Vehicle for transportation and launch
WEG Link	ASN-207_Olvanan_MALE_Unmanned_Aerial_Vehicle_(UAV)

TORBIAN PEOPLES ARMY / NAVY	
S-100 UAV	
Manufacturer	Austria (Schiebel)
Crew	Nil
Weapons/Payload	Multiple sensor suites including: Laser Designator, LIDAR, GPR, FLIR
Mass	200kg (55kg Payload)
Speed	220km/h
Range	6hrs
Ceiling	5500m
Sensors	See payload
Protection	Nil
Notes	UCAV variant being developed
WEG Link	Camcopter S-100 Austrian Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)

FREE SULU MOVEMENT / TANTOCO CARTEL	
BK-10 FAST ATTACK CRAFT	
Manufacturer	Olvana
Crew	2 crew 12 passengers
Weapons	No fixed weapons systems
Displacement	4.5t
Speed	40kts
Range	?
Sensors	UNK
Aircraft/Landing Craft	Nil
Notes	Free Sulu Movement and Tantoco Cartel known to operate variants to support piracy activities in Sulu Sea
WEG Link	BK-10_Class_Olvanan_Fast_Attack_Craft_(Assault_Boat)

Step 4

Situation (Panay)

- NTMEF 3rd Marine Bde have secured SPOD and APOD within Roxas City and Caticlan
- NTMEF, with help from the Visayan Peoples Front (VPF) have captured the San Rafael Mine complex
- NTMEF have established a mobile defensive position southwest of the San Rafael Mine and north of the city of Iloilo
- Belesian 12th Inf Bde, after landing in Iloilo, attempted to advance north to destroy NTMEF
- A stalemate has ensued with Belesian Forces defending positions around Iloilo
- North Torbian Forces control all northern approaches to Panay
- Belesia has access to Iloilo City SPOD/APOD



NTMEF MLCOA (Panay)

- ME:
  - Secure Roxas APOD/SPOD
- SE:
  - Secure San Rafael Mine
  - Block any advances North from Iloilo along MSRs
  - Reinforce 3rd MAR Bde with additional Div Troops



NTMEF MDCOA (Panay)

- ME:
  - Seize Iloilo APOD/SPOD
- SE:
  - Neutralise Belesian 12th Bde
  - Secure San Rafael Mine
  - Secure Roxas APOD/SPOD
  - Reinforce 3rd MAR Bde with additional MAR Bde and Div Troops

Assessed Enemy Critical Factors / Decisive Points

Critical Factors

- North Torbia will have long supply lines that cannot overfly South Torbian territory
  - This has necessitated the capture of a staging base in Palawan
  - Supply lines will have to traverse through international waters in the South China Sea and Sulu Sea
- NT JTF(Div) Command will be located in Palawan
  - Sizeable force will be located in Palawan to protect this vital logistic node (4th Marine Bde)
- The long supply lines from North Torbia to Panay means that enemy lines of communication are vulnerable to interdiction and disruption
- North Torbia is relying on local Panayan support to maintain legitimacy of invasion
  - North Torbia will foment Panayan dissatisfaction with Belesian Federation and spur independence movement

Decisive Points

- Reinforce the ground forces in Panay with an additional NTMEF Div troops
- Potential capture of Mt Coolon APOD/SPOD
- Set conditions for favourable political solution
- Set conditions for the independence of Panay (under North Torbian / Olvanan auspices) from Belesian Federation by exploiting historical ethnic tensions

Assessed Enemy Centre of Gravity

Strategic

- North Torbia's Strategic CoG is the moral narrative that their occupation of Belesian territory is to protect ethnic Torbians from persecution in Belesia and their ability to control and maintain that narrative

Operational

- North Torbia's ability to sustain projected power in the region
- Ability to control the sea/air lanes
- The physical manifestation of this CoG are:
  - Surface and sub-surface naval capability
  - Combat aircraft operating out of Palawan and Panay
  - Logistics node at Palawan

Tactical

- The APOD/SPODs at Townsville and Greenvale

Assumptions and IRs

ANNEX C TO
TG 667.2 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

OPERATION CERIUM STEAL

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
LAND OPERATIONS – PANAY
V2.0

LINES OF OPERATION – OP STEEL SENTINEL



Decisive Points ?

1. Enemy dispositions in PANAY are defined/confirmed
2. Coalition Forces have temporal control of sea/air lanes within the JFAO
3. Coalition Forces have staged enough combat power in the JFAO to prosecute decisive actions
4. Coalition Forces have successfully executed the deception plan
5. NTMEF have been successfully isolated logistically on Panay
6. NTMEF isolated politically and socially from the local population on Panay
7. Coalition Forces have conducted JFEO successfully
8. Advance Forces have successfully transitioned operations
9. NTMEF is defeated in JFAO
10. Coalition Forces have transition of authority to UN

Objectives OBJ

1. Deny NTMEF sustainment on Panay
2. Estb safe and secure environment in occupied Belesian territories
3. Degrade Enemy Strategic CoG

CONOPS OUTLINE – OP STEEL SENTINEL





CONOPS OUTLINE – OP CERIUM STEAL

COMD 1 Div (TG667.2) Intent

- **Commander's Intent**
  - **Purpose.** Defeat NTMEF land forces on PANAY.
  - **Method.** Operation CERIUM STEAL will be a three-phase operation nested within Operation STEEL SENTINEL (OSS). Phase 1 will consist of an amphibious lodgement of the TG onto Panay. Phase 2 will result in the Neutralisation of the NTMEF by dislocating and then defeating them in battle. During Phase 2, X BDE will ADV N and defeat NTMEF forces loc N of Passi. This will dislocate the NTMEF forces IVO Roxas City and set the conditions for Y BDE to defeat these forces in detail. Phase 3 will be the transition of authority back to the BX government. At all times, we must be cognisant that the main effort is the removal of NT forces in BX. If this can be achieved during any of the stages without further bloodshed, then all effort must be taken to explore those options.
  - **Endstate.** The liberation of PANAY and removal of North Torbian forces from PANAY, establishment of a safe and secure environment in the occupied Belesian territories, and conditions set for the UN supervised transition of authority in Panay back to the Belesian Government

Critical Assumptions

- Critical Assumptions
  - ADF Armoured vehicles have overmatch against most NTMEF armoured vehicles
  - Armoured vehicles restricted to roads without significant engineering effort
  - Full SOFA and cooperation with Belesia to allow staging of Coalition Forces (CF) from Belesian territory
  - TG667.2 will have operational control of Belesian Forces within PANAY
  - TG667.2 will not be permitted to kinetically target the San Rafael mine complex
  - NTMEF will anticipate and oppose landing
  - Air superiority achieved for certain periods over PANAY by coalition forces



Situation

Enemy (North Torbia):

- North Torbian Marine Expeditionary Force (**NTMEF**) elements have lodged in Panay and Palawan
- NTMEF 4th MAR Bde lodged in El Nido and refurbished WW2 port and airfield being used as a staging base for movement into Panay
- NTMEF 3rd MAR Bde in Panay have secured the city of Roxas City and San Rafael Mine complex
- Pro-NT insurgents (Visayan Peoples Front - VPF) have aided NT in securing strategic locations in Panay
- Surface and sub-surface sea elements are operating in the Sulu and Sth China Sea
    - 1x Type 052D Luyang III (DDG)
    - 2x Type 052C Luyang II (DDG)
    - 1x Type 051G Luda (DDG)
    - 2x Type 054A Jiangkai II (FFH)
    - 1x Type 053H3 Jiangwei II (FFH)
    - 2x Type 053 Jianghu V (FFG)
    - 3x Type 039 Song (SSK)
- Combat air elements operating out of El Nido Airfield (12x SU-30MKK, 12x J-11B) and Roxas Airport (12x SU-30MKK, 12x J-11B, 12x Z-9, and 6x Z-19)
- Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ – also referred to as ADIZ/MEZ) declared over occupied islands and connecting sea/air lanes

- Strategic Goals
    - Seek political solution to establish Panay ‘independence’ (annexation) under NT sponsorship
    - Seek to maintain destabilised region to set the conditions for annexation of Panay
    - Control of ‘rare earth metals’ supply in region

- Tactical Goals
    - NTMEF will likely secure positions within Panay and Palawan and may reinforce presence in region
    - Secure sea/air lines of communications/supply between Roxas City-El Nido-North Torbia
    - Maintain and defend TEZ over occupied territories and sea/air lanes
    - No intent to escalate conflict beyond occupied islands


Cabal
South China Sea
SAG 1
1x Luyang III DDG
1x Jiangkai II FFH
G
SAG 2
1x Luyang II DDG
1x Jiangkai II FFH
1x Jianghu V FFG
Roxas
El Nido
San Rafael Mine
Panay
TEZ
SAG 3
1x Luyang II DDG
1x Luda DDG
1x Jiangwei II FFH
1x Jianghu V FFG
Iloilo
Palawan
G
Sulu Sea

Assessed Enemy Critical Factors / Decisive Points

Critical Factors

- NTMEF Forces in Panay will be dependant on log node on Palawan
  - Supply lines will have to traverse through international waters in the South China Sea and Sulu Sea
  - Main Log hub will be in Roxas – at least a BN will be used to hold this log node (Port/Airfield)
  - Alternate Log hub has been identified at Greenvale – estimate a Coy strength holding this node
- 3 MAR BDE HQ (NTMEF) will be located in Roxas
  - Affiliate with VPF
- 3 MAR BDE likely to use tank BN as reserve to defeat AS lodgement
  - Reinforced with Company of T-72B/Type 98 tanks
- North Torbia is relying on local Panayan support to maintain legitimacy of invasion
  - North Torbia will foment Panayan dissatisfaction with Belesian Federation and spur independence movement

Decisive Points

- Reinforce the ground forces in Panay with an additional NTMEF assets (AD, Cbt Engr, EW, MLRS)
- Potential capture of Iloilo
- Set conditions for favourable political solution [don’t lose!]
- Set conditions for the independence of Panay (under North Torbian / Olvanan auspices) from Belesian Federation by exploiting historical ethnic tensions

Assessed Enemy Centre of Gravity

Strategic

- North Torbia's Strategic CoG is the moral narrative that their occupation of Belesian territory is to protect ethnic Torbians from persecution in Belesia and their ability to control and maintain that narrative

Operational

- North Torbia's ability to sustain projected power in the region
- Ability to control the sea/air lanes
- The physical manifestation of this CoG are:
  - Surface and sub-surface naval capability
  - Combat aircraft operating out of Palawan and Panay
  - Logistics node at Palawan

Tactical

- 3 MAR BDE COG is assessed as their ability to maintain their occupation of Roxas.

C2 and Groupings

See separate CJTF 667.2 C2 Diagram for more detail


Operational Environment
Olvana
Area of Interest
North Torbia
South Torbia
Gabal
Belesia
Joint Force Area of Operations

C-12/24

AO FANNING





ROUTES



Control Routes

Route ORANGE
- Old Iloilo-Capiz Road – PC Barracks Rd – Tapaz-Jamind-Altavaz Road
- ILOILO CITY APOD/SPOD – CALINOG – TAPAZ – JAMIND – SAPI-AN

Route PURPLE
- Calinog-Passi Road – Passi-San Rafael Road – Sara-Lemery Road
- CALINOG – PASSI – SAN RAFAEL – LEMERY – SARA

Route BLUE
- Roxas Ivisan Bypass– PC Barracks Road – Aklan West Road
- ROXAS CITY – ALTAVAS – KALIBO – CATICLAN SPOD

Route GREEN
- Iloilo-East-Coast-Capiz Road
- ILOILO CITY APOD/SPOD – PASSI – CUATERO – ROXAS CITY

Route RED
- Barotac-NuevoRd-Zarraga Road – Western Nautical Highway
- ILOILO CITY – BAROTAC NUEVEO – BANATE – SARA – ESTANCIA

Route MAGENTA
- Iloilo-East Coast-Capiz Road
- ROXAS CITY – PILAR – ESTANCIA

BOUNDARIES & PHASE LINES



Phase Lines

Phase Line ABLE
- SAN JOSE – SANTA BARBARA – BANALE – CONCEPCION

Phase Line BAKER
- VALDERRAMA – CALINOG – PASSI – SAN RAFAEL – SARA

Phase Line CHARLIE
- SEBASTE – JAMINDAN – DAO – MAAYON – PRESIDENT ROXAS – ESTANCIA

Phase Line DOG
- CATICLAN – KALIBO – ROXAS CITY – PILAR – CARLES



1 Div Scheme of Manoeuvre

Phase 1 – Lodgement (D-Day – D+2)

Main Effort:

- Conduct lodgement and Joint Force Entry Operations into Panay

Supporting Efforts:

- Conduct Joint Force Entry Operations deception plan on Palawan
- Establish logistic node at Iloilo
- Degrade NTMEF ground forces capability in Panay

Endstate:

- CJTF 667.2 ground elements will have lodged successfully in Panay and postured to conduct decisive actions

Groupings & Tasks

HQ 1 Div:

- Estb HQ Main at Iloilo APOD
- Assume OPCON of all Coalition assets in Panay (incl BX 12 Inf Bde)

Y Bde:

- Conduct JFEO in the vic of Banate

X Bde:

- Lodge at Iloilo SPOD/APOD
- Secure SPOD/APOD within Iloilo
- BPT conduct Fwd Passage of Lines with BX 12 Bde

16 Avn Bde

- Support lodgement and secure APOD
- BPT conduct recce tasks

FSG:

- Estb main log node at Iloilo APOD/SPOD

SF Elms

- Continue to conduct AFO on key NTMEF HVT

BX 12 Bde

- Secure Iloilo APOD/SPOD
- Maintain defensive positions around Iloilo



1 Div Scheme of Manoeuvre
Phase 2 – Neutralise (D+3 – D+14)

Main Effort:

- Defeat NTMEF in Panay by securing Roxas

Supporting Efforts:

- Isolate Charters Towers
- Secure Hervey Range Rd
- Secure San Rafael Mine
- Contain Ayr
- Conduct RASO

Endstate:

- NTMEF ground forces will have been defeated on Panay

Groupings & Tasks

Y Bde:

- Adv NW and secure San Rapahel Mine
- Clear NE BDET vic Sara
- Neutralise/Contain NT BDET vic Estancia
- Secure Roxas

X Bde:

- Conduct Fwd Passage of Lines with BX 12 Bde
- Adv N along Route GREEN / ORANGE
- Neutralise/Isolate NT BDET vic Passi
- Clear towards Route BLUE

16 Avn Bde:

- Conduct recce tasks ISO Cbt Bdes
- Destroy NTMEF armour/HVT
- Conduct AMO
- Conduct AME

SF Elms

- Continue to conduct AFO on key NTMEF HVT

BX 12 (Z) Bde

- Advance north along Route Yellow
- Secure Caticlan



1 Div Scheme of Manoeuvre

Phase 3 – Transition (D+15 onwards)

Main Effort:

- Transition to UN peacekeeping

Supporting Efforts:

- HOTO authority to Belesian Forces
- Reconstruction efforts
- Stability Operations
- Repatriate/Return to Aus ADF assets
- Conduct COIN as needed

Endstate:

- Establishment of Belesian authority in Panay
- Removal/repatriation of all NTMEF from Belesian territory

Groupings & Tasks

HQ 1 Div:

- Maintain security of Panay under UN mandate
- BPT transition authority to BX Forces / Government

Y Bde:

- Conduct STABOPS within Roxas and boundaries
- BPT handover security to BX authority

X Bde:

- Conduct STABOPS within Passi and boundaries
- BPT handover security to BX authority

16 Avn Bde:

- Assist in conduct of STABOPS
- BPT conduct AMO as required

FSG:

- Begin RTA procedures on ADF assets no longer required as per draw down plan
- BPT conduct reconstruction efforts

SF Elms

- BPT conduct COIN

Concept for Intelligence Operations

Collection

- All available intelligence gathering assets across all domains will be utilised including:
  - HUMINT
  - ELINT
  - SIGINT

Link to PIR

- TBA

Counterintelligence

- TBA

Communications and Information Systems

Space

- TBA

Datalinks

- TBA

Coordination

- TBA

Command and Signal

Command

- Succession of Command
  - COMD TG 667.2
  - Deputy COMD TG 667.2
  - COMD Y Bde
  - COMD X Bde

Signals

- TBA

Vulnerabilities and Risks

Phase 1

- TBA

Phase 2

- TBA

Phase 3

- TBA

Annex D
HQ 1 DIV Task Group 667.2 OPORD 01 (OPERATION CERIUM STEAL (OCS))

FIRE SUPPORT, JOINT FIRES AND TARGETING

References:
A. CJTF 667 OPORD 01 (OP STEEL SENTINEL)

Time Zone: Reference A

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy. Reference A.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) 1 Div Field Artillery Order of Battle:

(a) 1 Regt RAA (M777, 155mm How), DS 7 Cbt Bde, and

(b) 4 Regt RAA (M777, 155mm How), DS 3 Bde.

(2) 6 Bde Units:

(a) 16 Regt RAA (GBAD, RBS70),[1]

(b) 20 Regt RAA (STA)[2], DS TG 667.2, and

(c) HIMARS Bty RAA (M142 RKT) DS TG 667.2.

(3) 12 (BX) Moto Bde:

(a) 12 FA Bn (18 x D30, 120 mm How) DS 13 (BX) Moto Bde, and

(b) 12 ADA Bty (9 x ZU 23 8, 23 mm canon).

2. MISSION. To provide coordinated joint fires in support of TG 667.2 IOT CLEAR NT Mar DTG on PANAY.

3. EXECUTION

a. Commander's Guidance for Joint Firepower.

(1) Employ lethal and non-lethal capabilities ISO TG 677.2 mission;

(2) JFECC HQ TG 667.2 is responsible for coordinating targeting, joint offensive support to achieve effects as guided by Joint Targeting Directive issued by CJTF 667;

(3) 12 (BX) FA Bn will provide fire support to TG 667.2 lodgement until 1 Div FA reports ready;

(4) 1 Div field artillery units will lodge with their supported brigades once sufficient and suitable AMA are secure in bde AO;

[1] Could read 8 Bde?
[2] Could read 16 Bde?

(5) Once ready, 1 & 4 Regt RAA will assume FIRES to respective bde NLT attainment of PL ABLE (D+3) and manoeuvre to ensure IDF coverage for duration of OCS;

(6) Elements of 16 Regt RAA will lodge to provide GBAD at ILOILO;

(7) 20 Regt RAA, remainder 16 Regt RAA and HIMARS Bty RAA will lodge once 3 & 7 Bde secure PL BAKER;

(8) 20 Regt RAA will commence STA ISO of TG 667.2 advance to SAN RAFAEL and PASSI;

(9) 16 Regt RAA will continue to provide GBAD at ILOILO, once PL CHARLIE is secure, provide GBAD to deny enemy air assets use of ROXAS;

(10) HIMARS Bty RAA is to provide depth FIRES against enemy IDF, armour and counter attack elements;

(11) TG 667.3 CAS will provide up three sorties per day to support TG 667.2, bids for CAS by Bde HQ through gun RHQ to JFECC;

(12) TG 667.1 will provide opportunity NGS by NGS Request through JFECC from gun RHQ.

b. Field Artillery Groupings and Tasks

(1) D-D+3 (PL ABLE)

(a) 12 (BX) FA Bn ISO TG 667.2;

(b) 1 Regt RAA DS 7 Cbt Bde;

(c) 4 Regt RAA DS 3 Bde;

(d) 20 Regt RAA ISO TG 667.2 priority STA 7 Cbt Bde; and

(e) HIMARS Bty RAA ISO TG 667.2 priority deep FIRES.

(2) D+3-D10 (PL CHARLIE)

(a) 12 (BX) FA Bn reverts ISO 12 (BX) Moto Bde

(b) Remainder – no change

(3) D+10-D+14 (PL DOG): no change.

(4) D+15 onwards: BPT support Transition

c. GBAD

(1) D-D+3

(a) 16 Regt RAA - area defence ILOILO; and

(b) 12 (BX) ADA Bty – as directed by 12 (BX) Moto Bde.

(2) D+3-D10 (PL CHARLIE)

(a) 16 Regt RAA:

i. Area defence ILOILO; and

ii. Area defence IVO ROXAS.

(b) 12 (BX) ADA Bty – no change.

(3) D+10-D+14 (PL DOG): no change.

(4) D+15 onwards: BPT support Transition

d. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Fire Support Coordination Measures:

(a) Boundaries.

i. FIRES within 500m of a boundary must be coordinated with adjacent formation or unit.

ii. FIRES greater than 500m of a boundary is at the discretion of the formation/unit commander.

(b) Coordinated Fire Line (CFL). Battle Groups (BG) are responsible for identifying and promulgating a CFL that must be coincident with a phase line (PL). A trigger line is to be identified 1000m short of the CFL; JOSTs must request a shift to CFL on attaining the trigger line.

(c) Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT). BG are to update FLOT NLT every 30 minutes when units are on the move. FIRES is not to be closer than 500m to FLOT.

(d) Fire Support Coordination Line. (FSCL).

i. D-D+3 – FSCL IRON coincides with PL BAKER;

ii. D+4-D+10 – FSCL COBALT coincides with PL DOG;

iii. D+11-D+14 – FSCL ZINC coincides with PL EASY; and

iv. D+15 onwards – Revert to TG 667.2 AO as RFA.

(e) Free Fire Areas (FFA). No FFA are designated on the friendly side of the FSCL.

(f) Restrictive Fire Area (RFA). The following are RFA for OSC. HQ TG 667.2 is the authority to engage within RFA:

i. Population and conglomeration centres: ROXAS, SAN RAFAEL, PASSI, CATICLAN.

ii. With 500m of major watercourse crossing (bridge or causeway) of PANAY Island rivers;

iii. Within 500m of airstrips identified as AMA for HIMARS.

(g) No Fire Area (NFA). San Rafael Cerium Mine.

(2) Joint Fires

(a) JFECC TG 667.2 to coordinate Joint Fires and targeting in AO see appendix 1;

(b) Bdes may nominate targets to JFECC to support manoeuvre OSC;

(3) Ammunition Planning. The following table provides the current ammo planning estimate to TG 667.2 OSC:

(a) 155mm – 1st lines/gun/day;

(b) M142 RKT – Pods per launcher/day

(c) RBS 70 – missiles per launcher/day:

PHASE	HE	SMK	IR ILL	M142 RKT	RBS 70
D-D+3	0.5	0.5	0.5	1	1
D+3-D+10	2	2	2	4	6
D+10-D+14	3	3	3	6	6
D+15 +++	1	1	1	2	4

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

a. Arty Ammunition

(1) 12 (BX) Moto Bde is responsible for its Class V supplies;

(2) TG 667.2 FA units initial load of ammunition will be demand replenishment through brigade support group (BSG);

(3) From D+3 ammunition resupply will be automatic from BSG to gun lines; and

(4) BSG will collect ammunition from FSG ammunition dumps IAW dumping program.

b. Movement

(1) DS units will move to designated AMA, hides, Assy Area IAW supported formation orders.

(2) GBAD and STA units will move as directed by HQ TG 667.2.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command

(1) Comd TG 667.2 will exercise command of all Arty units.

(2) Alternate Comd. COL Effects TG 667.2 is alternate Comd arty units TG 667.2.

(3) Locations. JFECC will collocate with TG 667.2 Main CP.

(4) Coordination:

(a) Target lists

(b) Air space control

b. Signal

(1) Communications IAW with TG 667.2 SIG OP Procedures.

Appendices:

Appendix 1 - Joint Targeting
Appendix 2 - Fire Support Coordination Measures Overlay

Appx 1
Annex D
HQ 1 DIV Task Group 667.2 OPORD 01 (OPERATION CERIUM STEAL (OCS))

JOINT TARGETING

References.

A. CJTF 667 OPORD 01 (OP STEEL SENTINEL)

1. SITUATION.

a. General. This order sets out the agreed approach to joint targeting for OCS.

2. MISSION. To provide coordinated joint fires in support of TG 667.2 IOT CLEAR NT Mar DTG on PANAY.

3. EXECUTION.

a. The Targeting Process. The targeting process:

(1) does not apply when exercising self-defence governed by the appropriate principles and ROE;

(2) does not apply immediate action is required;

(3) these situations are not to be used to avoid the targeting process when of offensive action can be foreseen; and

(4) all targeting and application of joint FIRES are to be conducted in compliance with the ROE implemented and the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC).

b. TG 667.2 Targeting Board (DTB). Comprises:

(1) Comd TG 667.2 or delegate;

(2) COL Effects

(3) INT;

(4) OPS;

(5) LEGAL;

(6) LO 12 (BX) Moto Bde; and

(7) JFECC secretariat.

c. Legitimate Targets. The principle of distinction as described in International Humanitarian Law (IHL) will always be applied by commanders. Commanders at all levels must distinguish the civilian population and objects, and combatants and military objectives.

d. Legitimate targets are divided into two categories:

(1) Persons as military objectives; and

(2) Objects as military objectives.

e. The Doubt Rule. If doubt exists about the person or object, they shall be considered civilian.

f. Dynamic Targeting. The Dynamic Targeting process is applied to:

(1) targets of opportunity; and

(2) planned targets that have changed and require rapid engagement. COMD TG 667.2 has pre-approved engagement of the following targets in the AO:

(a) IDF systems;

(b) GBAD systems;

(c) Tank units;

(d) AT units; and

(e) C2 vehicles.

Tabs (TBI):

Tab A - Targeting Priorities
Tab C - Target Checklist
Tab D - Attack Guidance Matrix

ANNEX XX TO
TG667.2 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

HOST NATION SUPPORT (HNS)

References:
A. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Belesia/Australia 11 April 2006

1. SITUATION. The Belesian (BX) Government has limited resources available to support CJTF 667 efforts to end North Torbian aggression on Panay. As a relatively new democratic federation, the Belesian Government is busy with maintaining law and order among its other provinces. To that end, Belesian resources will be limited to humanitarian aid and other essential resources for the effective governance of Panay during and post conflict. The Belesian Federation Defense Force (BFDF) has provided support to the liberation of Panay in the form of a Motorised Brigade (12 Mot Bde). Logistic support for the 12 Mot Bde will be through the BFDF, coordinated and augmented by TG 667.2 whilst the 12 Mot Bde remains in the TG 667.2 AO.

2. MISSION. Coordinate the provision of HNS to TG 667.2 elements located in Panay to contribute to mission success.

3. EXECUTION

a. Scheme of HNS. Resources are constrained within BX. To that end it is the intent of Comd TG 667.2 that forces operating within the TG 667.2 Area of Operations (AO) shall be self-sufficient and will not impose a significant support bill on the host nation (HN). In order to reduce demands on HN, all HNS requests shall be made through the Force Support Group (FSG).

b. HNS Considerations.

(1) Facilities. HN has agreed that TG 667.2 will have access to buildings within the Iloilo APOD and SPOD where they are available. Requests are to be made through FSG.

(2) Ammunition and Weapons. TG 667.2 FE will not utilise BX ammunition and weapons, except those under OPCON with the 12 Mot Bde.

(3) Communications. Belesian telephone (cell and land-line) networks are relatively advanced and provide a high degree of functionality for military communications as does the national data network. TG 667.2 may utilise some of the existing communications infrastructure on Panay, but only at the OFFICIAL level. Consideration must be taken that civilian NGO/OGAs will be relying on existing telecommunications infrastructure on Panay. TG 667.2 will minimise use of the limited telecommunications infrastructure where possible

(4) Finance. The government of BX has agreed that there will be no charge for the use of government and military facilities for TG 667.2. Local contractors which can be provided (permissive environment permitting) will be charged at the same rate as the local government for the same service.

(5) Fuel. Fuel shall be drawn from Belesian sources only in emergency circumstances. Where it is necessary to draw from Belsian sources, fuel will be replaced in kind as soon as practical.

(6) Local Labour. Local labour is available to support TG 667.2 operations. Payment for labour shall be at agreed rates identified in the technical arrangement to the SOFA (Ref A, Annex 1, Section 6). All requests for local labour are to be made through the FSG.

(7) Maintenance. TG 667.2 units shall have access to maintenance facilities and equipment not in use by Belesian government agencies or military. Access will be strictly controlled through advance requests to the FSG.

(8) Medical. TG 667.2 units and personnel shall only use Belesian medical facilities in an emergency to save life and limb. TG 667.2 will utlise organic CJTF 667 medical services in line with the Health Support Order Annex. This includes the 12 Mot Bde whilst it is within the TG 667.2 AO. Injured TG 667.2 members shall subsequently be transferred to the Role 2E or 3 hospital as soon as practical. Any emergency treatment by Belesian medical services shall immediately be reported to TG 667.2 J07.

(9) Movement/Transport Support. There is limited transport available within Panay and TG 667.2 formations cannot rely on transportation support from local contractors within Panay whilst it remains a non-permissive environment. During Ph3 (Transition), we can expect more transportation support to become available as government and private industry return. Additionally, any riverine/littoral services within and around Panay cannot be counted upon to be available until hostilities cease. 35 Water Transport Sqn will provide riverine transportation where needed, in addition to organic engineer assets from the CERs and 6 ESR. Several large water obstacles within Panay may have operating ferries. Planning for their usage must assume that these services will not be available due to enemy action.

(10) Rations. TG 667.2 will draw upon organic ration supplies (CL I stores). Fresh rations will be procured through the FSG and purchased at market rates if available within Belesia. If fresh rations are available within Panay, careful consideration must be given that these supplies do not affect availability to the local population or NGO/OGAs providing humanitarian aid.

(11) Supplies and Equipment. All spare parts and equipment will be provided through extant supply chains back to the National Support Base (NSB). Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) will be responsible for providing their own spare parts and equipment. If available, common spare parts and equipment (e.g. tools) may be purchased through Belesian stocks by the FSG, but only in accordance with arrangements in the SOFA (Ref A).

(12) Translation. Translation and interpreter services are available within BX. Payment for translation and interpreter services shall be at agreed rates

identified in the technical arrangement to the SOFAs (as contractors or local labour). Requests for translation and interpreter services are to be made through the FSG.

(13) Water. TG 667.2 formations and units are to draw water exclusively from military sources. Units responsible for acquiring and treating bulk water may draw water from Belesian military and government facilities although potability will still need to be confirmed.

c. Tasks to Subordinate Units.

(1) Force Support Group.

(a) Coordinate requests for local labour services;

(b) Coordinate requests for translation and interpreter services;

(c) Coordinate contracting for commercial transport services; and

(d) Coordinate requests for use of Belesian military facilities and locations in Panay.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT. No change to base order.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. No change to base order.

ANNEX XX TO
TG 667.2 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

References

A. Joint Media and Communications Directive 01/2020, MSC dated 15 July 2019
B. Joint Targeting Directive 01/2020 Defence Minister - Joint Effects Guidelines
C. Annex J to OP STEEL SENTINEL – CJTF 667 OPORD 01 – Info Ops
D. United Nations Security Council Resolution 8873 dated 01 May 2020
E. Joint Information Operations Policy CJOPS dated 14 May 2020
E. Information Operations Support - Planning Directive, dated 05 Jun 2020
F. Multi-National Headquarters SOP and Operating Instrs dated May 2020

SITUATION

1. General. Information Operations (IO) is the integration, synchronisation and coordination of two or more non-kinetic means through a number of Information Related Capabilities (IRC) that generate and sustain a targeted information advantage. An information advantage is a favourable information situation relative to a group, organisation or adversary. IO includes both influencing the decision-making of actors while protecting our own information and decision-making. These include:

a. Shaping and Influencing (S&I) (at the strategic level);

b. Information Operations (IO) (at the operational level); and

c. Inform and Influence Actions (IIA) (at the tactical level).

2. The IRCs are the tools, capabilities or processes, which can have effects of a physical, functional, temporal or psychological nature upon target systems and/or target audiences (an individual group selected for an effect). The IRCs have many extended sub elements to them but all work towards the same aim as the main component under the direction of IO. All actions are integrated into the overall campaign plan and are applicable from Phase 1 to Phase 3 of OP CERIUM STEAL and must be planned accordingly and not added later. Achievement of Australia's national aims and national strategic objectives, as stated in Ref A, within the South Pacific region requires TG 667.2 IO assets to nest within the CJTF 667 ability to synchronise and integrate the Info Ops BOS activities with CJTF 667 Manoeuvre BOS and Offensive Support BOS activities. This Info Ops Annex provides the non-kinetic guidance for TG 667.2 IO efforts IAW Refs B and C.

3. Adversary Forces. For analysis of operational environment, threat forces and assessment of likely en ops, see OPORD Annex B, Intelligence. In summary, Nth Torbian (NT) forces have invaded Panay in a bid to seize control of critical natural resources under the guise of protecting the Torbian diaspora in Panay. NT government (GoNT) and military (North Torbian Marine Expeditionary Force – NTMEF) forces are heavily engaged in air, land and sea operations and shaping and influencing effects across the northern most island province of Panay, in an undermining attempt to separate it from its

nation state of Belesia. This has necessitated the United Nations assembly to pronounce a Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 8873, noted as Ref D, to re-establish the Government of Belesian (GoB) sovereignty in both islands of Panay and Palawan. However, NTMEF information operations activities have been undertaken for some time and have had the desired effect on the population and will take some determination to change. This is especially true given NTMEF IO elements have an additional IRC in their organisation and which has been actively deployed. That of terrorism. This non-kinetic IRC has the capability of producing both lethal and non-lethal effects and is very successful.

4. Friendly Forces. For information and organisations of detailed friendly forces, groupings, tasks and capabilities, see OPORD Annex C, Operations. Those friendly force IRC planners, staff and elements to be made available to TG 667.2 IO Cell, include but are not limited to, those below noted;

a. Civil Military Operations (CMO) elements and components including the provisions and coordination of tactical CIMIC Team, Civil Aid Programs (CAP), and Civil Military Actions or Activities (CMA).

b. Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) elements and components including the provision of Radio in a Box (RIAB) broadcast staff and eqpt and speaker announcement / material delivery teams.

c. Electronic Warfare (EW) elements and components including air strike capabilities (EA-18 Growler sorties) and ground Direction Finding and Radio Intercept (LEWT) teams.

d. Key Leader Engagement (KLE) cell for the creation of the liaison architecture and assignment and coordination of Force Elements (FE) for the implementation of the KLE plan.

e. Media and Public Affairs (MPA) officers, staff and combat camera teams (CCT) to be coordinated with IO to achieve the COMD's desired Public Relations (PR) effect as detailed in the strategic communications directive and the MPA plan. This includes media liaison and release of approved targeted public information.

f. Computer Network Operations (CNO) staff and teams to advise on strategic effects and assist with protection measures. Its strike capability is not advised and will be noted in the CJTF 667 strategic S&I Plan.

g. Deception (DECEP) staff and units to create and implement the larger operational manoeuvre decep plan and the coordination of tactical level deception activities. This includes but is not limited to cam and concealment, dummy sites and decoy wpns, false electronic signatures and the staging of false activities and lures.

h. Operational Security (OPSEC) staff and teams to advise on OPSEC measures to protect EEFIs and monitor, investigate and report on OPSEC violations for further actions.

i. Presence, Posture and Profile (PPP) activities will be a matter for all FE units and members adherence to follow IAW established procedures, orders, instructions and the PPP plan.

j. Protective Security (PS) staff and Rear Security, Regimental Provost and Military Police FE to work towards the PS plan.

k. Information Assurance (IA) activities to secure ICT hardware and software, networks and routers, data servers and information, and systems access protection measures IAW Information System Security Procedures (ISSP).

l. Offensive Support (OS) elements along with Joint Fires (JF) units and systems which support the Manoeuvre BOS but with whom can be leveraged non-lethal effects such as show of force, fire power demonstrations or destruction of material IAW synchronised effects plan.

m. Evidentiary Imagery (EI) staff and elements capable or capturing before and after activities imagery, such as bomb damage assessment to counter that which may be used against FE by adversary.

n. Military to Military (M2M) networking cell for the creation of the communications and information architecture between deploy allied and host nation military force units and HQs, and the publishing of this data for the implementation of the M2M Plan. M2M should not be confused with the Liaison Officer function as prescribed in the C2 BOS.

o. Other related staff and organisations as detailed by the Comd to achieve a desired effect on a target using the means at their disposal. These include resources inside and outside of the AO.

MISSION

5. Information Operations are to be conducted in support of the TG 667.2 mission of conducting military operations to expel all NTMEF from Panay, in order to create conditions for the re-establishment of a safe and secure environment in Belesia and the surrounding region in accordance with the provisions of the UNSCR 8873.

EXECUTION

6. **Commanders Intent.**

a. **Purpose**. The purpose of TG 667.2 IO within Panay is to DEGRADE adversary information and information systems whilst protecting and enhancing TG 667.2 information and information systems.

b**.** **Method**. IO will support the TG 667.2 mission in accordance with the IRC taskings as noted in Ref E, through performance of the following inform and influence actions:

(1) PROTECT TG 667.2 legitimacy, information and information systems IOT ENABLE TG 667.2 operations.

(2) INFORM Panay civil population of NTMEF subversion/atrocities IOT UNDERMINE NTMEF actions and narrative.

(3) DEGRADE enemy forces and belligerent actors within Panay IOT ENHANCE GoB and Panayan authorities.

(4) INFLUENCE Panay civil population to reconcile IOT ASSIST GoB to re-establish law and order.

c. **End state.** All foreign actors have been rejected by Panayan CIVPOP, belligerent groups degraded to ineffectiveness, community groups commencing reconciliation, GoB endorsed and supported as legitimate authority and TG 667.2 preparing to conduct transition actions.

7. **Concept of Operations.**

a. **Essential Effects.** The desired TG 667.2 essential effects are as follows:

(1) **1. PROMOTE GoB and TG 667.2 legitimacy.** The immediate acquisition of the dominant narrative within Panay is essential to achieving specified national strategic aims. IOT facilitate the below listed joint essential effects, TG 667.2 and GoB legitimacy are a crucial platform that will both prevent further NT involvement and undermine NTMEF shaping and influencing actions.

(2) **2. ISOLATE Panay from foreign influence.** IOT allow Panay to return to normal patterns of life, external destabilising influences that are affecting the internal security of Panay must be isolated. If belligerent groups within Panay are unable to communicate and resupply, their influence on the battle space will be dramatically reduced.

(3) **3. DEGRADE belligerent actors within Panay.** Once belligerent groups are isolated from supply and support, these groups must be systematically degraded to reduce their impact on TG 667.2 and GoB operations. This will be achieved through synchronisation of direct and indirect kinetic and non-kinetic TG 667.2 actions to dislocate and neutralise belligerent actors in Panay.

(4) **4. ASSIST GoB to re-establish law and order.** The degradation of belligerent groups alone will not be sufficient to allow transition of Panay to HN control. The enhancement of local security forces and government authorities will be essential to the achievement of the TG 667.2 end state.

b. **Joint Effects Tasks (JETs).** In line with the joint essential effects listed above, the approved JETs are as follows:

(1) **1.1 PROMOTE TG 667.2 legitimacy.** Throughout this operation, it is essential that TG 667.2 legitimacy is maintained both IOT maintain public support in Panay and AS, and to counter pro-NT narratives that seek to undermine TG 667.2 presence.

(2) **1.2 ENHANCE GoB legitimacy.** IOT achieve the end state it is essential that both the Panay CIVPOP and the international community accept the reinstated GoB. Therefore, TG 667.2 under CJTF 667 is to facilitate every opportunity to enhance the GoB's reputation to further counter the NT negative narrative.

(3) **1.3 UNDERMINE NT legitimacy.** IOT prevent NT force projection and escalation, it is essential that the NT narrative is dismantled at every opportunity using facts and examples of NTMEF influence within Panay. This will undermine NT's political standing in the region and reduce their impact on shaping regional and global opinion.

(4) **1.4 EXPOSE NTMEF atrocities and regional shaping actions.** Linkages to activities within the NTMEF shaping and influencing activities will further degrade NT's political position and enhance the TG 667.2 narrative.

(5). **2.1 DISLOCATE NTMEF within Panay.** Where possible, TG 667.2 seeks to physically and functionally dislocate NTMEF forces through non-kinetic actions and non-lethal effects IOT activate NTMEF withdrawal triggers and avoid kinetic engagement with TG 667.2 elements.

(6) **2.2 ISOLATE NTMEF, Insurgents and Auxiliaries from support bases.** Concurrent isolation of belligerent groups within Panay from local, regional and transnational support will deny these groups the ability to remain below the detection threshold and enable TG 667.2 targeting.

(7) **3.1 EXPOSE NTMEF destabilising actions.** IOT influence Panayan CIVPOP to expose belligerent groups concealed within their midst, links to NTMEF shaping and influencing within Panay are an important platform for the dismantling of belligerent group support.

(8) **3.2 INFORM Panayan CIVPOP of atrocities.** Continual exposure of belligerent group activities against the Panayan CIVPOP and GoB will contribute to the isolation of subversive elements from the population.

(9) **3.3 ISOLATE NTMEF, Insurgents and Auxiliaries from Panayan CIVPOP.** In addition to INFORM effects, TG 667.2 must undertake non-kinetic actions to cause these groups to isolate themselves from the population IOT allow targeting.

(10) **3.4 SHAPE NTMEF, Insurgents and Auxiliaries into TG 667.2 EAs.** Once clearly isolated from Panayan CIVPOP, TG 667.2 needs to shape these groups into a time and place of its own choosing IOT neutralise them.

(11) **4.1 ENHANCE Panayan authorities.** IOT ensure that Panayan establishments have the capabilities required to assume control of Panay, TG 667.2 must progressively enhance host nation authorities in preparation for transition.

(12) **4.2 ENHANCE ethnic relations.** A significant factor of instability within Panay is the state of relations between the various ethnic groups. By improving these relations at the local level, TG 667.2 will reduce a significant threat to Panayan authority's ability to maintain control of the population.

(13) **4.3 PROTECT vulnerable populations within Panay.** In concert with international conventions, treaties and obligations, TG 667.2 must understand its responsibilities with regard to UNSCR1325, 1612, 1674, 1820 and 2242 in addition to the culture and values beliefs within Panayan society.

(14) **4.4 PROTECT critical infrastructure within Panay.** The legitimacy of both TG 667.2 and GoB in Panay will rest on TG 667.2's ability to maintain essential services, utilities and amenities to maintain or return to normal patterns of life. TG 667.2 must ensure these services are not targeted, collaterally protected and maintained where possible throughout this operation. That which is not, must be repaired or replaced as soon as practically possible and implement minimum military involvement in maintaining function.

c. **Approved Target Audiences (TA).** As advised in the Target Directive, Ref B, the approved TG 667.2 TAs are as follows:

(1) **TA 1: Government of Belesia (GoB) - Panay.** This TA includes all members of local and regional government in all capacities within Panay. The GoB is deemed critical to the success of OP CERIUM STEAL as it is the basis for the implementation of UNSCR 8873 and provides TG 667.2 its legitimacy and authority.

(2) **TA 2: Panay Civilian Population (CIVPOP).** This includes all ethnic groups collectively IOT build understanding, unity and social cohesion. This TA will be essential to the success of OP CERIUM STEAL as it is that, they who must ultimately endorse the GoB and TG 667.2 and comply with Panayan authorities whilst denying foreign and belligerent actor influence within the community.

(3) **TA 4: Panay local Authorities.** This includes all law enforcement (police), emergency services (fire, rescue, and ambulance), security organisations (customs, sheriff, and bailiff) and regulatory arms of government that regulate, oversee, enforce and maintain rule of law within Panay. A holistic, WoG approach to the reformation and enhancement of Panay institutions is deemed critical to the strengthening of the government and the long term restoration of law and order.

(6) **TA 5: NT CIVPOP.** This TA is restricted to those groups within NT IOT influence support to the NT Government. The degree of public support for NT's political position will directly influence the likelihood of military incursion or further NTMEF employment. This TA will mainly be the responsibility of CJTF 667, but TG667.2 will enable these efforts.

(7) **TA 6: International Civilian Population (INTNPOP).** This TA is restricted to those groups external to the Belesian Islands IOT influence support to the NT Government. The degree of public awareness of NT and NTMEF's shaping and influencing actions within the region will directly influence perceptions of TG 667.2 legitimacy, regional diplomacy and lobbying of the UN, placing increased political pressure on both NTMEF and NT.

(8) **TA 7: NTMEF.** This includes enlisted ranks through to senior command levels. The NTMEF poses a significant threat and is likely to deliberately seek opportunities to escalate its involvement in Panay based on TG 667.2 activities. TG 667.2 must not present opportunities for NTMEF to dominate the narrative by claiming that TG 667.2 is manoeuvring aggressively, must try to influence peaceful NTMEF withdrawal from the disputed region and if unsuccessful must convince the NTMEF that it cannot win any military contest on either practical or moral grounds. This is to be further developed into a surrender strategy during the combat ops phase.

(9) **TA 8: Insurgents.** This includes members through to senior leader levels. The Insurgents are predominantly from the Visayan People's Front and are being used by the NTMEF as a force to divide the community, incite violence and promote propaganda as a platform/screen for subsequent NTMEF and NTMEF SF activities. The chaos and optics that the Insurgents provide NTMEF are essential to NTMEF's ability to retain the initiative and maintain the dominant narrative within Panay, therefore the degradation and dismantling of the Insurgency will present a significant operational and messaging victory for TG 667.2.

(10) **TA 9: NT Auxiliaries.** This includes interested parties through to organisers and instigators. The Auxiliaries include privately funded security firms (such as the Wagner Group) used to provide security to the San Rafael Mine. The debunking of Auxiliary propaganda and countering of violence and influencing actions is crucial to establishing a safe political environment for Panay to work towards the desired end state.

d. **Approved Operational Themes.** The approved TG 667.2 themes are as follows:

(1) TG 667.2 667 is here at the invitation of the GoB to enforce UNSCR 8873 and to protect the Panayan people.

(2) The current destabilised situation in Panay is the result of NT intervention and NTMEF influences assisted by local radicals.

(3) Panay's future rests on dialogue, not violence. All aspects of the Panayan community are encouraged to leave the past behind and move towards a brighter future together.

(4) TG 667.2 looks forward to working with the GoB (in Panay) and the Panayan people to restore Panay to prosperity and success.

e. **Key Messages.** The key messages aligned with the approved TG 667.2 themes are as follows:

(1) TG 667.2 is here to help. Please work with coalition forces to allow them to assist the Panayan local government.

(2) If you see something, say something; report any suspicious activity to local authorities. Do not take action yourself.

(3) Violence is being used to drive Panayans apart; talking between community groups is the key to the future.

(4) TG 667.2 looks forward to working with the government and the community to return life in Panay to normal.

(5) Do not take up arms or support those that do. Law and order will be restored and criminal acts will be punished under law.

8. **Groupings and Tasks.**

a. **CMO.** TG 667.2 will be supported by CMO from the tactical level to plan and conduct PROMOTE, ENHANCE, INFORM and INFLUENCE actions in support of the force. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 1.

b. **PSYOPS.** Tactical PSYOPS Teams (TPT) will be held at the operational level for distribution to tactical formations at the direction of the commander. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 2.

c. **EW.** Electromagnetic and directed energy will be used to SCREEN, DENY, DISRUPT, INTERDICT and DEGRADE adversary communications and emissions across the EM spectrum. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 3.

d. **KLE.** Key WoG representatives from DFAT, AFP, OGA and Defence will foster strategic outcomes through engagement with the relevant Panayan stakeholders. Additional guidance and engagement instrument of authority is contained within Appendix 4.

e. **MPA.** PAOs and detachments will operate from HQ TG 667.2 and formation HQs across Panay under guidance from CJTF 667. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 5.

f. **CNO.** May be proliferated at the operational and strategic level to attack, defend and exploit information and data networks from the National Support base within Australia and New Zealand. At the TG 667.2 level, these effects may be requested and coordinated at the tactical level, but HQJOC will maintain OPCON of these capabilities. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 6.

g. **DECEP.** Deception activities will be coordinated at the tactical level by HQ TG 667.2 supported by elements of CJTF 667 and JOC within Australia. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 7.

h. **OPSEC.** All formations and units are responsible for the maintenance of OPSEC. Specific guidance is contained within Appendix 8.

i. **PPP.** Force postures will be dictated by the developing situation on the ground tempered by the achievement of national strategic aims when security permits. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 9.

j. **PS.** Force Protection Elements (FPE) will be allocated to key strategic points of entry (SPOE) within Panay, whilst Reserve components will provide tactical commanders an organic protective security asset for use within tactical AOs. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 10.

k. **Information Assurance (IA**). IA activities will be coordinated at the operational level by HQ CJTF 667 supported by elements of the National Support base within Australia. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 11.

l. **Offensive Support (OS) / Destruction**. Elements of conventional naval, air and land manoeuvre will be combined with Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) assets to facilitate strategic destruction effects. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 12.

m. **Evidentiary Imagery (EI).** All images captured that are of an operational nature should be forwarded to MPA through respective formation Chains of Command, and opportunities to leverage the dominant narrative should be exploited. Additional guidance is contained within Appendix 13.

9. **Coordinating Instructions**

a. It is incumbent on the Tactical Headquarters to ensure adequate control and support/taskings are organised for the IRCs. The coordination of which begins with the IRC's elements meeting in their respective working group and discuss the issues and progression of their task and effect deliver on their assigned targets. These targets being assigned from the Joint Prioritised Integrated Target List as (JPITL) maintained by the Joint Fires and Effects Coordination Centre (JFECC). The results of which and suggestions for future targets/effects will be then brought forward by their applicable operations staff to the Information Operations Work Group (IOWG). The SO2 IO will then collate the Measures of Performance (MOP) and the Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) and synchronise them at the Joint Effects Working Group (JEWG). At the JEWG, staffed by the SO2 Joint Effects will be the SO2 Joint Fires, intelligence rep, legal rep, targeting officer and other staff involved in the targeting process. After the discussions and proposals are advised, these will be brought to the Joint Effects Target Board (JETB) where the Comd or his delegate will approve the actions, apportion resources and if required, task elements via Fragmentary or Task Order (FRAGO for assigned FE or TASKORD for resources not found on the ORBAT) to achieve effects. The times and frequency of these meetings and work groups will be advise by way of a HQ Battle Rhythm (B2C2WG).

b. IRCs are expected to conduct their own work groups and have a trained staff member provide inputs and exchange information coherently as the IRCs Subject Matter

Expert (SME). The SME may be required to attend at the JEWG or to the COMD's JETB but should not attend as a regular matter of course. Where an order is to be struck for an action or activity, the SME can assist in drafting the order and give advance warning of the order to their respective IRC elements.

c. In some cases where the sensitivity of the desired effect or the secrecy surrounding the chosen target exists, the IRC tactical element may not necessarily be inform of the higher order impact or the true target for the desired effect. IRCs are expected to conduct their activities with a minimum of information and should report all aspects of their task using the communications chain in accordance with command and signals reporting requirements. Timings are TBA.

d. MOPs and MOEs assist in the accomplishment of the assessment process by qualifying or quantifying the intangible attributes of the information environment. The MOP for any one action should be whether or not the TA was exposed to the IO action or activity. MOEs should be observable, to aid with collection; quantifiable, to increase objectivity; precise to ensure accuracy; and correlated with the progress of the operation to attain timeliness. Indicators are crucial because they aid the joint IO plan in informing MOEs and should be identifiable and reported on by all IRCs. Information of effects and measures can be found in Ref E.

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

10. Log Arrangements and Resupply

a. The prudent and general log rule for all IRC tactical teams and elements is self-sufficiency. When employed in the AO, all IRC elements with teams or staffs must have their own logistics and transportation resources and be capable of sustained ops for periods from 72 hrs to 7 days without the need for resupply. If resupply is required then the parent unit of the IRC team is to make the necessary arrangements. Contingency plans for emergencies such as break down, veh recovery or comms failures must be detailed in a units patrol TTPs and orders.

b. All IRCs with actual tactical elements, will retain responsibility for the provision of daily sustainment or for organising that resupply with a unit with control of the AO where the team operates. Where the element is allocated to a formation HQs for a task, then it is to come under administrative control of the HQs support unit. Where an element is in location of a forward combat unit then administrative arrangements may be made with that unit for sustainment. Care must be used when assigning command and control arrangements while elements are in a units location or under their responsibility for security. It is expected that elements may have to provide assistance to a supporting unit and it may even be necessary for them to be incorporated into the watch routine and perimeter security plan.

c. The IO staff in the HQs are to become the technical administrative leader for IRC staff or cells as maybe assigned to the HQs. As such, the IO staff cell of that HQ are expected to have an administrative officer / NCO capable of sorting the working and living arrangements of these members whilst attached to the HQs. These staff should come as self-contained as possible but there is an expectation that their pers welfare and basic office needs will be meet by the staff in IO to ensure maximum efficiency of their

staff function. However, as the SME for their IRC, the HQs will have an expectation that special to needs items such as laptops and software or systems access will be brought with the SME or sorted out with that staff member prior to assignment.

11. **Tpt Arrangements and Movements.**

a. IRC tactical elements and teams are also expected to come with their own intrinsic transportation to move them into and around the assigned AO. Where this transport is not compatible with the organisation assigned or doesn't meet the protection or mobility needs of the team, then arrangements detailing the transportation requirements are to be created and tasked to the forward unit. This may also include the assignment of security to the team as well. The IRC teams will be expected to organise vehicle resupply and light recovery and should a vehicle require replacement, that IRCs unit remains responsible.

b. Staff assigned as SME to a HQs are to be carried and transported by the HQs in its vehicles and transport means when the HQ moves. Should a SME arrive with intrinsic transportation, arrangements should immediately be made for that vehicles resupply and recovery arrangements. The HQs has responsibility for the veh but should not expect to have control or use of that resource unless arrangements can be mutually organised and agreed to.

12. **Admin Support Arrangements**.

a. As for the logistical arrangements, tactical teams remain the responsibility of their higher IRC organisation for admin support. The exception being health care. Should a tac team member become a casualty, especially in the forward area, then they are to enter the chain of evacuation by the best means possible with consideration given towards their condition and severity.

b. Staff attached to the HQs will be treated as for the arrangements of the permanent HQs staff.

COMMAND AND SIGNALS

13. **Command.**

a. The Principle Command staff of the formations are;

(1) COMD 1 DIV is MAJGEN XXXXXX (AS)

(2) DEPCOMD 1 DIV is BRIG XXXXXX (AS).

(3) COS 1 DIV is COL XXXXXX (AS).

b. Those listed in para A above are all listed as having full Target Authorisation. Changes to this list are to be promulgated as made.

14. **Headquarters Locations.**

a. HQ TG 667.2

(1) FWD HQ Located at; TBA

(2) MAIN HQ Located at; Iloilo APOD

(3) REAR HQ Located at; General Santos City APOD

15. **Communication and Information Systems (CIS).**

a. Main Comms to be provided by secure link as follows;

(1) Primary – VHF

(2) Alternate – HF

(3) Contingency – TacSat

(4) Runners

16. **Signals.**

a. Frequencies, rotating call signs and net identifiers to be published and changed on schedule IAW CEOI.

b. All reports and returns are to be compiled and transmitted IAW Ref F.

17. **Acknowledge.**

Appendices:

1 CMO Plan (TBI)

2 PSYOPS Plan (TBI)

3 EW Plan (TBI)

4 KLE Plan (TBI)

5 MPA Plan (TBI)

6 CNO Plan (TBI)

7 DECEP Plan (TBI)

8 OPSEC Plan (TBI)

9 PPP Plan (TBI)

10 PS Plan (TBI)

11 IA Plan (TBI)

12 OS/Destruction Plan (TBI)

13 EI Plan (TBI)

14 M2M Plan (TB)

ANNEX XX TO
TG 667.2 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

FORCE PROTECTION

Reference:

A. ADDP 3.22 Force Protection 2015

B. CJTF 667 OPORD 01 OP STEEL SENTINEL

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu

1. Situation.

a. Background. See paragraph 1 of the main body of TG 667.2 OPORD 01 and Annex B (Intelligence).

(1) Force Protection (FP). Force protection is defined as preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against ADF personnel, resources, facilities, and critical information (see Ref A). FP measures may be defensive (active and passive), offensive and recuperative measures.

b. Protection Principles. The following principles of protection provide military professionals with a context for implementing protection efforts, developing schemes of protection, and allocating resources:

(1) Command Responsibility. FP is a function of command. Commanders at all levels are responsible and accountable for the protection of their assets. Subordinate commanders may use their discretion in imposing additional FP measures, but may not reduce the measures imposed by this HQ without prior approval.

(2) Risk Management. Risk Management is the coordinated activities to direct and control the Joint Force with regards to risk. Risk management ensures that risk is managed effectively, efficiently and coherently across the Joint Force.

(3) Coordination. FP must be fully coordinated across all components, multi-agency and multinational elements. It is essential to coordinate FP planning at the strategic, operational and tactical levels in order to ensure a unified approach and mitigate vulnerabilities that might otherwise be exploited by a threat.

(4) Integrated**.** FP is integrated with other activities, systems, efforts, and capabilities associated with unified joint operations to provide strength and structure to the overall effort. Integration must occur vertically and horizontally with coalition partners throughout the operations process.

(5) Economy. Excessive allocation of resources for FP may remove capabilities needed to accomplish the mission. Economical use of FP capabilities allows the commander to focus resources on the protection of those assets that are deemed critical to operational effectiveness and mission success.

(6) Prioritisation. There will always be insufficient resources to protect every asset against every threat all of the time. Priority should be given to centres of gravity, both tangible and intangible.

(7) Flexibility. FP policies and measures must have the flexibility and agility to respond to rapidly changing threats, within resource limitations.

(8) Layered**.** FP capabilities are arranged using a layered approach to provide strength and depth. Layering reduces the destructive effect of a threat or hazard through the dispersion of energy or the culmination of the force.

(9) Redundant. Protection efforts are often redundant anywhere that a vulnerability or a critical point of failure is identified. Redundancy ensures that specific activities, systems, efforts, and capabilities that are critical for the success of the overall protection effort have a secondary or auxiliary effort of equal or greater capability.

(10) Enduring**.** Protection capabilities are ongoing activities for maintaining the objectives of preserving combat power, populations, partners, essential equipment, resources, and critical infrastructure in every phase of an operation.

Threat and Risk Assessment.

(11) Conventional threats. For more detail see Annex B. The North Torbian Marine Expeditionary Forces (NTMEF) essentially represent a "near peer" threat with a wide range of capabilities. As they have demonstrated, they have sufficient force capabilities to seize and control key infrastructure and large areas of terrain in a littoral environment. They also possess the necessary capabilities to project and sustain power beyond their national boundaries. Whilst the Torbian People's Army (TPA) is known to hold quantities of CBRN capabilities, it is highly **unlikely** they will utilise these weapons during this conflict.

(12) Unconventional Threats.

(a) Visayan Peoples Front (VPF) Insurgents. The VPF is an armed insurgent group committed to establishing an independent entity composed of the islands of Panay, Negros, Cebu and Bohol. Over time, the group, which originally sought the creation of a separate secular state, demanded the exclusion of Muslims and creation of a Christian nation. The VPF has aided the NTMEF in securing key infrastructure and installations during the early stages of NT occupation of Panay. Levels of cooperation between the NTMEF and the VPF at this time is unknown.

(b) Free Sulu Movement (FSM) Separatists. The FSM is a conglomeration of anti-federation factions of the Belesian archipelago. The group seeks to break free of the alleged overreach of the Belesian central government and abuses of the Belesian Federation National Guard. The FSM is not known to be actively supporting the NTMEF in Panay.

(c) Black Societies Criminal Network. The Black Societies Criminal Network is based mainly in Olvana with networks and interests in Belesia and surrounding nations. This criminal network is involved in armed robbery, racketeering, smuggling, narcotics trafficking, prostitution, gambling, and contract killings. The Black Societies will not involve themselves directly in the current conflict but may capitalise on demand through black market operations. Post conflict, these criminal elements will take advantage of any power vacuums to establish greater influence, particularly in areas will no to little law enforcement.

(d) Tantoco Cartel Criminal Organisation. Originating in South Torbia (RT), the Tantoco Cartel operates across the region with networks and interests in Olvana and Belesia. Like the Black Society, the Tantoco Cartel is involved in all forms of illegal activities. Recent expansion into Belesia and Olvana has resulted in turf disputes with the Black Society. Again, like the Black Society Criminal Networks, expect that the Tantoco Cartel will establish in areas where law enforcement is at a minimum, particularly in a post-conflict environment.

(13) Non-Military Threats. For environmental health threats, see the Health Support Annex.

(a) Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs) / Contaminated Grounds. BX holds large amounts of toxic industrial chemicals for multiple purposes, including mining, production of electronic goods, water purification, wastewater management, pesticides and fertiliser to increase agricultural output. A mine collapse in Panay a few years ago resulted in a release of 20.6 million tons of waste water into a nearby river. Prior to the capture of the San Rafael Mine Complex, large quantities (5000lt+) of reagents were kept at a storage facility near the mine complex. These reagents include Sulfuric and Hydrochloric Acids, chemicals which in their storage state presents hazardous chemicals. Large quantities of Hydrochloric acid can also be distilled to produce Chlorine gas, that can be crudely weaponised. In most instances, a level of MOPP will need to be taken when operating near large TIC storage facilities.

(b) Battlefield Pollutants. Aside from UXOs (detailed below), battlefield pollutants from destroyed vehicles and equipment will pose a hazard to TG667.2 forces. NTMEF armoured vehicles are not know to utilise depleted Uranium (either as part of composite armour or as a projectile) or other radioactive material. However, commanders at all levels must be cognisant of these threats.

(c) Unexploded Ordnance (UXO). It is expected that UXOs will litter the battlefield. UXOs from dropped ordnance (from aircraft, missiles and artillery) can be encountered when manoeuvering around previously held enemy defensive positions. All identified UXO are to be treated under SOPs relating to EOD disposal.

(d) Pollution. BX faces significant pollution problems stemming from poor industrial practices. High levels of air pollution require mitigating measures to ensure TG 667.2 members health and safety.

(e) Potable Water. The majority of the BX archipelago's urban population has access to potable water. In rural areas people must rely on local sources such as rivers, streams and wells to obtain water for cooking, drinking and washing. Currently, about 90% of all Belesians can access potable water. All water sources are considered potentially contaminated and not potable until tested.

(f) Sewage. Seventy-five percent of the population has access to improved sanitation, predominantly in the developed urban areas. Even in the cities, this does not always equate to fixing plumbing in residences, but also includes improved latrines. The lack of universal or adequate sanitation contributes to the high rate of infectious disease spread, especially in the dense urban environments.

(g) Disease. The following diseases are known to be present in BX:

1. Diarrheal diseases;
2. Hepatitis A;
3. Malaria;
4. Cutaneous Leishmaniasis;
5. Leptospirosis;
6. Schistosomiasis;
7. Hepatitis;
8. Tuberculosis; and
9. Q Fever.

2. Mission. TG 667.2 will protect the force and conserves combat power against threats and risks associated with the conduct of operations throughout Operation CERIUM STEAL.

3. Execution.

a. General. FP must be included in all parts of planning down to the lowest levels. Commanders will conduct appropriate risk management procedures to ensure that all risk to maintaining force preservation is considered. Reduction in operational capability due to avoidable identified threats is unacceptable.

Risk. The FP posture should be based on risk management, not risk elimination. Deliberate or accidental casualties are a reality of military operations, as are material and equipment losses and an overemphasis in avoiding them may impact adversely on the achievement of the mission. Commanders therefore must balance risk within the context of mission accomplishment. Component commanders should establish FP awareness within their staffs and provide suitable advice and direction to subordinate units. FP functions will be fully integrated and coordinated in the operational planning process from the outset.

b. Tasks Throughout. Formation Commands conduct FP operations to protect the force and conserve combat power in AO FANNING. Large troop concentrations and sustainment facilities shall be protected from NT missile/CBRN attacks by establishing an Integrated Air Defense System. Vulnerability assessments are to be conducted for staging areas, C2 nodes, and MSRs / ASRs concerning threats from CBRN, IEDs, missile attacks and other indirect fires as well as direct attack throughout this operation. Operational threats from enemy UAVs/UASs must be determined and mitigated. We must take clear measures and undertake effective coordination to ensure inter-operability between TG 667.2 and BX Defense Forces under OPCON. The implementation of successful FP measures will be particularly important for safeguarding the TG 667.2 Center of Gravity (our long range strike capability). Supporting tasks of the FP warfighting function include:

(1) Conduct operational area security.

(2) Employ safety techniques (including fratricide avoidance).

(3) Implement OPSEC.

(4) Provide intelligence support to protection.

(5) Implement physical security procedures.

(6) Apply anti-terrorism (AT) measures.

(7) Conduct law and order.

(8) Conduct survivability operations.

(9) Provide force health protection.

(10) Conduct chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) operations.

(11) Provide explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and protection support.

(12) Coordinate air and missile defense.

(13) Conduct personnel recovery.

(14) Conduct internment and resettlement.

c. Protection by Phase of OP CERIUM STEAL.

(1) Phase 1 - Lodgement. This phase will see the lodgement of ground forces in Panay as the main effort. Amphibious landings will be conducted on Panay along with landings at an established APOD/SPOD. TG 667.2 FP will focus on maintaining safe operations of the disembarkation of forces through the APOD/SPOD. Protection to be enhanced by OPSEC, and measures to eliminate fratricide during forward passage of lines with BX forces already on Panay.

(2) Phase 2 - Neutralise. This phase will see decisive land operations take place on Panay. The aim of this phase is to defeat the NTMEF on Panay. Protection to be enhanced by control of all sea and air lanes around Panay and consideration for CBRN threats to be factored into daily MOPP states.

(3) Phase 3 – Transition. This phase will see the transition of authority on Panay from TG 667.2 to either a UN sanctioned Peacekeeping Force or a follow on HN force. It will be expected that TG 667.2 FE will remain to conduct Stability Operations until a replacement force can take over. Protection measures will begin to put greater emphasis on non-conventional threats, law and order, health, crime, drugs, safety, protection of captured enemy personnel, operational area security, physical security, antiterrorism and on coordination of FP measures with Host Nation. The potential for kidnapping or capture of friendly forces increases significantly in this phase requiring the establishment of a Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC). Key risks to TG 667.2 forces throughout this phase include accidents caused by fatigue or failure to adhere to published SOPs and standards. The BX government assumes responsibility for their own security and infrastructure maintenance.

d. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Training. Personnel and units are to receive appropriate FP training, particularly in Escalation of Force procedures, ROE and battlefield / environmental hazards.

(2) Vulnerability Assessments (VA). In order to ensure that FP measures meet required standards, site assessments must be conducted for any semi-permanent sites (FOBs, main camps, etc.). The assessments routinely involve sites visits with interviews with key specialists and inspection of all FP related procedures and infrastructure, ranging from defensive positions through classified document handling procedures to food

hygiene. The process is intended to be consultative and can be used by site commanders to reinforce their cases for improvements to their FP posture.

(3) Force Protection Working Groups. Force Protection Working Groups will be established at HQ TG 667.2 and at subordinate Formation Commands.

4. Sustainment. See Logistic Support Order Annex to TG 667.2 OPORD 01.

5. Command and Signal.

a. Command. FP measures issued by COMD TG 667.2 are valid for all Coalition members and facilities in AO FANNING.

b. Reporting. Deviations from the prescribed FP measures, changes in threat, and FP incidents are to be reported via the TG 667.2 reporting chain. CBRN incidents are to be reported to COMD TG 667.2 via the TG 667.2 CBRN Warning and Reporting chain.

ANNEX XX TO
TG 667.2 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

MILITARY PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Reference: ADFP 3.13.2 Military Public Affairs 14 Feb 2020

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu.

1. **Situation**

a. Background. See paragraph 1 of the main body of TG 667.2 OPORD 01, Annex B (Intelligence), and Annex XX (Civil-Military Operations).

b. General. The Public Affairs (PA) office is assigned as a Command Advisory Group section (G09) to TG 667.2. PA provides timely and accurate information in support of the Commander's objectives for strategic communication. PA informs, educates and counters misinformation with respect to key audiences (both civilian and military) regarding TG 667.2 objectives, accomplishments and challenges. By engaging local and international media, as well as through social media, PA is able to disseminate key themes and messages to a wide audience to engender and maintain support for TG 667.2 and to correct misinformation in the public domain. Via spoken and written word, and through still and video images, PA represents a trusted and powerful tool to reach diverse audiences. Robust and effective PA activities are fundamental to TG 667.2's ability to proactively communicate to audiences in a truthful and timely manner. PA aims to be 'first with the truth,' providing the facts regarding ongoing events and military and humanitarian activities, and by assisting the media in reporting accurately by providing context. It also informs public perception and opinion by providing reliable, timely and accurate information to local and international media, while monitoring media outlets to ensure that information is disseminated. Media monitoring collects reports from all open sources to disseminate a complete picture of media coverage and to assist Key Leader Engagement in decision-making and ensure consistency with other PA organisations throughout the Area of Operations (AO). All units and elements of TG 667.2 as well as Host Nations' armed forces and IO and NGOs are primary sources regarding security-related and humanitarian issues. This annex provides policy guidance and tasking concerning the public affairs coverage of TG 667.2 operations. It includes coordinating instructions for releasing information and visual products, news coverage, media support and, support of the internal information and outreach engagement programs.

c. Communication in the Information Environment.

(1) Host Nation. Belesia's state-run and public media compete with private and opposition publications and broadcasters. Internet, television and mobile phone networks are more accessible to much of the population in the AO, notably in urban areas. TV is the most-popular medium. In more isolated rural areas and islands, traditional communication print and media remain the most influential communication tools. Belesian government bodies are in the lead for shaping and influencing their publics' opinions regarding progress made in re-establishing regional development and security. TG 667.2 will deliver support and assistance in this area to local authorities. TG 667.2 PA effort is aimed at attaining and maintaining popular support for the mission at the higher level by

explaining the goals and legitimacy of the UN-sanctioned IBSAF mission and of TG 667.2's intentions, actions and achievements as well as by developing a media campaign based on success stories that appeal to the public.

(2) International Media. All personnel must understand the power of the international media and the importance it plays in maintaining support for ongoing operations. The international media, to include traditional journalists, documentarians and reputable bloggers, will significantly influence western public and political opinion. The international media is strongly augmented by local stringers, who will accompany the other local media representatives at media functions. These stringers will feed the international media from Coalition events as well as from adversary spokespersons.

(3) North Torbia. Transparency in political and social debate is subject to extremely tight governmental control in Nth Torbia, resulting in the populace being extremely hard to influence from external government and organisation. The Nth Torbian government continues to use a wide range of media as an integral part of its activities to influence the populace and international actors. Nth Torbia and its affiliated partners and proxies will attempt to shape the information environment based on their interests.

d. Core Audiences.

(1) Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) members, countries and regional policymakers, opinion leaders, publics, service members, and families.

(2) Regional, national, and international News Media Representatives (NMRs).

(3) Belesian and Nth Torbian public.

(4) TG 667.2 TCN service members and civilian staff.

(5) Host Nations Defence Forces.

(6) International Organisations (IO) and NGOs.

e. Assumptions.

(1) The Nth Torbian government and the Nth Torbian Armed Forces can be expected to mount a massive, carefully constructed, well-orchestrated, worldwide propaganda campaign as part of its military campaign.

(2) Nth Torbia will use political, economic, cultural, and military issues and events as opportunities to discredit Coalition resolve, military capability and intentions in the free press. Nth Torbia will use the media to further its propaganda goal to weaken public support and confidence in Coalition military resolve and/or intentions.

(3) Non-state organisations and proxies associated with Nth Torbia can be expected to use the media to further their goals.

2. **Mission**. TG 667.2 plans and executes active communications and military public affairs activities in support of Operation CERIUM STEAL (as part of Operation STEEL SENTINEL) to provide responsive, timely, and accurate information about TG 667.2 activities to both domestic and foreign audiences, and to counter enemy misinformation to support the goals and objectives of the Commander.

3. **Execution.**

a. Concept of Operations. PA policy is maximum disclosure with minimum delay, but consistent with operational security and Privacy Act provisions. PA will assist in the creation of conditions that maintain Coalition integrity and the confidence of TCNs as well as the International Community in TG 667.2 operations by:

(1) Providing timely information and news products that demonstrate the core messages;

(2) Providing timely information about TG 667.2 operations to public and news media representatives and facilitate news media operations;

(3) Providing internal command information programs and products to keep units and family members informed;

(4) Countering effects of Nth Torbian propaganda attempts through an active PA posture by informing and educating external and internal publics of the actual situation and facts;

(5) Conducting media embed program consistent with AS and/or TCN media embed directives;

(6) Facilitating outreach engagement initiatives to inform and educate local, national and international opinion leaders, academics, and defence-issues analysts; and

(7) Maintaining and managing TG 667.2 social media.

b. PA Effects.

(1) TG 667.2 is recognised as a stabilising force by national and international audiences.

(2) TCNs and public audiences receive timely updates of TG 667.2 mission progress and significant events to include enemy and friendly casualty status without compromising operational security.

(3) International recognition and support for the IBSAF Coalition is strong and unwavering.

(4) Nth Torbian propaganda is effectively countered by increased accurate and independent reporting from international, national, and local news agencies.

(5) International public understands that Nth Torbian people are not the targets of TG 667.2 military efforts.

(6) TG 667.2 forces and TCNs are informed of mission progress and critical issues of force protection and safety and efforts to sustain health, welfare, and morale.

(7) Increased reporting of defeats suffered by Nth Torbian military forces by international, national, and local media.

(8) Key audiences recognise TG 667.2 will transition authority to follow-on forces or Host Nations for stability or peace support operations on Panay once security conditions permit.

c. TG 667.2 PA Tasks.

(1) Coordinate across the TG 667.2 staff sections and Formation Commands to synchronize communications efforts.

(2) Provide PA guidance to Formation Commands.

(3) Prepare for media coverage throughout all phases of the operation, including social media coverage and support to outreach engagement initiatives.

(4) Plan for and support the media embed program (to be led by CJTF 667 J09).

(5) Inform public of IBSAF initiatives and diplomatic stances.

(6) Coordinate with national reps of TCNs as appropriate.

(7) Consolidate daily TG 667.2 PA SITREP.

(8) Inform public in order to support TG 667.2 mission and objectives.

(9) Illustrate TG 667.2 units' capabilities and resolve, as well as their professionalism through external and internal media coverage, social media outlets, and visual imagery.

(10) Support internal communications efforts to reach and inform internal audiences and protect them from enemy misinformation and propaganda.

d. PA Support to Inform and Influence Activities.

(1) Coordinate daily messages and talking points consistent with strategic objectives.

(2) Coordinate efforts to counter Nth Torbian propaganda by having international news media presence in critical locations to accurately report events.

(3) Coordinate to ensure PA activities do not compromise or conflict with TG 667.2 Information Operations.

(4) Coordinate and focus media attention on operational and strategic isolation of Nth Torbian regime, destruction of NTMEF military capability in Panay, and TG 667.2 humanitarian assistance efforts.

e. Coordinating Instructions to Formation Command and Subordinate Units PAOs.

(1) All Formation Commands will submit daily Public Affairs Situation Reports (PASITREP) to TG 667.2 PAO. TG 667.2 PAO will consolidate all reports.

(2) Keep TG 667.2 Public Affairs Officer (PAO) informed of any critical information requirements such as media requests, military and civilian casualties, large-scale/significant incidents, injuries to PAO personnel or NMRs.

(3) Lead, plan, coordinate, and conduct operational and tactical PA activities within their TAORs.

(4) Obtain still and video imagery of events/activities and send to TG 667.2 PAO for approval and release.

(5) Safeguard classified information and imagery by retaining the release authority at the military public affairs office.

(6) Key Leader Engagements (KLE) are critical to the success of all PA operations. They should be used as frequently and in as many situations and mediums as possible.

(7) Provide military public affairs support to the TG 667.2 command to highlight the successes of the operation to Target Audiences through internal and external media coverage, KLE, and visual imagery.

(8) Keep TG 667.2 military personnel and family members informed; provide the local and International audiences truthful information through News and TCN Department of Defence Media Representatives.

(9) Support higher level PA plans to counter misinformation, gain, and maintain the support of the Local and International Communities and deter further Nth Torbian aggression.

(10) Be prepared to receive media embeds and provide support to media during the operation.

(11) Designate Unit Public Affairs Representatives (UPAR) for each Bn sized element. UPARs are responsible for briefing commanders on current Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) and ensuring PAG is disseminated and units are prepared to facilitate media engagements. All appropriate military personnel should be provided with Talking Points prior to media engagements to help facilitate communication synchronisation and ensure they understand the overarching intent on the mission.

(12) Ensure that subordinate commanders and PA personnel are familiar with communications, transportation and other media support requirements; approved PAG and ground rules concerning this operation.

(13) Do not interfere with News Media Representatives (NMR) as long as they do not interfere with the execution of the mission or threaten to violate OPSEC.

(14) Advise TG 667.2 PAO immediately of news media exposure to classified information or any possible media ground rules violations.

(15) TG 667.2 personnel are not authorised to confiscate media cameras, film, audio/videotape, or reporter's notebooks. Any questions regarding the specific application of this policy should be referred to the TG 667.2 PAO.

(16) All entitled media are to have approved credentials before joining any unit with TG 667.2 PAO task organisation. Lists of accredited and registered media will be provided to the Formation Command and subordinate PAOs on a daily basis.

(17) Provide TG 667.2 PAO with a press kit for their Formation or unit, to include a formation/unit fact sheet and Commander's biography with photo.

(18) Utilise best practices in media interviews when talking to reporters.

(19) Following official announcement of deployment, units may acknowledge they have been notified for a deployment; however, they may not release specific details that may violate OPSEC. Commanders are encouraged to release information if appropriate and PAOs should be prepared to address media requests in support of family readiness efforts.

(20) In the event of a large scale incident, critical information leak, capture/kill of a key leader, or mass casualty situation which may require communications consequence management, all key information (5W's) must be forwarded immediately to TG 667.2 PAO.

(21) In the event of a crisis, the TG 667.2 PAO will coordinate with higher headquarters to determine release authority and appropriate public statements to make.

(22) Requests for public affairs information (RFIs). Submit all RFIs to TG 667.2.

(23) Support for News Media Representatives.

(a) Media Escort.

1. Accreditation. Requirements for accreditation will be established by the Coalition/national-level defence agencies and supported by TG 667.2 PAO through the CJTF 667 J09. As a minimum, the CJTF 667 J09 will institute procedures to determine the legitimacy of individuals as *bona fide* media representatives entitled to receive support afforded by TCN and TG 667.2 forces. News media representatives must have passports and working visas identifying them as journalists to fulfil CJTF 667 accreditation requirements.
2. Assignment. TG 667.2 G09, in consultation with subordinate unit PAOs, will determine the assignment of NMR to specific subordinate units within the AO to preclude overloading any single unit. Where possible, media representatives will be assigned to their preferred location.
3. Facilities. TG 667.2 units will provide media embeds with adequate accommodation, meals, and transportation. A degree of discomfort will be expected by embeds and will not be treated any better than their host unit personnel.
4. Inoculations. NMR accompanying TG 667.2 in the field will be required to have the same inoculations, at their own expense, administered to military personnel participating in the operations.
5. Communications. TG 667.2 and major subordinate commands will provide communications services free of charge to civilian media representatives when commercial facilities are not available. Transmission by military communication facilities will be on a non-interference basis. News media will be advised of the status of their traffic.
6. Transportation. TG 667.2 will provide accredited media representatives with military transportation into and within the AO when such travel is in connection with assignments to cover the operation and when commercial transportation is restricted into the area or unavailable.

(b) Security. The presence of news media representatives in operational areas will require the following considerations concerning security:

1. Procedures will be implemented to preclude the unauthorised release of classified or sensitive information. NMRs violating embargo agreements will be immediately dis-embedded.
2. Media representatives can access operations, intelligence, and other classified areas only in case of strong need and under strict escort and control.
3. Individuals are not authorised to release information to media nor are they permitted to agree to a personal interview without prior coordination with the PAO supporting that unit or command. When the PAO has coordinated the media visit, personnel may grant media requests for interviews and provide only unclassified information in interviews, briefings, and written materials. Do not make "off the record" statements to media representatives.

(c) Audio-Visual. TG 667.2 will assist the media as necessary in obtaining audio-visual coverage.

(d) Embedded media will abide by established ground rules on releasable and non-releasable information.

4. **Sustainment.**

a. Administration. Media are required to carry their own equipment.

b. Logistics.

(1) Non-embedded media (Unilateral) covering our operations should be "self-sustaining". TG 667.2 PAO will coordinate additional logistical support to media as required. Intent is to maximize use of Host Nation Support (HNS). Host Nation Contract Support is used if support/service is not available through military logistic means or through HNS.

(2) Media embeds will have their own protective equipment. Military embeds will be provided with military transportation (ground or air) into and within the AO while covering the operation.

(3) Embedded NMRs will be entitled to medical care provided to TG 667.2 personnel in the event of life threatening injuries.

5. **Command and Signal.**

a. Media will use commercial means of communications if available. If commercial lines are not available, official military means will be authorised. Military satellite transmission facilities can be provided when operationally feasible.

b. Media may use independent satellite uplinks for transmission of products from field locations when the on- scene commander determines transmission will not violate OPSEC or compromise an ongoing operation.

c. TG 667.2 PAO co-locates with TG 667.2 HQ.

ANNEX XX TO
TG 667.2 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

CIVIL MILTARY OPERATIONS

References:

A. World Fact Book 2020 – The Republic of Belesia as at 8 Nov 18
B. Panay District Supplement as at 1 Jan 18
C. Palawan District Supplement as at 13 Jan 18
D. HQ JOC OIE Prospects for Security and Stability in Belesia dated XX XXX XX
E. UNHC – P Report 008/XX – Humanitarian Sit Panay Isles dated XX XXX XX

OVERVIEW

1. **General.** This annex details the Civil Military Operations (CMO) objectives and activities to be undertaken in support of the land component operations. This is to support the establishment of security and stability conditions in the JFAO sufficient for the transition of responsibility for security to a mandated UN Follow on Force (FoF) and subsequent Host Nation Military / Security forces. This annex is to be used by those elements involved in Civ-Mil activities and those whom may need to understand the Civ-Mil environment for their own BOS. All CMO intentions will be undertaken with in IO objectives and in line with the COMD's intent (here with restated);

a. **Purpose**. Enforce UNSCR 8873 to re-establish Belesian sovereignty in Panay and Palawan.

b. **Method**. Deploy TG 667.2 with enablers from ADF and OGA to the JFAO to prosecute Multi-Domain Operations against North Torbian elements in Belesian sovereign territory. Coordinate WOAG and multinational efforts to enforce UNSCR 8873.

c. **Endstate**. The removal of NTMEF from Belesian sovereign territory, establishment of a safe and secure environment in the occupied Belesian territories, and conditions set for the UN supervised transition of authority in Panay and Palawan back to the Belesian Government.

SITUATION

2. **Enemy**. Analysis of operational environment, threat, threat forces and assessment of likely En Ops, see Intelligence, OPORD Annex B.

3. **Friendly**. Detailed friendly forces, groupings, tasks and organisation see Operations, OPORD Annex C.

4. **Inhabitants**. A detailed social-political and infrastructure summary of the JFAO is provided in Ref A to E, and detailed in the enclosed Country Study Appendix 1. That study providing the following points as particular relevance to the TG 667.2 CMO plan for the Panay Island province of the nation state of Belesia:

a. **Population.** The population of Belesia is 109,000,000 based on July 2016 estimates. The pop in Panay is 4,301,000 (2015) which is spread throughout the island's urban and rural area with pop centres noted in Panay Map Appendix 2 and as follows;

(1) Roxas; pop 574,000 capital of province of Aclan supporting 17 smaller towns.

(2) San Rafael; pop 582,000 capital of province of Antiq supporting 18 towns.

(3) Caticlan; pop 761,000 capital of province of Apiz supporting 16 towns.

(4) Iloilo City; pop 2,384,000 capital of province of Iloilo supporting 42 towns.

b. **Language**. Panay has three official languages, Tok Belesia, Tagalog, and English, although Tagalog is seldom used by the younger generations. English is the language of government, education and business. Tok Belesia, a Melanesian pidgin similar in nature to Papua New Guinea Tok Pisin and Vanuatu Bislama. It is the lingua franca. There are a number of indigenous languages spoken which belong to various linguistic groups. The number of speakers of these languages has steadily dwindled in recent decades. FE should be able to communicate with the pop in English, especially the younger people without need of translators.

c. **Culture and Society**. Within Panay there are four ethnic groups, Panayan 48%, Torbian 32%, Olvanan 18%, and European 2%. Within each of these groups a number of clans or extended family groups exist. Each of these clans historically operated within a defined territory as noted in Panay Map attached as Appendix 3, moving throughout their home lands. While a homogeneous and multicultural population, FE should still exercise caution when dealing with tribal issues as this is still a strong bond within Panay society.

d. **Religion**. The Roman Catholic Church (RCC) is the major religion in Panay, being a de facto provider of many public services a more functional government would ordinarily supply. The RCC has strong and deep roots within most communities both religious and secular, and its international character has led to some suspicion that factions within the local cathedral communities might be partisan actors or at least being logistical links for Olvana and Torbia. The influence the RCC has over the population, almost 65% are active parishioners, cannot be overstated. A highly religious society means that care must be taken by the FE to not be seen to be contrary to the church or its symbology.

e. **Politics and Government**. Following the 1967 announcement of the government to grant Panay self-governance no later than 1972, elections to a popular assembly were held in 1971. The Panay District Assembly consists of 40 members with 10 members elected by each of the 4 districts and is headed by a parliament based out of the capital Iloilo City. The government still operates on a small “pay for services” scheme to get work done. This is often and incorrectly referred to as corruption, but is not. It is the recognised method of getting govt work done. This is not to be confused with the graft and payouts done by the mining sector of business as this money goes straight to elected members and not into the government supply.

f. **Economic outlook.** Successive Panay governments have overseen the exploitation of the islands natural resources with a light hand, generally granting concessions, specifically mining, in a resource bidding war that if successful would see Panay gain high economic benefits. The commercial and industrial businesses which thrive in Panay have worked out that small wages and pay offs to politicians can lead to high profit. These commercial interests need careful handling. The FE can expect that commercial enterprises will be quick to exploit the situation and it is anticipated that claims and compensation will be sought as the security circumstances improve.

g. **Electricity.** Panay has a coal fired power generator located on the outskirts of each of the provincial centres. Power is reasonably well provided for but suffers from high demand shortages especially during peak periods, resulting in outages of a few hours. Energy is supplied as 240-250v 60Hz cycle which is broken into 110-120v in the homes and buildings with power within the pop. Breakdowns in coal delivery can also disrupt supply sometimes lasting in outages of days. Critical infrastructure has backup generators but these are also subject to outage due to disruptions in diesel fuel supply. FE should not expect to be able to tap into and utilise the civilian electricity grid and must come self-contained with its own generator power supply and fuel to run it.

h. **Water Supply.** All towns draw their town water from underground aquifers and the larger rivers which runs through them. The water quality can run from an A to C rating. Supply during the dry season may also cause shortages. Given the low quality and lack of quantity, FE must bring its own purification and water supply systems.

i. **Fuel Supply.** Panay is bisected by the AMADA Natural Gas Pipeline, which is a significant infrastructure of considerable value to the national Belesian government. Natural gas is the fuel of choice for the pop needs being used for everything from cooking to powering vehicles and generators. Fuel supply of both diesel and petrol is provided from refineries in Belesia which can result in shortages due to the problems of shipping and distribution. Fuel supplies for FE will not be possible from inside Panay and CSS & LOG should not plan to get these from in country with care taken to not cause shortages to the pop.

j. **Waste Treatment**. Regional centres have a rudimentary and inefficient sewage systems with the more remote areas generally have individual house septic systems. This has in past caused fouling of the water supply which then causes health concerns with the pop. The FE needs to be cognisant that its waste disposal systems and programs do not cause environmental issues nor exacerbate problems with the existing infrastructure.

k. **Telecommunications**. A high **s**tandard of telephone, mobile phone and internet connections are available across the whole island, with high speed data capability available in regional centres. Remote rural areas are for the most part available with various levels of reliability. It is well known that the phone infrastructure was built by the MISO Telecom company and that while a reliable and well used system, can be intercepted and be used as an information and intelligence source. Phones which use the local system will be subject to foreign intelligence service information collection activities. It is important for rebuilding of the country so must be protected from kinetic or non-kinetic disruption in all phases.

l. **Health.** The island's civilian health services and support infrastructure, based on hospitals at the provincial centres. Nationals generally seek treatment for major medical treatment in Belesia in preference to the Panay health service. FE should not expect to be able to use the civilian infrastructure and can expect requests for support when they are located in country.

m. **Legal System.** Justice is administered by the national authority, which was generally only concerned with serious crimes. Local issues are generally handled by provincial magistrates or city judges. Given the CJTF will operate under the provisions of the UNSCR 8873 and an extant SOFA, FE should have very limited dealings with the Panay legal system.

Legislative issues including the SOFA and ROE are to be found with the Legal OPORD Annex K.

n. **Policing.** Under national rule, a semi-professional constabulary force of approximately 100 officers was trained in basic policing skills. Following self-autonomy, this small department was expanded and now has some 5,000 members. A Police Proficiency and Capability report is expected from the AFP on the competencies and shortfalls of this law enforcement agency. It is to be found with the Military Police OPORD Annex AD. The expectation is that the countries police force will return and provide the necessary law enforcement activities upon cessation of hostilities.

o. **Transportation.** Panay has a well-developed, albeit not extensive road system. Road haulage operations are a key component of the success of the Panay economy. Care must therefore be exercised by FE to ensure damage to the roads by either offensive support actions (deliberate or dynamic) or ground force usage, is kept to a minimum. Where damage occurs, it is to be reported immediately and repaired as soon as practically possible. The low weight rate (40t classification) of most highways and bridges will see the use of the roads by the heavy A veh fleet and larger logistics vehicle fleet severely curtailed.

p. **Humanitarian Situation.** United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator – Panay **(**UNHC-P) reporting at Ref F estimates approximately 40,000 IDP's are scattered throughout Panay as a result of increased activities by the enemy who have a sophisticated public communications and information operation. These are moved as the camps reach capacity or if the reason for the displacement ceases. In most cases, the camps successfully re-integrate the IDPs back to their home locations.

q. **IDP Camps.** The following IDP camps may have been identified in Panay:

(1) Municipality of Roxas: Two camps; *Tanza Norte to the east & Ilaya* adjacent to Roxas.

(2) Municipality of Passi; Two camps; *Arac* and *Bacuranan*.

(3) Municipality of Sara. Three camps; *Alibayog, Labigan and Salcedo* near Sara.

(4) Municipality of Iloilo: Two camps; *Cabatuan and New Lucena*.

r. **IDP/Refugees Movements.**

(1) Population movement internal of a country produces internally displaced persons (IDP) but if the population flees across countries borders, they become refugees. Additional IDP/Refugee movement is expected on commencement of Phase 2 and additional temporary camps are expected to emerge. These movements are expected to include both those fleeing active conflict and those who have benefitted from the supported government and now fear reprisals.

(2) Greater movements of people combined with an expected deterioration of law & order and the economy during and immediately after decisive operations are likely to exacerbate existing problems within communities. This is likely to have a

particular impact on women with increased incidence of rape, transactional sex and related gender based violence.

(3) The maintenance of awareness on the situation of Displaced Persons and Refugees (DPRE) in the AO will remain a CMO responsibility.

(4) Upon ceasing of hostilities, security of movement is restored and people feel that there is sufficient law and order to protect them from attack or retaliation in their home communities, IDP/refugees will begin to return. This is expected to strain post-conflict housing availability, public services and food/water supplies.

5. **HA and Civil Society Organisations (CSO).**

a. Some of the IO/NGO operating across the CJOA and within Belesia are managing the IDP camps. It is likely that international and other staffs who work for IO/NGO may depart or curtail their activities during military operations as they will conduct their own threat assessments and act IAW the UN Security Level System.

b. Some CSO are anticipated to be in place to support HA distribution. NGO/IO will likely determine their own security criteria for entry based on information from their own sources and the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). Threat elements will likely attempt to disrupt HA supply and distribution IOT support their own agenda.

c. Those IOs and NGOs are found in the Panay civil organisations and contact list attached as Appendix 4.

6. **Civil Assumptions.**

a. Heads of various sections, key stakeholders within the Panay government will also be based at the capital in Iloilo. Further, other coalition stakeholders within military and government, NGOs, and other stakeholders such as ICRC will be based in Iloilo during operations.

b. The Panay people in the occupied area have a neutral position yet positive sentiment towards the CJTF and aligned Panay Govt.

c. Threat groups will leverage off the CivPop to collect on the CJTF/ADF activities.

d. Provincial political entities are positive towards Panay Govt and CJTF elements.

e. Law enforcement aligned with provincial govt are also positive towards Panay Govt and CJTF elements as well.

f. Medical services and public utilities will deteriorate less than 24hrs of the commencement of combat operations.

g. National economic aspect of country will deteriorate and will heavily rely on the informal market and local and provincial economies.

h. Liaison authority to engage with for HN government ministers resides with CJOPS.

i. IO/NGO will be capable of provision of HA and initial capacity building.

MISSION

7. **Purpose**. CMO activities will support the TG 667.2 Mission in order to set the conditions for transition of authority to the mandated UN Follow on Force (FoF) supported by the international community and to minimise the impact of TG 667.2 operations on the civil population.

8. **Method**. CMO will support the TG 667.2 mission by:

a. Undertaking direct comms and liaison, collaboration and interagency planning, actions and activities with the WOG to set the conditions for transition to the mandated UN FoF.

b. Supporting the IO objectives, assist in the delivery of key messages to the local population which prepares them for the return and establishment of the legitimate Govt of Belesia with an emphasis on our intention to achieve transition to the UN or Host Nation FoF.

c. Conduct or coordinate those targeted CMO activities on the assigned persons or groups to achieve the desired effects and outcomes and control those elements with the AO who will interface with the population.

d. Ensuring that TG 667.2 operations and offensive actions minimise targeted activities and collateral damage to key civil infrastructure. Where this has not been achieved, undertake such assessments and organise the repair or replacement of this damage in as orderly and responsive way as possible.

e. Ensuring that CJTF operations do not create a dependency by the HN population on TG 667.2 resources.

f. Ensure the avoidance of placing additional strain upon the already fragile key civil infrastructure including assisting those FE responsible for assisting the HN Govt departments becoming re-established to provide a return to normality.

g. The provision of appropriately OFFICIAL briefs to key stakeholders.

h. Assist with the provision of a secure environment that allows IO/NGO to deliver services and possible HA to the populace.

i. Coordinating with key agencies regarding IDP/Refugee movement through the AO so agencies are able to establish interim IDP camps if required.

j. Facilitating the provision of Immediate Life Sustaining Aid (ILSA) through coordination with the On-Site Operational Coordination Centre (OSOCC), Other Governmental Agencies (OGA), International Organisations (IO) and NGOs.

9. **Endstate.** Set the conditions for the transition of responsibility to the mandated UN or HN FoF.

EXECUTION

10. **Concept of Operations**.

a. **CMO Elements**. To conduct CMO the following units and force elements will be utilised for the delivery of effects and provision of Civ-Mil influencing and informing activities as assigned and directed by the Joint Effects Targeting Board. The lack of coalition forces, specifically US Mil, means that Civil Affairs (CA) teams are unavailable for tasking or use.

(1) The lack of CA means that the principal CMO tool will be the tactical CIMIC detachments and teams as provided from the formation CIMIC Group. These elements will be the priority task for assessments coordination of CMO effects as tasked to units and FE. It is expected that each Cbt Bde will be provided with its own CIMIC Tactical Support Teams (TST). The role of CIMIC is to support the mission through three core functions:

(a) enhance situational understanding of the civil space

(b) support/enhance decision-making, and

(c) conduct tactical CIMIC tasks as detailed from OPORD.

(2) Civ Mil Activities (CMA), any unit / sub-unit, elements or staff can be utilised for activities and duties as tasked through ops as detailed in TASKORDs from HQs. This is inclusive of any specialist elements as attached to the formations.

(3) Civ Mil Liaison (CML) staff for communication and coordination between HQs and those OGA or HN departments. All staff are BPT to be detached as required within the TG 667.2 C2.These would be coordinated through the Info Ops KLE cell staff (G2) assisted by the CIMIC Teams.

(4) Engineer Assessment Teams for reconnaissance and assessment of infrastructure and civilian capabilities. May also be required for Engineer Civil Assistance Program (ENGCAP) activities in later phases.

(5) Medical Assessment Teams for assessment and inspection of medical facilities and population health services. May also be required for Medical Civil Assistance Program (MEDCAP) activities in later phases.

(6) Military Police detachment Engagement Teams for investigations and assessment of detainee handling infrastructure and civilian capabilities. May also be required for Police Civil Assistance Program (POLCAP) activities in later phases. It will be expected that a separate and comprehensive hand over of security arrangements will be specified.

(7) Female Engagement Teams (FET) or Cultural Support Teams (CST) for engagement and assessment of the civil situation and population support either from specialised formed teams or those created for the operation. These teams are

not to be used in the HUMINT role and if they are, must not be additionally tasked for Civ Mil activities or actions.

(8) Other IO Information Related Capabilities (IRC) units or elements which may be tasked or accompany the CMO elements as part of an IRC combined effects team. These may include but are not limited to;

(a) The Key Leader Engagement (KLE) cell will have a close relationship with the CMO elements as they will coordinate much of the interactions between any FE and those civilian leaders and persons of influence.

(b) Psychological Operations (PSYOP) teams may also be with CMO elements to either distribute or provide for delivery that IO product and messages for the same audience that Civ Mil activities apply to. CMO elements may also be tasked to distribute this product as they meet with the civilian agencies and individuals allocated to so engage.

(c) Light Electronic Warfare Teams (LEWT) may accompany CMO elements as a means of gaining movement within the AO. They may also be there to provide early warning in the event of hostile activities against FE.

(d) Public Affairs (PA) officers or teams may also accompany or request information for input into their products and stories in spt of the FE IO campaign. They may include Combat Camera members or staff or they may request imagery as part of CMO activities.

(e) Those staff which exist in or on the formation HQs which can facilitate civil engagement either through personal contacts (such as family, educational or business etc ties), secular contacts, medicinal contacts or any interest contacts that may provide meeting opportunity.

(9) The Dept of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) has a special relationship with defence. It may provide a liaison offr, a Policy Advisor (POLAD) to the higher headquarters who advises the COMD on strategic issues such as diplomatic negotiations, demarche exchanges, adherence to agreements such as the Montreaux document or Ottawa agreement and national policy interpretation. They cannot provide operational or tactical direction nor should they interpose in the manoeuvre of combat forces.

(10) Interactions with other Civil Agencies. These are defined as those non-military organisations which will exist in the battle space and may be made up on International Organisations (IOs) such as the UN, ICRC, Amnesty International etc, Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) such as WADE, RAID, FADE, MWC, LoRD etc., and Other Government Agencies (OGA) such as AFP, DSTO, ABF etc. It is a misconception that the Military Land Force entrusted with enforcing the UN mandated actions can also direct or task those civil agencies which are or may soon be present in the AO. The military should never task nor expect that those civ agencies will do the land forces bidding and can only set the security conditions, which enables them to do the work that they wish to do. Dialog and open communications must always be sought but influencing or

exploitive actions on behalf of the force is never to be planned. Their neutrality, impartiality and organisational concern for humanity must always be respected.

b. **Scheme of Manoeuvre**. CMO will be conducted across all phases. TG 667.2 CMO elms and those FE tasks with CMO effects will deploy to support TG 667.2 operations during all phases with TG 667.2 conducting a handover of CMO activities to the mandated UN or HN FoF in Phase 3.

(1) **PH 0 Shaping**. CMO elms conduct initial liaison with key stakeholders, including HN Govt, OGA and UN OSOCC. These tasks will be conducted under the guidance and coordination of the CJTF 667 CMO. Conduct mission planning for the possible assistance in population movements including the returning of IDP/Refugees. Participate in the refinement of target lists with Joint Effects and Targeting (JET) and the provision of information for the KLE engagement strategy. Gain Situational Awareness and Situational Understanding (SASU) of key civilian and humanitarian issues, threats and opportunities IOT identify potential CMO activities within the AO.

(2) **PH 1 Lodgement**. TG 667.2 G9 will deploy with HQ TG 667.2. G9 will coordinate initial assistance and response with OGA, OSOCC, IO/NGO. Allocation of CMO assets throughout the AO is as follows:

(a) TG 667.2 – G9 CMO Dir (O6) and Staff,

(b) TG 667.2 – G9 CMO PSO (O5), Staff Brch and 1 x TST (-)

(c) TG 667.2.1 (X BDE) – 1 x CIMIC TST (26);

(d) TG 667.2.2 (Y BDE) – 1 x CIMIC TST (26);

(e) TG 667.2.3 (16 AVN BDE) – 1 x CML Tm (from 667.2 TST).

(4) **PH 2 Neutralise.** Refine initial CIMIC assessments and continue Key Stakeholder Engagement (KSE). Conduct civil engagement with available HN civil authorities. Facilitate the delivery of key IO messages to local population. BPT facilitate and control the delivery of ILSA. Coord with OGA, OSOCC, and IO/NGO for the management of refugees/IDP's within the AO. In conjunction with OGA and OSOCC plan and facilitate the restoration of key essential services within capacity.

(5) **PH 3 Transition and Redeployment.** Conduct handover of all TG 667.2 CMO activities which will be purposely planned and undertaken to NOT build in dependencies, to other agencies and the mandated UN or HN FoF.

11. **CMO Grouping and Tasks**.

a. **Grouping**. HQ TG 667.2 G9 Main

(1) **Tasks all phases**:

(a) Respond to HQ CJTF 667 tasking;

(b) Establish technical control (TECHCON) with all CMO assets within the AO;

(c) Conduct collaborative interagency planning with OGA for stabilisation and transition activities;

(d) Develop relationships with key stakeholder networks (Tribal, HN, OSOCC, and IO/NGO); and

(e) Develop and maintain an OFFICIAL security and Belesia entry procedures briefing pack for IO/NGOs.

b. **Grouping:** TU 667.2.1 (O/O), TU 667.2.2 and TU 667.2.3.

(1) **PH 0 Preparatory Tasks:**

(a) Prepare for deployment;

(b) Commence key stakeholder identification and engagement;

(c) Confirm through KSE the locations of UN agencies with IO and NGO; and

(d) Coordinate with G4 the HA needs for ILSA.

(e) Establish baseline data through all source reporting in support of effects including:

(i) Key civil infrastructure;

(ii) Status of essential services; and

(iii) Humanitarian situation.

(f) Identify suitable civilian evacuation routes that are de-conflicted from initial activities and advise HQ G9 Main;

(g) Capabilities and dispositions of key civil stakeholders (HN/IO/NGO); and

(h) Support the delivery of IO messaging to the local population.

(3) **PH 2 Decisive Tasks:**

(a) Support the conduct of mission planning.

(b) Commence tactical CIMIC assessments in support of effects including:

(i) Key civil infrastructure;

(ii) Status of essential services;

(iii) Humanitarian situation; and

(iv) Capabilities and dispositions of key civil stakeholders (HN/IO/NGO).

(c) Identify and engage with key stakeholders within AO IAW the liaison architecture to inform KLE and targeting.

(d) Support the delivery of IO messaging to the Belesia population.

(e) Report incidences of alleged atrocities and Human Rights abuses and secure the location.

(f) Facilitate the release and distribution of appropriately de-classified information to key stakeholders.

(g) BPT spt Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation and Reintegration (DDRR) (FRAGO TBI). Tasks may include but are not limited to:

(i) Disarming all mandated armed groups and individuals IOT support DDR plan and the TG 667.2 mandate;

(ii) Influencing the population to support the disarmament requirement by disseminating authorised and approved DDR IO themes and messages;

(iii) Identifying suitable disarmament /demobilisation sites, collect, store, and secure all confiscated weapons;

(iv) Securing Panay Police armouries, weapons and critical infrastructure;

(v) Receipting surrendered/seized small arms and light weapons (SALW), storage and security of surrendered/seized SALW and EO/IED components in suitable storage facilities, including maintaining an inventory of surrendered weapons

(h) BPT to assist in the movement of disarmed combatants to demobilisation sites;

(i) BPT transport weapons from disarmament sites to final disposal destination;

(j) BPT conduct biometric enrolling (subject to approval);

(k) BPT detain and secure individuals accused of serious criminal crimes and release or transfer to appropriate authorities;

(l) BPT support requests for critical infrastructure repair after a Request for Assistance (RFA) approval and report details of effects delivered;

(m) BPT facilitate the delivery and distribution of ILSA IAW para 4c; and

(n) BPT provide appropriately de-classified briefings to IO/NGO regarding route conditions, movement control measures and security coord protocols and mechanisms that are applicable to the entry of their land, sea and air assets.

(4) **PH 3 Transition and Stability Tasks**

(a) Continue tactical CIMIC assessments in support of effects including updates on:

(i) Key civil infrastructure and essential services;

(ii) Reconstruction and development tasks;

(iii) Humanitarian situation; and

(iv) HN/IO/NGO – HA, reconstruction, development, capabilities and disposition.

(b) Maintain engagement with HN/IO/NGOs and CSO within CJOA.

(c) Facilitate release of authorised information to key stakeholders.

(d) BPT support requests for ILSA and critical infrastructure repair after a Request for Assistance (RFA) approval and report details of effects delivered.

(e) BPT facilitate repatriation of refugees and displaced persons.

(f) BPT transition responsibilities/tasks to mandated UN FoF.

(g) Report on all ERW requirements as requested.

(h) Conduct handover of all TG 667.2 CMO activities to the legitimate national authority or authorised agencies.

12. **Coordinating Instructions.**

a. **Stabilization Aid Funds/Commanders' Emergency Relief Program (SAF/CERP).** TG 667.2 currently does not have an allocation of funding to implement Consent Winning Activities (CWA) and Quick Impact Projects (QIP). A request for funding has been sent to HQJOC and further details will be released by FRAGO.

b. **Compensation Claims.** All civilian claims for compensation are to be investigated at the command level prior to submission to the HQ TG 667.2 G06. Commanders are not authorised to agree to pay compensation claims.

c. **Locally Employed Civilians (LEC).** Opportunities will exist for contracting LEC to fulfil certain functions in support of TG 667.2 efforts and base support plans. The employment of LEC is to consider the effect upon the integrity of local community structures and delivery of essential services. Formation S9 staff are to ensure coordination with HQ TG 667.2 G9 Main during LEC employment planning phase. Guidance on payment rates is TBI, but shall conform within existing SOFA. HQ TG 667.2 G9 approval is required to employ LEC from: Police, Fire, Ambulance, Border Protection, Education Dept, Water Dept or Health Dept. This also includes specialists e.g. police/teachers and administrators.

d. **Operations Assessment (OA).** All CMO reporting including SITREPs, Incident Reports, CMO SITREPS and Quicklook Storyboards will be utilised in support of the TG 667.2 OA process.

e. **Request for Assistance (RFA).** The following procedures are to be used for RFA planning and execution:

(1) In the first instance formations are to ensure civilian agencies maximize use of their resources (either integral or contracted) before accepting RFA for consideration.

(2) Formations are authorized to execute RFA as long as they do not prejudice the TG 667.2 mission and can be executed within formation capabilities.

(3) RFA that require external support are to be passed through TG 667.2 G9 for assessment, coordination and de-confliction with other civilian agencies and CJTF resources.

f. **Humanitarian Standards for Encampment Site Selection and Operation.** TG 667.2 will not be responsible for establishing IDP or refugee camps. Responsibility for the establishment of IDP/refugee camps resides with the UN humanitarian community. However, TG 667.2 may be required to support the movement and route security if requested by the IO / NGOs through the OSOCC.

g. **CMO Measures of Effect.** There must also be continuous assessment of the civil dimension in order to determine measures of effectiveness (MOE) and the progress of the mission. This ongoing assessment task is performed by CIMIC assessment teams and monitored by the CMO staff. MOE refer to observable, preferably quantifiable, subjective indicators that an activity is proceeding along a desired path. A commander uses MOE to determine whether an operation is succeeding in achieving the goals of the operation according to the mission. MOE should be developed as a product of mission analysis. MOE will differ for every mission and for different phases of a mission. As the commander and staff identify specified, implied, and critical tasks, they should define what constitutes successful completion of each task. They decide how the MOE will be identified, reported and validated. They determine what action will be taken when the MOE is achieved, as well as contingency plans in case MOE are not achieved according to the original plan. MOE are not necessarily fixed and can be adjusted as the situation changes. See appendix 7.

h. **CMO Normality Indicators**. Normality Indicators (NI) serve to measure trends and progress in the recovery of a civil society to an improved quality of life. NI measure the level of development of the civilian condition to reduce the level of dependency on the military

force by the civil population and civil authorities. Data should be objective, quantifiable and collected systematically. The force commander must exploit all sources of data measuring the quality of life and recovery of the local population in the AO, as well as the effectiveness of military operations that assist in this recovery. Direct and indirect MOE and NI should be jointly developed with civilian agencies to reinforce unity of purpose and effort in civil–military activities. It is the interface with the civilian sector that provides the means for collecting data that contributes to normality. NI should be SMART (specific, measurable, attainable, results oriented and time based), objective and comparable from occasion to occasion. Measuring only that which is easily measured, will give a false impression. Robust information management systems are required to support the delivery of worthwhile MOE and NI. See appendix 8.

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

13. **Civilian Resource Requirements**. Arrangements will be required to provide a minimum of one APOD/SPOD access to the AO which must remain serviceable, with apron or wharf space, to be provided to IO/NGO for delivery of HA. Ideally, this will be a separate facility from the military. It should come complete with its own aircraft / vessel handling and refuelling facilities as well as transport facilities for loading cargo.

14. **Military Resource Requirements.**

a. **ILSA.** Immediate Life Sustaining Assistance is defined as the provision of small scale emergency supplies and services which are needed as a matter of extreme urgency (in-extremis) to save life or to prevent serious suffering. The provision of ILSA may be conducted without approval from TG 667.2 HQ where it can be provided within formation resources and or capability. In the main, ILSA comprises the provision of water and food however, depending on the circumstances it may also include; shelter, medical assistance (life, limb or eyesight), transport, rescue and repair of essential infrastructure.

b. ILSA should be provided at ‘arm’s length’ whenever possible with the direct distribution to beneficiaries undertaken by IO/NGO, HN agencies, CSO, village or tribal leader. Direct distribution of ILSA by TG 667.2 FE should only be undertaken in-extremis and as a last resort and may be sourced from TG 667.2 supply chain. ILSA stocks will be made available to TG 667.2 formations from PH 1 for emergency distribution to the population as required. Provision of ILSA should be in response to immediate and life threatening requirement and should not displace any current arrangements in place by NGOs. Under no circumstances should ILSA become the main source of provisioning for the population.

c. **Bottled Water.** Water (bulk or by 5, 10 or 20 litre military jerry can) **is not** to be provided for from TG 667.2 log stocks. Commercially procured plastic 5 or 10 litre collapsible water containers in either blue or clear colour and bottled drinking water may be authorised where thirst may become the possible cause of death within the population. It will be carried in unit A and B Ech in sufficient bulk quantities and provided for upon auth from the unit Comd. Water for bathing/cleaning will **not** be provided.

d. **Foodstuffs.** Military rations / CRP **is not** to be provided for from TG 667.2 log stocks. Limited quantities of HUMRAT prepacked high energy supplements may be available and are

to be used only as a means of having an immediate relief of starvation. It will be carried in unit A and B Ech in sufficient bulk quantities and provided for upon auth from the unit Comd.

e. **Shelter.** Shelter **is not** to be provided for unless it is necessary to provide an immediate life sustaining assistance. FE tentage or canvas, especially that which is easily identified as military (coloured green, brown or camouflaged) must never be used to provide shelter to the population. Where shelter is required to protect from the elements it must be of a civilian pattern, coloured blue or white and set up away from any possible military associated facilities. Blue tarpaulins, poles and cordage will be carried in formation B Ech in sufficient bulk quantities and provided for upon auth from the formation Comd.

f. **Medical**. Medical care and use of med supplies is to be strictly limited and is only to be used in those extreme cases where life, limb or eyesight is in danger of being lost. The application of med supplies is to be limited to those members of the FE who are trained and can provide the necessary care and support given the conditions as found in the AO. Civilians who enter the chain of evacuation due to FE actions, must be turned over to the civil authority at the earliest opportunity. The SMO or G07 will provide the necessary decision making arrangements with the formation Comd.

g. **Transportation**. Pop movement and transportation is **not** to be done utilising any military vehicle of TG 667.2. Pop movement is to be carried out with civilian pattern vehs and should be made off of the designated MSR. Should a requirement exist to provide life sustaining transport then the use of clearly identified ambulances / medevac ac may be requested. The auth of this will require Formation Comd approval. Under no circumstances should A vehs or armoured veh ambulances be used.

h. **Rescue**. Any requirement to facilitate any rescue should only be undertaken where life is in danger or the pop was forced into a position of requiring rescue owing to the unintended consequences of FE activities. Rescue may be required where the pop has, in moving out of the way of FE manoeuvre, inadvertently become entrapped in the obstacles or minefields of either side. Such rescue activities will require the unit COMDs approval and may extend to the use of TG 667.2 resources such as breaching and mine detection eqpt but done only after the area has been secured and cleared of en threat. The rescue activities are only to be undertaken after the force has achieved its assignment and any rescue effort must not impede the military mission.

i. **Maintenance**. Any requirement to complete work on civilian infrastructure such as; power generators and electricity lines, water pumps, filtration units and distribution systems, sewage and sanitation works, and medical / education facilities may only be undertaken if;

(1) The damage to these facilities were a result of FE actions or fires,

(2) The damage is to public facilities and not private or commercial interests,

(3) The maint undertaken is sufficient to render serviceability and not surpass the normal standard for the area or facilities.

(4) That works has been tasked via the CMO / CIMIC team as part of the Effects battle rhythm, approved by the Comd and detailed as an OPS FRAGO or TASKO.

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

15. **CMO Coordinating and Liaison Architecture.** TECHCON will be established by HQ TG 667.2 G9 from PH 1 to all TG 667.2 Bde S9 staff to assist in overall coordination of CMO activity and allocation of resources. TG 667.2 G9 will establish comms to the CJTF CMOC in General Santos City. TG 667.2 G9 will remain in loc with HQ TG 667.2 for all phases.

16. **Reports and Returns.** All TG 667.2 Bde S9 are to ensure daily CMO SITREP is compiled and forwarded to HQ TG 667.2 NLT 2100H daily. The format for the CMO SITREP is at Appendix 5. Significant CIMIC contacts are to be recorded as CHATREPS and forwarded on completion NLT 12h following contact. Layout is noted at Appendix 6.

17. **Communications.** CMO elements requiring interactions with the HN Govt, UN Agencies or IO/NGOs must come complete with civilian mobile phones, network data devices and civilian means laptop computers to be able to effectively pass and collect information from these sources. As a minimum, elements must have the following communications means;

a. Civ Telecom land line phone with answering device and facsimile capabilities. These may need to be source in country given the power supply incompatibility with the AS power system.

b. Civ Mobile phones for voice, text, and NGO chat app usage. The SIM cards must be sourced in country and care must be exercised given the FIS collection capabilities within that system.

c. CIMIC PC laptops with non military email accounts as established prior to in country operations. These can be connected to the data communications system via network devices but will also require local telecom data network SIM cards. This LAN system is to have backup capability and multifunction device capability to allow printing and scanning of documents and IO products.

d. Those CMO elements should also come with a number of civilian two way hand held radios compatible with those used by NGOs and must have a charging capability for those power packs.

e. Elements must come with or be provided with, Military PRR and MBTR radios for internal sigs and patrol comms. SOIs and CEOIs to be provided from the HQs elements.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Appendices:
1. Country Brief
2. Map of Panay City and Provincial Boundaries.
3. Map of Pop Tribal Demographics and Boundaries.
4. Civil Contacts in country.

5. CMO SITREP Format.
6. CMO CHATREP Format.
7. CIMIC MOE.
8. CIMIC Normalcy Indicators.

Appendix 1 to
ANNEX XX TO
TG 667.2 OPORD
Dated XXXXXX

COUNTRY BRIEF (DRAFT FRAMEWORK)

BACKGROUND

1. The island of Panay was formerly a possession of the Skolkan Empire along with Palawan, Cebu, Negros, and Bohol. After the empire's collapse in the early 20th century, Panay declared independence but was subsequently absorbed into the Belesian Federation after a period as a protectorate of Torrike, former seat of the Skolkan Empire. Panay's two main population centres are Caticlan in the north and Iloilo in the south. Panay is also home to the San Rafael Cerium mine, where one of the world's few concentrated rare earth mineral deposits is located. Since its shift from gold ore extraction to Cerium mining, San Rafael has both created opportunities and exacerbated local ethno-social tensions as well as becoming a focus of regional power competition.

2. Panay has never been a willing member of the Belesian Federation being culturally distinct owing to its history of Skolkan influence. Over the years, strong separatist sentiment has periodically escalated into violent revolt, a frequent and costly irritant for the Belesian government. Despite this, they have been loth to grant independence, partly from unwillingness to compromise the territorial integrity of their young state, and partly owing to the revenues generated by the San Rafael mine. These tensions culminated in the 1972 massacre of some one hundred and forty four during ethnic clashes with the Belesian paramilitary police officers. This event, dubbed "The Ash Wednesday Massacres", resulted in Panay being granted autonomous home rule. Relations between the local Panay government and Belesian central authorities have yet to be normalised, and Ash Wednesday has become a frequent catchcry for separatist elements in Panay.

3. Panayan internal politics are no less fraught. The mine, which is integral to the local economy, is largely worked by Torbian immigrants who have to some extent monopolised mining employment on the island. While the mine itself is owned by Panay (and therefore nominally by Belesia), much of the plant and infrastructure was acquired through Olvanan investment. The Torbian immigrant population is the most sizeable ethnic minority, making up some 32% of the island's total population, having arrived in Panay shortly after WWII as indentured labour for the San Rafael mine during its gold extraction period. A small Olvanan diaspora, mainly concentrated in Caticlan around Olvanatown and the recently established Olvanan trade mission set up to safeguard Olvanan interests in San Rafael, is the next largest ethnic minority. The remaining bulk of the island's population identify as Panayan.

ETHNIC GROUPS

4. Panayan: The Panayan people share a common heritage with the broader Belesian population, but are culturally distinct. This is partly owing to their position near the Western hinterland of the archipelago which has a high concentration of unmixed indigenous tribes, but is mostly to do with the fact that Panay is majority Christian, the island having been largely insulated from the spread of Islam through the region in the 15th century by Skolkan rule. This has led to significant differences in culture, custom, and world view between the

inhabitants of Panay and the rest of the Belesian Federation. The majority of Panayans feel marginalised by the majority Islamic Belesian state, and despite a heavy Christian presence within the Belesian military, the Christians of Panay feel disadvantaged and sometimes persecuted by their Muslim neighbours. This disaffection has allowed the Visayan People's Front (VPF), a separatist Christian armed insurgent group, to maintain a strong presence on the island.

5. Torbian: The Torbian diaspora has a long history in Belesia in general and Panay in particular, many Belesians having mixed Torbian ancestry. The Torbian population on Panay, however, has failed to integrate into Panayan society. Given their size, making up one third of the local population, Torbians on Panay have been a largely self-sustaining, self-referential community. While their original status as indentured labour is no longer in effect, the Torbians on Panay remain an underclass, being economically disadvantaged even relative to the high levels of youth and rural poverty in the region, and driven into insularity by periodic racial scapegoating over their long history on the island. This has led to the Torbian population demonstrating unusually high levels of ethnic tribalism, which acts to drive a further wedge between them and the indigenous population of Panay.

6. Olvanan: The Olvanan diaspora in Belesia possesses disproportionate social and economic power, and the Olvanan minority on Panay is no exception. Despite making up only a small percentage of Panay's population, Olvanans own a sizeable chunk of the island's wealth and are significantly overrepresented within the island's educated, business and property owning middle class. This has led to a long history of mistrust and resentment between the Panayan and Olvanan populations, not helped by the history of antagonism between their two nations. These tensions have been further exacerbated by the recent upsurge in Olvanan activity on the island, the Olvanan government having invested heavily in roads, ports, and other mine related infrastructure. This investment has come at the cost of punishing royalties and loan repayments overseen by the recently established Olvanan trade mission in Caticlan. The mine, Olvanatown, and especially the trade mission, have become symbolic targets for Panayan resentment of the far more prosperous Olvanan minority.

POLITICAL AND SECURITY — INTERNAL

7. The autonomous government of Panay is a small, beleaguered, and highly corrupt institution with a poor record in delivering services, especially to the Torbian community centred on the San Rafael mine. Poor governance and lack of interest has resulted in the Panayan government having little to no monopoly of force outside Iloilo and Roxas. The tense nature of relations with Belesia has meant that not only has the BF been extremely unwilling to involve itself in Panayan affairs at any level, it has also resulted in the island being effectively cut off from services and other benefits available to Federation members. Conversely, significant revenues from the San Rafael mine flow out to the BF government as part of the home rule agreement, and this has led to increased levels of resentment amongst Panayans towards the rest of Belesia. This coupled with the memory of The Ash Wednesday Massacres has made the Belesian authorities deeply reluctant to intervene overtly in Panayan affairs.

8. The Roman Catholic Church is a major player in Panay, being a de facto provider of many services a more functional government would ordinarily supply. The RCC has strong and deep roots within most Panayan communities both religious and secular, and its

international character has led to some suspicion that factions within the local cathedral communities might be partisan actors or at least logistical links for Olvana and Torbia.

9. Given the marginalisation of the Torbian population on Panay, the Torbian community has become largely self-sufficient in terms of service delivery and security. Localised committees organise essential services such as garbage collection and education, and what little policing and security which exists is administered via small localised militias formed from past and present private security contractors hired either by the Olvanan trade mission or the historical owners of the mine. This has led to what is effectively a Torbian enclave in the immediate environs of the mine, with smaller satellite enclaves existing in the major population centres.

10. The Olvanan trade mission represents a syndicate of Olvanan SOEs which, between them, own the major port facilities in both Caticlan and Roxas, the main trunk roads linking these ports with the San Rafael mining complex, and large gated precincts in Caticlan, Roxas, and San Rafael in which technical and trade personnel, mostly Olvanans, are housed. They also have major interests in the power distribution and generation networks and telecommunications infrastructure of Panay. This unusually heavy level of investment arises from the fact that the San Rafael mine makes up a significant percentage (12%) of Olvana's total rare earth metal inflows, the securing of which is a key Olvanan strategic goal. The segregated nature of the Olvanan footprint, and the relative prosperity of Olvanans in Panay, is a major source of tension and conflict.

11. Given Panay's position near the western extremity of Belesia, the island has always acted as a nexus for regional licit and illicit trade. Crime levels in Belesia are considered high, and Panay is no exception. The principle criminal enterprises involve smuggling of people, goods, and/or illicit drugs. Local crime syndicates, Olvanan Black Societies, and the Tantoco Cartel are highly active in the region. The traffic in drugs, uncustomed goods, and labour slaves (mostly Torbian) is estimated to be worth over $1 billion dollars per annum. It can sometimes be difficult to disambiguate Olvanan and Panayan criminal organisations from legitimate centres of power, especially at a local level.

12. The Visayan People's Front is a Christian separatist insurgent militia committed to establishing an independent entity composed of the islands of Panay, Negros, Cebu, and Bohol. Whilst the Panayan government is not one hundred percent aligned with their goals, there is sufficient crossover, especially with regard to ethno-religious commonalities, to make the relationship between Panayan authorities and the VPF highly ambiguous. Additionally, given the general poverty of the island and its role in illicit trade routes, the VPF has developed a significant degree of interoperability with local and Olvanan criminal syndicates, often turning to smuggling and piracy for fundraising purposes. Along with the heavy presence of Wagner Group PMCs, VPF militants are frequently used as armed security for various criminal and even some legitimate groups across Panay.

13. The Wagner Group has a heavy footprint in Panay. The general inability of government to maintain law and order unaided, combined with the Wagner Group being the principal contractor providing security for the Olvanan SOEs associated with the San Rafael mine, means that Wagner Group PMCs are a significant armed body existing within the security matrix of the island of Panay. Given that most Wagner Group operatives in the region are of Torbian descent, there is significant crossover between the Torbian immigrant community and Wagner Group personnel.

14. The Red Tigers Black Society is a major link in the illicit trade route that runs through access points north and south of Palawan, as well as elsewhere. The Red Tigers are suspected to be in direct competition with the Tantoco Cartel for control of the arms, drugs, and people trafficking markets within the region. The leadership of the Red Tigers is unknown, but given the general character of the group, their head is thought to be a member of the Olvanan community.

15. The Tantoco Cartel is the second of the large transnational criminal organisations operating in the area, with significant suspected drug and weapons markets within and around the San Rafael mine and Torbian workers' ghetto. Their leadership is also unidentified, but strong suspicions rest on the local police department. It is also thought that the Tantoco Cartel is the vector for most Wagner Group recruitment which occurs off island.

POLITICAL AND SECURITY — EXTERNAL

16. The Local Panayan Government has a UN mandate for independence, but is in reality a semi-autonomous member of the Belesian Federation. This complicates Panay's external security situation, creating a triangle effect between Panay, Belesia, and the external power in question.

17. At this point in time, Belesia is embroiled in an EEZ dispute with neighbouring South Torbia, a major aspect of which concerns the San Rafael mine. This has led to a number of minor cross maritime border incidents between Panay/Belesia and South Torbia.

18. Belesian relations with Olvana, a regional hegemon within easy reach, are highly complex. On the one hand, Olvanan investment is eagerly sought after by all of the islands of the Belesian Federation, including and especially Panay. On the other hand, however, the strategic interests of the two nations often clash, and Olvana and Belesia are currently embroiled in maritime territorial disputes, both nations frequently conducting provocative FONOPS. Panay itself is increasingly at odds with Olvana over what is perceived to be Olvana's rapacious financial exploitation of the San Rafael mine.

19. Belesia's relationship with the small island nation of Gabal is described as good. Gabal's neutrality and relative unimportance help to facilitate this.

20. In the broader region, North and South Torbia are experiencing a periodic cooling of their perennial conflict. This has freed South Torbia to pursue its other claims and disputes and is the cause of South Torbia's current intense focus on its disputes with Belesia/Panay. Belesia is one of the few nations which has cordial relations with North Torbia.

21. Olvana's expansionist strategy has ruffled the feathers of many of its regional neighbours, including Belesia and South Torbia, but there is little expectation at present of these tensions leading to a major conflict in the immediate future. Having said that, Olvanan military activity has ramped up significantly over recent years. At present, Olvana and North Torbia are currently conducting Ex RISEN SWORD, a biannual interoperability and cooperation exercise, in the South China Sea west of Palawan Island and just outside Belesia's EEZ.

22. Belesia has generally good relationships with the US and its allies, specific economic or territorial disputes aside. At present, there is a high level of information and personnel exchange between the Belesian military and western powers active in the region including Australia, New Zealand, and the USA. Panay itself maintains close ties with Torrike, though these are generally considered to consist more of a sense of historical kinship rather than any more tangible relationship of exchange.

Appendix 2 to
ANNEX XX TO
TG 667.2 OPORD
Dated XXXXXX

PANAY COUNTRY MAP



Appendix 3 to
ANNEX XX TO
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Dated XXXXXX

PANAY POPULATION DEMOGRAPHICS

Appendix 4 to
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Dated XXXXXX

CIVIL CONTACTS in JFAO

1. **Host Nation Government Contacts**

a. Chief Minister

b. Deputy Chief Minister

c. Minister of Health

d. Chief of Police

e. Chief of Fire & Emergency Services

2. **UN Organisations and contacts**

a. SRSG

b. UNHCR

c. UNWFP

d. UNPKO

e. UNPOL

3. **International Organisations and contacts**

a. ICRC

b. Amnesty International

c. The Holy Roman Catholic Church

4. **Non-Government Organisations**

a. RAID “Reconstruction Assistance for International Disasters".

(1) Provision of emergency shelter & Camps RAID.NGO@worldwideweb.org

(2) This NGO uses a combination of funding means, public and govt to provide workers and infrastructure to both construct camps and run them for displaced pop. Provides Temp bldg, tentage, limited camp power and toilets.

b. FADE “Food Assistance in the Disaster Environment".

(1) Provision of food

FADE.NGO@worldwideweb.org

(2) This NGO uses a combination of funding means, public and govt to provide workers and foodstuffs to both supply food, refrigeration and cooking facilities to feed a displaced pop. Provides food, cooking, kitchens, refrigeration and limited water for cleaning and cooking

c. WADE “Water Assistance in the Disaster Environment"

(1) Provision of water WADE.NGO@worldwideweb.org

(2) This NGO uses a combination of funding means, public and govt to provide workers and distribution systems for the winning, treating, storing and distribution of fresh and clean water to displaced pop. Provides water, purification, dist lines, storage, plumbing & heating

d. MWC “Medicos Without Concern"

(1) Provision of health services MWC.NGO@worldwideweb.org

(2) This NGO uses public funding only to provide medical staff and facilities for the evacuation and treatment of medical and health issues to a displaced pop. Provides Health services

e. LoRD “Logistics Relief in Disasters"

(1) Provision of transport and material LORD.NGO@worldwideweb.org

(2) This NGO uses govt funding to provide staff, vehicles, material and facilities for the movement and handling of stores, fuel and logistics to a displaced pop. Specialises in transport, maintenance, veh lift, recovery, mobile spt eqpt.

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Dated XXXXXX

CMO SITREP

SUBJ: FM/TG/ COMPONENT CMO SITREP XX/XX, DTG XXXX to DTG XXXX

1. AO/REGION/PROVINCE
2. PREVIOUS 24HRS:
    a. OVERVIEW OF AO STATUS, INCLU SECURITY, EMERGENCY SERVICES AND GOVERNENCE SECTOR.
    b. MAJOR ACTIVITIES – SUMMARY OF INCIDENTS / EVENTS THAT AFFECTED THE CIVIL POPULATION
    c. CIVIL INTERACTION WITH AUS MILTARY FORCES.
    d. KNOWN CIVIL INTERACTION WITH OTHER FE ELEMENTS BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL.
    e. CIVIL ATTITUDES / ACTIONS TOWARDS AUS FE.
    f. CIVIL ATTITUDES TOWARDS OTHER FE.
    g. OGA/NGO/IO ACTIVITY, INCLU REQ FOR ASSISTANCE.
    h. POPULATION MOVEMENT AND EMERGENCY AID / PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS.
    i. MAIN ISSUES / CONCERNS WITHIN AO.
    j. DETAIL ANY TRENDS WITHIN CIVIL DIMENSION.
    k. IDENTIFIED OPPPORTUNITIES FOR AUS INFLUENCE.
    l. STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT CULTURAL FACILITIES / LOCATIONS.
3. NEXT 24HRS:
    a. ANTICIPATED BOTH MILITARY AND CIVIL ACTIVITIES /INCIDENTS / EVENTS THAT MAY EFFECT/INFLUENCE THE CIVIL POPULATION.
    b. PLANNED CIMIC ENGAGEMENT/ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES
    c. KNOWN CIVIL INTERACTION WITH OTHER FE BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL.
    d. EXPECTED MOVEMENT OF POPULATION AND EFFECT ON AUS FE.

Appendix 6 to
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CMO CHATREP

SUBJECT	CHATREP 038 OF 111050K JUL15 – SUBJECT HEADER
FROM	C/S, Unit and sub-unit
TO	For action Unit / Fmn C/S
A Collector	Military member; (Name / Position & DOBI ID)
B Info Provider	The civil actor; Name / Position / Contact details
C Location	GR / address loc collected, GR and address loc of subject reference
D **DTG**	DTG collected (discussion)
E **DTG**	DTG report written
F **Brief**	Brief description of incident event or topic discussed BLUF (Summary, key points of relevance) DISCUSSION Points discussed in the civilian providers words Questions asked or points made by collector State facts and perceptions reported not the collectors opinions COLLECTORS COMMENT (if required)
G **Source**	First-hand account (the person has first-hand knowledge) Yes/No
H **Other source**	Has the information come via other POC?
I **Identification**	POC name and contact details
J **Discussion**	Discussion initiated by provider or collector Y/N
K **Language**	Language used
L **Interpreter**	Identification and skill or language level

Appendix 7 to
ANNEX XX TO
TG 667.2 OPORD
Dated XXXXXX

CMO MEASURES OF EFFECT

1. CIMIC MOE. CIMIC MOE is to be developed in conjunction with major civilian participants to ensure transition success. MOE guidelines will focus on the following sectoral areas:

a. Water winning, treatment and supply,
b. Electricity generation and supply,
c. Shelter and site planning,
d. Food and Nutrition aid,
e. Waste and sanitation,
f. Health services,
g. Public security,
h. Infrastructure,
i. Communications,
j. Transportation,
k. Economics, and
l. Agriculture.

Appendix 8 to
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CMO Normality Indicators

1. CIMIC Normality Indicators. Normality indicators to be grouped into categories and adapted to meet the changing requirements, e.g., political, socio-economic, cultural and technological. Guidance for development and reporting of NI listed below:

a. Staple availability;

b. Water;

c. Power;

d. Medical (Civilian);

e. Law and Order;

f. Infrastructure;

g. Civil communication (freedom of speech, incl media);

h. Education;

i. Non-staple consumer goods available;

j. Inflation;

k. Sport and social activity;

l. Unemployment;

m. Religious;

n. Infant mortality; and

o. Agriculture.

p. Sensitive Areas.

q. FEG are to make all efforts to avoid cultural and environmentally sensitive areas.

Cultural sites and environmentally sensitive areas – TBC.

ANNEX N TO
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SPACE OPERATIONS

References:

A. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, Oct 1967

B. *The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space*, Dec 1968

C. *The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects*, Sep 1972

D. *The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space*, Sep 1976

E. *The Agreement Governing the Activities of State on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies*, Jul 1984

1. **Situation**.

a. North Torbia (NT).

(1) Space Capabilities. NTMEF capabilities are generally focused on missile launch controls and observation, however possess limited optical or positional satellites, any Space capabilities continue to be augmented through use of state/non-state actors willing to provide or disseminate technology or proxy access to NT.

(a) Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RISTA). NT Image Intelligence (IMINT) requirements are supported by purchases of commercial imagery from other countries, and proxy access by NT proxies operating internationally.

(b) NT's allies including Olvania and Donovia has access to Hi-Fidelity IMINT supported by an aggressive Satellite program, providing PROBABLE access to NT, depending on operational requirements of the host nation forces and opportunity. Recent Olvanian IMINT reportedly consists high-speed bandwidth with up to 4K, with 0.5m - 0.8m ground resolution, and 3D Micro-Millimeter Spatial Mapping capabilities.

Owner	Satellite Class	IMINT Resolution	Coverage	ELINT	Revisit Time	Orbit Class	Zulu Window
NT	KMS-4	3m	Unknown	Possible	94min 24sec	Sun Synch	0045-0115
Olvania	Gao Feng 03A	3D @ 1m	17km	N/A	Once Every 72 hrs	LEO	2200-2230
Olvania	Gao Feng 02	0.75m	40km	N/A		LEO	0100-0120
Olvania	Jilin Shipin 02	HD Video 1.13m	4.6 x 3.4 km	N/A	Once Every 80 hrs	Sun Synch	2200-2300

(c) Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT). NT's military is believed to use hybrid solutions dependent on commercially accessible solutions, with certain capabilities tied to specific Defence treaties and technology transfer agreements. While these include GPS, GLONASS, and BDS

(d) It is likely that GPS also provides the backbone for timing for services such as SATCOM.

(e) SATCOM. NT operates one earth observation satellite that utilizes X-Band transponders to communicate images for download while in a sun-synchronous polar orbit with IMINT and pontential ELINT capabilities. NT may also be using commercial or allied satellites from Olvana, Donovia and other nations.

(f) ELINT. NT's KMS4 is unlikely to have sophisticated ELINT capabilities, however NT may have negotiated access to a combination of Olvanian capabilities including Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS), SIGINT and supporting precision strike capabilities.

Owner	Satellite Class	Cluster Size	ELINT	Focus	Revisit Time	Orbit Class	Zulu Window
Olvania	Yaogan 30-K	3	Yes	Land SIGINT	107mins	LEO	1800-1840
Olvania	Yaogan 30-10	3	Yes	Maritme SIGINT	97mins 30 sec	LEO	1600-1630
Donovia	Kosmos 2543	1	Probable	Unknown	96min 40 secs	LEO	1500-1530

Sources:

Kosmos Tracker http://n2yo.com/satellite/?s=44835

Yaogan 31-K Tracker http://n2yo.com/satellite/?s=47854

(2) Counter-Space Capabilities. Counter Space capabilities are a set of capabilities that NT may use to deny Coalition space effects:

(a) ISR. NT ability to negate threats from the US, Coalition, and other more sophisticated opponents is extremely limited and the threat from NT for ISR counter-space will be minimal.

(b) PNT. The ability to counter Coalition use of space-based PNT will be dependent on NT's access to COTS technology or jammers acquired from Olvana, Donovia or other vendor nations or third parties.

(c) SATCOM. The ability to counter Coalition use of space-based SATCOM is UNLIKELY, due to current capabilities, and the risk of antagonising South Torbia into joining the conflict.

(3) Launch Capability. The North Torbian Space Agency is UNLIKELY to launch any successful Satellite payloads. NT allied capabilities are significantly advanced with Olvania launching 3-4 commercial and military Hi-Res IMINT, SIGINT monthly

through both Land and Sea-based launches. It is assessed that Olvania is LIKELY to have short-term Satellite Surge launch capacity.

b. Coalition Forces.

(1) General. The CJTF has access to a limited use of Hi-Res US Keyhole technologies with Ground Resolution of under 1 metre, via FVEY arrangements.

(2) Space Capabilities. The IBSAF use a wide range of space-based ISR assets, reliant on GPS and GLONASS. Use of space based PNT and SATCOM by the Coalition is ubiquitous at all levels; denial of this capability would be debilitating.

(3) Counter-Space Capabilities. The IBSAF may leverage existing legislation from respective governments to interrupt or restrict service by commercial satellite imagery providers over the JFAO.

(4) Host Nation (HN).

(a) Belesia (BX). The host nation commercially purchases global positioning receivers that support commercial needs as well as military navigation and targeting operations, which may be leveraged for additional bandwidth of capabilities.

ANNEX XX TO
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DATED XXXXXX

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

References:

A. ANNEX N to OP CERIUM STEAL – Space Operations dated XXXXXXX

B. ADDP 3.24 - Cyberspace Operations 1st Ed – 30 Jul 2020

1. **Situation.**

a. North Torbia (NT).

(1) SIGINT and EW. NTMEF capabilities are focused on RISTA, Electronic Intelligence Warfare (EIW) as key to any Offensive or Defensive manoeuvre, specific planning down to a Division-level are assigned, and executed by manoeuvre forces including SPF and trained insurgent forces within the AO.

(a) Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RISTA) and Counter Reconnaissance Detachments (CRDs) – DTG assets are allocated in all phases of the Defence and Offense, with a focus on Detection, Disruption and Electronic of Physical Attacks. A dedicated CRD is assigned per disruption zone to maximise system warfare principles including C2, Logistics and Sensors.

(b) The Defensive Main Effort of an NTMEF DTG is the detection of the enemy's Main Effort, C2, Logistics nodes, and strategic reserve.

(c) BTG Design of EIW. Focus on disaggregation of C2 nodes, including elaborate deception plans are typical of Inforwar / Deception C3D plans, involving ghost formations, realistic manoeuvre deception plans and false emissions in line with the higher echelon intent.

(d) NTMEF will operate with as little emissions as possible during the pre-battle phase, within strict schedules and spectrum management. Radio silence or limited transmission is typical when manoeuvring fires or manoeuvre elements into place.

(e) Land Forces. NTMEF land ELINT and EW capabilities include: Vehicle-mounted 1L222 ELINT (8-18 GHz), RASIT, and Tigr-M REI PP LEER mobile EW units.

(f) SFP and Insurgents. NTMEF forces will employ SPF and provide capacity building to allied insurgents with Super High Frequency (SHF) and High Frequency (HF) capabilities for organic long-range communications, and sustained operations behind enemy lines. Where integrated with civilian infrastructure, redundancies away from main population centres are established to ensure sustainment of viable operations they have been compromised.

(g) Air Force. NTMEF Air Force has a moderate heli-borne EW jamming capability, employing HIP-J/K and HORIZON platforms.

(h) Sat ELINT. NTMEF rely on the indigenous KMS-4 satellite with limited visual resolution and ELINT capabilities, however are likely to be supported by allied Olvanan YAOGAN or Donovian KOSMOS assets which include triangulation ELINT detection capabilities.

(i) GPS Jamming. NTMEF deploys COTs and specifically designed EXJAMs in PELs and choke points which can be pre-positioned or remotely activated, just-in-time emplacements are achieved either through covert of Artillery delivered means. Activation strategies are known to use Civilian telecommunications and energy infrastructure, including operatives within the NGOs/OGA networks. Use of M-GPS Assured Positioning and Timing (A-PNT) reduces but does not eliminate impacts of EXJAMs or targeted Jamming.

(j) Cyber Operations. The NTMEF employs highly sophisticated and effective Cyber Offensive operations, synchronised to Strategic and Tactical effects. It is assessed as HIGHLY LIKELY civilian SCADA infrastructure has been compromised and can be activated to enhance Disruption activities within CIVPOP and critical IBSAF nodes. Cyber operations are nominally controlled at the strategic level and may be activated remotely from outside the AO.

(k) Redundancy. Within the AO of a BTG, as far as practically feasible Line-based communications and physical means are established to reduce the electronic signature of NTMEF forces.

b. Olvana (OV).

(1) Olvanan ELINT/IMINT capabilities may be deployed in support of NT at a National level including Hi-Res video, ELINT triangulation and millimeter wave 3D mapping within specified windows as described in Ref A.

2. **Mission.** EW will provide support to TG 667.2 during OP CERIUM STEAL IOT counter and neutralise enemy EW capabilities.

3. **Execution.**

a. Joint Information Domain Concept of OPs. TG 667.2 will employ Joint Manoeuvre in the Information Environment (MIE), to take advantage of any opportunities and mitigating vulnerabilities, IOT operate with freedom within the Information Environment.

b. Linked to National Objectives. TG 667.2 will plan and execute Joint Information Warfare through use of Information Related Capabilities (IRCs) in line with National Objectives directed by National and Integrated IW outcomes. TG 667.2 is authorised to leverage military capabilities and IRCs to conduct the following limited activities and objectives within the following constraints:

(1) Centralised Control. TG 667.2's authority to conduct Joint MIE is co-ordinated through MSC, IWD and JOC to Assure, Advise and Affect.

(2) Decentralised Execution. To execute the InfoWar Combat Functions, SHIELD, SHAPE, KNOW, aligned with National Objectives. Where executed, simultaneous manoeuvre should be used to enhance Battlespace effects including Deception.

(3) Limitations. The Australian Government and ADF plans and executes information warfare to ensure it is legal, policy compliant, ethical, rules-based and measured. As with other engagements, the ADF will have specified rules of engagement that have been approved at the highest levels.

(4) Authority and Waivers. CJTF 667 is the lead for the International response, operational authorities and waivers can be obtained for the implementation of MIE activities within a specified military operating area. A minimum of 30 days is required for submission to CJTF 667 for Joint MIE Ops, when responding to an immediate and impending threat waivers can be submitted with 36 hours' notice.

(5) Constraints. Lethality and impacts across Time must be considered when planning MIE, where enduring effects may linger across years. Where practicable, it should be contained within the operating environment.

(6) Integrated Workforce. MIE will utilise all the IRC's integrated workforce to leverage expertise and enhance effects, these support the IBSAF's Mission to Defeat the NTMEF within BX.

c. Satellite Access Requests. TG 667.2 has limited access to Allied Sat OPS, where required TG 667.2 will submit a Communications Access Request (CAR) through Defence Communications Area Master Station Australia (DEFCAMSAUS) via HQ CJTF 667 J6.

d. Spectrum Frequency Assignment Operating in a Foreign Country. This operation will utilise a combination of Area, Space and Band assignments. IAW Ref B, international frequency assignments are to be submitted with a minimum of 90 days' notice to ensure international frequency requests are managed.

e. Groupings & Tasks.

(1) **G6**.

(a) Is to comply and coordinate EMS use with the joint restricted frequency list (JRFL) / combined restricted frequency list (CRFL) and associated processes ensuring the Worldwide Restricted Frequency List IAW Ref B is used as the minimum restricted frequencies that will be protected against friendly electronic warfare (EW).

(b) Contribute to the joint or combined communications-electronics operating instructions (JCEOI/CCEOI).

(c) Provide administrative and technical support to TG 667.2 units for military spectrum use.

(d) Receive and send reports, analyse and attempt to resolve incidents of unacceptable interference within the AO.

(e) Act as the focal point for requesting interference resolution support within AO.

(f) Provide and resolve conflicts not resolved at a lower level.

(g) Be the focal point for inclusion of spectrum use considerations in the communications annex of future operational plans (OPLAN).

(h) Participate in multifunctional user use of the EMS to resolve interference.

(i) Identify and resolve potential electromagnetic environmental effect hazards to ordnance, equipment, personnel, and fuel.

(j) Assist the EW staff in integrating EW activities into operations to ensure minimum impact on friendly use of the EMOE.

(k) Provide recommendations for the update of the JRFL/CRFL as required.

(l) Be the primary source for information on the impact of EW actions on friendly command and control nodes and the overall impact of EW actions on friendly force EMS operations within AO.

(2) **G5** (Plans) is to:

(a) Incorporate EMS use into long-range and future operations planning and the EW strategy, based upon input from the G2, G3 and G6.

(b) Establish coordination channels with any HN forces involved in a joint or multinational operation to negotiate EMS use where procedures do not already exist.

(3) **Spectrum users** need to:

(a) Obtain frequency authorisation for each use of the EMS by their appropriate SMC.

(b) Use frequencies within their parameters as authorised by the frequency assignment process.

(c) Coordinate any need to exceed or operate spectrum-dependent equipment outside the parameters authorised by the frequency assignment authority.

(d) Ensure the spectrum-dependent equipment is properly maintained to preclude unintentional violation of authorised spectrum-use parameters.

(e) If an incident is encountered, initiate a Harmful Interference Report in accordance with Appendix 2 in the format attached below.

4. **Admin & Log**. TBA.

5. **Command and Signal**.

a. ASD shall continue to exercise SIGINT Operational Tasking Authority (SOTA) over the SIGINT assets until SOTA is delegated to CJTF 667.

b. Communications Systems.

(1) The cryptologic communications architecture shall include:

(a) TBA

(2) The SIGINT section has access to the following communications networks:

(a) TBA

c. Coalition Networks as applicable.

Appendix 1 – Minimum Required Information for Frequency Clearance and Assignment

Appendix 2 – Harmful Interference Reporting Format

APPENDIX 1

MINIMUM REQUIRED INFORMATION FOR FREQUENCY CLEARANCE AND ASSIGNMENT

SFAF Data Item Number	Title	Note
005	Security classification	
010	Type of action	
110	Frequency (ies)	
111	Excluded frequency band	
113	Station class	
114	Emission designator	
115	Transmitter power	
140	Required date	
141	Expiration date	
207	Operating unit	
300	State/Country	1
301	Antenna location	1
303	Antenna coordinates	1
306	Authorised radius	1, 3
340	Equipment nomenclature	1
345	Radar tunability	1, 4
346	Pulse duration	1, 4
347	Pulse repetition rate	1, 4
354	Antenna name	1
355	Antenna nomenclature	1
357	Antenna gain	1
400	State/Country	2
401	Antenna location	2
403	Antenna coordinates	2
406	Authorised radius	2, 3
440	Equipment nomenclature	2
454	Antenna name	2
457	Antenna gain	2
502	Description of requirement	
803	Requestor data	
805	Date response required	

APPENDIX 2

HARMFUL INTERFERENCE REPORTING FORMAT

The following format is to be used for the reporting of harmful interference. The layout follows the format used in Appendix 10 of the International Telecommunication Union Radio Regulations and is similar to the format in Allied Communications Publication (ACP) 194— *Policy for the Coordination of Military Electromagnetic Spectrum Allocations and Assignments Between Cooperating Nations.* The report should include the following information

Particulars concerning the interference:

(1) name, call sign or other means of identification

(2) frequency measured, including date-time group

(3) class of emission

(4) bandwidth (indicate whether measured or estimated)

(5) measured field strength or power flux-density (including date and time)

(6) class of station/nature of service

(7) location/position/bearing of the station which made the above measurements.

b. Particulars of station experiencing interference:

(1) name of station

(2) location/position/area

(3) dates and times (universal time coordinated (UTC)) of occurrence of harmful interference

(4) bearings or other particulars

(5) nature of interference

(6) field strength or power flux-density of the wanted emission at the station experiencing the interference, including date and UTC time

(7) polarisation of the receiving antenna or observed polarization

(8) action requested.

ANNEX AC TO
1 AS DIV OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

ENGINEER SUPPORT

References:

A. TG667.2 OPORD 01 (Operation Cerium Steal)
B. Belesian (BX) Country Study
C. North Torbian (NT) Country Study

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU.

1. **Situation.**

a. Background. See paragraph 1 of the main body of TG667.2 OPORD 01 (Ref A) and Annex B - Intelligence.

b. General. Engineer operations for TG667.2 requires a rapid build-up of Mobility (M)/Counter mobility (CM)/Survivability (S)/General Engineer (GE) capacity across the Combined, Joint, Interagency domain .

c. Purpose. The purpose of this Annex is to describe the Scheme of Engineer Operations on Panay during Ph 2 and 3 of OP CERIUM STEAL and provide Engineer guidance at the Component Command (Div) level.

d. Engineer Intelligence. Refer to Annex B to TG667.2 OPORD 01.

e. Operational Areas.

(1) TG667.2 Area of Operations (AO FANNING). The AO FANNING is comprised of the landmass, airspace and territorial waters (12NM) of Panay Island.

f. Terrain and Man-Made Features. See Appendix 4 to Annex B of Ref A.

g. Civil Considerations

(1) As an island nation, BX relies on a network of regular maritime ferry and domestic air services to move personnel and freight amongst its various islands. Typically, the maritime ferry services are the primary means of inter-island transportation. BX roads networks on the larger islands are mainly paved. However, there are numerous unimproved dirt and gravel roads throughout the area, especially on the smaller islands, or islands with a small population. Disrupting mobility would be easily affected by damaging paved roads through the use of IEDs or cratering charges. Rural roads do not receive proper maintenance, leaving them susceptible to damage from the weather and neglect. The monsoonal season also has a drastic effect on the inland roads with communities at time being cut off and isolated during severe weather. For more details on BX terrain, see Ref B.

(2) Most of the region, particularly rural areas, cannot access all modern utilities such as potable water, electricity, and modern sewage systems. This will cause a reliance on military electrical, water and sanitation systems.

(3) Paramilitary, insurgent, and guerrilla forces operate in BX. This could lead to an increased use of IEDs in Panay, particularly on main highways and field landing strips, having a negative impact on mobility.

(4) BX contains a number of heavily populated areas such as the cities on Panay. Enemy operations in these areas could result in the Host Nation asking for engineers to provide survivability/force protection, and general engineering assistance.

h. Enemy Engineer Forces. See Annex B Intelligence and NT Country Study (Ref C).

i. Friendly Engineer Forces. See Belesian Country Study (Ref B).

2. **Mission.** TG667.2 Engineer Elements will provide Force Level Engineering effects to project, protect and sustain the Land Force on Panay.

3. **Execution.**

a. Concept of Engineer Support. The Divisional engineer effort will be centrally planned and coordinated, and executed by the Divisional organic and assigned engineers. Theatre planning and coordination for engineer support will be provided by the Joint Force Engineer, supplemented by elements from 19 Chief Engineering Works. Divisional level engineering support will be provided by 6th Engineer Support Regiment (6 ESR) as part of TG667.2.

b. Each Combat Bde within TG776.2 will have organic engineer support to provide intimate mobility/counter-mobility/survivability support. RAAF Airfield Engineers (65 Sqn) will provide intimate support to the APOD at Iloilo post lodgement through the Combat Support Squadrons assigned to each APOD. RAAF Airfield Engineers will remain OPCON to the CJTF 667 HQ, but may be assigned TACON to the relevant AO commander.

c. HN engineering capability will be required during Ph 4 Transition operations to rebuild infrastructure damaged or destroyed during the conflict in Panay. This may include civilian contractors. The Joint Force Engineer will be responsible for coordinating all sustainability engineering support across the JFAO. Div Engineer will be responsible for coordination for all sustainability engineering operations within Panay.

d. Scheme of Engineer Operations. TG667.2 Engineers will provide and synchronise mobility, counter-mobility, survivability, sustainability and general Engineer efforts to defeat NT forces and support BX civil authorities. The majority of planning effort will focus around Phases 2 and 3 of OP CERIUM STEAL.

e. Priority of Div Engineer Effort by Phase.

(1) Phase 1 – Lodgement

(a) Support the establishment of a beachhead on Panay.

(b) Support the establishment of an APOD/SPOD in Iloilo.

(c) BPT conduct mobility/counter-mobility/survivability tasks ISO ground operations.

(2) Phase 2 – Neutralise

(a) Conduct mobility/counter-mobility/survivability tasks ISO ground operations.

(b) Conduct sustainment operations by maintaining Lines of Communication (LoC).

(c) Conduct battlefield clearance.

(d) Conduct survivability tasks for key Div capabilities.

(e) BPT conduct sustainability operations ISO RASO and Stability Operations.

(3) Phase 3 – Transition.

(a) Conduct reconstruction tasks ISO capacity building.

(b) Conduct battlefield clearance.

(c) Support the handover of engineer sites and works to civil and military authorities of respective Host Nations.

(d) Contribute to capacity building of Belesian security forces.

(e) Support TG667.2 in the conduct of relief in place and transition to a follow-on force on Panay.

(f) Support the withdrawal of TG667.2 forces.

f. Assignment of Additional Engineer Assets. Components will deploy with organic and assigned engineer units and assets. Engineer organizations are assigned as follows:

(1) TG667.2. 6 ESR, 1 Int Bn (5 Coy for Geospatial support).

(2) X BDE. X CER.

(3) Y BDE. Y CER.

(4) BX 12 MOT BDE. 12 ENGR Coy

g. Common Tasks.

(1) Conduct combat engineering and general engineering support to assigned formation.

(2) Maintain TG667.2 MSRs operational within assigned TAORs.

(3) Coordinate Explosive Hazard information collection and counter-explosive hazard operations.

(4) Be prepared to assist BX authorities with the repair of critical infrastructure that impacts TG667.2 operations.

(5) Be prepared to coordinate engineer support for humanitarian assistance and to create a safe environment in Panay.

(6) Liaise with Host Nation local engineers, and coordinate Host Nation engineer support in AO.

h. Specific Tasks.

(1) 6 ESR.

(a) Establish TG667.2 policy, standards, and priorities for construction, facilities, and real estate utilisation.

(b) Establish TG667.2 environmental policy and standards.

(c) Operate the Explosive Hazard Coordination Centre and reporting system.

(d) Provide Div level engineer support to TG667.2, including permanent horizontal and vertical construction, pipeline repair and construction, well-drilling, and power generation.

(e) Manage TG667.2 facilities, real estate, construction, and engineer construction contracts.

(2) 1 Int Bn

(a) Provide geospatial support to the TG667.2 (5 Coy (Topographical)).

i. Engineer Intelligence Requirements for Planning.

(1) Iloilo APOD and SPOD capacity, limitations, and damage.

(2) Extent of damage to BX critical infrastructure in Panay.

(3) Status of MSRs on Panay.

(4) Employment of improvised explosive devices, booby-traps, and mines by VPF.

(5) Extent of damage or obstacles on airfields in Panay.

(6) Location and disposition of NT breaching and bridging assets.

(7) Type and location of NT obstacles in Panay.

(8) Capacity, limitations, and damage of bridges over major waterways in Panay.

(9) Loss of friendly breaching and bridging assets.

(10) Location and extent of engineer construction materials in Panay.

j. Explosive Hazards.

(1) 6 ESR will establish an Explosive Hazards Coordination Cell (EHCC) to gather information, track, predict, distribute information on, and mitigate explosive hazards within the theatre that affect force protection and mobility.

(2) EOD within 6 ESR and CERs will conduct tactical activities to address explosive hazards. Combat engineer unit activities include the detection, reporting, breaching and clearing of minefields, and the detection, reporting, and destruction of IEDs. Only EOD units and properly qualified EOD personnel shall conduct EOD procedures against

explosive ordnance, UXO, or IEDs. Attempts will be made to render safe explosive devices for intelligence gathering efforts if the situation does not affect the local population and TG667.2 ability to accomplish the mission being undertaken.

(3) IEDs/Booby-Traps. TG667.2 will not employ booby-traps or IEDs.

(4) Mines. COMD TG667.2 is the emplacement authority for AT mines in AO FANNING. Artillery delivered mines will not be utilised by TG667.2. Anti-tank mines, if utilised, will be surface laid. No AP mines will be utilised.

(5) Humanitarian Demining (HDM). Because of the threat to peace and safety, HDM has become a significant disarmament and peace operations activity. Demining is ultimately an HN responsibility; however, TG667.2 may assist BX through mine awareness education and training of HN personnel in the surveying, marking, and clearing of mines during Ph3.

k. Geospatial. Div and formations will deploy with integral terrain analysis capabilities. Div geospatial support will be provided by 5 Coy, 1 Int Bn.

l. Firefighting. The CERs will provide close firefighting capabilities ISO RW operations. These firefighting capabilities will be OPCON to 16 Avn Bde during Ph1 – 3. 6 ESR will be responsible for TG667.2 policy on firefighting capabilities for TG667.2 facilities. TG667.2 fire protection priorities are:

(1) APODs and SPODs.

(2) Medical facilities.

(3) Ammunition and fuel storage installations.

(4) TG667.2 Headquarters and communication centres.

m. Reach back. The Div Engineer will reach back to the Joint Force Engineer will facilitate the utilisation of NSB engineer capabilities. All requests for assistance will be passed to the Joint Force Engineer based out of General Santos City.

n. Host Nation Support. TG667.2 Engineers will maximise the use of Host Nation (civilian) engineer support. Host-Nation Support planning considerations include the following: indigenous labour; local availability of construction materiel, supplies, and equipment; local contractor support; and local facilities.

o. Construction Standards.

(1) When new construction is the only means of sourcing facility requirements, it will be constructed either using respective TCN standards or using temporary guidelines (less than six months) found in extant Doctrine and Policy.

(2) Expedient construction (e.g., rapid construction techniques such as pre-fabricated buildings, clamshell structures, etc.) should also be considered as these methods can be selectively employed with minimum time, cost, and risk to offer in-theatre forces another source of required temporary facilities.

4. **Sustainment.**

a. Logistics. Engineer Units will deploy with their own organic logistic support, and will receive additional support from their supported formations. During Ph2, priority of availability for CL IV supply will be lower. CL IV supplies will be limited to what formations will bring as part of basic defensive stores.

b. Medical. Engineer Units will deploy with their own organic medical assets (RAP), and will receive additional support from their supported formations (R1 – R2E).

c. Construction Materiel. Construction materiel is readily available for local purchase, and contracted construction capability is available. The following quantities of CL IV material will be made available to be called forward from the Iloilo APOD.

Serial	Description	Qty	Notes
1	Star Pickets	10,000	
2	HESCO Barrier Baskets	500	
3	Corrugated Iron sheets (2.4m x 0.66m)	5,000	103/pallet
4	Concertina Wire (15m coil)	200	36/pallet
5	Barbed Wire (100m coil)	1000	78/pallet
6	Hessian (0.9m wide) 110m roll	50	19/pallet
7	Sandbags (pallet of 3000)	50	

d. Mines. All AT mines will be held within the ammunition store at the Iloilo APOD and brought forward on request. Authority to issue AT mines will be as per paragraph j(4). Quantity of mines available listed below.

Serial	Description	Qty	Notes
1	Mk 5 AT Mines (pallet)	20	145 mines/pallet

e. Explosive Stores. CERs will deploy with their own quantity of explosive stores. The following quantities of service explosives will be held at the Iloilo ammunition store and can be called forward.

Serial	Description	Qty	Notes
1	Chg, dml, block, Comb B	100 cases	10 slabs / case

2	Chg, dml cart, PE4	100 cases	20 carts / case
3	Sheet expl, Primasheet 1000	20 crates	12 sheets / crate
4	ANFO	200 bags	25kg / bag
5	Primer, CE, 35g	10 boxe	60 / box
6	Bangalore Torpedo Mk 1	50	
7	Chg, dml, shaped, No 1 Mk 6, 150mm, Beehive	10 cases	4 / case
8	Chg, dml, shaped, NR50 Mk 1, 200mm, Beehive	10 crates	2 / crate
9	Chg, dml, shaped, No 14 Mk 1, Hayrick	10 cases	5 / case
10	Charge linear cutting (CLC)	50 boxes	24 / box
11	PELCC	20	

f. Bridging Equipment. CERs will hold the following bridging equipment as part of their integral holdings and will be kept within the BMA:

(1) 1 x DSB

(2) 2 x Footbridge

g. The following bridging equipment will be kept at the Iloilo APOD and be brought forward on demand:

(1) 2 x MGB (22 bay)

(2) 1 x IRB (complete with BEPB)

5. **Command and Signal.**

a. TG667.2 Engineer – Lieutenant Colonel XXXXXX (CO 6 ESR) is appointed as the Divisional Engineer.

b. Location. The Divisional Engineer will establish at Iloilo APOD, Panay with TG667.2 HQ by XXXXXX.

c. Engineer Coordinating Boards.

(1) The TG667.2 Engineer Synchronisation teleconference. TBA

JFACC Joint Air Operations Plan

Direction for Execution & Planning Guidance Operation Steel Sentinel 2020

CAO: XXXXX

JFACC		
Approve	Disapprove	Discuss
☐	☐	☐

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SITUATION

(O:S) Operation Steel Sentinel is the coalition response to the situation in the Belesian islands of Panay and Palawan.

(O:S) Growing ethnic tensions in Panay have resulted in sustained violence after the local government attempted to take control of the Cerium rare earth mine in San Rafael. This attempt was to take control from the Olvanan registered operator. This action resulted in civil unrest in the second largest city on Panay, Roxas.

(O:S) Recently Olvana (OV) and North Torbia (NT) participated in Exercise RISEN SWORD which was conducted in the South China Sea (SCS). Under the cover of this exercise NT landed a marine force (estimated to be a Brigade) on Palawan near the sparsely populated town of El Nido, capturing the port and airfield facilities. Simultaneously, NT landed a Marine Expeditionary Force (estimated to be a Brigade strength) near Roxas on Panay and captured the seaport, airport and the San Rafael Mine.

(O:S) In response to this aggression, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed UNSCR 8868 (ref A) condemning the NT aggression. Concurrently a Brigade of Belesian troops landed on the south of Panay. This action has resulted in a stalemate.

(O:S) NT has declared a Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) and an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the occupied islands and parts of Sulu and the SCS. As a further response the UNSC passed UNSCR 8869 and then 8873 which together, authorised the raising of an International Belesian Security Assistance Force (IBSAF) with Australia as the lead nation of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF 667). The government of Belisia has consented, subject to SOFAs, to allow CJTF 667 to stage in their territory and supporting any CJTF 667 overflights.

CJTF 667 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

(O:S) The concept of operations for CJTF 667 is a phased approach (Phases 0-4) which begins with a coordinate shaping effort to isolate the North Torbian Marine Expeditionary Force (NTMEF) politically, economically and socially. From there the intent is to further isolate the NTMEF through disruption and denial of communications and logistical support.

(O:S) Phase 2 begins with a deception plan, indicating that the proposed landing site is Palawan. The main effort of Phase 2 is a lodgement of forces, a Joint Force Entry Operation (JFEO) into the island of Panay.

(O:S) Phase 3 is the domination and defeat of the NTMEF on Panay in the first instance and then the defeat of the NTMEF elements on Palawan, this is through both traditional operations and through Counter-Insurgency (COIN) operations.

(O:S) Phase 4 is the transition into a peacekeeping force on both Panay and Palawan. The ultimate end state is returning peace and security to Belesia (BX).

OPERATIONAL AREA

(O:S) The Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO) includes the landmasses, national air space and territorial waters of Belesia and the waters and associated airspaces of the Sulu Sea, the Celebes Sea north of the XX degrees latitude, Philippine Sea west of XX degrees longitude and the South China Sea east of XX degrees longitude.

(O:S) The JFACC AO is the airspace in the bounds of Belesian sovereign territory.

(O:S) The operation under this JAOP should cease once the islands of occupied Belesia are sufficiently secure and stable and there is improved capability of the Belesian security forces such that state sponsored hostilities have ceased. A safe and secure environment on Belesia exists when:

a. (O:S) It allows IOs and NGOs safe and unrestricted access to the Belesian population; and

b. (O:S) It encourages the return of IDPs and refugees; and

c. (O:S) It fosters the rapid re-establishment of representative government institutions; and

d. (O:S) It allows economic reconstruction and development.

MISSION

(O:S) **CJTF 667 Mission**. To conduct military operations to expel all NT forces from Belesian sovereign territory in order to create conditions for the re-establishment of a safe and secure environment in Belesia and the surrounding region.

(O:S) **JFACC Mission**. On order, JFACC will integrate air, space and cyber operations with CJT 667 to gain and maintain air superiority over the JFAO to allow freedom of movement for the CJTF 667 JFLCC and JFMCC to expel all NT forces from the Belesian sovereign territory and create safe and secure conditions in Belesia and the surrounding region.

JFACC Guidance:

a. (O:S) **Purpose**: JFACC will support CJTF 667 to defeat the NT military forces on Belesian sovereign territory to re-establish a safe and secure environment in Belesia to restore and continue Belesian democratic governance and developmental programs. JFACC will also support UN Agencies, International Organisations (IOs) and NGOs within capabilities and limitations in order to preserve human life and alleviate suffering of IDPs and refugees within the JFAO.

b. (O:S) **Method**: JFACC will conduct air, space and information operations to support land and maritime Scheme of Manoeuver, deter NT aggression, disrupt/deny adversary C4ISR, destroy/neutralise adversary weapon systems, and protect CJTF 667, the UN Agencies, IOs and NGOs personnel and assets in order to defeat all NT military forces on Belesian sovereign territory.

c. (O:S) **End state**: The establishment of a sufficiently secure and stable environment in the occupied Belesian islands and improved capability of Belesian security forces such that state sponsored hostilities have ceased, territorial borders are secure, humanitarian assistance programs operate unhindered and transition to an UN-sanctioned and Host Nation follow-on security force is complete.

EXECUTION

JFACC Concept of Operations

(O:S) During Phase 0 the JFACC will support the Belsian air force, establish air superiority over key areas to enable disembarkation for a follow on force to support Phase 1 and beyond and utilise all available ISR assets to understand NT posture, intentions and pattern of life. Further, the ISR assets will provide I&W to friendly and coalition assets in response to any threat from NT. During Phase 0 JFACC will prepare and may be called on to move assets in support of Phase 1 and beyond.

(O:S) During Phase 1 the JFACC will continue to utilise ISR assets to understand the NT posture, intentions and pattern of life and to inform the Joint Targeting Cycle. Further, the JFACC will establish and patrol an ADIZ to disrupt and deny logistical support to the disputed islands. The final portion of Phase 1 will be for the JFACC to establish air superiority in the JFAO through Offensive Counter Air (OCA) operations. Phase 1 is intended to provide the air support required for the JFLCC and JFMCC to conduct their planed scheme of Maneuver.

(O:S) Beginning in Phase 2 and continuing in phase 3 the JFACC will transition to Defensive Counter Air (DCA) operations and maintain air superiority throughout the Joint Force Area of Operations. Further, the JFACC will support the JFLCC with Strike and Close Air Support (CAS) mission sets. Finally, on order the JFACC will support the JFLCC and JFMCC in their respective Scheme of Maneuver with air mobility assets.

(O:S) During Phase 4 the JFACC will maintain air superiority in the JFAO drawing down forces as the threat level decreases. The JFACC will conduct training and joint operations with BX air assets while transitioning to a focus on humanitarian and air mobility support.

JOINT AIR OPERATIONS PLAN

References:

A. (O:S) UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 8868
B. (O:S) CJTF 667 OPORD 01 (OPERATION STEEL SENTINEL)
C. (O:S) UNSCR 8869
D. (O:S) UNSCR 8873
E. (O:S) Australian Treaty Series 2006 No 7 (SOFA)
F. (O:S) Rules of Engagement – Annex L to the CJTF 667 OPORD (including appendix 1 and 2)
G. (O:S) Appendix 3 to Annex R to OSS - CJTF 667 OPORD – Personnel Support
H. (O:S) Annex R to OSS - CJTF 667 OPORD – Logistic Support Order
I. (O:S) Annex AA to OSS - CJTF 667 OPORD – Health Support

SITUATION

Background

1. (O:S) Growing ethnic tensions in the Belesian island of Panay resulted in violence when the local government in Panay attempted to take control of the lucrative Cerium rare earth mine in San Rafael from the Olvanan registered operator. The resulting loss of life amongst the Belesian Constabulary and unknown number of mine employees has sparked unrest in the nearby city of Roxas with the violence occurring along ethnic lines with the greatest loss of life amongst the Torbian diaspora.

2. (O:S) Olvana (OV) and North Torbia (NT) have been conducting a week's long biennial exercise in the South China Sea, named Exercise RISEN SWORD. It was under the cover of this exercise that NT landed a marine force (estimated to be a Battalion plus) on Palawan near the sparsely populated town of El Nido, capturing the port and airfield facilities.

3. (O:S) Simultaneously, NT landed a Marine Expeditionary Force (estimated to be at Brigade strength) near the city of Roxas, Panay and captured the seaport, airport, and the San Rafael Mine.

4. (O:S) NT has claimed the justification for this act of aggression is to protect ethnic Torbians in Panay from persecution. In response to this blatant disregard for international protocols, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed UNSCR 8868 (ref A) condemning NT aggression and calling for the withdrawal of NT Forces from Belesian territory.

5. (O:S) Concurrently, Belesia (BX) landed a Brigade of troops in the south of Panay through the city of Iloilo in an attempt to force the NT forces off the island. This course of action has resulted in a stalemate with the NT Marine Expeditionary Force (NTMEF) holding the northern half of Panay centred on the city of Roxas and the BX Forces holding the area around Iloilo.

6. (O:S) NT has since declared a Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) and Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the occupied islands and parts of the Sulu and South China Sea.

7. (O:S) In an effort to allow diplomatic options to be utilised and reduce further loss of life, the UNSC passed UNSCR 8869 (ref C) calling on all Member States to enforce economic and military sanctions against NT. With NT's continued occupation of Panay and Palawan in contravention of International laws, the UNSC passed UNSCR 8873 (ref D) authorising the raising of the International Belesian Security Assistance Force (IBSAF) to utilise military force to remove NT military elements on sovereign Belesian territory.

8. (O:S) Australia has volunteered to be the lead nation of the Combined Joint Task Force 667 (CJTF 667) with contributing nations including New Zealand, Fiji, Malaysia, Singapore, Tonga, PNG, Japan and Thailand.

9. (O:S) The Government of BX has consented, subject to SOFAs (ref E), to allow CJTF 667 forces to stage through their territories, to station forces, materiel and installations involved in supporting its operations and to overflights.

Guidance

10. (O:S) The JFACC guidance for this operation is that Commanders will at all times act within the UN mandate and while maintaining the support of the BX government, will support the JFLCC and JFMCC IOT achieve the CJTF 667 strategic aim, that being:

a. End NT aggression towards BX;

b. Expulsion of all NT Military Forces from BX sovereign territory;

c. Creations of a free, safe, secure and stable environment in the region; and

d. Provide the environment for the continuation of BX democratic national governance and developmental programs.

11. (O:S) This is a localised operation between NT and BX, to that end all subordinate commanders must ensure that no actions taken by them will antagonise neutral countries.

12. (O:S) At all times subordinate commanders will conduct operations within international guidelines and endeavour to reduce collateral death and damage to non-combatants.

13. (O:S) While the CJTF 667 supports the use of conventional military forces to attain the abovementioned end state, the expulsion of all NT Military Forces from BX sovereign territory is a desired off-ramp which should lead to a reduction in hostilities and a posture aimed to deter further NT aggression.

Enemy Forces

14. (O:S) **Capability.** Refer to Annex B of Ref B, the current Intel update and the following:

15. (O:S) **Panay**. NTMEF Bde have secured their Sea Point Of Disembarkation (SPOD) and Air Point Of Disembarkation (APOD) within the city of Roxas, and with the help from the Visayan Peoples Front (VPF) — an insurgent force — have captured the San Rafael Mine complex. They have a mobile defensive position southwest of the San Rafael Mine and north of the city of Iloilo. At the Roxas APOD, NT have based 12x SU-30MKK, 12x J-11B, 12 x Z-9, and 6x Z-19.

16. (O:S) **Palawan**. NTMEF Bn have lodged in El Nido and refurbished disused WW2 port and airfield being used as a staging base for movement into Panay. The combat air elements operating out of El Nido Airfield include; 12x SU-30MKK and 12x J-11B.

17. (O:S) **Sulu and South China Sea**. Surface and Subsurface elements known to be operating in the Sulu and South China Sea are:

a. 1x Type 052D Luyang III (DDG);

b. 2x Type 052C Luyang II (DDG);

c. 1x Type 051G Luda (DDG);

d. 2x Type 054A Jiankai II (FFH);

e. 1x Type 053H3 Jiangwei II (FFH);

f. 2x Type 053 Jianghu V (FFG); and

g. 3x Type 039 Song (SSK).

Area of Operations

18. (O:S) The Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO) includes the landmasses, national air space and territorial waters of BX and the waters and associated airspaces of the Sulu Sea, the Celebes Sea north of the XX degrees latitude, Philippine Sea west of XX degrees longitude and the South China Sea east of XX degrees longitude.

19. (O:S) The JFAO is depicted in by the blue outline in Figure – 1.



Figure 1 - JFAO

Air Component Friendly Order of Battle (FROB)

20. (O:S) The Air Component FROB has been developed based on the airpower required to achieve CJTF 667 guidance and the laydown outlined below is based on a successful completion of Phase 0. On commencement of Phase 0 adequate forces will be required to provide air superiority directly in support of the lodgement of CJTF 667 forces IVO General Santos City and to provide the air mobility required to support the lodgement of forces. This air superiority will be extended to Zamboanga throughout Phase 0. A pictorial can be found in Figure 2.

a. (O:S) **Fighter Assets.**

(1) 24 RAAF F-35A Lighting II (Zamboanga)

(2) 12 RAAF F/A-18F Super Hornets (Zamboanga)

b. (O:S) **EW assets.**

(1) 8 RAAF EA-18G Growlers (Zamboanga)

c. (O:S) **C2 and ISR assets.**

(1) 3 RAAF E-7A Wedgetail (General Santos City)

(2) 4 RAAF P-8 Poseidon (General Santos City)

(3) 2 RAAF MQ-4C Triton (General Santos City)

(4) 2 RNZAF P-3 Orion (General Santos City)

d. (O:S) **Air Mobility and AAR**.

(1) 4 RAAF C-17 Globemaster (Darwin)

(2) 4 RAAF C-130 J Hercules (Darwin)

(3) 5 RAAF C-27J Spartan (General Santos City)

(4) 4 RAAF KC-30A (General Santos City)

(5) 2 RNZAF C-130 Hercules (Darwin)

e. (O:S) **Support assets.**

(1) 1 RAAF Airfield Defence Squadron (As required)

(2) 1 RAAF Airfield Engineering Squadron (As required)

(3) 2 RAAF ECSS (As required)



Figure 2 - CJTF 667 FROB post Phase 0

Centre of Gravity Analysis (COG)

21. (O:S) **HQJOC.** The friendly strategic COG is the CJTF offensive air capability.

22. (O:S) **JFACC.** The JFACC's COG is the operation of General Santos and Zamboanga airfields. In order to generate the air superiority required to permit the land and maritime ground operations the JFACC needs to be able to generate sustained ISR, C2, air mobility and offensive air capability.

JFACC operational CRs

23. (O:S) The following are the friendly operational critical requirements (CRs):

a. (O:S) Support from BX government and forces

b. (O:S) Secure airfields based in BX (from ground and air attack)

c. (O:S) Effective command, control, and communication (C3) system

d. (O:S) Secure supply and distribution of munitions and POL

e. (O:S) Effective ISR

f. (O:S) Ability to project and maintain Air Superiority

g. (O:S) Ability to conduct integrated operations

JFACC operational CVs

24. (O:S) The following are the friendly operational critical vulnerabilities (CVs):

a. (O:S) Cultural differences between Australia and host nation

b. (O:S) Cyber-attack against BX infrastructure supporting JFACC operations

c. (O:S) Disruption to supply lines between Australia and BX (Air & Maritime)

d. (O:S) Disruption to the initial deployment of forces to BX

e. (O:S) Maintaining Air Superiority against superior force (Olvana)

CJTF 667 assumptions

25. The following are the assumptions developed from analysis and guidance:

a. (O:S) CJTF 667 will be a single rotation deployment

b. (O:S) Minimum Air assets must remain in AUS for national defence

c. (O:S) CJTF 667 will include FE from other nations

d. (O:S) Full SOFA and cooperation with BX to allow staging of Coalition Forces (CF) from BX territory

e. (O:S) CJTF 667 will not have complete operational command of all Host Nations (BX) Forces within the AO

f. (O:S) CJTF 667 will have Operational Control of designated BX Forces

g. (O:S) BX Forces will only be involved in a defensive capacity

h. (O:S) No staging of CF out of South China Sea

i. (O:S) South Torbia will remain strictly neutral due to previous armistice with NT and will vigorously defend its territory (incl. EEZ) from ALL incursions

j. (O:S) Gabal has no means of enforcing sovereign territory

JFACC Assumptions

26. The following are **JFACC** derived planning assumptions.

a. (O:S) CATG640 will be a single rotational deployment with logistic support from Australia

b. (O:S) CATG640 will include air elements from other nations

c. (O:S) BX air elements will provide DCA of BX airfields based at Gen Santos and Zamboanga.

d. (O:S) Minimum air elements must remain in AUS for national defence

e. (O:S) BX Forces will provide ground defence of airfields – Gen Santos & Zamboanga

f. (O:S) Olvana will not intervene conduct air operations in JFAO as long as their interests are not threatened

g. (O:S) South Torbia will remain neutral, however will defend its airspace from all incursions

h. (O:S) NT will not use chemical or biological weapons in the JFAO

i. (O:S) NT will not actively bring Olvana into the conflict for air support

j. (O:S) NT will attempt to protect MEZ with force

k. (O:S) The intelligence picture of forces on Panay and Palawan is accurate.

Limitations-Restraints (Must NOT Do)

27. (O:S) The following restraints have been imposed by higher command guidance and the operational environment:

a. (O:S) Disrupt the use of civilian air routes in and out of the JFAO.

b. (O:S) Adversely affect the BX economy more than is necessary.

c. (O:S) Disrupt maritime traffic in the region outside the JFAO.

Limitations-Constraints (Must Do)

28. (O:S) The following constraints have been imposed by higher command guidance and the operational environment:

a. (O:S) Minimise the use of scarce BX resources.

b. (O:S) Minimise collateral damage and civilian casualties in BX.

c. (O:S) Deploy to the JFAO as soon as possible in a sequence coordinated by the CJTF.

d. (O:S) Work closely with the UN to facilitate the work of the UN agencies, IOs and NGOs.

e. (O:S) Minimise the demand on BX resources.

f. (O:S) Operate in accordance with the SOFA with BX.

29. (O:S) **Legal Considerations.** Detailed legal considerations are contained in Appendix C.6 to Annex C – Operations.

30. (O:S) **Rules of Engagement (ROE).** At all times the operations will be conducted in accordance with the rules of engagement as drafted in Annex L to the CJTF 667 OPORD (Ref F). Of note Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 apply to individual phases of the operation. Mission specific ROE will be published at a later date.

Risk

31. (O:S) **Risks**. The following risks have been identified as potentially impacting the progression of operations:

32. (O:S) **Risk to mission**. The following have been identified as risks to mission:

a. (O:S) **Maintainability and Logistics**. There is a MODERATE risk to maintaining air superiority due the serviceability and resupply of spare parts, munitions and POL from AUS.

b. (O:S) **NT capability**. The NT have sufficient force capabilities to conduct integrated mission tactics, this represents a HIGH risk to ATG assets flying into the TEZ. With the reduction in NT capability based on Panay and Palawan, the risk will reduce and will require reassessment.

c. (O:S) **Panay lodgement**. In addition to the NT forces on Panay, there are a number of IMG - insurgents, separatists and criminal organisations that pose a HIGH risk to assets landing on Panay.

d. (O:S) **OPSEC**. Given the number of IMGs located on the BX islands there is a HIGH risk to low level OPSEC that can been observed on the BX airfields and nearby (take off timings, number of assets, personnel movement). There is LOW risk to detailed mission OPSEC with the correct facilities and C2 systems established.

33. (O:S) **Risk to forces**. The following have been identified as risks to mission:

a. (O:S) **Belesian Airfields**. There is a LOW Risk to the destruction of ATG aircraft and facilities based in BX, NT have no desire to escalate conflict beyond Panay and Palawan.

b. (O:S) **Olvana**. As long as Olvana interests on Panay are not threatened, there is a LOW risk of Olvana entering conflict.

c. (O:S) **ISR**. With the appropriate air support (fighters) there is a LOW risk to ISR assets flying in the JFAO.

d. (O:S) **Fratricide**. There is a LOW risk to fratricide with aircraft complying to ROE, IFF requirements and utilising datalink capabilities.

Adversary's Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA)

34. (O:S) **Adversary's End State.** Neutralise the ability of CF to project air power from BX airfields, while reinforcing defensive positions on Panay and Palawan and providing justification for Olvana to enter the dispute and establish air & maritime assets in the JFAO.

35. (O:S) **Enemy's Strategic Objectives**. Maintain instability on Panay to justify the deployment of more forces to consolidate positions within Palawan and Panay - reinforcements to: communications, supply chain, air/sea lanes. Once embedded, reduce volatility to display control & peace to rationalize Panay annexation and assume control of rare earth metals supply in region.

MISSION

36. (O:S) **JFACC Mission**. Gain and maintain air superiority over the JFAO to allow freedom of movement for the CJTF 667 JFLCC and JFMCC to expel all NT forces from the BX sovereign territory and create safe and secure conditions in BX and the surrounding region.

37. (O:S) The directed effort is to:

a. (O:S) Gain and maintain air superiority in the JFAO (ESSENTIAL);

b. (O:S) Collect intelligence on the NTMEF in the JFAO (ESSENTIAL);

c. (O:S) Deter NT or any NT allied countries from offensive operations against BX (ESSENTIAL).

d. (O:S) Support the UN agencies, IOs and NGOs in their rebuilding and peacekeeping efforts (ESSENTIAL).

EXECUTION

JFACC Concept of Operations

38. (O:S) **JFACC Intent.** Through air power support the expulsion of NT forces from BX sovereign territory and deter further BX aggression IOT stabilise the region.

39. (O:S) **JFACC Purpose**. To support the JFLCC and JFMCC ground and maritime Scheme of Manoeuvre (SoM) to deter NT aggression and expel NT forces from BX sovereign territory.

40. (O:S) **JFACC Method**. To provide the following:

a. an air combat capability to establish and maintain air superiority throughout the operation;

b. an air mobility capability to support CJTF 667 in attaining the desired end state;

c. an ISR capability to assist in decision making and safeguard CJTF 667 elements; and

d. BPT provide a maritime strike capability should this be requested by JFMCC.

41. (O:S) **JFACC End State.** The JFACC end state is as follows:

a. NT Military expelled from Panay and Palawan;

b. NT Forces expelled from BX sovereign territory;

c. The JFACC assets returned to national control after a successful transfer of CJTF 667 responsibilities to the designated follow on force/authority.

Overview

42. (O:S) The operation will be broken into five phases, 0-4. The intent is to establish forces within the JFAO, defeat NT forces on Panay first, then defeat TN forces in Palawan and finally assist the UN in a ordered and stable transition of power back to the Belesian government.

43. (O:S) **Phase 0 – Shaping.** During Phase 0 the JFACC will support the Belsian air force. The main effort will be to establish air superiority over key areas to enable disembarkation for a follow on force to support Phase 1 and beyond. JFACC will utilise all available ISR assets to understand NT posture, intentions and pattern of life. Further, the ISR assets will provide I&W to friendly and coalition assets in response to any threat from NT. During Phase 0 JFACC will prepare and may be called on to move assets in support of Phase 1 and beyond.

44. (O:S) **Phase 1 – Denial.** During Phase 1 the JFACC will continue to utilise ISR assets to understand the NT posture, intentions and pattern of life and to inform the Joint Targeting Cycle. Further, the JFACC will establish and patrol an ADIZ to disrupt and deny logistical support to the disputed islands. The final portion of Phase 1 will be for the JFACC to establish air superiority in the JFAO through Offensive Counter Air (OCA) operations.

45. (O:S) **Phase 2 – Lodgement.** Beginning in Phase 2, and continuing in phase 3, the JFACC will transition to Defensive Counter Air (DCA) operations while maintaining air superiority. Further, the JFACC will support the JFLCC with AI, strike and Close Air Support (CAS) mission sets. Unique to Phase 2 JFACC will provide air mobility assets to assist in the lodgement of the CJTF 667 forces on Panay.

46. (O:S) **Phase 3 – Neutralise**. Phase 3 will consist of the JFACC maintaining air superiority through a persistent DCA posture in the JFAO and provide CAS and AI operations in order to support CJTF 667 forces in the battle for Panay and the lodgement into Palawan.

47. (O:S) **Phase 4 – Transition.** During Phase 4 the JFACC will maintain air superiority in the JFAO drawing down forces as the threat level decreases. The JFACC transition to a focus on humanitarian and air mobility support.

48. (O:S) **Transition Points.** These transition points are:

a. Transition Point 1 (TP1) – TP1 is the transition point between Phase 0 and Phase 1. TP1 will occur when the following conditions are met:

(1) Air superiority is established in Southern Belesia which enables freedom of movement for CJTF 667 forces at Makar Wharf, General Santos City, BX (SPOD) and General Santos International Airport, General Santos City, BX (APOD);

(2) Role 2 Enhanced Hospital is established IVO Makar Wharf;

(3) Establish a COAC IVO General Santos City; and

(4) CJTF 667 HQ established at Rajah Buayan Airbase.

b. Transition Point 2 (TP2) – TP 2 is the transition point between Phase 1 and Phase 2. TP2 will occur once the following conditions are met:

(1) Air superiority is achieved in the JFAO;

(2) Sea/air lines of communication are cut to the NTMEF forces established on Panay.

(3) JFLCC and JFMCC deception plan is completed.

c. Transition Point 3 (TP3) – TP3 is the transition point between Phase 2 and Phase 3. TP3 will occur when ground elements have successfully lodged on Panay. JFACC will have control of the air, and support ground and maritime forces, with CAS and maritime strike, through joint targeting.

d. Transition Point 4 (TP4) –TP4 is the transition point between Phase 3 and Phase 4. TP4 has occurred when the NTMEF ground forces have been defeated and removed from Panay and Palawan.

JFACC Operational Approach by Operational Objectives

49. (O:S) **Joint Force Air and Space Operational Objectives**. The JFACC operational objectives are:

a. (O:S) **OO 1:** Conduct surveillance and reconnaissance activities in accordance with the JIPTL and JIPCL in support of the eventual operations against NT forces in Palawan and Panay, the NT posture, intentions and pattern of life, while protecting friendly assets and respond to any threat from air, sea or ground (missile attack).

b. (O:S)**OO 2**: Establish air defence posture with a high state of readiness with timely early warning and dissemination.

c. (O:S) **OO3**: Be prepared to support offensive operations ISO CJTF maritime and land forces (including lodgement and sustainment on Panay and Palawan).

d. (O:S) **OO 4:** Conduct training and area famil for coalition and newly arriving forces to integrate into our deterrence posture.

JFACC Concept of Operations - Detail by Phase.

PHASE 0

50. (O:S) **Phase 0** – Phase 0 is the shaping phase of the operation. The main effort for CJTF667 in this phase is isolating the NTMEF politically, socially and economically. The supporting efforts in this phase are to gather intelligence on the NT forces in the JFAO, forward deploying of the forces required to complete Phase 1 and establishing temporal control of the air/sea lanes in JFAO. JFACC will have a minimal role the main effort and will concentrate its force apportionment in the supporting efforts.

JFACC Phase 0 Scheme of Manoeuvre.

51. (O:S) **Main Effort**. The Main effort for the JFACC in Phase 0 is the establishment of localised air superiority IVO APOD and SPOD.

52. (O:S) **Operational Concept**. The air component's primary tasks during this phase are to support the BX air force in defensive operations and establishing air superiority over SPOD and APOD and forward deploy air assets to be in a position to support CJTF 667 operations in Phase 1. It is expected that the JFACC will have OPCON of the BX Air Force assets. Further, the eventual goal in forward deployment is to have the fast jet Assets stationed at Zamboanga. A secondary task for the air component will be to collect intelligence and distribute Indicators and Warnings regarding the movement or threats contained in the NTMETF.

53. JFACC may order all or part of the following:

a. **Fighter assets.**

(1) Forward deploy to Zamboanga ;

(2) BPT support BX Air Force defensive operations;

(3) Establish and maintain air superiority IVO Zamboanga, SPOD and APOD;

b. **EW Assets.**

(1) BPT forward deploy to APOD.

c. **C2 and ISR Assets.**

(1) All assets to forward deploy to APOD.

(2) 4 RAAF P-8 Poseidon and 2 RNZAF P-3 Orion to provide ASuW and ASW IVO of SPOD.

(3) 3 RAAF E-7A Wedgetail to provide Surveillance and C2 coverage in support of the BX air force defensive operations.

(4) 2 RAAF MQ-4C to provide ISR IVO APOD and SPOD.

d. **Air Mobility and AAR**

(1) BPT provide air lift in support of the establishment of APOD and SPOD.

(2) KC-30A to provide AAR in support of BX Air Force defensive operations and CJTF 667 operations IVO APOD and SPOD.

(3) BPT to provide air mobility support in the establishment of the CAOC and HQ CJTF 667.

e. **Support Assets**

(1) 1 RAAF Airfield Defence Squadron BPT deploy to AFOD and provide security to the AFOD and CAOC.

(2) 1 RAAF Airfield Engineering Squadron BPT deploy to AFOD ISO establishing operations.

(3) 2 RAAF ECSS BPT deploy to AFOD to establish CAOC and base operations.

(4) Command elements BPT to operate a COAC in HQJOC and assume OPCON of BX Air Force assets for the duration of the operation.

54. (O:S) The JFACC will look to forward position its assets in General Santos Air field and Zamboanga in Belesia to allow force projection onto the islands of Panay and Palawan.

55. (O:S) With the priority in this phase being the forward deployment of offensive air capabilities into the JFAO IOT support Phase 0 and 1 shaping operations, the JFACC will prepare a DCA package consisting of C2, AAR, EW and DCA assets to provide localised air superiority IVO General Santos City. This period of air superiority will be coordinated with other CJTF 667 elements and the BX Armed Forces to enable the lodgement of CJTF 667 assets IVO General Santos City which will be the first of the forward operating bases.

56. (O:S) In a graduated response as assets become available in the JFAO, the JFACC will look to extend the area and increase the persistence of the localised air superiority in Belesia such that the relevant

assets can be stationed in Zamboanga and from there the localised air superiority will be further pushed out such that at the transition into Phase 1 the JFACC will be able to effectively control the critical air lanes.

57. (O:S) Throughout the phase, and as the localised air superiority permits, the JFACC will order ISR assets to collect in accordance with the JIPCL and report on all NT movements with a specific priority on developing a robust maritime operating picture and providing information to educate the Joint Targeting Cycle in support of Phase 2 lodgement operations. Evolving over the phase, collection activities must be synchronised in priority and time with any maritime strike targeting lists to ensure timely threat passing to enable JFACC to provide localised air superiority over the SPOD and AFOD.

58. (O:S) Throughout this phase JFACC should look to coordinate any available non-kinetic fires to assist in shaping operations.

PHASE I

59. (O:S) Phase I is the denial phase of the operation. A further emphasis will be placed on the ISR operations commenced in Phase 0 in order to identify NT force posture, intentions, and patterns of life. JFACC will commence DCA operations in order to establish localised air superiority of the JFLCC AO and critical air lanes to enable JFEO in Phase 2 and continued staging of CJTF 667 forces. OCA operations will commence with an emphasis on degrading NTMEF lines of communication, disrupting NT logistic supply to Palawan, and supporting the deception plan.

60. (O:S) **Transition point.** TP1 is the transition point into Phase 1.

61. (O:S) **JFLCC Scheme of Manoeuvre (SoM).** Prepare for the Joint Force Entry Operations (JFEO) into Panay while concurrently preparing and executing deception operations WRT landing ground forces into Palawan.

62. (O:S) **JFMCC SoM** – Commence operations to deny the NTMTEF sea based logistical support and establish and maintain sea superiority IVO of Palawan and Panay.

JFACC Phase I Scheme of Manoeuvre

63. (O:S) **Main Effort.** JFACC's main effort in Phase I is to isolate NT forces in Panay by conducting Airborne Interdiction, and degrading NT Air Force capability, thus setting the conditions for JFEO.

64. (O:S) **Operational Concept**. DCA CAPs — supported by AEW&C operations and AAR — will be established to provide force protection of CJTF 667 assets in the JFAO and to attrite NT Air Force assets. ISR operations will identify NT forces, contribute to the Recognised Air Picture (RAP), inform targeting and provide early warning. OCA operations will isolate NTMEF forces on Palawan and Panay by targeting lines of communication and supply. Further OCA operations and air posturing against NTMEF in Palawan will support the CJTF 667 deception plan.

65. (O:S) (O:S) JFACC may order all or part of the following:

a. **Fighter assets.**

(1) Establish Air Superiority in the JFAO

(2) BPT conduct Offensive Counter Air to establish air superiority in the JFAO

(3) BPT conduct Defensive Counter Air to maintain air superiority JFAO

(4) BPT conduct MAR STRIKE

(5) BPT conduct joint targeting

(6) BPT provide HVAA SPT

b. **EW Assets.**

(1) BPT conduct Electronic Support ISO CF

(2) BPT conduct Electronic Protection ISO CF

(3) BPT conduct Electronic Attack ISO CF

c. **C2 and ISR Assets.**

(1) BPT conduct ABM

(2) BPT collect, process, disseminate and exploit sensor information

d. **Air Mobility and AAR**

(1) BPT provide AAR in support of air assets

(2) BPT support JFLOGCC operations

e. **Support Assets**

(1) Maintain security to the AFOD and CAOC.

66. (O:S) Having achieved both localised air superiority IVO the APOD, and the forward deployment of CF air assets during Phase 0, JFACC will initially look to establish air superiority in the JFAO through OCA missions and maintain air superiority by establishing DCA CAP coverage further North within the JFAO. Enduring DCA CAPs — supported by airborne C2 and AAR — will be established and postured to provide force protection to JFMCC, JFLCC and other JFACC assets from Panay and Palawan based NT Air Force aircraft.

67. (O:S) Further, DCA CAP will be postured to provide localised air superiority ISO subsequent JFEO and of critical air lanes in the JFAO

68. (O:S) With DCA coverage in place, JFACC will commence C2 and ISR asset forward operations to identify NT air, land and maritime forces as well as identify targets for subsequent Airborne Interdiction (AI) missions.

69. (O:S) Leveraging information gleaned from ISR operations, JFACC will begin offensive operations against both Panay and Palawan based NTMEF. Strike packages comprising C2, AAR, EW and Fighter assets will support/conduct AI and Sweep missions to destroy NT lines of communication and supply, and attrite NT Air Force assets.

70. (O:S) In support of the CJTF 667 deception plan, JFACC will bias OCA operations and DCA posturing towards Palawan.

71. (O:S) **Phase transition.** JFACC will transition to Phase 2 upon reaching TP2.

PHASE II

72. **(O:S) Phase II -** Phase II is the lodgement phase of the operation.

73. (O:S) **Transition point.** TP 2 is the transition point into Phase II.

74. (O:S) **JFLCC Scheme of Manoeuvre.** Conduct JFEO into Panay; establish HQ in Panay; secure APOD / SPOD; be prepared to deter attack against CFs and prepare for Counter-Insurgency (COIN) operations.

75. (O:S) **JFMCC Scheme of Manoeuvre** – Continue deception plan while supporting lodgement of ground forces onto Panay. Maintain control of sea-lanes from Palawan to Panay while supporting joint targeting, with JFACC, to retain Air Superiority and support of ground forces.

JFACC Phase II Scheme of Manoeuvre

76. (O:S) **JFACC Main Effort.** Offensive and defensive operations in direct support of the JFEO.

77. (O:S) **Operational Concept**. The air component's primary tasks during this phase are to support the lodgement of ground assets on Panay through maintaining air superiority in the JFAO with Control of the Air, Strike, Air Mobility and ISR roles ISO JFLCC and JFMCC operations. A secondary task for the air component will be the maintenance and distribution of the Recognised Air Picture (RAP). to support missions into Panay, while collecting intelligence & distributing Indications and Warnings in the movements of NT forces on and around Palawan.

78. (O:S) **JFACC SoM** - JFACC may order all or part of the following:

a. **Fighter Assets.**

(1) Maintain Air Superiority in the JFAO

(2) BPT conduct Offensive Counter Air ISO JFLCC SoM

(3) BPT conduct Defensive Counter Air to maintain air superiority in the JFAO

(4) BPT SPT JFLCC and JFMCC lodgement

(5) BPT conduct MAR STRIKE

(6) BPT joint targeting

(7) BPT CAS

(8) BPT provide HVAA SPT

b. **EW Assets.**

(1) BPT conduct Electronic Support ISO CF

(2) BPT conduct Electronic Protection ISO CF

(3) BPT conduct Electronic Attack ISO CF

c. **C2 and ISR Assets.**

(1) BPT conduct ABM

(2) BPT collect, process, disseminate and exploit sensor information

d. **Air Mobility and AAR**

(1) BPT provide air lift in support of the ground forces lodging on Panay

(2) BPT provide AAR in support of air assets.

(3) BPT support JFLOGCC operations

e. **Support Assets**

(1) Maintain security to the AFOD and CAOC.

(2) BPT to deploy and establish APOD operations on Panay

79. (O:S) CJTF 667 will conduct a deception plan before conducting JFEO into Panay to establish a HQ and secure APOD / SPOD on Panay. CJTF 667 will be prepared to deter attack against CFs and prepare for Counter-Insurgency (COIN) operations.

80. (O:S) To support the lodgement of ground elements onto Panay, JFACC will prepare an OCA package consisting of C2, SEAD, ESCORT, AAR, EW and HVAA protection to ensure air superiority IVO Panay. Once air mobility aircraft have landed ground elements on Panay, they are to return to General Santos City under fighter escort. The remaining fighter aircraft will transition into a DCA and CAS role to support lodgement operations. AAR and additionally fighter aircraft are to ensure continuous CAS operations are achievable throughout the phase.

81. Throughout the phase, JFACC will maintain a distributed RAP to respond to air, land and maritime threats through early warning and timely responses.

82. JFACC will order ISR assets to collect and report on NT movements IVO Palawan to develop a recognised air and maritime picture ISO Phase III Neutralise operations.

83. Throughout this phase JFACC must be able to also support maritime control of the sea operations through joint targeting and strike operations. Battle damage assessments (BDA) will be distributed amongst Commanders and higher HQ expeditiously.

84. (O:S) **Phase transition.** JFACC will transition to Phase 3 upon reaching TP3.

PHASE III

85. (O:S) **Phase III –** Phase III is the Neutralise phase of the operation.

86. (O:S) **Transition point.** TP 3 is the transition point to PHASE III.

87. (O:S) **JFLCC Scheme of Manoeuvre.** Close with and destroy the NTMEF forces on Panay. Conduct JFAO on Palawan.

88. (O:S) **JFMCC Scheme of Manoeuvre** – Maintain control of sea lanes, BPT participate in joint Targeting and offensive maritime operations.

JFACC Phase III Scheme of Manoeuvre

89. (O:S) **JFACC Main Effort.** Offensive and defensive operations in direct support of the JFEO of Palawan while providing Close Air Support to JFLCC forces in Panay.

90. (O:S) **Operational Concept**. The air component's primary tasks during this phase are to maintain control of the air while simultaneously supporting ground and maritime forces through timely application of airpower (CAS & Strike). CJTF 667 will defeat NTMEF while JFMCC will control sea lanes through offensive maritime operations and STABOPS. JFACC will also be prepared to support JFEO in Palawan.

91. (O:S) JFACC may order all or part of the following:

a. **Fighter Assets.**

(1) Maintain Air Superiority in the JFAO

(2) BPT conduct CAS ISO JFLCC SoM

(3) BPT conduct MAR STRIKE ISO JFMCC SoM

(4) BPT conduct joint targeting

(5) BPT SPT JFLCC and JFMCC lodgement on Palawan

(6) BPT conduct Offensive Counter Air

(7) BPT conduct Defensive Counter Air

(8) BPT provide HVAA SPT

b. **EW Assets.**

(1) SPT air assets build and maintain RAP

(2) BPT conduct Electronic Support ISO CF

(3) BPT conduct Electronic Protection ISO CF

(4) BPT conduct Electronic Attack ISO CF

c. **C2 and ISR Assets.**

(1) Conduct ISR to maintain RAP

(2) BPT conduct ABM duties ISO Strike and CAS operations

(3) BPT collect, process, disseminate and exploit sensor information

(4) BPT SPT JFLCC and JFMCC lodgement on Palawan

d. **Air Mobility and AAR**

(1) SPT ground forces lodged on Panay through logistic transport

(2) BPT provide air lift in support of the ground forces lodging on Palawan

(3) Provide AAR in support of air assets conducting operations in JFAO

(4) BPT support JFLOGCC operations

e. **Support Assets**

(1) Maintain security to the AFOD and CAOC.

(2) Maintain security of APOD on Panay

(3) BPT to deploy and establish APOD operations on Palawan

92. (O:S) CJTF 667 will focus on defeating NTMEF forces on Panay while conducting JFEO in Palawan and defeating NTMEF in location. CJTF 667 will be prepared to deter attack against CFs and prepare for Counter-Insurgency (COIN) operations in Palawan.

93. (O:S) To support the lodgement of ground elements in Palawan, JFACC will prepare an OCA package consisting of C2, SEAD, ESCORT, AAR, EW and HVAA protection to ensure air superiority IVO Palawan. Air mobility assets supporting the JFEO will return to General Santos City under fighter escort. Fighter aircraft will re-role into DCA / CAS to support the lodgement of ground assets in Palawan.

94. (O:S) Throughout the phase, JFACC must maintain a recognised air picture of the JFAO while facilitating CAS and logistic support on Panay.

95. (O:S) Throughout the phase, JFACC must be prepared to support maritime assets in controlling the sea lanes through joint targeting and strike operations. BDA will be distributed amongst Commanders and higher HQ expeditiously.

96. (O:S) **Phase transition.** JFACC will transition to Phase 3 upon reaching TP3.

PHASE IV

97. (O:S) **Phase IV** - Phase IV is the transition phase of the operation.

98. (O:S) **Transition point.** TP 4 is the transition point to PHASE IV.

99. (O:S) **JFLCC Scheme of Manoeuvre (SoM).** JFLCC will focus on stability operations and supporting the UN and IO & NGOs to protect human life and reduce further suffering. JFLCC will slowly reduce in size, role and profile as authority is handed over to the UN mission.

100. (O:S) **JFMCC SoM** – JFMCC will focus on handing over OPCON to the Belesian Navy. JFMCC will be prepared to conduct STABOPS, FONOPS and MARSEC to ensure a smooth transition

JFACC Phase IV Scheme of Manoeuvre

101. (O:S) **Main Effort**. JFACC's main effort in Phase IV is to facilitate a smooth transient of the ACC roles and responsibilities to the Belesian Military.

102. (O:S) **Operational Concept**. The air component's primary tasks during this phase are handing over OPCON of ACC functions to Belesian Military while supporting IO and NGO efforts to protect human life and suffering. Additionally, the ATG will support JFLCCC and JFMCC in STABOPS, FONOPS, MARSEC COIN. The ATG will reduce in size and role while ensuring a smooth transition to the Belesian military.

103. (O:S) JFACC may order all or part of the following:

a. **Fighter Assets.**

(1) Conduct training operations with BX Air Force

(2) Redeploy to AUS

b. **EW Assets.**

(1) SPT air assets building and maintaining RAP

c. **C2 and ISR Assets.**

(1) Conduct ISR to maintain RAP

(2) BPT conduct ABM duties

(3) BPT to hand over ABM duties to Belesian forces

d. **Air Mobility and AAR**

(1) SPT withdrawal of CJTF resources and assets

(2) SPT UN Agencies, IO/NGOs with logistical support

(3) BPT support JFLOGCC operations

e. **Support Assets**

(1) Handover security of AFOD and CAOC to Belesian forces.

(2) Handover security of APOD on Panay and Palawan

104. (O:S) CJTF 667 will focus on transition to UN peacekeeping while supporting IO, STABOPS, FONOPS and maritime security (anti-piracy). CJTF will posture forces to conduct stability operations while transitioning authority over the UN Mission and Host Nation military.

105. To support the handover of ACC to the Belesian military, JFACC will conduct training and joint operations with Belesian air assets. Missions will involve small packages of fighter packages conducting DCA, and C2 aircraft be ISO JFLCC and JFLCC operations (STABOPS, FONOPS and MARSEC) and logistics. This will involve a phased approach.

106. On the handover of OPCON of the ACC role, JFACC will reduce the number of aircraft assets that are completing roles that can be filled by Belesian aircraft.

107. Throughout the phase, the ATG will support UN Agencies, IOs and NGOs, including JPR missions.

108. (O:S) **Operation Termination.** CJOPS will terminate this operation once CFs have established a safe and secure environment in the occupied Belesian territories, and the UN has supervised the transition of authority in Panay and Palawan back to the Belesian Government.

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

109. (O:S) **Administration and Logistics**.

a. **Administration**. Personnel CONOPS to support the Air Component operation can be found at Appendix 3 to Annex R to OSS - CJTF 667 OPORD – Personnel Support (ref G).

b. **Logistics Concept of Operations.** The Logistics CONOPS to support the Air Component operation can be found at Annex R to OSS - CJTF 667 OPORD – Logistic Support Order (ref H). .

c. **Health Concept of Operations**. The Health CONOPS to support the Air Component operation can be found at Annex AA to OSS - CJTF 667 OPORD – Health Support (ref I)

COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION

110. (O:S)CJTF is the supported commander for all operations across the JFAO and retains responsibility for coordination across JFAO.

111. (O:S) All other components are supporting.

112. (O:S) The JTF 667 is designated operational commander and is the supported commander for operations within the AO. The JTF 667 has OPCON of all assigned forces.

113. (O:S) COMD CJTF 667 has designated DGAIR to perform the JFACC responsibilities for the operation. JFACC will have OPCON of deployed AS air assets and, on declaration of JFACC OPRED, OPCON over designated BX Air Force aircraft.

114. JFACC becomes the defacto ACC for the CJTF 667 air assets, including the BX Air Force assets.

115. The JFACC also has been assigned the duties of Theater ISR Coordinator. As the supported commander for the conduct of Personnel Recovery operations, the JFACC will establish the Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell (PRCC).

116. The JFACC will establish the CAOC at Bungedore.

117. A JACCE will be establish within HQ CJTF 667.

Command

118. (O:S) JFACC will exercise Operational Command of Air Component units.

Control

119. (O:S) JFACC will exercise control of Air Component operations as the ACC, responsible to CJTF. This will be done through AOC Bungendore.

C2 relationships

120. (O:S) **AADC, SCA, ACA authorities**. JFACC is assigned as the Area Air Defence Commander (AADC), Airspace Control Authority (ACA), and Space Coordination Authority (SCA).

121. (O:S) **Liaison and co-ordination elements.** JFACC will employ a JACCE within the HQCJTF 667 for air effect coordination.

List of Annexes

A.	Task Organisation	**Pending**
B.	Intelligence	**Pending**
C.	Operations	**Pending**
D.	Logistics	**Pending**
E.	Personnel - not issued/ IAW OMD.	**Not Used**
F.	PA	**Not Used**
G.	Civil Affairs (Not used)	**Not Used**
H.	Met	**Not Used**
I.	ISR Ops	**Pending**
J.	Not Used	**Not Used**
K.	Communications and Information	**Pending**
L.	Environment - Not Used	**Not Used**
M.	Geospatial Information and Services (not used)	**Not Used**
N.	Space	**Pending**
O.	Not Used	**Not Used**
P.	Host-Nation Support - N/A (White Force)	**Not Used**
Q.	Health	**Pending**
R.	Not Used	**Not Used**
S.	Not Used	**Not Used**
T.	Not Used	**Not Used**
U.	Not Used	**Not Used**
V.	STO – Issued Separately	**Not Used**
W.	Operational Contracting Support – (in Annex D)	**Not Used**
X.	Execution Checklist (A3O developed separately)	**Not Used**
Y.	Not Used	**Not Used**
Z.	Not Used	**Not Used**
C.1.	Strategy to Task	**Pending**
C.2.	Air Defence Plan	**Pending**
C.3.	Airspace Control Plan	**Pending**
C.4.	Deliberate Targeting Nomination Process	**Pending**
C.5.	Air Task Order - Air Support Request Process	**Pending**
C.6.	Legal	**Pending**
C.7.	ROE	**Pending**
C.8.	Information Operations	**Pending**
C.9.	Personnel Recovery	**Pending**
C.10.	Air Base Operability	**Pending**
C.11.	Combined Fires	**Not Used**
C.12.	Force Protection	**Pending**
C.13.	Air Mobility Plan	**Pending**

Attachment 1

Proposed C2 Structure



Diagram of C2 structure

ANNEX A

JOINT AIR OPERATIONS PLAN – STEEL SENTINEL

TASK ORGANISATION

1. (U) **Theatre Command (TCOMD).** CJOPS is the Theatre Commander and retains TCOMD for all assigned ADF forces.

2. (U) **Operational Command (OPCOMD).** JFACC will retain OPCOMD of assigned forces under CJTF667.

3. (U) **Operational Control (OPCON).** CATG 667 will retain OPCON of all assigned forces to ATG 667.

4. (U) **Tactical Control (TACON).**

a. (U) CTU's will retain TACON of all assigned air forces.

b. (U) CTE's will be delegated TACON of all assigned forces in their elements.

5. (U) Standing Airbase Operations Squadrons will maintain standing C2 up to CDR CSG.

6. (U) Combat Support TE and Airbase Operations SQUADRONS are in direct support to their respective geographic CTU.

Appendix:

1. OP Steel Sentinel – Air C2 Organisation

2. OP Steel Sentinel - Air C2 Basing

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A

JOINT AIR OPERATIONS PLAN – STEEL SENTINEL



(U) Figure1: OP Steel Sentinel Air C2 Organsitaion

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A

JOINT AIR OPERATIONS PLAN – STEEL SENTINEL



(U) Figure 2: OP Steel Sentinel Air C2 Basing


CJOPS
CJTF 667
IN DIRECT SUPPORT
JFACC
AOC
JACCE
CATG 640
DAMD
AMCC
CTU 640.1 TUHQ (ZAM)
CTU 640.2 TUHQ (GSC)
CTU 640.3 TUHQ (DWN)
CTU 640.4 DCSD
TE 640.1.1 F-35A
TE 640.1.2 F-35A
TE 640.1.3 F/A-18F
TE 640.1.4 EA-18G
TE 640.1.5 E-7A
TE 640.2.1 KC30
TE 640.2.2 P-8A
TE 640.2.3 NZ P-3K
TE 640.2.4 C-27A
TE 640.2.5 MC-55
TE 640.3.1 C-17A
TE 640.3.2 C-130J
TE 640.3.3 MQ-4
TE 640.3.4 NZ C-130H
TE 640.4.1 CMBT SPT ZAM
TE 640.4.2 CMBT SPT GSC
TE 640.4.3 CMBT SPT DWN
TCOMD
OPCOM
OPCON
TACON

APPENDIX A TO

ANNEX C.9

JOINT AIR OPERATIONS PLAN – STEEL SENTINEL

References:

A. (O:S) ADDP 3.6 Joint Personnel Recovery
B. (O:S) DI(G) OPS 47-1 ADF SAR Command and Control Arrangement
C. (O:S) DI(AF) 4-5 Joint Personnel Recovery

SITUATION

Aim

1. (O:S) This annex describes the Operation Steel Sentinel (OP SS) Personnel Recovery (PR) procedures. CJOPS is the ADF authority for PR and has delegated this responsibility to JFACC within the JOA for the conduct of Op SS.

2. (OS) JFACC has directed the establishment of a Joint Personnel Recovery Coordination Centre (JPRC) within the AOC as the first point of contact for all PR requirements.

Definitions

3. (O:S) The following frequently used PR terms are listed below for reference:

a. **(O:S) Personnel Recovery (PR).** The aggregate of military, civil and diplomatic efforts to rescue or recover isolated personnel from the full spectrum of permissive to hostile environments. The spectrum of PR operations covers civil and military SAR, recovery operations and care after recovery.

b. **(O:S) Isolated Personnel (IP).** Military or civilian personnel that have become separated from their unit or organisation in an environment requiring them to survive, evade, or escape while awaiting rescue or recovery. IPs are considered to be no longer in control of their situation or mission.

c. **(O:S) Military Search and Rescue (MilSAR).** The overt use of military and/or civilian resources to assist military IPs in potential distress during peacetime.

d. **(O:S) Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR).** A specific task or series of tasks performed by rescue forces to recover IPs during war or contingency operations, where the IP is not trained to receive CSAR.

e. **(O:S) Combat Recovery (CR).** A specific task or series of tasks performed by rescue forces to recover IPs during war or contingency operations, where the IP is not trained to receive CSAR.

f. **(O:S) Joint Personnel Recovery Centre (JPRCC).** OP SS JPRCC will be established within the AO. The JPRC will be embedded in the AOC located in HQJOC.

g. **(O:S) Personnel Recovery Coordination Centre (PRCC).** A search and rescue operations centre subordinate to the JPRC established by a component commander staffed by supervisory personnel with responsibility for directing and coordinating PR activities within a specified area and/or in support of a specified force. The PRCC differs from the JPRC in that it is normally sub-regional, single service and component driven. PRCCs may consist of members of an already established staff. The PRCC may in practice consist of a senior watch keeper in a component operations centre. The PRCC will coordinate the initial PR response and keep the JPRC informed.

h. **(O:S) Joint Personnel Recovery Mission Coordinator (JPRMC).** The person designated by the JPRC to direct a specific PR mission.

i. **(O:S) SAR Mission Commander/Coordinator (SMC).** In real world SAR events the SMC will act as the primary SAR coordinator on behalf of the SAR Commander.

j. **(O:S) Airborne Mission Coordinator (AMC).** An aircraft designated to coordinate PR efforts between the task force and the JPRC, monitor the status of all elements, assist or relieve the OSC, request additional assets as required and ensure recovery and supporting forces arrive at designated stations to accomplish the PR mission.

k. **(O:S) Rescue Mission Coordinator (RMC).** The asset with the best SA and capability tasked to plan and command the recovery mission.

l. **(O:S) On-Scene Commander/Coordinator (OSC).** A person or unit designated to coordinate the SAR effort at or near the location of the IP. Responsibilities are further defined in reference B and C.

m. **(O:S) Rescue Vehicle (RV)**. Any vehicle tasked specifically with conducting the rescue of any IP.

n. **(O:S) Rescue Combat Air Patrol (RESCAP)**. Air superiority aircraft assigned to protect the CSAR assets and isolate personnel from airborne threats. RESCAP forces are generally used if enemy air activity is forecast along the intended flight route or in the objective area. RESCAP may also assist in locating IPs due to their higher operating altitude.

o. **(O:S) Rescue Escort (RESCOURT)**. Tactical aircraft designed to protect RVs from possible hostile surface/ground threats while en route to and from a CSAR objective area and during the recovery phase. The RESCOURT may be designated as the OSC.

MISSION

4. (O:S) JFACC is to conduct comprehensive PR activities in order to prevent loss of life to military and designated civilian personnel and ensure preservation of military capability to within the JOA.

EXECUTION

Concept of operations

5. (O:S) All PR operations will be planned in accordance with the five PR execution tasks (report, locate, support, recover and reintegrate). PR operation risk should be weighed against accuracy of IP

status, asset availability, timeliness of recovery, and adversary status/location. During execution, thought should be given to the reintegration task and the logistics required for care after recovery.

6. (O:S) JFACC will establish a JPRC to coordinate PR responses by, or involving, task force assets. JFACC will exercise command authority through the JPRC, which will be the focal point of all PR coordination. The JPRC will have the authority to task (through the JFACC) JTF units with PR missions. The JPRC will coordinate PR operations and tactical air operations with JFACC.

7. (O:S) In all cases components are to attempt rescue within the capabilities and risk levels available to them. The JPRC should be informed of all planned and executed PR missions via message. If component PRCCs are unable to coordinate an IP's recovery within their organic capabilities, the JPRC should be notified and will source and task assets from the JTF as required. The JPRC will then assume authority of the recovery.

8. (O:S) Coordination of PR activities within the AOC is to be conducted via message system.

Assets and capabilities

9. (O:S) There are no dedicated PR assets assigned to JFACC. Assets that could assist in the JPR mission sets are as follows:

a. (O:S) RAAF P-8 Poseidon;

b. (O:S) RNZAF P-3 Orion;

c. (O:S) RAAF E-7A (AMC only);

d. (O:S) RAAF F-35A (Escort only);

e. (O:S) Elements of the Australian Army Aviation Task Group; and

f. (O:S) Elements of the New Zealand Army Aviation Regiment.

Tasks and responsibilities

10. (O:S) The following tasks and responsibilities are assigned for the duration of Op SS:

a. (O:S) Component commanders are to:

(1) (O:S) Establish a PRCC capable of planning, executing and coordinating PR operations consistent with the size of own force.

(2) (O:S) Ensure PRCCs are to be co-located with the component commander's OPCEN to ensure that R considerations are included in all mission planning and execution. Staffing of the PRCCs is at the Component Commander's discretion.

(3) (O:S) Delegate PRCCs the authority to release suitable PR assets to JFACC for the conduct of the JPR missions.

b. (O:S) JFACC is to:

(1) (O:S) Establish a JPRC capable of providing coordination for isolating events involving air components assets within the JOA.

(2) (O:S) Ensure the JPRC is capable of coordinating joint responses to isolating incidents using assets sourced from JFMCC and/or JFLCC, and

(3) (O:S) Ensure SARSITs are released for each PR incident at 12 hour intervals and upon successful completion of recovery.

c. (O:S) PRCCs are to:

(1) (O:S) Report establishment of PRCC to the JPRC, providing point of contact / communications information.

(2) (O:S) Notify the JPRC and all other PRCCs of an isolating incident through use of the agreed message system.

(3) (O:S) Prepare for Phase 1 and Phase 2 reintegration:

a) (O:S) Phase 1. Conducted within first 24 hours of recovery. Mandatory reintegration tasks include reception, triage, time sensitive debriefing and then either return to duty or transport to a health facility.

b) (O:S) Phase 2. Conducted in a health facility within the AO. This phase can last up to two weeks and includes health care, non-physical family contact, screening, decompression, formal debriefing and support.

11. (O:S) If an isolating incident takes place over water or non-hostile territory overland and the PRCC determines that they can coordinate a successful response with assets under that component commander's control, then the PRCC should initiate appropriate action and advise the JPRC accordingly. If the incident takes place in hostile territory overland, the PRCC shall notify the JPRC and submit a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) outlining the plan for recovery of downed personnel. Upon approval by the JFACC, the JPRC will coordinate execution of the PR mission if joint forces are required.

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

Theatre entry requirements.

12. (O:S) CJOPS has mandated theatre entry requirements for all personnel in the CJOA. Personnel deemed at medium or high risk of isolation are to have completed Aircrew Environmental Survival Course and Aircrew Combat Survival Course. Aircrew are deemed to be at medium to high risk of isolation.

Component Commanders are required to maintain PR capability.

13. (O:S) CSAR support beyond component capability in support of their own forces. Component Commanders unable to provide dedicated PR assets in support of forces under their command should attempt recovery through opportunity, PR-capable assets and request support from JPRC on a case by case basis.

ISOPREP and short term authentication

14. (O:S) ISOPREP information is to remain with personnel managers or intelligence section of each unit. If ISOPREP information is to be accessed it will be via secure means from the unit to the PRCC and JPRC.

15. (O:S) Short term authentication data will be specified in SPINS and is to include:

a. (O:S) Word of the Day

b. (O:S) Letter of the Day

c. (O:S) Number of the Day

d. (O:S) SARNEG

e. (O:S) Duress Word

f. (O:S) SARDOTS

16. (O:S) JPRC will track the usage of all short term authentication data and is responsible for the promulgation of new data in SPINS if/when any element becomes compromised. All participants in the PR network are to ensure JPRC is advised of compromised authentication data in order for this to occur.

COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS

Command and Control delegations

17. (O:S) Command and control for OP SS is shown at attachment 1 of the Joint Air Operations Plan. In accordance with this construct, JFACC is not under the command of CJTF 667, but provides assets and personnel in direct support of CJTF 667.

18. (O:S) CJOPS has ultimate responsibility for PR operations within the JOA and has delegated authority of PR missions to JFACC.

JPRC responsibilities.

19. (O:S) The JPRC has been given DIRLAUTH with component PRCCs for the sourcing of assets for the conduct of JPR in the JOA.

20. (O:S) Upon tasking of JTF assets not under the OPCON of JFACC for PR missions, the JPRC will include HQ CJTF 667 as an information addressee to enable situational awareness.

PRCC responsibilities.

21. (O:S) PRCCs are to provide capability and feasibility assessments to the JPRC when requested. PRCCs are authorised to release assets to JFACC in support of PR missions after consultation with respective component commanders, noting that timely response to capability and feasibility requests are imperative to successful PR missions.

22. **Launch and execute approval.** Approval for PR missions is IAW Table 1.

Risk Level	Description	Threat	Execution Authority
LOW	Recovery package will not require additional support.	PR units unlikely to be engaged by enemy threat.	CCO/DCCO – AIR (Launch/Execute) Component PRCC (Launch/Execute)
MEDIUM	Recovery package is capable of self protection with minimal support or appropriate threat mitigation in place.	PR units likely to encounter some threat.	CCO/DCCO – AIR (Launch/Execute) Component PRCC (Launch/Execute)
HIGH	Recovery package will require significant additional support to mitigate the threat.	PR units likely to encounter significant threat.	CCO/DCCO – AIR (Launch) PRCC Component (Launch) JFACC (Execute) DJFACC (Execute) DIRCAOC (Execute)

Table 1. Launch/Execute Approvals for CJTF 667

Communications reporting procedures

23. (O:S) Initial reports to the JPRC are to be by the quickest means (secure voice, chat, e-mail, etc) with hard-copy message traffic to follow. On-station communications with IPs is to be conducted on CSAR-A frequency as promulgated in SPINS. PR task force communications are to be conducted on frequencies as promulgated by the AMC.

24. (O:S) All commands are responsible for notifying the appropriate PRCC/JPRC of a PR incident by the quickest means available. The JPRC is the initial point of contact for all PR events.

25. (O:S) Direct, secure voice communications should normally be used among reporting units and the PRCC/JPRC should be notified by supporting message traffic. Use of message traffic as initial means of reporting or coordinating PR usually causes unacceptable delays in prosecuting the mission and should only be used when direct voice communications are not possible or are unacceptable.

26. (O:S) A Search and Rescue Incident Report (SARIR) is to be released to the JPRC as soon as is practical following the initial reporting of an incident.

(O:S) **SAR Incident Reports (SARIR)**

(O:S) SARIRs report situations that may require a PR mission response. SARIRs are to be sent by reporting units by the quickest secure means possible, normally by radio, telephone or chat, to the appropriate PRCC/JPRC. These verbal reports must be followed up by message. The SARIR is in a 14 line format and is to include:

1. **Callsign** (Callsign of IP or lost aircraft/vessel/other)
2. **Type** (Type of lost aircraft/vessel/other)
3. **Colour** (Colour of lost aircraft/vessel/other)
4. **ID** (Aircraft tail number, Ship hull number, or other number)
5. **Location** (Location of IP or lost aircraft/vessel/other)
6. **Qualifier** (Actual, estimated, ellipse, GPS, overland, over water)
7. **Time** (Date time group (DTG) of incident. DDHHMMZMMMYY)
8. **Cause** (Cause of disabled or lost aircraft/vessel/other)
9. **Assistance Reqd** (JPRC or combined assistance if required)
10. **Point of Contact**
11. **Narrative**
12. **Time of Report** (DTG of incident. DDHHMMZMMMYY)

(O:S) SAR Situation 9SARSIT) Summary Report. Serially numbered SARSITs are sent to coordinate, summarise or terminate joint PR operations. During PR operations, SARSITs shall be sent at designated regular intervals (at least every 24 hours) to the JPRC (or other SAR Coordinator) and forwarded to JTF HQ. SARSITs inform the JPRC of on-scene mission progress and conditions. Based on information received, the JPRC should address SARSITs to as many other commands or agencies as necessary to keep them informed. Lastly, SARSITs are used by the JPRC to terminate individual PR operations. SARSITs are a 10 line format and will include:

1. **PR Mission Number/Report Number**
2. **Mission status** (on going, complete, on hold)
3. **Identifying Info**
    a. Callsign
    b. Type (aircraft/vessel etc)
    c. Colour
    d. ID
    e. Cause
4. **Location**
    a. Coordinates
    b. Date Time Group of incident
    c. Source
    d. Qualifier
5. **Personnel Status**
    a. Number
    b. Status
    c. Authentication
    d. Condition
6. **Time of incident**
7. **Required assistance**
8. **POC**
9. **Narrative**

JFACC Airspace Control Plan

Airspace Control Plan for Operation Steel Sentinel 2020

CAO: XXXXX

JFACC		
Approve	Disapprove	Discuss
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JOINT AIR OPERATIONS PLAN

References:

A. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 8868
B. Australian Treaty Series 2006 No 7 (SOFA)
C. CJTF 667 OPORD 01 (OPERATION STEEL SENTINEL)
D. Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR)
E. Annex C.9 to OSS JAOP – Joint Personnel Recovery

SITUATION

1. **(U) Background.** Growing ethnic tensions in the Belesian (BX) island of Panay resulted in violence when the local government in Panay attempted to take control of the lucrative Cerium rare earth mine in San Rafael from the Olvanan registered operator.

2. (U) Olvana (OV) and North Torbia (NT) have been conducting a week's long biennial exercise in the South China Sea, named Exercise RISEN SWORD. It was under the cover of this exercise that NT landed a marine force (estimated to be a Battalion plus) on Palawan near the sparsely populated town of El Nido, capturing the port and airfield facilities.

3. (U) Simultaneously, NT landed a Marine Expeditionary Force (estimated to be at Brigade strength) near the city of Roxas, Panay and captured the seaport, airport, and the San Rafael Mine.

4. (U) In response to this blatant disregard for international protocols, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed UNSCR 8868 (ref A) condemning NT aggression and calling for the withdrawal of NT Forces from BX territory. Australia has volunteered to be the lead nation of the Combined Joint Task Force 667 (CJTF 667) with contributing nations including New Zealand, Fiji, Malaysia, Singapore, Tonga, PNG, Japan and Thailand.

5. (U) The Government of BX has consented, subject to SOFAs (ref B), to allow CJTF 667 forces to stage through their territories, to station forces, materiel and installations involved in supporting its operations.

6. (O:S) The concept of operations for CJTF 667 (ref C) is a phased approach (Phases 0-4):

a. **Phase 0 – Shaping.** During Phase 0 JFACC will support the BX air force. The main effort will be to establish air superiority over key areas to enable disembarkation for a follow on force to support Phase 1 and beyond. During Phase 0 JFACC will prepare and may be called on to move assets in support of Phase 1 and beyond.

b. **Phase 1 – Denial.** During Phase 1 the JFACC will continue to utilise Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets to understand the NT posture, intentions and pattern of life, and to inform the Joint Targeting Cycle. The final portion of Phase 1 will be for the JFACC to establish air superiority in the Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO) through Offensive Counter Air (OCA) operations.

c. **Phase 2 – Lodgement.** Beginning in Phase 2, and continuing in phase 3, the JFACC will transition to Defensive Counter Air (DCA) operations while maintaining air superiority. Unique to Phase 2, JFACC will provide air mobility assets to assist in the lodgement of the CJTF 667 forces on Panay.

d. **Phase 3 – Neutralise.** Phase 3 will consist of the JFACC maintaining air superiority through a persistent DCA posture in the JFAO and providing Close Air Support (CAS) and Airborne Interdiction (AI) operations in order to support CJTF 667 forces in the battle for Panay and the lodgement into Palawan.

e. **Phase 4 – Transition.** Phase 4 is a transition into a peacekeeping force on both Panay and Palawan. The ultimate end state is returning peace and security to BX.

7. **(O:S) Purpose.** This Airspace Control Plan (ACP) provides a baseline structure to standardise procedures for airspace control in support of all military air operations in the JFAO.

8. **(O:S) Command intent.** This ACP contributes to the operations of CJTF 667 in support of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

9. **(O:S) Authority for issue.** This ACP is issued under the authority of the JFACC as the Airspace Control Authority (ACA).

10. **(O:S) Applicability.** The procedures detailed in this ACP apply to all airspace users operating or controlling manned and unmanned aircraft, guided missiles, artillery, or air defence systems within or through the JFAO. Agencies responsible for tasking and supporting airspace users must be familiar with this plan.

11. **(O:S) Validity**. This ACP is valid from the commencement of Phase 0 operations through to the conclusion of Phase 4 operations.

12. **(O:S) Amendment.** The Joint Airspace Control Cell (JACC) may amend this plan through Airspace Control Orders (ACO) and/or Special Instructions (SPINS) issued under the authority of the ACA.

13. **(U) Timings.** All timings in the ACP are in the Coordinated Universal Time (UTC/Zulu).

14. **(U) Altitudes.** All levels in this ACP are Above Mean Sea Level (AMSL) unless otherwise specified.

15. **(U) Geodetic datum.** All positions, maps and charts in this ACP are based on the World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS84) datum.

16. **(O:S) Global Area Reference System (GARS).** GARS may be used as an integrated common frame of reference for joint force situational awareness and to facilitate air-to-ground coordination, de-confliction, integration and synchronisation.

17. **(U) Safety.** Personnel and organisations involved in air operations, or the provision of Air Traffic Management (ATM) and Air Navigation Systems (ANS) are required to comply with the Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) (ref D).

18. **(O:S) Enquiries and changes.** All question on the management of airspace or any requests for change to this ACP should be processed through the JACC within the Headquarters Joint Operations Command, Air and Space Operations Centre. JACC contact details are:

    a. Telephone: + XX XXXX XXXX

    b. Email: XXXX.XXXXXXX@defence.gov.au

19. **(U) Briefings.** All aircrew and controllers must be familiar with the procedures described within this document and supporting SPINS and ACO documentation. JFACC must ensure that all participants are briefed prior to participating in Operation Steel Sentinel (Op SS). Individual unit or squadron commanders are to ensure that all aircrew and controllers are familiar with the operational documentation and procedures as they pertain to airspace, procedures and coordination requirements.

EXECUTION

20. **(O:S) Airspace Control Authority (ACA).** The ACA for Op SS is JFACC, located at Headquarters Joint Operations Command, Air and Space Operations Centre (HQJOC – AOC).

21. **(O:S) Sub-ordinate Airspace Control Authority (SACA).** The ACA may assign SACA for a portion of airspace to a Commander to accomplish a specific mission or to facilitate decentralised execution. The ACA will retain overall responsibility for the specified airspace and will recall the airspace when required for higher JTF priorities, or when the assigned Commander can no longer exercise command and control over the specified airspace.

22. **(O:S) Airspace priorities.** The ACA, in consultation with Commander Joint Task Force, has set the following airspace priorities for phases 0-3:

a. Aircraft with a declared emergency, radio failure or participating in activities for the preservation of life or property

b. Military aircraft on ATO derived mission sets

c. Aircraft on humanitarian operations

d. Unscheduled military aircraft movements

e. Scheduled commercial air transport operations

f. Other non-scheduled aircraft commercial transport operations

g. Other civilian operations.

23. (O:S) The ACA has set the following airspace priorities for phase 4:

a. Aircraft with a declared emergency, radio failure or participating in activities for the preservation of life or property

b. Aircraft on humanitarian operations

c. Military aircraft on ATO derived mission sets

d. Unscheduled military aircraft movements

e. Scheduled commercial air transport operations

f. Other non-scheduled aircraft commercial transport operations

g. Other civilian operations.

24. **(O:S) ACA duties and responsibilities.** The ACA is responsible for:

a. The establishment of an Airspace Control System (ACS) that is responsive to operational airspace activities

b. Integration of the ACS with military and civil ATC agencies

c. Assuming command of the ACS during execution

d. Authorising amendments to this ACP as required.

AIRSPACE STRUCTURE

25. **(U) JFAO.** The JFAO includes the air, surface and subsurface of BX and surrounds as depicted in Figure 1.



Figure 1 - JFAO

26. **(U) Coordination level (CL).** The CL is a procedural method to segregate rotary wing (RW) aircraft and small/micro Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) operations from Fixed Wing (FW) operations. The CL is 5000FT and:

a. Aircraft operating below the CL may operate up to 5000FT

b. Aircraft above the CL require a positive clearance from the relevant control agency prior to descent below 6000FT for operations below the CL

c. Operations below the CL are VFR, unless otherwise requested and approved.

27. **(U) Altimetry.** Aircraft operating in the JFAO are to set force QNH below the transition level of FL160 as provided through tactical airspace Command and Control (C2) agencies. Above the transition level, aircraft operating in the JFAO are to set standard altimeter.

28. **(O:S) Battle Management Area (BMA).** BMAs are established to facilitate aircraft de-confliction and employment of aircraft consistent with the character of operations within that BMA. Further, BMAs assist in distributing C2 responsibilities and radio frequency allocation. The ATO will assign tactical C2 (TAC C2) for BMAs.

AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT

29. **(O:S) Airspace Control Order (ACO).** The ACO is published daily to coordinate, integrate and synchronise airspace use for Air Tasking Order (ATO) assigned missions. The effective times of the daily ACO will coincide with the daily ATO.

30. **(O:S) Airspace Control Means (ACMs).** An ACM is a procedural control method used to de-conflict airspace and/or aircraft from other airspace users. When appropriate communications exist, TAC C2 may provide procedural control instructions in real time to increase operational flexibility for airspace users. The daily ACO will promulgate active ACMs.

31. **(O:S) Airspace de-confliction concept.** BX ATC is the primary means of de-conflicting civilian and military aircraft within the JFAO. Aircraft will be in contact with BX ATC when operating in airspace outside of TAC C2 controlled ACMs. TAC C2 is the primary means of de-conflicting aircraft operating in active ACMs within the JFAO.

32. (O:S) Unless specifically granted authority from BX ATC, flight operations within the JFAO will be conducted IAW the Belesian Aeronautical Information Publication (BAIP). ATC will issue headings and altitudes and allocate airspace while providing traffic advisories to assist in safe and orderly flow of aircraft. Coalition TAC C2 units are not authorised to provide control instructions to aircraft while in, or transiting ATC controlled airspace (unless relaying ATC instructions). However, TAC C2 may provide situational awareness and traffic point outs. An aircraft under TAC C2 authority must seek a clearance from the responsible controlling agency prior to entering/exiting ATC controlled airspace.

33. (O:S) Tactical flights should monitor the respective BMA frequency for traffic advisories and situational awareness while in transit. Aircraft will comply with control instructions and airspace restrictions issued by ATC unless compliance unnecessarily presents risk to safety of flight, the aircraft is

executing defensive manoeuvres while threatened, or as directed by a "CHARIOT-directs" for mission execution.

34. **(O:S) Airspace activation/de-activation procedures.** Daily SPINS and ACOs provide airspace activation details; TAC C2 will manage real time changes.

35. **(O:S) High Density Airspace Control Zones (HIDACZs).** HIDACZs are ACMs used to manage concentrated employment of numerous and varied weapons/airspace users promulgated via the ACO. BMA assigned TAC C2 will manage activity within a HIDACZ.

36. **(O:S) Entry and exit.** Aircrew entering the JFAO will check in with BX ATC. Aircrew will remain in two-way communication with ATC until given clearance to proceed into working airspace and switch to tactical frequencies. TAC C2 and/or aircraft will coordinate with ATC for airspace allocation IAW SPINS. TAC C2 does not need to request permission from ATC when working uncontrolled airspace or inside of a HIDACZ.

37. **(O:S) Kill box procedures.** GARS will be used as the frame of reference for kill box procedures IOT integrate, de-conflict and synchronise operations. Further kill box details are:

a. **Dimensions.** The GARS divides the JFAO into 30-minute by 30-minute kill boxes, each with a unique five-character designator. Altitude limits for each kill box are defined in the ACO.

b. **Keypads**. To aid in directing aircraft to a specific point within the kill box, each is broken down into four 15-minute by 15-minute quadrants. Further, each quadrant is divided into nine 5-minute by 5-minute 'keypads'.

c. **Restrictions.** Coalition aircraft will not use kill box nomenclature with BX ATC at any time. If coordination is required with ATC to enter the confines of a kill box, in the first instance the encompassing ACM will be used, if one is not available then latitude/longitude or a reference point with radius and working altitude will be required.

d. **Kill boxes outside HIDACZ.** Kill boxes are to be used in HIDACZ only; when kill boxes lay wholly or partly outside the confines of a HIDACZ, a Restricted Operating Zone ACM must be established.

e. **Entry and exit.** Entry into kill boxes will be controlled by TAC C2. Aircraft will enter and exit kill boxes at the ACO, SPINS, or ATC assigned altitudes.

f. **Communications.** The communications plan directed by the SPINS will include discrete kill box frequencies for each BMA.

AIRCRAFT PROCEDURES

38. **(O:S) UAS de-confliction below CL.** UAS will not be in direct two-way communications with TAC C2. Therefore, de-confliction with manned aviation platforms will be achieved through the implementation of a UAS Restricted Operating Zone (ROZ), as well as the following procedures:

a. **Standard Army Aircraft Flight Routes (SAAFR).** SAAFRs shall be requested through the ACM Request (ACMREQ) process and published in the daily ACO, SFC-1000FT AGL, and:

(1) UAS should remain clear of SAAFRs at all times, unless TAC C2 can facilitate appropriate de-confliction with Rotary Wing (RW).

(2) Outside of SAAFRs, RW can tactically manoeuvre not above 300FT AGL, which provides a buffer of 500FT with tactical UAS operating 800-1000FT AGL. RW may request higher levels with TAC C2, who in turn, can appropriately de-conflict with UAS by other means.

b. **Fixed Wing (FW) transit route.** A FW transit route may be requested through the ACMREQ process and published in the daily ACO, SFC-2000FT AGL.UAS shall remain clear of FW transit routes at all times, unless TAC C2 can facilitate appropriate de-confliction with FW.

39. **(U) Flight planning.** Aircraft operating exclusively within Op SS ACMs are not required to submit civil flight plans; they are to be included in the daily ATO. Aircraft operating to/from operational airspace are to submit civil flight plans and squawk Mode 3/A and C SSR codes as issued by the flight planning authority while enroute to/from Op SS airspace. Once established within operational areas, ATO modes/codes are to be used.

40. **(O:S) Search and Rescue (SAR).** SAR is to be conducted IAW reference E.

EMERGENCIES

41. **(O:S) General.** During Phase 0-3 aircraft experiencing an emergency are to follow the individual squadron SOPs and the daily SPINS.

42. (O:S) During Phase 4 aircraft experiencing an emergency are to squawk 7700, broadcast a PAN or MAYDAY, call on the operating frequency and GUARD and proceed IAW aircraft emergency procedures. Tac C2 or ATC will coordinate immediate RTB or initiation of SAR as the case may be.

43. **(O:S) Communication failure.** During Phase 0-3 aircraft experiencing a communications failure are to follow the no-com individual squadron SOPs and the daily SPINS.

44. (O:S) During Phase 4 aircraft experiencing a communication failure are to squawk 7600, and follow ATC communication failure SOPs.

45. **(O:S) Weapon emergencies.** In the event of hung ordnance, aircraft shall advise their controlling agency, and should follow the procedures published in local area briefings.

JFACC Air Operations Directive

Air Operations Directive for Phase 0 of Operation Steel Sentinel XX-XX XXX 2020

For Execution at XX/XX/XX to XX/XX/XX

CAO: XXXXX

JFACC		
Approve	Disapprove	Discuss
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AIR OPERATIONS DIRECTIVE

References:

A. CJTF 667 OPORD 01 (OPERATION STEEL SENTINEL)
B. UNSCR 8869
C. UNSCR 8873
D. Australian Treaty Series 2006 No 7 (SOFA)
E. Rules of Engagement – Annex L to the CJTF 667 OPORD (including appendix 1 and 2)

(Highlighted portions of this document are variables that exercise participants/planners can modify. Modifications will depend on the number of participants involved in the exercise, and the aims/objectives of the exercise)

SITUATION

Background

1. (U) Growing ethnic tensions in the Belesian island of Panay resulted in violence when the local government in Panay attempted to take control of the lucrative Cerium rare earth mine in San Rafael from the Olvanan registered operator. The resulting loss of life amongst the Belesian Constabulary and unknown number of mine employees has sparked unrest in the nearby city of Roxas with the violence occurring along ethnic lines with the greatest loss of life amongst the Torbian diaspora.

2. (U) Olvana (OV) and North Torbia (NT) have been conducting a week's long biennial exercise in the South China Sea, named Exercise RISEN SWORD. It was under the cover of this exercise that NT landed a marine force (estimated to be a Brigade) on Palawan near the sparsely populated town of El Nido, capturing the port and airfield facilities.

3. (U) Simultaneously, NT landed a Marine Expeditionary Force (estimated to be at Brigade strength) near the city of Roxas, Panay and captured the seaport, airport, and the San Rafael Mine.

4. (U) NT has claimed the justification for this act of aggression is to protect ethnic Torbians in Panay from persecution. In response to this blatant disregard for international protocols, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed UNSCR 8868 (ref A) condemning NT aggression and calling for the withdrawal of NT Forces from Belesian territory.

5. (U) Concurrently, Belesia (BX) landed a Brigade of troops in the south of Panay through the city of Iloilo in an attempt to force the NT forces off the island. This course of action has resulted in a stalemate with the NT Marine Expeditionary Force (NTMEF) holding the northern half of Panay centred on the city of Roxas and the BX Forces holding the area around Iloilo.

6. (U) NT has since declared a Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) and Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the occupied islands and parts of the Sulu and South China Sea.

7. (U) In an effort to allow diplomatic options to be utilised and reduce further loss of life, the UNSC passed UNSCR 8869 (ref C) calling on all Member States to enforce economic and military sanctions against NT. With NT's continued occupation of Panay and Palawan in contravention of International laws, the UNSC passed UNSCR 8873 (ref D) authorising the raising of the International Belesian Security Assistance Force (IBSAF) to utilise military force to remove NT military elements on sovereign Belesian territory.

8. (U) Australia has volunteered to be the lead nation of the Combined Joint Task Force 667 (CJTF 667) with contributing nations including New Zealand, Fiji, Malaysia, Singapore, Tonga, PNG, Japan and Thailand.

9. (U) The Government of BX has consented, subject to SOFAs (ref E), to allow CJTF 667 forces to stage through their territories, to station forces, materiel and installations involved in supporting its operations and to overflights.

Commanders Guidance

10. (U) The JFACC guidance for phase 0 of Operation Steel Sentinel is to:

a. support the BX Air Force in defensive operations;

b. enable freedom of movement for CJTF 667 elements at Makar Wharf, General Santos City, BX (SPOD) and General Santos International Airport, General Santos City, BX (APOD) by establishing and maintaining air superiority in the area;

c. forward deploying air assets to be in a position to support CJTF 667 Operations in Phase 1;

d. establish a Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) at HQJOC, Bungendore;

e. provide air mobility to each of the JFLCC and JFMCC to support their Scheme of Manoeuvre (SoM); and

f. collect intelligence and distribute Indicators and Warnings (I&W) regarding the NTMETF movement and threats.

Air Apportionment

11. (U) **JFC Air Apportionment Decision.** The JFACC will allocate sufficient air power to accomplish these prioritised operational objectives with the specifies high, medium, or low weight of effort for this AOD period:

a. enable freedom of movement for CJTF 667 elements at Makar Wharf, General Santos City, BX (SPOD) and General Santos International Airport, General Santos City, BX (APOD) by establishing and maintaining air superiority in the area; (High)

b. forward deploying air assets to be in a position to support CJTF 667 Operations in Phase 1; (High)

c. establish a CAOC IVO HQJOC, Bungendore; (High)

d. support the BX Air Force in defensive operations; (Medium)

e. provide air mobility to each of the JFLCC and JFMCC to support their Scheme of Manoeuvre (SoM); (Medium) and

f. collect intelligence and distribute Indicators and Warnings (I&W) regarding the NTMETF movement and general NT threats. (Medium)

12. (U) The secondary effort will be providing air mobility to each the JFLCC and JFMCC ISO their SoM.

Enemy Forces

13. (U) **Capability.** Refer to Annex B of Ref A, the current Intel update and the following:

14. (U) **Panay**. NTMEF Bde have secured the SPOD and APOD within the city of Roxas, and with the help from the Visayan Peoples Front (VPF) have captured the San Rafael Mine complex. They have a mobile defensive position southwest of the San Rafael Mine and north of the city of Iloilo. At the Roxas APOD, NT have based 12x SU-30MKK, 12x J-11B, 12x KA-28, and 6x Z-19.

15. (U) **Palawan**. NTMEF Bn have lodged in El Nido and refurbished disused WW2 port and airfield being used as a staging base for movement into Panay. The combat air elements operating out of El Nido Airfield include; 12x SU-30MKK and 12x J-11B.

16. (U) **Sulu and South China Sea**. Surface and Subsurface elements operating in the Sulu and South China Sea are:

a. 1x Type 052D Luyang III (DDG);

b. 2x Type 052C Luyang II (DDG);

c. 1x Type 051G Luda (DDG);

d. 2x Jiankai II (FFG);

e. 1x Jiangwei II (FFH);

f. 2xJianghu V (FFH); and

g. 3x Song (SSK).

Friendly Forces

Air Component

17. (U) Below is a brief outline of the air assets supporting JFACC.

a. (U) **Intercept Assets.**

(1) 12 RAAF F-35A Lighting II

(2) 12 RAAF F/A-18F Super Hornets

b. (U) **EW assets.**

(1) 8 RAAF EA-18G Growlers

c. (U) **C2 and ISR assets.**

(1) 3 RAAF E-7A Wedgetail

(2) 4 RAAF P-8 Poseidon

(3) 2 RAAF MQ-4C Triton

(4) 2 RNZAF P-3 Orion

d. (U) **Air Mobility and AAR**.

(1) 4 RAAF C-17 Globemaster

(2) 4 RAAF C-130 J Hercules

(3) 5 RAAF C-27J Spartan

(4) 4 RAAF KC-30A

(5) 2 RNZAF C-130 Hercules

e. (U) **Support assets.**

(1) 1 RAAF Airfield Defence Squadron

(2) 1 RAAF Airfield Engineering Squadron

(3) 2 RAAF ECSS

Maritime Component

18. (U) Below is a brief outline of the Maritime assets supporting JFMCC:

a. (U) **RAN led Maritime Task Group (MTG).**

(1) 2 RAN Air Warfare Destroyers (DDG)

(2) 2 RAN Frigates (FFH)

(3) 2 RAN Diesel Electric Submarines (SSG)

(4) 1 RNZN Frigate (FFH)

b. (U) **RAN led Amphibious Task Group (ATG)**

(1) 2 RAN Amphibious Assault Ships (LHD)

(2) 1 RAN Dock Landing Ship (LSD)

(3) 1 RAN Pre-Landing force (PLF) with the associated fixed and rotary wing aircraft and replenishment ship.

(4) 1 RNZN Multi-Role Vessel (MRV)

c. (U) **Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG).**

(1) 3 JMSDF Landing Ships (LST)

(2) 1 JMSDF Destroyer (DDH)

(3) 2 JMSDF Guided Missile Destroyers (DDG)

(4) 1 JMSDF Diesel-Electric Submarine (SSG)

(5) A JSDF Amphibious Ground Force based on three Army Marine Battalions

Land Component

19. (U) Below is a brief outline of the Land assets supporting the JFLCC:

a. Australian Army JFLCC and staff for JFLCC HQ

b. 1 Australian Army Combat Brigade complete with one Aviation Task Group and Division enablers

c. 1 New Zealand Army Infantry Battalion

d. 1 New Zealand Army Aviation Regiment

e. 1 Fijian Infantry Battalion

f. 1 Coalition Infantry Battalion (Indonesia/Malaysia/Tonga/PNG/Singapore/Thailand)

MISSION

20. (U) **JFACC Mission**. Gain and maintain localised air superiority over SPOD and APOD to allow freedom of movement for the CJTF 667 JFLCC and JFMCC. Support the JFLCC and JFMCC SoM through Air mobility and conduction Intelligence and I&W focussed operations.

21. (U) The directed effort is to:

a. (U) Gain and maintain air superiority IVO APOD and SPOD (ESSENTIAL);

b. (U) Support BX air force elements (HIGHLY DESIREABLE);

c. (U) Support JFMCC and JFLCC SoM through apportionment of Air Mobility assets (HIGHLY DESIREABLE);

d. (U) Establish a CAOC IVO HQJOC, Bungendore; (ESSENTIAL)

e. (U) Forward position all JFACC assets in position to support Phase 1 operations (ESSENTIAL); and

f. (U) Collect intelligence on the NTMEF in the JFAO (HIGHLY DESIREABLE);

EXECUTION

JFACC Concept of Operations

22. (U) **JFACC Intent.** To allow the freedom of movement of the CJTF 667 assets IVO of SPOD and APOD through the establishment of air superiority, the support of air mobility assets, the collection of intelligence and providing I&W.

23. (U) **JFACC Purpose**. To support the JFLCC and JFMCC ground and maritime scheme of manoeuvre to allow the posture and battel space shaping to support Phase 1 operations to be set.

24. (U) **JFACC Method**. JFACC will provide force protection IVO SPOD and APOD to assist with the forward deploying of coalition assets. This force protection will be conducted through the BX and CJTF 667 air, space and cyber assets and operations to produce the following effects:

a. Establish and maintain localised air superiority IVO of General Santos City with a DCA package consisting of BX and CJTF 667 C2, AAR, EW and DCA assets. At Attachment 1 there is an indicative CAP E, CAP W and HVAA CAP describing the force posture to attain localised air superiority over Gen Santos City;

b. Look to extend the localised air superiority to include Zamboanga IOT permit the forward basing of JFACC assets there. At attachment 1 there is an indicative CAP Z describing the force posture to attain localised air superiority over Zamboanga;

c. Conduct shaping operations to establish preconditions for further CJTF 667 offensive operations;

d. Provide strategic airlift to CJTF 667 force elements;

e. Gain and maintain situational awareness through ISR and Airborne Early Warning and Control; and

f. Coordinate the above efforts through the establishment and operation of CAOC at HQJOC, Bungendore.

25. (U) **JFACC End State.** The JFACC end state for phase 1 is the achievement of Transition Point 1 (TP1) which is:

a. Air superiority is established in Southern Belesia enabling freedom of movement for CJTF 667 forces at SPOD and APOD;

b. Establish CAOC at HQJOC, Bungendore;

c. Role 2 Enhanced Hospital is established IVO Makar Wharf; and

d. CJTF 667 HQ established at Rajah Buayan Airbase.

ATO Planning Guidance

26. (U) **JFACC Priorities.** The priorities for Phase 0 are to establish air superiority in support of the lodgement of the CJTF 667 assets and to conduct shaping and strategic airlift operations.

27. (U) **Risk.** Tactical aircraft will operate at "Medium" Acceptable level of Risk (ALR) for all missions. ISR, C2, Tanker and Airlift aircraft will operate at "Low" ALR. RPA missions may operate in "High" ALR areas. Accept "Medium" risk for all other missions including Troops In Contact (TIC) or as a last chance to prevent strikes against APOD, SPOD or Zamboanga. On a case-by-case basis, operations meeting the "High" ALR, need JFACC approval. Operations meeting the "Extreme" ALR need CJTF 667 approval.

28. (U) **Air to Air Guidance**. The TN air force presents a challenge to CJTF 667. This challenge will be partially mitigated by the CJT 667's use of superior tactics, techniques and procedures and use of force enablers such as the E-7A, KC-30A and FA18G. As such the defence of these force enabling assets should be prioritised.

29. (U) **Air Mobility Guidance**. The Air Mobility aircraft should prioritise tasks that assist the preparations for the Phase 1 Lodgement and deception plan.

30. (U) **ISR Guidance**. The AOC will provide the ISR assets with a Joint Intelligence Prioritised Collection List (JIPCL). The ISR assets should prioritise collection in accordance with this list and they should also report on any emerging threat or TN military movement within or within collection range of the JFAO.

31. (U) **Cyber Guidance**. The AOC will plan and coordinate joint and combined cyber fires in support of CJTF 667 objectives to defeat TN forces and degrade/disrupt TN operations.

32. (U) **Electronic Warfare Guidance**. EW operations should be conducted IAW the ROE listed. Further, the EW operators should operate in a manner which minimised disruption to civilians.

33. (U) **Military Information Support Operations** (**MISO**). Execute MISO series previously developed against TN air forces deployed in Palawan or Panay.

34. (U) **Space Operations Guidance**. The AOC will plan and integrate space capabilities in support of CJT 667 objectives.

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

35. (U) CJTF 667 ROE for Operation Steel Sentinel is in effect and should be read in conjunction with the relevant UNSCRs and SOFAs. The legal basis and legitimacy for Operation Steel Sentinel stems from the abovementioned UNSCRs and the SOFAs authorising a coalition force to use "*all necessary measures*" up to and including deadly force to carry out the tasks listed in UNSCRs 8869 and 8873.

36. (U) **National Policy.** Use of force is to be limited to the achievement of CJT 667's mission. Commanders are to ensure they take all feasible precautions in attack to minimise the incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects in accordance with the LAOC when conducting operations. Commanders must ensure that all targets intended to be prosecuted are valid military objectives. Disruption to the delivery of essential services to the civilian population is to be minimised and actions that would antagonise diplomatic relations with neutral and non-belligerent parties including Olvana are to be avoided.

37. (U) **ROE Structure.** The ROE will be followed by all coalition personnel. It is noted that each coalition partner will be required t0o abide by the most restrictive of their own national ROE or the Operation Steel Sentinel ROE.

38. (U) **ROE Requests.** CJTF 667 components are to submit ROE change requests (ROEREQ) to CJTF 667. These will then be staffed via J3 in HQ CJTF. All ROEREGs must include the proposed wording of the ROE change supported by an analysis of military necessity considerations. Legal justification, national policy considerations and risk to the mission if not approved.

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40. (U) **Hostile Forces.** Attack on Hostile Forces, their equipment and facilities is permitted. Hostile Forces includes any NTMEF within BX sovereign territory, positively identified members of the Visayan Peoples Front (VPF).

Air Mobility Guidance

41. (U) The Air mobility priorities are as follows:

a. Provide AAR support to DCA and E-7A as required;

b. Support JFLCC deployment into the JFAO;

c. Support the JFACC deployment into the JFAO;

d. Conduct theatre sustainment ISO CJTF 667 deployed forces; and

e. BPT provide AAR support on activation of any GDCA or AI.

Personnel Recovery (PR) Guidance

42. (U)When dedicated PR assets are made available to conduct PR operations in support of combat and combat support operations. Posture and position PR alert crews and aircraft to be positioned to complete immediate PR recoveries from alert and airborne assets.

43. (U) **PR Authorities.** PR operations authorities are as follows:

a. When rescue efforts for Isolated Personnel (IP) are assessed at “Low” ALR, launch and execute authority is delegated down to the Rescue Mission Commander (RMC).

b. When rescue efforts for IP are assessed as “Medium” ALR, launch and execute authority is delegated to the Chief of Combat Operations (CCO).

c. When rescue efforts for IP are assessed at “High” ALR, launch authority is the CCO, and execute authority is retained by the JFACC.

Electronic Warfare Guidance

44. (U) Electronic Attack mission profiles in support of air operations will be flown within the ALR commensurate with the overall objective of the supported mission. EA and Electronic Warfare Support (ES) profiles will normally be located outside the operational range of all Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) systems, unless the TTPs and ALR allow encroachment. Requests for EW support and potential fratricide issues will be routed through the AOC for review. Requests for EA and ES will be submitted via a JFACC-approved Electronic Attack Request Form (EARF). Planners/operators will reference the CJTF 667 Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL) for frequency de-confliction.

Theatre ISR Guidance

45. (U) ISR should be prioritised according to risk level and collection benefits. Manned platforms should operate outside known Weapons Engagement Zones (WEZs). In Phase 0 there will be a limited ability for air superiority to be extended to support ISR missions IVO Palawan and Panay. All missions must be flown IAW the risk guidance in paragraph 27. CFACC may authorise escort for ISR assets on a case by case basis.

46. (U) Accordingly, unmanned ISR assets should be considered as primary assets for missions within WEZs and over Panay and Palawan in Phase 0.

47. (U) The following ISR collections are listed in priority order:

a. Maritime activity – Monitor location and movement of TN maritime forces with emphasis on Naval SAM-capable vessel movements. ISR collection will support CJTF 667 objectives looking to Phase 1 and beyond.
b. IADS – Enable establishment and maintenance of air superiority. Monitor the location and movement of any emergent TN IADS assets.
c. Ground – Find and fix the NTMEF forces IVO Palawan and Panay.

Logistics

48. (U) Logistics Concept of Operations. Within the JFAO provide support to the CJTF 667 forces through supporting forward deployment, CJTF 667 force movements, sustain critical munitions and aircraft spares. BPT support Humanitarian Assistance operations (HA) in BX. Prioirty of supply will be ammunition (Class V), petroleum fuels, lubricants, hydraulic and insulating oils subclass: troops support material (class IIIB), substances (Class I), water, medical material (class VIII), repair parts (Class IX), major end items (Class VII), material t support non-military personnel and cargo in that order.

49. (U) The priority of rearward movement will be MEDEVAC, personnel, major end items and cargo in that order.

Command, Control and Communications (C3)

50. (U) **Command.** JFACC will exercise Command of the Air Component units through the CAOC to be established during this phase. Prior to the establishment of the CAOC the JFACC will exercise Command of the Air Component units through the AOC located at HQJOC, Bungendore. In both cases Command will be exercised through the issue of a daily air tasking order.

51. (U) **Control**. JFACC will exercise control of Air Component operations as the Theatre JFACC, responsible to the Theatre Commander.

52. (U) **Control Authorities**. JFACC shall exercise the following control authorities:

a. Area Air Defence Commander (AADC);

b. Airspace Control Authority (ACA);

c. Space Coordinating Authority (SCA); and

d. Joint Personnel Recovery Commander (JPRC).

53. (U) **Assignment of JFACC Joint Air Component Coordination Element (JACCE)**. JFACC JACCE staff will integrate into components and headquarters but remain under command of the JFACC. The primary responsibility will be to ensure the JFACC Air Operations Plan remains synchronised with supported and supporting commander's SoM and to ensure their air assets are integrated into the air tasking cycle. The JACCE will provide timely air advice to support CJT 667campaign decision-making, joint force planning and targeting cycle decisions.

54. (U) **Succession of Command.** If JFACC is unable to continue command, succession of Command is:

a. Director of the Air Operations Center (DAOC); then

b. Chief of Combat Operations (CCO).

55. (U) **Continuity of Operations.** If communications are lost with the CAOC, or it is unable to direct forces, all units will continue operations IAW the last AOD/ATO issued and in concert with the JAOP when considering/performing future operations. Continue this method of operations until communication is re-established with the CAOC.

ATTACHMENT 1

Component Commander Phase 0 SoM

Place holder for JFLCC SoM and CONOPS

Place holder for JFMCC SoM and CONOPS

JFACC SoM / CONOPS for Phase 0 operations AOD XX.



ATTACHMENT 2
Strategy to task Matrix

TBC

ATTACHMENT 3
Risk Definitions, Metrics and mitigation factors

TBC

ATTACHMENT 4
JFACC Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs)

JFACC Priority Intelligence Requirements, Friendly Force Information Requirements, Essential Elements of Friendly Information.

1. **JFACC Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs)**
    a. What actions will cause TN to escalate the conflict (inside or outside the JFAO)?
    b. Will TN attack the Australian homeland or any other coalition nation homeland?
    c. How will regional alliances/partnerships affect support for JFACC operations?
    d. Where/how will humanitarian crises affect JFACC operations?
    e. How will TN affect the JFACC SoM within the JFAO?
    f. What is the capability and status of TN offensive space and cyber capabilities in the JFAO?
    g. How will TN non-kinetic operations affect JFACC operations?
    h. What are the TN maritime surface and sub-surface force disposition, operational status, TTPs and patterns of life?
    i. What is the disposition of TN Land components on Panay and Palawan?
    j. What is the TN air combat force disposition, operational status and TTPs and patterns of life?
    k. What is the disposition and operational status of TN IADS and associated acquisition and C2 nodes?
    l. What is the disposition, status and intent of capability of groups sympathetic to TN in the JFAO?

2. **JFACC Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIRs)**
    a. Any change in status of IAMD capability.
    b. Status of localised air superiority inside and outside the JFAO.
    c. JFACC ready for phase change.
    d. Critical munitions status.
    e. Forces postured and ready for kinetic and non-kinetic shaping operations.
    f. Sustainment falls below levels required for continued JFACC combat operations.

3. **JFACC Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFIs)**
    a. Details of RAAF involvement in operations, including branching and sequels, unless released by Government of Australia (GoA).
    b. The specific details of the deployment, rotation and re-deployment schedule for RAAF FE until released by GoA.
    c. Tactical, operational and military strategic objectives related to operations.
    d. Operationally deployed RAAF capabilities, including detailed composition, roles, disposition, tasks, vulnerabilities and notice to move.
    e. ROE
    f. Security and force protection capabilities of RAAF elements, including specific details relating to vulnerabilities and TTPs.
    g. The identity of locally engaged staff or RAAF personnel deployed on operations, and their families, unless authorised byt eh individual and relevant public release information management instructions.

h. Details of the effect that RAAF involvement in operations has on other operational commitments and its ability to conduct further operations.
i. C4I capabilities and architecture.
j. Existing and developing classified equipment, weapons and tactics.
k. JPR capabilities, processes and operations.
l. Intelligence collection capabilities, processes and operations.
m. Australian Intelligence Community support to RAAF activities and the intelligence relationship with Coalition partners.
n. Commander's risk appetite.

JFACC Air Operations Directive

Air Operations Directive for Phase 1 of Operation Steel Sentinel
XX-XX XXX 2020

CAO: XXXXX

JFACC		
Approve	Disapprove	Discuss
☐	☐	☐

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AIR OPERATIONS DIRECTIVE

References:

A. CJTF 667 OPORD 01 (OPERATION STEEL SENTINEL)
B. UNSCR 8869
C. UNSCR 8873
D. Australian Treaty Series 2006 No 7 (SOFA) (need correct reference – Date in the information pack seems to be odd)
E. Rules of Engagement – Annex L to the CJTF 667 OPORD (including appendix 1 and 2)

(Highlighted portions of this document are variables that exercise participants/planners can modify. Modifications will depend on the number of participants involved in the exercise, and the aims/objectives of the exercise)

SITUATION

General Situation

1. (U) Operations during Phase 0 have seen CJTF 667 forces successfully established in the JFAO allowing decisive actions to commence.

2. (U) No significant change to NT force disposition on Panay or Palawan has occurred from Phase 0 to Phase 1.

Commanders Guidance

3. (U) The JFACC guidance for phase 1 of Operation Steel Sentinel is to:

a. conduct ISR operations to support CJTF 667 in identifying NT force posture, intentions and patterns of life;

b. conduct DCA operations to establish air superiority in support of continued staging of CJTF 667 forces, in support of military operations in the JFAO, and in readiness for JFLCC lodgement and land operations;

c. conduct AI operations to physically isolate and degrade NTMEF forces in the JFAO; and

d. conduct AI and posturing of forces in the JFAO to support CJTF 667 deception plan.

Air Apportionment

4. (U) **JFC Air Apportionment Decision.** The JFACC will allocate sufficient air power to accomplish these prioritised operational objectives with the specified high, medium, or low weight of effort for this AOD period.

a. Conduct decisive military operations, which leads to the restoration of Belesian sovereignty in the occupied islands; stabilize the region; and deter further external aggression against BX. **(High)**

b. Establish military superiority in the maritime and airspace within the JFAO in a manner which supports decisive operations. **(High)**

c. Assist humanitarian assistance efforts and IO/NGO activities in BX. **(Low)**

d. Assist the government of BX to re-establish and maintain a safe and secure environment to facilitate the continuance of democratic government institutions and programmes. **(Low)**

e. Support any applicable International Criminal Court (ICC) investigations of crimes against humanity through the preservation and collection of evidence. **(Low)**

Enemy Forces

5. (U) **Enemy Intent.** NT will likely look to reinforce forces on Panay via Palawan in an attempt to break the current stalemate between NT and BX ground forces.

6. (U) **Land.** NTMEF Bde in Panay continues to secure the SPOD and APOD within the city of Roxas, maintain control of the San Rafael Mine Complex, and hold BX forces at a mobile defensive position southwest of the San Rafael Mine and north of the city of Iloilo. NTMEF Brigade in Palawan consolidates its position in El Nido, as a key staging base for movement into Panay.

7. (U) List land forces

8. (U) **Maritime.** TBD

9. (U) Surface and Subsurface elements potentially operating in the JFAO are:

a. 1 Type 052D Luyang III (DDG);

b. 2 Type 052C Luyang II (DDG);

c. 1 Type 051G Luda (DDG);

d. 2 Jiankai II (FFG);

e. 1 Jiangwei II (FFH);

f. 2 Jianghu V (FFH); and

g. 3 Song (SSK).

10. (U) **Air.** NT Air Force assets based at Roxas and at El Nido have commenced day time DCA operations and night ground alert, likely in response to CF Stage 0 operations. NT Air Force continues day CAS operations from Roxas ISO NTMEF on Panay. The combat air elements operating out of the Roxas APOD include; 12x SU-30MKK, 12x J-11B, 12x KA-28, and 6x Z-19. The combat air elements operating out of El Nido Airfield include; 12x SU-30MKK and 12x J-11B.

11. (U) **Air Defence.** NTMEF Bde on Panay is supported by a HQ-16 medium range air defence missile Bn located at the APOD. NTMEF Brigade in Palawan is supported by an El Nido based HQ-17A short range air defence missile Bn and a PGZ-07 Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Artillery Bn. These systems provide tactical SAM support and point defence, but are operating with no C2 or Early Warning radar capability.

12. (U) **Insurgent Activity.** TBD

Friendly Forces

13. (U) **JFLCC.** Phase 1 will consist of an amphibious lodgement of the TG onto Panay and conduct information warfare effects to counter NT/Insurgent information warfare.

14. (U) Below is a brief outline of the Land assets supporting the JFLCC:

a. Australian Army JFLCC and staff for JFLCC HQ

b. 1 Australian Army Combat Brigade complete with one Aviation Task Group and Division enablers

c. 1 New Zealand Army Infantry Battalion

d. 1 New Zealand Army Aviation Regiment

e. 1 Fijian Infantry Battalion

f. 1 Coalition Infantry Battalion (Indonesia/Malaysia/Tonga/PNG/Singapore/Thailand)

15. (U) **JFMCC.** On order lodgement of amphibious units onto Panay to support Belesian Armed Forces. JMCC forces will also integrate BN elements, establish Amphibious Operating Area, support lodgment of ground forces at designated APOD / SPOD, and maintain local Sea Control of designated areas.

16. (U) Below is a brief outline of the Maritime assets supporting JFMCC:

a. (U) **RAN led Maritime Task Group (MTG).**

(1) 2 RAN Air Warfare Destroyers (DDG)

(2) 2 RAN Frigates (FFH)

(3) 2 RAN Diesel Electric Submarines (SSG)

(4) 1 RNZN Frigate (FFH)

b. (U) **RAN led Amphibious Task Group (ATG)**

(1) 2 RAN Amphibious Assault Ships (LHD)

(2) 1 RAN Dock Landing Ship (LSD)

(3) 1 RAN Pre-Landing force (PLF) with the associated fixed and rotary wing aircraft and replenishment ship.

(4) 1 RNZN Multi-Role Vessel (MRV)

c. (U) **Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG).**

(1) 3 JMSDF Landing Ships (LST)

(2) 1 JMSDF Destroyer (DDH)

(3) 2 JMSDF Guided Missile Destroyers (DDG)

(4) 1 JMSDF Diesel-Electric Submarine (SSG)

(5) A JSDF Amphibious Ground Force based on three Army Marine Battalions

17. (U) **JFACC**. Below is a brief outline of the air assets supporting JFACC:

a. (U) **Fighter Assets.**

(1) 12 RAAF F-35A Lighting II

(2) 12 RAAF F/A-18F Super Hornets

b. (U) **EW assets.**

(1) 8 RAAF EA-18G Growlers

c. (U) **C2 and ISR assets.**

(1) 3 RAAF E-7A Wedgetail

(2) 4 RAAF P-8A Poseidon

(3) 2 RAAF MQ-4C Triton

(4) 2 RNZAF P-3K2 Orion

d. (U) **Air Mobility and AAR**.

(1) 4 RAAF C-17 Globemaster

(2) 4 RAAF C-130 J Hercules

(3) 5 RAAF C-27J Spartan

(4) 4 RAAF KC-30A

(5) 2 RNZAF C-130 Hercules

e. (U) **Support assets.**

(1) 1 RAAF Airfield Defence Squadron

(2) 1 RAAF Airfield Engineering Squadron

(3) 2 RAAF ECSS

MISSION

18. (U) **JFACC Mission**. JFACC gains and maintains air superiority to enable coalition military operations within the JFAO. JFACC supports coalition land and maritime forces to physically isolate NTMEF in the JFAO, destroying NT forces main lines of communications and supply. JFACC supports the CJTF 667 deception plan by posturing and conducting offensive operations towards Palawan. JFACC supports rear area operations to secure ports, airfields and supply lines.

19. (U) The directed effort is to:

a. Gain and maintain air superiority ISO coalition operations in the JFAO (ESSENTIAL);

b. Conduct AI operations to physically isolate NTMEF forces in the JFAO (ESSENTIAL);

c. Collect intelligence on the NTMEF in the JFAO (ESSENTIAL); and

d. Conduct offensive operations and posturing of forces to support the CJTF 667 deception plan (ESSENTIAL).

EXECUTION

JFACC Concept of Operations

20. (U) **JFACC Intent.** To expand air superiority within the JFAO in order to conduct AI, ISR, support JFLCC and JFMCC scheme of manoeuvre, and facilitate deception plan. To conduct ISR operations to gain intelligence on NT forces in the JFAO and to inform targeting. To conduct interdiction operations to isolate NTMEF forces on Panay.

21. (U) **JFACC Purpose**. The purpose of this phase is to set the conditions for phase 2 lodgement of forces into Panay by isolating NTMEF on Panay, establishing air superiority within the JFAO, and completing the CJTF deception plan.

22. (U) **JFACC End State.** The JFACC end state for phase 1 is the achievement of Transition Point 2 (TP2) which is:

a. Air superiority is achieved in the JFAO;

b. Sea/air lines of communication are cut to the NTMEF forces established on Panay; and

c. JFLCC and JFMCC deception plan is completed.

23. (U) **Operational Concept**. Persistent E-7A AEW&C operations within the JFAO will provide Early Warning to DCA assets and Airspace Battle Management ISO offensive operations and DCA. Until such time as Panay and Palawan based NT Air Force assets have been sufficiently degraded to establish air supremacy, air superiority will be achieved by dynamic management of airborne and alert fighter assets ISO continuing CF operations. BX DCA assets will provide defence in depth, concentrating on defending the BX mainland, while CJTF 667 forces — supported by AAR — will be positioned forward in the JFA (Attachment 1). Offensive operations will begin with SEAD, Sweep and OCA to disrupt Palawan and Panay based air defence assets while degrading NT Air Force capability in the JFAO. Degrading/destroying air defence assets will support subsequent AI against NT communications and resupply capabilities. Priorities in this effort include NTMEF support forces and infrastructure at both the SPOD and APOD within Roxas. Operations targeting existing BX infrastructure on Panay and Palawan will be limited.

24. (U) ISR missions will be conducted to gain and maintain situational awareness of NT Forces. P-8A and P-3K2 aircraft will conduct ASW/ASuW primarily to develop a robust maritime operating picture, while also providing on-call Maritime Strike in support of the JFMCC. MQ-4C will conduct High Altitude, Long Endurance (HALE) surveillance missions, to support the Joint Targeting Cycle.

25. (U) Strategic airlift will continue to sustain the force.

ATO Planning Guidance

26. (U) **Priorities.** The priorities for Phase 1 are to establish air superiority within the JFAO and to conduct AI to isolate NT Forces in preparation for Phase 2 JFEO.

27. (U) **Risk.** Tactical aircraft will operate at "Medium" Acceptable level of Risk (ALR) for all missions. ISR, C2, Tanker and Airlift aircraft will operate at "Low" ALR. RPA missions may operate in "High" ALR areas. Accept "Medium" risk for all other missions including Troops In Contact (TIC) or as a last chance to prevent strikes against APOD, SPOD or Zamboanga. On a case-by-case basis, operations meeting the "High" ALR, need JFACC approval. Operations meeting the "Extreme" ALR need CJTF 667 approval.

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29. (U) **Air Mobility Guidance**. Having established CF in BX, Air Mobility assets will be prioritised ISO force sustainment and assisting preparations for Phase 2 lodgement.

30. (U) **ISR Guidance**. The AOC will provide the ISR assets with a Joint Intelligence Prioritised Collection List (JIPCL). The ISR assets will prioritise collection in accordance with this list and should also report on any emerging threat or TN military movement within, or within collection range, of the JFAO.

31. (U) **Cyber Guidance**. The AOC will plan and coordinate joint and combined cyber fires in support of CJTF 667 objectives to defeat TN forces and degrade/disrupt TN operations.

32. (U) **Electronic Warfare Guidance**. EW operations should be conducted IAW the ROE listed. Further, the EW operators should operate in a manner which minimises disruption to civilians.

33. (U) **Military Information Support Operations** (**MISO**). Execute MISO series previously developed against TN air forces deployed in Palawan or Panay.

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37. (U) **ROE Structure.** The ROE will be followed by all coalition personnel. It is noted that each coalition partner will be required to abide by the most restrictive of their own national ROE or the Operation Steel Sentinel ROE.

38. (U) **ROE Requests.** CJTF 667 components are to submit ROE change requests (ROEREQ) to CJTF 667. These will then be staffed via J3 in HQ CJTF. All ROEREGs must include the proposed wording of the ROE change supported by an analysis of military necessity considerations. Legal justification, national policy considerations and risk to the mission if not approved.

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40. (U) **Hostile Forces.** Attack on Hostile Forces, their equipment and facilities is permitted. Hostile Forces includes any NTMEF within BX sovereign territory, positively identified members of the Visayan Peoples Front (VPF).

Air Mobility Guidance

41. (U) The Air mobility priorities are as follows:

a. Provide AAR support to DCA, offensive operations and AEW&C;

b. Support JFACC scheme of manoeuvre ISO Phase 2 JFEO;

c. Conduct theatre sustainment ISO CJTF 667 deployed forces; and

d. BPT provide AAR support on activation of any GDCA

Personnel Recovery Guidance

42. (U) Conduct PR operations in support of combat and combat support operations. Posture and position PR alert crews and aircraft to support immediate PR recoveries from alert and airborne assets.

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c. When rescue efforts for IP are assessed at “High” ALR, launch authority is the CCO, and execute authority is retained by the JFACC.

Electronic Warfare Guidance

44. (U) Electronic Attack mission profiles in support of air operations will be flown within the ALR commensurate with the overall objective of the supported mission. EA and Electronic Warfare Support (ES) profiles will normally be located outside the operational range of all Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) systems, unless the TTPs and ALR allow encroachment. Requests for EW support and potential fratricide issues will be routed through the AOC for review. Requests for EA and ES will be submitted via a JFACC-approved Electronic Attack Request Form (EARF). Planners/operators will reference the CJTF 667 Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL) for frequency de-confliction.

Theatre ISR Guidance

45. (U) ISR should be prioritised according to risk level and collection benefits. Manned platforms should operate outside known Weapons Engagement Zones (WEZs). In Phase 1 CF will provide DCA ISO ISR missions IVO Palawan and Panay. All missions must be flown IAW the risk guidance in provided. CFACC may authorise escort for ISR assets on a case by case basis.

46. (U) Unmanned ISR assets should be considered as primary assets for missions within WEZs and over Panay and Palawan in Phase 1.

47. (U) The following ISR collections are listed in priority order:

a. Maritime activity – Monitor location and movement of TN maritime forces with emphasis on Naval SAM-capable vessel movements.
b. IADS – Enable establishment and maintenance of air superiority. Monitor the location and movement of any emergent TN IADS assets.
c. Communications and logistics – Find and fix key lines of communications and supply to support the Joint Targeting Cycle.
d. Ground – Find and fix the NTMEF forces IVO Palawan and Panay.

Logistics

48. (U) Logistics Concept of Operations. Within the JFAO provide support to the CJTF 667 forces through supporting forward deployment, CJTF 667 force movements, sustain critical munitions and aircraft spares. BPT support Humanitarian Assistance operations (HA) in BX. Priority of supply will be ammunition (Class V), petroleum fuels, lubricants, hydraulic and insulating oils subclass: troops support material (class IIIB), substances (Class I), water, medical material (class VIII), repair parts (Class IX), major end items (Class VII), material to support non-military personnel and cargo in that order.

49. (U) The priority of rearward movement will be MEDEVAC, personnel, major end items and cargo in that order.

Command, Control and Communications (C3)

50. (U) **Command.** JFACC will exercise Command of the Air Component units through the CAOC established during Phase 0. Command will be exercised through the issue of a daily air tasking order.

51. (U) **Control**. JFACC will exercise control of Air Component operations as the Theatre JFACC, responsible to the Theatre Commander.

52. (U) **Control Authorities**. JFACC shall exercise the following control authorities:

a. Area Air Defence Commander (AADC);

b. Airspace Control Authority (ACA);

c. Space Coordinating Authority (SCA); and

d. Joint Personnel Recovery Commander (JPRC).

53. (U) **Assignment of JFACC Joint Air Component Coordination Element (JACCE)**. JFACC JACCE staff will integrate into components and headquarters but remain under command of the JFACC. The primary responsibility will be to ensure the JFACC Air Operations Plan remains synchronised with supported and supporting commander's SoM and to ensure their air assets are integrated into the air tasking cycle. The JACCE will provide timely air advice to support CJT 667campaign decision-making, joint force planning and targeting cycle decisions.

54. (U) **Succession of Command.** If JFACC is unable to continue command, succession of Command is:

a. Director of the Air Operations Center (DAOC); then

b. Chief of Combat Operations (CCO).

(U) **Continuity of Operations.** If communications are lost with the CAOC, or it is unable to direct forces, all units will continue operations IAW the last AOD/ATO issued and in concert with the JAOP when considering/performing future operations. Continue this method of operations until communication is re-established with the CAOC.

ATTACHMENT 1

Component Commander Phase 1 SoM

Place holder for JFLCC SoM and CONOPS

Place holder for JFMCC SoM and CONOPS

ATTACHMENT 2
Strategy to task Matrix

To be issued.

ATTACHMENT 3
Risk Definitions, Metrics and mitigation factors

To be issued.

ATTACHMENT 4
JFACC Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs)

JFACC Priority Intelligence Requirements, Friendly Force Information Requirements, Essential Elements of Friendly Information.

1. **JFACC Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs)**
    a. What actions will cause TN to escalate the conflict (inside or outside the JFAO)?
    b. Will TN attack the Australian homeland or any other coalition nation homeland?
    c. How will regional alliances/partnerships affect support for JFACC operations?
    d. Where/how will humanitarian crises affect JFACC operations?
    e. How will TN affect the JFACC SoM within the JFAO?
    f. What is the capability and status of TN offensive space and cyber capabilities in the JFAO?
    g. How will TN non-kinetic operations affect JFACC operations?
    h. What are the TN maritime surface and sub-surface force disposition, operational status, TTPs and patterns of life?
    i. What is the disposition of TN Land components on Panay and Palawan?
    j. What is the TN air combat force disposition, operational status and TTPs and patterns of life?
    k. What is the disposition and operational status of TN IADS and associated acquisition and C2 nodes?
    l. What is the disposition, status and intent of capability of groups sympathetic to TN in the JFAO?

2. **JFACC Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIRs)**
    a. Any change in status of IAMD capability.
    b. Status of localised air superiority inside and outside the JFAO.
    c. JFACC ready for phase change.
    d. Critical munitions status.
    e. Forces postured and ready for kinetic and non-kinetic shaping operations.
    f. Sustainment falls below levels required for continued JFACC combat operations.

3. **JFACC Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFIs)**
    a. Details of RAAF involvement in operations, including branching and sequels, unless released by Government of Australia (GoA).
    b. The specific details of the deployment, rotation and re-deployment schedule for RAAF FE until released by GoA.
    c. Tactical, operational and military strategic objectives related to operations.
    d. Operationally deployed RAAF capabilities, including detailed composition, roles, disposition, tasks, vulnerabilities and notice to move.
    e. ROE
    f. Security and force protection capabilities of RAAF elements, including specific details relating to vulnerabilities and TTPs.
    g. The identity of locally engaged staff or RAAF personnel deployed on operations, and their families, unless authorised byt eh individual and relevant public release information management instructions.

h. Details of the effect that RAAF involvement in operations has on other operational commitments and its ability to conduct further operations.
i. C4I capabilities and architecture.
j. Existing and developing classified equipment, weapons and tactics.
k. JPR capabilities, processes and operations.
l. Intelligence collection capabilities, processes and operations.
m. Australian Intelligence Community support to RAAF activities and the intelligence relationship with Coalition partners.
n. Commander's risk appetite.

JFACC Air Operations Directive

Air Operations Directive for Phase 2 of Operation Steel Sentinel
XX-XX XXX 2020

CAO: XXXXX

JFACC		
Approve	Disapprove	Discuss
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References:

A. CJTF 667 OPORD 01 (OPERATION STEEL SENTINEL)
B. UNSCR 8869
C. UNSCR 8873
D. Australian Treaty Series 2006 No 7 (SOFA) (need correct reference – Date in the information pack seems to be odd)
E. Rules of Engagement – Annex L to the CJTF 667 OPORD (including appendix 1 and 2)

(Highlighted portions of this document are variables that exercise participants/planners can modify. Modifications will depend on the number of participants involved in the exercise, and the aims/objectives of the exercise)

SITUATION

General Situation

1. (U) Phase 1 shaping operations have set the conditions for JFEO in Phase 2. Critical lines of communications and supply to NT Forces on Panay have been degraded, while CF Strike/AI operations against NT Forces on Palawan, and posturing of CF air assets have supported the CJTF 667 deception plan. 667

2. (U) NT Air Force assets on both Panay and Palawan have been degraded although an air threat to CF still exists.

Commanders Guidance

3. (U) The JFACC guidance for phase 2 of Operation Steel Sentinel is to:

a. conduct DCA operations to maintain air superiority in the JFAO;

b. provide air mobility assets ISO JFEO on Panay;

c. conduct Strike operations ISO JFLCC;

d. conduct ISR operations to support CJTF 667 in identifying NT force posture, intentions and patterns of life;

e. 667continue AI operations to isolate NT Forces on Panay and Palawan; and

f. be prepared to support maritime strike.667

Air Apportionment

4. (U) **JFC Air Apportionment Decision.** The JFACC will allocate sufficient air power to accomplish these prioritised operational objectives with the specified high, medium, or low weight of effort for this AOD period.

a. Conduct decisive military operations, which leads to the restoration of Belesian sovereignty in the occupied islands; stabilize the region; and deter further external aggression against BX. **(High)**

b. Establish military superiority in the maritime and airspace within the JFAO in a manner which supports decisive operations. **(High)**

c. Assist humanitarian assistance efforts and IO/NGO activities in BX. **(Medium)**

d. Assist the government of BX to re-establish and maintain a safe and secure environment to facilitate the continuance of democratic government institutions and programmes. **(Low)**

e. Support any applicable International Criminal Court (ICC) investigations of crimes against humanity through the preservation and collection of evidence. **(Low)**

Enemy Forces

5. (U) **Enemy Intent.**

6. (U) **Land.** NTMEF Bde in Panay continues to secure the SPOD and APOD within the city of Roxas, maintain control of the San Rafael Mine Complex, and hold BX forces at a mobile defensive position southwest of the San Rafael Mine and north of the city of Iloilo. NTMEF Bn in Palawan consolidates its position in El Nido, as a key staging base for movement into Panay.

7. (U) **Maritime.**

8. (U) Surface and Subsurface elements potentially operating in the JFAO are:

a. 1 Type 052D Luyang III (DDG);

b. 2 Type 052C Luyang II (DDG);

c. 1 Type 051G Luda (DDG);

d. 2 Jiankai II (FFG);

e. 1 Jiangwei II (FFH);

f. 2 Jianghu V (FFH); and

g. 3 Song (SSK).

9. (U) **Air.** NT Air Force assets based at Roxas and at El Nido suffered significant losses during CJTF 667 Phase 1 offensive operations. NT Air Force has ceased CAS missions ISO NTMEF on Panay; However, DCA operations — albeit at a reduced arate of effort — continue. The combat air elements operating out of the Roxas APOD include; 12x SU-30MKK, 12x J-11B, 12x KA-28, and 6x Z-19. The combat air elements operating out of El Nido Airfield include; 12x SU-30MKK and 12x J-11B.

10. (U) **Air Defence.** The Panay based HQ-16 medium range air defence missile capability was neutralised during Phase 1 offensive operations, with both of the Bn's radar units being destroyed. NTMEF Bn in Palawan maintains a degraded air defence capability with X of Y HQ-17A short range air defence missile systems assessed as destroyed while the PGZ-07 Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Artillery Bn remains at full strength. Palawan based air defence systems continue to operate with no C2 or Early Warning radar capability.

Friendly Forces

11. (U) **JFLCC.** Phase 2 will result in the Neutralisation of the NTMEF by dislocating and then defeating them in battle. AS Mech BDE will ADV N and defeat NTMEF forces loc N of San Rafael Mine IVO Roxas. This will dislocate the NTMEF forces IVO San Rafael mine and set the conditions for the NZ Mech BDE to defeat these forces in detail

12. (U) Below is a brief outline of the Land assets supporting the JFLCC:

a. Australian Army JFLCC and staff for JFLCC HQ

b. 1 Australian Army Combat Brigade complete with one Aviation Task Group and Division enablers

c. 1 New Zealand Army Infantry Battalion

d. 1 New Zealand Army Aviation Regiment

e. 1 Fijian Infantry Battalion

f. 1 Coalition Infantry Battalion (Indonesia/Malaysia/Tonga/PNG/Singapore/Thailand)

13. (U) **JFMCC.** Phase 2 will commence on order and involve the lodgment of amphibious units onto Panay to support Belesian Armed Forces. JFMCC will integrate BN elements into CJTF 667 operations, establish Amphibious Operating Area, support lodgment of ground forces at designated APOD / SPOD, neutralise NT maritime elements.

14. (U) Below is a brief outline of the Maritime assets supporting JFMCC:

a. (U) **RAN led Maritime Task Group (MTG).**

(1) 2 RAN Air Warfare Destroyers (DDG)

(2) 2 RAN Frigates (FFH)

(3) 2 RAN Diesel Electric Submarines (SSG)

(4) 1 RNZN Frigate (FFH)

b. (U) **RAN led Amphibious Task Group (ATG)**

(1) 2 RAN Amphibious Assault Ships (LHD)

(2) 1 RAN Dock Landing Ship (LSD)

(3) 1 RAN Pre-Landing force (PLF) with the associated fixed and rotary wing aircraft and replenishment ship.

(4) 1 RNZN Multi-Role Vessel (MRV)

c. (U) **Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG).**

(1) 3 JMSDF Landing Ships (LST)

(2) 1 JMSDF Destroyer (DDH)

(3) 2 JMSDF Guided Missile Destroyers (DDG)

(4) 1 JMSDF Diesel-Electric Submarine (SSG)

(5) A JSDF Amphibious Ground Force based on three Army Marine Battalions

15. (U) **JFACC**. Below is a brief outline of the air assets supporting JFACC:

a. (U) **Fighter Assets.**

(1) 12 RAAF F-35A Lighting II

(2) 12 RAAF F/A-18F Super Hornets

b. (U) **EW assets.**

(1) 8 RAAF EA-18G Growlers

c. (U) **C2 and ISR assets.**

(1) 3 RAAF E-7A Wedgetail

(2) 4 RAAF P-8A Poseidon

(3) 2 RAAF MQ-4C Triton

(4) 2 RNZAF P-3K2 Orion

d. (U) **Air Mobility and AAR**.

(1) 4 RAAF C-17 Globemaster

(2) 4 RAAF C-130 J Hercules

(3) 5 RAAF C-27J Spartan

(4) 4 RAAF KC-30A

(5) 2 RNZAF C-130 Hercules

e. (U) **Support assets.**

(1) 1 RAAF Airfield Defence Squadron

(2) 1 RAAF Airfield Engineering Squadron

(3) 2 RAAF ECSS

MISSION

16. (U) **JFACC Mission**. JFACC supports coalition land and maritime forces in achieving lodgement of ground assets on Panay by maintaining air superiority in the JFAO. JFACC directly supports the JFEO through conduct of Strike, CAS, ISR and Air Mobility operations.

17. (U) The directed effort is to:

a. Maintain air superiority ISO coalition operations in the JFAO (ESSENTIAL);

b. Provide Airlift ISO JFEO (ESSENTIAL);

c. Support JFEO by conducting Strike and CAS (ESSENTIAL);

d. Collect intelligence on the NTMEF in the JFAO (ESSENTIAL); and

e. Conduct AI operations to physically isolate NTMEF forces in the JFAO (ESSENTIAL).

EXECUTION

JFACC Concept of Operations

18. (U) **JFACC Intent.** To maintain air superiority within the JFAO, and conduct CAS, Strike, ISR and Airlift in support of the JFEO. To conduct ISR operations to gain intelligence on NT forces in the JFAO, to inform joint targeting, and to maintain and distribute the Recognised Air Picture and Maritime Operating Picture. To conduct interdiction operations to isolate NTMEF on Palawan ISO Phase 3 operations.

19. (U) **JFACC Purpose**. The purpose of this phase is to directly support the JFEO.

20. (U) **JFACC End State.** The JFACC end state for phase 2 is the achievement of Transition Point 3 (TP3) which is:

a. JFLCC elements have successfully lodged on Panay;

b. Air superiority is maintained in the JFAO667; and

c. JFACC is supporting ground and maritime forces through joint targeting.

21. (U) **Operational Concept**. Persistent E-7A AEW&C operations within the JFAO will continue to provide Early Warning to DCA assets and Airspace Battle Management ISO offensive operations and DCA. BX DCA assets will continue to primarily provide defence of the BX mainland, while CJTF 667 forces — supported by AAR — will be positioned forward in the JFAO (Attachment 1). Tactical Airlift assets will assist the JFEO, supported by Strike Packages against NTMEF defensive positions and CAS.

22. (U) ISR missions will be conducted to maintain situational awareness of NT Forces. P-8A and P-3K2 aircraft will conduct ASW/ASuW to develop a robust maritime operating picture, while also providing on-call Maritime Strike in support of the JFMCC. MQ-4C will conduct High Altitude, Long Endurance (HALE) surveillance missions, to support the Joint Targeting Cycle.

23. (U) Strategic airlift will continue to sustain the force.

ATO Planning Guidance

24. (U) **Priorities.** The priorities for Phase 2 are to maintain air superiority within the JFAO and to support lodgement of ground forces on Panay.

25. (U) **Risk.** Tactical aircraft will operate at “Medium” Acceptable level of Risk (ALR) for all missions. ISR, C2, Tanker and Strategic Airlift aircraft will operate at “Low” ALR. RPA missions may operate in “High” ALR areas. Accept “Medium” risk for all other missions including Troops In Contact (TIC) or as a last chance to prevent strikes against APOD, SPOD or Zamboanga. On a case-by-case basis, operations meeting the “High” ALR, need JFACC approval. Operations meeting the “Extreme” ALR need CJTF 667 approval.

26. (U) **Air to Air Guidance**. Although TN air force assets in the JFAO have been degraded, an air threat still exists, presenting a challenge to CJTF 667. This challenge will be partially mitigated by the

CJTF 667's use of superior tactics, techniques and procedures and use of force enablers such as the E-7A, KC-30A and FA18G. As such the defence of these force enabling assets should be prioritised.

27. (U) **Air Mobility Guidance**. Having established CF in BX, Strategic Air Mobility assets will be prioritised ISO force sustainment and while Tactical Air Mobility assets will assist the JFEO.

28. (U) **ISR Guidance**. The AOC will provide the ISR assets with a Joint Intelligence Prioritised Collection List (JIPCL). The ISR assets will prioritise collection in accordance with this list and should also report on any emerging threat or TN military movement within, or within collection range, of the JFAO.

29. (U) **Cyber Guidance**. The AOC will plan and coordinate joint and combined cyber fires in support of CJTF 667 objectives to defeat TN forces and degrade/disrupt TN operations.

30. (U) **Electronic Warfare Guidance**. EW operations should be conducted IAW the ROE listed. Further, the EW operators should operate in a manner which minimises disruption to civilians.

31. (U) **Military Information Support Operations** (**MISO**). Execute MISO series previously developed against TN air forces deployed in Palawan or Panay.

32. (U) **Space Operations Guidance**. The AOC will plan and integrate space capabilities in support of CJT 667 objectives.

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

33. (U) CJTF 667 ROE for Operation Steel Sentinel is in effect and should be read in conjunction with the relevant UNSCRs and SOFAs. The legal basis and legitimacy for Operation Steel Sentinel stems from the abovementioned UNSCRs and the SOFAs authorising a coalition force to use "*all necessary measures*" up to and including deadly force to carry out the tasks listed in UNSCRs 8869 and 8873.

34. (U) **National Policy.** Use of force is to be limited to the achievement of CJTF 667's mission. Commanders are to ensure they take all feasible precautions in attack to minimise the incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects in accordance with the LAOC when conducting operations. Commanders must ensure that all targets intended to be prosecuted are valid military objectives. Disruption to the delivery of essential services to the civilian population is to be minimised and actions that would antagonise diplomatic relations with neutral and non-belligerent parties including Olvana are to be avoided.

35. (U) **ROE Structure.** The ROE will be followed by all coalition personnel. It is noted that each coalition partner will be required to abide by the most restrictive of their own national ROE or the Operation Steel Sentinel ROE.

36. (U) **ROE Requests.** CJTF 667 components are to submit ROE change requests (ROEREQ) to CJTF 667. These will then be staffed via J3 in HQ CJTF. All ROEREGs must include the proposed wording of the ROE change supported by an analysis of military necessity considerations. Legal justification, national policy considerations and risk to the mission if not approved.

37. (U) **Self Defence.** This is permitted up to including deadly force to protect self and Designated Persons. The use of such force is limited to the intensity and duration reasonably necessary to achieve the objective. Deadly force for the protection of property is not permitted unless there is reasonable belief that damage to or destruction of the property is likely to result in serious harm or loss of life.

38. (U) **Hostile Forces.** Attack on Hostile Forces, their equipment and facilities is permitted. Hostile Forces includes any NTMEF within BX sovereign territory, positively identified members of the Visayan Peoples Front (VPF).

Air Mobility Guidance

39. (U) The Air mobility priorities are as follows:

a. Provide AAR support to DCA, Strike and AEW&C;

b. Provide Airlift ISO the ground forces lodgement on Panay;

c. Conduct theatre sustainment ISO CJTF 667 deployed forces; and

d. BPT provide AAR support on activation of any GDCA

Personnel Recovery Guidance

40. (U) Conduct PR operations in support of combat and combat support operations. Posture and position PR alert crews and aircraft to support immediate PR recoveries from alert and airborne assets.

41. (U) **PR Authorities.** PR operations authorities are as follows:

a. When rescue efforts for Isolated Personnel (IP) are assessed at "Low" ALR, launch and execute authority is delegated down to the Rescue Mission Commander (RMC).

b. When rescue efforts for IP are assessed as "Medium" ALR, launch and execute authority is delegated to the Chief of Combat Operations (CCO).

c. When rescue efforts for IP are assessed at "High" ALR, launch authority is the CCO, and execute authority is retained by the JFACC.

Electronic Warfare Guidance

42. (U) Electronic Attack mission profiles in support of air operations will be flown within the ALR commensurate with the overall objective of the supported mission. EA and Electronic Warfare Support (ES) profiles will normally be located outside the operational range of all Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) systems, unless the TTPs and ALR allow encroachment. Requests for EW support and potential fratricide issues will be routed through the AOC for review. Requests for EA and ES will be submitted via a JFACC-approved Electronic Attack Request Form (EARF). Planners/operators will reference the CJTF 667 Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL) for frequency de-confliction.

Theatre ISR Guidance

43. (U) ISR should be prioritised according to risk level and collection benefits. Manned platforms should operate outside known Weapons Engagement Zones (WEZs). In Phase 2, CF will provide DCA ISO ISR missions IVO Palawan and Panay. All missions must be flown IAW the risk guidance in paragraph 27. CFACC may authorise escort for ISR assets on a case by case basis.

44. (U) Accordingly, unmanned ISR assets should be considered as primary assets for missions within WEZs and over Palawan in Phase 2.

45. (U) The following ISR collections are listed in priority order:

a. Ground – Find and fix the NTMEF forces IVO Palawan and Panay
b. Maritime activity – Monitor location and movement of TN maritime forces with emphasis on Naval SAM-capable vessel movements. ISR collection will support CJTF 667 objectives looking to Phase 1 and beyond.
c. IADS – Enable establishment and maintenance of air superiority. Monitor the location and movement of any emergent TN IADS assets.

Logistics

46. (U) Logistics Concept of Operations. Within the JFAO provide support to the CJTF 667 forces through supporting forward deployment, CJTF 667 force movements, sustain critical munitions and aircraft spares. BPT support Humanitarian Assistance operations (HA) in BX. Priority of supply will be ammunition (Class V), petroleum fuels, lubricants, hydraulic and insulating oils subclass: troops support material (class IIIB), substances (Class I), water, medical material (class VIII), repair parts (Class IX), major end items (Class VII), material to support non-military personnel and cargo in that order.

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a. Area Air Defence Commander (AADC);

b. Airspace Control Authority (ACA);

c. Space Coordinating Authority (SCA); and

d. Joint Personnel Recovery Commander (JPRC).

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52. (U) **Succession of Command.** If JFACC is unable to continue command, succession of Command is:

a. Director of the Air Operations Center (DAOC); then

b. Chief of Combat Operations (CCO).

(U) **Continuity of Operations.** If communications are lost with the CAOC, or it is unable to direct forces, all units will continue operations IAW the last AOD/ATO issued and in concert with the JAOP when considering/performing future operations. Continue this method of operations until communication is re-established with the CAOC.

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Component Commander Phase 1 SoM

Place holder for JFLCC SoM and CONOPS

Place holder for JFMCC SoM and CONOPS

ATTACHMENT 2
Strategy to task Matrix

TBC

ATTACHMENT 3
Risk Definitions, Metrics and mitigation factors

TBC

ATTACHMENT 4
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JFACC Priority Intelligence Requirements, Friendly Force Information Requirements, Essential Elements of Friendly Information.

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    b. Will TN attack the Australian homeland or any other coalition nation homeland?
    c. How will regional alliances/partnerships affect support for JFACC operations?
    d. Where/how will humanitarian crises affect JFACC operations?
    e. How will TN affect the JFACC SoM within the JFAO?
    f. What is the capability and status of TN offensive space and cyber capabilities in the JFAO?
    g. How will TN non-kinetic operations affect JFACC operations?
    h. What are the TN maritime surface and sub-surface force disposition, operational status, TTPs and patterns of life?
    i. What is the disposition of TN Land components on Panay and Palawan?
    j. What is the TN air combat force disposition, operational status and TTPs and patterns of life?
    k. What is the disposition and operational status of TN IADS and associated acquisition and C2 nodes?
    l. What is the disposition, status and intent of capability of groups sympathetic to TN in the JFAO?

2. **JFACC Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIRs)**
    a. Any change in status of IAMD capability.
    b. Status of localised air superiority inside and outside the JFAO.
    c. JFACC ready for phase change.
    d. Critical munitions status.
    e. Forces postured and ready for kinetic and non-kinetic shaping operations.
    f. Sustainment falls below levels required for continued JFACC combat operations.

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    b. The specific details of the deployment, rotation and re-deployment schedule for RAAF FE until released by GoA.
    c. Tactical, operational and military strategic objectives related to operations.
    d. Operationally deployed RAAF capabilities, including detailed composition, roles, disposition, tasks, vulnerabilities and notice to move.
    e. ROE
    f. Security and force protection capabilities of RAAF elements, including specific details relating to vulnerabilities and TTPs.
    g. The identity of locally engaged staff or RAAF personnel deployed on operations, and their families, unless authorised byt eh individual and relevant public release information management instructions.

h. Details of the effect that RAAF involvement in operations has on other operational commitments and its ability to conduct further operations.
i. C4I capabilities and architecture.
j. Existing and developing classified equipment, weapons and tactics.
k. JPR capabilities, processes and operations.
l. Intelligence collection capabilities, processes and operations.
m. Australian Intelligence Community support to RAAF activities and the intelligence relationship with Coalition partners.
n. Commander's risk appetite.

JFACC Air Operations Directive

Air Operations Directive for Phase 3 of Operation Steel Sentinel
XX-XX XXX 2020

CAO: XXXXX

JFACC		
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A. CJTF 667 OPORD 01 (OPERATION STEEL SENTINEL)
B. UNSCR 8869
C. UNSCR 8873
D. Australian Treaty Series 2006 No 7 (SOFA)
E. Rules of Engagement – Annex L to the CJTF 667 OPORD (including appendix 1 and 2)

(Highlighted portions of this document are variables that exercise participants/planners can modify. Modifications will depend on the number of participants involved in the exercise, and the aims/objectives of the exercise)

SITUATION

General Situation

1. (U) Operations during Phase 0, 1 and 2 have seen CJTF 667 forces successfully established in the JFAO, gain air superiority and conduct JFEO on Panay. Conditions now allow for further shaping operations in the JFAO and offensive operations to defeat the NTMEF located in Palawan.

2. (U) CJTF ground elements have defeated the majority of NTMEF forces on Panay. However, in an attempt the destabilise CJTF operations, small insurgent groups are attacking CF and Panay infrastructure.

3. (U) Engagements with JFACC assets during Phases 1& 2 have severally weakened NTMEF forces on Palawan. CF have disrupted supply lines from NT, and the NTMEF are unable to conduct offensive operations IVO Panay. Reduced aircraft and air defence systems operational in Palawan has not stopped the NTMEF conducting DCA ISO the facilities and airfields it controls on Palawan.

Commanders Guidance

4. (U) The JFACC guidance for phase 3 of Operation Steel Sentinel is to:

a. Maintain Air superiority in JFAO to allow freedom of movement in the JFAO

b. Support CF ground elements on Panay eliminate any remaining NTMEF on Panay through CAS and Strike operations

c. Support JFMCC forces in control of seas lanes and STABOPS – ASW & ASuW

d. Conduct ISR operations IVO Palawan to support CJFT 667 in identifying NT forces posture, intentions and patterns of life;

e. Conduct OCA operations to physically isolate and degrade NTMEF forces in Palawan; in readiness for JFLCC lodgement and ground operations

f. Provide air mobility to support JFLCC SoM for lodgement in Palawan.

g. Support CJTF in shaping the AO for phase 4 transition.

Air Apportionment

5. (U) **JFC Air Apportionment Decision.** The JFACC will allocate sufficient air power to accomplish these prioritised operational objectives with the specified high, medium, or low weight of effort for this AOD period.

a. Maintain Air Superiority in JFAO (**High**)

b. Defend ground based CF in the JFAO (**High**)

c. Support JFMCC Scheme of Manoeuvre (SoM) (**High**)

d. Provide air mobility to JFLCC ISO lodgement of ground assets in Palawan (**High**)

e. Defend southern airfields in JFAO (General Santos and Zamboanga) (**Low**)

Enemy Forces

6. (U) **Capability.** Refer to Annex B of Ref A, the current Intel update and the following:

7. (U) **Land**. The majority of the NTMEF Bde on Panay are defeated, only small groups supported by the Visayan Peoples Front (VPF) are still conducting minor attacks on targets of opportunity. CFs have re-captured the San Rafael Mine complex with mining slowly returning to normal. CF have destroyed NT defensive positions and pose no threat to air assets.

8. Engagements during phases 1 and 2 have weakened the NTMEF Bn located in Palawan. Logistic support flights from NT have reduced in numbers to 1-2 a week.

9. (U) **Maritime.** Surface and Subsurface elements operating in the Sulu and South China Sea are:

a. XX x Type 052D Luyang III (DDG);

b. XX x Type 052C Luyang II (DDG);

c. XX x Type 051G Luda (DDG);

d. XX x Jiankai II (FFG);

e. XX x Jiangwei II (FFH);

f. XX x V (FFH); and

g. XX x Song (SSK).

10. (U) **Air**. Aircraft previously position at Roxas APOD have been destroyed or re-deployed to Palawan. Intel estimate that XX x SU-30MKK, XX x J-11B, XX x KA-28, and XX x Z-19, have been re-located to Palawan. Intel estimate the NT can launch up to 12x SU-30MKK and 12x J-11B, out of El Nido.

11. **(U) Air Defence.** The NTMEF Bn in Palwan is supported by HQ-17A short range air defence missile Bn and a PGZ-07 Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Artillery Bn based at the APOD. These systems provide tactical SAM support and point defence, but are operating with no C2 or Early Warning radar capability.

Friendly Forces

JFMCC

12. (U) Below is a brief outline of the Maritime assets supporting JFMCC:

a. (U) **RAN led Maritime Task Group (MTG).**

(1) 2 RAN Air Warfare Destroyers (DDG)

(2) 2 RAN Frigates (FFH)

(3) 2 RAN Diesel Electric Submarines (SSG)

(4) 1 RNZN Frigate (FFH)

b. (U) **RAN led Amphibious Task Group (ATG)**

(1) 2 RAN Amphibious Assault Ships (LHD)

(2) 1 RAN Dock Landing Ship (LSD)

(3) 1 RAN Pre-Landing force (PLF) with the associated fixed and rotary wing aircraft and replenishment ship.

(4) 1 RNZN Multi-Role Vessel (MRV)

c. (U) **Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG).**

(1) 3 JMSDF Landing Ships (LST)

(2) 1 JMSDF Destroyer (DDH)

(3) 2 JMSDF Guided Missile Destroyers (DDG)

(4) 1 JMSDF Diesel-Electric Submarine (SSG)

(5) 1 JSDF Amphibious Ground Force based on three Army Marine Battalions

JFLCC

13. (U) Below is a brief outline of the Land assets supporting the JFLCC:

a. Australian Army JFLCC and staff for JFLCC HQ

b. 1 Australian Army Combat Brigade complete with one Aviation Task Group and Division enablers

c. 1 New Zealand Army Infantry Battalion

d. 1 New Zealand Army Aviation Regiment

e. 1 Fijian Infantry Battalion

f. 1 Coalition Infantry Battalion (Indonesia/Malaysia/Tonga/PNG/Singapore/Thailand)

JFACC

14. (U) Below is a brief outline of the air assets supporting JFACC.

a. (U) **Intercept Assets.**

(1) 12 RAAF F-35A Lighting II

(2) 12 RAAF F/A-18F Super Hornets

b. (U) **EW assets.**

(1) 8 RAAF EA-18G Growlers

c. (U) **C2 and ISR assets.**

(1) 3 RAAF E-7A Wedgetail

(2) 4 RAAF P-8 Poseidon

(3) 2 RAAF MQ-4C Triton

(4) 2 RNZAF P-3 Orion

d. (U) **Air Mobility and AAR**.

(1) 4 RAAF C-17 Globemaster

(2) 4 RAAF C-130 J Hercules

(3) 5 RAAF C-27J Spartan

(4) 4 RAAF KC-30A

(5) 2 RNZAF C-130 Hercules

e. (U) **Support assets.**

(1) 1 RAAF Airfield Defence Squadron

(2) 1 RAAF Airfield Engineering Squadron

(3) 2 RAAF ECSS

MISSION

15. (U) **JFACC Mission**. Maintain air superiority in the JFAO to allow freedom of movement for the CJTF 667 JFLCC and JFMCC. JFACC will support the JFLCC and JFMCC SoM through CAS, Strike, Air mobility and I&W focussed operations. JFACC supports posturing for Phase 4 – Transition to UN Mission and IO/NGOs.

16. (U) The directed effort is to:

a. (U) Maintain air superiority in JFAO (ESSENTIAL)

b. (U) Support JFMCC and JFLCC SoM through apportionment of Fighter and Air Mobility assets (ESSENTIAL);

c. (U) Collect intelligence on the NTMEF in Palawan (ESSETIAL);

d. (U) On order, conduct offensive operations IVO Palawan through apportionment of fighter , ISR and C2 assets (ESSENTIAL)

e. (U) On order, support JFEO in Palawan through apportionment of Air Mobility assets; and DCA operations through appointment of fighter, ISR and C2 assets. (ESSENTIAL)

f. (U) BPT established DCA operations IVO Palawan to deter further attacks from NT forces based in North Torbia

g. (U) Position JFACC assets in readiness to support Phase 4 operations (HIGHLY DESIRABLE);

EXECUTION

JFACC Concept of Operations

17. (U) **JFACC Intent.** To allow the freedom of movement of the CJTF 667 assets throughout the JFAO through maintaining air superiority with AI, CAS and ISR. Support JFLCC logistics through air mobility.

18. (U) **JFACC Purpose**. To support the JFLCC and JFMCC scheme of manoeuvre to defeat NT forces in Palawan and Sulu Sea. Establish stability in the JFAO and prepare for phase 4 – Transition.

19. (U) **JFACC End State.** The JFACC end state for phase 3 is the achievement of Transition Point 4 (TP4) which is:

a. NTMEF ground forces have been defeated and removed from Panay and Palawan

b. Deterred retaliatory action from NT

c. Air superiority is established in JFAO enabling freedom of movement for CJTF 667 and BX forces

20. (U) **Operational Concept**. Fighter assets will maintain a DCA CAP overhead Panay that can also provide CAS and MAR Strike ISO JFLCC and JFMCC IVO Panay.

21. C2 and ISR assets will build a Recognised Air Picture (RAP) to provide early warning and control to air a maritime assets operating in the JFAO. C2 and ISR assets will focus their attention on the area IVO Palawan to support JFMCC operations in Phase 3. The RAP will also support Joint Targeting; MAR Strike, STABOPS, Offensive Maritime Ops and JFEO in Palawan.

22. A large strike package consisting of Fighters (SEAD, OCA, and ESCORT), AAR and Air Mobility will support JFLCC and JFMACC JFEO into Palawan. Fighter assets will re-role into DCA once Air Superiority over Palawan is established. Focus will shift to CAS of ground assets and building the RAP to the South China Sea. Fighters will be prepare to respond to any retaliatory action from threats based out of NT or the SCS.

ATO Planning Guidance

23. (U) **Priorities.** The priorities for Phase 3 are as follows:

a. Maintain Air Superiority

b. Support JFLCC COIN on Panay through CAS and DCA

c. Support JFMCC through Joint Targeting and MAR Strike

d. Support ground element logistics on Panay through Air Mobility

e. Support JFLCC and JFMCC JFEO in Palawan

f. BPT conduct DCA of BX airfields southern part of JFAO

24. (U) **Risk.** Tactical aircraft will operate at "Medium" Acceptable Level of Risk (ALR) for all missions. ISR, C2, Tanker and Airlift aircraft will operate at "Low" ALR. RPA missions may operate in "High" ALR areas. Accept "Medium" risk for all other missions including Troops In Contact (TIC) or as a last chance to prevent strikes against APOD or SPOD. On a case-by-case basis, operations meeting the "High" ALR, need JFACC approval. Operations meeting the "Extreme" ALR need JFACC approval.

25. (U) **Air to Air Guidance**. The NT air capability is significantly reduced after Phase 1&2. The JTF667 will continue to utilise superior tactics, techniques and procedures and use of force enablers such as the E-7A, KC-30A and FA18G. As such the defence of these force enabling assets should be prioritised.

26. (U) **Air Mobility Guidance**. The Air Mobility aircraft should prioritise tasks that support the JFEO in Palawan.

(U) **ISR Guidance**. The AOC will provide the ISR assets with a prioritised collection list. The ISR assets should prioritise collection in accordance with this list and report on any emerging threat or NT military movement within or within collection range of the JFAO.

27. (U) **Cyber Guidance**. The AOC will plan and coordinate joint and combined cyber fires in support of CJTF 667 objectives to defeat NT forces ad degrade/disrupt NT operations.

28. (U) **Electronic Warfare Guidance**. EW operations should be conducted IAW the ROE listed. Further, the EW operators should operate in a manner which minimised disruption to civilians.

29. (U) **Military Information Support Operations** (**MISO**). Execute MISO series previously developed against NT air forces deployed in Palawan or Panay.

30. (U) **Space Operations Guidance**. The AOC will plan and integrate space capabilities in support of CJT 667 objectives.

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

31. (U) CJTF 667 ROE for Operation Steel Sentinel is in effect and should be read in conjunction with the relevant UNSCRs and SOFAs. The legal basis and legitimacy for Operation Steel Sentinel stems from the abovementioned UNSCRs and the SOFAs authorising a coalition force to use "*all necessary measures*" up to and including deadly force to carry out the tasks listed in UNSCRs 8869 and 8873.

32. (U) **National Policy.** Use of force is to be limited to the achievement of CJT 667's mission. Commanders are to ensure they take all feasible precautions in attack to minimise the incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects in accordance with the LAOC when conducting operations. Commanders must ensure that all targets intended to be prosecuted are valid military objectives. Disruption to the delivery of essential services to the civilian population is to be minimised and actions that would antagonise diplomatic relations with neutral and non-belligerent parties including Olvana are to be avoided.

33. (U) **ROE Structure.** The ROE will be followed by all coalition personnel. It is noted that each coalition partner will be required ot abide by the most restrictive of their own national ROE or the Operation Steel Sentinel ROE.

34. (U) **ROE Requests.** CJTF 667 components are to submit ROE change requests (ROEREQ) to CJTF 667. These will then be staffed via J3 in HQ CJTF. All ROEREGs must include the proposed wording of the ROE change supported by an analysis of military necessity considerations. Legal justification, national policy considerations and risk to the mission if not approved.

35. (U) **Self Defence.** This is permitted up to including deadly force to protect self and Designated Persons. The use of such force is limited to the intensity and duration reasonably necessary to achieve the objective. Deadly force for the protection of property is not permitted unless there is reasonable belief that damage to or destruction of the property is likely to result in serious harm or loss of life.

36. (U) **Hostile Forces.** Attack on Hostile Forces, their equipment and facilities is permitted. Hostile Forces includes any NTMEF within BX sovereign territory, positively identified members of the Visayan Peoples Front (VPF).

Air Mobility Guidance

37. (U) The Air mobility priorities are as follows:

a. Provide AAR support to OCA and E-7A as required;

b. Support JFLCC JFEO operations in Palawan;

c. Conduct theatre sustainment ISO CJTF 667 deployed forces; and

d. BPT provide AAR support on activation of any DCA or AI.

Personnel Recovery (PR) Guidance

38. When dedicated PR assets are made available conduct PR operations in support of combat and combat support operations. Posture and position PR alert crews and aircraft to complete immediate PR recoveries from alert and airborne assets.

a. When rescue efforts for Isolated Personnel (IP) are assessed at "Low" ALR, launch and execute authority is delegated down to the Rescue Mission Commander (RMC).

b. When rescue efforts for IP are assessed as "Medium" ALR, launch and execute authority is delegated to the Chief of Combat Operations (CCO).

c. When rescue efforts for IP are assessed at "High" ALR, launch authority is the CCO, and execute authority is retained by the JFACC.

Electronic Warfare Guidance

39. Electronic Attack mission profiles in support of air operations will be flown within the ALR commensurate with the overall objective of the supported mission. EA and Electronic Warfare Support (ES) profiles will normally be located outside the operational range of all Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) systems, unless the TTPs and ALR allow encroachment. Requests for EW support and potential fratricide issues will be routed through the AOC for review. Requests for EA and ES will be submitted via a

JFACC-approved Electronic Attack Request Form (EARF). Planners/operators will reference the CJTF 667 Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL) for frequency de-confliction.

Theatre ISR Guidance

40. (U) ISR should be prioritised according to risk level and collection benefits. Manned platforms should operate outside known Weapons Engagement Zones (WEZs). In Phase 1 CF will provide DCA ISO ISR missions IVO Palawan and Panay. All missions must be flown IAW the risk guidance in provided. CFACC may authorise escort for ISR assets on a case by case basis.

41. (U) Unmanned ISR assets should be considered as primary assets for missions within WEZs and over Panay and Palawan in Phase 1.

42. (U) The following ISR collections are listed in priority order:

a. Maritime activity – Monitor location and movement of TN maritime forces with emphasis on Naval SAM-capable vessel movements.
b. IADS – Enable establishment and maintenance of air superiority. Monitor the location and movement of any emergent TN IADS assets.
c. Communications and logistics – Find and fix key lines of communications and supply to support the Joint Targeting Cycle.
d. Ground – Find and fix the NTMEF forces IVO Palawan and Panay.

Logistics

43. (U) Logistics Concept of Operations. Within the JFAO provide support to the CJTF 667 forces through supporting forward deployment, CJTF 667 force movements, sustain critical munitions and aircraft spares. BPT support Humanitarian Assistance operations (HA) in BX. Priority of supply will be ammunition (Class V), petroleum fuels, lubricants, hydraulic and insulating oils subclass: troops support material (class IIIB), substances (Class I), water, medical material (class VIII), repair parts (Class IX), major end items (Class VII), material to support non-military personnel and cargo in that order.

44. (U) The priority of rearward movement will be MEDEVAC, personnel, major end items and cargo in that order.

Command, Control and Communications (C3)

45. (U) **Command.** JFACC will exercise Command of the Air Component units through the CAOC established during Phase 0. Command will be exercised through the issue of a daily air tasking order.

46. (U) **Control**. JFACC will exercise control of Air Component operations as the Theatre JFACC, responsible to the Theatre Commander.

47. (U) **Control Authorities**. JFACC shall exercise the following control authorities:

a. Area Air Defence Commander (AADC);

b. Airspace Control Authority (ACA);

c. Space Coordinating Authority (SCA); and

d. Joint Personnel Recovery Commander (JPRC).

48. (U) **Assignment of JFACC Joint Air Component Coordination Element (JACCE)**. JFACC JACCE staff will integrate into components and headquarters but remain under command of the JFACC. The primary responsibility will be to ensure the JFACC Air Operations Plan remains synchronised with supported and supporting commander's SoM and to ensure the integration of air assets into the air tasking cycle. The JACCE will provide timely air advice to support CJT 667campaign decision-making, joint force planning and targeting cycle decisions.

49. (U) **Succession of Command.** If JFACC is unable to continue command, succession of Command is:

a. Director of the Air Operations Center (DAOC); then

b. Chief of Combat Operations (CCO).

(U) **Continuity of Operations.** If communications are lost with the CAOC, or it is unable to direct forces, all units will continue operations IAW the last AOD/ATO issued and in concert with the JAOP when considering/performing future operations. Continue this method of operations until communication is re-established with the CAOC.

ATTACHMENT 1
Component Commander Phase 1 SoM

Place holder for JFLCC SoM and CONOPS

Place holder for JFMCC SoM and CONOPS

ATTACHMENT 2
Strategy to task Matrix

TBC

ATTACHMENT 3
Risk Definitions, Metrics and mitigation factors

TBC

ATTACHMENT 4
JFACC Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs)

JFACC Priority Intelligence Requirements, Friendly Force Information Requirements, Essential Elements of Friendly Information.

1. **JFACC Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs)**
    a. What actions will cause TN to escalate the conflict (inside or outside the JFAO)?
    b. Will TN attack the Australian homeland or any other coalition nation homeland?
    c. How will regional alliances/partnerships affect support for JFACC operations?
    d. Where/how will humanitarian crises affect JFACC operations?
    e. How will TN affect the JFACC SoM within the JFAO?
    f. What is the capability and status of TN offensive space and cyber capabilities in the JFAO?
    g. How will TN non-kinetic operations affect JFACC operations?
    h. What are the TN maritime surface and sub-surface force disposition, operational status, TTPs and patterns of life?
    i. What is the disposition of TN Land components on Panay and Palawan?
    j. What is the TN air combat force disposition, operational status and TTPs and patterns of life?
    k. What is the disposition and operational status of TN IADS and associated acquisition and C2 nodes?
    l. What is the disposition, status and intent of capability of groups sympathetic to TN in the JFAO?

2. **JFACC Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIRs)**
    a. Any change in status of IAMD capability.
    b. Status of localised air superiority inside and outside the JFAO.
    c. JFACC ready for phase change.
    d. Critical munitions status.
    e. Forces postured and ready for kinetic and non-kinetic shaping operations.
    f. Sustainment falls below levels required for continued JFACC combat operations.

3. **JFACC Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFIs)**
    a. Details of RAAF involvement in operations, including branching and sequels, unless released by Government of Australia (GoA).
    b. The specific details of the deployment, rotation and re-deployment schedule for RAAF FE until released by GoA.
    c. Tactical, operational and military strategic objectives related to operations.
    d. Operationally deployed RAAF capabilities, including detailed composition, roles, disposition, tasks, vulnerabilities and notice to move.
    e. ROE
    f. Security and force protection capabilities of RAAF elements, including specific details relating to vulnerabilities and TTPs.
    g. The identity of locally engaged staff or RAAF personnel deployed on operations, and their families, unless authorised byt eh individual and relevant public release information management instructions.

h. Details of the effect that RAAF involvement in operations has on other operational commitments and its ability to conduct further operations.
i. C4I capabilities and architecture.
j. Existing and developing classified equipment, weapons and tactics.
k. JPR capabilities, processes and operations.
l. Intelligence collection capabilities, processes and operations.
m. Australian Intelligence Community support to RAAF activities and the intelligence relationship with Coalition partners.
n. Commander's risk appetite.

3A.001 DECISIVE ACTION TRAINING ENVIRONMENT

HQ X BDE
General Santos City
XX XXX 21

HQ X CBT BDE OPORD XXX/21 - OPERATION CERIUM STEAL

References:

A. UNSCR 8873.

B. Status of Forces Agreement – Australia/Belesia

C. Belesia (BX) Country Study.

D. North Torbia (NT) Country Study.

E. HQ 1 DIV TASK GROUP 667.2 OPORD 01 (OP CERIUM STEAL)

F. CJTF 667 OPORD 01 (OP STEEL SENTINEL)

Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU.

1. **Situation.**

a. Background. North Torbia invaded Palawan and Panay, claiming to protect ethnic Torbians from persecution because of recent tensions that were precipitated by the clashes over control of the Panayan San Rafael Mine Complex. The North Torbian Marine Expeditionary Force (NTMEF) deployed the 4th Marine Brigade Task Group (BTG) to secure the seaport and airport facilities in the town of El Nido in Palawan before deploying the 3rd Marine BTG to capture the Panayan Island northern city of Roxas City. The NTMEF is based on the Torbian Marine Expeditionary Division of the Torbian People's Army (TPA), Western Army Command. It has an integrated command structure, which includes ground, air and maritime components. The 3rd MAR BTG quickly expanded to capture the northern half of Panay, including the seaport and airport facilities at Caticlan. The 3rd MAR BTG advanced quickly south to capture Passi and Sara and the San Rafael Mine Complex after only token resistance from local Belesian Militia and Constabulary. It is assessed that the 3rd MAR BTG has been helped by the Visayan Peoples Front (VPF) by disrupting Belesian Federation Defence Force (BFDF) efforts in any coordinated defence. The BFDF landed the 12th Infantry Bde two days after the initial invasion at the sea and airport facilities near Iloilo City. The BX 12th Inf Bde advanced north to stop further 3rd MAR BTG advanced south and to defeat the NTMEF on Panay. However, the fighting has quickly ground to a stalemate with the 12th Inf Bde pushed back to Iloilo City and holding defensive positions. This status of affairs has been in place for three weeks with the NTMEF showing no signs of expanding further beyond the defensive lines established along the Passi-Sara-Estancia line. The strategic message from Nth Torbia is that they are not the aggressors and have no wish to annex Panay and are content to maintain their defensive line until law and order is established to protect ethnic Torbians in Panay. The International Belesian Security Assistance Force (IBSAF) has been established under a UN mandate to remove NTMEF presence in Belesian sovereign territory. The Combined Joint Task Force 667 (CJTF 667) is the military component of IBSAF. Operation STEEL SENTINEL (OSS) is the Joint Campaign Plan for the removal of

the NTMEF from Belesian territory. Operation CERIUM STEAL (OCS) is the land component campaign plan of OSS for the liberation of Panay. X Bde, as part of 1 Div (an AS led multi-national force) will participate in ground operations in Panay to remove all NTMEF elements. OCS will commence after sea and air lanes from staging bases in General Santos City and Zamboanga (Mindanao) to Panay have been established, and that interdiction from NTMEF maritime and air components no longer pose a significant threat to amphibious operations.

b. Strategic Aim. The aim of the international community is to:

(1) end North Torbian aggression towards Belesia

(2) expulsion of all North Torbian military forces from Belesian sovereign territory

(3) creation of a free, safe, secure and stable environment in the region

(4) continuation of Belesian democratic national governance and developmental programs.

c. Strategic Objectives. In order to achieve the desired end state, the strategic objectives of the international intervention include:

(1) Expel all North Torbian military forces from Belesian sovereign territory.

(2) Restore a secure and stable environment throughout the BX Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO).

(3) Effect force protection for coalition military forces deployed throughout the JFAO.

(4) Assist the government of BX to strengthen the capacities of their national security forces and institutions to enforce central control.

(5) Preserve and enforce the freedom of navigation throughout the JFAO.

(6) Support UN Agencies, International Organizations (IOs) and NGOs within capabilities and limitations in order to preserve human life and alleviate the suffering of IDPs and refugees within the JFAO.

(7) Gradually reduce the size, role and profile of the IBSAF contribution. This process will be guided by reviews of tasks, environment, threat, risks, follow-on forces and Host Nation (HN) capacities as part of a Transition and Exit Strategy that is linked to the achievement of the Desired Military Strategic End State.

d. Operational Objectives. With the support and agreement of the international community, IBSAF has undertaken to end the crisis in BX by deploying a combined joint task force to BX to repel NT invading forces and restore BX territorial sovereignty. The force, hereafter referred to as CJTF 667 will deploy under the authority of UNSCR 8873 (ref A). The objectives of this military intervention are as follows:

(1) Establish military superiority in the maritime and airspace within the JFAO in a manner which supports decisive operations.

(2) Conduct decisive military operations, which leads to the restoration of Belesian sovereignty in the occupied islands; stabilize the region; and deter further external aggression against BX.

(3) Assist humanitarian efforts and IO/NGO activities in BX.

(4) Assist the government of BX to re-establish and maintain a safe and secure environment to facilitate the continuance of democratic government institutions and programmes.

(5) Support any applicable International Criminal Court (ICC) investigations of crimes against humanity through the preservation and collection of evidence.

e. To this end, a ground force, designated TG 667.2 is to deploy to the BX island of PANAY to expel NTMEF from the island, defeat the ongoing insurgency and to return control to the BX authorities.

f. Tactical Objectives. As part of TG 667.2, X Bde (TU 667.2.1) will achieve the following objectives to meet the Strategic and Operational objectives:

(1) Secure the ILOILO CITY APOD/SPOD to enable lodgement of TG 667.2 FE

(2) Generate combat strength on PANAY to enable decisive action

(3) Conduct decisive actions against the 3rd MAR BTG

(4) Secure key terrain and infrastructure on PANAY

(5) Set conditions to enable transition of authority in PANAY back to BX

g. End State. The desired endstate for X Bde will have been the defeat of the 3rd MAR BTG within AO and set the conditions for the transition of authority on PANAY to UN or BX.

h. Limitations.

(1) Constraints. In conducting its operations, TU 667.2.1 will:

A. Minimize the use of scarce BX resources.

B. Minimize collateral damage and civilian casualties on PANAY.

C. Deploy to the AO as soon possible in a sequence coordinated by TG 667.2.

D. Work closely with the UN to facilitate the work of UN agencies, IOs and NGOs.

E. Operate in accordance with the SOFA with BX (ref B).

(2) Restraints. In conducting its operations, TU 667.2.1 will not:

A. Adversely affect the civilian population of PANAY more than is required

B. Kinetically target the San Raphael mine complex.

C. Adversely affect the BX economy more than is necessary.

D. Disrupt port operations in ILOILO CITY more than necessary.

E. Damage ROXAS CITY infrastructure more than is necessary.

F. Damage PASSI infrastructure more than is necessary.

i. Operational Areas.

(1) AO GLADSTONE. The AO includes the central landmass of PANAY as per OPORD overlay in Annex C.

j. Threat Assessment. See Annex B, as well as the Country Studies at References C and D inclusive for more detail.

(1) General. NT has projected forces onto the BX island of PANAY IOT control the mineral resources, and to foster a viable alternate government that seeks to protect the Torbian minority of PANAY.

(2) NTMEF located on PANAY. The principle land component of the NTMEF located on PANAY is the 3 Marine BDE Task Group (BTG) supplemented with DIV troops. The HQ is located in the city of ROXAS CITY in the N of PANAY. 34 MAR BDET is in mobile defence in the vic of the SAN RAFAEL mine, 32 MAR BDET is conducting mobile defence in the vic of SARA, 31 MAR MBET is located in ESTANCIA, and the 33 MER BDET is defending IVO PASSI. The 3 MAR Tank Bn is in reserve IVO ROXAS CITY to CATK any AS advance N from ILOILO CITY or landing forces on the E coast. Recent intelligence suggests that the 3 Marine BDE has been reinforced with a Tank Coy equipped with T-72Bs. The NTMEF is positioned to prevent the return of control to the BX authorities IOT to gain time to legitimise their occupation through Information Warfare. 3 MAR BDE is supported by a BN size organisation of insurgents from the Visayan Peoples Front (VPF):

A. HQ

1. Commander, *Taejwa* (Senior Colonel) **Kim Youn-Hwan**
2. Chief of Staff, *Chungjwa* (Lieutenant Colonel) **Hae Kyung**

B. DIV Troops on PANAY.

1. 2 AD Bty (1 MAR AD Bn) in defence of TOWNSVILLE airfield,
2. 1 CBT ENG BN
3. MLRS Bty
4. UAV Coy
5. DIV comms assets (including EW).
6. ELMS from DIV INFOWAR BN
7. ELMS from DIV MAT SUP BN

C. Land Component. 3 Marine BTG.

D. Air Component. NTMEF has located significant air assets at ROXAS CITY.

1. 12 SU-30MKK (FLANKER-G) Strike Fighter
2. 12 J-11B (FLANKER-L) Air Superiority Fighter
3. 12 KA-28 (HELIX-A) Anti-submarine Helicopter
4. 6 Z-19 Recon/Attack Helicopter

E. Insurgents. One BN size elm of the Visayan Peoples Front.

k. Friendly Forces. TU 667.2.1 will operate within AO GLADSTONE. Additional friendly forces on PANAY include TU 667.2.2 (Y Bde) operating in AO FLINDERS, TU 667.2.3 (16

AVN Bde) operating out of the ILOILO CITY APOD, and the BX 12 Bde operating in AO ONSLOW. CJTF and Divisional troops will also be operating in the AO (see Annex A to Ref E for more details).

l. International Organizations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Some IOs and NGOs are currently operating in BX. Their presence is expected to increase dramatically once a more secure operating environment is created. See Annex Q of the Ref F for further details.

2. **Mission.** X Bde is to defeat all NTMEF within AO GLADSTONE IOT create conditions for a safe and secure PANAY to return to Belesian authority.

3. **Execution.**

a. Commander's Analysis. The occupation of Panay by North Torbia is an unacceptable act of aggression against the sovereignty of Belesia and the international rule of law. X Bde will enforce UNSCR 8873 to restore Belesian sovereignty over Panay and enabling humanitarian aid to ease the suffering of the civilian population of Panay. The NTMEF on Panay is a capable force and will provide a challenging adversary. Also noted is that the local politics of Panay is complicated. The history of Panay within the Belesian Federation has been fractious and we must be cognisant that our forces are not embroiled in the local politics. There are elements within the local Panayan population that may not be pleased with our presence. We will not antagonise the Panayan population with wanton destruction of infrastructure and avoiding where possible collateral damage. It is important that our actions are conducted within international guidelines and that care to reduce collateral death and damage to non-combatants is utmost in all planning considerations. Subordinate commanders at all levels must be alert to these factors in the conduct of all of their operations, particularly as we transition from combat operations.

b. Commander's Intent. X Bde will conduct decisive actions against the NTMEF within AO GLADSTONE, utilising manoeuvre and superior precision fires to neutralise the NTMEF's defensive advantages. Additionally, we will capitalise on our moral advantage by targeting the enemy's limited support from the local Panayan population through effective strategic communications, information operations and by our effective use of force. However, I will not expose the lives of Coalition troops by holding back on the use of force where the use of all Coalition assets is appropriate and necessary. The NTMEF must be made aware that our determination and resolve will see us complete our mission to the maximum permissible under international law. It is my intent that the NTMEF is defeated on Panay and that authority for the governance of Panay is handed back to the Belesian Government or a UN appointed provisional authority.

A. Purpose: Defeat NTMEF and insurgency forces within AO GLADSTONE.

B. Method: The X Bde contribution to Operation CERIUM STEAL will be a three-phase operation, with a preliminary phase, nested within Operation STEEL SENTINEL (OSS). Phase 0 will see the preparation of all ground forces for lodgment onto PANAY (including embarkation on maritime assets). Phase 1 will consist of an amphibious and air lodgement of the TU into ILOILO CITY APOD/SPOD. Phase 2 will result in the Neutralisation of the NTMEF by dislocating and then defeating them in battle. During Phase 2, X BDE will ADV N and defeat NTMEF forces loc IVO of PASSI complex, and cut-off LoC to the alternate APOD/SPOD in CATICLAN. This will dislocate the NTMEF forces IVO ROXAS CITY and set the conditions

for Y BDE to defeat these forces in detail and secure ROXAS CITY. Phase 3 will be the transition of authority back to the BX government. At all times, we must be cognisant that the main effort is the removal of NT forces in BX. If this can be achieved during any of the stages without further bloodshed, then all effort must be taken to explore those options.

C. Endstate: The liberation of PANAY and removal of NTMEF forces and establishment of a safe and secure environment in PANAY with X Bde postured for stability operations.

c. Main Effort. The main effort is dislocating the 3rd MAR BTG in ROXAS CITY by securing ROUTE BLUE and cutting off supply through the alternate APOD/SPOD at CATICLAN.

d. Concept of Operations. OP CERIUM STEAL will be conducted in three phases as follows:

(1) Phase 1 – **Lodgement** (D-Day – D+2)

A. Main Effort:

1. Conduct lodgement into ILOILO CITY

B. Supporting Efforts:

1. Secure ILOILO CITY SPOD/APOD (with support from BX 12th Inf Bde)
2. Conduct passage of lines with BX forces in ILOILO CITY
3. BPT support BX 12 Bde for any NTMEF C/ATK
4. BPT hold defensive line around ILOILO APOD/SPOD

C. Endstate:

1. X Bde elms have successfully lodged in ILOILO CITY and taken up positions in preparation for phase 2.

(2) Phase 2 – **Neutralise** (D+3 – D+14)

A. Main Effort:

1. Defeat NTMEF forces within AO.

B. Supporting Effort:

1. Conduct advance from ILOILO CITY to secure ROUTE BLUE
2. BPT Secure the CATICLAN APOD/SPOD
3. Conduct RASO
4. BPT defeat NTMEF outside of AO on order
5. Defeat insurgency forces
6. Conduct Counter-Insurgency (COIN) operations

C. Endstate:

1. NTMEF ground forces will have been defeated within AO

(3) Phase 3 – **Transition** (D+15 onwards)

A. Main Effort:

1. Transition to UN Peacekeeping

B. Supporting Efforts:

1. Conduct Stability Operations (STABOPS)
2. Conduct Information Operations (IO) to support strategic messaging
3. Neutralise any remaining elms of the Visayan Peoples Front

C. Endstate:

1. Transition of authority will have been conducted between X Bde and UN Mission
2. X Bde will have transitioned and postured to conduct STABOPS on order

e. Limitations.

(1) Restraints.

A. All targeting of BX infrastructure will take into consideration the economic and humanitarian effects post conflict – see Targeting Directive at Annex I of Ref F.

(2) Constraints.

A. Defensive ROE will be in place prior to deployment and into BX. Offensive ROE will be on order (see Annex L to Ref F).

f. Common Tasks.

(1) During all phases ensure the security of coalition lines of communication.

(2) Support the BX government and established IO/NGOs in their ongoing humanitarian efforts while remaining cognisant of the need to create and maintain a safe and secure environment.

g. Groupings & Tasks. See Annex A for details on C2 and groupings

(1) TE 667.2.1.0 HQ X BDE

A. All phases:

1. C2 through all phases
2. Establish Bde Main IVO ILOILO CITY APOD
3. Establish BMA IVO ILOILO CITY SPOD
4. ID VPF dispositions and intentions
5. Degrade NTMEF and VPF narrative
6. Support Coalition narrative

(2) TE 667.2.1.1 CAVALRY (BG XXX)

A. Phase 1 (Lodgement)

1. 2nd in order of lodgement.

2. BPT conduct ISR tasks forward of defensive lines

B. Phase 2 (Neutralise)

1. Conduct FPL with BX 12 Bde
2. Guard right flank of Bde advance north
3. BPT neutralise NT BDET vic SARA within boundaries
4. BPT spt flanking BGs

C. Phase 3 (Transition)

1. Conduct STABOPS within boundaries
2. BPT hand over security to Belesian authority
3. BPT support NGO in humanitarian assistance tasks

(3) TE 667.2.1.2 MECH (BG XXX):

A. Phase 1 (lodgement)

1. 3rd in order of lodgement
2. BPT occupy defensive positions around APOD/SPOD

B. Phase 2 (Neutralise)

1. Conduct FPL with BX 12 Bde
2. Adv north along Route GREEN towards PASSI
3. Contain 31 MAR BDET vic PASSI
4. Clear towards Route BLUE
5. Secure Route BLUE within boundaries
6. BPT spt flanking BGs

C. Phase 3 (Transition)

1. Conduct STABOPS within boundaries
2. BPT handover security to BX authority
3. BPT support NGO in humanitarian assistance tasks

(4) TE 667.2.1.3 – MOTORISED (BG XXX).

A. Phase 1 (Lodgement):

1. 4th in order of lodgement
2. BPT occupy defensive positions around SPOD/APOD

B. Phase 2 (Neutralise):

1. Conduct FPL with BX 12 Bde
2. Adv north towards Route ORANGE

3. Clear NTMEF within TAOR
4. BPT spt flanking BGs
5. Adv N towards Route BLUE
6. BPT secure route BLUE within boundaries

C. Phase 3 (Transition):

1. Conduct STABOPS within boundaries
2. BPT hand over security to Belesian authority
3. BPT support NGO in humanitarian assistance tasks

(5) TE 667.2.1.4 – BG XXX.

A. Phase 1 (Lodgement):

1. 1st in order of lodgement.
2. Occupy defensive positions around APOD/SPOD
3. Establish liaison with any Belesian Forces in the area
4. BPT spt BX 12 Bde in defence of APOD/SPOD

B. Phase 2 (Neutralise):

1. Prov COMD's Reserve
2. BPT contain 31 MAR BDET vic PASSI
3. BPT secure PASSI

C. Phase 3 (Transition):

1. Conduct STABOPS within boundaries
2. BPT hand over security to Belesian Authority
3. BPT support NGO humanitarian tasks

(6) TE 667.2.1.5 – X REGT RAA.

A. Phase 1 (Lodgement):

1. Lodge into ILOILO CITY APOD/SPOD on order
2. BPT spt defensive positions with offensive support

B. Phase 2 (Neutralise):

1. DS to BG XXX
2. GS to CAVALRY
3. GS to BG RAM
4. Prov fire support on order/request

C. Phase 3 (Transition):

1. BPT support STABOPS.
2. BPT support NGO humanitarian tasks

(7) TE 667.2.1.6 – X CER.

A. Phase 1 (Lodgement):
   1. Lodge into ILOILO CITY APOD/SPOD in order
   2. BPT spt defensive positions with C/MOB tasks

B. Phase 2 (Neutralise):
   1. Spt Battlegroups with Mobility, C/Mobility, and Survivability tasks
   2. BPT spt Battlegroups with CBRND tasks
   3. BPT coordinate engineering efforts within AO GLADSTONE

C. Phase 3 (Transition):
   1. BPT conduct re-construction efforts within AO
   2. BPT support STABOPS
   3. BPT support NGO humanitarian tasks

(8) TE 667.2.1.7 – X CSR.

A. Phase 1 (Lodgement):
   1. Lodgement into ILOILO CITY APOD/SPOD on order
   2. Estab Bde comms net

B. Phase 2 (Neutralise):
   1. Provide comms and life support to HQ X Bde
   2. Provide comms nodes to BGs

C. Phase 3 (Transition):
   1. Maintain comms and life support to HQ X Bde
   2. BPT support STABOPS

(9) TE 667.2.1.8 – X CSSB.

A. Phase 1 (Lodgement):
   1. Lodge into ILOILO CITY APOD/SPOD on order
   2. Establish BMA vic ILOILO CITY APOD
   3. Establish 5 DOS for high intensity operations

B. Phase 2 (Neutralise):
   1. Provide 2nd line logistic support to BGs
   2. BPT re-locate BMA on order

3. BPT establish fwd logistic nodes

C. Phase 3 (Transition):

1. Maintain 2nd line logistic support to X Bde Units
2. BPT support STABOPS
3. BPT support NGO humanitarian tasks

h. Groupings & Tasks – Attachments:

(1) TE 667.2.1.9 – XX CHC.

A. Phase 1 (Lodgement):

1. Establish Role 1 vic BMA
2. Provide close health spt to X Bde

B. Phase 2 (Neutralise):

1. Provide close health spt to X Bde
2. BPT re-locate Role 1 on order

C. Phase 3 (Transition):

1. Maintain close health spt to X Bde
2. BPT support NGO humanitarian tasks

(2) XX EW SQN (X Sig Regt).

A. All Phases:

1. Prov EW spt to X Bde

(3) XX AL Bty (XX Regt RAA)

A. All phases:

1. Prov C/Bty spt to X Bde
2. Prov AD spt to X Bde

(4) X Int Bn

A. All phases:

1. Prov specialist Int spt to X Bde

(5) XX STA Bty (XX Regt RAA)

A. All phases:

1. Prov UAS ISR spt to X B

(6) X Coy, X MP Bn

A. All phases:

1. Prov MP spt to X Bde

i. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Routes, Boundaries and Control Measures

A. See Op Overlay Annex C

(2) Timings.

A. Phase 1 Operation CERIUM STEAL to commence NB completion of OSS Phase One (Denial) is complete.

B. SPOD ILOILO CITY secure – by D+1.

C. APOD ILOILO CITY secure – by D+1

D. Lodgement complete in PANAY – by D+3.

E. Phase two will commence on order once the following conditions have been met:

1. SPODs and APODs are secure.

2. Supplies sufficient for 5 days are landed in ILOILO CITY APOD.

F. NTMEF cleared from ROXAS CITY by D+14.

G. Phase three will commence on order when the following conditions have been met:

1. NTMEF cleared from PANAY.

2. Insurgency has been controlled

H. Transition complete TBA.

(3) Joint effects, targeting and offensive support

A. IAW Annex I of Ref F

B. CO X FD REGT is responsible authority within AO GLADSTONE

(4) Services Support

A. IAW Annex R of Ref F

(5) Transfer of Authority.

A. BX Forces. BX's SHC will continue to command defensive operations until declaration of CJTF 667 OPRED (most probably coincident with JFACC OPRED). At that time, designated BX land combat forces in PANAY will TOA OPCON to HQ 1 Div.

B. BX GOVT. BX GOVT will regain command of its forces on PANAY post-transition. This will be coord by HQ 1 Div.

(6) Reports and Returns. The Battle Rhythm schedule for Reports and Returns will be published once the HQ X Div has declared OPRED.

4. **Admin and Logistics (Sustainment).**

a. Outline Concept.

(1) Sustainment support to X Bde will be coordinated and led by HQ 1 Div in conjunction with JFLOGCC. While TCNs retain overall responsibility for the sustainment of national formations and units, JFLOGCC retains coordinating authority.

(2) HQ 1 Div will establish a Theater Support Area (TSA) within PANAY adjacent to the SPOD/APOD (MT COOLON) in order to execute sustainment operations. Additional logistic nodes will also be set up as required such as at COLLINSVILLE once the ATG has lodged. Sustainment support during OSS Ph 2-4 to forward FE will be the responsibility of organic logistic FE through JFLOGCC coordination. Annex R to Ref F will provide more details.

(3) X Bde will deploy to PANAY with sufficient Op stock for 5 days. TEs will deploy with sufficient for 3 days.

b. Movements. Movement forward into PANAY post D-Day will be coordinated by JFLOGCC HQ. Movement within PANAY will be coord by HQ TG 667.2.

c. Medical Support. The concept of Health Support (HS) is detailed within the Health Support Order (HSO) at Annex AA to Ref F. HS to TU 667.2.1 will be provided by ADF and Coalition medical capabilities coordinated by the CJTF 667 J07. HQJOC J07 retains overall technical control (TECHON) for all health care delivery on an overseas operation.

5. **Command and Signal.**

a. Command.

A. Commander, Brigadier, XXXXXXXX.

B. Deputy Commander, Colonel XXXXXXXXXX .

b. Headquarters Locations. (see Annex C - CONOPS overlay)

(1) HQ TU 667.2.1 will establish at ILOILO CITY APOD, BX by D+1.

c. Communication and Information Systems (CIS). Effective C2 of TU 667.2.1 will be highly dependent upon the flexible and interoperable CIS.

(1) TE 667.2.1.7 7 CSR will:

A. Establish Bde level CIS down to TE HQs, including the management of network interface gateways

B. Coordinate AO GLADSTONE-wide CIS plans

ACKNOWLEDGE:

Commander's last name
Commander's rank

OFFICIAL:

Authenticator's Name
Authenticator's Position

ANNEXES:

Annex A	TU 667.2.1 Task Organisation
Annex B	Intelligence
Annex C	Concept of Operations

ANNEX A TO
B SQN OPORD 01/09
APR 09

B SQN 2/14 LHR (QMI)
TASK ORG MATRIX

Originator	Related Order	Time Effective
	B SQN OPORD 01/09 EX KOSTER RIVER	31 0700 Mar-09

EXERCISE/OPERATION

KOSTER RIVER 09

Phases	Copy No	Reference
All	_____ of _____	

						
Atts & Dets		Manning as per RMC Manning				V28 detached to courses

Mission

B Sqn is to conduct Stage Four (coached) including IBRs from 02 – 05 MAR 09 IOT prepare for Ex EMU CHARGE (Ex EC).

Tasks

	V20 is to conduct and coordinate Stage Four (coached) from 02 - 05 Apr	**V21 is to conduct Stage Four (coached) on 02 Apr**	**V22 is to conduct Stage Four (coached) on 04 Apr**	**V23 is to conduct Stage Four (coached) on 04 Apr**	**V25 is to support V2 from 03 - 05 Apr**	
Phase 1	1. Issue March Card NLT 011600K APR 09 2. March to WBTA IAW March Card 3. Conduct SBF with A2	1. Detach LT Fricker and Scouts for departure at 021700K to BNE 2. Conduct SBF with A2 3. Leave one Type 1 in WBTA for 22	1. March to WBTA IAW March Card 2. Conduct SBF with A2 3. Take over 21 Type 1 for Stage Four	1. March to WBTA IAW March Card 2. Conduct SBF with A2	1. March to WBTA IAW March Card	1. 2. 3.
Phase 2	1. Conduct St 4 IAW OOM 2. V29A to OIC Sqn IBRs 3. Provide Ambulance and CFA for all shoots 4. BPT prov 29F as DPRAC	1. Conduct St 4 IAW OOM 2. BPT prov crew spt to other Tps	1. Provide TPR Jamieson as CFA for entirety of St 4. 2. Conduct St 4 IAW OOM 3. BPT prov crew spt to other Tps	1. Conduct St 4 IAW OOM 2. BPT prov crew spt to other Tps	1. Provide Q spt to V2 2. Liaise with A2 ref ration delivery	1. 2. 3.
Phase 3	1. Issue March Card NLT 041600K APR 09 2. March to BNE IAW March Card 3. Conduct post-acty battle prep prior to Ex EC	1. March to BNE IAW March Card. 2. Conduct post-acty battle prep prior to Ex EC	1. March to BNE IAW March Card. 2. Conduct post-acty battle prep prior to Ex EC	1. March to BNE IAW March Card. 2. Conduct post-acty battle prep prior to Ex EC	1. March to BNE IAW March Card. 2. Conduct post-acty battle prep prior to Ex EC	1. 2. 3.

Originator	Related Order	Time Effective		Phases	Copy No	Return
TU 667.2.1	OP CERIUM STEAL PHASES 1 AND 2	D-20 TO D+14	**OP CERIUM STEAL**	CJTF Ph 2 AND 3	N/A	N/A

OA	TE 667.2.1.1 (BG XXX)	TE 667.2.1.2 (BG XXX)	TE 667.2.1.3 (BG XXX)		TE 667.2.1.4 (BG XXX)	REMARKS
						
MISSION (All Phases)	**MISSION (PH.1-2)**	**MISSION (PH.1-2)**	**MISSION (PH.1-2)**			
TU 667.2.1 is to defeat all NTMEF within AO GLADSTONE IOT create conditions for a safe and secure PANAY to return to Belesian Authority	BG XXX is to GUARD the Bde right flank from NTMEF and defeat all En within TAOR XXX	BG XXX is to CLEAR all En within TAOR XXX up to Route BLUE IOT ISOLATE NTMEF in ROXAS CITY	BG XXX is to SECURE Route BLUE IOT ISOLATE NTMEF in ROXAS CITY		BG XXX is to CLEAR NTMEF within boundaries on order IOT support Bde ME	
TASKS	**TASKS**	**TASKS**	**TASKS**		**TASKS**	
All Phases 1. C2 through all phases 2. Estab Bde Main IVO ILOILO APOD 3. Estab BMA IVO ILOILO SPOD 4. Identify VPF dispositons and Intentions 5. Degrade NTMEF and VPF narrative 6. Support Coalition narrative	**Phase 1** 1. 2nd in order of lodgement 2. BPT conduct ISR tasks fwd of def lines	**Phase 1** 1. 3rd in order of lodgement 2. BPT occupy defensive positions around APOD/SPOD	**Phase 1** 1. 4th in order of lodgement 2. BPT occupy defnesive positions around APOD/SPOD		**Phase 1** 1. 1st in order of lodgement 2. Occupy def posns around APOD/SPOD 3. Estab liasion with BX Forces within AO DIAMOND 4. BPT spt BX 12 Inf Bde in defence of APOD/SPOD	
	Phase 2 1. Conduct FPL with BX 12 Inf Bde 2. GUARD right flank of Bde advance 3. BPT neutralise NT BDET vic BANATE within boundaries 4. BPT spt flanking BGs	**Phase 2** 1. Conduct FPL with BX 12 Inf Bde 2. Adv N along Route GREEN towards PASSI 3. CONTAIN 31 MAR BDET IVO PASSI 4. CLEAR towards Route BLUE 5. SECURE Route BLUE within boundaries 6. BPT spt flanking BGs	**Phase 2** 1. Conduct FPL with BX 12 Inf Bde 2. Adv N along Route ORANGE towards Route BLUE 3. SECURE Route BLUE 4. CLEAR NTMEF within TAOR 5. BPT spt flanking BGs		**Phase 2** 1. Prov COMD's Reserve 2. BPT CONTAIN 31 MAR BDET IVO PASSI 3. BPT SECURE PASSI	
	Phase 3 1. Conduct STABOPS within boundaries 2. BPT hand over security to BX Authority 3. BPT support NGO in humanitarian assistance tasks	**Phase 3** 1. Conduct STABOPS within boundaries 2. BPT handover security to BX Authority 3. BPT support NGO in humanitarian assistance tasks	**Phase 3** 1. Conduct STABOPS within boundaries 2. BPT handover security to BX Authority 3. BPT support NGO in humanitarian assistance tasks		**Phase 3** 1. Conduct STABOPS within boundaries 2. BPT handover security to BX Authority 3. BPT support NGO in humanitarian assistance tasks	



HQ

Brick

Sect

Patrol

Troop

Squadron

Regiment

X Brigade

XX Division

Armour

Recon

Mech

Arty

Engr

Wheeled

CT/BG

OPCOMD
TACOMD
OPCON
TACCON

Sub-unit

B











DS
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GS
GSR
Rft

XXXXXXXX
fm D 0600
Ph 1 & 3
Ph 2 only
O/O

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Higher unit
Main/Tac (HQ)






















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M1A1
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ASLAV
Recon
M113
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PMV
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21
B
23A


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
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
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
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
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
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Field

Artillery
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
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
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GBAD

Engineer
Field

Aviation
Recce

Engineer
Mech



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
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CS
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
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
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
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
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

ANNEX B TO
X BDE OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

References:

A. CJTF 667 OPORD 01 – OP STEEL SENTINEL

B. Belesia (BX) Country Study

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu.

1. **Situation**

a. Characteristics of the Operational Environment (OE).

(1) See Ref A, Annex B, Appendix 4 and ODIN.

b. Enemy Evaluation.

(1) Under the stated aim of "liberating ethnic Torbians from the oppressive governance of the Belesian government", North Torbia (NT) invaded the Belesian (BX) islands of Palawan and Panay with the NT Marine Expeditionary Force (NTMEF) landing on Palawan on (*insert date*) and Panay on (insert date). The NTMEF utilised the cover of a biennial exercise with Olvana (Ex RISEN SWORD) to muster forces to commence their OP RIGHTEOUS HARMONY, the annexation of Panay. The first phase of OP RIGHTEOUS HARMONY saw the landing of NTMEF elements to capture an old airfield and seaport in the north Palawan town of El Nido. Establishing El Nido as a logistic staging base, within 24hrs NT landed (utilising amphibious and heli-borne troops) and captured the seaport, airport and other key locations of the northern Panayan city of Roxas. Roxas was the scene a few months earlier of rioting, which resulted in the deaths of over one hundred ethnic Torbians. Little effective resistance was encountered during the capture of El Nido and Roxas. It is estimated that the NTMEF has landed a Marine Brigade (4th Marine Bde) in El Nido and established a logistic node to support operations on Panay. The NTMEF HQ is also identified to have setup in El Nido to better coordinate C2 and sustainment operations. The NTMEF is estimated to have landed a reinforced Marine Brigade (3rd Marine Bde Task Group) in Panay. Shortly after taking control of Roxas, the 3rd Marine BTG has advanced south and established a defensive line approximately along Calinog – Passi – San Rafael - Sara. Conveniently, this defensive line incorporates the San Rafael Mine complex, a key strategic asset in Panay that produces a large quantity of rare earth metals, notably Cerium.

(2) In response to the capture of Roxas, the Belesian Federation Defence Forces (BFDF) landed a Brigade (12th Infantry Bde) in the southern Panayan city of Iloilo. The 12th Bde is a light infantry unit, so could be deployed at a relatively short notice. However, the 12 Bde did not have the combat power to defeat the NTMEF 3rd Marine Bde. Initial advances north from Iloilo by the BFDF 12th Bde was stopped short of the NTMEF defensive line and has since resulted in a stalemate with the majority of the 12th Bde holding defensive positions around Iloilo to secure the sea and airport.

(3) The NTMEF has declared a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) over northern Palawan, half of Panay and the sea and air lanes connecting the two islands. The NTMEF has reinforced

their hold in Palawan and Panay with SU-30MKK fighter-bombers, and J-11B fighters, along with active patrolling in the Sulu Sea between Palawan and Panay. Aside from organic elements within the two NTMEF Marine Brigades, there have been reports of HQ-16 SAMs, 122mm MLR batteries and other NTMEF Division troops in El Nido and Roxas. It appears that not all NT Marine Expeditionary Division elements have been deployed to Palawan or Panay. The remaining two Marine Brigades are reported to still be in North Torbia and it is estimated that the NT armed forces do not want to escalate this conflict wider. These two Marine Brigades may also be kept back as a strategic reserve to reinforce the deployed Marine Brigades as required. Identified NT Naval elements patrolling the sea-lanes within the declared TEZ include 1x Type 052D (Luyang III) destroyer, 2x Type 052C (Luyang II) destroyers, 1x Type 051G (Luda) destroyer, 2x Type 054A (Jiangkai II) frigates, 1x Type 053H3 (Jiangwei II) frigate, and 2x Type 053 (Jianghu V) frigates. Whilst not observed, it is assessed that an unknown number of up to three Yuan and Song class diesel-electric submarines (SSG) are operating in and around the sea-lanes between Palawan and Panay. Combat Air Patrols of fighter aircraft have been observed operating out of El Nido and Roxas in addition to rotary wing traffic of Z9 helicopters.

(4) Overall, the NTMEF are well trained and proficient in conducting combined arms and joint operations and are capable of limited power projection in the region. The land forces of the NTMEF are designed for quick deployment and are therefore lacking in heavier armour, but makes up for this deficiency in a larger number of combat units within each Marine Brigade. It is expected that the 3rd Marine Brigade in Panay will have been augmented with additional Divisional troops such as an MRL Battery, an HQ-16 SAM AD Battery and significant Engineer troops. Additionally, there are reports that the 3rd Marine BTG has been reinforced with a T-72B Tank Coy from the mainland (suspected from the 6th Mech Div of the Southern Army Command) to provide additional firepower. Similarly, the NTMEF maritime and air capabilities are also significant and capable with several platforms of Tier 1 or 2 capability (<15 years old). Finally, all NTMEF assets are under a unified command similar to a JTF based on the Marine Division HQ. It is noted that NT has significantly more forces on the mainland, but is postured along the North and South Torbian border. NT sees a conflict with Republic of South Torbia (RT) as the more dangerous possibility and will keep the bulk of its forces poised for a possible RT attack (from their viewpoint). Consequently, we can expect that NT's considerable strike capabilities on the mainland will not be utilised in the conflict in BX as they are held in reserve for a possible RT attack. Whilst NT has stockpiles of CBRN weapons, along with the delivery mechanisms for their employment, it is not expected that the NTMEF will actively use these weapons as their first response. There are currently no reports of CBRN weapons deployed with the NTMEF.

(5) Enemy Strengths

(a) General. NT maintains the second largest military of the five Pacific countries, only behind Olvana. Militarily, it is a dominant actor within the region, capable of conducting military action across the spectrum of operations. The NT military conducts overt, covert, and clandestine operations with ripple effects across the region. Reporting also suggests ties between elements of NT's military and criminal

and terror groups within the region, which further extends the potential for a global threat.

(b) Army. The Torbian People's Army (TPA) is the largest and most influential of the NT Armed Forces. With compulsory national service, the TPA has a large number of military trained personnel from which to draw upon. This reflects the stated nature of the TPA goal as the reunification of the two Torbias. The bulk of the TPA is located within the Southern and Northern Commands. The Western Command has the only credible non-land based power projection capability through the NT Marine Division. This Marine Division reflects the NT shift to power projection and is therefore well equipped with Tier 1, 2 and 3 equipment. The Marine Division is slightly different to other TPA Divisions in that it has more Mechanised Infantry Battalions per Brigade (4 vs 3). However, this is offset by having lighter armoured vehicles than their non-marine counterparts.

(c) Air Force. The Torbian Peoples Air Force (TPAF) is a capable organisation that is able to strike any targets within the JFAO. The TPAF has two squadrons of TU-22 bombers that can reach any target within the JFAO. However, these assets are kept in strategic reserve and are primarily postured to counter any attack by South Torbia. Instead, for OP RIGHTEOUS HARMONY, two squadrons of J-11 fighters and two squadrons of SU-30MKK fighter-bombers have been allocated to support the NTMEF. Additional AEW&C, surveillance and tanker support is provided. One squadron of J-11 and SU-30MKK is operating out of El Nido, with the other squadrons operating out of the Roxas airport.

(d) Navy. In recent years, the Torbian Peoples Navy (TPN) has greatly expanded its maritime capability. In order to project power and maintain logistic support, the TPN has provided significant support to OP RIGHTEOUS HARMONY. The focus of the TPN in support of the NTMEF is to secure the sea-lanes in and around the contested islands of Panay and Palawan. The single Luyang III destroyer assigned to the NTMEF is a significant threat to all aircraft in the TEZ. The NTMEF also recognises the importance of the Luyang III and has kept this ship in the South China Sea to secure the link between NT and El Nido, but also out of harm's way from possible RT attack.

(6) Enemy Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities.

(a) Army. The terrain of Panay and Palawan means that travel of armoured vehicles is restricted and will tend to canalize ground forces along MSRs. The availability of engineer assets to support maneuverability is limited within the NTMEF. It is expected that the 3rd Marine BTG will have limited engineer support assets. This is alleviated somewhat with the amphibious and light armour nature of the NTMEF. This light amphibious armour nature of the NTMEF will mean that the use of heavy armour by friendly forces will provide overmatch in most tactical situations. The only caveat would be the Company of T-72Bs recently assigned to the 3rd Marine BTG. This armour capability will likely be allocated as the 3rd Marine BTG COMD's Reserve.

(b) Air Force: In the event of full-scale combat engagement by modern air forces, the TPAF would not be able to accomplish more than local air parity for a short period.

The TPAF ability to project force against NT's neighbors is not only a source of national prestige but represents a significant investment on the part of the National Command Authority (NCA). The NT NCA is unlikely to risk more than a token loss to a superior force. The training and equipment of the TPAF is below the level of CJTF 667. Additionally, any strike aircraft from mainland NT will have to fly a circuitous route along the South China Sea avoiding Republic of Sth Torbian (RT) airspace, which will reduce their ability to dominate the TEZ. Instead, the TPAF will have to rely on forces staged out of Palawan and Panay in order to maintain dominance over the TEZ.

(c) Navy. The TPN has a relatively long line of communication from Panay, through Palawan back to NT. The TPN ability to enforce the TEZ will be limited in the relatively close waters of the north Sulu Sea. Being close to RT waters also means that they will have concerns regarding RT naval vessels monitoring their movements. Finally, the TPN has invested heavily in its naval vessels and will be reluctant to expose these assets to complete loss. Hence, it is expected that their most valuable naval surface vessels will likely remain in the South China Sea with lower tiered vessels operating in the Sulu Sea (with the exception of their SSGs).

(7) Enemy Courses of Action (COAs)

(a) Most Likely Course of Action. The strategic goal of the NT occupation of Panay and Palawan is for a political solution to foster Panayan independence under NT sponsorship and not to escalate the conflict further. This means that at the strategic level, NT will be careful not to portray itself as an occupying aggressor. It is likely that NT will limit its military presence on Panay and Palawan to that of a Marine Division and supporting maritime and air elements. It is likely that NT will reinforce the Marine Brigade on Panay with additional Div troops but holding enough combat power to deter or defeat any offensive attacks by Coalition Forces. In the event of CF landing ground forces on Panay, the NTMEF will utilise SPF and local insurgents to disrupt CJTF 667 activities before using maneuver to defeat or cause attrition to CJTF elements. The NTMEF will continue to maintain the TEZ with combat air patrols and surface warship patrols. They will remain in a defensive posture until hostilities commence. Additionally, the NTMEF will likely aim to cause attrition of CJTF 667 in order to force a diplomatic solution. The NTMEF will use information warfare to discredit CJTF 667 and BX Defense Forces, challenge the legitimacy the BX government, tell its "liberation of ethnic Torbians" story and promote its claim to support Panayan independence. Tactically, the 3rd MAR BTG will prepare complex defensive positions in and around Passi with the intent to block CJTF 667 advance north from Iloilo.



(b) Most Dangerous Course of Action. The NTMEF will reinforce the ground forces on Panay with an additional Marine Brigade (likely the 1st Marine Brigade as the 2nd is currently under strength and on a lower readiness cycle). With that amount of combat power, the NTMEF may be able to capture the southern city of Iloilo and occupy the entire island of Panay. If Coalition Forces have been successful in degrading NTMEF capability prior to ground operations, the NTMEF may commit to capturing Iloilo with just the 3rd Marine BTG or commit to attacking CJTF 667 ground forces before the Land Component can commence offensive operations on Panay. The NTMEF will use information warfare to discredit CJTF 667 and BX Defense Forces, challenge the legitimacy of the BX government, tell its "liberation of ethnic Torbians" story and promote its claim to support Panayan independence.



c. Friendly Forces.

(1) Coalition Intelligence Capability. Coalition intelligence organizations, including those nested within the CJTF will provide all-source intelligence utilising all possible means, including the establishment of a Multi-National intelligence operations center that will serve as a central all-source intelligence fusion center supporting operations in the JFAO.

2. **Environmental Effects ASCOPE - Panay (see Ref B for PMESII)**

a. Areas.

(1) Panay Island is a relatively large island, the third largest within the Belesian Federation. The island has many rivers that crisscrosses the low-lying areas towards the central and eastern parts of the island. There is a mountain range along the western side of the island that runs north to south along the full length of Panay. This leaves the western side of the island exposed to the prevailing westerly winds with a narrow corridor between the mountain range and the sea. The majority of the island is farmland with pockets of lush jungles and vegetation.

(2) Of the major cities on the island, the two largest are the southern city of Iloilo with a population of approx. 447,000, and Roxas with a population of approx. 167,000. The other cities and towns on Panay are predominantly located along the low-lying eastern part of the island.

b. Structures.

(1) San Rafael Mine. The San Rafael Mine has been the largest economic generator for Panay Island. Originally a Copper-Gold mine, the mine was discovered to hold large deposits of the rare earth, Cerium. Cerium has found use in technology, particularly as an important component of catalytic converters. As a result of this discovery, Panay has

become one of the largest suppliers of Cerium on the world market, accounting for up to 37% of world supplies. The San Rafael Mine is an open-cut mine located south of Roxas. Co-located with the mine is the refining plant that processes the ore into usable compounds. During the early 1990's, the local government of Panay entered into an agreement with an Olvanan registered mining company to develop the mine beyond just mining Cu-Au. This has resulted in the San Rafael Mine operators utilising mainly Torbian workers for much of the dangerous work, with security being provided by a private military contractor, the Wagner Group. Much of the supporting infrastructure for the mine comes from Roxas. A dedicated rail system was planned to be constructed linking the mine with Roxas, but this project has not been able to commence, allegedly due to corruption within the Panayan local government and intransigence amongst the wealthy elite. Instead, much of the Cerium ore is transported using trucks. The use of road transport has meant that the road infrastructure to and from the mine has degraded significantly. However, the benefit to the local economy has been moderate. The mine has had a detrimental impact on local environment. In 2015, large quantities of hydrochloric acid was 'accidently' released into the local river system, affecting the local fauna and flora. For more information on the chemical hazards of the mine see appendix 2. Noting the recent violence over the perceived lack of wealth distribution of the mine, it is important to note that Nth Torbian control of the mine will have a serious effect on the world supply of Cerium.

(2) Iloilo City. With a population of nearly 450,000, Iloilo City is the largest city on Panay. The centre of the Provincial Government is located in Iloilo. The city boasts relatively modern facilities that you would expect such as the Iloilo Port and the Iloilo Airport. Medical facilities in the city are considered good with Iloilo becoming one of the medical tourism hubs in Belesia. There are three government run hospitals in the city, the *West Visayas State University Medical Centre*, *Western Visayas Medical Centre*, and the *Iloilo City Hospital*.



(3) Roxas. As the second largest city on Panay, Roxas is the primary port for the export of Cerium ore to Olvana. The airport and seaport facilities are not as large as Iloilo, but is sufficient to serve the needs of the city and the San Rafael Mine. Roxas Hospital is the only large medical facility in the city.



(4) Caticlan. This city lies to the northwest of Panay and is the fourth largest city at 100,000 residents. The only major facilities of note in Caticlan are its seaport and airport facilities. Whilst the majority of the Cerium ore is sent to Roxas for worldwide shipping, Caticlan has traditionally served as an alternate port, especially during the height of Cu-Au mining in the 1980s. Today, Caticlan is mainly used as a tourist destination where it has direct access to local island resorts.





c. Capabilities.

(1) For the various threat groups and their capabilities, see Ref A, Annex B - Intelligence.

d. Organisation.

(1) For the various organisations in the area, see Ref A, Annex Q – Civil Military Ops.

e. People.

(1) For more information, see ODIN.

f. Events.

(1) For more information, see ODIN.

Appendices

Appendix 1 - Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield - Panay
Appendix 2 - Rare Earth Mining Risks – CSIRO Report Jan 2021

APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX D TO
X Bde OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

OPERATION Cerium Steal

X Bde IPB

Step 1

Belesia

Capital	Davao
Ethnic groups	•Mindanaoan Sulu: 55% •Cebuan Sulu: 14% •Olvanese: 23% •Torbian: 7% •Other: 1%
Population	59.9 Million
Religion	•87% Muslim •10% Christian •3% Buddhist
Type of Government	Presidential Republic
State Forces	98,500
Total Area	99,926 sq mi (258,807 km^2)
Total GDP	$209.5 Bn
Miscellaneous	Relatively new democracy emerged from colonialism
	Volatile arena of political unrest and terrorism

Caticlan
Roxas City
Panay
San Rafael
Passi
Iloilo
Malay
Buruanga
Libertad
Nabas
Ibajay
Tangalan
Pandan
Poblacion
Makato
Kalibo
Aklan
Banga
Sebaste
Batan
Balete
Altavas
Madalag
Libacao
Culasi
Tibiao
Barbaza
Laua-an
Bugasong
Valderrama
Patnongon
Belison
San Remigio
Sibalom
San Jose
Hamtic
Tobias Fornier
Anini-y
San Joaquin
Miagao
Igbaras
Tubungan
Leon
San Miguel
Pavia
Alimodian
Santa Barbara
Oton
Tigbauan
Jordan
Guimaras
Guimaras Island
San Lorenzo
Nueva Valencia
Sibunag
Ivisan
Sapian
Capiz
Mambusao
Sigma
Dao
Maayon
Cuartero
Dumalag
Tapaz
Dumarao
Bingawan
Calinog
Lambunao
Dueñas
Badiangan
Janiuay
Mina
Pototan
Cabatuan
New Lucena
Barotac Nuevo
Dingle
Anilao
Barotac Viejo
Banate
Pontevedra
President Roxas
Pilar
Balasan
Estancia
Carles
Batad
Sara
San Dionisio
Concepcion
Ajuy
Sicogon Island
Manapla
Victorias
Enrique B. Magalona
Silay
Talisay
Bacolod
Murcia
Salvador Benedicto
Bago
Valladolid
La Carlota
Northern Negros Natural Park
Mount Kanlaon Natural Park
Northwest Panay Peninsula Natural Park
Iloilo City
Panay
Roxas City
Panay
Passi
Dumangas
Barotac Nuevo
Dingle
Anilao
Banate
Barotac Viejo
Ajuy
Concepcion
San Dionisio
Sara
Batad
Estancia
Balasan
Pilar
Carles
Sicogon Island
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Talisay
Bacolod
Murcia
Salvador Benedicto
Bago
Valladolid
La Carlota
Northern Negros Natural Park
Mount Kanlaon Natural Park
Guimaras
Guimaras Island
San Lorenzo
Nueva Valencia
Sibunag
Jordan
Miagao
Igbaras
Tubungan
Leon
San Miguel
Pavia
Alimodian
Santa Barbara
Oton
Tigbauan
Hamtic
San Joaquin
Tobias Fornier
Anini-y
Belison
San Remigio
Sibalom
San Jose
Patnongon
Valderrama
Bugasong
Laua-an
Barbaza
Tibiao
Culasi
Sebaste
Pandan
Libertad
Buruanga
Nabas
Ibajay
Tangalan
Poblacion
Makato
Kalibo
Aklan
Banga
Batan
Balete
Altavas
Madalag
Libacao
Ivisan
Sapian
Capiz
Mambusao
Sigma
Dao
Maayon
Cuartero
Dumalag
Tapaz
Dumarao
Bingawan
Calinog
Lambunao
Dueñas
Badiangan
Janiuay
Mina
Pototan
Cabatuan
New Lucena
Barotac Nuevo

High-level Human Terrain (Panay)

- Following KLE engagement from Govt of Belesia (GoB), local leadership will be identified (Iloilo, Roxas City, Passi, San Rafael, and Cuartero)
- DIRLAUTH with various GoB agency heads through CJTF 667
- Infrastructure, media and communications stakeholders
- Key insurgent and VFP and SPSN leadership
- Private Security Corporations and stakeholders

Non-State Actors (Insurgents)

Visayan Peoples Front (VSF)

- Insurgent organisation based in Belesia (approx. 300 active members)
- Committed to the establishment of an independent entity composed of the islands of Panay, Negros, Cebu and Bohol from the Belesian Federation
- Predominantly a Christian organisation seeking to create a Christian nation
- Has been active in aiding NTMEF in Panay to achieve political goals
    - Prominently aided the NTMEF in securing the San Rafael Mine
- Likely to actively oppose CF in region

Non-State Actors (Insurgents)

Free Sulu Movement (FSM)

- Conglomeration of anti-federation and independence factions on the Belesian archipelago (approx. 200 active members)
- The group seeks to break free from the alleged over reach of Belesian central government
- Predominantly a secular organisation
- Has links to criminal organisations and will commit criminal acts to support political goals
- Is not know to be actively supporting the NTMEF in either Panay or Palawan
- May oppose CF in region if CJTF mission does not support political goals

Non-State Actors (Criminal)

Black Societies

- Criminal networks based in Olvana but operating across the Belesian archipelago (approx. 250 active members)
- This criminal network is normally a family affair, with each family staying local to avoid conflict with other groups
- This criminal network is involved in:
  - Armed Robbery
  - Racketeering
  - Smuggling
  - Narcotics Trafficking
  - Prostitution
  - Gambling
  - Contract Killings
- Will not likely be a threat to CF but may leverage off CF presence in Belesia

Non-State Actors (Criminal)

Tantoco Cartel

- Criminal cartel founded in South Torbia (approx. 950 active members)
- Operates across the region (even within Nth Torbia)
- Involved in most criminal activities including:
  - Drug and Weapons Smuggling
  - Extortion
  - Motor Vehicle Theft
  - Illegal Gambling
  - Money Laundering
  - Counterfeiting
  - Contract Killing
  - Piracy
- Has clashed with Black Society network over territory
- Will not likely be a threat to CF but may leverage off CF presence in Belesia

667.2.1 Named Area of Interest (NAI) Overview


Caticlan
NAI 09
Roxas City
NAI 08
Spt Zone
EN ZORR
Panay
NAI 05
NAI 07
San Rafael
NAI 04
NAI 006
Passi
NAI 03
Battle Zone
Disruption Zone
NAI 02
EN ZORR
Iloilo
NAI 01

NAI	Description	Grid NE (Lat/Lon)	Grid NW (Lat/Lon)	Grid SW (Lat/Lon)	Grid SE (Lat/Lon)
01	Iloilo POE				
02	AOA IBSAF/NTMEF EN Disruption Zone				
03	Predicted EN Battle Zone				
04	EN Support Zone				
05	EN Bdet Spt Zone (HQ) - BMA				
06	EN Western (ZORR)				
07	EN Eastern AOR (ZORR)				
08	EN COMD Reserve / Flanking EN SPT Zone				
09	EN MSR - Withdrawal / AoA				

Step 2

Primary SPOD
Makar Wharf, General Santos City

Primary staging port for:

- ATG
- ESG (JA/US)

Alternate SPOD
Zamboanga Port, Zamboanga City

Primary staging port for:

- JFMCC HQ
- MTG
- USNS Mercy

Lat: 6°54'11"N, Lon: 122°4'19"E

50 m

Panay SPOD
Iloilo Port



- Currently under BX control
- Likely landing area for non-ATG forces

Panay SPOD
Culasi Port, Roxas City



- Currently under NT control
- Primary SPOD for NTMEF

Panay SPOD
Caticlan Port



- Currently under NT control
- Alternate SPOD for NTMEF

Lat: 11.9280, Lon: 121.9503

50 m

Time & Space (Indicative)

Maritime Transit Times (8kts)				
	Darwin	**General Santos City**	**Zamboanga**	**Iloilo**
Darwin	N/A	1160NM (6 days)	1275NM (6 days 14hrs)	1480NM (7 days 17hrs)
General Santos City	1160NM (6 days)	N/A	189NM (1 day)	320NM (1 day 14hrs)
Zamboanga	1275NM (6 days 14hrs)	189NM (1 day)	N/A	234NM (1 day 5hrs)
Iloilo	1480NM (7 days 17hrs)	320NM (1 day 14hrs)	234NM (1 day 5hrs)	N/A

Air **Effects**

- POL
- Air traffic
- Air Navigation / Traffic Control



- Runway: 8,500ft long
- Currently under BX control
- Limited air traffic due to NT SAM umbrella

Panay APOD
Iloilo Airport

- Runway: 8,00ft long
- Currently under NT control
- Operating TPAF aircraft:
  - SU-30MKK
  - J-11B
  - Z-9
  - KA-28



Lat: 11.6007, Lon: 122.7493

200 m

Panay APOD
Roxas Airport (fictitious)



- Runway: 5,00ft long
- Currently under NT control
- No known TPAF aircraft operating from airport

Panay APOD
Caticlan Airport

Time & Space (Indicative)

Air Transit Times (300kts)				
	Darwin	**General Santos City**	**Zamboanga**	**Iloilo**
Darwin	N/A	1160NM (4hrs)	1275NM (4hrs 15min)	1480NM (5hrs)
General Santos City	1160NM (4hrs)	N/A	189NM (40mins)	320NM (1hr)
Zamboanga	1275NM (4hrs 15min)	189NM (40mins)	N/A	234NM (45mins)
Iloilo	1480NM (5hrs)	320NM (1hr)	234NM (45mins)	N/A

Land Effects (Panay)

- Vegetation
  - Thick jungle vegetation along the western side
  - Farmlands and sub-tropical forests along the lowlands
- Topography
  - Panay is bisected by the Central Panay Mountain Range close to the west coast
    - Highest peak is Mt Madia-as (2,117m)
  - There are may rivers with the longest being the Panay River
  - Most of the population is concentrated on the central and eastern part of the island (lowlands)
  - The eastern lowlands contain many farms (sugarcane and rice)
- Assessment
  - Heavy vehicles may be restricted in movement to MSR
  - Will require engineer support to traverse along lowland areas (create/reinforce bridges)
  - Wet season will restrict movement significantly



Land Effects (Panay)

- Urban
  - Iloilo City (pop - 448,000) - Provincial capital
  - Roxas City (pop – 167,000)
- Logistical hubs
  - See APOD/SPOD data for Panay
  - Single railway linking Roxas and Iloilo originally used for sugarcane produce transportation
- POL sites
- Infrastructure

San Rafael Mine
San Rafael, Panay



- Cerium Mine
- Former Copper-Gold Mine
- Ore Processing Facility located onsite
- Major economic income for Panay

Space Effects

- GPS
  - GPS and GLONASS available throughout the region
- Comms

Weather Effects - Belesia

- Two seasons: Wet and Dry
  - Dry season Dec – May
  - Wet Season Jun – Nov
- Region is susceptible to tropical typhoons during the wet season
  - Typhoons are regular and generally occur during Jul to Oct
  - On average Belesia is hit by 9 typhoons/year of varying strength
- Temperature is relatively constant all year as expected in a tropical climate







OFFICIAL

Step 3

NTMEF Div Assets



NTMEF 3 MAR BTG



NTMEF 31 Bdet (+), 3 BTG



MAR BN

Total Pers: 622

II

11/12/13/14 1

2 X IFV ZBD 05
1 X ACV ZBD 05

1

10 X IFV ZBD 05
2 X TRK UAZ
1 X GAZ 66
1 X URAL 375
3 X GL 35MM AGL
18 X GL ATGL PF 89
13 X GL ATGL FHJ 84

2

10 X IFV ZBD 05
2 X TRK UAZ
1 X GAZ 66
1 X URAL 375
3 X GL 35MM AGL
18 X GL ATGL PF 89
13 X GL ATGL FHJ 84

3

10 X IFV ZBD 05
2 X TRK UAZ
1 X GAZ 66
1 X URAL 375
3 X GL 35MM AGL
18 X GL ATGL PF 89
13 X GL ATGL FHJ 84

6 X PLL-05 (TYPE 05)
120MM SPMH
1 X APC BTR 80
1V152
5 X UAZ 469B
7 X GL UBGL 35MM
7 X GL ATGL FHJ 84

2 X IFV ZBD 05
1 X ARC ZBD 05
3 X SKYLARK IV UAV
2 X GL 35MM AGL
2 X GL ATGL PF 89
4 X GL ATGL FHJ 84

WPNS

3 X APC ZBD 05
3 X GL 35MM AGL
3 X GL ATGL PF 89
6 X GL ATGL FHJ 84

3 X IFV ZBD 05
6 X SA 14 (FN-16)
3 X GL ATGL FHJ 84

2

3

1 X ACV ZBD 05
3 X GAZ 66
1 X GL UBGL 35MM

CSS

4 X AAMB ZBD 05
6 X ARV ZBD 05
8 X GL UBGL 35MM
6 X GL ATGL FHJ 84

Taejwa (Senior Colonel) Kim Youn-Hwan
Commander 3rd Marine Brigade



DOB	15 Oct 1971
Nationality	North Torbian
Service / Organisation	TPA
Birthplace	Santiago, North Torbia
Education	Torbian Military Academy (Baguio) – 1993 (commissioned into Infantry) Song Yang-Hwan Military College – 2015
Religion	N/A
Marital Status	Married 1996 – Kim Sujin (nee Pu) Children – 1 son (12 yrs)
Personality Traits	• Creative thinker • Charismatic • Confident bordering on arrogant
Biography	Kim You-Hwan has shown himself to be one of the 1st Marine Division's most tactically able brigade commanders. Kim is known to be eloquent and charismatic. He instils strong loyalty from subordinates and is popular with his troops. This confidence means that at times he may be reluctant to listen to alternative views if his mind is already set on a course of action

Chungjwa (Lieutenant Colonel) Hae Kyung
Chief of Staff 3rd Marine Brigade



DOB	11 April 1976
Nationality	North Torbian
Service / Organisation	TPA
Birthplace	Gonzaga, North Torbia
Education	Torbian Military Academy (Baguio) – 2000 (commissioned into Engineers)
Religion	Christian
Marital Status	Single
Personality Traits	• Meticulous and process driven • Socially awkward
Biography	Not much is known about Hae Kyung. His family is from a poor fishing village in the north of the country. This poor background has meant that the few public interactions he has been seen, he has exhibited poor social interaction. It is believed that he has risen up the ranks due to his diligent and meticulous nature.

Chungjwa (Lieutenant Colonel) Nan Sung-Jin
Commander 31st Battalion, 3rd Marine Brigade



DOB	01 Jul 1980
Nationality	North Torbian
Service / Organisation	TPA
Birthplace	Santiago, North Torbia
Education	Torbian Military Academy (Baguio) – 2002 (commissioned into Infantry)
Religion	N/A
Marital Status	Married 2007 – Spouse unknown Children – unknown
Personality Traits	• Methodical • Orthodox thinking
Biography	Not much is known about Nan Sung-Jin. Very little media profile or appearance

Chungjwa (Lieutenant Colonel) Hwan Tonghyon
Commander 3rd Tank Battalion, 3rd Marine Brigade



DOB	06 Jun 1980
Nationality	North Torbian
Service / Organisation	TPA
Birthplace	Cauayan, North Torbia
Education	Torbian Military Academy (Baguio) – 2002 (commissioned into Armour)
Religion	Buddhist
Marital Status	Married – spouse unknown Children - unknown
Personality Traits	• Aggressive, diligent • Competent and Tactically proficient • Well read on warfare
Biography	Hwan Tonghyon exhibits a keen interest in the study of warfare. He has submitted several essays on the tactical use of armour on the battlefield to the Military Academy and his profile is well known amongst his peers.

Sojang (Major General) Yun Jun-Yeong
Air Component Commander



DOB	03 Jul 1970
Nationality	North Torbian
Service / Organisation	TPAF
Birthplace	Baguio, North Torbia
Education	Torbian Air Academy (Tuguegarao) – 1991 (trained as a fighter pilot) Song Yang-Hwan Military College – 2010
Religion	Buddhist
Marital Status	Married (1995) – Yun So-Yi (nee Pong) Children - 2 sons (15 and 10 yrs)
Personality Traits	• Creative thinker • Aggressive
Biography	Yun Jun-Yeong is known as an aggressive commander with incidents relating to border clashes between the TPAF and ROTAF aircraft under Yun's command. He has not shied away from provoking incidents or backing down from what he sees as an insult to TPAF 'honour'

Sojang (Rear Admiral) Roe Il-Seong
Maritime Component Commander



DOB	25 Aug 1969
Nationality	North Torbian
Service / Organisation	TPN
Birthplace	Candon, North Torbia
Education	Torbian Naval Academy (San Fernando) – 1990 Song Yang-Hwan Military College – 2009
Religion	N/A
Marital Status	Married – spouse unknown Children - unknown
Personality Traits	• Conventional thinking • Places high value on traditions and customs • Strict disciplinarian • Cautious by nature
Biography	Roe Il-Seong has led a typical Naval career with the majority of his career spent on surface warships (Destroyers). He is known to be a strict disciplinarian with reports of harsh punishments meted out for relatively minor infractions by his crew during his time as a ship captain.

Niko (pseudonym - real name unknown)

Commander – Free Sulu Movement



DOB	
Nationality	Belesian
Service / Organisation	FSM
Birthplace	
Education	
Religion	
Marital Status	
Personality Traits	
Biography	

Alarico Sanchez

Second-in-command – Visayan People's Front



DOB	13 Apr 1992
Nationality	Belesian (Panayan)
Service / Organisation	VPF
Birthplace	Roxas City, Belesia
Education	Qi Yang Kuen Academy
Religion	N/A
Marital Status	
Personality Traits	
Biography	

Eddie Ramos

Finance/Logistics - Visayan People's Front



DOB	06 Mar 1968
Nationality	Belesian
Service / Organisation	VPF (CEO Libas Fisherman's Co-operative)
Birthplace	Roxas City, Belesia
Education	Tanque Nacional High School
Religion	Christian (Catholic)
Marital Status	Married
Personality Traits	• Prone to violence/brutality • Anti-authority/establishment sentiment, but very patriarchal • Impulsive, secretive
Biography	Born into a large fishing family, Eddie grew up under the guidance of his mother after his father and step-father were lost at sea in successive storms. Eddie holds very strong anti-local authority sentiments but holds close ties with his local church. Due to the lack of a strong paternal influence, Eddie often resorts to violence and brutality to resolve disputes. Eddie is suspected of being associated with the VPF. It is not known whether Eddie holds strong sentiments towards the West.

Step 4



3rd BTG MLCOA

- Overview:
  - Estab Complex Battle Posn IVO Passi. Retain NTMEF combat power, and attempt to force IBSAF to culminate by extending IBSAF GLOC. Retaining key laterals ISO flanking forces IOT destroy IBSAF Tgts of Opportunity.
- ME:
  - Retain Passi and Deny IBSAF advance north from Iloilo
- SE:
  - Disrupt IBSAF GLOC in Disruption Zone through use of INS and Stay behind forces



3 BTG MDCOA

- Overview:
  - Est and Defend CBP in Passi. Force IBSAF to culminate by denying GLOC on Panay, projecting rapidly through Passi, with support of INS to capture Iloilo.
- ME:
  - Deny APOD/SPOD within AO
- SE:
  - Reinforce with MAR Bde and additional Div assets
  - Identify and destroy IBSAF critical capabilities including Log Nodes
  - Degrade IBSAF popular support through amplifying IW targets of opportunity

Assessed Enemy Critical Factors / Decisive Points

Critical Factors

- Retaining Passi and GLOCs will enable NTMEF to project forwards
  - This has necessitated the capture of a staging base in Palawan
  - Supply lines will have to traverse through international waters in the South China Sea and Sulu Sea
- NTMEF 3 BTG Command will be located in Roxas City
  - The EN Spt Zone must spt both Western and Eastern approaches to protect this vital logistic node
- North Torbia is relying on local Panayan support to maintain legitimacy of invasion
  - North Torbia will foment Panayan dissatisfaction with Belesian Federation and spur independence movement

Decisive Points

- Identification of IBSAF ME and AoA
- NTMEF GLOCs threatened within AO resulting threats to combat power
- Identify Targets of opportunity to deny key Log Nodes to IBSAF
- Set conditions for the independence of Panay (under North Torbian / Olvanan auspices) from Belesian Federation by exploiting historical ethnic tensions
- Identify deployment of IBSAF COMD Reserve

Assessed Enemy Centre of Gravity

Operational

- Control of GLOCs enabling 31 Bdet to sustain and maintain momentum

Tactical

- Ability to identify and defeat IBSAF ME through concentration of force

Assumptions and IRs

Version	Date	Amendment	Author
v1.1.2.1	30 Jun 21	Document created	Mr. M Ng
V2.0	17 May 22	Document updated for 13 CSSB	MAJ M. Paje

APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX B TO
7 BDE OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

Rare earth elements

Threats posed by the refining process

(Report from CSIRO Analysis Jan 2021)

Scope

- Definition & global distribution
- Extraction chemistry
- Reagents & by-products
- Mining vs refining threat
- Potential deliberate misuse of reagents
- Threat scenarios
- Summary

What we mean

Rare earth elements: Scandium, Yttrium and the Lanthanides



Global distribution

- 40% of world's reserves held in China & Russia – Increased demand and pressure to source from other sovereign nations
- Used in high efficiency magnets, vehicular catalytic converters, medical imaging devices, lighting, wind turbines, crude oil refinement, aircraft engines, refrigeration systems, lasers,
- Worldwide reserve estimates [millions of metric tons]
    - China 55
    - CIS 19
    - USA 13
    - India 3.1
    - Australia 1.6
    - Brazil 0.05
    - Malaysia 0.03
    - Other countries 22.0
    - Total 113.8

Source: US Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries, 2011, 2020

Note: Other countries include Burma, Burundi, Greenland, Madagascar, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Vietnam

Extraction chemistry

- Typical process:
  - Mining of phosphate, ferricarbonate ores
  - Particle size reduction by crushing, grinding
  - Separation from other materials [froth flotation, electrostatic, gravitational, electromagnetic]
  - Corrosive extraction of mineral from ore using NaOH, HNO_3 or HCl or H_2SO_4 – corrosive byproducts generated
  - Filtration
  - Solvent extraction & purification – TICs used – Ion exchange in zeolite
  - Refinement – Calciothermic, electrolytic, Lanthanothermic
  - Production of 99-99.95% purity rare earth elements ready for sale



Rhone Poulenc extraction process of rare earth minerals.
Maximises recovery of target elements from a variety of ores

Reagents

- Reagents
  - Alkalis and acids - NaOH, HNO_3 or HCl or H_2SO_4
  - Solvents
- Health impact
  - Corrosives, poisons
  - Inflammables

By-products

- By-products
  - Typically held as liquids in tailings dams
  - Have been known to leach, seep, overflow, or have levees burst resulting in contamination of waterways
  - Caused fish kills, rendered waterways sterile and water unfit for human & livestock consumption
  - Low level radioactive waste material from Uranium and Thorium ores
  - Release of airborne fluorides
- Biological impact in human and other species
  - Birth defects
  - Cancer
  - Dental loss
  - Death
  - Leukaemia
  - Liver damage
  - Neurological developmental problems in children
  - Permanent respiratory damage
  - Livestock deaths, birth defects, contamination of meat

Mining vs refining threat

- Unless there is a rare earth mineral processing plant in the vicinity of the mining operation, the ores pose little chemical and radiological danger

Potential deliberate misuse of reagents

- Reagents stored in large quantities pose a risk for theft and use in the production of explosive material and chemical weapon hazard
- Nitric acid is an essential reagent in the production of modern explosives on both a laboratory and industrial scales
- Hydrochloric acid is also readily converted to Chlorine gas, and is one of the oldest known and effective chemical weapons

Threat scenarios

- If mining and refinery operations are co-located or in the vicinity of each other, potential for HA and Security operations
- Humanitarian assistance operations
  - IVO mine sites resulting from environmental effects of tailings dam spillovers/ leakages or dam wall collapse
- Security operations
  - Under circumstances of acid or reagent theft
  - Suspected explosive, chemical or toxic weapon development by insurgents

San Rafael Mine
San Rafael, Panay

- Cerium Mine
- Former Copper-Gold Mine
- Ore Processing Facility located onsite
- Major economic income for Panay

SAN RAFAEL MINE

- Originally a Cu-Au open-cut mine
- Now mainly a Ce mine
- Also located adjacent to the mine is a processing facility to transform the raw material into transportable ore
- Large quantities of reagents are stored at the processing facility (last report from pre-conflict):
  - 50,000L of Hydrochloric Acid
  - 5,000L of Sodium Cyanide
  - 3,000L of Hydrogen Sulfide

Summary

- The processing of rare earth elements uses chemical reagents that can be the basis of both explosives and a CW agent
- If rare earth element mining and refining operations are co-located, there is potential for theft of some of the chemical reagents which can be processed into explosives and/ or CW agent
- Realistic threat scenarios could include HADR or security operations

ANNEX C TO
TU 667.2.1 OPORD
DATED XXXXXX

OPERATION CERIUM STEAL

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

X BDE OPERATIONS

CONOPS OUTLINE – OP STEEL SENTINEL





CONOPS OUTLINE – OP CERIUM STEAL

COMD X Bde (TU667.2.1) Intent

- **Commander's Intent**
  - **Purpose.** Defeat NTMEF land forces within AO.
  - **Method.** Operation CERIUM STEAL will be a three-phase operation nested within Operation STEEL SENTINEL (OSS). Phase 1 will consist of an amphibious and air lodgement of X Bde onto Panay through the Iloilo City APOD/SPOD. During Phase 2, X BDE will ADV N and defeat NTMEF forces loc N of Passi. This will dislocate the NTMEF forces IVO Roxas City and set the conditions for Y BDE to defeat these forces in detail. Additionally, Z Bde will secure the NTMEF alternate APOD/SPOD at Caticlan. Phase 3 will be the transition of authority back to the BX government. At all times, we must be cognisant that the main effort is the removal of NT forces in BX. If this can be achieved during any of the stages without further bloodshed, then all effort must be taken to explore those options.
  - **Endstate.** The liberation of PANAY and removal of North Torbian forces from PANAY, establishment of a safe and secure environment in the occupied Belesian territories, and conditions set for the UN supervised transition of authority in Panay back to the Belesian Government

Critical Assumptions

- Critical Assumptions
  - ADF Armoured vehicles have overmatch against most NTMEF armoured vehicles
  - Armoured vehicles restricted to roads without significant engineering effort
  - Full SOFA and cooperation with Belesia to allow staging of Coalition Forces (CF) from Belesian territory
  - X Bde will not be permitted to kinetically target the San Rafael mine complex
  - NTMEF will anticipate and oppose landing
  - Air superiority achieved for certain periods over PANAY by coalition forces
  - NTMEF on Panay will have been severely depleted prior to Ph1



Situation

Enemy (North Torbia):

- North Torbian Marine Expeditionary Force (**NTMEF**) elements have lodged in Panay and Palawan
- NTMEF 4th MAR Bde lodged in El Nido and refurbished WW2 port and airfield being used as a staging base for movement into Panay
- NTMEF 3rd MAR Bde in Panay have secured the city of Roxas City and San Rafael Mine complex
- Pro-NT insurgents (Visayan Peoples Front - VPF) have aided NT in securing strategic locations in Panay
- Surface and sub-surface sea elements are operating in the Sulu and Sth China Sea
    - 1x Type 052D Luyang III (DDG)
    - 2x Type 052C Luyang II (DDG)
    - 1x Type 051G Luda (DDG)
    - 2x Type 054A Jiangkai II (FFH)
    - 1x Type 053H3 Jiangwei II (FFH)
    - 2x Type 053 Jianghu V (FFG)
    - 3x Type 039 Song (SSK)
- Combat air elements operating out of El Nido Airfield (12x SU-30MKK, 12x J-11B) and Roxas Airport (12x SU-30MKK, 12x J-11B, 12x Z-9, and 6x Z-19)
- Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ – also referred to as ADIZ/MEZ) declared over occupied islands and connecting sea/air lanes

- Strategic Goals
    - Seek political solution to establish Panay ‘independence’ (annexation) under NT sponsorship
    - Seek to maintain destabilised region to set the conditions for annexation of Panay
    - Control of ‘rare earth metals’ supply in region

- Tactical Goals
    - NTMEF will likely secure positions within Panay and Palawan and may reinforce presence in region
    - Secure sea/air lines of communications/supply between Roxas City-El Nido-North Torbia
    - Maintain and defend TEZ over occupied territories and sea/air lanes
    - No intent to escalate conflict beyond occupied islands



Situation (Panay)

- NTMEF 3rd Marine Bde have secured SPOD and APOD within Roxas City and Caticlan
- NTMEF, with help from the Visayan Peoples Front (VPF) have captured the San Rafael Mine complex
- NTMEF have established a mobile defensive position south of the San Rafael Mine and north of the city of Iloilo City
- Belesian 12th Inf Bde, after landing in Iloilo City, attempted to advance north to destroy NTMEF
- A stalemate has ensued with Belesian Forces defending positions around Iloilo City
- North Torbian Forces control all northern approaches to Panay
- Belesia has access to Iloilo City SPOD/APOD



NTMEF MLCOA

- ME:
  - Secure Roxas City APOD/SPOD
- SE:
  - Secure Estancia
  - Secure San Rafael Mine
  - Block any advances North from Iloilo City along MSRs
  - Reinforce 3rd MAR Bde with additional Div Troops
  - Disrupt CF efforts with insurgent activity IVO Iloilo City



NTMEF MDCOA

- ME:
  - Seize Iloilo City APOD/SPOD
- SE:
  - Neutralise Belesian 12th Bde
  - Secure Roxas City APOD/SPOD
  - Secure Estancia
  - Reinforce 3rd MAR Bde with 2nd MAR Bde and Div Troops
  - Disrupt CF efforts with insurgent activities

Assessed Enemy Critical Factors / Decisive Points

Critical Factors

- NTMEF Forces in Panay will be dependant on log node on Palawan
  - Supply lines will have to traverse through international waters in the South China Sea and Sulu Sea
  - Main Log hub will be in Roxas City – at least a Bn will be used to hold this log node (Port/Airfield)
  - Alternate Log hub has been identified at Caticlan – estimate a Coy strength holding this node
- 3 MAR BDE HQ (NTMEF) will be located in Roxas City
  - Affiliate with VPF
- 3 MAR BDE likely to use tank BN as reserve to defeat AS lodgement
  - Reinforced with Company of T-72B tanks
- North Torbia is relying on local Panayan support to maintain legitimacy of invasion
  - North Torbia will foment Panayan dissatisfaction with Belesian Federation and spur independence movement

Decisive Points

- Reinforce the ground forces in Panay with an additional NTMEF assets (AD, Cbt Engr, EW, MLRS)
- Potential capture of Iloilo City
- Set conditions for favourable political solution [don’t lose!]
- Set conditions for the independence of Panay (under North Torbian / Olvanan auspices) from Belesian Federation by exploiting historical ethnic tensions

Assessed Enemy Centre of Gravity

Strategic

- North Torbia's Strategic CoG is the moral narrative that their occupation of Belesian territory is to protect ethnic Torbians from persecution in Belesia and their ability to control and maintain that narrative

Operational

- North Torbia's ability to sustain projected power in the region
- Ability to control the sea/air lanes
- The physical manifestation of this CoG are:
  - Surface and sub-surface naval capability
  - Combat aircraft operating out of Palawan and Panay
  - Logistics node at Palawan

Tactical

- 3 MAR BDE COG is assessed as their ability to maintain their occupation of Roxas City.

C2 and Groupings

See separate CJTF 667.2 C2 Diagram for more detail

C-12/24

AO FANNING





ROUTES



Control Routes

Route ORANGE
- Old Iloilo-Capiz Road – PC Barracks Rd – Tapaz-Jamind-Altavaz Road
- ILOILO CITY APOD/SPOD – CALINOG – TAPAZ – JAMIND – SAPI-AN

Route PURPLE
- Calinog-Passi Road – Passi-San Rafael Road – Sara-Lemery Road
- CALINOG – PASSI – SAN RAFAEL – LEMERY – SARA

Route BLUE
- Roxas Ivisan Bypass– PC Barracks Road – Aklan West Road
- ROXAS CITY – ALTAVAS – KALIBO – CATICLAN SPOD

Route GREEN
- Iloilo-East-Coast-Capiz Road
- ILOILO CITY APOD/SPOD – PASSI – CUATERO – ROXAS CITY

Route RED
- Barotac-NuevoRd-Zarraga Road – Western Nautical Highway
- ILOILO CITY – BAROTAC NUEVEO – BANATE – SARA – ESTANCIA

Route MAGENTA
- Iloilo-East Coast-Capiz Road
- ROXAS CITY – PILAR – ESTANCIA

BOUNDARIES & PHASE LINES



Phase Lines

Phase Line ABLE
- SAN JOSE – SANTA BARBARA – BANALE – CONCEPCION

Phase Line BAKER
- VALDERRAMA – CALINOG – PASSI – SAN RAFAEL – SARA

Phase Line CHARLIE
- SEBASTE – JAMINDAN – DAO – MAAYON – PRESIDENT ROXAS – ESTANCIA

Phase Line DOG
- CATICLAN – KALIBO – ROXAS CITY – PILAR – CARLES



667.2.1 Boundaries

667.2.1.1 (BG XXX)
- TAOR **XXX**

667.2.1.2 (BG XXX)
- TAOR **XXX**

667.2.1.3 (BG XXX)
- TAOR **XXX**



X Bde Scheme of Manoeuvre

Phase 1 – Lodgement (D-Day – D+2)

Main Effort:

- Conduct lodgement into ILOILO CITY

Supporting Efforts:

- Secure ILOILO CITY SPOD/APOD
- Conduct fwd passage of lines with BX 13 Bde
- BPT spt BX 13 Bde for NTMEF C/Atk
- BPT hold defensive lines around ILOILO CITY APOD/SPOD

Endstate:

- X Bde ground elements will have lodged successfully in ILOILO CITY and taken up positions in preparation for Ph2

Groupings & Tasks

HQ X BDE:

- Estb Bde HQ Main at ILOILO CITY APOD
- Coord liaison with BX 13 Bde for defence of APOD/SPOD

X Bn (BG XXX):

- 2nd in order of lodgement
- BPT conduct ISR tasks fwd of defensive lines

X Bn (BG XXX):

- 3rd in order of lodgement
- BPT occupy defensive positions around APOD/SPOD

X Bn (BG XXX):

- 4th in order of lodgement
- BPT occupy defensive positions around APOD/SPOD

BG XXX

- 1st in order of lodgement
- Occupy defensive positions around APOD/SPOD
- BPT spt BX 13 Bde in defence of APOD/SPOD



X Bde Scheme of Manoeuvre
Phase 2 – Neutralise (D+3 – D+14)
Main Effort:
- Defeat NTMEF within AO

Supporting Efforts:
- Conduct Adv from ILOILO CITY to secure Route BLUE
- BPT defeat NTMEF outside of AO on order
- Defeat insurgency forces
- Conduct RASO
- BPT Conduct COIN Operations

Endstate:
- NTMEF ground forces will have been defeated in AO FANNING

Groupings & Tasks

HQ X Bde (BG XXX):
- Guard right flank of Bde advance north
- BPT spt flanking formations

X Bn – Cavalry (BG XXX):
- Adv N within boundaries
- Guard right flank

X Bn - Mech (BG XXX):
- Adv N along Route GREEN towards PASSI
- Contain 31 MAR BDET vic PASSI
- Clear along Route GREEN
- Secure Route BLUE
- BPT spt flanking formations

X Bn – Motorised (BG XXX):
- Adv N along Route ORANGE
- Clear any NTMEF within TAOR
- BPT spt flanking formations
- Adv N towards Rout BLUE
- BPT secure Route Blue

X Bn – Reinforcing (BG XXX):
- COMD's Reserve
- BPT contain 31 MAR BDET vic PASSI
- BPT secure PASSI



X Bde Scheme of Manoeuvre

Phase 3 – Transition (D+15 onwards)

Main Effort:

- Transition to UN peacekeeping

Supporting Efforts:

- HOTO authority to Belesian Forces
- Reconstruction efforts
- Stability Operations
- Repatriate/Return to Aus ADF assets
- Conduct COIN as needed
- BPT spt NGO in humanitarian tasks

Endstate:

- Establishment of Belesian authority in Panay
- Removal/repatriation of all NTMEF from Belesian territory

Groupings & Tasks

HQ X Bde:

- C2 STABOPS within boundaries
- BPT transition authority to BX Forces / Government

X Bn (BG XXX):

- Conduct STABOPS within boundaries
- BPT handover security to BX authority

X Bn (BG XXX):

- Conduct STABOPS within boundaries
- BPT handover security to BX authority

X Bn (BG XXX):

- Conduct STABOPS within boundaries
- BPT handover security to BX authority

BG XXX:

- Conduct STABOPS within boundaries
- BPT handover security to BX authority

X CER:

- BPT conduct reconstruction tasks