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HQ ACC OBA  
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OPS 01/XX

ACC-OBA OPORD 01/XX – OPERATION BRONZE ACHILLES (OBA)

References:

- A. MNF-OBA OPORD 01
- B. US Joint Publication 3-16 Multinational Operations
- C. US Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations
- D. US Joint Publication 3-30 Joint Air Operations
- E. Indo-Pacific Anti-Nuclear Alliance Charter
- F. Status of Forces Agreement, Australia and Belesia
- G. Maps: Map Series S701, S702, S711, S721, S733, PHILIPPINES; Sheets TBD

Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU.

1. Situation.

a. Current Situation. The Torbian People's Army (TPA) forces launched a surprise offensive against the Republic of Torbia (ROT) on two fronts.

- (1) On DDXXXXMONYY under cover of the combined Olvanan/North Torbian Exercise RISEN SWORD, a TPA Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) of approximately brigade size launched an amphibious assault IVO of SAN NARCISO (51PSS861616) and SAN ANTONIO (51PSS869547). Having consolidated their beachhead MEF forces began to advance SE wards towards OLONGAPO (51PTS063041). Their objective was assessed to be the SUBIC BAY airport and port facilities (51PTS149350).
- (2) As the TPA MEF conducted their assault, North Torbian air force (TPAF) bombers attacked and knocked out South Torbian military radar installations along the South Torbian west coast. North Torbian SPF teams attacked key infrastructure providing power to military installations in the CASTILLEJOS-SUBIC-OLONGAPO region and the MAGTFST command element.
- (3) A South Torbian frigate was sunk by torpedo in South Torbian territorial waters west of MORONG. North Torbian submarines, probably elements of the North Torbian Western Fleet operating in the region are suspected of carrying out this attack.
- (4) A second wave of North Torbian Air force bombers targeted South Torbian Naval bases in OLONGAPO, MANILA, BATANGAS CITY and GENERAL NAKAR.

North Torbian SPF teams are suspected of designating vessels for targeting. North Torbian submarines have laid mines in the entrance to SUBIC BAY, MANILA BAY and in the VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE as well as the northern entrance to the POLILLO STRAIT. This has resulted in the South Torbian Navy no longer being an effective force and confined to their home ports.

- (5) Supported by North Torbian SPF elements TPAF bombers also targeted South Torbian air bases in MANILA, MAMBURAO, SAN JOSE and ANGELES causing significant losses. All remaining South Torbian aircraft have been redeployed to air bases on MINDORO.
- (6) On DDXXXXMONYY under cover of the TPA's multi-regional command military exercise, EXERCISE RED PHOENIX, the TPA launched a land offensive initiated with artillery barrages on South Torbian headquarters, command posts and cantonment areas along the Military Demarcation Line (MDL). Simultaneously multiple air bases and air defense sites were subjected to EW jamming and assault by TPA SPF.
- (7) The TPA Southern Army initial attack penetrated the ROTA forces along the MDL using surface crossing points and a system of tunnels under the MDL. Possible objectives were identified as DAGUPAN (51QTT146758) in the west, TARLAC (51PTT 420135) in the centre and CABANATUAN (51PTT825133) in the east.
- (8) The Torbian People's Navy (TPN) Western Fleet continues to support the North Torbian MEF assault on OLONGAPO. Reports indicate that the TPN Eastern fleet was able to sail from home ports under the cover of fog and heavy clouds and is believed to be concentrating to the north east of North Torbia in the Philippine Sea. Exact locations are unknown at this stage.
- (9) The TPAF is able to achieve local air superiority for short periods of time over North Torbian-occupied territory. The recent acquisition of H-6 (Hong-6) Strategic Bombers and J-16D EW aircraft from Olvana as well as the upgrade of the TPA's coastal artillery battalions provides the North Torbians with an enhanced A2AD capability and the ability to extend their air power eastwards as far as Guam.
- (10) Unable to sustain effective operations to stop the North Torbian advance southwards South Torbia has sought assistance from the international community. Fellow members of the Indo-Pacific Anti-Nuclear Alliance (IPANA), the US, Australia, New Zealand and Japan have agreed to provide military assistance IOT to blunt the North Torbian attack, expel TPA forces from South Torbia and restore international borders. Belesia has agreed to allow the US, Australia, New Zealand and Japan to use General Santos City and Zamboanga as theatre entry points for Operation Bronze Achilles.

b. Guidance.

- (1) The JFACC guidance for this operation is that Commanders are at all times to act IAW International Law of Land Conflict and while maintaining the support of the South Torbian government, are to support the LCC-OBA and MCC-OBA IOT achieve MNF-OBA strategic aim, that being:
  - (a) End North Torbian aggression towards South Torbia
  - (b) Expulsion of all North Torbian Military Forces from South Torbian sovereign territory
  - (c) Creation of a free, safe, secure and stable environment in the region
  - (d) Provide the environment for the continuation of South Torbian democratic national governance and developmental programs.
- (2) This is a localised operation between North Torbia and South Torbia, and therefore all subordinate commanders must ensure that no actions taken by them will antagonise neutral countries.
- (3) At all times subordinate commanders are to conduct operations within international guidelines and endeavour to reduce collateral death and damage to non-combatants.
- (4) While MNF-OBA supports the use of conventional military forces to attain the abovementioned end state, the expulsion of all North Torbian Military Forces from South Torbian sovereign territory is a desired off-ramp which should lead to a reduction in hostilities and a posture aimed to deter further North Torbian aggression.

c. Area of Operations (AO). The ACC-OBA AO includes the landmasses, national airspace and territorial waters of South Torbia and Belesia. It also includes the airspace over the following:

- (1) The Luzon Strait, bounded by Taiwan in the north and North Torbia in the south, which connects the Philippine Sea to the South China Sea in the western Pacific Ocean.
- (2) The Philippines Sea bounded by the Torbias and Taiwan to the west, Japan to the north, the Marianas to the east and Palau to the south.
- (3) The South China Sea bounded by the furthest limit of the Olvanan Exclusive Economic Zone in the north, in the west by the Indochinese Peninsula, in the east by the islands of Taiwan and the Torbias (mainly Luzon, Mindoro and Palawan), and in the south by Borneo, eastern Sumatra and the Bangka Belitung Islands.

- (4) The Celebes Sea which is bordered on the north by the Sulu Archipelago and Sulu Sea and Mindanao Island, on the east by the Sangihe Islands chain, on the south by Sulawesi's Minahasa Peninsula, and on the west by northern Kalimantan in Indonesia.
- (5) The Sulu Sea, a body of water in the southwestern area of the archipelago, separated from the South China Sea in the northwest by Palawan and from the Celebes Sea in the southeast by the Sulu Archipelago.
- (6) The Sibuyan Sea is connected to the Sulu Sea via the Tablas Strait in the west, the South China Sea via the Verde Island Passage in the northwest, and the Visayan Sea via the Jintotolo Channel in the south-east.
- (7) The Verde Island Passage separates the islands of Luzon and Mindoro, connecting the South China Sea with the Tayabas Bay and the Sibuyan Sea beyond. It is the main shipping route between the Port of Manila and the Visayas and Mindanao in the south.
- (8) Constraints.
  - (a) No MNF-OBA forces are to cross the MDL/NLL into North Torbia or enter North Torbian airspace.
  - (b) MNF-OBA air forces operating over the South China Sea are to avoid engagement with Olvanan Naval and Air Forces.

d. North Torbian Military Forces.

- (1) General.
  - (c) North Torbia's military has played a significant domestic role in shaping the nation. As the government's largest asset, it touches nearly every aspect of life within North Torbia.
  - (d) The Torbian People's Army (TPA) controls the ground, air, and naval forces in the Democratic People's Republic of Torbia (DPRT) and is one of the most militarized countries in the world with approximately half a million active duty military personnel and over two million reservists.
  - (e) Most of the military is located along the border with the Republic of Torbia (South Torbia) as North Torbia's stated intent is to unify the country under DPRT control. North Torbia often looks toward Olvana to provide support for naval and amphibious operations.
  - (f) Much of the North Torbian force's equipment is older Donovanian equipment, North Torbia commenced a modernization program in 2014. This has involved the acquisition of more modern Olvanan equipment and the development of an A2AD strategy. The three artillery coastal battalions

began replacing their tubed artillery equipment with the latest Olvanan SAM, ASM and ASBM systems. INTEL reports believe that these coastal artillery battalions are now structured as follows:

- i. 21<sup>st</sup> Coastal Artillery Battalion is now an AD artillery battalion equipped with HQ-9 SAM systems
- ii. 22<sup>nd</sup> Coastal Artillery Battalion is equipped with YJ-18C ASM systems
- iii. 23<sup>rd</sup> Coastal Artillery Battalion is equipped with DF-21D ASBM systems.

(2) North Torbian Air Defence Systems.

- (a) North Torbian air defense supports combined arms combat by the comprehensive integration of a large number and variety of weapons and associated equipment into an effective, redundant air defense system. Employment of this system pursues the basic objectives of air defense by employing certain concepts and principles. This is best accomplished by establishing an integrated air defense system (IADS).
- (b) The TPA air defense systems use a variety of long-range, medium-range, and short-range air defense artillery weapons. SAMs used by the TPA include:
  - i. MANPAD – SA-18 and FN-6, these are used to engage and defeat low and slow aerial targets as well as deter or canalize higher, faster, and more-capable targets.
  - ii. SHORAD – HQ-7B including AA guns such as the SA19 and PGZ-07, which move with and provide coverage to manoeuvre elements, deny the use of tactical airspace over wide areas to low-altitude aircraft and protect longer-range fires systems by intercepting both threat aircraft and munitions.
  - iii. Medium range AD – SA-17, which use a combination of range and mobility to defeat suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) efforts while defeating or deterring attacks by aircraft on ground forces.
  - iv. Long range AD – HQ-9 and S-400, which are used as part of the North Torbian A2AD strategy.
- (c) The North Torbians employ its air defense units and all-arms air defense in three phases. The phases are defined by where the enemy aircraft are and what they are doing.

- i. Phase I: Actions against enemy aircraft and control systems on the ground before they are employed. This includes all actions taken to destroy enemy aircraft and control systems before they are employed by targeting aircraft while they are still on the ground at airfields or in marshalling or staging areas. This “basing area” extends from enemy home territory, to allied basing and staging areas, to and including in-theater enemy support areas down to enemy division level. These actions may be carried out by North Torbian Special Forces or insurgents.
- ii. Phase II: Actions against enemy aircraft while in flight but before they enter the airspace over North Torbian ground maneuver forces.
- iii. Phase III: Actions against enemy aircraft that have penetrated into that airspace.

(3) North Torbian Naval Threat.

- (a) In past years the Torbian People’s Navy (TPN) was predominantly a brown water fleet with obsolete and aging equipment. These have been refreshed with fourth and fifth generation Naval assets. Third generation equipment still in service has generally been refitted and what was often old, unreliable and unserviceable is now routinely state of the art providing the TPN with a potent blue water capability. This process has been almost entirely been facilitated by Olvana.
- (b) In concert with the supply of new equipment, Olvana has provided significant training resources and increased the frequency and complexity of bilateral exercises. The capability, in both hardware and ability to effectively employ it, has never been more formidable.
- (c) The TPN consists of two fleets:
  - i. The Western Fleet’s role is to support the North Torbian Marine Expeditionary Force and is equipped with a range of amphibious platforms, surface combatant platforms as well as a fast boat squadron consisting of Type 22 PHM – Houbei and Taregh (Boghammar) platforms.
  - ii. The Eastern Fleet’s role is to conduct blue water operations, is equipped with Renhai Type 055 CGs, Luyang III DDGs and Song SSGs that are all YJ-18B ASM capable and is assessed as an integral component of the North Torbian A2AD strategy.
- (d) TPN platforms are equipped with a range of SAM systems including:
  - i. HHQ-9B SAM

- ii. HHQ-10 SAM
  - iii. HQ-7 SAM
  - iv. HHQ-16 SAM.
- (e) The TPN has a developing UAV capability. Olvanan-built EA-03 and BZK-005 UAVs were observed during an Eastern Fleet exercise off the north east coast of North Torbia almost 12 months ago.
- (f) There are reports that at least one, possibly two North Torbian Merchant container vessels are equipped with the Club-K Containerized Anti-ship Missile System.
- (4) North Torbian Air Threat.
- (a) The primary mission of the Torbian People's Air force (TPAF) is to defend its homeland from the air, with secondary missions to provide tactical air support to the army and navy, transportation, logistical support, and SPF insertion/extraction.
  - (b) The TPAF operates primarily tier 2 and 3 equipment and planes but is in the process of introducing a number of tier 1 platforms. Recent upgrades to its strategic bomber fleet enhance its A2AD strategy. The upgraded Tu-22M3M, represents enhanced capability in virtually every area except stealth. In addition to the new land-attack missiles it can also be equipped with long-range ultrahigh-speed dual-capable (nuclear and conventional) missiles with land-attack and anti-ship capability.
  - (c) The H-6 (Hong-6) strategic bomber is capable of carrying air-launched cruise missiles such as the YJ-100 as well as a range of other anti-ship and air-to-ground missiles. With a range of 6,000 km it is a key component of North Torbia's A2AD strategy.
  - (d) North Torbia recently acquired J-16D aircraft from Olvana to provide an EW jamming capability. These platforms are likely to work with the Hong-6 bombers.
  - (e) The primary North Torbian air superiority fighter is the J-11B Flanker. However it also employs a range of multi-role aircraft including the Su-30MKK and the J-16 which will also be used in an air superiority role.
  - (f) The TPAF primary fixed wing ground attack aircraft is the Su-25 Frogfoot. These aircraft are augmented by rotary wing attack helicopters including the Z-19, MI-17 HIP H and MI-35.
  - (g) Specialist aircraft include the KJ-2000 Mainring, Y-8H1 and SU-24 MR.

- (h) All of the TPAF's II-76MD fleet are capable of providing in-flight refuelling.
- (5) Olvana. Whilst not directly involved, Olvana is likely to provide support to North Torbia as an extension of its own A2AD strategy. An Olvanan Carrier Strike Group (CSG) remains on station in South China Sea and is possibly providing early warning and surveillance spt to the North Torbian Eastern Fleet SAG. It may also attempt to block coalition naval forces entering the South China Sea. Recent reports confirm that Olvana is providing:
- (a) Access to Olvanan satellite capability for surveillance and reconnaissance including the Yaogan series of satellites
  - (b) Internet services
  - (c) Over-the-Horizon radar
  - (d) YLC-8B 3D Long-Range Anti-Stealth Surveillance Radar
  - (e) Additional Y-8G (High New 3) Long-Range Electronic Jamming Aircraft flying under Olvanan livery
  - (f) Additional KJ-2000 (Mainring) Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft flying under Olvanan livery
  - (g) H-6 (Hong-6) Strategic Bombers
  - (h) J-16D EW aircraft
  - (i) DF-11 SS Short Range Ballistic Missiles to replace the ageing SS-21
  - (j) DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles
  - (k) YJ-12 Supersonic Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles
  - (l) HQ-9 (Hong Qi 9) 8x8 Long-Range Air Defense Missile Systems.
- (6) Donovia. Reports indicate that Donovia recently provided a battery of the S-400 Triumph (SA-21 Growler) Long-Range Surface-to-air Missile System. It is highly likely that this weapon system is manned by the Fólkvangr Group, Donovanian contractors supported by Donovanian AD military advisors.
- (7) Ariana. South Torbian intelligence sources report sightings of Arianian-manufactured UAVs in South Torbian airspace including:
- (a) Qasef-1 – a recon and loitering munition drone
  - (b) Mohajer-4 – a tactical UAV



- (c) Shahed-129 – medium altitude long-endurance UAV.
- (8) Assessment.
- (a) Supported by the North Torbian Airforce, North Torbian forces will continue their ground offensive to secure intermediate objectives and consolidate before continuing their advance to Manila.
  - (b) TPA MEF forces will continue to advance SE wards to seize the SUBIC BAY airport and port facilities.
  - (c) North Torbian MLCOA. North Torbia will employ its A2AD strategy IOT enable TPA ground forces to advance on Manila and unite the two Torbias by preventing/delaying coalition forces deploying to South Torbia.
    - i. The North Torbian Eastern Fleet seeks engagement with 5 CSG.
    - ii. The North Torbian air force will seek to locate and engage coalition forces deploying to South Torbia by sea and air.
    - iii. The North Torbian Western Fleet continues supporting the Amphibious Task Group (ATG).
    - iv. North Torbia continues to employ components of its A2AD system to keep US and coalition forces at a distance to stop them being able to provide military support to South Torbia.
    - v. The North Torbian government continues its INFOWAR campaign to legitimise its invasion of South Torbia to unite the two countries.
    - vi. An Olvanan CSG remains on station in the South China Sea close to the Luzon Strait possibly to provide early warning and surveillance spt to the North Torbian Eastern Fleet. It may also attempt to block coalition naval forces entering the South China Sea.
    - vii. Olvana continues to spt North Torbia providing access to its ISR and nav satellite system.
  - (d) MLCOA End State. North Torbia successfully prevents US and coalition intervention in South Torbia and captures Manila.
  - (e) North Torbian MDCOA. North Torbia creates an incident to obtain direct support from Olvana IOT to enable it to unite the two Torbias.
    - i. Olvana agrees to direct involvement in the conflict and deploys ground forces plus additional AD, ENGR and ABSM, EW and comms equip.

- ii. The Olvanan CSG deploys to the Philippine Sea to join with the TPN Eastern Fleet to directly engage with 5 CSG. OPN submarines may also join the CSG.
  - iii. North Torbian Western Fleet could also be reinforced with an OPN SAG to provide additional spt to the Amphibious Task Group (ATG).
  - iv. Olvanan People's Air Force (OPAF) units are likely to be deployed to North Torbia to bolster the TPAF bomber regt to engage targets in Okinawa, Guam and Palau.
  - v. Increased and enhanced space, EW and IW spt provided to bolster the North Torbian A2AD strategy and to prosecute the INFOWAR battle to reinforce North Torbia's legitimate right to unite the two countries by force.
  - vi. Further OPN assets including submarines are to deploy to the South China Sea and Luzon Strait IOT to isolate the Torbian archipelago.
- (f) MDCOA End State. Combined North Torbian and Olvanan forces overcome friendly forces, destroying their combat effectiveness forcing the South Torbian government to capitulate and agree to North Torbia's demands.
- (g) Critical Requirements.
- i. Artillery and AD Command Elements
  - ii. TPAF Command Elements
  - iii. TPNF Command Elements
  - iv. Artillery intelligence system
  - v. Air Force intelligence system
  - vi. UAV system
  - vii. Artillery and AD HQ & Control locations
  - viii. Artillery and AD Communications systems
  - ix. Intelligence communications systems
  - x. Artillery and AD / Air Force systems
  - xi. Artillery and AD radars
  - xii. Coastal Defence missile batteries

- xiii. Artillery ammunition including ASM and ASBM stocks and inventories
- xiv. AD missiles stocks and inventories
- xv. Aircraft systems (Hong-6, Tu-22M3 and J-17)
- xvi. RW Aircraft systems
- xvii. Aerial refuelling of FW air assets
- xviii. Airfield security.

(h) Critical Vulnerabilities.

- i. Artillery and AD HQ locations open to destruction
- ii. Artillery and AD radars
- iii. Artillery ISR system open to deception & denial of observation
- iv. Artillery communications systems susceptible to disruption (physical & electronic)
- v. UAV control systems open to disruption
- vi. RW assets (including FARPs) open to destruction
- vii. ASCM open to disruption (electronic)
- viii. Pilots & artillery operators susceptible to deception & influence
- ix. MSR choke points open to disruption or denial for artillery resupply in AO
- x. Fuel depots susceptible to destruction in AO
- xi. Artillery & RW transports open to physical destruction in AO
- xii. CDU open to destruction in coastal areas
- xiii. Airfields open to disruption in AO.

- e. Friendly Forces. ACC-OBA consists of:
- (1) 613<sup>th</sup> Air Operations Center.
  - (2) Air Expeditionary Task Force – Operation Bronze Achilles (AETF-OBA). The AETF-OBA is comprised of:
    - (a) AEW-Attack
    - (b) AEW-EW
    - (c) AEW-C2 and ISR
    - (d) AEW-Air Mobility and AAR
    - (e) AEG-SPT.
  - (3) US Navy.
    - (a) Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW 5).
    - (b) A Patrol and Reconnaissance Force of 4 X P-8A from CTF 72
  - (4) RAAF/RNZAF
    - (a) Fighters
    - (b) EW platforms
    - (c) C2 and ISR platforms
    - (d) Air mobility and AAR
    - (e) Support.
  - (5) Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF).
    - (a) Fighter assets
    - (b) EW/Cs and ISR
    - (c) Air mobility and AAR.
  - (6) A detailed Task Organisation for ACC-OBA is at Annex A.
  - (7) Republic of Torbia Air Force (ROTAF). The ROTAF suffered significant losses during the first wave of North Torbian air attacks. Remaining assets have relocated to air bases on the Island of MINDORO and will be used to support the ROTA 3rd Army forces defending MANILA and BATANGAS CITY.

f. Centre of Gravity Analysis (COG).

- (1) MNF-OBA. The friendly strategic COG is the MNF-OBA offensive firepower capability.
- (2) ACC-OBA. The ACC-OBA's COG is the operation of Guam, Palau, Okinawa, General Santos and Zamboanga airfields. In order to generate the air superiority required to permit the maritime and ground operations ACC-OBA needs to be able to generate sustained ISR, C2, air mobility and offensive air capability.
- (3) ACC-OBA Operational Critical Requirements (CRs). The following are the friendly CRs:
  - (a) Support from South Torbian government and forces
  - (b) Secure airfields based in Guam, Palau, Okinawa and Belesia (from ground and air attack)
  - (c) Effective command, control, and communication (C3) system
  - (d) Secure supply and distribution of munitions and POL
  - (e) Effective ISR
  - (f) Ability to achieve and maintain Air Superiority
  - (g) Ability to conduct integrated operations.

g. ACC-OBA Operational Critical Vulnerabilities (CVs). The following are the friendly operational CVs:

- (1) Cultural differences between coalition forces and host nation
- (2) Cyber-attack against South Torbian and Belesian infrastructure supporting ACC-OBA operations
- (3) Disruption to supply lines between the US, Australia and Japan, and Belesia (Air and Maritime)
- (4) Disruption to the initial deployment of forces to Belesia
- (5) Disruption of the initial deployment forces to South Torbia.

h. MNF-OBA Assumptions. The following are the assumptions developed from analysis and guidance:

- (1) MNF-OBA will be a single rotation deployment
- (2) MNF-OBA will include FE from other nations

- (3) Full SOFA and cooperation with Belesia and South Torbia to allow staging of Coalition Forces (CF) from BX territory into South Torbia
- (4) COMD MNF-OBA will not have complete operational command of all Host Nations (South Torbia) Forces within the AO
- (5) COMD MNF-OBA will have Operational Control of designated South Torbian Forces
- (6) South Torbian Forces will only be involved in a defensive capacity
- (7) No staging of CF out of South China Sea.

i. ACC-OBA Assumptions. The following are ACC-OBA derived planning assumptions:

- (1) ACC-OBA will be a single rotational deployment with logistic support from the US, Australia and Japan.
- (2) ACC-OBA will include air elements from other nations (Australia, New Zealand and Japan).
- (3) Belesian air elements will provide DCA of airfields based at Gen Santos and Zamboanga.
- (4) Belesian Forces will provide ground defence of airfields – Gen Santos and Zamboanga.
- (5) Olvana will not intervene or conduct kinetic air operations in the JFAO as long as their interests are not threatened.
- (6) The intelligence picture of North Torbian forces in South Torbia is accurate.
- (7) The intelligence picture of North Torbian maritime and air forces is accurate.

j. Limitations-Restraints (Must NOT Do). The following restraints have been imposed by higher command guidance and the operational environment:

- (1) The use of civilian air routes in and out of the JFAO are not to be disrupted.
- (2) Operations are not to adversely affect the South Torbian economy more than is necessary.
- (3) Operations are not to disrupt maritime traffic in the region outside the JFAO.
- (4) ACC-OBA aircraft are not to enter North Torbian airspace.
- (5) ACC-OBA aircraft are to avoid engagement with Olvanan aircraft.

k. Limitations-Constraints (Must Do). The following constraints have been imposed by higher command guidance and the operational environment:

- (1) Minimize the use of scarce South Torbian resources.
- (2) Minimize collateral damage and civilian casualties in South Torbia.
- (3) Deploy to the JFAO as soon as possible in a sequence coordinated by MNF-OBA.
- (4) Work closely with the UN to facilitate the work of the UN agencies, IOs and NGOs.
- (5) Minimize the demand on South Torbian resources.
- (6) Operate in accordance with the SOFA with South Torbia and Belesia.

l. Legal Considerations. Detailed legal considerations are contained in Annex FF to Annex C – Operations.

m. Rules of Engagement (ROE). At all times operations are to be conducted IAW ROE as drafted in Annex GG to the MNF\_OBA OPOD (Ref A). Of note Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 apply to individual phases of the operation. Mission specific ROE are to be published at a later date.

2. Mission. On Order, ACC-OBA is to gain and maintain air superiority over the JFAO to allow freedom of movement for the MNF-OBA, LCC-OBA and MCC-OBA IOT expel all North Torbian forces from the South Torbian sovereign territory to enable the creation of safe and secure conditions in South Torbia and the surrounding region.

3. Execution.

a. Commander MNF-OBA Intent.

- (1) Purpose. To neutralize TPN forces IOT destroy their capability to conduct offensive operations and to restore pre-war international borders.
- (2) Key Tasks. Using a combination of both kinetic and non-kinetic forces:
  - (a) Neutralize North Torbia's maritime and air forces to enable LCC-OBA forces to land in South Torbia to conduct offensive operations to expel North Torbian ground forces from South Torbia
  - (b) Achieve air superiority and sea control in the AO
  - (c) Neutralise the North Torbian A2AD system
  - (d) Neutralize the North Torbian cyber and EW capabilities
  - (e) Deter direct Olvanan involvement.

- (3) End State. North Torbian forces are defeated in the AO. Internal stability and legitimate governance have been restored.
- b. ACC-OBA Concept of Operations. The directed effort is to:
- (1) Gain and maintain air superiority in the JFAO (ESSENTIAL).
  - (2) Collect intelligence on all North Torbian forces in the JFAO (ESSENTIAL);
  - (3) Deter North Torbian or any North Torbian allied countries from offensive operations against South Torbia and its coalition partners (ESSENTIAL).
  - (4) Support the UN agencies, IOs and NGOs in their rebuilding and peacekeeping efforts (ESSENTIAL).
- c. JFACC Intent. Through air power support the expulsion of North Torbian forces from South Torbian sovereign territory and deter further North Torbian aggression IOT stabilise the region.
- d. JFACC Purpose. To support the LCC-OBA ground and MCC-OBA and maritime Schemes of Manoeuvre (SoM) to deter North Torbian aggression and expel North Torbian forces from South Torbian sovereign territory.
- e. JFACC Method. To provide the following:
- (1) An air combat capability to establish and maintain air superiority throughout the operation.
  - (2) An air mobility capability to support MNF-OBA in attaining the desired end state.
  - (3) An ISR capability to assist in decision making and safeguard MNF-OBA elements.
  - (4) BPT provide a maritime strike capability should this be requested by MCC-OBA.
  - (5) BPT provide supporting kinetic and non-kinetic effects should this be requested by the LCC-OBA
- f. ACC-OBA End State. The ACC-OBA end state is as follows:
- (1) North Torbian ground forces have been expelled from South Torbia.
  - (2) North Torbian Forces have been expelled from South Torbian sovereign territory.
  - (3) ACC-OBA assets have been returned to national control after a successful transfer of MNF-OBA responsibilities to the designated follow on force/authority.



g. General Outline. Air operations to support MNF-OBA are to be conducted in four phases as follows:

(1) Phase 0 – Shaping.

- (a) The main effort is to establish air superiority over key areas including GENERAL SANTOS CITY and ZAMBUANGA in Belesia, South Torbia and in particular the SPOD established in BATANGAS International Port and SLOC approaches to the SPOD to enable disembarkation for a follow on force to support Phase 1 and beyond. ACC-OBA will commence attrition of NT A2AD assets through Global and Long Range Strike assets.
- (b) Air superiority and a common operating picture is to be established over the Philippine Sea IOT to assist in neutralising the North Torbian A2AD strategy.
- (c) ACC-OBA is to utilize all available ISR assets to understand the North Torbian posture, intentions and pattern of life. Location of key A2AD elements, specifically S-400 and HQ-9 batteries, is to be prioritized.
- (d) During Phase 0, ACC-OBA prosecution of key A2AD nodes will be conducted by Global Strike assets, supported by OCA packages.
- (e) Further, the ISR assets are to provide Indicators and Warnings to friendly and coalition assets in response to any threat from North Torbia. During Phase 0 ACC-OBA is to be ready to move assets in support of Phase 1 and beyond if called on.
- (f) Throughout the phase, and as the localised air superiority permits, ACC-OBA is to direct ISR assets to collect in accordance with the JIPCL and report on all North Torbian movements with a specific priority on developing a robust maritime operating picture and providing information to educate the Joint Targeting Cycle in support of Phase 1 lodgement operations. Evolving over the phase, collection activities must be synchronised in priority and time with any maritime strike targeting lists to ensure timely threat passing to enable ACC-OBA to provide localised air superiority over the SPOD and APOD.

(2) Phase I – Deployment.

- (a) Phase I is the denial phase and lodgement of ground forces in South Torbia. A further emphasis will be placed on the ISR operations commenced in Phase 0 in order to identify NT force posture, intentions, and patterns of life, alongside the continued attrition of NT A2AD assets.
- (b) ACC-OBA is to generate a common operating picture to understand the North Torbian posture, intentions and pattern of life and to inform the Joint Targeting Cycle.

- (c) ACC-OBA is to achieve air superiority in the JFAO through Offensive Counter Air (OCA) operations.
  - (d) ACC-OBA is to establish and patrol an Air Exclusion Zone (AEZ) to disrupt and deny logistical support to North Torbian ground forces.
  - (e) As LCC-OBA ground forces lodge in South Torbia ACC-OBA is to conduct to Defensive Counter Air (DCA) operations supporting LCC-OBA while generating OCA packages as required.
  - (f) LCC-OBA is to be provided with AI, strike and Close Air Support (CAS) mission sets.
  - (g) ACC-OBA is to generate daily OCA packages consisting of C2, SEAD, STRIKE, ESCORT, AAR, EW and HVAA protection to ensure achieve air superiority. OCA packages will prioritise targeting of IADS/A2AD elements.
  - (h) ACC-OBA is to provide air mobility assets to assist in the lodgement of the LCC-OBA forces in South Torbia using the APOD at BASILIO FERNANDO AIR BASE.
- (3) Phase II – Expulsion of North Torbian forces from South Torbian sovereign territory.
- (a) ACC-OBA’s primary tasks during this phase are to maintain control of the air while simultaneously supporting ground and maritime forces through timely application of kinetic and non-kinetic effects.
  - (b) ACC-OBA is to generate a persistent DCA posture in the JFAO with reference to the Defended Asset List (DAL).
  - (c) ACC-OBA is to generate daily OCA packages consisting of C2, SEAD, STRIKE, ESCORT, AAR, EW and HVAA-P.
  - (d) ACC-OBA is to provide CAS and AI operations IOT support LCC-OBA forces to block the North Torbian advance in South Torbia and force them to withdraw back across the DML.
  - (e) Throughout the phase, ACC-OBA must maintain a recognised air picture of the JFAO while facilitating CAS and logistic support to LCC-OBA in South Torbia.
  - (f) Throughout the phase, ACC-OBA is to be prepared to support maritime assets in controlling the sea lanes through joint targeting and strike operations. BDA is to be distributed amongst Commanders and higher HQ expeditiously.

(4) Phase III – Transition.

- (a) ACC-OBA's main effort in this phase is to facilitate a smooth transition of ACC-OBA's role and responsibilities to the South Torbian Military.
- (b) AAC-OBA's primary tasks during this phase are handing over OPCON of ACC-OBA functions to the South Torbian Military while supporting IO and NGO efforts to protect human life and suffering.
- (c) ACC-OBA is to maintain air superiority in the JFAO drawing down forces as the threat level decreases.
- (d) To support the handover of MNF-OBA to the South Torbian military, ACC\_OBA is to conduct training and joint operations with South Torbian air assets. Missions are to involve small packages of fighter packages conducting DCA, and C2 aircraft be allocated ISO LCC-OBA, its STABOPS operations and logistics. This will involve a phased approach.
- (e) COMD INDOPACOM will terminate this operation once coalition forces have established a safe and secure environment in the South Torbia.

h. Groupings and Tasks.

(1) HQ ACC-OBA.

- (a) Establish an ACCE in GENERAL SANTOS CITY in Belesia in Phase 0.
- (b) Perform ACA duties.
- (c) Perform AADC duties.
- (d) Perform PD duties.
- (e) Provide LNOs to MCC-OBA and LCC-OBA.

(2) 613<sup>th</sup> Air Operations Center.

- (a) Establish a CAOC in Hawaii.
- (b) Act as the CAOC for MNF-OBA.

(3) Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW 5).

(a) Fighter assets.

- i. Establish Air Superiority in designated areas in the JFAO in Phase 0.
- ii. BPT conduct Offensive Counter Air to establish air superiority in designated areas in the JFAO.

- iii. Maintain Air Superiority in designated areas in the JFAO in Phases I to III.
  - iv. BPT conduct Defensive Counter Air to maintain air superiority in the JFAO.
  - v. BPT conduct joint targeting.
  - vi. BPT provide HVAA SPT.
  - vii. BPT conduct maritime STRIKE.
  - viii. BPT conduct CAS and AI
- (b) EW assets.
- i. BPT conduct Electronic Support ISO MCC-OBA
  - ii. BPT conduct Electronic Protection ISO MCC-OBA
  - iii. BPT conduct Electronic Attack ISO MCC-OBA
- (c) C2 and ISR Assets.
- i. BPT conduct ABM
  - ii. BPT collect, process, disseminate and exploit sensor information.
- (4) Patrol and Reconnaissance Force (CTF 72).
- (a) BPT conduct Anti-Surface (ASuW) and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) throughout all phases.
  - (b) BPT collect, process, disseminate and exploit sensor information throughout all phases.
- (5) AEW-attack.
- (a) Establish and maintain air superiority IVO BATANGAS, SPOD and APOD in Phase 0.
  - (b) OO Conduct STRIKE against NT A2AD assets
  - (c) BPT support South Torbian Air Force defensive operations in Phase 0.
  - (d) Establish Air Superiority in designated areas in the JFAO in Phase 0.
  - (e) Deploy 354<sup>th</sup> Fighter Squadron to APOD (SAN SALVADOR 51PTR980439) in Phase I.

- (f) BPT conduct Offensive Counter Air to establish air superiority in designated areas in the JFAO.
  - (g) Maintain Air Superiority in designated areas in the JFAO in Phases I to III.
  - (h) BPT conduct Offensive Counter Air to maintain air superiority in the JFAO.
  - (i) BPT conduct joint targeting
  - (j) BPT conduct CAS and AI
  - (k) BPT provide HVAA SPT.
- (6) AEW-EW.
- (a) BPT conduct Electronic Support ISO MNF-OBA for all phases.
  - (b) BPT conduct Electronic Protection ISO MNF-OBA for all phases.
  - (c) BPT conduct Electronic Attack ISO MNF-OBA for all phases.
- (7) AEW-C2 and ISR.
- (a) BPT conduct ABM in all phases.
  - (b) BPT collect, process, disseminate and exploit sensor information in all phases.
- (8) AEW-Air Mobility and AAR.
- (a) BPT provide airlift in support of the ground forces lodging in South Torbia.
  - (b) SPT ground forces lodged South Torbia through logistic transport
  - (c) BPT provide AAR in support of air assets.
  - (d) BPT support JFLOGCC operations.
- (9) AEG-SPT.
- (a) BPT to deploy and establish APOD operations in South Torbia
  - (b) Provide engineer support to airfields as required.
  - (c) Maintain security for all airfields as required.
  - (d) Handover security of AFOD and CAOC to South Torbian forces in Phase III.

(e) Handover security of APOD to South Torbian forces in Phase III.

(10) RAAF/RNZAF.

- (a) Detach fighter assets OPCON to AEW-Attack.
- (b) Detach EW assets OPCON to AEW-EW.
- (c) Detach C2 and ISR assets OPCON to AEW-C2 and ISR.
- (d) Detach Air mobility and AAR assets OPCON to AEW-Air Mobility and AAR.
- (e) BPT provide AAR in support of air assets.
- (f) BPT to deploy and establish APOD operations in South Torbia
- (g) Provide engineer support to airfields in Belesia and South Torbia as required.
- (h) Maintain security for airfields in Belesia and South Torbia as required.

(11) JASDF.

- (i) BPT support OCA operations as required.
- (j) BPT support DCA operations as required.
- (k) BPT support EW and C2/ISR operations as required.
- (l) BPT provide AAR in support of air assets as required.

i. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Timings.

- (a) G Day is XXX.
- (b) D Day is XXX.
- (c) CAOC established by NLT XXX
- (d) ACCE established in GENERAL SANTOS by NLT XXX.

(2) Theatre Special Instructions (SPINS).

- (a) SPINS are to apply to all MNF-OBA fixed and rotary wing aircraft (including all UAV) operating in the JAO.

- (b) SPINS are to be produced and/or updated daily by the ACC-OBA CAOC.
- (3) ISR Operations.
- (a) Priority of effort for ISR aircraft is to be to establish and maintain the Common Operating Picture (COP) for air operations.
  - (b) Second priority is to F2T NT A2AD and IADS elements.
  - (c) Third priority of effort is to be information gathering to establish the required freedom of manoeuvre for MNF-OBA forces to support Phase II operations.
- (4) Air Priorities.
- (a) Priority of effort in Phase I is to focus on kinetic and non-kinetic DCA operations.
  - (b) The priority of effort in Phase II is to be OCA, ground attack and deep strike operations to attain and maintain the freedom of movement for all LCC-OBA forces.
- (5) Tactical Aviation Operations. Priority of effort for MLH, is:
- (a) Joint Personnel Recovery
  - (b) Medevac
  - (c) Tactical troop lift
  - (d) Logistic resupply.
- (6) Transport Operations. Priority of effort, controlled by the Movement and Transportation Co-ordination Cell (MTCC), is:
- (e) AC operations
  - (f) Intra-theatre operational movements
  - (g) Logistic movements.
- (7) Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR).
- (a) JPR is to continue to be limited to operations inside the JOA. In the event rescue is required outside the JOA, CJTF OIG will be responsible for coordination into other national territory or territorial waters.
  - (b) Planned JPR activities will source assets from daily generated OCA packages as required

- (8) MEDEVAC.
- (a) ACC-OBA-controlled MEDEVAC flights into South Torbia are to be escorted by armed /attack helicopters wherever possible.
  - (b) Flights from Role 2 to Role 3 medical facilities do not require direct escort.
- (9) Transfer of Authority (TOA). Troop contributing nations to offer TOA of declared assets as early as possible, but no later than upon entering the AO.
- (10) Airspace Control.
- (a) Air operations in the AO are to conform to the requirements of their respective national Air Traffic Control Authorities for all phases.
  - (b) Normal airspace regulations are to apply for transport and civil aircraft in the AO.
  - (c) ACC-OBA is to be included in the Airspace Control Plan as it has organic aviation and small UAV assets.
  - (d) An Airspace Control Order (ACO) is to be issued daily.
- (11) Air Tasking Order (ATO).
- (a) A 72-hour Air Operations Directive (AOD) applies to the ATO tasking cycle.
  - (b) ATOs are to be issued daily at 1900Z, to take effect 12 hours following issue (0700Z).
  - (c) IOT be included in the ATO, requests for non-forecasted support must be submitted to the CAOC planning cell 36 hours ahead of the applicable ATO effective time.
  - (d) Requests for effects received inside of 36 hours are to be considered immediate requests and coordinated by the CAOC Combat Operations (COPS) ATO planners.
- (12) Airfield Defence. All airfields being used by MNF-OBA air forces are to have local air and ground force protection deployed. Coordination with host nation agencies is the responsibility of the designated ADA.
- (13) Airfield Engineering Support. AEW-SPT is to provide airfield repair and maintenance support to APOD in South Torbia and Belesia. Deployment locations TBD.



4. **Administration and Logistics.**

- a. **Concept.** Sustainment is a national responsibility, with the exception of aircraft fuel as described below.
- b. **Shelters/Aircraft Protection on Ground.** National commanders are to take appropriate actions to ensure that the vulnerability of parked aircraft is minimized. The ACC-OBA has OPCON of two REDHORSE Squadrons that will be based at XXXXXX and XXXXXX. AC staff are to liaise with 593 ESC for additional heavy engineer resources that might be required for any additional construction engineer support in South Torbia. National commanders are to ensure all aircraft are guarded when on the ground in South Torbia and Belesia.
- c. **Ammunition.** Seven days of supply of air munitions are to be stocked at airfields under national control arrangements. Continuous pull re-supply of air munitions is to be in effect. Temporary resupply/replenishment may be possible on a bilateral basis or through requests to ACC-OBA A4.
- d. **Spare Parts.** 30 days supply of spare parts are to be maintained by TCNs within the JOA.
- e. **Fuel.** Aircraft and aviation fuel are to be supplied by the designated Logistics Lead Nation (US).

5. **Command and Signal.**

- a. **Command.** ACC-OBA will exercise Command of the Air Component units through the CAOC located in Hawaii. Command is to be exercised through the issue of a daily air tasking order.
- b. **Control.** JFACC is to exercise control of Air Component operations as the Theatre JFACC, responsible to the Theatre Commander MNF-OBA. ACC-OBA has the following control authorities:
- (1) Area Air Defence Commander (AADC)
  - (2) Airspace Control Authority (ACA)
  - (3) Space Coordinating Authority (SCA)
  - (4) Joint Personnel Recovery Commander (JPRC).
- c. **Assignment of JFACC Joint Air Component Coordination Element (JACCE).**
- (1) JACCE staff are to integrate with components and headquarters but remain under command of the ACC-OBA.

- (2) The primary responsibility is to ensure the ACC-OBA Air Operations Plan remains synchronised with supported and supporting commander's SoM and to ensure their air assets are integrated into the air tasking cycle.
- (3) The JACCE is to provide timely air advice to support MNF-OBA campaign decision-making, joint force planning and targeting cycle decisions.

d. Succession of Command. If JFACC is unable to continue command, succession of Command is:

- (1) Director of the Air Operations Center (DAOC); then
- (2) Chief of Combat Operations (CCO).

e. Continuity of Operations.

- (1) If communications are lost with the CAOC, or it is unable to direct forces, all units are to continue operations IAW the last AOD/ATO issued and in concert with the JAOP when considering/performing future operations.
- (2) This method of operations is to continue until communication is re-established with the CAOC.

LTGEN XXXX  
COMD ACC-OBA

**Annexes:**

A.	Task Organisation	
B.	Intelligence	<b>Pending</b>
C.	Operations	<b>Pending</b>
D.	Logistics	<b>Pending</b>
E.	Personnel	<b>Not Used</b>
F.	PA	<b>Not Used</b>
G.	Civil Affairs	<b>Not Used</b>
H.	Met	<b>Not Used</b>
I.	ISR Ops	<b>Pending</b>
J.	Not Used	<b>Not Used</b>
K.	Communications and Information	<b>Pending</b>
L.	Environment -	<b>Not Used</b>
M.	Geospatial Information and Services	<b>Not Used</b>
N.	Space	<b>Pending</b>
O.	Not Used	<b>Not Used</b>
P.	Host-Nation Support	<b>Not Used</b>
Q.	Health	<b>Pending</b>
R.	Not Used	<b>Not Used</b>
S.	Not Used	<b>Not Used</b>
T.	Not Used	<b>Not Used</b>
U.	Not Used	<b>Not Used</b>
V.	STO – Issued Separately	<b>Not Used</b>
W.	Operational Contracting Support	<b>Not Used</b>
X.	Execution Checklist	<b>Not Used</b>
Y.	Not Used	<b>Not Used</b>
Z.	Not Used	<b>Not Used</b>
AA	Strategy to Task	<b>Pending</b>
BB	Air Defence Plan	<b>Pending</b>
CC	Airspace Control Plan	<b>Pending</b>
DD	Deliberate Targeting Nomination Process	<b>Pending</b>
EE	Air Task Order - Air Support Request Process	<b>Pending</b>
FF	Legal	<b>Pending</b>
GG	ROE	<b>Pending</b>
HH	Information Operations	<b>Pending</b>
II	Personnel Recovery	<b>Pending</b>
JJ	Air Base Operability	<b>Pending</b>
C.11.	Combined Fires	<b>Not Used</b>
C.12.	Force Protection	<b>Pending</b>
C.13.	Air Mobility Plan	<b>Pending</b>

**DISTRIBUTION:** Special

**ACC-OBA TASK ORGANIZATION**

**Reference**

ACC-OBA AIR OPS PLAN 01 (OPERATION BRONZE ACHILLES)

**Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU**

1. **US Navy.**
  - a. **Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW 5).**
    - (1) VFA-27 Strike Fighter Sqn 27 (10 X FA-18E)
    - (2) VFA-102 Strike Fighter Sqn 102(10 X FA-18E)
    - (3) VFA-115Strike Fighter Sqn 115(10 X FA-18E)
    - (4) VFA-195 Strike Fighter Sqn 195 (10 X FA-18E)
    - (5) VAW-125 Airborne C2 Sqn 125 (4 X E2D Hawkeye)
    - (6) VAQ-141 Electronic Attack Sqn 141 (4 X EA-18G Growler)
    - (7) VRC-30 Fleet log Spt Sqn 30/Det 5 (2 X C-2A Greyhound)
    - (8) HSC-12 Helo Sea Combat Sqn 12 (8 X MH-60S Seahawk)
    - (9) HSM-77 Helo Maritime Strike Sqn 77 (11 X MH-60R Seahawk)
    - (10) HSM-51 Helo Maritime Strike Sqn 51 (11 X MHR-60R Seahawk).
  - b. **Patrol and Reconnaissance Force (CTF 72).** 4 X P-8A.
2. **AETF-OBA.**
  - a. **AEW-Attack.**
    - (1) 354<sup>th</sup> Fighter Squadron. 24 X A10 II Thunderbolt.
    - (2) 61<sup>st</sup> Fighter Squadron. 24 X F-35A.
    - (3) 13<sup>th</sup> Bomb Squadron. 4 X B-2

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(4) 11<sup>th</sup> Attack Squadron. 6 X MQ-9 Reaper.

(5) 36<sup>th</sup> Fighter Squadron. 24 X F-16C

b. AEW-EW.

(1) 41<sup>st</sup> Electronic Combat Squadron. 2 X EC-130H.

(2) 42nd Electronic Combat Squadron. 2 X EC-130H.

c. AEW-C2 and ISR.

(1) 961<sup>st</sup> Airborne Air Control Squadron. 2 X E-3G

(2) 128<sup>th</sup> Airborne Command and Control Squadron. 2 X E-8C Joint STARS.

(3) 12<sup>th</sup> Reconnaissance Squadron. 4 X RQ-4 Global Hawk

d. AEW-Air Mobility and AAR.

(1) 344<sup>th</sup> Air Refuelling Squadron. 4 X KC-46A.

(2) 21<sup>st</sup> Airlift Squadron. 8 X C-17A Globemaster.

(3) 39<sup>th</sup> Airlift Squadron. 8 X C-130J.

e. AEG-SPT.

(1) XX RED HORSE Squadron.

(2) XX RED HORSE Squadron

(3) XX Security Forces Squadron.

3. RAAF/RNZAF.

a. Fighter Assets.

(1) 24 X RAAF F-35A Lightning II (Zamboanga).

(2) 12 X RAAF F/A-18F Super Hornets (Zamboanga.)

b. EW assets.

(1) 8 X RAAF EA-18G Growlers (Zamboanga)

(2) 2 X MC-55A Peregrine (Zamboanga).

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c. C2 and ISR assets.

- (1) 3 X RAAF E-7A Wedgetail (General Santos City)
- (2) 4 X RAAF P-8 Poseidon (General Santos City)
- (3) 2 X RAAF MQ-4C Triton (General Santos City)
- (4) 2 X RNZAF P-3 Orion (General Santos City)

d. Air Mobility and AAR.

- (1) 4 X RAAF C-17 Globemaster (Darwin)
- (2) 4 X RAAF C-130 J Hercules (Darwin)
- (3) 5 X RAAF C-27J Spartan (General Santos City)
- (4) 4 X RAAF KC-30A (General Santos City)
- (5) 2 X RNZAF C-130 Hercules (Darwin)

e. Support assets.

- (1) 1 X RAAF Airfield Defence Squadron (As required)
- (2) 1 X RAAF Airfield Engineering Squadron (As required)
- (3) 2 X RAAF ECSS (As required)

4. **JASDF.**

a. Fighter Assets.

- (1) 12 X F-35A
- (2) 12 X F-2A

b. Other assets.

- (1) 1 X E-767
- (2) 4 X C-130H
- (3) 1 X KC-767.