

OPS 01/XX

MCC-OBA OPORD 01/XX – OPERATION BRONZE ACHILLES (OBA)

References:

- A. US Joint Publication 3-16 Multinational Operations
- B. US Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations
- C. Maps: Map Series S701, S702, S711, S721, S733, PHILIPPINES; Sheets TBD

Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU.

1. **Situation.**

- a. **Current Situation.** The Torbian People's Army (TPA) forces launched a surprise offensive against the Republic of Torbia (ROT) on two fronts.
 - (1) On DDXXXXMONYY under cover of the combined Olvanan/North Torbian Exercise RISEN SWORD, a TPA Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) of approximately brigade size launched an amphibious assault IVO of SAN NARCISO (51PSS861616) and SAN ANTONIO (51PSS869547). Having consolidated their beachhead MEF forces began to advance SE wards towards OLONGAPO (51PTS063041). Their objective was assessed to be the SUBIC BAY airport and port facilities (51PTS149350).
 - (2) As the TPA MEF conducted their assault, North Torbian air force (TPAF) bombers attacked and knocked out South Torbian military radar installations along the South Torbian west coast. North Torbian SPF teams attacked key infrastructure providing power to military installations in the CASTILLEJOS-SUBIC-OLONGAPO region and the MAGTFST command element.
 - (3) A South Torbian frigate was sunk by torpedo in South Torbian territorial waters west of MORONG. North Torbian submarines, probably elements of the North Torbian Western Fleet operating in the region are suspected of carrying out this attack.
 - (4) A second wave of TPAF bombers targeted South Torbian Naval bases in OLONGAPO, MANILA, BATANGAS CITY and GENERAL NAKAR. North Torbian SPF teams are suspected of designating vessels for targeting. North Torbian submarines have laid mines in the entrance to SUBIC BAY, MANILA BAY and in the VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE as well as the northern entrance to the POLILLO STRAIT. This has resulted in the South Torbian Navy no longer being an effective force and confined to their home ports.

- (5) Supported by North Torbian SPF elements North Torbian Air force bombers also targeted South Torbian air bases in MANILA, MAMBURAO, SAN JOSE and ANGELES causing significant losses. All remaining South Torbian aircraft have been redeployed to air bases on MINDORO.
- (6) On DDXXXXMONYY under cover of the TPA's multi-regional command military exercise, EX RED PHOENIX, the TPA launched a land offensive initiated with artillery barrages on South Torbian headquarters, command posts and cantonment areas along the Military Demarcation Line (MDL). Simultaneously multiple air bases and air defense sites were subjected to EW jamming and assault by TPA SPF.
- (7) The TPA Southern Army initial attack penetrated the ROTA forces along the MDL using surface crossing points and a system of tunnels under the MDL. Possible objectives were identified as DAGUPAN (51QTT146758) in the west, TARLAC (51PTT 420135) in the centre and CABANATUAN (51PTT825133) in the east.
- (8) The Torbian People's Navy (TPN) Western Fleet continues to support the North Torbian MEF assault on OLONGAPO. Reports indicate that the TPN Eastern fleet was able to sail from home ports under the cover of fog and heavy clouds and is believed to be concentrating to the north east of North Torbia in the Philippine Sea. Exact locations are unknown at this stage.
- (9) The TPAF is able to achieve local air superiority for short periods of time over North Torbian-occupied territory. The recent acquisition of H-6 (Hong-6) Strategic Bombers and J-16D EW aircraft from Olvana as well as the upgrade of the TPA's costal artillery battalions provides the North Torbians with an enhanced A2AD capability and the ability to extend their air power eastwards as far as Guam.
- (10) Unable to sustain effective operations to stop the North Torbian advance southwards South Torbia has sought assistance from fellow members of IPANA. The governments of the US, Australia, New Zealand and Japan have agreed to provide military assistance IOT to blunt the North Torbian attack, expel TPA forces from South Torbia and restore international borders.

b. North Torbian Military Forces.

(1) General.

- (a) North Torbia's military has played a significant domestic role in shaping the nation. As the government's largest asset, it touches nearly every aspect of life within North Torbia.
- (b) The Torbian People's Army (TPA) controls the ground, air, and naval forces in the DPRT and is one of the most militarized countries in the world with

approximately half a million active duty military personnel and over two million reservists.

- (c) Most of the military is located along the border with the Republic of Torbia (South Torbia) as North Torbia's stated intent is to unify the country under DPRT control. North Torbia often looks toward Olvana to provide support for naval and amphibious operations.
- (d) Much of the North Torbian force's equipment is older Donovanian equipment, North Torbia commenced a modernization program in 2014. This has involved the acquisition of more modern Olvanan equipment and the development of an A2AD strategy. The three artillery coastal battalions began replacing their tubed artillery equipment with the latest Olvanan SAM, ASM and ASBM systems. INTEL reports believe that these coastal artillery battalions are now structured as follows:
 - i. 21st Coastal Artillery Battalion is now an AD battalion equipped with HQ-9 SAM systems
 - ii. 22nd Coastal Artillery Battalion is equipped with YJ-18C ASM systems
 - iii. 23rd Coastal Artillery Battalion is equipped with DF-21D ASBM systems.

(2) North Torbian Naval Threat.

- (a) In past years the Torbian People's Navy (TPN) was predominantly a brown water fleet with obsolete and ageing equipment. These have been refreshed with fourth and fifth generation Naval assets. Third generation equipment still in service has generally been refitted and what was often old, unreliable and unserviceable is now routinely state of the art providing the TPN with a potent blue water capability. This process has been almost entirely been facilitated by Olvana.
- (b) In concert with the supply of new equipment, Olvana has provided significant training resources and increased the frequency and complexity of bilateral exercises. The capability, in both hardware and ability to effectively employ it, has never been more formidable.
- (c) The TPN consists of two fleets:
 - i. The Western Fleet's role is to support the North Torbian Marine Expeditionary Force and is equipped with a range of amphibious platforms, surface combatant platforms as well as a fast boat squadron consisting of Type 22 PHM – Houbei and Taregh (Boghammar) platforms.

- ii. The Eastern Fleet's role is to conduct blue water operations, is equipped with Renhai Type 055 CGs, Luyang III DDGs and Song SSGs that are all YJ-18B ASM capable and is assessed as an integral component of the North Torbian A2AD strategy.
 - (d) The TPN has a developing UAV capability. Olvanan-built EA-03 and BZK-005 UAVs were observed during an Eastern Fleet exercise off the north east coast of North Torbia almost 12 months ago.
 - (e) There are reports that at least one, possibly two North Torbian Merchant container vessels are equipped with the Club-K Containerized Anti-ship Missile System.
- (3) North Torbian Air Threat.
- (a) The primary mission of the Torbian People's Air force (TPAF) is to defend its homeland from the air, with secondary missions to provide tactical air support to the army and navy, transportation, logistical support, and SPF insertion/extraction.
 - (b) The TPAF operates primarily tier 2 and 3 equipment and planes but is in the process of introducing a number of tier 1 platforms. Recent upgrades to its strategic bomber fleet enhance its A2AD strategy. The upgraded Tu-22M3M, represents enhanced capability in virtually every area except stealth. In addition to the new land-attack missiles it can also be equipped with long-range ultrahigh-speed dual-capable (nuclear and conventional) missiles with land-attack and anti-ship capability.
 - (c) The H-6 (Hong-6) strategic bomber is capable of carrying air-launched cruise missiles such as the YJ-100 as well as a range of other anti-ship missiles. With a range of 6,000 km it is a key component of North Torbia's A2AD strategy.
 - (d) North Torbia recently acquired J-16D aircraft from Olvana to provide an EW jamming capability. These platforms are likely to work with the Hong-6 bombers.
 - (e) All of the TPAF's II-76MD fleet are capable of providing in-flight refuelling.
- (4) Olvana. Whilst not directly involved, Olvana is likely to provide support to North Torbia as an extension of its own A2AD strategy. An Olvanan Carrier Strike Group (CSG) remains on station in South China Sea and is possibly providing early warning and surveillance spt to the North Torbian Eastern Fleet SAG. It may also attempt to block coalition naval forces entering the South China Sea. Recent reports confirm that Olvana is providing:

- (a) Access to Olvanan satellite capability for surveillance and reconnaissance including the Yaogan series of satellites
 - (b) Internet services
 - (c) Over-the-Horizon radar
 - (d) YLC-8B 3D Long-Range Anti-Stealth Surveillance Radar
 - (e) Additional Y-8G (High New 3) Long-Range Electronic Jamming Aircraft flying under Olvanan livery
 - (f) Additional KJ-2000 (Mainring) Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft flying under Olvanan livery
 - (g) H-6 (Hong-6) Chinese Strategic Bomber
 - (h) J-16D EW aircraft
 - (i) DF-11 SS Short Range Ballistic Missiles to replace the ageing SS-21
 - (j) DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles
 - (k) YJ-12 Supersonic Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles
 - (l) HQ-9 (Hong Qi 9) 8x8 Long-Range Air Defense Missile Systems.
- (5) Donovia. Reports indicate that Donovia recently provided a battery of the S-400 Triumph (SA-21 Growler) Long-Range Surface-to-air Missile System. It is highly likely that this weapon system is manned by the Fólkvangr Group, Donovanian contractors supported by Donovanian AD military advisors.
- (6) Ariana. South Torbian intelligence sources report sightings of Arianian-manufactured UAVs in South Torbian airspace including:
- (a) Qasef-1 – a recon and loitering munition drone
 - (b) Mohajer-4 – a tactical UAV
 - (c) Shahed-129 – medium altitude long-endurance UAV.
- (7) Assessment.
- (a) Supported by the North Torbian Airforce, North Torbian forces will continue their ground offensive to secure intermediate objectives and consolidate before continuing their advance to Manila.
 - (b) TPA MEF forces will continue to advance SE wards to seize the SUBIC BAY airport and port facilities.

- (c) North Torbian MLCOA. North Torbia will employ its A2AD strategy IOT enable TPA ground forces to advance on Manila and unite the two Torbias by preventing/delaying coalition forces deploying to South Torbia.
- i. The North Torbian Eastern Fleet seeks engagement with 5 CSG.
 - ii. The North Torbian Western Fleet continues supporting the Amphibious Task Group (ATG).
 - iii. North Torbia continues to employ components of its A2AD system to keep US and coalition forces at a distance to stop them being able to provide military support to South Torbia.
 - iv. The North Torbian government continues its INFOWAR campaign to legitimise its invasion of South Torbia to unite the two countries.
 - v. An Olvanan CSG remains on station in the South China Sea close to the Luzon Strait possibly to provide early warning and surveillance spt to the North Torbian Eastern Fleet. It may also attempt to block coalition naval forces entering the South China Sea.
 - vi. Olvana continues to spt North Torbia providing access to its ISR and nav satellite system.
- (d) MLCOA End State. North Torbia successfully prevents US and coalition intervention in South Torbia and captures Manila.
- (e) North Torbian MDCOA. North Torbia creates an incident IOT obtain direct support from Olvana IOT to enable it to unite the two Torbias.
- i. Olvana agrees to direct involvement in the conflict and deploys ground forces plus additional AD, ENGR and ABSM, EW and comms equip.
 - ii. The Olvanan CSG deploys to the Philippine Sea to join with the TPN Eastern Fleet to directly engage with 5 CSG. OPN submarines may also join the CSG.
 - iii. North Torbian Western Fleet could also be reinforced with an OPN SAG to provide additional spt to the Amphibious Task Group (ATG).
 - iv. Olvanan People's Air Force (OPAF) units are likely to be deployed to North Torbia to bolster the TPAF bomber regt to engage targets in Okinawa, Guam and Palau.
 - v. Increased and enhanced space, EW and IW spt provided to bolster the North Torbian A2AD strategy and to prosecute the INFOWAR battle

to reinforce North Torbia's legitimate right to unite the two countries by force.

vi. Further OPN assets including submarines are to be deployed to the South China Sea and Luzon Strait IOT to isolate the Torbian archipelago.

(f) MDCOA End State. Combined North Torbian and Olvanan forces overcome friendly forces, destroying their combat effectiveness forcing the South Torbian government to capitulate and agree to North Torbia's demands.

c. Friendly Forces.

(1) MCC-OBA. The MCC-OBA is comprised of:

(a) CSG 5 consisting of Carrier Air Wing 5, CG and DESRON 15.

(b) A Patrol and Reconnaissance Force of 4 X P-8A from CTF 72.

(c) A submarine force (CTF 74) of 4 X SSN with two submarine tenders.

(d) A Logistics Group element from CTF 73.

(e) Elements of Navy Expeditionary Forces Command Pacific CTF 75.

(f) Elements of ESG 7/CTF 76 including an amphibious squadron, a mine countermeasures squadron, naval support elements and 31st MEB.

(g) An Australian/New Zealand task force consisting of a SCGRP with 9 X DDG and an amphibious task group

(h) A Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force task force consisting of an SCGRP and amphibious task group.

(i) A detailed Task Organization for MCC-OBA is at Annex A.

(2) Higher Headquarters Mission and Intent.

(a) Higher Headquarters. MNF OBA.

i. Mission. On order, MNFOBA is to dislodge TPA forces from South Torbia IOT restore the South Torbian border, deter further aggression, and re-establish pre-war international borders to restore peace and security.

ii. Commander's Intent. The purpose of this operation is to restore the international border, defeat TPA forces, and deter further aggression against South Torbia.

iii. Endstate. TPA forces have been neutralised and expelled from South Torbian Territory, ROTA forces are occupying positions along the MDL, the international border has been reestablished, and the South Torbian government is stable, functioning at pre-conflict levels.

(b) South Torbian Forces.

i. Republic of Torbia Navy (ROTN). As a result of North Torbian air attacks on naval bases in OLONGAPO, MANILA, BATANGAS CITY and GENERAL NAKAR the ROTN is no longer an effective force. Apart from the ROTN 21 Missile Squadron, all other squadrons are at 25 percent combat effectiveness or less. Due to blockades by the North Torbian Navy ROTN vessels are unable to leave their ports.

ii. Republic of Torbia Army (ROTA). The ROTA has very limited offensive capability and is only able to conduct defensive ops IOT prevent TPA ground forces from further advancement into South Torbia.

iii. Republic of Torbia Air Force (ROTAF). The ROTAF suffered significant losses during the first wave of North Torbian air attacks. Remaining assets have relocated to air bases on the Island of MINDORO and will be used to support the ROTA 3rd Army forces defending MANILA and BATANGAS CITY.

d. Battlespace Description.

(1) Area of Interest (AI). The MCC-OBA AI spans more than 124 million square kilometers, stretching from the International Date Line (180° E) to the India/Pakistan border (24°12'50"N 69°15'28"E) and from the Kuril Islands (43°46'40"N 145°26'33"E) in the North to the Antarctic (67°14'11"S 145°32'49"E) in the South.

(2) Area of Operations (AO). The MCC-OBA AO includes the land masses, national airspace and territorial waters of North Torbia, South Torbia and Belesia. It also includes:

(a) The Luzon Strait, bounded by Taiwan in the north and North Torbia in the south, which connects the Philippine Sea to the South China Sea in the western Pacific Ocean.

(b) The Philippines Sea bounded by the Torbias and Taiwan to the west, Japan to the north, the Marianas to the east and Palau to the south. It covers an area measuring 5,695,000 sq km and a mean depth of 4,108 meters.

(c) The South China Sea bounded by the furthest limit of the Olvanan Exclusive Economic Zone in the north, in the west by the Indochinese Peninsula, in the east by the islands of Taiwan and the Torbias (mainly Luzon, Mindoro

and Palawan), and in the south by Borneo, eastern Sumatra and the Bangka Belitung Islands. It encompasses an area of around 3,500,000 sq km with an average depth of 1,500 meters. The Manila Trench is an oceanic trench located west of Luzon and Mindoro, and reaches a depth of about 5,400 meters.

- (d) The Celebes Sea which is bordered on the north by the Sulu Archipelago and Sulu Sea and Mindanao Island, on the east by the Sangihe Islands chain, on the south by Sulawesi's Minahasa Peninsula, and on the west by northern Kalimantan in Indonesia.
- (e) The Sulu Sea, a body of water in the southwestern area of the archipelago, separated from the South China Sea in the northwest by Palawan and from the Celebes Sea in the southeast by the Sulu Archipelago.
- (f) The Sibuyan Sea is connected to the Sulu Sea via the Tablas Strait in the west, the South China Sea via the Isla Verde Passage in the northwest, and the Visayan Sea via the Jintotolo Channel in the south-east. The Visayan Sea is the shallowest of the basins, with an average station depth of 38 m and with most areas, 50 m deep and a maximum depth of just 150 m.
- (g) The Verde Island Passage separates the islands of Luzon and Mindoro, connecting the South China Sea with the Tayabas Bay and the Sibuyan Sea beyond. It is the main shipping route between the Port of Manila and the Visayas and Mindanao in the south.

e. Constraints. No MNF OBA forces are to cross the MDL/NLL into North Torbia or enter North Torbian airspace. MNF-OBA maritime forces operating in the South China Sea are to avoid engagement with Olvanan Naval and Air Forces.

2. Mission. On Order, MCC-OBA is to provide the necessary maritime effects IOT support military operations to expel all NT forces from South Torbian sovereign territory, contribute to land and air missions as directed, and be prepared to take all measures necessary to neutralize NT maritime forces in the AO.

3. Execution.

a. Commander MNF-OBA Intent.

- (1) Purpose. To neutralize TPN forces IOT destroy their capability to conduct offensive operations and to restore pre-war international borders.
- (2) Key Tasks. Using a combination of both kinetic and non-kinetic forces:
 - (a) Neutralize North Torbia's maritime and air forces to enable LCC-OBA forces to land in South Torbia to conduct offensive operations to expel North Torbian ground forces from South Torbia

- (b) Achieve air superiority and sea control in the AO
 - (c) Neutralise the North Torbian A2AD system
 - (d) Neutralize the North Torbian cyber and EW capabilities
 - (e) Deter direct Olvanan involvement
- (3) End State. North Torbian forces are defeated in the AO. Internal stability and legitimate governance has been restored.

b. Concept of Operations. Maritime operations to support OBA are to be conducted in phases as follows:

- (1) Phase 0 – Shaping. This phase is the normal state of affairs and no overt action is to be conducted unless authorised and/or approved by COMD MNF-OBA. Throughout this phase, the following actions are to occur:
- (a) Submarine deployments in the AO IOT to conduct further collection and surveillance opportunities, and familiarisation with the AO.
 - (b) The conduct of Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS).
 - (c) Establishment of HQ MCC-OBA base of operations in GENERAL SANTOS CITY in Belesia. LCC-19 is to provide a forward CP IVO the SPOD, BATANGAS International Port, South Torbia.
 - (d) Units as directed BPT conduct maritime presence and force protection of designated shipping
 - (e) Units as directed BPT at 48hrs NTM embark personnel, equipment and stores as required for amphibious lodgement in follow on phasing
 - (f) Units as directed assume 24hrs NTM for Sea Combat Operations within the AO
 - (g) Units as directed BPT conduct shaping operations within the AO
 - (h) Units as directed BPT conduct FONOPS
 - (i) Units as directed BPT conduct HADR support
 - (j) Phase 0 will be complete when ordered by COMD MNF-OBA, or should North Torbian or Olvanan forces conduct hostilities against MNF-OBA personnel or civilians.
- (2) Phase I – Deployment. This phase will commence on order to secure the necessary maritime approaches to South Torbia to facilitate lodgement of LCC-OBA forces in South Torbia. FONOPS are to cease and all elements are to

reconstitute IOT to support the lodgement of LCC-OBA forces at the SPOD in BATANGAS Port, South Torbia. Lodgement of LCC-OBA forces will commence once Sea Lines Of Communication (SLOC), Air Lines Of Communication (ALOC) are identified and secured, and directed local Sea and Air Control are achieved. Throughout this phase, the following actions are to occur:

- (a) Units as directed embark personnel, equipment and stores required for amphibious lodgement.
 - (b) Units as directed conduct Force Integration Training (FIT) en-route to AO
 - (c) Units as directed sail to conduct shaping operations within the AO
 - (d) Units secure necessary Sea Lines of Communication as directed within the AO.
 - (e) Units as directed secure local sea control of designated areas within the AO in preparation for follow on tasking.
 - (f) BPT support the transit and lodgement of ESG 7 into the AO
 - (g) Units conduct ASW surveillance in order to reduce the likelihood of the presence of unfriendly sub-surface units within the AO
 - (h) Phase I is complete when LCC-OBA has been successfully lodged, or the requirement for lodgement is negated due to North Torbian forces withdrawing from South Torbia.
- (3) Phase II – Expulsion of North Torbian forces from South Torbian sovereign territory. This phase commences on completion of the amphibious lodgement and encompasses all measures necessary to support the expulsion of all North Torbian Forces from South Torbia. Throughout this phase, the following actions are to occur:
- (a) BPT support the transit of 5 CSG into AO providing the necessary sea and air control
 - (b) Neutralise North Torbian maritime elements IOT maintain local Sea Control of designated areas
 - (c) BPT neutralize North Torbian forces within the AO, as determined by COMD MNF-OBA as directed
 - (d) BPT to contribute to joint local air control of designated areas.
 - (e) BPT support littoral operations in support of ground forces
 - (f) BPT conduct Joint Fires in support of troop movements

- (g) BPT support SF operations
 - (h) BPT employ deception measures, including feints, displays, demonstrations, ruses and other means as directed by COMD MNF-OBA.
 - (i) BPT support NEO of US, Australian, NZ and approved Foreign nations.
 - (j) BPT conduct HADR support as required.
 - (k) Phase II will be completed when North Torbian forces have been neutralised in the AO, North Torbian land forces are expelled from South Torbia and conditions are set to transition to local stability and enforcement operations.
- (4) Phase III – Transition. This phase will commence on order, once all NT maritime elements have been neutralized in the AO and North Torbian land forces have been expelled from South Torbia. Tasks are as follows:
- (a) On order, redeployment of non-essential maritime forces is to commence
 - (b) Maritime support operations are to be conducted IOT facilitate training and transition to South Torbian maritime forces
 - (c) MCC-OBA forces BPT conduct FONOPS
 - (d) MCC-OBA forces BPT conduct HADR support
 - (e) Phase III will be completed once all MNF-OBA forces have redeployed to respective host nations and South Torbian sovereignty has been restored.

c. Groupings and Tasks.

(1) HQ MCC-OBA.

- (a) Estb HQ MCC-OBA base of operations in GENERAL SANTOS CITY in Belesia in Phase 0.
- (b) Position LCC-19 at SPOD (BATANGAS International Port, South Torbia) Phase I.
- (c) BPT to operate from Phase I onwards.

(2) CTG 70.1.

- (a) Position in the Philippines Sea during Phase 0.
- (b) Maneuver as a show of force in Phase 0.
- (c) Secure SLOC as directed to enable lodgement of LCC-OBA in South Torbia in Phase 1.

- (d) BPT estb local sea control of designated areas from Phase I onwards
 - (e) BPT estb air superiority in designated areas of the AO from Phase I onwards.
 - (f) BPT provide CAS to LCC-OBA from Phase I onwards.
- (3) CTF 72.1.1.
- (a) BPT provide ASW and SUW protection to CTG 70 during all phases.
 - (b) BPT provide ASW and SUW protection to CTF 76 during all phases.
 - (c) BPT conduct patrols throughout the AO to support ISR and targeting.
- (4) CTG74.1.
- (a) SSG 77 and SSG 78 attached OPCON for all phases.
 - (b) Position in designated submarine operating area during Phase 0.
 - (c) Provide SUW/ASW and ISR support to protect forces
 - (d) Prepare for future joint fires.
- (5) CTU 73.1.
- (a) A195 and HMNZS Aotearoa attached OPCON for all phases.
 - (b) Sustain MCC-OBA in the Philippine Sea, Verde Island Passage, Celebes Sea, Sulu Sea and Sibuyan Sea.
 - (c) Provide medical support to MCC-OBA.
- (6) CTU 75.1.
- (a) Provide EOD, diving and salvage support to MCC-OBA.
 - (b) Provide naval construction support to MCC-OBA.
 - (c) Provide Force Protection of land/port/littoral waterway operations for MCC-OBA assets.
- (7) CTU 76.1.
- (a) Preposition at XXXX in Phase 0.
 - (b) BPT to conduct possible amphibious operations.

- (c) BPT conduct mine hunting to determine the presence or absence of mines for the SLOCs within the OA.
- (8) ANZ Task Force (ATF) CTU 70.3.
- (a) Detach SSG 77 and SSG 78 OPCON to CTU 74.1
 - (b) Detach A195 and HMNZS Aotearoa to CTU 73.1 for all phases
 - (c) Position in the Philippines Sea during Phase 0.
 - (d) Maneuver as a show of force in Phase 0.
 - (e) Secure SLOC as directed to enable lodgement of LCC-OBA in South Torbia in Phase 1.
 - (f) BPT estb local sea control of designated areas from Phase I onwards
 - (g) BPT estb air superiority in designated areas of the AO from Phase I onwards.
- (9) Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force CTU 70.4.
- (a) Position in the Philippines Sea during Phase 0.
 - (b) Maneuver as a show of force in Phase 0.
 - (c) Secure SLOC as directed to enable lodgement of LCC-OBA in South Torbia in Phase 1.
 - (d) BPT estb local sea control of designated areas from Phase I onwards
 - (e) BPT estb air superiority in designated areas of the AO from Phase I onwards.
- d. Coordinating Instructions.
- (1) Timings.
- (a) G Day is XXX.
 - (b) D Day is XXX.
- (2) Maritime CCIRs.
- (a) CFMCCIR01 - Modifications in the level of readiness or demonstration of North Torbian intent to conduct offensive mining or offensive SSK Ops.

- (b) CFMCCIR02 - Evidence of disruption to delivery of humanitarian assistance.
 - (c) CFMCCIR03 - Disruption/denial of critical infrastructure (SLOCs, SPODs).
 - (d) CFMCCIR04 - Interruption to international merchant traffic in OA which may indicate a denial of Freedom of Navigation.
- (3) Rules of Engagement and the Use of Force.
- (e) Rules of Engagement requested for the Maritime environment **TBD**.
 - (f) Limitations imposed by National ROE are to be communicated to COMD MCC-OBA by XXX.
- (4) Targeting. The targeting concept is to be conducted IAW MNF-OBA direction and guidance, and national limitations.
- (5) Force Protection. All forces deploying to the JOA are to evaluate force protection measures based on potential adversary/terrorist actions. They are also to ensure vulnerability analysis and vulnerability assessments are routinely conducted to evaluate impacts on operational effectiveness.
- (6) Operations Assessment. Operations Assessment are to be conducted IAW MNF-OBA-approved processes and to enable the measurement of the effectiveness and performance of maritime operations, as well as the development of conclusions and recommendations that support decision-making.
- (7) ACC-OBA Theatre Special Instructions (SPINS). SPINS apply to all MNF-OBA fixed and rotary wing aircraft (including all UAV) operating in the AO. SPINS are to be produced and/or updated daily by the ACC-OBA CAOC.
- (8) ISR Operations. The establishment and maintenance of the Common Operating Picture (COP) is to be the priority of effort for ISR aircraft for air defensive operations, followed by information gathering to establish the required freedom of manoeuvre for MNF-OBA forces to support operations. CTF 75 and CTF 72.1 Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Force ISR missions are to be coordinated with the ACC-OBA CAOC and published in the ATO.
- (9) Air Operations. Priority of effort in Phase I will be focused on DCA operations, enforcement of the NFZ (if established), CAP, SEAD, and ISR. The priority of effort in Phase II is to be OCA, ground attack and deep strike operations to attain and maintain the freedom of movement for all LCC-Oba land forces. Carrier and Amphibious TF air operations are to be coordinated with the ACC-OBA CAOC and published in the ATO.
- (10) Transfer of Authority (TOA). Troop contributing nations to offer TOA of declared assets as early as possible, but no later than upon entering the AO.

- (11) Airspace Control. Air operations in the AO are to conform to the requirements of their respective national Air Traffic Control Authorities for all phases. Normal airspace regulations are to apply for transport and civil aircraft in the AO. MCC-OBA is to be included in the Airspace Control Plan as it has organic aviation and small UAV assets. An Airspace Control Order (ACO) is to be issued daily.
- (12) Air Tasking Order (ATO). A 72-hour Air Operations Directive (AOD) applies to the ATO tasking cycle. ATOs are to be issued daily at 1900Z, to take effect 12 hours following issue (0700Z). IOT be included in the ATO, requests for non-forecasted support must be submitted to the CAOC planning cell 36 hours ahead of the applicable ATO effective time. Requests for effects received inside of 36 hours are to be considered immediate requests and coordinated by the CAOC Combat Operations (COPS) ATO planners.

4. Administration and Logistics.

a. Concept.

- (1) Sustainment is a national responsibility; however, CTF 73 will provide in-theatre support and coordinate with 593 ESC as required. 593 ESC has been assigned the task of coordinating inter-service support requirements.
- (2) Requests for support above and beyond national capabilities are to be submitted to MCC-OBA through CTF 73. Logistics requirements, fuel and ammunition status, and days of supplies are to be reported in daily Assessment Reports (ASSESSREP). TF and TG Commanders are to promulgate OPGEN and OPTASK Messages for their respective TF/TG.
- (3) All ships to be at 30 minutes notice to conduct RAS while at sea.

b. Logistic Support Concept.

- (1) Delivery of Logistics coordination remains a 593 ESC responsibility. The MCC-OBA is required to support and be supported by MNF-OBA when operating IVO South Torbia. MCC-OBA has established CTF 73 to manage afloat and ashore maritime logistic support in the AO, coordinating support with 593ESC.
- (2) Co-operation between 593 ESC and CTF 73 is essential across the full spectrum of logistics. MCC-OBA is to exercise influence through respective LNOs to ensure the best use of limited resources.
- (3) MCC-OBA is to deploy Forward Logistic Sites (FLS) to provide ashore support to MNF-OBA. FLS teams are to be established in BATANGAS International Port (SPOD). An Advanced Logistics Support Site (ALSS) is to be established in Guam co-located with AORs fuel bunkering.

- (4) Logistics Afloat Support C2 is to be coordinated by the MCC-OBA Force Logistic Coordinator (FLC) supported by the Group Logistics Coordinators within each TF. MCC-OBA is to task CTF 73 URGs to provide continuous afloat support to enable ships to remain at sea for extended periods. Supplementary to this, units are to make full use of Port Visits (PVSTs) to replenish.
- (5) Maintenance of an accurate Recognised Maritime Logistic Picture (RMLP) is of paramount importance. The RMLP is to be maintained by the FLC and passed to CTF 73 and 593 ESC to consolidate with the whole force logistic picture.

c. Logistic Standards and Requirements.

- (1) ALSS/FLS are to facilitate continuous flows of stocks from ashore to afloat in order to sustain the maritime force during the operational tempo.
- (2) Maritime units are to arrive in the AO with sufficient quantities of Class II, Class V and blood for the operational tempo until the arrival of the follow-on Forces.
- (3) CTF 73 is to provide the required level of sustainment for the operation. AOR support is limited and stocks are to be allocated IAW MCC-OBA priorities.
- (4) The initial start level of sustainment of the maritime units (except MCM) is 30 DOS.

d. Movement Concept.

- (1) 593 ESC is to plan and conduct theatre level sustainment and distribution. Strat Ro-Ro will move to SPODs.
- (2) Air movement is to be provided by Strat Airlift into APOD at SAN SALVADOR.
- (3) Maritime Intra Theatre Lift (MITL) is to be conducted using all available air and sea transportation means coordinated by MCC-OBA and FLC, CTF 73.

e. Host Nation Support Concept. MCC-OBA TF and TG are to maximise all available Host Nation Support (HNS), through the ALSS/FLS and SPOD/APOD in South Torbian construct, to reduce the logistic footprint while maintaining effective sustainment of the force throughout the operation.

f. Supply and Maintenance Concept.

- (1) Contributing Nations are responsible for supply of Class II and IV to the AO APOD/SPOD in South Torbia.
- (2) Maintenance requiring external support is to be coordinated through MCC-OBA who is to escalate issues to 593 ESC through CTF 73 as required.

- (3) 593 ESC has no intrinsic naval maintenance capability but can arrange contracted support when required.

g. Contractor Support Concept.

- (1) 593 ESC intends to exploit commercial supply and contractor capabilities for the MCC-OBA.
- (2) It is anticipated that this will not be established prior to arrival of the maritime forces in the AO, therefore, national contracts should be invoked for initial Class I.

h. Military Engineering Concept. CTF 73 and CTF 75 organic engineering are to be exploited. MCC-OBA is to allocate a maintenance base at BATANGAS International Port if required.

i. Medical Support Concept.

- (1) The Medical Support concept is to be based on medical afloat services from units with Role 1 and Role 2 capability. There will be no initial Role 3.
- (2) Ashore Medical Support is to be coordinated through 62 MED BDE via CTF 73.
- (3) The overall medical support which includes medical treatment, evacuation, supply and blood management, is to be overseen by the MCC –OBA Medical Advisor who is to be in direct contact with 62 MED BDE.
- (4) A mass evacuation plan is to be established. STRATEVAC remains a national responsibility.
- (5) CTE 73.1.2.1 (USNS MERCY) provides Afloat Medical Group operating in the Philippine Sea.
- (6) In accordance with the Geneva Conventions, USNS MERCY and her crew do not carry any offensive weapons. Firing upon MERCY would be considered a war crime as the ship only carries weapons for self-defense.

j. Manpower. 593 ESC is to authorize entry of all personnel into the AO. Manpower in the maritime environment is to be managed by MCC-OBA. The intention is to reduce manpower to as low as practical.

5. Command and Signal.

a. Command.

- (1) COMD MCC-OBA - VADM XXXX (US) Commander 7th Fleet.
- (2) Commander Task Force 70.1 CSG 5 – RADM XXX

- (3) CAG CVW 5 – CAPT XXX
- (4) CTF 70.1.1 CG – CAPT XXX
- (5) CTF70.1.2 DESRON 15– CAPT XXX
- (6) CTU 72.1.1 – CAPT XXX
- (7) CTG 74.1 – CAPT XXX
- (8) CTF 73.1 LOG – CAPT XXXX
- (9) CTF 75.1 – CAPT XXX
- (10) CTF 76.1 ESG – RADM XXX
- (11) CTU 76.1.1 – CAPT XXX
- (12) CTU 76.1.2 – CAPT XXX
- (13) CTU 76.1.3 – CAPT XXX
- (14) 31 MEB – COL XXX USMC
- (15) ANZ TF – RADM XXX RAN (DEPUTY COMD MCC-OBA)
- (16) CTU 70.1.3 ANZ SCGRP – CAPT XXX RAN
- (17) JAPANESE MARITIME SELF DEFENSE FORCE – RADM XXX

b. Reporting Requirements.

- (1) Reporting requirements, including timings are to be outlined in the respective OPGEN to be signaled SEPCOR.
- (2) Reports are to be made via formal messaging format (OPREP) and followed by Sametime Chat messaging. Further clarification is to be provided within the OPGEN. Notwithstanding, should any Commanding Officer be unsure as to whether an incident or activity needs to be reported, they are to contact MCC-OBA at first available opportunity.

c. Tasking.

- (1) All tasking is to occur through the use of Warning Orders, (WARNORDs), Execution Orders (EXECUTOs) and Tasking Orders (TASKORDs).
- (2) These are to be released as required by MFC-OBA and MCC-OBA as appropriate.

- (3) All units are warned they may be tasked IAW their OSI, and are to be ready to support to achieve the mission.

d. Battle Rhythm.

- (1) A Battle Rhythm is to be promulgated in the OPGEN.
- (2) All units are to adhere to the reporting cycle as determined within the battle rhythm, as returns from units will have a direct impact on the ability to provide support to other MNF-OBA assets or operations.
- (3) Information flow is to be conducted using WIMS, DIMS and as required intelligence injects.
- (4) As the operation matures the battle rhythm may change, and this is to be coordinated through DIMs.

XXXX
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Annex:

A MCC-OBA Task Organization

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**ANNEX A
(TASK ORGANIZATION)
TO MCC-OBA OPORD 01**

Reference

MCC-OBA OPORD 01 (OPERATION BRONZE ACHILLES)

Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU

1. **Headquarters, Maritime Component Command**
 - a. Command Group
 - b. Maritime Operations Center
 - c. USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19).
2. **Carrier Strike Group 5 (CSG 5) CTF 70.1**
 - a. Flag Ship – USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) CTG 70.1
 - b. **Guided missile cruisers CU 70 1.1.**
 - (1) USS Antietam (CG 54) CTE 70.1.1.1
 - (2) USS Chancellorsville (CG 62) CTE 70.1.1.2
 - (3) USS Shiloh (CG 67) CTE 70.1.1.3.
 - c. **Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW 5).**
 - (1) VFA-27 Strike Fighter Sqn 27 (10 X FA-18E)
 - (2) VFA-102 Strike Fighter Sqn 102(10 X FA-18E)
 - (3) VFA-115Strike Fighter Sqn 115(10 X FA-18E)
 - (4) VFA-195 Strike Fighter Sqn 195 (10 X FA-18E)
 - (5) VAW-125 Airborne C2 Sqn 125 (4 X E2D Hawkeye)
 - (6) VAQ-141 Electronic Attack Sqn 141 (4 X EA-18G Growler)
 - (7) VRC-30 Fleet log Spt Sqn 30/Det 5 (2 X C-2A Greyhound)
 - (8) HSC-12 Helo Sea Combat Sqn 12 (8 X MH-60S Seahawk)

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- (9) HSM-77 Helo Maritime Strike Sqn 77 (11 X MH-60R Seahawk)
- (10) HSM-51 Helo Maritime Strike Sqn 51 (11 X MHR-60R Seahawk).
- d. Destroyer Sqn (DESRON) 15 CTF 70.1.2.
 - (1) USS Barry (DDG 52) CTE 70.1.2.1
 - (2) USS Benfold (DDG 65) CTE 70.1.2.2
 - (3) USS MILIUS (DDG-69) CTE 70.1.2.2
 - (4) USS HIGGINS (DDG 76) CTE 70.1.2.4
 - (5) USS HOWARD (DDG-83) CTE 70.1.2.5
 - (6) USS DEWEY (DDG 105) CTE 70.1.2.6
 - (7) USS RALPH JOHNSON (DDG 114) CTE 70.1.2.7
 - (8) USS RAFAEL PERALTA (DDG CTE 70.1.2.8.
- 3. Patrol and Reconnaissance Force (CTF 72) CTU 72.1.1. 4 X P-8A
 - (1) 1 X P-8A CTE 72.2.1.1
 - (2) 1 X P-8A CTE 72.2.1.2
 - (3) 1 X P-8A CTE 72.2.1.3
 - (4) 1 X P-8A CTE 72.2.1.4.
- 4. Submarine Force (CTF-74) CTG 74.1.
 - a. Attack Submarines (SSN) CTU 74.1.1.
 - (1) USS Key West (SSN 722) CTE 74.1.1.1
 - (2) USS Oklahoma City (SSN 723) CTE 74.1.1.2
 - (3) USS Topeka (SSN 754) CTE 74.1.1.3
 - (4) USS Asheville (SSN 758) CTE 74.1.1.4
 - b. Submarine tenders CTU 74.1.2.
 - (1) USS Frank Cable (AS 40) CTE 74.1.2.1
 - (2) USS Emory S. Land (AS 39) CTE 74.1.2.2.

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5. **Logistics Group (CTF 73) CTU 73.1.**
 - a. USNS Rainier (T-AOE-7) CTE 73.1.1.1
 - b. USNS Sacagawea (T-AKE 2) CTE 73.1.1.2
 - c. USNS Watkins (T-AKR 315) CTE 73.1.1.3
 - d. SS Wright (T-AVB 3) CTE 73.1.1.4
 - e. USNS Mercy (T-AH-19) CTE 73.1.2.1.
6. **Navy Expeditionary Forces Command Pacific CTF 75.1**
 - a. EOD Mobile Unit Five CTE 75.1.1.1
 - b. CRG 1 Det Guam CTE 5.1.1.2
 - c. Naval Mobile Construction Bn DET CTE 75.1.1.3.
7. **ESG 7/CTF 76.1.**
 - a. **Amphibious Sqn CTU 76.1.1,**
 - (1) PHIBRON Staff
 - (2) USS Essex (LHD-2)
 - (3) USS Ashland (LSD-48)
 - (4) USS New Orleans (LPD-18).
 - b. **Mine Countermeasures Squadron (COMCMRON) 7 CTU 76.1.2**
 - (1) USS Patriot (MCM 7)
 - (2) USS Pioneer (MCM 9)
 - c. **Naval Spt Elements CTU 76.1.3.**
 - (1) ACU 1
 - (2) ACU 5
 - (3) NBU-7
 - (4) BMU-1
 - (5) Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 25

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- (6) Tac Air Sqn 12, Det W Pacific
 - (7) Fleet Surgical Team 7
 - (8) Helicopter Mine Countermeasures 14 DET 2A.
- d. 31st Marine Expeditionary Bde .
- (1) Comd element
 - (2) Bn landing team 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines
 - (3) MAG-36
 - (4) Combat Log Bn 31
8. **ANZ Task Force (ATF)**
- a. SCGRP CTU 70.1.3.
- (1) HMAS Brisbane – D41 (DDG) equipped with 1 x MH 60-R
 - (2) HMAS Hobart – D39 (DDG) equipped with 1 x MH 60-R
 - (3) HMAS Anzac – FFH 150 equipped with 1 x MH 60-R
 - (4) HMAS Arunta – FFH 151 equipped with 1 x MH 60-R
 - (5) HMAS Ballarat – FFH 155 equipped with 1 x MH 60-R
 - (6) HMAS Parramatta – FFH 154 equipped with 1 x MH 60-R
 - (7) HMNZS Te Kaha – F77 (FFH) 1 x SH-2G Super Seasprite embarked
 - (8) HMAS Sheean (SSG 77)
 - (9) HMAS Rankin (SSG 78).
- b. ATG CTU 75.1.2.
- (1) HMAS Adelaide – L01 (LHD) equipped with 2 x MRH 90
 - (2) HMAS Canberra – L02 (LHD) equipped with 2 x MRH 90
 - (3) HMAS Choules – L100 (LSD) 1 x MRH 90 embarked
 - (4) HMAS Supply A195 (AOR)
 - (5) HMNZS Canterbury – L421 (MRV)

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(6) HMNZS Aotearoa (AOR).

9. **Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force.**

a. **SCGRP CTU 70.1.4.**

(1) DDG-179 Maya

(2) DDG-178 Ashigara

(3) DDG-174 Kirishima

(4) DE-229 Abukuma

(5) DE-230 Jintsū

(6) AOE-422 Towada.

b. **ATG CTU 75.1.3.**

(1) DDH-181 Hyuga

(2) 1st Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment.