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OPORD 07
(OPERATION IRON
GUARDIAN)
CFLCC

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References:

- a. UN General Assembly Resolutions: National Sovereignty Principles (A/RES/50/172), and (A/RES/63/308) Responsibility to Protect (R2P).
 - b. UNSCR Resolution 7739
 - c. UNSCR Resolution 7752
 - d. CJTF-OIG Operation Order 01 dated XXXXXX
 - e. CJTF-OIG Operation Order 03 dated XXXXXXXX (G+75 days)(notional)
 - f. The White House, Office of the President, National Security Strategy, May 2010.
 - g. The White House, Office of the President, Presidential Study Directive (PSD-10), 4 AUG 11.
 - h. CJCSM 2500.04D, Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), 1 AUG 05.
 - i. NSC Policy Memorandum, Subject: US Aims in Caucasus Crisis, dated: 01 OCT 13. (Notional)
 - j. Joint Navigation Charts (JNC), Scale 1:2,000,000. Sheets: JNCXX022, JNCXX023.
 - k. Operational Navigation Charts (ONC), 1:1,000,000. Sheets: F03, F04, F05, G03, G04, G05.
 - l. (l). Tactical Pilot Chart (TPC), Scale 1:500,000. Sheets: F03A, F03B, F03C, F03D, F04A, F04B, F04C, F04D, F05A, F05D, G04A, G04B, G04C, G04D, G05A, G05B, G05C, G05D.
 - m. Map, National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), Series 1501A Joint Operations Graphic-Air (JOG-A), 1:250,000 Scale. Sheets: NJ3801, NJ3802, NJ3803, NJ3804, NJ3805, NJ3806, NJ3807, NJ3808, NJ3809, NJ3810, NJ3811, NJ3812, NJ3901, NJ3905, NJ3909, NJ3910, NK3703, NK3706, NK3712, NK3716, NK3801, NK3802, NK3803, NK3804, NK3805, NK3806, NK3807, NK3808, NK3809, NK3810, NK3811, NK3812, NK3904, NK3907, NK3910, NK3911, NL3711, NL3712, NL3810, NL3811, NL3812.
 - n. Nautical Charts, Series 55ACO; Sheet 55001, BLACK SEA (INT 310); Sheet 55040, Marmara, Denizi.
 - o. Cartography, Geodesy, and Navigation datum used throughout this OPORD is World Geodetic System-84 (WGS84), (revised in 2004).
 - p. FM 5-0 Army Planning and Orders Production, January 2005
- WARNO 03 to 5th Corps OPORD 07(OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)(not issued)

Time Zone Used Throughout OPORD: ZULU

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Task Organization. See Annex A (Task Organization)

Situation.

a. General. This OPORD supports CJTF-OIG Phase II operations for the expulsion of Arianian Armed Forces occupying southern AP. AN has been unsuccessful in the seizure of their subsequent objectives (OBJs) but no more than one third of these forces have yet to be committed. A considerable threat remains, including to the capital Baku.

b. Area of Operations (AO). The LCC AO is defined as the recognized landmass, airspace and territorial waters of AP, less Lower Janga. Although at this time there is no intention for CFLCC forces to occupy Arianian territory, elements including attack aviation may cross the International Border (IB) to direct fires in depth. See Appendix 2 (Scheme of Maneuver and Control Measures) to Annex C (Operations) and reference M.

(1) Terrain. The AO is made up of over 200,000 square miles, it is a mountainous region located between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. The AO is approximately 695 KM long and 320 KM wide. The Caucasus Mountains traditionally separate Europe and Asia. The AO lies between the Greater Caucasus Mountain Range, which runs just north of the northern borders of Gorgas and Atropia through Donovia, and the Lesser Caucasus Mountain Range, which dominate Limaria. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence).

(2) Weather. High pressure dominates much of the region throughout the summer, cutting off migratory low pressure systems from the region for extended periods of time. Occasional spring/summer cold fronts will struggle through the mountains into the area, but they are too weak to carry much more than isolated rain showers into the area. June has the most precipitation in the summer months; although, the precipitation tapers off late in the month as the area of high pressure strengthens.

Largely due to the terrain, frontal systems are rare in June. Locally generated rain showers and isolated thunderstorms bring the only rain. Mostly cloudy skies below 1,000 feet are extremely rare, providing favorable conditions for all air support operations. Morning fog tends to develop less than five times in June throughout Limaria and Atropia.

Gorgas is more promising to fog development due to the close proximity of the moisture from the Black Sea. Morning fog generally dissipates before mid-morning. Surface winds in Atropia tend to flow from the east in the valleys, generally less than 10 knots. June marks the beginning of the hot and dry season. Extreme temperatures reach triple digits throughout the region.

For more details regarding weather refer to Annex B (Intelligence).

c. Area of Interest. The CFLCC area of interest includes the Caspian Sea, the land mass and airspace of AN, and the area of Lower Janga. See Annex B (Intelligence) for further detail.

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d. Enemy Forces.

(1) Elements of the Arianian (AN) OSC 2 have now culminated in terms of their initial advance to seize the key transportation and oil center of Kazi-Magamed on the approaches to Baku and the choke point at Agdzhahed that would have prevented Coalition forces from entering the AO from Gorgas. Lead enemy formations, including the 25 Mech DTG and 23 Mech DTG occupy defensive positions along the Kura River.

23 DTG has been attrited to approximately 60 percent, while 25 DTG has been reduced to approximately 40 percent strength.

349 Tk BTG is assessed at 60 percent strength.

OSC 2's corps troops are centrally located north of Bilasuvar.

The depth formation of OSC 2, 24 Mtzd DTG remains to the southeast in the area of Gyrape; it currently remains 70 percent combat effective.

Although OSC 1 has withdrawn from AP, it poses a significant threat. Further details of current enemy dispositions and their relative combat power are found at Annex B (Intelligence).

(2) Asymmetric/Irregular Threats. The two most significant irregular threats to CFLCC operations in support of Op IRON GUARDIAN are as follows:

(a) South Atropian People's Army (SAPA). The SAPA operates in three separate units – Northern, Central, and Southern Commands. The group conducts most of its training in AN where it receives its equipment and supplies.

Reports indicate that Arianian SPF or other “advisors” may support the SAPA with logistics and some in-country training. SAPA also clashes violently with Salasyl over ideology, limited resources, and similar recruiting pools.

SAPA is assessed as being a medium threat to CFLCC operations in southern AP.

(b) Salysal (SAL). SAL is one of the largest groups within AP, second only in size to SAPA. Its major support comes from the southeast portion of the country. It is reported that the group may have ties to transnational criminal and terrorist actors.

For the last two decades, SAL has engaged the current Atropian regime in a low-level insurgency in response to the government's taxation, judicial, and critical infrastructure policies. It is assessed that SAL will initially wait to see if western intervention will have any influence on the Government of AP.

The threat from SAL is initially assessed as low; however, this could change to medium should SAL not be satisfied that CJTF-OIG is having a positive influence on the provision of services by the Government of AP.

e. Friendly Forces.

(1) USEUCOM/ICASS Intent. The overall intent of the ICASS is the expulsion of AN Armed Forces from AP. USEUCOM supports the strategic intent of the ICASS, as it directly supports U.S. foreign policy and the strategic position articulated at reference F.

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(2) CJTF-OIG Intent and Concept of Operations. The CJTF completed Phase 1 operations (deployment) with the arrival of 77 AVN BDE at **G+120**. All MCC, LCC, and ACC combat forces and enablers are now positioned within the JOA. Specific Component synopses of operations to date are found below. The CJTF-OIG mission remains “to conduct military operations to expel all Arianian forces from Atropian sovereign territory in order to create conditions for the re-establishment of a safe and secure environment in AP and the surrounding region”.

(3) CFMCC. Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) have successfully enforced the arms and economic embargo authorized at reference B. AN is currently facing key shortages in certain raw materials. CFMCC has suffered three ship losses to date, including one MCM vessel, one frigate, and one replenishment ship. Naval fixed and rotary wing assets remain at 95 percent strength.

(4) CFACC. Enforcement of the No Fly Zone was suspended shortly after the ground invasion of AP. To date, CFACC operations have focused on air interdiction, defensive counter-air (DCA) and shaping operations to create favorable conditions for the CJTF-OIG Phase II.

CFACC main effort has been attrition of Arianian Armed Forces fixed wing assets, operational-level SEAD (specifically the IADS), attrition of OSC 1 depth formations and Arianian military C2 nodes.

CFACC is currently at approximately 88 percent strength in fighter/bombers, 88 percent strength in fixed-wing RISTA capabilities, and 90 percent in air-to-air refueling capability.

(5) 82 ABN DIV. The Div has fared relatively well throughout the past four months. Despite taking some significant losses, reconstitution efforts have **brought the Div back to 90 percent strength in personnel, vehicles, and major equipments**. The Div has reverted to OPCON CFLCC.

(6) Atropian (AP) Armed Forces.

(a) Land Forces. The AP Army has now been fully integrated OPCON to the CFLCC. Overall, AP land forces are at **approximately 75 percent strength**, with lower percentage strengths in certain capabilities.

Four maneuver brigades (bdes) within the AP Southern Command (ASC) are committed directly to defensive operations against the AN invasion, one bde remains in defense of Baku and one to any potential threat on the AP/Donovia northern border.

Of note, the Atropian 352 Tank (Tk) Bde southwest of Baku, near Sangachaly, has been reduced to 70 percent, and the 350 Infantry Bde deployed between Pirsagat and Ali-Bayramti has been reduced to 65 percent.

(b) Maritime Forces. The Atropian Surface Action Group 160.3, OPCON to CFMCC, has suffered serious losses in their mission to defend Baku and the oil infrastructure in the western Caspian Sea. The Task Group’s sole remaining mission is to deny the approaches to the port of Baku.

Atropian maritime strength currently stands at 60 percent.

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(c) Air Forces. The AP Air Force has suffered significant losses during Phase I operations, including: 12 x TU-22 Backfire (four from ground losses), 6 x SU-27 Flanker (ground losses), 6 x SU-24 MR Fencer, 8 x IL-76 Candid (ground losses), and 6 x MI-26 Halo. Most of the AP losses came as a result of AN deep air strikes in the days following the AN invasion.

Despite their losses, the AP Air Force remains fully engaged and integrated under OPCON to CFACC.

AP retains approximately 70 percent of their air/aviation combat power.

(7) Centers of Gravity.

(a) Strategic Center of Gravity. The continuance of stable leadership of the AP Government remains the strategic center of gravity. This center of gravity is threatened by both the AN invasion and internal irregular actors.

(b) Operational Center of Gravity. The CJTF-OIG center of gravity remains its offensive air capability. Coalition air assets are vital to setting favorable conditions for land operations, specifically degrading the enemy to the desired force ratios and establishing air superiority over the CFLCC AO.

(8) Dispositions. CFLCC friendly force assembly and staging areas, as well as AP current dispositions are at Appendix 2 (Scheme of Maneuvre and Control Measures) to Annex C (Operations).

(9) International Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations (IO and NGO). A wide range of UN and International organisations as well as International and AP NGO operate in AP. A list of these IO and NGO currently operating in AP can be found at Appendix 1 (Humanitarian Organizations in Atropia) to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations).

f. Attachments and Detachments. No change, except:

(1) Squadron 3 CAV detached OPCON 4 MND Phases I-III until OBJ PEARL is secure.

(2) Bde(-) 82 ABN DIV detached OPCON 4 MND Phase III for assault crossing Kura River.

Mission. CFLCC is to conduct decisive counter-moves and offensive operations to clear all Arianian forces from Atropian sovereign territory.

Execution.

g. Concept of Operations. This is a four-phased operation consistent with Phase II of the CJTF-OIG operations articulated at reference D. CFLCC operations within CJTF-OIG's Phase III and IV [reference D (Annex G)] are to be further detailed in separate OPORD and FRAGOs.

h. Commander's Intent. CJTF-OIG Phase I operations have been completed with all CFLCC formations and enablers now in theater.

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The combined efforts of 82 ABN DIV, CFACC, CFMCC, and the AP Armed Forces have successfully stalled the AN advance. Of key concern to me is the potential isolation of Baku, which would have a significant negative effect on the AP Government and population.

As the CJTF-OIG main effort in the conduct of this decisive phase, I will destroy the enemy's OSC 2 depth forces, while dislocating his forward elements and eroding his will to fight.

In my scheme of maneuver I will initially deceive OSC 2 by depicting CFLCC in a defensive posture, having moved into TAAs under electronic silence.

I will concurrently degrade OSC 2 depth forces with deep fires while continuing to erode and block his lead DTGs. I will then attack in a series of pincer movements from both the northeast and northwest.

The northeast attack (4 MND) will be my main effort, capitalizing on the shorter distances and better terrain to get at his depth DTG and enablers. The other pincer will defeat the enemy in the northwest and guard against the potential commitment of OSC 1.

Deception measures will encourage the enemy into believing the main attack is coming from that direction (i.e. 1 ID).

With the enemy's depth formations destroyed, the LCC closed up on the international border (IB) and the remnants of the lead DTGs isolated within AP, the enemy will be quickly defeated in subsequent clearing operations.

Throughout, CFACC air assets will target the follow-on OSC 1, focusing on engineer/bridging assets, logistics hubs, and attack aviation in order to dissuade their commitment to the battle.

The establishment of local air superiority inside southern AP is paramount to our success. In all phases, I will preserve a strong force of attack aviation: my center of gravity is those attack helicopter units.

Op IRON GUARDIAN is to be conducted in four phases.

i. Scheme of Maneuver.

(1) Phase I - Shape (D-Day - D+3). This phase is to include preliminary moves and further attrition of AN forces by deep fires. 4 MND is to move to and occupy TAA SILVER; this is to appear to the enemy as strengthening our defense in depth.

1 ID is to move to TAA GOLD in preparation for the northwest pincer. 3 CAV and a mechanized bn (the initial CFLCC reserve) from 4 MND is to occupy TAA BRONZE.

The movement of the Divs and 3 CAV is to take place under electronic silence. A deception plan is to portray our intention as a building up of our defense rather than conduct of decisive offensive operations.

CFACC will gain and maintain local air superiority over friendly force concentrations. Main Effort in this phase is joint fires and attack aviation missions against OSC 2 lead DTGs, ADA, and the likely OSC 2 reserve (353 Anti-Tank (AT) Bde and 349 Tk Bde).

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(2) Phase II - Clear (D+3 - D+6). This phase is the northwest pincer. 1 ID is to conduct a forward passage of lines with 82 ABN DIV, seize OBJs RUBY and EMERALD, defeat 23 Mech DTG and 347 Inf BTG, and secure OBJ DIAMOND blocking oriented east and south. It is expected that OSC 2 will react to the 1 ID attack by committing some or all of 353 AT and 349 Tk Bdes.

O/O 3 CAV is then to cross Kura River north of OBJ OPAL and guard the right flank of 4 MND against 25 Mech DTG and any OSC 2 corps troops remaining in that area. Main Effort in this phase is 1 ID.

(3) Phase III - Dominate (D+7 - D+15). In this phase, we will conduct decisive counter-moves. 4 MND is to advance to destroy enemy depth formation 24 Mtzd DTG.

Bde(-) 82 ABN DIV, OPCON 4 MND, is to seize crossings of the Kura River, OBJs OPAL and GARNET, by air assault. 4 MND is to then cross the Kura River seizing OBJ PEARL and destroying 24 Mtzd DTG. 4 MND and 1 ID is then to adjust and reorient quickly to re-establish the IB.

Any Arianian formations that have been bypassed and isolated by this maneuver, that have not surrendered, are to be cleared by the ASC. Priority of fires is to initially be 24 Mtzd DTG, shifting to OSC 1. 4 MND will be the Main Effort in this phase.

(4) Phase IV - Stabilize (D+16 - D+27). This phase will see the establishment of a defense along the IB and a stabilization of the AO. The balance between stabilization and defense is dependent upon the threat that AN and its proxies (i.e. SAPA) continue to pose.

After establishing a viable defense of the IB, we are to assist the Atropian Government and IO/NGOs in reconstruction and HA, within capabilities, in order to demonstrate to the Atropian populace that the Coalition can and will support them.

My Main Effort in this phase will be 4 MND and the timely establishment of a defense along the IB, with deep fires capable of reaching well into AN.

j. Desired End State. Op IRON GUARDIAN is deemed to be complete and successful once all elements of the AN Armed Forces have been cleared from AP, that the CFLCC has a solid defense along the IB in order to deter AN, that IO/NGOs are supported in the provision of HA, that the AP Government is enabled and that the CFLCC is prepared to conduct a relief-in-place to a follow-on force.

k. Tasks Common to all Phases.

- (1)) Be prepared to (BPT) conduct rear area security (RAS) tasks within boundaries.
- (2) BPT exchange liaison teams with adjacent AP formations.
- (3) BPT conduct or support forward passage of lines.

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1. Tasks to Subordinate Formations.

(1) (3 CAV.

(a) Phase I.

1. Detach to OPCON 4 MND one squadron for Phases I-III until seizure of OBJ PEARL.

2. Occupy TAA BRONZE (3 CAV(-)) as if in hasty defense oriented south to support CFLCC deception.

(b) Phase II.

1. O/O and upon 1 ID seizure of OBJ EMERALD, advance southeast and conduct crossings of Kura River north of OBJ OPAL.

2. Guard right flank of 4 MND (oriented north and west) against 25 Mech DTG and any OSC 2 corps troops remaining in that area.

3. Degrade 25 Mech DTG with fires.

(c) Phase III.

1. Conduct relief-in-place of guard task with ASC.

2. Upon 4 MND seizure of OBJ PEARL, conduct forward passage of lines and advance south, clearing major north-south routes along coastline to IB.

(d) Phase IV.

1. Supported by elements of 77 AVN BDE, screen along the IB within sector.

2. BPT occupy an assigned sector to conduct stabilization operations.

(2) (1 ID.

(a) Phase I.

1. Move to and occupy TAA GOLD in preparation for the northwest pincer.

(b) Phase II.

1. O/O, conduct forward passage of lines through 82 ABN DIV.

2. Seize OBJs RUBY and EMERALD.

3. Defeat remnants of 23 Mech DTG and 347 BTG.

4. Secure and establish blocking posns at OBJ DIAMOND oriented east and south.

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(c) Phase III.

1. BPT defeat remnants of 349 Tk BTG IVO OBJ SAPPHIRE.
2. BPT defeat enemy elements in OBJ TOPAZ.
3. BPT defeat remnants of 25 Mech DTG.
4. Provide one mech bn-size TF as CFLCC reserve.

(d) Phase IV.

1. Establish hasty defensive positions along IB border (line Parsabad-Boyuk Bahmanii) within boundaries.
2. BPT occupy an assigned sector to conduct stabilization operations.

(3) 4 MND.

(a) Phase I.

1. Move to and occupy TAA SILVER as if in hasty defense oriented south.
2. Provide one mech bn as the CFLCC reserve to be positioned in TAA BRONZE.

(b) Phase II.

1. BPT conduct tactical movement along Route SEATTLE from TAA SILVER to Phase Line COUGAR.
2. Provide one mech bn as the CFLCC reserve to be positioned in TAA BRONZE.

(c) Phase III.

1. O/O, using Bde(-) 82 ABN DIV seize crossings of Kura River at OBJs OPAL and GARNET by air assault.
2. Advance along Route SEATTLE to conduct crossings of Kura River at OBJs OPAL and GARNET subsequently expanding bridgehead to Phase Line LION.
3. Retain crossing sites at OPAL and GARNET until Line of Communication (LOC) bridging has been installed on Route SEATTLE (E115).
4. Destroy OSC 2 depth formation 24 Mtzd DTG.
5. Seize OBJ PEARL.
6. (Secure LD for 3 CAV forward passage of lines and advance south to IB.

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(d) Phase IV.

1. Establish hasty defensive positions along IB line Parsabad-Bilasuvar Calilabad – Massali within boundaries.
2. Provide one mech bn as CFLCC reserve to be located IVO Saatli.
3. BPT occupy an assigned sector to conduct stabilization operations.

(4) 82 ABN DIV.

(a) Phase I.

1. Continue to block within boundaries.
2. Detach to OPCON 4 MND bde(-) for air assault ops IVO OBJ OPAL and GARNET
3. Establish air assault staging area at Naftalan for Phase II and op reserve tasks.
4. Provide one bn (air assault) as CJTF-OIG op level reserve for all phases.

(b) Phase II.

1. Support 1 ID forward passage of lines.
2. Support by fire 1 ID's defeat of 23 Mech DTG attack into OBJ RUBY and EMERALD.
3. In Phases II and III, be prepared to support 1 ID in the clearance of bypassed enemy elements along the 1 ID axis of advance up to and including OBJ EMERALD.

(c) Phase III.

1. Provide bde (air assault) as CFLCC reserve.

(d) Phase IV.

1. O/O, consolidate the Div in TAA GOLD and reconstitute.
2. BPT conduct stabilization operations within an assigned sector.

(5) ASC.

(a) (U) Phase I.

1. (U) Continue to block AN forces within boundaries oriented south.
2. As agreed by AP Supreme High Command (SHC), one mech bde to guard northern Atropian/Donovian border all phases.
3. As agreed by AP SHC, one bde to secure Baku all phases.

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(b) Phase II.

1. Support by fire 3 CAV's crossing of Karu River and establishment of guard against 25 Mech DTG.

(c) Phase III.

O/O conduct relief-in-place 3 CAV and guard right flank 4 MND.

(d) Phase IV.

1. BPT defeat remnants of 25 Mech DTG and OSC 2 corps troops.
2. BPT conduct stabilization operations within an assigned sector.
3. BPT conduct relief-in-place of 1 ID and 4 MND along IB as potential follow-on force.

(6) 77 AVN BDE.

(a) Phase I.

1. Attack by fire 353 AT BTG in order to degrade and reduce mobility.
2. BPT provide aviation support to CJTF-OIG op reserve (bn 82 ABN DIV) in all phases.

(b) Phase II. Attack by fire OSC 2 corps troops with priority to 349 Tk Bde in order to degrade and contain in current locations.

(c) Phase III.

1. Support 4 MND assault on OBJs OPAL and GARNET.
2. Attack by fire 24 Mtd DTG and O/O shift fires to 25 Mech DTG in order to fix both formations in place.
3. O/O support CFLCC reserve (bde 82 ABN DIV).

(d) Phase IV.

1. Establish and coordinate attack by fire positions along IB.
2. BPT attack by fire elements of OSC 1 in any moves towards the border.
3. BPT support CFLCC reserve (bde 4 MND).

(7) 75 FA BDE.

(a) (U) Provide the CFLCC Force Artillery HQ and C-Fires HQ.

(b) (Allocate fire support resources to Divs and establish priorities of fires per Annex D (Joint Fires).

(c) Execute SEAD and ATACMS missions in support of Phases I-IV inclusive.

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(8) 11 ADA BDE. See Annex D (Joint Fires).

(9) 66 MI BDE. See Appendix 13 (MISO) to Annex C (Operations).

(10) 415 CHEM BDE. See Appendix 10 (CBRN) to Annex E (Protection).

(11) 36 EN BDE. See Annex G (Engineer). Engineer priorities as follows:

(a) Phase I.

1. Mobility support in move to TAAs GOLD, SILVER, and BRONZE.

(b) Phase II.

1. Mobility support 1 ID.

2. Crossings of Kura River north of OBJ OPAL in support 3 CAV.

(c) Phase III.

1. Crossings of Kura River at OBJs OPAL and GARNET in support of 4 MND.

2. Mobility support in priority 4 MND then 3 CAV to include LOC bridging across Kura River.

(d) Phase IV.

1. O/O, counter-mobility tasks in support of 1 ID and 4 MND in defense along IB.

2. General engineer support stabilization tasks.

(12) 16 MP BDE.

(a) Traffic control behind Div rear boundaries to include establishment of LCC Movement Control HQ (system capable under electronic silence).

(b) CPers Holding Facility in the area of **XXXX**.

(13) 10 SIG BDE. See Annex H (Signal).

(14) 360 CA BDE. See Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations).

m. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Timings.

(a) D Day (commencement of Phase I) - Established as (**date (G+150 days)**).

(b) Phase II - O/O, and not before (**date (G+153 days)**).

(c) (U) H-Hr - Commencement of Phase II (Clear) operations O/O.

(d) L Hr - Air Assault into OBJs OPAL and GARNET TBC and not before **G+156 days**.

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(2) Commander's CCIR.

(a) Phase I.

1. What other elements or formations have been attached to the OSC 1 within the past 30 days?
2. What is the current location and disposition of AN attack helicopters units?
3. Where/how has SAPA attempted to coordinate its activities in the AO with other groups?
4. What is the level of SAPA activity in Baku?
5. What is the location/disposition of NODONG-II SSM Bns?
(indicates AN committing to most dangerous COA (MDCOA))?
6. What is the priority of effort for cyber activity by the 331 and/or 9 Information Warfare Bdes?
7. Which SAPA leaders IVO Baku pose the greatest threat to the Atropian government?
8. Where are the bridging and engineer mobility units of OSC 1 being staged/employed for any follow-on attack?
9. What is the status of Heydr Aciyev International Airport and the LZs IVO Baku?
10. What is the location and disposition of Arianian barriers/obstacles within AP?
11. What is the location and disposition of 349 Tk BTG?

(b) Phase II.

1. Where are the components of the IADS or separate MANPADS units that are supporting OSC1 formations?
2. Where are the AN 305 and 307 BTGs located and what is their relative combat status?
3. Which AP chemical and biological warfare sites (if any) are vulnerable to seizure by AN forces or their surrogates?
4. What and where are the critical nodes that allow OSC 2 to employ precision indirect fire against friendly forces (observers, radars, logistical nodes, etc.)?
5. How will the 12 Mech DTG of OSC 1 commit/array its forces to facilitate the follow-on exploitation force, (indicates AN committing to MDCOA)?

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(3) Friendly Forces Information Requirements.

- (a) Bde combat power below 75percent.
- (b) Loss of attack or medium transport helicopters.
- (c) Loss of ADA coverage in the forward area.
- (d) Status of ISR/MQ assets.
- (e) Loss of AN/TPQ-53 Radar.
- (f) HIMARS/MLRS ammunition status less than 40percent.
- (g) Atropan tank and field artillery units that are reduced to 70percent combat power.
- (h) Loss or destruction of a Bde Tac or Main CP.

(4) (U) Essential Elements of Friendly Information.

- (a) Location and disposition of the CFLCC reserve.
- (b) Location and disposition of potential crossing sites over the Kura River.
- (c) Evacuation routes and collection points for IDP.
- (d) Locations and dispositions of IO/NGO in the AO.

n. ISR. See ISR task matrix at Annex L (Information Collection).

o. Military Deception. Additional tasks to Divs and LCC units are detailed at Appendix 14 (Military Deception) to Annex C (Operations) and must be read in conjunction with para 3b and 3c above.

p. Routes. See Appendix 4 (Movements) to Annex F (Sustainment).

q. Air Assault Staging Area. To be established at Naftalan Airfield.

r. Objective Areas, Boundaries, and Phase Lines. See Appendix 2 (Scheme of Maneuver and Control Measures) to Annex C (Operations).

s. Fire Support. See Annex D (Joint Fires). Priorities:

(1) Phase I. OSC 2 in priority 353 AT BTG, 349 Tk BTG, FA and ADA systems, C2 nodes and EW.

(2) Phase II. 23 Mech DTG, 25 Mech DTG, and 347 Inf BTG.

(3) Phase III. 25 Mech DTG, then 24 Mtzd DTG.

(4) Phase IV. OSC 1 FA and ADA, C2 nodes, EW, bridging, and logistics units.

t. Control Measures.

(1) Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL).

(a) FSCL STEEL (see Appx 2 (Scheme of Maneuver and Control Measures) to Annex C (Operations)).

(b) FSCL TUNGSTEN effective not before D+3.

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(c) No Fire Areas (NFA).

1. NFA (city of Baku) becomes effective on commencement of Phase I.

2. NFA (area OBJs OPAL and GARNET) becomes effective with this order.

u. Joint Fires. See Annex D (Joint Fires).

v. Engineer Support Concept. See Annex G (Engineer).

w. Rules of Engagement. See Appendix 11 (Rules of Engagement) to Annex C (Operations).

x. By-Pass Policy. Divisions may by-pass isolated enemy sub-units of up to company size and below in the conduct of Phase II and III operations. All enemy elements will be cleared within divisional sectors during Phase IV operations or earlier if conditions permit. All such enemy positions will remain under constant surveillance.

y. Civil Affairs (CA)/CMO. All formations to BPT conduct CA/CMO supporting tasks within assigned sectors during Phase IV. The CA approach and tasks are found at Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations).

Sustainment. Detailed requirements are listed in Annex F (Sustainment).

z. Intent. Support to elements of the CFLCC are to be provided by a combination of integral sustainment assets and area resources. Non-US LCC formations and units are to be supported via a combination of TCN sustainment assets and US assets operating as the lead nation for sustainment.

aa. Combat Supplies. Basic and Maintenance loads of combat supplies (Class I, III and V) totaling 4 DOS are to be held on wheels by all LCC formations. In addition to the basic and maintenance loads, the following quantities of combat supplies are to be held in the DSA:

(1) Class I. 7 DOS.

(2) Class III. 1 DOS on wheels and 3 DOS on wheels or in storage tanks.

(3) Class V. 7 DOS on wheels or in storage facilities.

bb. Sustainment Priorities by Phase.

(1) Phase I. Class III and Class V to support Div moves and joint fires.

(2) Phase II.

(a) Class I, III and V supplies in support of 1 ID.

(b) Class I and V in support of bde (-) 82 ABN DIV at OBJs OPAL and GARNET.

(3) Phase III.

(a) (U) Class I, III and V support to 4 MND. Class V and VII support to 1 ID.

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(4) Phase IV.

(a) (U) Class III, V and VII support to 4 MND.

(b) (U) Class IV support to 1 ID and 4 MND.

cc. Logistics. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment).

dd. (U) Personnel. See Appendix 3 (Personnel) to Annex F (Sustainment).

ee. (U) Health Service Support. See Appendix 2 (Medical) to Annex F (Sustainment).

Command and Signal.

ff. Command.

(1) Location of Commander and HQs.

(a) CFLCC TOC (Fwd) - located Ujar opened (G+119).

(b) CFLCC Main HQ - located Yevlakh airfield opened (G+48).

(c) CFLCC Rear HQ - located Tblisi opened (G+119).

(d) Corps/LCC Alternate HQ - HQ 82 ABN DIV, located XXXXXXXX.

(2) Succession of Command. COM 82 ABN DIV, COM 1 ID, COM 4 MND.

(3) Liaison Requirements. LNOs are to be dispatched to all flanking AP formations and during passage of lines operations.

(4) Reports. See Annex R (Reports).

gg. Signal. See Annex H (Signal).

(1) Emission Control orders (EMCON).

(a) Phase I. EMCON 1.

(b) Phase II-IV. EMCON 3.

(2) Expeditionary Signal Battalion (ESB) Allocation.

(a) 50 ESB – 1 ID.

(b) 63 ESB – 4 MND.

(c) 67 ESB – 82 ABN DIV.

(3) Priority for Signal Support. Primary C4I is LANDWARNET (LWN) with interface to CENTRIXS-OIG, alternate is TACSAT. Coalition classified data sharing is through CENTRIXS-OIG.

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(4) Code Words

<u>Ser</u>	<u>Code Word</u>	<u>Meaning</u>	<u>Issued By</u>
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	LEMON	EMCON 3	CFLCC Main HQ
2	PEAR	Assume control	Corps/LCC Altn HQ
3	PINEAPPLE	Commence Phase II	CFLCC Main HQ
4	GRAPE	OBJ RUBY seized	1 ID
5	PLUM	OBJ EMERALD seized	1 ID
6	APPLE	1 ID secure on OBJ DIAMOND	1 ID
7	ORANGE	3 CAV secured crossings Kura River	3 CAV
8	BANANA	Guard set against 25 Mech DTG	3 CAV
9	MELON	Bde(-) 82 ABN DIV L Hr Kura River crossing	4 MND
10	PEACH	OBJS OPAL and GARNET secure to include bridging	4 MND
11	FIG	4 MND commence Phase III	CFLCC Main HQ
12	COCONUT	3 CAV handover guard task to ASC	CFLCC Main HQ
13	CHERRY	4 MND Phase III complete	4 MND
14	KIWI	3 CAV commencing advance south	3 CAV
15	MANGO	3 CAV Phase III complete	3 CAV
16	AVOCADO	Commence Phase IV tasks	CFLCC Main HQ
17	LIME	Phase IV complete	Divs, 3 CAV, ASC

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ACKNOWLEDGE:

(original signed by)

XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

LTG

ANNEXES:

- Annex A – Task Organization
- Annex B – Intelligence
- Annex C – Operations
- Annex D – Fires
- Annex E – Protection
- Annex F – Sustainment
- Annex G – Engineer
- Annex H – Signal
- Annex J – Public Affairs
- Annex K – Civil Affairs Operations
- Annex L – Information Collection
- Annex M – Assessment (omitted)
- Annex N – Space Operations
- Annex P – Host Nation Support
- Annex Q – Knowledge Management (omitted)
- Annex R – Reports
- Annex S – Special Technical Operations (omitted)
- Annex Z – Distribution (omitted)

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ANNEX A TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

Reference:

OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

Time Zone Used Throughout the OPLAN: ZULU

Task Organization:

- hh. (U) USAF 3d Air Support Operations Group (DS)
- ii. USAF Weather Det (DS)
- jj. (U) (FEST-M)
- kk. (U) 1BCD (DS to CAOC)

Headquarters, Combined Forces Land Component Command

- ll. (U) HHB, CFLCC
- mm. (U) Tactical Command Post
- nn. (U) Main HQ
- oo. (U) Rear HQ

1st Infantry Division

- pp. 10th Air Support Operations Squadron (ATTACHED)
- qq. HHC, 1st Infantry Division
- rr. 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team
- ss. 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team
- tt. 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team
- uu. 1st Combat Aviation Brigade
- vv. 1st Division Artillery
 - (1) Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
 - (2) 1st Battalion, 7th Field Artillery Regiment (M109A6)
 - (3) 1st Battalion, 6th Field Artillery Regiment (M109A6)
 - (4) 5th Battalion, 3d Field Artillery Regiment (MLRS)
 - (5) 1st Battalion, 94th Field Artillery Regiment (MLRS)
 - (6) Target Acquisition Platoon (2 x TPQ-37, 4 x LCMRs)
 - (7) (U) Signal Company
 - (8) Brigade Support Battalion

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ANNEX A TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

ww. 555th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade

- (1) HHC, 555th Engineer Brigade
- (2) 5th Engineer Battalion
 - (a) HHC, 5th Engineer Battalion
 - (b) 515th Sapper Company
 - (c) 55th Mobility Company
 - (d) 509th Clearance Company
 - (e) 50th Multi-Role Bridge Company
 - (f) Forward Support Company
- (3) 8th Engineer Battalion
 - (a) HHC, 8th Engineer Battalion
 - (b) 510th Sapper Company
 - (c) 572th Mobility Company
 - (d) 362d Multi-Role Bridge Company
 - (e) A/70 BEB
 - (f) Forward Support Company
- (4) 52d Engineer Battalion
 - (a) HHC, 52d Engineer Battalion
 - (b) 497th Vertical Construction Company
 - (c) 544th Horizontal Construction Company
 - (d) 615th Horizontal Construction Company
 - (e) 84th Survey & Design Team
 - (f) Forward Support Company,
- (5) 2d Military Intelligence Company C/S
- (6) 1st Military Police Battalion (I/R)
- (7) D Company, 17th Signal Battalion
- (8) 555th Engr Brigade Support Battalion

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ANNEX A TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(9) CBRNE Task Force 1 (OPCON)

- (a) Headquarters, 84th Ordnance (EOD) Battalion
- (b) 53d EOD Company (+)
- (c) 162d EOD Company (+)
- (d) (630th EOD Company (+)
- (e) 172d Chemical (AS) Company
- (f) 329th Chemical (CS) Company
- (g) 414th Chemical (AS) Company
- (h) Forward Support Company, 84th Ordnance (EOD) Battalion

xx. 1st Battalion, 62d Air Defense Artillery (62ADA) (AVENGER) (DS)

yy. 431st Civil Affairs Battalion (OPCON)

zz. B Company, 9th Military Information Support Battalion (OPCON)

aaa. 2d Military Police Battalion

bbb. 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (C/S)

ccc. 56th Expeditionary Signal Battalion (DS)

ddd. 1st Sustainment Brigade

(1) 1st Special Troops Battalion

(2) 541st Combat Sustainment Support Battalion

4 (Multi-National) Division

eee. 13 Air Support Operations Squadron (ATTACHED)

fff. HHB, 4th Infantry Division

ggg. Franco-German Brigade

hhh. 12 (UK) Armoured Infantry Brigade

iii. **X** Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group

jjj. 1st Australian/New Zealand Brigade

kkk. 7 (GE) Reconnaissance Battalion

lll. **X** (CA) Force Protection Battalion (-)

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ANNEX A TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

mmm. 4th Combat Aviation Brigade (MN)

- (1) (1st Attack/Recce Battalion, 4th Aviation Regiment
- (2) 4th Attack/Recce Battalion, 4th Aviation Regiment
- (3) 3d Assault Battalion, 4th Aviation Regiment
- (4) Attack (UK) Regiment (BN)
- (5) 401st Utility (CA) Regiment (BN)
- (6) 1st Utility (AS) Battalion
- (7) 2d General Support Aviation Battalion
- (8) 777 Aviation Support Battalion

nnn. 1st Artillery Brigade (MN)

- (1) 26 (UK) Royal Artillery Regiment (AS90) (ATTACHED)
- (2) (U) A & B Batteries, 1st Battalion, 12th Field Artillery Regiment (MLRS) (ATTACHED)
- (3) B Bty-43d Battalion, 11th Air Defense Artillery (AVENGER) (ATTACHED)
- (4) 4th GS Regiment (-) (MN)
- (5) 127 Battery, 4 GS Regiment (CA) (BLACKJACK & Radar)
- (6) UAV Troop (US), SUAS (GREYEAGLES)
- (7) UAV Troop (UK), SUAS (WATCHKEEPER)
- (8) HQ & Svcs Battery (CSS), 4 GS Regiment (CA)

ooo. 130th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade

- (1) HHC, 130th Engineer Brigade
- (2) 4th Engineer Battalion
 - (a) (U) HHC, 4th Engineer Battalion
 - (b) (U) 62d Sapper Company
 - (c) (U) 87th Sapper Company
 - (d) (U) 59th Mobility Company
 - (e) (U) 569th Mobility Company
 - (f) (U) Forward Support Company

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ANNEX A TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

- (3) 19th Engineer Battalion
 - (a) HHC, 19th Engineer Battalion
 - (b) 541st Sapper Company
 - (c) 68th Horizontal Construction Company
 - (d) 76th Vertical Construction Company
 - (e) 502d Multi-Role Bridge Company
 - (f) 72d Survey and Design Team
 - (g) Forward Support Company
- (4) 20th Engineer Battalion
 - (a) HHC, 20th Engineer Battalion
 - (b) 937th Clearance Company
 - (c) 91st Horizontal Construction Company
 - (d) 74th Multi-Role Bridge Company
 - (e) 47 Support Squadron, 4 (CA) Engineer Support Regiment (OPCON)
 - (f) Forward Support Company,
- (5) 91st Military Police Battalion
 - (a) Headquarters, 91st Military Police Battalion
 - (b) 23d Military Police Company
 - (c) 511th Military Police Company
 - (d) 543d Military Police Company
 - (e) 8 MP Dog Detachment
 - (f) Forward Support Company
- (6) CBRNE Task Force 4 (OPCON)
 - (a) Headquarters, 83d Chemical Battalion
 - (b) 51st Chemical (CS) Company
 - (c) (63d Chemical (AS) Company
 - (d) 92d Chemical (AS) Company
 - (e) 38th Ordnance (EOD) Company (+)
 - (f) 705th Ordnance (EOD) Company (+)
 - (g) 731st Ordnance (EOD) Company (+)
 - (h) Forward Support Company, 83d Chemical Battalion

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ANNEX A TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

- (7) 709th Military Intelligence Battalion
- (8) 130th Brigade Support Battalion
- ppp. 519th Military Police Battalion
- qqq. 4 (MN) Sustainment Brigade
 - (1) 4 Special Troops Battalion
 - (2) 577 Combat Sustainment Support Battalion
 - (3) (U) 180 Transport Battalion
 - (4) 4 (UK) Logistics Support Regiment
 - (5) (U) 4 (UK) Close Support Regiment (REME)
 - (6) **X** (CA) Service Battalion
 - (7) 1 (AS) Combat Service Support Battalion
 - (8) Franco-German Logistics Battalion
- rrr. 3d Battalion, 265th Air Defense Artillery (AVENGER) (DS)
- sss. 450th Civil Affairs Battalion (OPCON)
- ttt. C Company, 9 Military Information Support Battalion (OPCON)

82d Airborne Division

- uuu. 14th Air Support Operations Squadron (ATTACHED)
- vvv. Division Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion, 82d Airborne Division
- www. 1st Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne)
- xxx. 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne)
- yyy. 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne)
- zzz. 82nd Airborne Division Artillery
 - (1) HHB
 - (2) 1st Battalion, 319th Field Artillery Regiment
 - (3) 2nd Battalion, 319th Field Artillery Regiment
 - (4) 3rd Battalion, 319th Field Artillery Regiment

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ANNEX A TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

- aaaa. 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade
- (1) Headquarters and Headquarters Company
 - (2) 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment (Reconnaissance) OH-58D Kiowa Warrior
 - (3) 1st Battalion, 82nd Aviation Regiment (Attack) AH-64D Apache Longbow
 - (4) 2nd Battalion, 82nd Aviation Regiment (Assault) UH-60M Black Hawk
 - (5) 3rd Battalion, 82nd Aviation Regiment (General Support)
 - (6) 122nd Aviation Support Battalion
- bbbb. A/3-4 Air Defense Artillery
- cccc. 82nd Sustainment Brigade
- (1) 82d Special Troops Battalion
 - (2) 189th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion
- dddd. (27 Engineer Battalion (OPCON))
- (1) 57th Sapper Company
 - (2) 264th Clearance Company
 - (3) 161st Engineer Support Company (ABN)
 - (4) 618th Engineer Support Company (ABN)
 - (5) Forward Support Company
- eeee. 503d Military Police Battalion
- ffff. A Company, 9 Military Information Support Battalion
- gggg. CBRNE Task Force 82 (OPCON)
- (1) 192d Ordnance Battalion Headquarters
 - (2) 18th Ordnance (EOD) Company (+)
 - (3) 28th Ordnance (EOD) Company (+)
 - (4) 21st (CS) Chemical Company
 - (5) 101st (AS) Chemical Company
 - (6) Forward Support Company
- hhhh. 489th Civil Affairs Battalion
- iiii. 67th Expeditionary Signal Battalion

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ANNEX A TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

3rd Cavalry Regiment

jjjj. 7th Air Support Operations Squadron (-)(ATTACHED)

kkkk. HHB

llll. 1 (TIGER) Cavalry Squadron

mmmm. 2 (SABER) Cavalry Squadron

nnnn. 3 (THUNDER) Cavalry Squadron

oooo. 4 (LONGKNIFE) Cavalry Squadron

pppp. 1 (STEEL) Artillery Battalion (M777)

qqqq. 43d (PIONEER) Engineer Squadron (BEB)

rrrr. 3rd (MULESKINNER) Support Squadron

ssss. 579th Engineer Battalion (OPCON)

- (1) (HHC, 579th Engineer Battalion
- (2) 818th Sapper Company
- (3) 216th Mobility Company
- (4) 950th Clearance Company
- (5) 224th Engineer Support Company
- (6) 671st Multi-Role Bridge Company
- (7) Forward Support Company

tttt. 377th Chemical (CS) Company (OPCON)

uuuu. 763d Ordnance (EOD) Company (+) (OPCON)

vvvv. 66 Military Intelligence Company

www. 293 Military Police Company

75th Field Artillery Brigade

1-43 Air Defense Artillery Battalion

(U) 36th Engineer Brigade

xxxx. HHC, 36th Engineer Brigade

yyyy. 27th Engineer Battalion (Detached to 82d Airborne Division)

zzzz. 579th Engineer Battalion (Detached to 3d Cavalry Regiment)

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ANNEX A TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

aaaaa. 62d Engineer Battalion

- (1) HHC, 62d Engineer Battalion
- (2) 15th Horizontal Construction Company
- (3) 104th Vertical Construction Company
- (4) 697th Horizontal Construction Company
- (5) 551st Multi-Role Bridge Company
- (6) 259th Quarry Platoon
- (7) 63th Survey and Design Team
- (8) Forward Support Company

bbbbb. 65th Engineer Battalion

- (1) HHC, 65th Engineer Battalion
- (2) 34th Sapper Company
- (3) 95th Clearance Company
- (4) 441st Clearance Company
- (5) 82th Engineer Support Company
- (6) 814th Multi-Role Bridge Company(OPCON 3 CAV)
- (7) Forward Support Company,

77th Theater Aviation Brigade

10th Signal Brigade

cccc. HHC

dddd. 50th Signal Battalion (Detached to 1 ID)

eeee. 63d Signal Battalion (Detached to 4 MND)

ffff. 67th Signal Battalion (Detached to 82 ABN DIV)

415th CBRNE Brigade

ggggg. HHC, 415th CBRNE Brigade

hhhhh. 2nd Chemical Battalion

- (1) 44th Chemical (AS) Company
- (2) 68th Chemical (TE) Company
- (3) 181st Chemical (CS) Company
- (4) 301st Chemical (SMK) Company
- (5) 310th Chemical (BIDS) Company

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ANNEX A TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

- (6) Forward Support Company
 - iiii. CBRNE TF1 (Det to 1 ID)
 - jjjj. CBRNE TF4 (Det to 4 MND)
 - kkkk. CBRNE TF82 (Det to 82 ABN DIV)
 - llll. 377th Chemical Company (Det to 3d CR)
 - mmmm. 763d Ordnance (EOD) Company (Det to 3d CR)
 - nnnn. 79th Ordnance (EOD) Battalion
 - (1) 47th Ordnance (EOD) Company
 - (2) 75th Ordnance (EOD) Company
 - (3) 704th Ordnance (EOD) Company
 - (4) 752d Ordnance (EOD) Company
 - (5) Forward Support Company

360th Civil Affairs Brigade

9th Military Information Support Battalion

16th MP Brigade

- oooo. 385th MP Battalion
- pppp. 716th MP Battalion

66th Military Intelligence Brigade

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ANNEX B TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

Exercise Designer Note: The references listed below are all DATE training manuals. Clearly, an actual Intelligence Estimate would not refer to these documents, but these documents are the actual sources of the information in this assessment. Exercise designers may wish to edit the reference list to reflect plausible synthetic Intelligence products, etc.as the sources.

References:

- a. ADP 2-0, Intelligence, Aug 12.
- b. ADRP 2-0, Intelligence, Aug 12.
- c. ATTP 2-01, Planning Requirements and Assessing Collection, Apr 12 (FOUO).
- d. FM 2-0, Intelligence Operations, Apr 14.
- e. FM 7-100.1, Opposing Force Operations, Dec 04.
- f. FM7-100.4, Opposing Force Organization Guide, May 07.
- g. Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE), Version 2.2, Apr 15.
- h. OGCOE_DATEOBV6.1, Apr 13.
- i. OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC (U)

Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU

1. Situation.

a. Area of Interest(AOI). The AOI includes all of the regional nation states with historical, cultural, ethnic, and linguistic ties to the potentially warring states – Atropia and Ariana. This area contains portions of two Geographic Combatant Commander Areas of Responsibility (AOR), U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). Notably, Ariana lies within the USCENTCOM AOR.

The entire Caspian Sea and the country of Atropia lie within the USEUCOM AOR. In the northeast, the AOI includes the Turkic peoples in the central Asian littoral states surrounding the Caspian Sea, including Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. In the east, the AOI includes the Hindu-Muslim, Pashtu, and Baluch peoples in the states of Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the south, the AOI includes the Persian Gulf region, including the vital economic chokepoints of the Straits of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman.

The AOI also contains the Arabic peoples of the Middle Eastern Kingdoms of Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait. The State of Israel, and its Hebrew-speaking peoples, cannot be omitted given it may likely be attacked in an Arianian attempt to fracture the Coalition.

In the west, the AOI includes the States of Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. In the northwest, the AOI includes the Indo-European, Indo-Persian, and Turkic peoples in the South Caucasus states of Atropia, Limaria, Gorgas, and Donovia, including the North Caucasus autonomous regions of Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, and Karachay-Cherkessia.

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ANNEX B TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

- a. Area of Intelligence Responsibility (AIR). CFLCC AIR includes the country of Gorgas, the entire country of Atropia less the Lower Janga region, plus the northernmost triangle of Ariana.

- b. Area of Operations.

(1) Joint Operations Area (JOA). The CJTF-OIG JOA includes the landmasses, national air space and territorial waters of Atropia (less the province/region of Lower Janga), Gorgas, Ariana, and Turkey.

It also includes the waters and associated airspaces of the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas east of 24 degrees longitude, the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea south of 41 degrees 51.5 minutes north latitude, the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea north of 22 degrees 30 minutes north latitude, less the territorial waters and national air spaces of bordering sovereign nations.

(2) CFLCC Area of Operations (AO). CFLCC AO includes the entire country of Atropia less the Lower Janga region, plus the northernmost triangle of Ariana.

- c. Terrain. Made up of over 200,000 square miles, the AO is a mountainous region located between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. The AO is approximately 695 KM long and 320 KM wide. The Caucasus Mountains traditionally separate Europe and Asia.

The AO lies between the Greater Caucasus Mountain Range, which runs just north of the northern borders of Gorgas and Atropia through Donovia, and the Lesser Caucasus Mountain Range, which dominate Limaria. (Refer to Tab A (Terrain) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) of this annex.)

- d. Weather. High pressure dominates much of the region throughout the summer, cutting off migratory low pressure systems from the region for extended periods of time. Occasional spring/summer cold fronts will struggle through the mountains into the area, but they are too weak to carry much more than isolated rain showers into the area.

June has the most precipitation in the summer months; although, the precipitation tapers off late in the month as the area of high pressure strengthens. Largely due to the terrain, frontal systems are rare in June. Locally generated rain showers and isolated thunderstorms bring the only rain.

Mostly cloudy skies below 1,000 feet are extremely rare, providing favorable conditions for all air support operations. Morning fog tends to develop less than five times in June throughout Limaria and Atropia.

Gorgas is more promising to fog development due to the close proximity of the moisture from the Black Sea. Morning fog generally dissipates before mid-morning. Surface winds in Atropia tend to flow from the east in the valleys, generally less than 10 knots. June marks the beginning of the hot and dry season. Extreme temperatures reach triple digits throughout the region. (Refer to Tab B (Weather) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) of this annex.)

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e. Enemy Forces. Overall, Ariana's Armed Forces (AN Armed Forces) are well trained capable of conducting combined arms and joint operations, but are limited to regional power-projection capabilities. AN organizes its forces into six service components:

- (1) 1) the Army,
- (2) 2) Navy,
- (3) 3) Air Force,
- (4) Strategic Forces,
- (5) Special-Purpose Forces (SPF) Command, and
- (6) Internal Security Forces.

In wartime, the Internal Security Forces of the Ministry of the Interior become subordinate to the Supreme High Command (SHC); thus, becoming the AN Armed Forces' sixth service component.

The SHC consists of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. The Armed Forces are under the command of the Chief of the General Staff to whom the service commanders report. Refer to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) of this annex for more details on the AN Armed Forces.

(7) Current Situation. AN forces invaded Atropia (AP) on (date) with an Operational Strategic Command (OSC) based on 3rd Mechanized Army. Designated as 2 OSC the attack was preceded by theatre ballistic missile (TBM) strikes targeting AP airfields and surface to air missile (SAM) installations. AN was able to retain air superiority for the first four days of the invasion. Thereafter, Coalition air achieved first air parity, then air superiority.

Ten days following the invasion, 23 Division Tactical Group (DTG) ended its advance after being reduced to 65 percent combat effectiveness and began to transition to defensive operations. Twelve days following the invasion, 25 DTG lost its initial bridgehead over the Kura River, due to an aggressive counter attack by AP ground forces, supported by Coalition air power. The assessed objective of the 2 OSC attack was to isolate Baku and secure key routes to deny LCC entry into Ariana.

2 OSC consolidated its defenses and focused on establishing control of the occupied territory. AN forces attempted to breakout northwest from the area currently occupied on (Date D-2 months, Day 14). This attack was spearheaded by 92 DTG from the SHC and supported by 11,12 and 13 DTGs, part of 1 OSC. The attack was defeated with the 1 OSC forces subsequently withdrawing back into Ariana territory where they adopted a defensive posture in northern AN. 3 Paramilitary BDE is deployed across the occupied territory, purging AP supporters from local government as well as civilian police force positions of influence and replacing them with persons supportive of Ariana.

(a) Courses of Action (COA). AN defends occupied AP with 2 OSC. 2 OSC will consist of four divisions, 23 DTG, 24 DTG, 25 DTG and 26 DTG.

1. 23 DTG defends the western approach south of the Kura River.
2. 25 DTG defends in the east on the Kura River.

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3. 24 DTG defends in depth between the Talish Mountain range and the Caspian Sea Coast.

4. The location of the 26 DTG is unconfirmed but likely located in the vicinity of Ardabil, AN protecting the IB and lines of communication.

1 OSC defends inside the Ariana border. (Refer to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) of this annex for a more in depth discussion of Ariana's COAs.)

(8) Collection Capability. Recently, the AN military shifted more of its intelligence portfolio from the Intelligence Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Ariana to the military intelligence apparatus.

AN has sophisticated human intelligence (HUMINT), open source intelligence (OSINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT) programs. Analysts believe AN has at least one government-owned and -operated satellite that supports intelligence operations. Additionally, AN has access to commercial off-the-shelf satellite imagery and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for imagery intelligence (IMINT), along with AN-produced measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT).

(a) HUMINT. AN organizes its HUMINT programs into four primary categories:

1. collection and influence,
2. support to foreign militants,
3. support to friendly foreign countries, and
4. direct action.

The Ariana intelligence services use a vast web of interconnected economic, familial, and religious connections (such as the graduates of Ariana religious institutions) for collection and influence. Ariana intelligence previously funded, trained, and enabled insurgent paramilitaries throughout the Middle East. Much of this support activity has been targeted against Coalition forces in OIG.

It is believed that AN has, and will continue to support the South Atropian Peoples' Army (SAPA) within AP and will leverage SAPA for intelligence and direct action purposes. AN special-purpose forces (SPF), likely from 3961 SPF BDE (ABN), can be expected to be operating within AP and working with SAPA insurgents to monitor and target Coalition forces movement and activities.

(b) OSINT. **AN operates a massive OSINT program with government and government-affiliated operators who collect primarily via the Internet. The AN military continues to mobilize a large force of cyber collectors, most with computer warfare and English language skills, to collect data on Coalition forces and troop contributing nations (TCNs).**

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(c) SIGINT. AN SIGINT programs consistently demonstrate success in combating Western communications systems, especially units that demonstrate poor OPSEC. In any case, Coalition forces can expect AN SIGINT to provide the AN military with useable indications and warning, capabilities assessment, and targeting intelligence. Most AN SIGINT operators have significant “real world” experience and capabilities in English and all languages of the Caucasus area.

(d) IMINT. AN IMINT operations utilize unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and other air-breathing platforms, such as fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. However, recent developments have indicated that AN has access to a government owned and operated low resolution imaging satellite (three meters). This satellite is in low earth orbit (LEO) and is believed to have a relatively short life span, approximately four months. Images received from this satellite are stored and periodically dumped to a ground station located somewhere in AN. To further supplement its IMINT requirements, the AN military regularly purchases commercial imagery from other countries.

(e) MASINT. AN probably maintains a basic MASINT capability, though little on this topic appears in open-source references.

(f) Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RISTA). RISTA is viewed as the single-most important function for the AN military. Thus, AN forces typically commit significant resources to RISTA-related operations, which are usually aggressive with overlapping redundancy in the intelligence disciplines.

1. Directly subordinate to the AN SHC are 9 INFOWAR BDE and 9 UAV BDE. Elements of these two key enablers may be deployed to support the tactical activities of 2 OSC in AP, but are more likely to be focused more broadly on monitoring and disrupting Coalition forces deployment and actions throughout the JOA. 179 Squadron of the AN Air Force has the ISR assets with tier 2 level IMINT, ELINT and COMINT Pods.

2. AN forces currently in AP have been identified as elements of 3 Mechanized Army. The forces have been formed into an OSC (2 OSC) which most likely includes the 3 RISTA Command comprised of 36 Signal Recon BDE, 371 UAV BN and 375 Information Warfare (INFOWAR) BDE.

Elements of 1 RISTA Command are normally garrisoned in northwest AN and are likely providing RISTA coverage in depth along the border and within AN territory.

351 Recon BDE with two Recon BNs have been identified in AP. 23, 24 and 25 DTGs have been identified in AP. Each has a subordinate Recon BN with a Recon CO with each subordinate Bde.

7 Arty Command has been identified in Atropia with its subordinate 279 Target Acquisition (TA) BDE. Each of 23, 24 and 25 DTGs have a TA Bty as part of their subordinate Arty BDEs.

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f. Friendly Forces.

(1) Overall. AP forces, supported by 82 ABN DIV have contained the AN attack are in a defensive posture protecting the approaches to Baku and essential routes to support CFLCC deployment. Coalition air forces continue to maintain air superiority over AP conducting offensive counter-air operations, degrading AN air defense systems and strike AN long-range fire assets.

(2) Friendly Intelligence Capability. All intelligence requests/requirements are to be directed to the CFLCC Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE) which is to determine the necessity to forward higher to the CJTF-OIG JISE for support. The Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) is to be used as the primary application used for support requests. Requests may also be submitted via message, FAX, or STU-III. Skip-Echelon tasking/requests are to be used at the discretion of CFLCC CJ-2. (Refer to Annex L (Information Collection).)

(3) Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. A National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) is to be established in the CJTF-OIG JISE. All subordinate commands and agencies are to request intelligence products from the NIST cell via the CFLCC CJ-2.

(a) Civil Considerations. Refer to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) and Tab C (Civil Considerations) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) of this annex.

(b) Existing Situation. AP is a neutral, Western-leaning dictatorship centered on the Ismailov family. While not a broadly democratic state, AP is secularized, and the population enjoys a high standard of living by regional standards due to oil revenue. Government repression is limited, although some degree of censorship exists. Corruption is extensive and creates a reformist desire in the population who, while accepting of the Ismailov family dominance, would like greater freedom of expression and less official corruption.

(c) Internal Strife. Because of this situation and the activities of insurgents (Salasyl and the Southern Atropian Peoples' Army (SAPA), the two largest insurgent groups in AP) Coalition units may meet with opposition in the populace. Any Internal Security Force personnel will attempt, alone, or in conjunction with the Salasyl and the SAPA leadership, to organize ethnic Arianians into paramilitary organizations. These units normally will consist of less than 100 personnel equipped as light infantry companies. They will be poorly trained and forcefully recruited. These paramilitary units may establish camps for ethnic Atropians not loyal to Ariana near major population centers. It is expected the AN Armed Forces will position high value targets near these camps for protection against the Coalition targeting.

(4) Attachments and Detachments. No change, except Squadron 3 CAV detached OPCON 4 MND Phases I-III until OBJ PEARL is secure and Bde(-) 82 ABN DIV detached OPCON 4 MND Phase III for assault crossing Kura River. Refer to Annex A (Task Organization).

g. Assumptions.

(1) Ariana. AN 2 OSC will aggressively defend the occupied territory.

(2) AN Strength. AN forces in AP are currently assessed to be at 65 percent strength.

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Mission. Based on the approved G-2 Staff Estimate and Intelligence Estimate (Appendix 1 to this annex), federated intelligence operations are to be integrated and synchronized to support CFLCC decision points and joint operation assessments to accomplish the mission statement in CFLCC OPORD 07.

Execution.

- h. Scheme of Intelligence Support. Refer to base OPORD.
- i. Tasks to Subordinate Units.
 - (1) CFLCC G-2. Be prepared to:
 - (a) (U) Notify CJTF-OIG G-2 on the arrival and status of all collection assets in the JOA.
 - (b) Integrate assets into the CJTF-OIG Information Collection Plan.
 - (c) Prepare collection plan and ATO input 24 hours prior to arrival of collection assets in theater and 72 hours in advance thereafter.
 - (2) (U) 66 MI BDE.
 - (a) Notify CFLCC G-2 on the arrival and status of all collection assets in the JOA.
 - (b) Integrate assets into CFLCC Information Collection Plan.
 - (c) Prepare collection plan and ATO input 24 hours prior to arrival of collection assets in theater and 72 hours in advance thereafter.
 - (d) Provide interrogation support to the Theater Detention Facility (TDF).
 - (3) 1ID.
 - (a) Notify CFLCC G-2 on the arrival and status of all collection assets in the JOA.
 - (b) Integrate assets into CFLCC Information Collection Plan.
 - (c) Prepare collection plan and ATO input 24 hours prior to arrival of collection asset in theater and 72 hours in advance thereafter.
 - (d) Establish a Division Detainee Holding Area (DHA) with interrogation support.
 - (4) 4 MND.
 - (a) Notify CFLCC G-2 on the arrival and status of all collection assets in the JOA.
 - (b) Integrate assets into CFLCC Information Collection Plan.
 - (c) Prepare collection plan and ATO input 24 hours prior to arrival of collection asset in theater and 72 hours in advance thereafter.
 - (d) Establish a Division Detainee Holding Area (DHA) with interrogation support.

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(5) 82 ABN DIV.

(a) Notify CFLCC G-2 (if not already complete) on the arrival and status of all collection assets in the JOA.

(b) Integrate assets into CFLCC Information Collection Plan.

(c) Prepare collection plan and ATO input 24 hours prior to arrival of collection asset in theater and 72 hours in advance thereafter.

(d) Establish a Division Detainee Holding Area (DHA) with interrogation support.

(6) 3 CAV.

(a) Notify CFLCC G-2 on the arrival and status of all collection assets in the JOA.

(b) Integrate assets into CFLCC Information Collection Plan.

(c) Prepare collection plan and ATO input 24 hours prior to arrival of collection asset in theater and 72 hours in advance thereafter.

(7) 360 CA. Be prepared to assist with interrogation operations at the TDF.

j. Counterintelligence. Refer to Appendix 2 (Counterintelligence) of this annex.

k. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Requirements.

(a) Priority Intelligence Requirements.

1. What are the dispositions, composition, and strength of OSC 2 Integrated Fire Command (IFC) nodes and Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS)?

2. What is the strength of the OSC 2 forces (23 DTG, 24 DTG, and 25 DTG)?

3. (Are there indicators that the 26 DTG, 11 DTG, 12 DTG, 13 DTG and/or 92 DTG are reinforcing the 23 DTG or 25 DTG?

4. Are there indicators that the SHC or FG intend to employ the strategic or operational reserve?

5. What is the disposition and location of the 26 DTG?

6. What is the disposition and location of the 11 DTG?

7. What is the disposition and location of the 12 DTG?

8. What is the disposition and location of the 13 DTG?

9. What is the disposition and location of the 92 DTG?

10. What routes and border crossing points is Ariana using to sustain its forces in Atropia?

11. Have the NODONG-II SSM BNs been moved from their home bases?

12. Where are the Ariana SSMs with WMD capability in the AO or within range of it?

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13. Are there indications the Ariana National Command Authority (NCA) has approved the use of WMD?

14. What are the locations of the criminal, insurgent, or SPF elements that are planning to negatively impact CFLCC LOCs within Gorgas and Atropia and do they have that capability?

15. Are the Arianians or any non-state actors preparing to commit an action that would trigger a consequence management activity (Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO), loss of WMD accountability, etc.)?

(b) Friendly Force Information Requirements.

1. Bde Combat Power below 75percent.
2. (Loss of attack or medium transport helicopters.
3. Loss of ADA coverage in the forward area.
4. Status of ISR/MQ Assets.
5. Loss of AN/TPQ-53 Radar.
6. HIMARS/MLRS ammunition status less than 40percent.
7. Atropian tank and field artillery units that are reduced to 70percent combat power.
8. Loss or destruction of a Bde Tac or Main CP.

(2) Measures for Handling Personnel, Documents, and Material.

(a) Prisoners of War, Deserters, Repatriates, Inhabitants, and Other Persons. Refer to Tab B (Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW)/Civilian Detainees) to Appendix 4 (Human Intelligence) of this annex.

(b) Captured Documents. Refer to Appendix 8 (Captured Enemy Equipment (CEE)) of this annex.

(c) Captured Materiel. Refer to Appendix 8 (Captured Enemy Equipment (CEE)) of this annex.

(3) Documents or Equipment Required. Subordinate units request specific documents or equipment required to support intelligence operations to CFLCC G-2.

(4) Distribution of Intelligence Products. CFLCC G-2 shall process all information received from subordinate commands. CFLCC G-2 shall satisfy intelligence needs of all military forces operating in the CFLCC AO. All requirements in support of CFLCC forces shall be coordinated between each subordinate command and CFLCC Analysis and Control Element (ACE).

(a) Special Request for Reports. All requests for non-standard reports from subordinate commands will be handled by the CFLCC ACE chief.

(b) Special Request Liaison Requirements. CFLCC special request liaison requirements are TBD.

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(5) Other instructions. None.

Sustainment. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment).

Command and Signal.

l. **Command.**

(1) **Location of Commander and Key Leaders.** The CFLCC G-2 is currently located at the Main CP located at Tbilisi, Gorgas.

(2) **Succession of Command.** Refer to base OPORD.

(3) **Liaison Requirements.** Refer to base OPORD.

m. **Control.**

(1) **Command Posts.** Refer to base OPORD.

(2) **Intelligence Coordination Line.** TBD.

(3) **Reports.** Not Published.

n. **Signal.** Refer to Annex H (Signal).

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ATTACHMENTS:

- Appendix 1 - Intelligence Estimate
 - Tab A - Terrain
 - Tab B - Weather
 - Tab C - Civil Considerations
 - Exhibit 1 - Atropia Political System
 - Exhibit 2 - Atropia Military System
 - Exhibit 3 - Atropia NCA
 - Exhibit 4 - Atropia Economic System
 - Exhibit 5 - Atropia Social System
 - Exhibit 6 - Atropia Irregular Threats
 - Exhibit 7 - Atropia Information System
 - Exhibit 8 - Atropia Infrastructure System
 - Tab D - IPOE (Extracts)
 - Tab E - Enemy Forces
- Appendix 2 - Counterintelligence (CI)
- Appendix 3 - Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
- Appendix 4 - Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
 - Tab A - HUMINT Operations Cell
 - Tab B - Interrogation and Debriefing
- Appendix 5 – Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT)
- Appendix 6 – Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) (omitted)
- Appendix 7 – Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
- Appendix 8 – Captured Enemy Equipment (CEE) (omitted)

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**APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO
OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

(U) References:

CFLCC-OPORD_07-OP_IRON_GUARDIAN

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPLAN: ZULU

(U) Mission. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence).

(U) Analysis of the Area of Operations (AO).

o. (U) Topography.

(1) (U) Effect on Adversary Capabilities. The lesser Caucasus mountain range will provide limited avenues of approach (AAs) for Arianian forces to reinforce their troops already in southern Atropia. The Kura River is a natural obstacle that Arianian forces will exploit in the defence. The Aras River divides the occupied territory into two sectors. Crossings over the Aras are essential to Arianian Armed Forces (AN Armed Forces) for lateral movement, reinforcement, and resupply. The Lesser Caucasus mountain range also provides Arianian forces close terrain in which to stage forces, locate support units and equipment, and will provide good defensive terrain.

(2) (U) Effect on Friendly Course of Action (COA). The available intelligence systems can support this operation. The mountainous relief in the area of operations (AO) will decrease the effectiveness of ground-based Communications Intelligence (COMINT). Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is an extremely important source of information, especially to defeat the threat of SPF teams. Aerial platforms will be extremely valuable in visual reconnaissance. Both the Greater and the Lesser Caucasus Mountain ranges will affect Coalition operations. Movement out of the tactical assembly areas (TAA) along the AAs will be to a degree canalized along the Donovanian border near the Greater Caucasus. The reservoirs and the mountain ranges are natural choke points that if exploited by Arianian forces can delay movement. Additionally, these restricted routes pose a security threat in that they provide ideal terrain for operations by the Atropian insurgent forces and Arianian SPF.

p. (U) Hydrography.

(1) (U) Effect on Adversary Capabilities. The Arianian navy patrols the Persian Gulf and maintains a small, agile contingent on the Caspian Sea. The small ships of Ariana's Fourth Naval District will not be impeded by Atropia's coastline and will maintain the capability to destroy oil/natural gas infrastructure in the Caspian Sea or contest the sea LOCs; however, Coalition forces air operations present a significant threat that will severely curtail Fourth Naval District operations.

(2) (U) Effect on Friendly COAs. As the Caspian Sea's is not linked to the world's oceans, Coalition forces are limited to entering the JOA along Sea Lines of Communication through the Black Sea and subsequently through Gorgas.

q. (U) Weather. Refer to Tab B (Weather) of this appendix.

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r. (U) Civil Considerations. Refer to Tab C (Civil Considerations) of this appendix.

s. (U) Terrain Assessment using Observations & Fields of Fire, Avenue of Approach, Key Terrain, Obstacles, Cover & Concealment (OAKOC).

(1) (U) Observation and Fields of Fire. Line of sight is good in the lowlands allowing for maximum standoff firing distance for weapon systems. Fields of fire are excellent along the foothills of the mountain ranges. The mountainous area will limit radio communications.

(2) (U) Avenues of Approach.

(a) (U) The northern corridor is supported by the following highways: M5, R16, R9, M2, and M4. These are generally, a Battalion or below corridor until they opens up east of the Mingachevir Reservoir where it can support larger formations.

(b) (U) The central corridor is supported by the following routes: M2, R18 and R23. As with the northern corridor after passing east of the Mingachevir Reservoir, the corridor opens up to support larger formations.

(c) (U) Most likely air threat ingress and egress routes are dictated by the east-west mountainous terrain. This mountainous terrain provides good camouflage and concealment.

(3) (U) Key Terrain.

(a) (U) City of Baku.

(b) (U) Limited crossing sites along the Kura, Aras, and Agshu Rivers.

(c) (U) Mountain passes along the Greater Caucasus foothills.

(d) (U) Mingachevir Reservoir Dam.

(4) (U) Obstacles. The natural obstacles in the AO are the two major rivers in Atropia, the Kura and Aras Rivers. Snow melts and heavy rains during the spring and fall often cause these rivers to overflow and initiate flooding. The Kura River flows from the west through the Mingachevir Reservoir dissecting Atropia and emptying into the Caspian Sea. The Kura has a varying width from around 120 to 300 meters with a depth of roughly 9 meters. It has a velocity slow enough to support float bridge operations, if needed. The Aras River flows from the southwest along the border of Ariana and emptying into the Kura River. The Aras is roughly 80 to 150 meters wide with a varying depth of 5 to 12 meters. The Aras River's velocity can be controlled enough to provide the ability for float bridging, if needed, but engineer work will be required along the banks.

(5) (U) Cover and Concealment. Cover and concealment in the AO is generally poor in the lowlands, but excellent in mountainous areas, along the canal systems, and in the many urban areas.

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(U) **Enemy Situation.** The Arianian Supreme High Command (SHC) wants to increase the country's wealth and international prestige by seizing critical hydrocarbon infrastructure in Atropia and by constructing an oil pipeline from Sangachal in Atropia to Ariana. It also wants to ensure that any future Atropian political regime respects Arianian ethnic concerns in the border regions. With that purpose in mind, Ariana attacked Atropia with OSC 2 to isolate Baku, Atropia's capital and to seize the transportation hub east of the Mingachevir Reservoir in order to block Coalition entry into Atropia. Additionally the seizing of petroleum and gas pipeline infrastructure will control the export of Atropian oil and gas. Having failed to achieve these objectives, the Arianian SHC will aggressively defend the area it has occupied in Atropia with the intent of annexing this territory as a new province of Ariana.

(U) **Current Threat Situation.** Refer to Tab E (Enemy) of this appendix for organization charts of the OSC 2 and its organic formations.

(U) **Threat Characteristics/Order of Battle.**

t. (U) **Current Disposition.**

(1) (U) **OSC 2.**

(a) (U) The 25 DTG at 70percent strength is the OSC2 main effort, will defend on the Kura River to defeat Coalition entry into the occupied territory. SPF and SAPA will be used to target the LLC formations as they move into assembly areas. Initially, 25 DTG will deploy forces forward to disrupt Kura River crossings. These elements will withdraw under pressure to depth positions around established engagement areas to inflict maximum destruction. Bridgeheads will be counter attacked immediately to reestablish the defence on the Kura River.

(b) (U) The 23 DTG at 65percent strength is the OSC2 secondary effort and has established a defence approximately 60 kilometers inside Atropian territory oriented to the northwest. The rear boundary is the Aras River. North of the Aras River and south of the Kura River, 23 DTG defends to protect direct approaches to the Ariana border and to protect the west flank of 25 DTG. 23 DTG will take advantage of the restricted mobility caused by the numerous lowland canals and marshes; this will be covered by long range fires. The restricted terrain offered by the Lower Caucasus will be relatively easy to defend as there are few passable routes.

(c) (U) The 24 DTG at 75percent strength is OSC 2's depth formation. It defends the southern sector of the occupied territory and the coastal line of communication from Ariana.

(d) (U) The 351 Recon BDE and 353 Antitank BDEs both at 65percent strength have formed a large BTG. They are guarding along the Kura River between 23 DTG and 25 DTG and securing Aras River crossings.

(e) (U) 349 Tank BDE at 70percent strength is OSC 2's reserve, prepared to reinforce/counter attack in priority the 25 DTG then 23 DTG.

(f) (U) The OSC 2 defence is supported by the 3 Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition (RISTA) Command (CMD), the 27 Integrated Fires Command (IFC), the 355 Independent Combat Aviation Brigade (ICAB), the 281 Integrated Air Defence Command (IADC), and the 3 Engineer CMD (Mobility/Counter Mobility/Survivability, Pontoon, Deception). The 3 Integrated Support Command (ISC) will support OSC2 from within Ariana.

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(g) (U) OSC 2 is estimated to have 25-30 SPF teams from 3961 SPF BDE infiltrated into unoccupied Atropia.

(h) (U) The 26 DTG is at 25percent strength as a result of reallocating their assets to reinforce the other DTGs due to attrition. It is currently located in Ardabil, Ariana providing rear area security of the primary line of communication in Ariana for OSC 2.

(2) (U) OSC1

(a) (U) 13 DTG is at 65percent strength and OSC 1's main effort. It is defending the Ariana border to the southeast from the Aras River.

(b) (U) 11 DTG is at 65percent strength and is OSC's secondary effort. It is defending the Ariana border along the Aras River, securing Aras River crossings.

(c) (U) 12 DTG is at 70percent strength and is OSC 1's depth formation.

(d) (U) 92 DTG is at 65percent strength and is the Field Group's (FG) operational reserve positioned IVO Shur Gol (38S 486 415).

(e) (U) The OSC 1 defence is supported by 1 RISTA CMD, 1 IFC, the 311 and 313 ICABs, the 16 IADC, and 1 Engineer CMD. The 1 ISC will support the defence from within Ariana.

u. (U) Air Threat.

(1) (U) Arianan Air Force. The Arianian Air Force (ANAF) will be challenged to defend its airbases in Ariana and will be restricted to limited local offensive operations against CFLCC ground forces. Its target priorities will be massed formations, C2 nodes, and logistics facilities.

(2) (U) Aircraft.

(a) (U) The ANAF regiments have a mix of fighters, interceptors, and bombers. The majority of the ANAF will remain under the control of the SHC, mainly supporting the Defensive Counter Air to protect strategic critical assets in Ariana. They may however decide to commit additional bombers to support OSC 2 ground operations in Atropia.

(b) (U) Fixed wing attack aircraft typically fly in sorties of four to six, depending on the target's value, the necessity for mutual support, and will use a low altitude, high-speed target approach. Modern fighter-bombers (Gr.1, SU-30) ingress at 100 feet AGL (day) and must climb to several thousand feet prior to releasing their ordnance. Low-level night operations are generally restricted to the SU-30 and GR.1 Tornado. Use of decoy flights is common. Almost all fighter-bombers stage from fixed air bases. If SEAD is employed, it precedes the approaching aircraft by one to two minutes. The HARPY lethal UAV is capable of destroying any SAM system within its range. The ANAF does possess a limited quantity of AS-17 ARMs and employs wingtip-mounted Gardenia or Sorbtysia ECM pods. Ariana has been known to conduct fixed wing deep strikes in conjunction with TBM strikes in order to target active TBM tracking Patriot radars.

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(3) (U) Attack Aviation. Enemy attack aviation generally falls into two categories, pre-planned and immediate. Pre-planned includes: (1) Direct Air Support (DAS) in support of maneuver operations; (2) Disruption of the battle zone, typically engaging templated targets or targets of opportunity; (3) Aerial Interdiction (AI) sorties against a selected target, usually in the support zone or theater operational-level high payoff targets; (4) Counter-attack role. All pre-planned sorties are coordinated with the OSC and/or DTG IFCs, massing synchronized direct and indirect fires to attack a specific target. Immediate DAS is the pre-positioning of aviation assets with several aircraft on call for targets of opportunity. Helicopters are capable of attack in packages of two to four, ingressing at nap of the earth, gaining elevation prior to ordnance release, normally 200 feet AGL. Attack helicopters are capable of attacking armored/mechanized formations. OSCs are capable of establishing limited FARPs for attack helicopters early in the battle, within approximately 50-75 kilometers of the FEBA.

v. (U) Arianian Navy. The Arianian naval forces in the Caspian Sea have inflicted significant damage on the Atropian Navy, whereby the latter can now only protect the port of Baku. The Arianian navy now must operate under the threat of Coalition air. If the ANAF can achieve local air superiority they do however retain the capability to contest Atropian sea control, a capacity to conduct limited amphibious operations (including the seizure of Atropian hydrocarbon platforms) and the ability to lay sea mines. Arianan flagged commercial vessels in the Caspian Sea have the capability of transporting and offloading an infantry battalion equivalent with light armor vehicles.

w. (U) Significant Strengths and Weaknesses.

(1) (U) The enemy command, control, communications, and intelligence system is integrated and redundant allowing maximum flexibility and responsiveness.

(2) (U) Enemy has organic engineers at all levels down to and including brigades.

(3) (U) AN Armed Forces have a large number of main battle tanks and AT systems; therefore, it believes it can fight CFLCC forces on a linear battlefield and win.

(4) (U) AN Armed Forces possess chemical weapons and their doctrine supports first use of this capability.

(5) (U) Arianian SPF and SAPA forces are capable and will conduct attacks against Coalition and Government of Atropia in rear areas.

(6) (U) The training and equipment of the AN Armed Forces, with some exceptions, is below the level of Coalition forces.

(7) (U) Truck-based units lack protected mobility during movement. As a result, they are of limited value for offensive operations. Most of the Anti-tank and mortar systems in these units are towed, severely limiting offensive capability.

(8) (U) The limited crossing sites on the Aras River pose a challenge to resupply and reinforcement of Arianian forces in Atropia.

(9) (U) Most enemy satellite capability is commercial off-the-shelf, or provided by Western nations.

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(U) Threat Capabilities.

x. (U) Information Operations.

(1) (U) The Arianian Information Operations campaign began prior to the invasion. AM/FM receivers in Atropia have been receiving pro-Arianian broadcasts for many months.

(2) (U) Radio messages (propaganda) have focused on legitimization of what has been portrayed as the “much needed” liberation of Atropia. The invasion has been portrayed as an action that will appropriately maintain the peace in a historically affiliated country, until full liberation of Atropia can be affected. The legitimacy of the Atropian "dictatorship" has been challenged as has the “unfair” distribution of oil and gas reserves in the Caspian Sea. International actions in support of Atropia are being portrayed as “proof” of the US and western intentions to exploit regional natural resources with little or no benefit to the region.

(3) (U) Any local and international news media operating in the occupied territories of Atropia will be restricted in their reporting. Allowable reporting will emphasize Arianian military efforts to repair damage caused by the invasion and improvements to quality of life in the occupied territory.

(4) (U) The Government of Ariana will aggressively exploit collateral damage caused by the Coalition. SHC will place some possible High Pay-off Targets in locations that will cause collateral damage if attacked by air or indirect fires. They will leverage any missteps using the international news media and in regional/international political organizations, such as the UN.

(5) (U) OSC 2 has the capability to electronically attack non-secure communication nodes to include satellites.

(6) (U) The AN Armed Forces has the capability to conduct localized electronic attack on secure military networks.

(7) (U) The AN Armed Forces does not have the capability to exploit secure signals intercept or secure computer networks.

(8) (U) Arianian Cyber Forces may be colluding with criminal elements to facilitate cyber attacks against Coalition and Atropian forces, and Atropian government and commercial networks.

y. (U) Logistics OSC 2 will have two main supply routes extending from logistical nodes inside Ariana. The main strategic supply center will be in Ardabil, a city inside Ariana. 3 ISC will operate forward logistical bases near the Bilesuvar area where they will be centrally located to support all DTGs.

z. (U) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). AN Armed Forces could employ a variety of WMD in support of all COAs. If employed, the most probable type of WMD would be non-persistent chemical. Release of chemical weapons is assessed to be at the Minister of Defence level. The most probable means of delivery is either SS-26 or SS-21, although Ariana possesses several other forms of rocket, artillery, and mortar delivered chemical munitions.

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aa. (U) Strategic Center of Gravity. It is assessed that the Arianians consider their strategic center of gravity the AN Armed Forces. They believe defeat of the Coalition will raise Arianian status in the region and set the conditions for Ariana to seize hydrocarbon resources from Atropia once the Coalition has withdrawn from the region. Critical vulnerabilities include interdiction at key main supply routes (MSRs), bridges, and depots; jamming and destruction of air defence (ADA) assets; and commanders vulnerable to military information support operations (MISO). Critical requirements include the ability to resupply the force, the ability to command and control (C2) the force, the ability to protect the force, the loyalty of commanders in the field, and sufficient ground forces.

bb. (U) Operational Center of Gravity. It is assessed that the Arianians consider their operational center of gravity as OSC 2. They believe a successful defence in Atropia which imposed a decisive defeat on the Coalition would cause the Coalition to fracture and withdraw. Critical vulnerabilities include aircraft that are not as advanced as the Coalition; Integrated Air Defences (IAD) that can be jammed or destroyed; bridges, MSRs, and depots that are vulnerable to attack and interdiction; C2 that is vulnerable to jamming; limited satellites; and finite number of assets which if the Arianians over-use them, the operational readiness will degrade. Critical requirements include air support; the ability to protect the force, the ability to resupply the force; the ability to C2 the force; the ability to gather, process, and exploit intelligence; ground maneuver forces; and engineer forces (mobility/counter-mobility/survivability).

cc. (U) Tactical Center of Gravity. It is assessed that the Arianians consider their tactical center of gravity the 23 DTG defence that either denies or threatens Coalition entry into Atropia from Gorgas. Critical vulnerabilities include the relative ease with which its positions can be located and thus attacked; similarly with routes that can be detected and interdicted; vulnerability to jamming and destruction; logistic bases that can be located and attacked; and easily located artillery systems. Critical requirements include reserves, freedom to maneuver forces, engineer forces (Mobility/Counter-mobility/Survivability), IADs, supply, and fires.

dd. (U) Enemy Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA)/Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA). Refer to Tab E (Enemy) of this appendix.

ee. (U) Intelligence Capabilities. The AN Armed Forces will focus intelligence collection efforts toward precision weapons systems, air defence assets, intelligence gathering assets, higher headquarters, artillery, and operational and strategic level forces and their movements. The enemy will rely heavily on HUMINT and SIGINT to report movement, disposition, and deployment of Coalition forces with emphasis on airfields, command posts, and resupply locations. SPF are a major source of HUMINT. These teams are deployed at the OSC level and above and will coordinate operations with DTGs. Satellite imagery is available through commercial sources. OSC 2 has a RISTA unit as part of its organization and has been task organized with UAS and ground SIGINT assets. Aerial reconnaissance includes visual observation, aerial imagery, UAS reconnaissance, and signals reconnaissance.

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ATTACHMENTS:

Tab A – Terrain

Tab B – Weather

Tab C – Civil Considerations

Tab D – Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

Tab E – Enemy Forces

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**TAB A (TERRAIN) TO APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) TO ANNEX B
(INTELLIGENCE) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

(U) References:

Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC.

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU

(U) Topography.

ff. (U) Atropia. The Greater and Lesser Caucasus Mountain ranges dominate Atropia's topography and extend beyond its borders. Atropia occupies a total land area of 32,200 square miles (83,398 square kilometers). The country possesses two geographic regions: 1) the mountain ranges and 2) the vast flatlands (sometimes referred to as the Kura-Aras lowland). There are two major river systems which cut through Atropia, the Kura River and the Aras River. A manmade lake, the Mingachevir Reservoir, located in the central portion of the Area of Operations (AO), is a major obstacle and the dam on its southeast corner is a key facility. Agricultural fields are trafficable only during the late summer months or when frozen during the winter.

gg. (U) Ariana. Mountains and deserts form the majority of Ariana. A high plateau with vast sand deserts dominates eastern Ariana. High mountains such as the Zagros and Elburz mountain ranges encompass most of north-central, western, and southwestern parts of the country. Ariana's total land area is 636,372 square miles (1,648,196 square kilometers) located between two major depressions, with the Caspian Sea to the north and the Persian Gulf to the south. The rocky terrain located along most of Ariana's borders extends well into the nation's interior, making Ariana one of the world's most mountainous countries. Ariana's topography contains three principal regions: 1) the mountain ranges, 2) the lowlands, and 3) the Arianan Plateau (also referred to as the Central Plateau).

hh. (U) Limaria. The Lesser Caucasus Mountains dominate Limaria's topography, with approximately 70percent considered mountainous having an average altitude of 5,900 feet (1800 meters) above sea level. The mountains run horizontally across the north and then turn southeast into Ariana. Southwest of the Lesser Caucasus Mountains a plateau that gradually slopes downwards to the Aras River Valley forms much of central Limaria.

ii. (U) Relief. The Greater Caucasus Mountain range extends from the Caucasian Natural Reserve in the vicinity of Sochi, Donovia on the northeastern shore of the Black Sea, trending east-southeast nearly reaching Baku on the Caspian Sea. The Lesser Caucasus Mountain range runs parallel to the greater range along the Limarian border at an average distance of about 100 km (60 mi) to the south and with the Meskheta Range as a part of the Lesser Caucasus system. The Greater and Lesser Caucasus ranges are connected by the Likhi Range, which separates the Kolkhida Lowland from the Kura Depression (Kura-Aras Lowland). The highest peak in the Caucasus range is Mount Elbrus in the Greater Caucasus Mountains, which rises to a height of 18,506 feet (5,642 meters) above sea level. The lowest terrain is found in the east, central-eastern portion astride the banks of the Kura River.

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(U) Drainage.

jj. (U) Kura River. The Kura starts in northeastern Turkey in a small valley in the Kars Upland of the Lesser Caucasus. It flows west, then north and east past Ardahan, and crosses into Gorgas. It arcs to the northwest, then into a canyon near Akhaltsikhe where it starts to run northeast in a gorge for about 75 kilometers (47 mi), spilling out of the mountains near Khashuri. It then arcs east and starts to flow east-southeast for about 120 kilometers (75 mi), past Gori, then near Mtskheta, flows south through a short canyon and along the west side of T'bilisi, the largest city in the region. The river flows steeply southeast past Rustavi and turns eastward at the confluence with the Khrami River, crossing the Gorgan-Atropian line and flowing across grasslands into Shemkir reservoir and then Yenikend reservoir. The Kura River then empties into Mingachevir reservoir, the largest body of water in Atropia, formed by a dam near its namesake town at the southeastern end. The Iori (also known as Qabirri) and Alazani rivers formerly joined the Kura, but their mouths are now submerged under the lake. After leaving the dam the river meanders southeast where it meets its second biggest tributary Tartarchay in Barda rayon and continues across a broad irrigated plain for several hundred kilometers, turning east near Lake Sarysu, and shortly after, receives the Aras, the largest tributary, at the city of Sabirabad. At the Aras confluence it makes a large arc to the north and then flows almost due south for about 60 kilometers (37 mi), passing the west side of Shirvan National Park, before turning east and emptying into the Caspian Sea at Neftçala.

(1) (U) River Width. The average width of the Kura River from the Mingachevir Reservoir to the delta is around 150 meters, with some sections of the river, particularly the sections east of Yevlakh prior to the confluence with the Aras where irrigation is at its largest, can be as little as 90 meters in width. The river is navigable for the last 300 kilometers, to just below the town of Mingachevir.

(2) (U) River Banks. The banks of the Kura from Mingachevir Reservoir to its outflow on the Caspian Sea have little slope that would affect crossing. The Kura flows through farmlands at this point in its course. There are few covered and concealed locations along the banks of the Kura, especially on its southwestern banks. The limited concealment is provided by brush and trees along the bank, particularly in areas where canals or tributaries meet with the river, which poses additional concerns for mobility in those areas. The northeastern bank has some areas where the terrain rises in hills close to the bank, providing any enemy forces advantage to defending crossing sites.

(3) (U) Bank Soil. The Kura River is one of the most turbid rivers in the world, moving over 100,000 cubic meters of silt annually. The Kura has three main types of soil. The first is alluvial sand, which is abundant along the tributaries running off of the Lesser Caucasus ranges into the Kura. The second type of soil is found along the majority of the river, which consists of silt and loam deposited by the river and the continued farming. The final type of soil occurs in the oxbow areas along the river. These areas are a mix of clay and humus; soil in this area generally retains water, leading to swampy conditions.

(4) (U) Flow Rate. The mean velocity of the Kura River is about 1.65 m/s. Typical flooding for the region occurs in June and July when snow melt in the Lesser Caucasus ranges are at their greatest.

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(5) (U) Existing Crossing Sites. There are 12 existing bridges on the Kura River. These bridges are currently assumed to be Military Load Classification (MLC) 100.

kk. (U) Tartarchay River. The Tartarchay River originates in the area where Qonqur, Alaköz and Mıxtökən mountain ranges meet on Karabakh Plateau in the vicinity of hot springs village of Istisu located in Karvachar Rayon of Atropia, in Martakert Province of the Lower Janga region. The altitude where the river originates from mountain springs is 3,120 m (10,240 ft) above sea level. The river flows eastward through the whole Karvachar rayon passing through Karvachar city, Tartar and Barda rayons and the cities of Tartar and Barda before discharging into Kura. The river has three tributaries: Levçay (36 km (22 mi)), Ağdabançay (19 km (12 mi)), and Turağayçay (35 km (22 mi)). Sarsang Reservoir was built on Tartar River in 1976 for electricity and irrigation purposes. The overall length of the river is 200 km (120 mi), the basin area is 2,650 km² (1,020 sq mi). Tartarchay is considered one of the water-rich tributaries of Kura within Atropian territory.

(1) (U) River Width. The Tartarchay is a medium sized river. Near its mouth through to the town of Barda, the river is at its minimum just over 20 meters in width with an average depth of about 4 meters. Further up the river from Barda to Tartar, the river is an average of 12 m in width with a 3 m depth.

(2) (U) River Banks. The Tartarchay bank structure is steep to the west of Mataghis where the river travels through a canyon. The banks of the rivers east to Tartar level out, but in some locations are undercut. The banks between Tartar and Barda are generally gentle sloping to the river, with some steep deposits and cuts at the high water mark, that limit access. East of Barda, the river bank is more canal-like, with some trees and canals that prevent access along the route.

(3) (U) Bank Soil. The soil around the Tartarchay consists mainly of alluvial deposits. Sand and gravel will be the main soil types encountered through most of the river. As the river nears its confluence with the Kura, loam soils and humus deposited from canals and irrigation flowing back into the river will become more prevalent.

(4) (U) Flow Rate. The water volumes are sourced from rainfall (14percent), snow (28percent) and underground waters (58percent). During spring and summer months, the snow melting in the mountains causes floods making up 65-70percent of the annual water flow. In August and September, the water levels decrease. From October through November, the rainfall increases the water levels again due to precipitation. The average mean flow rate is less than 1 meter per second; however this river increases in size and flow rate drastically during the months of June and July.

(5) (U) Existing Crossing Sites. There are four existing bridges of MLC 100 on the Tartarchay River, with three of the bridges located in Mataghis, Tartar, and Barda.

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II. (U) Aras River. The Aras river source is south of Erzurum in the Bingöl Dağları (mountains) of Turkey; it flows eastward, forming for approximately 275 miles (440 km) the international boundary between Limaria and Atropia on the north and Turkey and Ariana on the south. Below the eastern boundary of Limaria, the stream emerges into a broad valley and then crosses the Muğan Steppe. After a course of about 665 miles (1,070 km), the Aras joins the Kura (Kür) River in Atropia 75 miles (121 km) from its mouth on the Caspian Sea. Since a flood in 1897, a separate tributary of the Aras (canalized since 1909) has emptied directly into the Caspian. The swift-flowing, un-navigable Aras provides most of the sediment forming the Kura-Aras delta. Principal tributaries of the Aras are the Arpa Çayı (Akhuryan), which receives the waters of the Kars River and Lake Çıldır in Turkey, the Hrazdan, draining Lake Sevan in Limaria, and the Qareh Sū, flowing off the Sabalān Mountains in northeastern Arianan.

(1) (U) River Width. The Aras River is approximately 60 meters at its narrowest points in the AO. The river also contains several areas where the river is braided. At these points the multiple channels are narrow, but the total gap distance is increased.

(2) (U) River Banks. The banks of the Aras are susceptible to erosion. The governments of Ariana and Atropia have taken steps to prevent bank erosion. Reconnaissance of potential crossing sites is required to determine bank potential for trafficability and abutments.

(3) (U) Bank Soil. The soil along the Aras consists of gravel and sand with a top layer of loam and humus, similar to the Tartarchay River.

(4) (U) Flow Rate. The Aras River has a discharge of approximately twice that of the Kura. With a smaller channel area, it would imply that the current could be as much as 4 times the speed of the Kura.

(5) (U) Existing Crossing Sites. There are six existing bridges crossing the Aras River at Barhamtepe, Imishli, Saatli, and Sabirabad. All are assumed MLC 100.

(U) Vegetation. Forests cover only about 10percent of Atropia and most consist of broad-leaf trees. The Greater Caucasus Mountains possess vast forest areas on the northern slopes of their eastern section. In Atropia's southeast region, the forests disappear and more arid areas generally dominate. While the forests exhibit a very diverse variety of trees, the main broad-leaf trees include hornbeam, pistachio, and oak.

(U) Agriculture. While 38percent of Atropians work in agriculture-related occupations, farming only produces 5.5percent of the country's GDP. The agriculture sector employs over three times the number involved in industrial production. The arable land and variable climate allow for diverse crop cultivation that includes vegetables, fruits, tea, grains, and nuts, but cotton reigns as Atropia's largest agricultural product.

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(U) Hydrography.

mm. (U) Coastal Features. The coastline of Atropia is 930 km long and occupies the central and southern parts of the Caspian Sea. The sea is stormy for 250 days a year and sometimes the severe winds cause huge waves to arise. The average summer temperature of the water in the south of the sea is about 77-86 F° and 55.4 F° in winter. The water never freezes close to the coastline of Atropia, but freezes in its northern section. The Caspian Sea has a unique ecosystem with mineral, organic, and recreational components. The Caspian Sea has fluctuations of up to 3 meters, because of wind action and barometric pressure. Tide ranges are small, only a few centimetres. Prevailing easterly winds produce strong wave action and occasional storm surges. Beach sediment has been supplied partly by rivers, and shelly material and oolites have been swept in from the sea floor, with local accessions from eroding cliffs. Pollution from agricultural chemicals (especially pesticides), industry, and oil drilling has had a serious adverse impact on the Caspian Sea shoreline environment.

nn. (U) Inlets. The Bay of Baku is a natural harbor located in the wide curve on the southern side of the Absheron Peninsula. The port city of Baku is also the nation's capital. Sumgayit, which is 20 miles (32 kms) northwest of Baku, contains Atropia's second-largest port facilities on the Caspian Sea.

oo. (U) Islands. The islands of the Baku archipelago are located just off the southern shore of the Absheron Peninsula and partially form the boundary of Baku Bay. The islands include Nargin, Zhiloy, Bulla, Svinoy, and Gliniany, all of which were formed by underwater mud volcanoes.

pp. (U) Major Land Formations. The Absheron Peninsula juts out into the Caspian Sea. The northern shore of the peninsula boasts beautiful orchards and vineyards with land particularly suited for agriculture and cattle breeding. The oil and gas fields of this peninsula region are the most important natural resources of Atropia.

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**TAB B TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON
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**TAB B (WEATHER) TO APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) TO ANNEX B
(INTELLIGENCE) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

(U) References:

(a) Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC.

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU

1. (U) Existing Situation.

a. (U) Summary. The CFLCC AO is sizeable with diverse weather conditions. Atropia exhibits a wide variety of climates dependent on location, elevation, and proximity to the Caspian Sea. Based on altitude and distance from the Caspian Sea coastline, parts of Atropia enjoy dry-subtropical, wet-subtropical, temperate, and alpine climates. The Kura-Aras River Lowland and the Absheron Peninsula exhibit a dry-subtropical climate, while the Talish Mountains feature a wet-subtropical climate. Temperate climates dominate the slopes of the Greater and Lesser Caucasus Mountains, while the ridges and peaks feature an alpine climate. High pressure dominates this region throughout the summer, cutting off migratory low pressure systems from the region for extended periods of time. Occasional spring/summer cold fronts will struggle through the mountains into the area. These fronts, however, are too weak to carry much more than isolated rain showers.

b. (U) Sky Cover. Summer skies are fair, mostly sunny to partly cloudy. Mostly cloudy skies below 1,000 feet are extremely rare, providing favorable conditions for all air support operations.

c. (U) Visibility. Morning fog tends to develop less than five times in June throughout Limaria and Atropia. Gorgas is more favorable to fog development due to the close proximity of moisture from the Black Sea. Morning fog generally dissipates before mid-morning. Pollution is the main cause of restricted visibility occurring 30-40 percent of the time during the day and 75 percent of the time at night.

d. (U) Precipitation. The location and the season dramatically affect precipitation throughout Atropia. June has the most precipitation in summer, although it tapers off late in the month as the area of high pressure strengthens. Largely due to the terrain, frontal systems are rare in June. Locally generated rain showers and isolated thunderstorms bring the only rain. In the east, along the Caspian Sea, most precipitation occurs in the fall and winter. In that period, communication systems can lose effectiveness. The southern coast of the Absheron Peninsula receives the lowest annual precipitation, which varies from 8 (200 mms) to 12 inches (300 mms). Along the Caspian Sea in the south, precipitation can reach between 47 to 55 inches annually.

e. (U) Temperature. In winter, the highest Atropian mountain areas can become very cold with sub-zero temperatures. January represents Atropia's coldest month with daily temperatures around 36°F (2.2°C) in the lowlands and 14°F (-10°C) in the mountains.

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f. (U) Wind. Numerous winds traverse Atropia, but the most common winds include the Gilavar and Khazri. The Khazri blows from the north and the Gilavar from the southwest. In the lowlands, winds usually blow in the southeastern and northwestern directions. In the valleys of Atropia, surface winds tend to flow from the east at less than 10 knots. Therefore, these relatively gentle winds allow air assault, airborne, and aviation operations. Winds reach higher speeds on the Absheron Peninsula where strong, stormy winds are considered normal.

2. (U) **Effect on Adversary Capabilities**.

a. (U) Low temperatures will adversely affect troop morale, especially the unprepared and poorly supplied. Snow will probably limit off road movement. Heavy snowfalls and frost may close some mountain passes for 3-6 months and force planners to find longer alternate routes.

b. (U) Enemy Su-24 FROGFOOT CAS, MI-8 HIP, MI-24 HIND aircraft lack all-weather capabilities. Enemy air assault insertions can be expected during hours of limited visibility.

3. (U) **Effect on Friendly COAs**. Forces may have to accept the cold temperatures in the mountains as they move from Gorgas into Atropia and must be mindful of the off road restrictions caused by snowfalls. Favorable southeastern winds with any man-made obscuration will help conceal wet gap crossings on the Kura-Aras Lowlands.

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**TAB C TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON
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**TAB C (CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS) TO APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE)
TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

(U) References:

Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC.

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU

(U) Political.

qq. (U) Existing Situation. Atropia is a neutral, Western-leaning dictatorship centered on the Ismailov family. While not a broadly democratic state, Atropia is secularized, and the population enjoys a high standard of living by regional standards due to oil revenue. Government repression is limited, although some degree of censorship exists. Corruption is extensive and creates a reformist desire in the population who, while accepting of the Ismailov family dominance, would like greater freedom of expression and less official corruption. Refer to Exhibit 1 (Atropia's Political System) of this tab.

a. (U) Effect on Adversary Capabilities. CFLCC may have to deal with individuals who are corrupt and may expect bribes for their efforts. As in Afghanistan, the populace may not assist U.S./Coalition troops as their loyalties rest with others (e.g., Donovia, SAPA, and BFB).

rr. (U) Effect on Friendly COAs. CFLCC forces will not be able to use Donovian or Limarian territory nor the Lower Janga Region.

(U) Military. The military's perspective has been discussed extensively throughout this OPLAN. Refer to Exhibit 2 (Atropia's Military System) and Exhibit 4 (Atropia's National Command Authority (NCA) of this tab.

(U) Economic.

ss. (U) Existing Situation. The Caucasus countries that possess hydrocarbon resources will continue to depend on the oil and gas industries to drive their economies, while those that do not possess such resources will attempt to tie themselves to hydrocarbon-rich nations. Both Ariana and Atropia face geopolitical difficulties in exporting their oil and natural gas. Bordered by adversaries, the Arianians and Atropians must rely on tenuous routes to export their resources. All nations of the Caucasus have relatively high inefficiency due to corruption, government involvement in the economy, and/or lack of export industry development. Atropia's oil and natural gas resources generate most of the country's wealth. Since it began to actively exploit oil reserves in the late 1990s through international oil consortiums, the country has experienced strong GDP growth. Atropia launched a deliberate program to develop its own natural resources. This hydrocarbon-specific economic policy continues to bring big dividends for Atropia's economy. Additionally, it bolstered Atropia's quest to become a regional player and to secure its sovereignty and integrity from encroachment by Donovia and Ariana.

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The growth in its economy also benefitted Atropia's security as it became an integral player in the world energy sector, especially in supplying Western Europe. President Salam Ismailov, son of the previous President Hazi Ismailov, sits at the top of the pyramidal patronage system that flows through all aspects of Atropian bureaucracy and economy. Salam Ismailov directs the state oil and natural gas systems, which are the two biggest revenue producers in the Atropian economy. Despite all the hydrocarbon revenue in the country, the economy is not balanced between sectors, with large portions of the population working in small service or agricultural industries. Atropia also lacks a significant middle class. Refer to Exhibit 4 (Atropia's Economic System) of this tab.

tt. (U) Effect on Adversary Capabilities. The Arianian forces in Atropia will garner support from those individuals who perceive the current Atropian economy hostile to them – those that do not share in the hydrocarbon revenues. For example, the Salasyl insurgency group is founded on the inequities of the taxation process and completely displeased with the Atropian government's handling of the economy. This faction operates in the southeast of Atropia along the international border with Ariana.

uu. (U) Effect on Friendly COAs. The international community has recognized Atropia as the legal regime and as lawfully owning their oil fields in the Caspian Sea. The influx of oil revenue has improved Atropia's living standard. Atropian beneficiaries of this will not want to lose this new status. The Atropian military will fight and the Government of Atropia will also act to retain its position.

(U) Social.

vv. (U) Existing Situation. As a long-standing meeting place of the European and Middle Eastern civilizations, Atropian society possesses social elements from both Europe and the Middle East. This is reflected in a culture that embraces the emphasis on higher education as in Europe, along with the social conservatism and traditions of Islam. Many Atropians enjoy a high education level, and some are multilingual. Atropian authorities place much emphasis on their vision of social order, which includes suppression of journalists and restrictions on religious organizations and celebrations. Atropia and the US enjoy a history of cooperation, and this will likely continue into the future. Atropians consider themselves a branch of the Turkish people and spoken Atropian is linguistically similar to Turkish. In addition to their links with Turkey, Atropians have links with Ariana, especially to the large Atropian minority there. Any Arianian attacks on the Atropian minority in Ariana; however, could trigger a reaction from the Atropian government or from the people living along the Atropia/Ariana border. Refer to Exhibit 5 (Atropia's Social System) and Exhibit 6 (Atropia's Irregular Forces) of this tab.

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ww. (U) Effect on Adversary Capabilities. The aggressor is Ariana, but it is a Muslim country, unlike Christian Limaria. However, Atropian society represents a secularized Muslim country. Atropia wants to adopt Western attitudes culturally while simultaneously seeking to reclaim traditional Atropian characteristics, such as their language. While the Atropian government often acts in a heavy-handed manner and exhibits some corruption, there is considerable latitude socially when measured against comparable neighbors, such as Ariana. The Atropian populace is not disgruntled with the Atropian government's secularity, and a preponderance of the younger generation does identify itself as Muslim. This attitude may be leveraged by the Arianian forces.

xx. (U) Effect on Friendly COAs. Aggressive Islam could well find little traction in Atropia, as the high levels of secularization will likely keep cultural Muslims from the adoption of an aggressive, politically Muslim identity. Atropians will likely continue their path to espouse more Western social standards as the population continues to become more urbanized. The outcome will likely result in a uniquely Atropian state. This mindset should benefit the Coalition forces as they attack to re-establish the international border.

(U) Information.

yy. (U) Existing Situation. Atropia is slowly developing its public broadcast and INFOWAR capabilities, both of which are driven by oil revenue. TV and the Internet are the most powerful media, while Atropian INFOWAR capability focuses on potential threats from Ariana and Limaria. Currently, Atropia leases satellites to aid in achieving its strategic goals. Imagery intelligence is derived from commercially purchased imagery assets. Atropian INFOWAR assets are generally tier two and three, though increasingly tier one elements are being purchased from abroad and integrated into the Atropian military and government. Refer to Exhibit 7 (Atropia's Information System) of this tab.

zz. (U) Effect on Adversary Capabilities. As the Atropian government expends considerable effort to control anti-government comments in the media, except the Internet, the Arianian forces can expect very little assistance from the Atropian populace. Atropia's lack of technologically advanced intelligence assets will enhance Ariana's preparations for attack and initial gains, but Arianian forces may need to protect themselves against HUMINT collectors, especially in the international border regions.

aaa. (U) Effect on Friendly COAs. The Atropian government does control the Atropian media, so Coalition forces should be able to exploit this control as a means to positively influence the Atropian populace. Since the Atropian forces lack much in the way of modern intelligence equipment, the CFLCC will have to rely on its own extensive array of assets. That said, the robust Atropian HUMINT resources should preclude the normal development time needed for sources; these HUMINT assets may prove valuable in garnering specific intelligence requirements.

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(U) Infrastructure.

bbb. (U) Existing Situation. Just over half of the Atropian (52percent) populace lives in urban areas. The nation contains a mixture of modern urban cities and almost pre-modern rural villages. Modern utilities can be found in most major cities, but not in the rural villages and countryside. Atropia finds itself at a crossroads between a modern future and an agrarian past in its infrastructure. A dichotomy exists in which cities possess most modern amenities, but many rural people continue to live as their ancestors did centuries ago. About 25percent (2.46 million) of the Atropian populace live in the capital city, Baku, or its immediate suburbs. Except for Ganja (307,500) and Sumgayit (268,800), no other Atropian city exceeds 100,000 people. Larger Atropian cities typically consist of an old inner city surrounded by more modern construction. Rural village dwellers live in homes built similarly to those of their ancestors. Industrial development uses modern construction and methods, especially in the oil industry. However, Atropian industry uses factories and methods that continue to pollute the environment. The government does little to regulate the industrial sector, and businesses continue to operate outdated equipment that harms the environment. Military operations in rural areas will require more logistical support due to a lack of modern infrastructure, but will face fewer problems due to civilians on the battlefield (COB). Military operations in urban areas will allow for greater use of host nation (HN) support, but will create additional problems due to health issues caused by pollution, more COB, and humanitarian support needs for the higher number of civilians.

ccc. (U) Effect on Adversary Capabilities. Military activities in Atropian urban areas will face the same challenges as similar-size Middle Eastern cities with old city centers and newer, more modern suburbs. The closeness of the buildings in the city centers will allow people to travel from building to building by a variety of methods that will include roofs, underground passageways, and streets. Should an operation occur in the late fall or winter, the rain and snow may restrict movement to the unpaved roads and to roads that are poorly maintained.

ddd. (U) Effect on Friendly COAs. As the Caspian Sea does not freeze in the winter, the Baku International Sea Port (BISP) possesses enough piers, equipment, and storage space to conduct military operations, albeit not ones connected to the world's sealanes. The military will be able to communicate with the vast majority of Atropia's populace as they can receive information from the radio, TV, or the Internet. The protection of the Atropian hydrocarbon infrastructure remains paramount for any military operations in the area: LCC operations should refrain from unnecessary damage to the industrial sector to facilitate economic recovery after the end of hostilities. The region's military operations will need to address pollution and possible TIC threats, ensuring soldiers take precautions due to high-level air pollution. Also due to pollution, units should also consider any local water source not potable until tested.

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ATTACHMENTS:

- Exhibit 1 – Atropia Political System
- Exhibit 2 – Atropia Military System
- Exhibit 3 – Atropia National Command Authority (NCA)
- Exhibit 4 – Atropia Economic System
- Exhibit 5 – Atropia Social System
- Exhibit 6 – Atropia Irregular Threats
- Exhibit 7 – Atropia Information System
- Exhibit 8 – Atropia Infrastructure System (Not issued)

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**EXHIBIT 1 (ATROPIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM) TO TAB C (CIVIL
CONSIDERATIONS) TO APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) TO ANNEX B
(INTELLIGENCE) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

(U) References:

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(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU

1. (U) **Centers of Political Power**. The Ismailov family controls Atropia and exercises political power based on a network of political, economic, judicial, and social associations that frequently involve organized crime. Corruption remains common and permeates the entire Atropian society. Although institutional processes exist, Atropians often circumvent the system to reach deals that reap better benefits for themselves. Many power bases depend on the relative geographic region, economic livelihood, social associations, etc., and operate in a symbiotic relationship with other power structures, legal or otherwise. Atropian politics function through a decentralized structure, with few exceptions. One of the most important associations on the national stage centers on the Ismailov family with its connections in political, economic, social, and most other important facets of Atropian life.

a. (U) **Military Authority**. The Ismailov family closely controls the Army, Atropia's primary military force. The Atropian Air Force and the Air Defense Force are subordinate to the ground forces. The Navy and the Maritime Border Services protect Atropia's territorial waters in the Caspian Sea, often violated in the past by Arianian military vessels and oil exploration related survey ships.

b. (U) **Family Authority**. The Ismailov family continues as the center of power in Atropia, headed by the current president, Salam Ismailov. Salam's father, Hazi Ismailov, the deceased patriarch of the family, established the powerbase that continues Salam's current control of Atropia. Hazi created the modern Atropian state and solidified his position with the support primarily of Atropian intelligence agencies which passed their loyalty to his son upon Hazi Ismailov's death.

c. (U) **Religious/Clerical Authority**. Although Atropia is predominately Shia Muslim, the country practices a more moderate version of Islam than Ariana. Shia Islam in Atropia does not possess the political influence it does in Ariana nor other Middle Eastern nations. While religious figures have been part of reformist demonstrations, the Atropian government maintains veto power on the selection of Shia Muslim religious leaders allowed to publically preach in Atropia.

(U) **Attitudes toward the US**. Despite disfavor with Atropia's domestic policies and actions, the US is generally viewed as favoring Atropia as a counterbalance to Arianian and Donovanian influence in the Caspian Sea region. Atropia also recognizes the US as the largest export market for its petroleum resources. In April 2006, Salam Ismailov met President of the US in an official state visit in which the President hailed the strong relations with Atropia, in recognition of the

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strategic position Atropia gives the US in the region. Atropian troops deployed in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Atropia also grants extensive freedom for US and Allied forces to use Atropian military facilities for multiple purposes to include logistics and flight routes. Atropia welcomes the growth of US investment in its industries, especially hydrocarbon, and seeks to use its newfound economic clout to create an identity as an independent regional power. Atropia currently welcomes and encourages US and western trade. Atropian leaders realize that Donovia and Ariana exert much influence on the Caucasus economic system and may affect the future of US trade in the region, especially in the hydrocarbon industry. Atropia views access to Western markets for its oil as its most important trade and political objective.

(U) Type of Government. The Republic of Atropia bases its government upon a 1995 constitution that articulates a republican form of government with three independent branches—the legislative, the judicial, and the executive. The Atropian constitution created a strong presidential system with a subordinate prime minister and a unicameral legislature. In theory, the branches balance each other's power as in the U.S. system. In reality, however, the President functions as the most powerful entity and controls the country's operations and policies. The judiciary and legislature do not possess the necessary power to seriously check the executive branch. Under the guidance of Salam Ismailov's Republican Party of Democracy (RPD), Atropia functions effectively as a one-party state. Although the constitution creates a multi-party state, the RPD dominates political life. Opposition party representation in the parliament amounts to less than 10percent of the assembly.

d. (U) **Legislative Authority.** Atropians elect a unicameral legislature of 125 members through direct voting based on districts. Each district elects one member. Each member serves a two-year term, with a limit of four consecutive terms in office. Prior to the 2005 elections, the assembly contained members directly elected via their district and a popular party vote. A 2002 constitutional amendment altered the arrangement to provide for only direct election based on districts, but kept the same total number of representatives.

e. (U) **Executive Authority.** The executive branch functions as the center of Atropian government and wields effective control over both the legislative and judicial branches. The Atropian President, elected by popular vote, serves a five-year term. Subsequent to the constitutional reform in 2009, the President may now serve more than two terms, the previous limit. The Atropian President appoints a prime minister and cabinet ministers who require the approval of parliament. Additionally, the President also serves as commander in chief of the Atropian armed forces.

f. (U) **Judicial Authority.** Although the Atropian judicial branch is nominally independent of the legislative and executive branch, the President heavily influences the courts' considerations. The Atropian President appoints members of the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court, who are confirmed by parliamentary assent. Due to near-total control of the parliament by the President's ruling party; however, the legislative branch rubber-stamps Ismailov's choices. The Atropian constitution stipulates no requirement for parliamentary approval for lower courts, and the President possesses the freedom to make those appointments

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as he desires. In addition, the Atropian government controls the appointments of prosecutors at the local, regional, and national levels.

(U) Government Effectiveness and Legitimacy. Atropia demonstrates a mixed record when it comes to its legitimacy. Internationally, no country questions the legitimacy of Atropia's territorial sovereignty, except for its dispute with Limaria over Lower Janga. The largest international issue involves Atropia's attempt to establish itself as a state free of interference from its much more powerful neighbors, Donovia and Ariana, and to create its own independent identity in the international realm. Many international organizations, however, continue to criticize Atropia's shortfalls in the adherence of the government to the rule of law and the protection of its citizens' civil liberties.

g. (U) Elections. Nearly all countries in the Caucasus possess a history of suspicious election practices followed by popular uprisings that meet varying degrees of success. From the peaceful revolutions in Gorgas, riots in Atropia, assassinations of political rivals in Limaria, to widespread crackdowns and the "disappearance" of opponents in Ariana, observers always consider elections a potential flashpoint. Elections occur every two years for legislative positions, while presidential elections occur every five years. There is a four consecutive term limit for parliament seats, but no such limitations on executive positions.

h. (U) Rule of Law. Due to the relative youth of the respective judicial branches in the Caucasus, powerful people still overshadow the rule of law, as many governmental leaders do whatever keeps them rich and powerful. Corruption of law enforcement personnel pervades the region, as loyalties apply more to individuals or groups of people than to something as ethereal as a constitution.

i. (U) Corruption. What Western eyes perceive as corruption is in reality a carefully-cultivated survival mechanism born of decades under dictatorial rule. In an environment where the government encourages family members to betray their relatives for small benefits, the people consider relationships as a resource while they avoid interaction with the state at all costs. Thus, a high level of official corruption exists in Atropia. Most official acts and access to government services require the payment of some level of bribe. Corruption is the single-largest threat to government legitimacy in Atropia.

(U) International Relationships.

j. (U) Regional Actors. Until the recent ceasefire agreement between the two countries Atropia often found itself in low level hostilities with Limaria, with regular sniping and small-scale skirmishes along the Lower Janga contact line. Significant tension exists between Ariana and Atropia despite a shared religion and history. The shared Atropian population (Ariana's largest minority) does not provide for channels of goodwill, but rather suspicion, despite the significant integration of Atropians into Arianian society. Atropia and Gorgas are partners due to the requirement for Atropian oil to transit Gorgan pipelines in order to reach international markets. Donovia's support for Limaria in the Lower Janga conflict and its aid to that enclave exemplifies the division between Donovia and Atropia. Donovan-sourced support for militants, particularly the Bilasuvar Freedom Brigade (BFB) operating in northern Vetlia and Erdabil provinces of Atropia, has also created significant tension in this bilateral relationship. Despite

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these considerations and the mutual distrust between them, strong economic considerations—mainly related to trade—tie the two countries together in a somewhat uneasy relationship.

k. (U) International Organizations. Atropia is active in a number of international organizations, including the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OCSE), NATO (though not as a full member), and a variety of UN-sponsored regional, functional, and international forums. Atropia generally uses diplomacy as its prime international activity and is strongly supportive of diplomatic solutions. Roughly 30 major Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and International Organizations operate within Atropia. The NGOs include extensive activities of The Human Fund regarding rural poverty and literacy programs. International Organizations like United Nations Development Program, World Bank, and various EU-sponsored programs are also active in both urban and rural settings.

l. (U) International Economic Associations. Atropia is a member of numerous trade and economic development institutions. While a comparatively wealthy nation due to petroleum reserves, economic development and the requirement to integrate large populations of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) from regional conflicts have strained Atropian government reserves. Atropia is most notably not a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and does not follow the pricing and output directives of that organization.

m. (U) Military Alliances. Through its direct NATO training, Partnership for Peace and previous deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan in support of U.S. operations, Atropia hopes to maintain warm relations with the West without angering its regional neighbors. Atropia also maintains bilateral relations with Gorgas and Israel.

(U) Influential Political Groups.

n. (U) Official Political Parties. Personalities determine political parties in Atropia. While strong party structure exists in the country, an Atropian citizen pledges his allegiance based on the party leaders. While Atropia supports a multi-party system with 42 registered parties, the system is dominated by a few main ones that do not base their appeal upon a single issue. Since Hazi Ismailov's election as President, the RPD has dominated national politics. Through both legal and somewhat nefarious means, the RPD controls parliament with a sizeable majority. Access to many jobs requires membership in the RPD. Since the government controls a large share of jobs, many Atropians owe their livelihood to RPD membership. Hazi's son, Salam Ismailov, succeeded his father as President of Atropia through Hazi's direct guidance to the party. For international observers, it appears that recent Atropian elections contain indications of more transparency and fairness. Despite this movement to more open elections, the RPD continues to control Atropian politics. The South Atropian People's Party (SAPP), on the other hand, has little real power according to the South Atropian People's Army (SAPA), an insurgent group whose goal is to create a separate country composed primarily of ethnic Atropians located in southern and central Atropia and Ariana's northwestern provinces.

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o. (U) Other Domestic Influential Groups. Due to the country's relatively pure ethnic composition, Atropian domestic groups distinguish themselves mainly through ideologies and personalities. The differences between these groups center more on the pursuit of domestic power, than significant shifts in governmental policy. The only group that begins to pose a significant threat to the nation on violent terms is SAPA, which remains somewhat isolated. Other insurgent activity present in Atropia is focused around the BFB in Vetlia and Erdabil provinces, and Provisional Army of Lezgin (PAL) operations in southern Erdabil and western Sirvaki provinces.

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**EXHIBIT 2 (ATROPIAN MILITARY SYSTEM) TO TAB C (CIVIL
CONSIDERATIONS) TO APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) TO ANNEX B
(INTELLIGENCE) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

(U) References:

Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC.

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU

1. **(U) Military Forces.** The Atropian military consists of a small army, navy, and air force with limited offensive capabilities. The entire ground force roughly corresponds to the size of one US army corps, and the army dominates the Atropian military in terms of size and funding. The military generally uses equipment with technology 10 to 20 years old making it a Tier 2 fighting force. However, over the past few years Atropia has commenced an equipment upgrade program with emphasis on moving an infantry and armor Brigade to Tier 1 status. Due to the military's small size, Atropia limits its scope of operations to defending the country's borders and regional operations, recently mostly directed against Limaria. The size of the Atropian military mirrors that of Limaria's forces. Continual skirmishes with Limaria over disputed territory drive Atropia's military doctrine, force structure, and deployment of forces. Like many of the countries in the region, Atropian doctrine was influenced by Donovia. Recently the Atropian military has participated in NATO training, Partnership for Peace and deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan in support of U.S. operations. This has had an influence on Atropian military doctrine and training. Unlike Limaria, however, hydrocarbon revenue allows Atropia to modernize its military.

(U) Military Strategy.

a. **(U) Atropian National Command Authority.** Atropia's National Command Authority (NCA) exercises overall control of the application of all instruments of national power to plan and carry out the national security strategy. The Atropian president serves as the commander in chief of the armed forces and functions at the top of the military hierarchy and decision-making process. The Atropian Army Chief of General Staff (CGS), however, serves as the highest military individual in the chain of command. Refer to Exhibit 3 Atropia NCA of this tab.

(U) Strategic Operational Framework. The NCA exercises command and control (C2) of the Armed Forces via the Supreme High Command (SHC) that includes the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and a General Staff drawn from all the service components. In peacetime, the MOD and General Staff operate closely, but separately. The MOD assumes the responsibility for Armed Forces policy, mobilization, acquisitions, and financing. The General Staff promulgates policy and supervises the service components while its functional directorates assume responsibility for key aspects of defense planning. In wartime, the MOD and General Staff merge to form the SHC, which functions as a unified headquarters.

(U) National Strategic Goals. The NCA determines the direction and scope of Atropia's strategic mission. Atropia's overall goals include the defense of its hydrocarbon resources, the

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eventual recovery of its Lower Janga region, and defense against any regional attacks by potential enemies. Included in these economic expansion and destruction of insurgent groups.

b. (U) Implementing National Security Goals. Strategic operations remain a continuous process not limited to wartime or preparation for war. Once war begins, strategic operations continue during regional, transition, and adaptive operations and complement those operations. Each of the latter three types of operations occurs only during war and only under certain conditions. Transition operations can overlap regional and adaptive operations. In pursuit of their national security strategy, Atropia is prepared to conduct four basic operational themes, or courses of action. These include: a) Strategic operations using all instruments of power in peace and war to achieve national security strategy goals through attacks against the enemy's strategic centers of gravity. b) Regional operations including conventional, force-on-force military operations against overmatched opponents, such as regional adversaries and internal threats. c) Transition operations bridging the gap between regional and adaptive operations and contain some elements of both. In these operations, Atropia continues to pursue its regional goals while dealing with developing outside intervention that has the potential to overmatch its military. d) Adaptive operations to preserve the country's power and apply it in adaptive ways against opponents that overmatch Atropia's military.

c. (U) National Security Strategy. Although Donovia, Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, and Limaria may refer to them as "operations," each of these courses of action is actually a subcategory of strategy. Each type of operation aggregates the effects of tactical, operational, and strategic actions in conjunction with instruments of national power to achieve each country's strategic goals. The types of operations employed at a given time will depend on the types of threats, opportunities, and other conditions present. Each country's strategy typically starts with actions directed at a regional opponent that the government overmatches in conventional military power, as well as other instruments of power. If possible, each government will attempt to achieve its ends without armed conflict. Accordingly, these governments do not limit strategic operations to military means and usually do not begin with armed conflict. They may achieve the desired goal through pressure applied by nonmilitary instruments of power, perhaps by merely threatening to use superior military power against the opponent. These actions fall under the general framework of "strategic operations." The government may resort to armed conflict to achieve its desired end state when nonmilitary means prove insufficient or not expedient. Strategic operations, however, continue even if a particular regional threat or opportunity causes the country to undertake "regional operations" that may include military means. Prior to the initiation of hostilities and throughout the course of armed conflict with its regional opponent, the government will continue to conduct strategic operations to preclude intervention by outside players, other regional neighbors, or an extra-regional power that could overmatch its forces. Such operations, however, always include branches and sequels to deal with the possibility of intervention by an extra-regional power.

(U) Military Strategy. Atropian military strategy focuses on reclamation of lost territory from Limaria, and the protection of its borders. To become more of a regional player, Atropia's military continues to obtain more technologically-advanced equipment from other countries, primarily Donovia, Israel, and the US. Besides its design on lost territory, the Atropian military remains in a mainly defensive posture protecting oil and other key infrastructure.

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(U) **Army Overview.** Atropia maintains an army primarily composed of tank and mechanized forces. Due to equipment technology being generally 10 to 20 years old, the Atropian army fields a predominately Tier 2 fighting force with some Tier 1 capabilities. The size of the Atropian military keeps the force in a defensive posture and limits its actions to regional operations. The security of Atropia's territorial integrity remains its military's main objective. In the past, Donovanian doctrine and force structures heavily influenced the Atropian army. Lately, the army has enjoyed additional monetary resources due to government profits from hydrocarbon exports, and is gradually adopting some Western concepts.

d. (U) **Army Size and Structure.** The Atropian Army maintains a relatively flat structure based on six separate manoeuvre brigades reporting directly to the Army CGS /General Staff, without a permanent divisional structure. There is a garrison/peacetime divisional structure around the capital Baku; this however is mostly administrative in nature. With the rising Arianian threat to the south, an operational strategic command (OSC), Southern Command, has recently been activated on an *as required* basis to command assigned formations in that region. The separate brigades are fairly self sufficient for short term operations within their own country with adequate integral combat support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) capability but no aviation. Additional CS and CSS assets are allocated by General Staff from the other support brigades (Engineer/Reconnaissance/ Helicopter/Material Support) while others are usually centrally controlled at national level (Reconnaissance Intelligence Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RISTA) / Artillery / Air Defence / Special Forces / Signals). To reflect increased centralized control and national responsibilities, the RISTA, Artillery and Air Defence Brigades were re-named "Commands" two years ago with commensurate national/theatre responsibilities. Information Warfare or INFOWAR (cyber/electronic warfare) has started to take on importance with an INFOWAR Battalion, now expanded to a Brigade, established within the RISTA Command. An Integrated Fires Command and an Integrated Support Command have also recently been established at the national level to coordinate respectively strategic level fires including air force and ballistic missiles, and strategic logistics.

e. (U) **Army Doctrine and Tactics.** The Atropian army gears its doctrine and tactics toward the opposition and the physical environment in which the army operates. The Atropian army can conduct large-scale operations with the ability to move between adaptive tactics and hybrid operations. The Atropians employ tactical control measures that include assembly areas, advance axes, check points, jump-off lines (similar to Western lines of departure), and attack lines. The Atropian army will engage its enemy in order to push them back, or to buy time for mobilization of reserves, or to allow for the onset of adaptive warfare.

f. (U) **Army Training and Readiness.** The Atropian army faces a consistently high turnover rate since it uses conscription to fill its ranks. The system does however result in a large percentage of the civilian population with previous military experience. Most Atropian males must serve for 18 months on active duty, but university graduates only need to serve 12 months. Approximately 50,000 young males enter the military each year as conscripts to begin serving their 12 or 18 month draft term. They generally serve six months in a training school learning individual and small team-based skills before they join the active forces for the remaining six or twelve months of their service. Technically these draftees, upon release from their active duty force units, continue to serve until age 35 in the reserves.

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In practice, a restricted number are called out for an annual exercise due to the expense of providing this ongoing training. Over 560,000 civilian Atropians possess military experience from the past 15 years and could serve again, if necessary. Atropia has recently instituted, through amendments to its national constitution, a mobilization plan to create a Reserve Force based on those still within five years of having left active service. The critical function of leadership in this Reserve will be achieved by moving the vast majority of active duty force officers and NCOs over 40 years of age to the Reserve Force. In peacetime, the reserve manning ceiling is 5percent. In wartime or crisis, the intent is to field a scalable Army Reserve of up to 90,000 personnel consisting of nine Reserve Infantry Brigades assigned to Regional Coordination Centers (RCC) and thirteen assorted Reserve Brigades. Despite the constant turnover in the enlisted ranks, overall the Atropian army fields a well-trained force with a 94percent readiness rate.

g. (U) Army Equipment and Weapons. The Atropian army primarily uses Tier 2 equipment and weapons systems fielded during the last 10 to 20 years. Due to the influx of funds from hydrocarbon exports, the Atropian army has upgraded some of its systems to Tier 1. The Atropian army has the equipment to operate in all terrain types and can successfully conduct 24-hour operations.

(U) Naval Forces Overview. The Atropian navy's main responsibility is patrol operations in the Caspian Sea. It also secures the country's coastal waterways, conducts anti-smuggling operations, and protects the hydrocarbon infrastructure in the Caspian Sea.

h. (U) Navy Size and Structure. The Atropian navy maintains its headquarters and main base facilities in Baku. Recent performance has shown these organizations are capable of functioning at a Tier 2 level.

i. (U) Navy Doctrine and Tactics. Atropia maintains a naval force heavily influenced by Donovanian naval doctrine. The navy will engage in hit-and-run tactics if attacked by larger Caspian Sea naval powers. At all times, the navy will attempt to preserve its capability to defend Baku and the off-shore hydrocarbon fields. Atropian naval missions include: a) Defensive patrolling of coastal areas, b) Anti-smuggling operations, c) Defensive mine laying, d) Insertion/extraction of special operations forces, and e) Protection of isolated oil rig platforms.

j. (U) Navy Training and Readiness. Due to its small size and recent purchase of newer equipment (with its reduced maintenance problems), the Atropian navy operates a well-trained force at an overall 93percent operational readiness rate. Separate reserve ships/squadrons do not exist. Conscripts remain on the naval reserve list for a period of five years and are intended to flesh out empty billets and provide individual replacements.

k. (U) Navy Equipment and Weapons. At the beginning of this conflict the Atropian navy possessed 39 surface craft. It operates a variety of attack boats, patrol boats, submarine chasers, minesweepers, four midget submarines and some amphibious craft. The Atropian navy also fields a small naval special operations forces (SOF) along with harbor salvage and clearance capabilities. Atropian naval equipment focuses on defensive operations, especially the defense of off-shore hydrocarbon infrastructure. Atropia will continue to purchase equipment (including

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mine countermeasure ships), increase SOF capabilities, and improve its amphibious forces. The Atropian navy can conduct 24-hour operations.

(U) Air Force Overview. The Atropian air force is small, but could be deadly in a regional conflict, and is best suited for defensive operations.

l. (U) Air Force Size and Structure. The Atropian air force fields an estimated 8,000 personnel operating approximately 140 fixed wing aircraft and 45 helicopters (at the beginning of the invasion). The Atropian air force operates from military and civilian airfields across the country, but the Baku metropolitan area contains the two largest military airports. The Atropian fighter aviation regiment is located in that area. Smaller fixed wing and rotary wing elements can support ground troops in contested regions from any suitable runway.

m. (U) Air Force Doctrine and Tactics. The Atropian air force's missions include protection of the country's borders, troop transport, close air support for ground forces, and protection of key infrastructure, such as political and economic targets. Atropian pilots possess a respectable reputation for their flying skills with the ability to conduct deep strikes. Despite the heavy Donovanian influence on the Atropian air force doctrine and tactics, the Atropians can adapt to a changed environment. Recent operations and training with Western air forces exposed the Atropians to non-Donovanian ideas about flexible and adaptive operations.

n. (U) Air Force Training and Readiness. Due to its small size and ability to increase its flight hours because of a greater operational budget, the Atropian air force maintains a high level of training and a 94percent operational readiness rate. Similar to Naval Forces, the Air Forces utilize relatively few conscripts. Like their sister services, their reserve is based on releases/retirements in the past five years. This Reserve list is intended to provide replacements only in the event of active operations. Frequency of refresher training varies.

o. (U) Air Force Equipment and Weapons. The Atropian air force equipment inventory is predominantly Tier 2. The infusion of funds from high hydrocarbon export revenues allowed Atropia to upgrade some air force systems for selected Tier 1 niche capabilities. The Atropian air force can conduct 24-hour operations in all weather and over all terrain.

(U) Government Paramilitary Forces. The Atropian government tasks the Minister of Internal Affairs with responsibility for the Atropian national police and other government departments related to Internal Security. The Minister of National Security (MNS) carries out intelligence, counter-intelligence, protection of state secrets and the detection and prevention of crimes. The exact size of the MNS is a closely guarded secret but is estimated to be in the range of 10,000. Atropian Customs and Border Services is the first line of protection against international terrorism, interdicting illegal migration, human trafficking, smuggling, and illegal trafficking of drugs. It safeguards against the proliferation of WMD components and protects the oil and gas platforms and pipelines of the Atropian sector of Caspian Sea. Border Services has a total strength of over 15,000 organized in six Border Patrol brigades, four Custom brigades, a maritime brigade, aviation command, logistics and various training centers. The total number of Atropian paramilitary forces is around 65,000 personnel. In a conflict, the Atropian paramilitary organizations will likely provide presidential security and protect critical infrastructure. The Atropian military will probably use these paramilitary organizations' reserve elements in its

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national defense plans. There is a reserve mobilization plan which would involve the activation of up to 2,000 personnel for Border Services and 8,000 for Internal Affairs.

(U) Non-State Paramilitary Forces.

p. (U) Insurgent/Guerrilla Forces. While numerous reasons exist for internal conflict in Atropia, two main reasons stand out above all others—ethnocentrism and nationalism. This internal strife devolved to irregular warfare as state and non-state actors struggled to gain legitimacy and influence over the populace. Sporadic violence over the last decade targeted government entities and key leaders. Several foreign-supported anti-Atropian insurgent groups operate within Atropian territory. The two dominant groups in the area of operations are Salasyl and the South Atropian Peoples' Army (SAPA).

(1) (U) Salasyl. Salasyl is the second largest insurgent group within Atropia. Its center of mass is in the southeast portion of the country, but the group conducts operations throughout Atropia. It is also reported that the group may have ties to transnational criminal and terrorist actors. The extent and dynamic of the relationship between Salasyl and these transnational actors is unknown at this time. For the last two decades, Salasyl has engaged the current Atropian regime in a low-level insurgency. Salasyl encourages the local populace to violently oppose the legitimate Atropian government due to state taxation policies; lack of reliable public services such as electrical power, sewage treatment, and potable water; substandard preventive medical services; lack of access to state education programs for working class citizens; and a state judicial system that illegally favors the political party currently in control of the government's executive and legislative branches. If political backlash against the culture of corruption were to undermine the current Atropian government, Salam Ismailov, President of Atropia, would face a difficult task to secure the loyalty of various elements of society.

(2) (U) SAPA. SAPA, the largest insurgent group, relates culturally to Ariana and wants to create a separate country composed of southern Atropia and Ariana's northwestern provinces that contain an ethnic Atropian majority. The SAPA feels that the South Atropian People's Party (SAPP) carries little weight in the Atropian political system and reforms aimed to assist the local people show few signs of progress. The SAPA, while it operates throughout Atropia, focuses on eight provinces in the south. The SAPA operates in three separate major units—Northern, Central, and Southern Commands. The group conducts most of its training in Ariana, where it receives its equipment and supplies. Reports indicate that Arianian SPF or other "advisors" may support the SAPA with logistics and training in the country. The Salasyl insurgents often clash violently with the SAPA over ideology, limited resources, and similar recruiting pools. SAPA is most likely to take a "wait and see" approach to determine whether it will join an Arianian imposed government, while continuing actions against Atropian officials. Their intelligence operations will continue to observe and assess combat operations. The leadership's continued partiality towards corruption and desire to maintain secular rule will be under scrutiny.

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(3) (U) Other Insurgent/Guerilla Forces. Two smaller insurgent groups that operate in northern Atropia are the Bilasuvar Freedom Brigade (BFB) and the Provisional Army of Lezgin (PAL). Donovia supports the BFB, which creates political tension between Donovia and Atropia. Other groups and affiliates in Atropia are generally sympathetic to pro-Western economic initiatives and social-political concepts of state governance. Coalition forces will need to not only determine each domestic group's agenda, but also discern whether they are criminal organizations, private militia, insurgents, or guerrillas to determine whether the groups will be useful to meet Coalition objectives.

q. (U) Criminal Organizations. Organized crime and its interrelationships in irregular warfare are active throughout the region. Crime is widespread and mostly linked to historical traditions and ancestral allegiances. Distinguishing crime as distinct from ongoing ethnic feuds, ideological and theological extremism, or elements of the society that incite insurgency for particular political expectations is problematic at best. At its worst, this category of violence is enmeshed in the daily lives of most people whether they reside in urban centers or are part of a rural ecosystem. The region contains criminal organizations such as the Bocyowicz Crime Family (BCF), the Atropian Organized Crime (AOC) group, and the Al Iksir Cartel, some of which have developed into sophisticated transnational criminal organizations (TCO) with ambitious economic and political agendas. The AOC operates primarily in Baku while the Al Iksir Cartel operates in northern Atropia and southern Donovia. The BCF is a third-generation criminal organization with the ability to control ungoverned territory within nation-states, and acquire political power in poorly-governed regions. These political actions are intended to provide security and freedom of movement for the criminal organization's activities. As a result, they challenge the legitimate state authority in its exercise of political control.

r. (U) Private Security Organizations. There are only a few private security organizations within Atropia and these predominantly service the hydrocarbon industry. The private security staffs are limited in number as they are generally used to trigger Ministry of Internal Affairs and/or military response. Protection of hydrocarbon infrastructure is a critical function in nearly all internal security and military operations in the region.

s. (U) Nonmilitary Armed Combatants. The insurgent and guerrilla forces operating in Atropia are generally openly hostile to U.S. involvement in the region. The criminal organizations are predominantly neutral in their view of the U.S. as long as the criminals' economic interests are not compromised. For the most part, the private security organizations that protect the Atropian oil and gas infrastructure are predominately neutral to somewhat friendly, since some of them work for foreign companies.

(U) Military Functions.

t. (U) Command and Control. The core of Atropia's C2 concept remains the assumption that modern communications are susceptible to attack and/or monitoring. Accordingly, the military operates from the view that centralized planning defines the means for assuring both command (establishing the aim) and control (sustaining the aim), leading to strategic and operational directions.

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To reflect increased centralized control and national responsibilities, the RISTA, Artillery and Air Defence Brigades were re-named Commands respectively two years ago with commensurate national/theatre responsibilities being exercised by these new Commands. Information Warfare or INFOWAR (cyber/electronic warfare) has started to take on importance with an INFOWAR Battalion now expanded to a Brigade established within the RISTA Command. An Integrated Fires Command and an Integrated Support Command have also recently been established at the national level to coordinate respectively strategic level fires including air force and ballistic missiles, and strategic logistics. The Atropian military designs its tactical C2 with emphasis on survivability through mobility, redundancy, and security. The Atropian military streamlines procedures and uses common procedures at its tactical command posts; this is not the case at operational level command posts.

u. (U) Maneuver. The Atropian military has a robust capability to conduct combined arms operations; the basic combined arms unit is the separate maneuver brigade. The separate brigades are designed to have a greater ability to accomplish independent missions without further allocation of forces from higher-level tactical headquarters, although this allocation will occur as needed.

v. (U) Air Defense. The Atropian Air Defense Command is subordinate to the Supreme High Command and provides air defense coverage for Atropian units. It also supports combined arms combat by the comprehensive integration of a large number and variety of weapons and associated equipment into an effective, redundant air defense system. Employment of this system pursues the basic objectives of air defense by employing certain concepts and principles. This is best accomplished by establishing a modern (Tier 2) integrated air defense system (IADS). Air defense weapons and surveillance systems at all levels of command are part of an IADS. This ability provides a continuous, unbroken (usually overlapping) umbrella of air defense coverage and presents a significant threat to any potential enemy air activity. Atropia recognizes that air defense is an all-arms effort. Thus, all ground units possess some type of organic air defense capability. Throughout maneuver units, there are a number of systems designed for air defense and other systems that can be used in an air defense role. The heavy antiaircraft machineguns on tanks are specifically designed for air defense. Machineguns on armored personnel carriers and automatic cannon on infantry fighting vehicles can engage both ground and air targets. Most antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) are extremely effective against low-flying helicopters. Several ATGM manufacturers offer anti-helicopter missiles and compatible fire control, which are especially effective against low-flying rotary-wing aircraft. Field artillery and small arms can also be integral parts of the air defense scheme. Atropia considers every soldier with a man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) to be an air defense firing unit. These weapons are readily available at a relatively low cost and are widely proliferated. Therefore, Atropian ground forces are acquiring as many MANPADS as possible and issuing them in large numbers to a wide variety of units. The military can also disseminate them to selected affiliated forces. The small size and easy portability of these systems provides the opportunity for ambush of enemy aircraft operating in any area near Atropian units. Ground units also employ them to set ambushes for enemy helicopters, especially those on routine logistics missions.

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w. (U) Information Warfare (INFOWAR). Atropia defines INFOWAR as specifically planned and integrated actions to achieve an information advantage at critical points and times. The goal is to influence an enemy's decision-making cycle through collected and available information, information systems, and information-based processes, while retaining the ability to employ friendly information and information-based processes and systems. Atropia operates a robust INFOWAR capability as part of RISTA Command in Baku.

x. (U) Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RISTA). The Atropian military views RISTA as the single-most important function for the Atropian military because it sets the stage for all other military operations. Two years ago, the RISTA organization was upgraded to a "Command" vice the older designation of "360 Brigade", and given greater strategic coordinating responsibilities which it has readily assumed to great effect. The Atropian military has made significant progress into Information Warfare (INFOWAR) using the cyber domain and considers this to be a priority. Recently its new INFOWAR Battalion has been expanded into an INFOWAR Brigade including two reserve battalions thus increasing capacity in this growing field. The Supreme High Command is considering further expansion by elevating the INFOWAR Brigade into its own Command. The recent acquisition of more modern Israeli UAVs gives Atropia a much needed and layered surveillance capacity. Atropian military forces tend to commit significant resources to RISTA-related operations with aggressive overlapping redundancy in the intelligence disciplines.

y. (U) Integrated Fires Command. The Integrated Fires Command is a newly stood up Command that reports directly to the Supreme High Command in operations. In peacetime it reports direct to the General Staff. It is responsible for coordinating all the fires of the Strategic Forces, the Special Forces, the Land Forces, the Air Forces and the Naval Forces. It is located in Baku as an adjunct to the Supreme High Command.

z. (U) Integrated Support Command. The Integrated Support Command is a newly stood up Command that reports directly to the Supreme High Command in operations. In peacetime it reports direct to the General Staff. It is responsible for coordinating all logistic support for the Strategic Forces, the Special Forces, the Land Forces, the Air Forces and the Naval Forces. It is the main coordination link for support from other governmental agencies and the private sector. It is located in Baku as an adjunct to the Supreme High Command.

aa. (U) Protection. Atropia will attempt to minimize civilian casualties in this conflict. The military has engineering assets that will be used to improve the survivability of both civilian and military installations. The C2 and fire support systems are sophisticated enough to minimize the threat of fratricide. The military installations and civilian populations are often closely intermingled, thus making it difficult for the enemy to attack without risk of civilian casualties.

bb. (U) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN). Should the strategic need arise, Atropia could produce CBRN munitions from its own resources (Refer to Exhibit 10 (Atropia's Chemical Plants) of this tab). It has long been suspected, but not proven, that Atropia may possess very limited CBRN munitions. Atropian strategic policy does not support a CBRN first strike. Its contingency plans for the acquisition of CBRN, when needed, are primarily for the defense of Atropia's sovereignty. In the event of an impending CBRN strike against the Atropian homeland it could decide to use preemptive CBRN strikes.

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Should any opponent conduct a CBRN attack against Atropia, it may retaliate in kind. Atropia has a wide variety of CBRN delivery means organic to its military forces. It has surface-to-surface missiles capable of carrying CBRN warheads. Most Atropian artillery is capable of delivering chemical munitions, and most systems that are 152-mm or larger are capable of firing nuclear rounds. Additionally, Atropia could use aircraft to deliver a CBRN attack. Trained Atropian SPF may also be used as alternate means of delivering CBRN munitions packages. Atropia is also well-prepared to employ CBRN protection measures—civilian and military—and has chemical defense units organic to all maneuver brigades. Atropia has a substantial industrial base that produces large quantities of toxic industrial chemicals (TIC) some possessing acute toxicity. An adjunct to chemical weapons is use of TIC, which can easily be exploited as improvised (or converted into) chemical weapons by military and civilians alike.

(U) **Research & Development Goals.** Atropia will continue to purchase its military equipment and arms from outsiders, especially the West. However, if oil and natural gas profits remain high the Atropian military industrial complex may begin to slowly grow with funds first flowing to military research and development (R&D). Atropia will likely focus its R&D efforts on INFOWAR or other capabilities that can level the playing field between Atropia and its larger neighbors. In 2013, Atropia announced goals to begin R&D into its own space program. Details are not known at this time, but it is assessed that Atropia is developing a space program to support economic and commercial interests. Technologies that are dual-use indicate that these satellites could ultimately assist in military operations.

(U) **Special Considerations.** Atropia's military policy focuses on its protection of its borders and petroleum resources. The relationship with Limaria over the Lower Janga region has been strained. However with the recent signing of the Atropia-Limaria accord on Lower Janga tensions have eased somewhat. Atropia wants to eventually regain the Lower Janga region, but it is unlikely to act on this while a greater threat looms. As we have seen Atropia maintains sufficient power to at least, delay its attackers until it can receive Western assistance from the U.S. and its allies. However, the Atropians recognize their inability to sustain a successful defense against either Donovia or Ariana. Out of self-interest, Turkey or Gorgas will most likely support Atropian defense, perhaps indirectly, against any foreign attacker.

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Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commander

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
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EXHIBIT 3 (ATROPIAN NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY (NCA) TAB C
(CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS) TO APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) TO
ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO OPORD IRON GUARDIAN CFLCC



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**EXHIBIT 4 (ATROPIAN ECONOMIC SYSTEM) TO TAB C (CIVIL
CONSIDERATIONS) TO APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) TO ANNEX B
(INTELLIGENCE) TO OPLAN 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

(U) References:

Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 07 (Op IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC.

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU

1. **(U) Participation in the Global Financial System.** Over the past decade, the Caucasus nations have made considerable efforts to integrate themselves into the global financial system. Their countries were opened to global markets for their products, especially petroleum, and looked to the West for economic developmental aid, usually in the form of loans and grants.

a. **(U) World Bank/International Development Aid.** The World Bank funds a variety of development programs in Atropia, mostly focused on the large number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) generated by its mid-1990s war with Limaria over Lower Janga. Additional resources have been applied in the effort to slowly integrate minority, non-Atropian populations located in the country's north into Atropian society and economic life. Other programs in Atropia focus on infrastructure development and other public service/public use sectors such as health care.

b. **(U) Foreign Direct Investment.** As a part of its modernization programs, Atropia welcomes international investment as an important facet of its money supply. This openness began in the mid-1990s when Atropia encouraged the development of production-sharing agreements (PSAs) that focused on the oil and gas development industries. Atropian International Oil Company (AIOC) is a consortium of 10 petroleum companies, including British Petroleum, Chevron, Devon Energy, StatoilHydro, Turkey Petrol, Amerada Hess, ExxonMobil, Inpex, Itochu, and the Atropian National Oil Company (NAOC). British Petroleum participates in the AIOC as the largest foreign investor. Most foreign investment in Atropia focuses on the extraction and transportation of crude oil and natural gas. Initially, foreign investment centered on oil extraction from the Kimaz oilfields, Atropia's largest, located 62 miles east of Baku in the Caspian Sea. The Kimaz oilfields presently account for over 80 percent of Atropia's total output. Later foreign investment focused on the Trans-Caucasus petroleum (TC-P) pipeline that originates in Baku and transports crude oil to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, via Tbilisi, for transshipment to Western Europe. The TC-P pipeline serves as the primary oil export transportation method for Atropia. Natural gas exploitation also garners much PSA attention, although development of this energy sector lags behind the oil industry. Outside of the energy market, foreign investment in Atropia remains quite limited.

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(U) Economic Activity.

c. (U) Economic Actors. Government-related entities serve as the main economic actors in Atropia, with President Salam Ismailov at not only the political controls but the economic controls as well. This control is manifest through patronage and favors granted to the business elite. NAOC operates as the most important company in Atropian economic life. NAOC is a state-owned oil company that administers all issues related to the Atropian hydrocarbon industry. NAOC's subsidiaries, Atropigaz and Atropineft, operate the Atropian natural gas production and distribution networks. Atropigaz operations encompass domestic supply processing, transport, and storage, while Atropineft controls exploration and production of the older gas wells.

Informal agreements and patronage among the Atropian societal elite drive the country's economic system. The larger the economic venture, the more important the person who helps the venture to succeed. While some may define this activity as corruption or illegal activity, the Atropians do not perform it to undermine the societal order, but see it as a necessary part of the system. While this semi-illegal activity may or may not hamper the bureaucracy's efficiency or act as a means to circumvent the legal system, the patronage system in Atropia exists nonetheless.

d. (U) Trade. Hydrocarbon products dominate Atropian trade and account for 96.7percent of it. Atropia's top export markets include Turkey, Italy, Donovan, Ariana, Indonesia, Israel, and Gorgas. The top sources for imports include Donovan, Turkey, Germany, Ukraine, UK, and Japan. While exports dramatically increased due to hydrocarbon exports, imports grew at a much more measured and steady rate. Non-fuel exports consist of food items and cotton. Imports consist of more complex manufactured items such as machinery, chemicals, and processed food. State-owned enterprises control Atropia's heavy industries, and these companies oversee trade contracts and agreements. NAOC controls the Atropian oil trade, and Atropineft, a NAOC subsidiary, manages natural gas exports. Foreign participation remains an important part of oil and natural gas field development agreements. Although foreign companies, especially British Petroleum, often enjoy the largest share of the enterprises, NAOC remains the owner of the assets.

e. (U) Commercial Trade. Commercial trade in Atropia revolves around the oil and gas industries, which are the dominant elements of the national economy. The state oil monopoly generates the lion's share of activity that drives Atropia's commercial trade.

f. (U) Military Exports/Imports. Atropia imports its military equipment and hardware primarily from Donovan, Israel, and the US. While the Atropian military equipped much of its forces with decades-old Donovanian equipment, the country has more recently purchased some Tier 1 equipment, such as T90As, BMP3s and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

(U) Economic Diversity. The Atropian economy demonstrates a contradiction of sorts, as the hydrocarbon industry employs only about 12percent of the population, but accounts for 60.5percent of the country's GDP. Over 38percent of the population works in the agricultural industry. The service sector employs almost 50percent of the population and produces 33percent of the GDP. Due to this economic imbalance, a large gap exists in Atropian society between the

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wealthy and the lower class. Approximately 11percent of Atropians live at or below the poverty line.

g. (U) Energy Sector. Oil and natural gas drive the Atropian economy, both domestically and internationally. Despite employing a smaller share of the Atropian population than agriculture or services, the hydrocarbon industry brings in the vast majority of the country's wealth. Hydrocarbon exports account for 96.7percent of total Atropian exports, and will likely continue to do so indefinitely.

h. (U) Oil. NAOC deals with all matters related to the acquisition, refining, and transportation of petroleum in the country. The Ministry of Industry and Energy directs exploration and production agreements, but NAOC always participates in these arrangements, particularly when they involve international investors and development projects such as the TC-P pipeline or the Kimaz offshore fields. Since Atropia brought in foreign investment and development to its oil industry, the country's production continues to rise. Only three years ago, oil production leaped to 228,000 bbl/d after the development of the Vapenaz portion of the oilfields. The development of the Kimaz fields played a key role in this rise, and last year the Kimaz fields accounted for 82percent of Atropia's total oil production. Development of the oilfields continues, with five operational platforms offshore in the Caspian Sea and another one under construction. With the completion of this platform (part of the Fransaz Oil Project), Atropia expects output to reach over one million bbl/d when it comes online next year. British Petroleum, the leader of the AIOC, expects that the new development will extend the output to one million bbl/d for a six-year period. In addition, Atropia possesses extensive land-based oil and gas reserves in the northeast that have yet to be developed. Atropian oil exports continue to rise alongside increased oil resourcing. Recent exports reached 749,000 bbl/d, more than double the figure from three years ago. NAOC ships most oil via pipeline, but small amounts travel by railway or truck. The 1,110-mile TC-P pipeline, with its terminus in the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, Turkey, serves as the major NAOC pipeline. Western Europe constitutes the majority of the market for the crude—especially Italy, which uses 40percent of Atropian export oil. A second major pipeline that originates in Atropia travels 830 miles to Novorossiysk, Donovia, on the Black Sea. This pipeline can operate at 100,000 bbl/d, but currently operates at half capacity. The flow through this pipeline will increase as development continues on the Kimaz fields and as more Kazakh oil enters Atropia. NAOC operates the Atropian portion of the pipeline while the Donovanian firm, Vianeft, operates the Donovanian portion. NAOC operates a third pipeline, the Caspian & Black Seas Petroleum (CBC-P), from Baku to Supsa, Gorgas on the Black Sea. The pipeline can transport 145,000 bbl/d, but operates at a much lower level. The pipeline closed five years ago for repairs, and the Donovia-Gorgas conflict two years later delayed its reopening. ExxonMobil, which is a part of the AIOC consortium to develop the Kimaz oil fields, but not part of the TC-P consortium, uses this pipeline to export its oil. Atropia possesses two oil refineries to produce gasoline and other oil products for the domestic market. The Baku refinery can process 239,000 bbl/d, and the Nye Baku refinery has a maximum capacity of 160,000 bbl/d.

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i. (U) Natural Gas. Natural gas continues to play an increasingly important role in the Atropian economy, with the exploitation of the Caspian Sea Pasha Sarak gas field as the most important element of this industry. The 330-square-mile field remains a point of contention with Ariana, which believes that it owns a larger share of the field. Atropia transports the natural gas via a pipeline that parallels the Caspian & Black Seas Petroleum (CBC-P) oil pipeline.

j. (U) Agriculture. Atropia possesses significant fertile land for the purposes of agriculture, although the majority of farmers produce crops for their own subsistence or domestic consumption. Large-scale privatization in the 1990s from state to private ownership reversed the previous downward trend in output. The fishing industry; however, suffers from high levels of pollution in Atropian rivers and the Caspian Sea. Atropia possesses a nascent food-processing industry, but the industry needs significant levels of modern technology, new infrastructure, and better machinery to increase production. Main agricultural products include cotton, fruit, tea, grains, tobacco, and vegetables. Herding exists in the mountainous areas for cattle, sheep, and other livestock.

k. (U) Manufacturing. Since the country now focuses so much on the hydrocarbon industry, most local manufacturing is centered on small-scale equipment supporting the oil and natural gas industries.

(U) Banking and Finance. The growth of the energy sector and the revenue it brings form the backbone of the Atropian financial system. This abundance encouraged the Atropian government to adopt expansionary programs based on state oil fund wealth. Even with this newfound wealth and governmental efforts toward bank reform, Atropia still does not possess a modern banking and financial system. The reforms' failures stem mainly from an inefficient bureaucracy and business leaders who do not desire reforms because they would weaken their traditional forms of control.

l. (U) Financial Policy. The recent abundance of oil development and transport revenue encouraged Atropia to embark on an ambitious expansionary fiscal policy. Expenditures rose from \$8.5 billion last year to \$16.8 billion this year. The 17-year-old state oil fund acts as the main repository for the revenue reaped from the oil sector; it currently stands at \$11.2 billion. Development plans usually focus on improved social services for the Atropian citizen. Atropian critics complain; however, that plans contain no oversight and often come from the President with little input from other leaders. Following the waning of Donovanian influence in 1991, Atropia privatized most of its industries except for the very largest. The Atropian government owns NAOC, the most important business in Atropia. Other state-owned industries include transportation and electrical generation/ distribution. Atropia privatized most of its agricultural sector, which resulted in an explosion of small-scale farmsteads. Although farmers improved their production in recent years, the agriculturally-dependent Atropians do not share in the wealth generated by the hydrocarbon industries.

m. (U) Taxation. Key issues in the Atropian economy include equitable taxation policy and tax avoidance. Taxes range from 12-35percent, with corporate taxation at 25percent. Additionally, the tax structure has an aggressive depreciation schedule that, unsurprisingly, encourages oil extraction. Excise taxes and other fees and taxes, especially on imports, round out the revenue stream.

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n. (U) Public Liabilities/Debt. At present, Atropian public debt stands at 5.1percent of its total GDP.

o. (U) Private Banking. Atropia maintains a limited private banking capability, mostly to handle the large balance of payments from the petroleum trade. A key problem with the Atropian economy remains the weakness of the banking and finance sector. The Atropian Stock Exchange also handles the trade of local companies. A variety of state-owned, private, and international banks operate within Atropia. Most state-owned banks remain heavily saddled with non-performing debt. Many Atropian citizens keep large amounts of cash instead of depositing it into banks. The Atropia Central Bank handles central banking matters. It regulates the money supply, oversees banks, and creates monetary policy.

(U) Employment Status. Atropia enjoys a low official unemployment rate, but this may be due to cultural beliefs against unemployment, even if the work does not fulfill the individual or the worker does not do anything productive. Atropian unemployment rates fluctuate around 6-7percent, but many of these jobs occur in the service industry, agricultural sector, or in small-scale enterprises. Having a secure job is held in high regard in Atropian society.

(U) Illegal Economic Activity. In Atropia, illegal activities operate alongside legal trade. Corruption occurs so commonly throughout Atropia that people see it as part of the normal economic system. Considerable Atropian crime occurs in a “loyal underworld” system, where economic and political corruption builds alliances and increases personal influence. Most Atropians do not want to undermine the system, but to benefit the most from it. Atropians view disruptive activity negatively, and both legal and illegal organizations maintain a vested interest in facilitating smooth operations in their ventures. The region contains criminal organizations such as the BCF, which has developed into a sophisticated transnational criminal organization with ambitious economic and political agendas. These political actions are intended to provide security and freedom of movement for the organization’s activities. As a result, the BCF and its leadership challenge the legitimate state authority on exercise of political control and use of criminal violence within a given geographical area. Other major organized crime groups operating in the country are the Atropian Organized Crime (AOC) group and the Al Iksir Cartel. The AOC operates primarily in Baku, while the Al Iksir Cartel operates in northern Atropia and southern Donovia. The growth of illegal narcotics, smuggling, and even human trafficking conducted outside of established channels only began recently. Many of those involved in Atropian illegal activities live in communities of displaced Atropians from Lower Janga and persons who fled Donovia. Atropia serves as a transit point for narcotics travelling to Donovia and Western countries.

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**EXHIBIT 5 (ATROPIAN SOCIAL SYSTEM) TO TAB C (CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS)
TO APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO
OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

(U) References:

Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 07 (Op IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC.

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU

1. **(U) Population Movement (Migration/IDPs/Refugees)**. The Lower Janga War forced the movement of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Atropian refugees into Atropia, where they remain one of the largest reminders of the war today. Over 15 years after the end of the conflict, more than a half million refugees remain unsettled. Atropia currently possesses one of the largest populations of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the hemisphere. The IDPs originate from one of the bloodiest, but relatively unknown, late 20th century wars that occurred from 1991 to 1994 between Atropians and Limarians. The war killed over 30,000 on both sides, and the repercussions from the subsequent population displacement reverberate to the present day. In 1994, an internationally brokered ceasefire ended the conflict, though the Atropian and Lower Janga government forces continue to exchange sporadic fire. The former Atropian residents of Lower Janga refuse to return to the separatist region. Lower Janga remains officially part of Atropia, but a Lower Janga Republic (supported by Limaria) politically and militarily controls the area. For the most part, Atropia failed to integrate the Atropian Lower Janga refugees due to a variety of factors. While monetary resources remain the primary issue, the Atropian government's official negotiation position remains that the IDPs possess the political right to return to their homes in the Lower Janga enclave. Recently, however, the Atropian government and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) increased resourcing to support the refugees and exerted additional effort to normalize the IDPs' lives and status. The refugees' status slowly shows signs of normalization, as the situation's permanency and continued Limarian control of Lower Janga become a *de facto* element of Atropian political life. By 2007, the Atropian government replaced the majority of the tent camps with permanent dwellings. Government services and economic opportunities available to IDPs outside major cities, however, remain extremely limited. The IDP integration into Atropian society will continue to tax the government's resources. Even though the Atropians' loss in the Atropia-Limaria conflict occurred in 1994, the defeat stills affects the Atropian population's psyche today. Migration is minimal, and usually consists of members of different ethnic groups repatriating to their country of origin.

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(U) Population Distribution. Atropia reflects an increasingly urban population and just over half of all Atropians (52percent) live in cities, with an annual urbanization rate of 1percent. Baku, the capital, is the largest metropolitan area with over two million inhabitants, or one-quarter of the total national population. The cities of Ganja and Sumgayit both contain over 300,000 people, while six other cities possess populations of 50,000 or higher. The most obvious impact of urbanization is the adoption of more Western cultural elements (most noticeably in dress, gender roles, the importance of religion, and educational practices) in lieu of traditional Atropian practices, which is a classic pattern in many developing countries. Atropia's ethnic Donovanian population resides predominately in an enclave in the northeast tip of the country. This enclave is on the border with Donovania and has access to the Caspian Sea to the east.

(U) Demographic Mix. Demographically, Atropia follows the classic trends for a balanced society. Women represent 50.7percent of the total population, and females outlive males in Atropia by nine years, on average. About 2,336,611 males and 2,329,275 females belong to the 16-49 age group and serve as Atropia's available manpower for military service. Of this 4.6 million, 3.7 million meet the medical standards for military service. About 84,441 males and 78,905 females reach military age annually in Atropia. It is likely that the maximum number of Atropian males ready for military service would top out at about 820,000. Atropia will likely always maintain a military advantage over its historical enemy, Limaria, due to its larger population, the greater number of people who reach military age each year, and its ability to fund the military through its hydrocarbon resources.

(U) Social Volatility. Persistent conflict with Limaria exists as one of a few defining and unifying elements throughout Atropian society and creates high social volatility. The fallout over the Lower Janga conflict manifests itself as a legacy of external oppression, military defeat, and refugees. Moreover, the threat of conflict represents a useful tool for the Atropian government to justify its military establishment and some repressive internal measures. Few Atropians maintain positive feelings toward Limarians. With an increase in oil revenues and a generally positive growth in the Atropian economy few Atropians harbor violent dissatisfaction with the current government. The Atropians will continue to support the current regime as indicated by the last parliamentary election results of **November 2010**. However, Southern Atropians do not feel well represented by their government: some are seeking the establishment of a separate country of ethnic Atropians that would exist in Atropia's southern provinces and Ariana's northwestern provinces.

a. **(U) Internal Conflict.** While numerous reasons exist for internal conflict in Atropia, two main reasons stand out above all others—ethnocentrism and nationalism. This internal strife devolved to irregular warfare as state and non-state actors struggled to gain legitimacy and influence over the populace. Sporadic violence over the last decade targeted government entities and key leaders. Several foreign-supported anti-Atropian insurgent groups operate within Atropian territory. The two dominant groups in the area of operations are Salasyl and the South Atropian Peoples' Army (SAPA). These two entities are described in detail elsewhere in this Annex.

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b. (U) Other Insurgent/Guerilla Forces. The Free Lower Janga Movement (FLJM) is a rebel group fighting Limarians in the Lower Janga region. The FLJM found a fertile recruiting ground in the IDP camps in northwestern Atropia. The FLJM is passively supported by the government of Atropia. Additional insurgent activity present in Atropia is focused around the BFB operating in northern Vetlia and Erdabil provinces, and the PAL operating in southern Erdabil and western Sirvaki Provinces. Other groups and affiliates in Atropia find themselves sympathetic to pro-Western economic initiatives and social-political concepts of state governance.

(U) Education Level. There is a relatively high level of education among the Atropian population. The UN Human Development Index indicates an adult Atropian literacy rate of 98.8percent. Atropian public education expenditures, however, remain comparatively low by regional standards. Atropia spends about 2.8percent of its Gross National Product (GNP) on education. Along with stagnant spending, Atropian education demonstrates unsatisfactory progress, as 55percent of students fail to meet the minimum score for national university entrance exams. Atropia maintains a robust higher education system with a number of colleges and universities. Many Atropian colleges have partnered with Western universities, including American ones. While Atropia enjoys high literacy, the government will need to invest additional resources to adequately prepare Atropian children for college, meet the increased demands of a global economy, and provide proper stewardship for Atropia's oil wealth. For the immediate future, it remains likely that Atropia will educate enough of its populace to exploit the country's hydrocarbon resources and make up any shortfalls by the importation of skilled labor from other countries.

(U) Ethnic Diversity. Atropia is almost entirely ethnically Atropian with a few non-Atropians who primarily reside in border areas or Baku. The official government census probably undercounts ethnic minorities, as the official numbers of the smaller ethnic groups consistently vary from self-counts and academic assessments. Atropians represent 90.6percent of the total population while Arianians represent 3percent, Gilani represent 2.2percent, and Donovanians 1.8percent. A number of smaller groups that include Limarians in the Lower Janga area comprise the remainder. Atropians dominate almost all facets of the country's political, social, and economic life. While no minority harbors dangerous anti-Atropian sentiment, non-Atropians hold no significant status in the country's cultural, economic, or social life.

(U) Religious Diversity. The percent of Atropians who consider themselves Muslim is 93.4, but polls suggest that only about 21percent of Atropians believe religion plays an important factor in their daily life. Eighty-nine percent of Atropians are of the Shia denomination. Additionally, 2.5percent are Donovanian Orthodox and 2.3percent are Limarian Orthodox. While religion does not color daily life as it does in neighboring Ariana: data suggests that some Atropians, especially the young, increasingly self-identify themselves as Muslims. From the late 1990s, the Atropian government implemented a variety of methods to control incipient Islamization. These programs include the deportation of foreign (predominately Arianian) religious instructors, arrest and conviction of pro-Arianian religious elements for espionage, and the subjugation of other religious elements to government oversight. This oversight allows for government approval of mullahs and other religious authorities.

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Other religions require government approval, and the Atropian government uses these actions to control other religions, such as Christianity. This lack of political representation for religious minorities, combined with intrusive government oversight could create the conditions for the potential rise of militant political Islam, as seen in Egypt or Ariana in the 1970s. In both cases, the lack of political pluralism funneled discontent into religious extremism. The Atropian government seems willing to run that risk as seen by its limitation on public Ashura celebrations, an important Shia holiday.

(U) Common Languages. Atropian serves as the common language in Atropia, but Atropians often understand other languages. Different languages spoken by large numbers of Atropians include Donovanian and Turkish. By law, Atropian is the official language of Atropia, but the Atropian government protects the rights of “native” language speakers. Any Coalition personnel who speak Donovanian, Turkish, or Atropian will likely find themselves with the ability to communicate with Atropian residents. Those who do not speak one of these three languages will need to use an interpreter.

(U) Criminal Activity. Atropia shows signs of increasingly violent crime and a high level of criminal activity. Baku, in particular, experiences a continuing problem with violent robbery gangs instead of the traditional pickpockets that inhabit many cities. However, nonviolent crimes, such as theft, still remain the norm in Atropia. Terrorist elements have operated within Atropia in the past. Recently, terrorists allegedly targeted the US Embassy in Baku, but Atropian security forces reported that they had arrested the plotters. The US State Department strongly discourages travel within or around the borders of Lower Janga due to the threat of violence. As with many nations in the region, its central location and often corrupt police make Atropia a transit point for drugs, weapons, and trafficked persons. Most notably, Atropian law enforcement agents increased their drug seizures consistently over the last several years from 300 kilograms four years ago, to 600 kilograms three years ago, to over one metric ton of narcotics two years ago, and over 1.25 metric tons last year. It remains unclear if these higher seizure figures resulted from additional narcotics traffic, increased police efficiency, or a combination of the two. A growing concern among law enforcement within Atropia is the increase in trafficking tunnels from Ariana and Limaria. These underground networks were created to shield criminal groups and their nefarious smuggling activities from law enforcement agencies on both sides of the border. These underground facilities vary in complexity and can be quickly constructed. The exact amount of underground networks is unknown at this time; however, there are an estimated 20 operational tunnels.

(U) Human Rights. Most international monitoring groups consider the human rights situation in Atropia to be generally poor by Western standards. Issues such as the government’s intervention in elections, deaths of journalists, and harsh treatment of persons in police custody contribute to this assessment. If judged against most of its regional neighbors; however, Atropia possesses a moderate human rights climate, especially compared to the repression found in Ariana. Apparently negative official behaviours, such as police corruption and a biased judiciary, often serve the government’s political goals through the disruption and detention of political dissidents. Atropian citizens, however, generally trust their police forces, something unique when compared to Atropia’s regional neighbors. While the equality of women continues to slowly improve, significant gaps remain between the genders.

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That said, Atropia is progressive in its politics and religion compared to Ariana, and its citizens enjoy a greater degree of freedom. Unless requested by the Atropian government, Coalition personnel will probably not be called upon to enforce human rights except as designated by the Geneva Convention and other applicable rules of warfare.

(U) **Centers of Social Power.** The family serves as the primary social unit in Atropia. Visitation to extended families serves as a primary social activity, especially in the rural areas.

(U) **Basic Cultural Norms and Values.** Atropia possesses a history of military service and directs its military focus at Limaria, a Christian nation. The 1990s war over the Lower Janga region continued the Muslim-Christian conflict in the region. Atropia still believes that the Lower Janga region belongs to its country and ultimately wants to force the reunification of the two areas. This goal serves as a rallying cry and a point of honor for Atropia.

(U) **Customs and Practices.**

Cultural Dos & Don'ts	Men are breadwinners; women take care of the home. Women are more traditional in rural areas than in urban areas. Neatness in clothing is valued. Women sometimes wear heavy makeup. Men and women wear Western-style clothing, but traditional clothing may be worn in rural areas. Young women wear a light kerchief; older men wear a lambskin hat. It is ok to point with the finger at objects, but not at people. The "thumbs-up" sign demonstrates acceptance or a positive response to a question.
Meeting & Greeting	Men shake hands and say <i>Salam</i> (peace). Women say <i>Salam</i> , but do not shake hands. Female relatives may hug or kiss.
Visiting/ Hospitality	Stand when an elderly person enters a room. Relatives and friends drop in unannounced. Host offers meal or tea with pastries, fruit, or candy. Atropians rarely eat at restaurants and only on special occasions. The host pays the entire bill and tip. If the host gives you a small bag of food to take home, it is a sign that he wants you to leave.
Manners	In formal occasions, greet men with <i>Bey</i> and the man's given (first) name. Use <i>ami</i> or <i>dayi</i> (uncle) after a man's given name or <i>hanum</i> (Miss or Mrs.) after a woman's given name. People of the same age call each other by their first names. Eat with fork in left hand and knife in right hand. The cook serves the meal to each person.
Gifts	Guests bring gifts—flowers, candy, or pastries.
Taboos	Do not dress sloppily. Do not serve yourself at a meal. Remove shoes before entering a mosque. Do not cross your legs, chew gum, or smoke in the presence of elders. Do not raise your voice when speaking to peers or elders. Do not use the left hand for any interaction unless the right hand is occupied. Do not use the "ok" sign with the index finger and thumb in a circle—it is considered obscene. Atropians usually do not marry in the months of Muharram, Safar, and Ramadan due to religious beliefs. Do not talk openly about sex and the body in public areas.

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Personal Space	No concept of personal space. In lines or crowded spaces, Atropians prefer not to stand close to strangers of the opposite gender.
Displays of Affection	Public displays of affection are frowned upon, even more so in rural areas than urban areas.
Marriage Rituals	Marriage age for women is 18. Despite a 2005 Atropian law to outlaw bride kidnapping, <i>qiz qacirmaq</i> (capture) and <i>goshulop gachmak</i> (elopement) still take place. If a woman is raped, her family considers the woman unpure and usually forces her to marry her kidnapper. Normal marriage procedures: <i>Preliminary Notification</i> (check out the female); <i>Prior Wooing</i> (important family members from both sides meet); <i>Wooing</i> (families meet to decide on the <i>Mehriye</i> , or marriage money for the girl); Engagement (entire families meet at the bride's house). People do a traditional dance—the <i>Asma Kasma</i> —as they escort the bride to the groom's house. People do a traditional dance—the <i>Anzali</i> —at the wedding celebration.
Work Week/ Work Hours	Monday to Friday, 40 hours per week with a Saturday-Sunday weekend. Normal work hours are 0900-1700, but late starts and long lunches are not uncommon. Restaurants in Baku usually open from 1100 to 2300 daily, but operating hours for rural restaurants depend on the clientele. Bazaars are usually open only in the mornings.
Concept Of Time	More relaxed than the Western world, but the urban areas such as Baku are becoming more time-conscious.
Dispute Resolution	No formal customs for dispute resolution.
Birth Rituals	Relatives of newly married women like them to hold babies, put a baby on the newlyweds' bed, and throw the bride's veil on the branches of a fruit-bearing tree to express their desires for the bride to become a mother. While pregnant, the woman tries to be cordial and affable for the baby's health. Pregnant women try to look at beautiful colors, still water, and the blue sky to have a healthy baby. After the baby is born, others bathe it with salt so it will be truthful, bold, and smart. When babies get their first tooth, they receive a special meal of seven grains to make their teeth grow faster. The baby's fingernails and hair are not cut until the baby reaches the age of 1. The nails are wrapped in a clean cloth and hidden in a crack in the floor or wall. The parents keep the baby's hair from its first haircut.

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**EXHIBIT 6 TO TAB C TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION
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**EXHIBIT 6 (ATROPIAN IRREGULAR THREATS) TO TAB C (CIVIL
CONSIDERATIONS) TO APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) TO ANNEX B
(INTELLIGENCE) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

(U) References:

Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 07 (Op IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC.

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU

(U) Irregular Threats in Atropia.

a. (U) South Atropian Peoples' Army (SAPA). SAPA is the military arm of the South Atropian Peoples' Party (SAPP). SAPP is led by Bahdir Mirgasimov and is known to maintain several safe houses in the cities of Baku and Fuzuli. SAPA is led by Farhad Karimov and is known to maintain safe houses in Baku and Ismili. SAPA is organized into three regional commands and a special urban battalion in Baku with a total of 18 cells throughout Atropia. Its strongest presence is in the southeast (SE) portion of the country. The strategic objective of SAPP is to overthrow the government of Atropia and replace it with a Shia Theocracy based on Sharia Law. Its operational objective is to form a shadow government in the SE portion of Atropia and through coercion and brute force and establish de facto control of key cities and rayons.

(1) (U) Operations in SAPA's northern region are based out of Ganja. Its suspected leader is Rafig Allahyarov. This individual maintains multiple safe houses in Ganja and Yehlakh. SAPA also maintains a presence in Yehlakh, Kelekan and Barda. SAPA operations in this sector center on recruitment and financial support for the more crucial southern regions. However, it maintains the capability to conduct small localized attacks in order to destabilize city and rayon governmental operations.

(2) (U) Operations in SAPA's central region are based out of Shamakhi. It is suspected to be run by Azad Ala and is known to maintain safe houses in Shamakhi and Baku. SAPA also maintains a presence in Ujar and Kuramir. SAPA operations in locales other than Baku center on recruitment and financial support for the more crucial southern regions. Again it maintains the capability to conduct small localized attacks in order to destabilize city and rayon governmental operations. The center region's Baku cell focuses primarily on recruitment and criminal operations leaving the Baku Mobile Urban Battalion to conduct attacks against the government and/or Salasyl.

(3) (U) Operations in SAPA's southern region are based out Fuzuli. Its suspected commander is Mashad Bagheri. He is known to maintain safe houses in Fuzuli and Imishli. The southern region conducts the same general types of tasks as the other two regions, however, operations within this region are also capable of conducting localized attacks against law enforcement agencies and small military units. There are standard SAPA operational cells in Nefthchala, Bilesuvar, and Zardob (capable of IED-type attacks). The city of Nefthchala has importance due to the Kura River Bridge and the coastal highway.

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(a) (U) Imishli is the logistical hub for SAPA's southern region. This network receives money, weapons, and people from the southern regions of Atropia. They also recruit locals who have ideological differences with the current Atropian government. This network has the capability to conduct attacks against Atropian and Coalition forces.

(b) (U) The Southern Region also has five Direct Action Networks Salyan, Saatly, Shirvan, Lankaran, and Lerik. The direct action networks are thought to be capable of fielding up to 50-man units to launch direct assaults on local law enforcement officials and government institutions in those cities. They have, in effect, established a shadow government. This network receives money, weapons, and personnel from SAPA's other regions to be used for attacks against Atropian and Coalition forces.

(4) (U) Baku Mobile Urban Battalion is led by Chechgan Polin. As of the time this OPORD was written, little is known about the Mobile Battalion. They are thought to have at least 4 cells of approximately 30 fighters each that will ferment violent riots and local sabotage.

(5) (U) In terms of their relationship to other irregular forces operating in Atropia, SAPA tolerates the Limarian Liberation Front (LLF), whom they see as fighting a common enemy. The SAPA leadership sees Salasyl and Free Lower Janga Movement (FLJM) as enemies and will strike them given the opportunity.

b. (U) Salasyl. Salasyl is a centrally controlled organization, not broken down into regions. There are 15 Cells throughout the country of Atropia. The overarching goal of Salasyl is for rule of law, effective governance, and the overthrow of the current regime. Salasyl is also attempting to establish shadow governments in the northeast (NE) portion of the country to counter what the Salasyl leadership sees as a corrupt and inefficient local government. Salasyl itself is centered in the city of Ganja where its leader Luka Amirejibi is known to maintain numerous safe houses. The cell structure within Salasyl consists of support and insurgent cells.

(1) (U) Support Cells. Ganja is the central logistical hub in the region for Salasyl. Baku is the eastern logistical hub and also serves as the primary port of entry for Salasyl's smuggling operations. These support cells fund and arm Salasyl operations. Other Salasyl support cells are known to exist in Kazakh, Mingechaur, and Agdash. While the operations in these cities are primarily focused on support, if given the opportunity they will confront and/or attack Atropian government forces or SAPA.

(2) (U) Insurgent Cells. There are insurgent cells operating in the cities of Shimkir, Aghastafa, Tovuz, Kazakh, Balakan, Zaqatala, Shirvan, Yevlakh Agjabadi, and Zardob. The primary purpose of these cells is to conduct attacks to destabilize local government with IEDs and small arms/RPGs. There is an attempt in each of these cities to install a local government generally based on good governance and rule of law.

(3) (U) Fear. The leadership of Salasyl, above all, fears the type of Shia Theocracy that exists in Ariana and that SAPP would impose in Atropia or its individual rayons. They are more or less neutral in the conflict between the Free Lower Janga Movement (FLJM) and the LLF, while wanting to maintain the Lower Janga as part of Atropia. Salasyl will not align itself with FLJM which receives aid from the government of Atropia.

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c. (U) The Free Lower Janga Movement (FLJM). FLJM is a low-level insurgent group backed by the Atropian Government whose purpose is to drive all of the Limarian Christians from the Lower Janga. It is led by Samol Vahl who is known to have numerous safe houses in Agdam and Barda.

(1) (U) Direct action cells are located in Agdam, Barda, Agjabadi Stepanaket/Khankendi, and, Fuzuli. They conduct low-level IED/small arms attacks against the LLF, businesses and churches where ethnic Limarians are known to gather.

(2) (U) Support cells are located in Agdam, Fuzuli and, Stepanakert/Khankendi. Networks in these cities receive money, weapons, and people to be distributed to the direct action cells for use against ethnic Limarians.

(3) (U) With its ties to the Government of Atropia, FLJM does not have good relations with any of the other insurgent groups. Individual members may have some sympathy with Salasyl, but the leadership is strongly aligned with the government of Atropia.

d. (U) Multiple Limarian Factions (LLF). This is an umbrella organization with no cadre providing a Lower Janga-wide leadership role; though, its most influential member is Lance Vahabov. The leader of the Agdam cell is Andre Ivanov. The overarching goal of LLF is to maintain the autonomy that the Limarians won as the result of a recent low-level insurgency by the Limarians against the Government of Atropia. They are known to receive support from the Government of Limaria, primarily humanitarian assistance, but there is reason to believe the Government of Limaria is also supplying small arms to the LLF as well. The primary focus of the organization is defensive but they will strike out specifically in retaliation for attacks by the FLJM. Each cell maintains its own support mechanisms and can conduct lethal direct action ambushes with IED, RPGs, and small arms. There are known cells in Agdam, Kalbajar, Stepanakert/Khankendi, Martuni, Qubaldi, and Fuzuli. These cells can be expected to cooperate with any organization that will maintain the autonomous status that the Limarians have achieved in the Lower Janga.

e. (U) Bilasovar Freedom Brigade (BFB).

(1) (U) Purpose. BFB is a low-level group that Donovia supports, which creates political tension between Donovia and Atropia. The driving motivation of this group is primarily profit from drug distribution, weapons, bribery, blackmail, and kidnapping.

(2) (U) Key Personalities. No information is known at this time.

(3) (U) Operational Activities. It is suspected that BFB possesses rockets and/or mortars, as well as light and heavy machine guns to conduct attacks.

(4) (U) Additional Comments. The BFB will likely try to take advantage of the current invasion to progress their criminal activities.

f. (U) Provisional Army of Lezgin (PAL).

(1) (U) Purpose. PAL is a low-level group whose main goal is profit in the northwestern region of Atropia. It is suspected that PAL has a passive role in supplying Salasyl with weapons. The group primarily profits from weapons smuggling and financing.

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(2) (U) Key Personalities. No information is known at this time.

(3) (U) Operational Activities. It is suspected that PAL possesses rockets and/or mortars, as well as light and heavy machine guns to conduct attacks.

(4) (U) Additional Comments. Again PAL will likely try to take advantage of the invasion to progress their activities.

g. (U) Bocyowicz Crime Family (BCF). BCF is the only known nationwide criminal organization operating in all of the metropolitan areas of Atropia. They have developed extensive contacts within the Government of Atropia through bribery and extortion. They derive a significant portion of their income from the trafficking of women and children for use in brothels in Atropia or for sex slaves in other countries and the smuggling of luxury goods and/or extortion at civilian airports and sea ports. They are also heavily involved in the trafficking of alcohol, opium, and heroin and will often trade drugs for children. While they operate throughout the country of Atropia, BCF is primarily based in Baku, Aghstafa, Tovus, Balakan, Zaqatala, Ujar, and Sumgayit. Their presence at BAKU's international airport allows them to require international aid agencies to pay bribes in terms of money, food, or medicines prior to allowing those items to flow into Atropia. BCF is not active in the Lower Janga and is willing to work with SAPP in order to eliminate the criminal enterprises of Salasyl.

2. (U) Gorgas. A recent civil war in Gorgas has resulted in two Gorgan provinces achieving independence from Gorgas, with Donovanian assistance. Criminal organizations associated with militias, on both sides, are fighting a low-level insurgency and are active in and around Aerial Ports of Debarkation/Sea Ports of Debarkation (APOD/SPOD) within Gorgas. CJTF-OIG J2 does not anticipate these criminal activities will have a significant adverse influence on line of communication (LOC) from the APODs/SPODs into Atropia.

3. (U) Impact on Adversary COA. The Arianian National Command Authority is clearly already influencing SAPA as a guerilla organization that will fight for Arianian strategic objectives in the area of operations (AO). The Arianian Supreme High Command may instruct SAPA to begin a low-level insurgent campaign against the FLJM and any Atropian Armed Forces deployed near the Lower Janga. The possibility exists that SAPA or Arianian Special Purpose Forces will reach out to the LLF with promises of increased autonomy if the LLF will facilitate Arianian operations in Atropia.

4. (U) Impact on Friendly COA. CFLCC cannot expect assistance from any of the insurgent groups in Atropia. The presence of SAPP/SAPA in the southeast portion of Atropia will likely pose a significant problem in cities in that region overrun by Arianian forces. In the Lower Janga, any nearby CFLCC forces should avoid being seen as taking the side of LLF or FLJM.

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**EXHIBIT 7 TO TAB C TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION
IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

**EXHIBIT 7 (ATROPIAN INFORMATION SYSTEM) TAB C (CIVIL
CONSIDERATIONS) TO APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) TO ANNEX B
(INTELLIGENCE) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

(U) References:

Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 07 (Op IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC.

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU

1. **(U) Public Communications Media.** Public communications media is growing in importance in Atropia, though most major outlets are controlled by the government or by confederates of the President. The exception is the Internet, where relative freedom exists, but government monitoring for anti-government messages occurs. While social media is blossoming, TV remains the most widely available medium.

a. **(U) Internet.** The Internet in Atropia exists in a zone relatively free from state interference or censorship, though evidence indicates some limited state filtering and direct monitoring of political content. Despite this relative Internet freedom, mockery of the government by Atropian users recently resulted in arrest and detention. The Atropian government likely takes a view that as long as Internet activity does not threaten Atropian government interests, it is allowed, but mockery or criticism is forbidden. Almost 1.45 million Atropians, or over one in every eight of the Atropian populace, use the Internet. Most users access the Internet from cybercafés or their workplaces, as the cost of computers and the Internet connection (\$40-50 per month, compared to an average income of \$100 per month) preclude personal Internet connections. The Atropian government maintains centralized Internet control via two governmental Internet Service Providers (ISPs). They, in turn, distribute bandwidth to over 20 private Internet providers.

b. **(U) Television.** Atropians receive the majority of their information through television. While the Atropian government banned rebroadcasts of foreign-produced English language programs by their local television outlets in December 2008 (presumably due to reporting on government fraud and corruption), the authorities do allow Turkish state television rebroadcasts. Atropians who live along the southern border can also receive spillover from Arianian television stations. Recent reports indicate that 10 television stations operate within Atropia. The top five television networks are: 1) ASTV - Atropian State TV, 2) PTVA - Atropian Public TV (the Atropian government created PTVA to meet requirements for joining the Council of Europe), 3) National TV Atropia - Private broadcaster, 4) Deep Space Broadcasting TV - Private broadcaster; owned by the sister of the President, and 5) Atropia Broadcasting System - Private broadcaster; controlled by a cousin of the President. The Atropian television media ownerships' connections to the highest sectors of government remain quite obvious. Due to the power of broadcast media in elections and the Atropian television stations' compliant nature, the television media serves as a powerful tool in the hands of the President and most Atropians receive their news through government-controlled sources.

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**EXHIBIT 7 TO TAB C TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO OPOD 07 (OPERATION
IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

c. (U) Radio. A variety of radio stations serve Atropia and include state-run, public radio networks, and private stations. Additionally, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty operates Atropian language programming, known as Radio Qaja. Radio Qaja broadcasts over the Internet, via satellite, and over shortwave. Ten FM, 11 AM, and one shortwave station are in operation. The top five radio networks are a combination of private and public broadcasters. In Atropia, even private broadcasts have significant ownership links to the ruling family and are generally unlikely to report adverse material about the government.

d. (U) Print Media. For a nation of its size, Atropia maintains a remarkably large print media establishment. Significant numbers of magazines, newspapers, and news bureaus exist, but must operate within the limits of politically permissible speech. While a nominal freedom of the press exists within Atropia, watchdog groups chronicled recent incidents of journalists allegedly killed or imprisoned for reporting that was critical of the government or political conditions within Atropia. The Committee to Protect Journalists reports four journalists killed in Atropia and one death while in prison. In addition to governmental interference, the relatively high cost and low print runs of the country's magazines make them significantly less important in Atropia than broadcast media. Three major Atropian news bureaus exist and all offer English, Donovanian, and Atropian feeds. More importantly, all generally support the Atropian government, especially on issues that involve Limaria. A number of magazines offer both online and hard-copy versions. Most print is in the Atropian language, though English language outlets like *Our Century*, *Atropian Times*, and *Atropian News* exist. Four major Atropian language publications are dominant, though their circulation is primarily among Atropian-speaking expatriates, urban Atropians, and Atropians living abroad.

e. (U) Telephone. The Atropian telecommunications infrastructure operates through a combination of recently built cellular components constructed over a framework of trunk architecture. Due to the government's control of landlines and the long wait for new installation, Atropians usually resort to more expensive cellular phones. Trunk connectivity internationally is slowly moving toward fiber optic, including participation in the Trans-Asia-Europe (TAE) fiber optic line, and away from microwave links. The Atropian phone network will unquestionably operate within the cellular realm in the future. Atropian cellular phone use continues to increase. As of this year, 1.5 million fixed phone lines are in operation, versus over 6.4 million mobile subscribers. Like many countries, the initial investment for cellular phones (towers) compared to landline phones (fiber and wire, connected switches) makes cellular conductivity clearly superior based on normal return on investment criteria. A public pay telephone network does exist in Atropia and consists of traditional pay phones and call offices where an attendant will place a call for a nominal fee. Atropian culture also considers it polite for businesses to offer patrons phone service, if needed.

f. (U) Satellite Telecommunications. As a less technologically developed country, Atropia relies on third party satellite services, leasing commercial Ku-band transponders from larger, more developed nations. This capability may also be used to support government and military operations. Analysts assess that Atropia is in the process of developing an independent space program designed to augment economic and commerce functions of the country. However, dual-use technologies that exist would indicate that these satellites could ultimately assist in military operations.

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**EXHIBIT 7 TO TAB C TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO OPOD 07 (OPERATION
IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

g. (U) Navigation. Atropia commercially purchases global positioning receivers which support commercial needs as well as military navigation and targeting operations.

h. (U) Postal/Courier. The Atropian postal service possesses a reputation for lack of service and reliability. A number of international and local courier companies known for better service exist. These couriers include FEDEX, UPS, and DHL. Capabilities are increasing to support the variety of foreign companies engaged in the oil and gas industry.

i. (U) Word of Mouth. Word of mouth communication in Atropia remains a common method for rural residents to receive their news and information. Within urban Atropian settings, residents often use short message service (SMS) texting and cell phones to replace face-to-face communication. Combined with social media, this combination of Internet and personal communication will be an increasingly important fixture in Atropia. As communications mature in the country, cell phones will likely become more common in rural Atropia. Religious-based appeals are apt to fail outside of the most conservative rural settings.

2. (U) Information Control. While the government of Atropia does not directly control information flow, the Atropian state-connected elite creates boundaries of “soft censorship,” where free speech includes everything except discussion of the government. Atropians currently push back against this limited censorship, especially with the new social media, in attempts to avoid direct governmental interference with their freedom of speech. It is likely that the Atropian government allows this limited degree of freedom of speech as the leaders know those with computer access (the urban elite) are unlikely to violently rebel.

3. (U) INFOWAR. Information Warfare (INFOWAR) in the Caucasus region contains a mixture of old and new technology. While older Donovanian equipment forms the backbone for much of the region’s INFOWAR warfighting capability, the countries conduct advanced operations with dedicated INFOWAR units. For example, regional perception management activities, often web-based, form the current global state-of-the-art. Internet operations are frequently used as an adjunct to major combat operations.

a. (U) Electronic Warfare. Generally speaking, the Atropians will operate outdated equipment, such as counter-battery and battlefield surveillance radars. Also, Atropian jammers likely remain relics of earlier buys from Donovanians. The possibility exists; however, that improved Atropian relations with Turkey and Israel could result in newer critical equipment procurement in the future or perhaps limited samples of advanced equipment for operational testing purposes.

b. (U) Computer Attack. While Atropian hackers actively attack Limarian websites, hard data on their identities or Atropian government involvement remains extremely limited and unreliable. While the Limarians claim Atropian government sponsorship of computer attacks, that evidence remains very circumstantial.

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**EXHIBIT 7 TO TAB C TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO OPOD 07 (OPERATION
IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

c. (U) Information Attack. Atropia maintains a limited information attack (IA) capability with the skill to deface websites or engage in basic tactics like distributed denial of service attacks or basic forensics. When compared to aggressive and capable Donovanian or Arianian information attack, it appears doubtful that Atropian capabilities will successively deter those of its larger neighbors. It remains possible that any IA will attempt to compromise similar unsophisticated Limarian systems.

d. (U) Deception. Atropia upholds emphasis on battlefield deception. Atropians will likely use decoys to great effect and tactically will use feints and other techniques to prevent the determination of the main effort by their adversaries until the last minute. Atropian overseas defense procurement and training has emphasized the acquisition of the latest reconnaissance and deception techniques and tools to improve their capability at executing deception operations.

e. (U) Physical Destruction. Physical destruction probably exists as the most developed of Atropian INFOWAR capabilities. The Atropians have copied Donovanian doctrine that stressed the neutralization of high-value targets, like INFOWAR assets, through various strike and fires capabilities. Since Atropia finds its military capabilities about a decade behind the current state of the art, the Atropian ability to neutralize enemy INFOWAR remains limited to other militaries with similar capabilities.

f. (U) Protection and Security Measures. Since so many protection and security measures (PSM) fall under the control of the Atropian Ministry of National Security, it remains probable that 1990s-era security practices continue. The Atropians, through their relationships with the US, probably view the application of integrated Western technology to their systems as a way to safeguard their information.

g. (U) Perception Management. Perception management exists as the most visible element of Atropian INFOWAR, as the Atropian government has expended considerable effort to demonstrate Limarian “terrorism” and “aggression” on websites, public pronouncements, and other official media. Even a brief tour of official Atropian government websites reveals the significance of events in the Lower Janga region, despite the recent cease fire agreement. Also, the Atropian government openly acknowledges its recent weapons procurements, especially those from Turkey and Israel, to demonstrate its strength and military potential to regional foes.

4. (U) Intelligence. The Atropian government maintains an intelligence service, the Ministry of Security Protection (MSP). Its mission focus is on threats to government control from extremists and unfriendly governments and to ascertain the intentions of Atropia’s neighbors, especially Limaria and Ariana. Its official website states that the MSP maintains responsibility for a number of missions. Unlike the US, where a variety of organizations possesses different roles and missions, the MSP maintains a very broad mandate that includes intelligence gathering; counterintelligence; government information and personnel security; and national-level, anti-organized crime efforts. According to one of the few authoritative sources, the MSP suffers from high turnover and bureaucratic infighting. It remains likely that the general security situation and large number of foreign companies in Baku will create a demand and corresponding higher wages for trained local security personnel. Reports estimate the size of the Atropian intelligence community at about 5,000 personnel. Currently, the leadership of the MSP is slanted toward anti-crime rather than the intelligence collection and analysis element of the organization.

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**EXHIBIT 7 TO TAB C TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO OPOD 07 (OPERATION
IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

a. (U) Human Intelligence. Atropia intelligence's strongest suit focuses on Human Intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities. As with many countries that have a variety of local threat actors and large neighbors, the maintenance of a strong HUMINT cadre becomes important. Recently, Atropian HUMINT scored some notable successes against Bad Nafar and Arianian-backed extremist elements that operate in Atropia. The service will remain focused on religious extremists, both Shia and Sunni, which operate within Atropia.

b. (U) Open Source Intelligence. Atropian intelligence analysts probably employ open source intelligence (OSINT) to determine the intentions of actors, especially those with significant media reporting, such as Western nations, Donovia, and Ariana. OSINT's general low cost represents a bargain for Atropian policy makers, as many Atropians possess fluency with Donovanian, Persian, and Western European languages.

c. (U) Signals Intelligence. While Atropia may operate signals intelligence (SIGINT) at the tactical level, it remains doubtful that the government maintains a robust national-level capability for signals collection. The MSP probably maintains the capability to monitor cellular communications occurring within Atropia, and is expected to cooperate with any SIGINT capabilities the Atropian military maintains. The Atropian fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) purchased from Israel may also contribute to SIGINT collection.

d. (U) Imagery Intelligence. Atropian imagery intelligence (IMINT) probably comes from commercially purchased imagery (one to two meter resolution) and various air-breathing assets, especially a fleet of Israeli-built unmanned aircraft and MiG-24 MR FENCER E reconnaissance aircraft. Atropia can also use rotary wing assets as tactical collection platforms.

e. (U) Measurement and Signatures Intelligence. Atropian resource constraints probably limit its measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT) to first-generation capabilities, such as basic seismic detection or harbor defense sonar. Additionally, MASINT's general cost and high analytical requirements probably render it an Atropian future requirement rather than a current operational need.

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**TAB D (IPOE BRIEF TO APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE)
TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

IPOE Brief (extracts)
CFLCC – OP IRON GUARDIAN

OPERATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS

- Coalition partner nations as well as Gorgas and Turkey will grant over-flight and basing rights to the Coalition
- Coalition will have secure APOD, SPOD and lodgment sites in Gorgas
- Arianian and sympathetic transnational actors will attempt Computer Network Attack against Coalition networks
- Arianian and sympathetic transnational actors will foster unrest and attempt to undermine the Coalition through insurgency, terrorism, and transnational criminal activity
- Lines of communication will have IDP traffic in excess of Atropian Government and NGO capacity to manage
- UN-led and/or an Atropian follow-on force will assume post-war, peacekeeping mandate once transition conditions have been met

OPERATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS (cont.)

- Limaria will assume a neutral stance, in order not to jeopardize the Lower Janga Peace accord with Limaria
- Atropia, Gorgas, and Turkey will continue to provide limited Host Nation support
- The conflict will spark long-standing regional ethnic tension, increasing potential for violations of Human Rights resulting in humanitarian crisis with potential for an additional displacement of internally displaced persons (IDP), further impacting GLOCS/ Main Supply Routes (MSR)

OUTLINE

- The Op Environment
 - JOA, AII, AIR, PIRs
- The Impact of the Op Environment
- Evaluation of the Adversary
- Adversary COAs



ORIENTATION




Located on the Caspian Sea in SW Asia between Ariana and Donovia, Atropia's land area is 86,600 sq km (slightly larger than New Brunswick) and includes the exclave of Atropia Minor and the Lower Janga region.

Atropia's total land boundary is 2,013 kilometers.

Countries bordering Atropia include:

- Limaria (787 kilometers)
- Gorgas (322 kilometers)
- Ariana (432 kilometers)
- Donovia (284 kilometers)





CFLCC AIR includes the country of Gorgas, the entire country of Atropia less the Lower Janga region, plus the northernmost triangle of Ariana

Area of Intelligence Interest (AII)

AII: The AII includes all of the regional nation states with historical, cultural, ethnic, and linguistic ties to the potentially warring states of Atropia and Ariana (JOA +):

- Turkic peoples in the central Asian littoral states surrounding the Caspian Sea, including Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan.
- Hindu-Muslim, Pashtu, and Baluch peoples in the states of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
- The Persian Gulf region, including the Straits of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman.
- Arabic peoples of the Middle Eastern Kingdoms of Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait.
- Iraq, Syria, and Kalaria.
- Indo-European, Indo-Persian, and Turkic peoples in Atropia, Limaria, Gorgas, and Donovia, including autonomous regions.
- The State of Israel.

PIRs


- What are the dispositions, composition, and strength of OSC 2 Integrated Fire Command (IFC) nodes and Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS)?
- What is the strength of the OSC 2 forces (23 DTG, 24 DTG, and 25 DTG)?
- Are there indicators that the 11 DTG, 12 DTG, 13 DTG and/or 92 DTG are reinforcing the 23 DTG or 25 DTG?
- Are there indicators that the SHC or FG intend to employ the strategic or operational reserve?
- What is the disposition and location of the 11 DTG?
- What is the disposition and location of the 12 DTG?
- What is the disposition and location of the 13 DTG?
- What is the disposition and location of the 92 DTG?

PIRs (cont.)

- What routes and border crossing points is Ariana using to sustain its forces in Atropia?
- Have the NODONG-II SSM BNs been moved from their home bases?
- Where are the Ariana SSMs with WMD capability in the AO or within range of it?
- Are there indications the Ariana National Command Authority (NCA) has approved the use of WMD?
- What are the locations of the criminal, insurgent, or SPF elements that are planning to negatively impact CFLCC LOCs within Gorgas and Atropia and do they have that capability?
- Are the Arianians or any non-state actors preparing to commit an action that would trigger a consequence management activity (Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO), loss of WMD accountability, etc.)?

The Impact of the Op Environment


BUILT-UP AREAS



OIL FIELDS




SOCIAL



IDPs

- 700 000 IDPs behind the FEBA resulting from Minarian-Atropian War
- Anticipate AAF to generate IDPs ahead of the FEBA to congest CF LOCs and overwhelm resources
- Anticipate AAF to stay in close proximity to BUAs and LNs IOT enhance survivability through risk of collateral
- AAF will use LNs as human shields in both the defence and offence



Social Demographics

Language

- 90.3% of Atropia speaks Atropian.

Religion

- 90.3% of Atropians are Shia muslim
- Atropia practises a much less extreme version of Shia islam then Ariana
- The northern regions surrounding Baku are the basis of the secularist movement.

Note to Exercise Designers: IDP numbers need to be confirmed relative to the specific scenario you are in


PMESII-PT FACTORS

	ARIANA	ATROPIA
Political	Theocracy: Clerical authority over government structure; Token representative government; Seeking regional dominance; Strong relationship with Limaria; Mutually beneficial unofficial relationship with Donovan; Generally antagonistic relationship with Atropia	Dictatorship: Power belongs to a small, elite group; one family; Looks to the West for support; Sees Ariana, Donovan, and Limaria as threats; US willing to support
Military	Large conventional force: Three standing Armies consisting mostly Tier 2 capabilities with four Separate Army Divisions that are considered to be Tier 1; Most capable military in the region after Donovan; Capable of a wide range of operations	Small army, navy, and air force: Tier 2 conventional forces; Limited offensive capabilities; Tensions much reduced with Limaria over Lower Janga region; Defense of hydrocarbon resources and infrastructure paramount; Two main and several small insurgent groups
Economic	Economy based on petroleum industry: Owns large oil and natural gas reserves; International sanctions depress economy; Relies on Limaria for international trade; Large agricultural sector	Hydrocarbon extraction dependent economy: Owns large oil and natural gas reserves; Political patronage depresses economic growth
Social	Persian Shia Muslim Culture: 51% Persian, 24% Atropian; 77% literacy rate; 1 million IDPs; 70% there over 20 years; 68% of population is urban	Shia Muslim Culture: 89% Shia Muslim; 91% Atropian; 99% literacy rate ; 700,000 IDPs; 52% of population is urban
Information	Tightly controlled information/media environment: Good INFOWAR capabilities; superior in niche areas	Free but monitored information/media environment: Growing INFOWAR capabilities; focus on Limaria and Ariana
Infrastructure	Relatively modern infrastructure: Priority is on nuclear and oil/natural gas programs; International sanctions prevent substantial improvements	Unable to maintain infrastructure: Focus is on oil/natural gas programs; Road system incapable of handling military traffic; Rural areas lack modern water, electricity, and sewage system
Physical Environment	Located in key position on Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz: Faces Caspian Sea; Borders Atropia and Limaria; Rugged mountainous terrain	Vital transportation corridor between east and west: Access to Caspian Sea; Varied terrain
Time	Value planning over deadlines: Uses the Solar, Lunar, and Gregorian (Western) calendars; Harvest cycle is May to August; 4-year election cycle, 6 for president, 8 for Forum of Proficiency; no term limit)	Punctuality not important: Uses Gregorian calendar; Harvest cycle is April to October, depending on climatic zone; 2-year election cycle for legislature, four consecutive-term limit; 6-year presidential cycle, no term limit; Delta time zone, Echo during DST (Mar – Oct

PMESII-PT OPERATIONAL IMPACTS


	ARIANA	ATROPIA
Political	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> As a whole, the country remains suspicious of Western views and wary of Western agendas. The government is committed to the export of the Council of Guardians Revolution and will actively support any group similarly aligned (SAPA) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Extreme elements of Islamic fundamentalism contained. Although Shia Muslim, country practices a more secular, less radicalized version than Ariana No history of liberal government and substantial civil liberties Pending agreement has reduced much of the unfocussed anger over the Lower Janga region (Limaria control)
Military	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Anti-Western rhetoric continues to increase throughout the country, but especially in Ariana's military Ariana's conventional military is capable of a wide range of operations, with the ability to shift from conventional to hybrid and/or adaptive warfare and back 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Atropian military can conduct combat that ranges from conventional to adaptive operations with the ability to fluctuate between both ends of the spectrum.
Economic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ariana will vigorously defend its hydrocarbon industrial infrastructure. National strategy aims to drive global prices upward as part of a favorable conflict cessation strategy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In any regional crisis, Atropia will focus on the defense of its critical hydrocarbon infrastructure, especially its extraction facilities and distribution pipelines
Social	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The belief in the superiority of the Persian culture and faith in Islam will manifest in Arianian soldiers willing to die for their cause. Will reconstitute until 20% combat effective. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pending political agreement over Lower Janga has greatly reduced Atropian's desire to recover its lost territory by force and revenge its previous defeat by Limaria
Information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ariana remains a supple media actor, skilled at crafting INFOWAR messages and is a competent INFOWAR operator with superior capabilities in niche areas 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Atropian media is generally aligned with government and political leaders
Infrastructure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ariana ranks as the world's second-largest gasoline importer, after the US 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Atropian roads do not usually meet Western standards outside of the Baku area and military use is likely induce further strain Many Atropian rural areas lack basic utilities such as running water, electricity, and sewage.
Physical Environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ariana's control of the Strait of Hormuz gives the country political and economic leverage over its Persian Gulf neighbors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Troop movement, though difficult in the mountains, is unhampered in the central lowlands.
Time	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Understanding of the Islamic calendar and its holiday schedule key to taking advantage of its effects on Arianian politicians and military personnel CF may find opportunities to exploit the lackadaisical attitude about time to exploit En's military's decision cycle 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CF must understand and accommodate the different perceptions of time between rural and urban Atropians, as urban dwellers possess a more Western view of time.

KEY TERRAIN



NO	Description	Importance
1	SPOD at POTI, Gorgas	The most viable port to offload equipment and is key to logistics and transportation network along the Black Sea coast. Vital to our operations and a likely target of enemy anti-access measures.
2	Road and rail LOC through mountainous terrain with little or no off road space	Coalition forces will be vulnerable to attack should we not control the terrain that dominates the LOCs. The road/rail lines themselves must be maintained to support ops.
3	Three roads, major airfield complex with restricted terrain nearby, and two rail lines near T'bilisi	These LOCs provide space to move forces and equipment <u>around</u> Tbilisi. The airfields and the routes to the east and Southeast are critical to sustain our operations.
4	The transportation hub with a nearby hydroelectric plant and dam near Mingechaur	Destruction of the dam and reservoir would completely sever ground support in AOs 4 and 5 from our bases in AOs 1 and 2.
5	Dam and crossing site near Akhmedalyar	These two areas provide a road network and a dam (Aras River crossing) in restrictive terrain that provides an avenue of approach to enemy forces approaching from Ariana.
6	Dam and crossing site near BIRMAY	
7	Three bridges; two over the Aras at IMISHLI mishli (39S TE4915) and Saatly (39T TE7325); and one over the KURA near Surra (39T TE8938)	Initially, AN forces will try to seize these bridges intact, but will likely destroy them to disrupt our attack to destroy or expel AN ground forces.
8	Road networks from the West providing access to BAKU. Limited off-road movement terrain causes canalization between the Caspian and inland terrain	This network of roads allows access to BAKU and must be denied to the enemy to protect it.
9	Road networks between PUSHKINO and SALYANY	PUSHKINO and SALYANY will likely be key logistic support areas enabling AN to support efforts toward BAKU.


WEST OF TBILISI – KEY TERRAIN




WESTERN ATROPIA – KEY TERRAIN



HYDROLOGY



ENEMY AVENUES OF APPROACH




Description


ENEMY AVENUES OF APPROACH (cont.)

AA1	BCT (+) Avenue of Approach and follows the coastal road leading out of AN. Once into AP, the terrain opens up allowing larger maneuver formations; however movement W is restricted by a mountainous area and movement directly north is restricted by wetlands / marsh. Once in AP the avenue heads NNW and must bypass several small to medium urban areas, the largest being Lenkoran. At the city of Pushkino the Avenue heads NE towards the Kura River with possible crossing sites near Salyany. After Crossing the Kura river the Avenue continues NE into Baku.
AA2	DIV (+) Avenue of Approach and leads out of the mountains of northern AN, into an area that is unrestricted allowing AN forces to mass prior to crossing in AP. This avenue will cross between the Aras River to the North and the Village of Bilsuvar. Once in AP the Avenue heads E towards the city of Pushkino as movement north is restricted by the Aras River and water obstacles in the flood plain. Once in Pushkino the Avenue merges into Avenue of Approach 1 and follows the same path toward Baku.
AA3	BCT (+) Avenue of Approach and leads west out the northern AN Mountains towards the Gordiz Dam over the Aras rivers. Once across the Aras the Avenue follows the Aras River along the northern side until it reaches the Kura River. At the Kura River the avenue heads east it links up with Avenue of Approach 1 near ALI-BAYRAMLY.
AA3a	BCT (+) Avenue of Approach and begins near Gordiz after crossing the Aras River. The avenue heads NW with the Lower Janga region along the western portion of the Avenue. It must bypass the city of Agdam. Near Agdam the Avenue turns north toward the city of Yevlak.
AA3b	BCT (+) Avenue of Approach and begins near Birmay at the Apex of the AN/AP border. It heads almost exclusive north NW as movement North is restricted by the Kura River and Marsh land near Ghazhabedy. The avenue passes through Ghazhabedy, a city which is large enough to require bypassing. After which the avenue continues NW towards the city of Yevlak.

ENEMY AIR AVENUES OF APPROACH



FRIENDLY FORCES AVENUES OF APPROACH



KEY TERRAIN

- City of Baku
- Limited crossing sites along the Kura, Aras, and Agshu Rivers
- Mountain passes along the Greater Caucasus foothills
- Mingachevir Reservoir Dam

TERRAIN/HYDROLOGY IMPACT

Adversary Impact	Friendly Forces Impact
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lesser Caucasus mountain range will provide limited avenues of approach (AAs) for Arianian forces to reinforce their troops already in southern Atropia. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mountainous relief in the area of operations (AO) will decrease the effectiveness of ground-based COMINT. HUMINT will become an extremely important source of information
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kura River is a natural obstacle that Arianian forces will exploit in the defense. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aerial platforms will be extremely valuable in visual reconnaissance
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crossings over the Aras are essential to Arianian Armed Forces (AN Armed Forces) for lateral movement, reinforcement, and resupply 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Movement out of TAA along the AAs will be to a degree canalized along the Donovan border near the Greater Caucasus
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lesser Caucasus mountain range also provides Arianian forces close terrain in which to stage forces, locate support units and equipment, and will provide good defensive terrain 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reservoirs and the mountain ranges are natural choke points that if exploited by Arianian forces can delay movement.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Restricted routes pose a security threat in that they provide ideal terrain for operations by the Atropian insurgent forces and Arianian SPF
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The northern corridor a Battalion or below corridor until they open up east of the Mingachevir Reservoir where they can support larger formations


TERRAIN/HYDROLOGY IMPACT (cont.)

Adversary Impact	Friendly Forces Impact
	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Central corridor is supported by the following routes: M2 and A23. As with the northern corridor after passing east of the Mingachevir Reservoir, the corridor opens up to support larger formations
	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Most likely air threat ingress and egress routes are dictated by the east-west mountainous terrain. This mountainous terrain provides good camouflage and concealment
	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Cover and concealment in the AO is generally poor in the lowlands, but excellent in mountainous areas, along the canal systems, and in the many urban areas
	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Line of sight is good in the lowlands allowing for maximum standoff firing distance for weapon systems. Fields of fire are excellent along the foothills of the mountain ranges
	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The mountainous area will limit radio communications

HYDROGRAPHY IMPACT

Adversary Impact	Friendly Forces Impact
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The Arianian navy patrols the Persian Gulf and maintains a small, agile contingent on the Caspian Sea	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• As the Caspian Sea's is not linked to the world's oceans, Coalition forces are limited to entering the JOA along Sea Lines of Communication through the Black Sea and subsequently through Gorgas
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The small ships of Ariana's Fourth Naval District will not be impeded by Atropia's coastline and will maintain the capability to destroy oil/natural gas infrastructure in the Caspian Sea or contest the sea LOCs	


ATROPIA CLIMATE



WEATHER/CLIMATE IMPACT

Adversary Impact	Friendly Forces Impact
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Low temperatures will adversely affect troop morale, especially the unprepared and poorly supplied.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Forces may have to accept the cold temperatures in the mountains as they move from Gorgas into Atropia and must be mindful of the off road restrictions caused by snowfalls
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Snow will probably limit off road movement	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Favorable southeastern winds with any man-made obscuration will help conceal wet gap crossings on the Kura-Aras Lowlands
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Heavy snowfalls and frost may close some mountain passes for 3-6 months and force planners to find longer alternate routes	

INSURGENT LOCATIONS



IRREGULAR THREATS

Adversary Impact	Friendly Forces Impact
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The Arianian National Command Authority is clearly already influencing SAPA as a guerilla organization that will fight for Arianian strategic objectives in the area of operations (AO)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• CFLCC cannot expect assistance from any of the insurgent groups in Atropia
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The Arianian Supreme High Command may instruct SAPA to begin a low-level insurgent campaign against the FLJM and any Atropian Armed Forces deployed near the Lower Janga	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The presence of SAPP/SAPA in the southeast portion of Atropia will likely pose a significant problem in cities in that region overrun by Arianian forces
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The possibility exists that SAPA or Arianian Special Purpose Forces will reach out to the LLF with promises of increased autonomy if the LLF will facilitate Arianian operations in Atropia	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• In the Lower Janga, any nearby CFLCC forces should avoid being seen as taking the side of LLF or FLJM
	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The Information Operations campaign will be crucial in managing the perceptions of the various ethnic and religious groups AO

Evaluation of the Adversary

NOTE: Ariana forces in Atropia are currently assessed to be at 65% strength

ARIANA SHC DEPLOYMENTS

FG

T: Defends occupied Atroplan Territory to impose decisive defeat of CF.

P: Defeat of CF will raise Arianian status in the region and set the conditions for Ariana to seize hydrocarbon resources from Atropia once CF have withdrawn from the region.

OSC 2 (ME)

T: Defend occupied territory.

P: To impose decisive defeat of CF.

OSC1(SE)

T1: Defend ARIANAN Border.

P1: Maintain ARIANAN territorial sovereignty.

T2: Support OSC 2 as directed.

P2: Ensure OSC 2's success.

92 MTZDDIV (FG Reserve)

Planning priority to reinforcing OSC 2's attack.

Special Purpose and Guerilla Forces

T: Conduct Special Recon and Direct Action throughout ATROPIA.


P: Degrade enemy critical vulnerabilities.

ARIANA Air Force

Support OSC 2's defense.

ARIANA Navy

Patrol and protect ARIANAN ports.




● Arianan Air Force Airfields ● Arianan Naval Bases

2nd Operational-Strategic Command (2OSC)

Command Relationships

Constituent (*OPCOM*) - - - - -

Supporting (In Support)



Command Relationships

Constituent (OPCOM)

Supporting (In Support)



24th Motorised Division


Command Relationships

Constituent (OPCOM) - - - - -

Supporting (In Support) - . - . - .

24 Motorised
Division

Total Pers:
36,137



Supporting (In Support) - . - . - . .



CBRN THREAT

- Most probable type of WMD OSC2 will use is non-persistent chemical.
- The most probable means of delivery is either SS-26 or SS-21
- Used to delay CF or deny terrain

Chemical

- Enemy forces are known to have a variety of chemical weapons
 - Weapons Grade Mustard/Lewisite Gas (HL)
 - Non-Persistent Nerve Agents (GB)
 - Semi-Persistent Nerve Agents (GD)
 - Persistent Nerve Agents (VX)
- Ariana has the ability to deploy these weapons from any artillery or air unit that uses a tubular launch system (122 mm or larger)

Nuclear threat

- None

Biological Threat

- The current biological threat is Low
- Ariana has anthrax, cholera, plague, smallpox, tularemia, or various types of fevers available for use




SS21- Tochka-U Ballistic Missile Transporter and Launcher



SS26- Russian Ballistic and Cruise Missile Launchers

ANTI-ACCESS/AREA DENIAL



INFORMATION OPERATIONS

- The Government of Ariana will aggressively exploit collateral damage caused by the Coalition. SHC will place some possible High Pay-off Targets in locations that will cause collateral damage if attacked by air or indirect fires
- OSC 2 has the capability to electronically attack non-secure communication nodes to include satellites
- The AN Armed Forces has the capability to conduct localized electronic attack on secure military networks
- The AN Armed Forces does not have the capability to exploit secure signals intercept or secure computer networks
- Arianan Cyber Forces may be colluding with criminal elements to facilitate cyber attacks against Coalition and Atropian forces, and Atropian government and commercial networks

INFORMATION CYBER THREATS

- Utilize covertly placed personnel to infiltrate C2 and HQ units IOT gain access to critical systems.
- Jamming techniques cause loss of communication and non communication data links, disrupt OPTEMPO by loss of GPS, and force CF to use alternative, less secure communications.
- Electronic deception techniques in order to mask enemy unit location and disposition.
- The enemy CANNOT decipher the signal; only intercept it for degrading or jamming purposes.




INTELLIGENCE

- Intelligence collection efforts focus on precision weapons systems, air defense assets, intelligence gathering assets, higher headquarters, artillery, and operational and strategic level forces and their movements
- The enemy will rely heavily on HUMINT and SIGINT to report movement, disposition, and deployment of Coalition forces with emphasis on airfields, command posts, and resupply locations
- SPF are a major source of HUMINT. These teams are deployed at the OSC level and above and will coordinate operations with DTGs
- Satellite imagery is available through commercial sources
- OSC 2 has a RISTA unit as part of its organization and has been task organized with UAS and ground SIGINT assets
- Aerial reconnaissance includes visual observation, aerial imagery, UAS reconnaissance, and signals reconnaissance

LOGISTICS

- OSC 2 will have two main supply routes extending from logistical nodes inside Ariana. The main strategic supply center will be in Ardibil, a city inside Ariana. 3 ISC will operate forward logistical bases near the Shirvan/Hajikabul area where they will be centrally located to support all DTGs

ENEMY AIR BASES AND DISPOSITIONS



THREAT STRENGTHS & WEAKNESSES

- The enemy command, control, communications, and intelligence system is integrated and redundant allowing maximum flexibility and responsiveness
- Enemy has organic engineers at all levels down to and including brigades
- AN Armed Forces has a large number of main battle tanks and AT systems; therefore, it believes it can fight CFLCC forces on a linear battlefield and win
- AN Armed Forces possesses chemical weapons and their doctrine supports first use of this capability
- Arianian SPF and SAPA forces are capable and will conduct attacks against Coalition and Government of Atropia in rear areas
- The training and equipment of the AN Armed Forces, with some exceptions, is below the level of Coalition forces

THREAT STRENGTHS & WEAKNESSES

- Truck-based units lack protected mobility during movement. As a result, they are of limited value for offensive operations. Most of the Anti-tank and mortar systems in these units are towed, severely limiting offensive capability
- The limited crossing sites on the Aras River pose a challenge to resupply and reinforcement of Arianian forces in Atropia
- Most enemy satellite capability is commercial off- the- shelf, or provided by Western nations

STRATEGIC CENTER OF GRAVITY

- **Strategic Center of Gravity**. It is assessed that the Arianians consider their strategic center of gravity the AN Armed Forces. They believe defeat of the Coalition will raise Arianian status in the region and set the conditions for Ariana to seize hydrocarbon resources from Atropia once the Coalition has withdrawn from the region
- **Critical Vulnerabilities**. Include interdiction at key main supply routes (MSRs), bridges, and depots; jamming and destruction of air defense (ADA) assets; and commanders vulnerable to military information support operations (MISO)
- **Critical Requirements**. Include the ability to resupply the force, the ability to command and control (C2) the force, the ability to protect the force, the loyalty of commanders in the field, and sufficient ground forces.

OPERATIONAL CENTER OF GRAVITY

- **Operational Center of Gravity**. It is assessed that the Arianians consider their operational center of gravity as OSC 2. They believe a successful defense in Atropia which imposed a decisive defeat on the Coalition would cause the Coalition to fracture and withdraw
- **Critical Vulnerabilities**. Include aircraft that are not as advanced as the Coalition; Integrated Air Defenses (IAD) that can be jammed or destroyed; bridges, MSRs, and depots that are vulnerable to attack and interdiction; C2 that is vulnerable to jamming; limited satellites; and finite number of assets which if the Arianians over-use them, the operational readiness will degrade
- **Critical Requirements**. Include air support; the ability to protect the force, the ability to resupply the force; the ability to C2 the force; the ability to gather, process, and exploit intelligence; ground maneuver forces; and engineer forces (mobility/counter-mobility/survivability)

TACTICAL CENTER OF GRAVITY

- **Tactical Center of Gravity**. It is assessed that the Arianians consider their tactical center of gravity the 23 DTG defense that either denies or threatens Coalition entry into Atropia from Gorgas
- **Critical Vulnerabilities**. Include the relative ease with which its positions can be located and thus attacked; similarly with routes that can be detected and interdicted; vulnerability to jamming and destruction; logistic bases that can be located and attacked; and easily located artillery systems
- **Critical Requirements**. Include reserves, freedom to maneuver forces, engineer forces (Mobility/Counter-mobility/Survivability), IADs, supply, and fires

Adversary COAs

OSC 2 MOST LIKELY DEFENSE PLAN

Phase 1 (Disrupt CF Deployment)

SPF (ME)

T: Conduct Special Recon and Direct Action throughout ATROPIA and GORGAS.

P: Disrupt CF deployment, deny critical infrastructure and provide INFOWAR opportunities targeting CF cohesion.

23rd DTG (SE)

T: Prepare to defend within sector.

P: Consolidate defensive preparations, including obstacles.

25th DTG (SE)

T: Prepare to defend within sector.

P: Consolidate defensive preparations, including obstacles.

24th DTG (SE)

T: Prepare to defend within sector.

P: Consolidate defensive preparations, including obstacles.

353rd Antitank & 351st Recon BDEs (SE)

T: Guard KURA River crossings.

P: To preserve freedom to maneuver.

349th Tank BTG (SE)

T: OSC2 reserve.

Air Force

T: Conduct Defensive Counter Air, Air Interdiction, and Air Sustainment.

P: Support OSC 2's defense.



OSC 2 MOST LIKELY DEFENSE PLAN

Phase 2 (Disruption Zone Battle)

23rd DTG (ME)

T: Disrupt CF approach using Yevlakh-Parsabad corridor.

P: Destroy CF HVTs to degrade offensive capability.

25th DTG (SE)

T: Disrupt CF approach to potential Kura River crossing sites.

P: Degrade CF water crossing capability.

24th DTG (SE)

T: Prepare to defend within sector.

P: Consolidate defensive preparations, including obstacles.

353rd Antitank & 351st Recon BDEs (SE)

T: Guard Kura and Araks River crossings.

P: To deny CF crossings and preserve freedom to maneuver.

SPF (SE)

T: Conduct Special Recon and Direct Action throughout ATROPIA and GORGAS.

P: Disrupt CF deployment, deny critical infrastructure, destroy CF HVYs and provide INFOWAR opportunities targeting CF cohesion.


349th Tank BTG (SE)

T: OSC2 reserve.

Air Force

T: Conduct Defensive Counter Air, Air Interdiction, and Air Sustainment.

P: Support OSC 2's defense.



OSC 2 MOST LIKELY DEFENSE PLAN

Phase 3 (Main Defense)

23rd DTG (ME)

T: Block Yevlakh-Parsabad corridor.

P: Retain occupied territory.

25th DTG (SE)

T: Block CF Kura River crossings.

P: Retain occupied territory.

24th DTG (SE)

T: Defend within sector.

P: Deny CF approach to Atropia-Ariana border.

353rd Antitank & 351st Recon BDEs (SE)

T: Guard Kura and Araks River crossings.

P: To deny CF crossings and preserve freedom to maneuver.

SPF (SE)

T: Conduct Special Recon and Direct Action throughout ATROPIA and GORGAS.

P: Disrupt CF deployment, deny critical infrastructure, destroy CF HVYs and provide INFOWAR opportunities targeting CF cohesion.

349th Tank BTG (SE)


T: OSC2 reserve. Be prepared to reinforce/counterattack in order of priority 23rd then 25th DTG sectors.

Air Force

T: Conduct Defensive Counter Air, Air Interdiction, and Air Sustainment.

P: Support OSC 2's defense.





OSC 2 MOST DANGEROUS DEFENSE PLAN

Phase 1 (Disrupt CF Deployment)

(No change from Most Likely Defense Plan)

SPF (ME)

T: Conduct Special Recon and Direct Action throughout ATROPIA and GORGAS.

P: Disrupt CF deployment, deny critical infrastructure and provide INFOWAR opportunities targeting CF cohesion.

23rd DTG (SE)

T: Prepare to defend within sector.

P: Consolidate defensive preparations, including obstacles.

25th DTG (SE)

T: Prepare to defend within sector.

P: Consolidate defensive preparations, including obstacles.

24th DTG (SE)

T: Prepare to defend within sector.

P: Consolidate defensive preparations, including obstacles.

353rd Antitank & 351st Recon BDEs (SE)

T: Guard KURA River crossings.

P: To preserve freedom to maneuver.

349th Tank BTG (SE)

T: OSC2 reserve.

Air Force

T: Conduct Defensive Counter Air, Air Interdiction, and Air Sustainment.

P: Support OSC 2's defense.



OSC 2 MOST DANGEROUS DEFENSE PLAN

Phase 2 (Disruption Zone Battle)

(No change from Most Likely Defense Plan)

23rd DTG (ME)

T: Disrupt CF approach using Yevlakh-Parsabad corridor.

P: Destroy CF HVTs to degrade offensive capability.

25th DTG (SE)

T: Disrupt CF approach to potential Kura River crossing sites.

P: Degrade CF water crossing capability.

24th DTG (SE)

T: Prepare to defend within sector.

P: Consolidate defensive preparations, including obstacles.

353rd Antitank & 351st Recon BDEs (SE)

T: Guard Kura and Araks River crossings.

P: To deny CF crossings and preserve freedom to maneuver.

SPF (SE)

T: Conduct Special Recon and Direct Action throughout ATROPIA and GORGAS.

P: Disrupt CF deployment, deny critical infrastructure, destroy CF HVYs and provide INFOWAR opportunities targeting CF cohesion.

349th Tank BTG (SE)

T: OSC2 reserve.

Air Force

T: Conduct Defensive Counter Air, Air Interdiction, and Air Sustainment.

P: Support OSC 2's defense.



OSC 2 MOST DANGEROUS DEFENSE PLAN

Phase 3 (Main Defense)

25th DTG (ME)

T: Accept Kura River crossing of up to two BDEs for destruction in depth engagement areas.

P: Destroy one CF division.

23rd DTG (SE)

T: Block Yevlakh-Parsabad corridor.

P: Retain occupied territory.

24th DTG (SE)

T: Defend within sector.

P: Deny CF approach to Atropia-Ariana border.

353rd Antitank & 351st Recon BDEs (SE)

T: Guard Kura and Araks River crossings.

P: To deny CF crossings and preserve freedom to maneuver.

SPF (SE)

T: Conduct Special Recon and Direct Action throughout ATROPIA and GORGAS.

P: Disrupt CF deployment, deny critical infrastructure, destroy CF HVYs and provide INFOWAR opportunities targeting CF cohesion.

349th Tank BTG (SE)

T: OSC2 reserve. Be prepared to reinforce/counterattack in order of priority 25th then 23rd DTG sectors.

Air Force

T: Conduct Defensive Counter Air, Air Interdiction, and Air Sustainment.

P: Support OSC 2's defense.



OSC 2 MOST DANGEROUS DEFENSE PLAN

Phase 4 (Contermoves)

92nd DTG (ME)

T: Counterattack across the Kura River to sever CF lines of communication and isolate CF Forces to the East.

P: Destroy one CF division.

25th DTG (SE)

T: Destroy CF on the near bank of the Kura River.

P: To restore occupied territory.

23rd DTG (SE)

T: Block Yevlakh-Parsabad corridor.

P: Retain occupied territory.

24th DTG (SE)

T: Defend within sector.

P: Deny CF approach to Atropia-Ariana border.

353rd Antitank & 351st Recon BDEs (SE)

T: Secure Kura River crossings.

P: To facilitate the forward passage of 13th DTG.

SPF (SE)

T: Conduct Special Recon and Direct Action throughout ATROPIA and GORGAS.

P: Disrupt CF deployment, deny critical infrastructure, destroy CF HVYs and provide INFOWAR opportunities targeting CF cohesion.

349th Tank BTG (SE)

T: OSC2 reserve. Be prepared to reinforce/counterattack in order of priority 25th then 23rd DTG sectors.


Air Force

T: Conduct Defensive Counter Air, Air Interdiction, and Air Sustainment.

P: Support OSC 2's defense.



ARIANIAN MOST DANGEROUS BATTLEFIELD ARCHITECTURE



INTELLIGENCE/INFO GAPS

- Current En disposition down to PI level
- Location of obstacles;
- Road/crossing sites suitability;
- Status of wet gaps;
- Flooding projections if Mingchevar Dam is compromised;
- Disposition/strength of SPF in AO;
- Disposition/strength of INS forces in AO;
- En ORBAT down to PI level;
- What En exact equipment is CBRN capable and what are the respective Area of Influence?;

**TAB E (ENEMY FORCES) TO APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE)
TO CFLCC OPORD 07 (UNCLASSIFIED)**

ARIANA SHC Deployments*

FG

T: Defends occupied Atropian Territory to impose decisive defeat of CF.

P: Defeat of CF will raise Arianian status in the region and set the conditions for Ariana to seize hydrocarbon resources from Atropia once CF have withdrawn from the region.

OSC 2 (ME)

T: Defend occupied territory.

P: To impose decisive defeat of CF.

OSC1(SE)

T1: Defend ARIANAN Border.

P1: Maintain ARIANAN territorial sovereignty.

T2: Support OSC 2 as directed.

P2: Ensure OSC 2's success.

92 MTZDDIV (FG Reserve)

Planning priority to reinforcing OSC 2's attack.

Special Purpose and Guerilla Forces

T: Conduct Special Recon and Direct Action throughout ATROPIA.


P: Degrade enemy critical vulnerabilities.

ARIANA Air Force

Support OSC 2's defense.

ARIANA Navy

Patrol and protect ARIANAN ports.



● Arianian Air Force Airfields

● Arianan Naval Bases

OSC 2 Assessed Order of Battle




With Assessed DTG Orders of Battle



2nd Operational-Strategic Command (2OSC)

Command Relationships

Constituent (OPCOM) - - - - -
Supporting (In Support)



Click on the Hyperlink to access the Orbat

25th Mechanised Division (APC)

Command Relationships

Constituent (*OPCOM*)

- - - - -


Supporting (In Support)

- . - . - . -

Mechanised DIV (APC)

Total Pers:

33,198



OSC 2



Most Likely COA

OSC 2 Most Likely Defense Plan

Phase 1 (Disrupt CF Deployment)

SPF (ME)

T: Conduct Special Recon and Direct Action throughout ATROPIA and GORGAS.

P: Disrupt CF deployment, deny critical infrastructure and provide INFOWAR opportunities targeting CF cohesion.

23rd DTG (SE)

T: Prepare to defend within sector.

P: Consolidate defensive preparations, including obstacles.

25th DTG (SE)

T: Prepare to defend within sector.

P: Consolidate defensive preparations, including obstacles.

24th DTG (SE)

T: Prepare to defend within sector.

P: Consolidate defensive preparations, including obstacles.

353rd Antitank & 351st Recon BDEs (SE)

T: Guard KURA River crossings.

P: To preserve freedom to maneuver.


349th Tank BTG (SE)

T: OSC2 reserve.

Air Force

T: Conduct Defensive Counter Air, Air Interdiction, and Air Sustainment.

P: Support OSC 2's defense.



OSC 2 Most Likely Defense Plan

Phase 2 (Disruption Zone Battle)

23rd DTG (ME)

T: Disrupt CF approach using Yevlakh-Parsabad corridor.

P: Destroy CF HVTs to degrade offensive capability.

25th DTG (SE)

T: Disrupt CF approach to potential Kura River crossing sites.

P: Degrade CF water crossing capability.

24th DTG (SE)

T: Prepare to defend within sector.

P: Consolidate defensive preparations, including obstacles.

353rd Antitank & 351st Recon BDEs (SE)

T: Guard Kura and Araks River crossings.

P: To deny CF crossings and preserve freedom to maneuver.

SPF (SE)

T: Conduct Special Recon and Direct Action throughout ATROPIA and GORGAS.

P: Disrupt CF deployment, deny critical infrastructure, destroy CF HVYs and provide INFOWAR opportunities targeting CF cohesion.

349th Tank BTG (SE)

T: OSC2 reserve.

Air Force

T: Conduct Defensive Counter Air, Air Interdiction, and Air Sustainment.

P: Support OSC 2's defense.



OSC 2 Most Likely Defense Plan

Phase 3 (Main Defense)

23rd DTG (ME)

T: Block Yevlakh-Parsabad corridor.

P: Retain occupied territory.

25th DTG (SE)

T: Block CF Kura River crossings.

P: Retain occupied territory.

24th DTG (SE)

T: Defend within sector.

P: Deny CF approach to Atropia-Ariana border.

353rd Antitank & 351st Recon BDEs (SE)

T: Guard Kura and Araks River crossings.

P: To deny CF crossings and preserve freedom to maneuver.

SPF (SE)

T: Conduct Special Recon and Direct Action throughout ATROPIA and GORGAS.

P: Disrupt CF deployment, deny critical infrastructure, destroy CF HVYs and provide INFOWAR opportunities targeting CF cohesion.

349th Tank BTG (SE)

T: OSC2 reserve. Be prepared to reinforce/counterattack in order of priority 23rd then 25th DTG sectors.


Air Force

T: Conduct Defensive Counter Air, Air Interdiction, and Air Sustainment.

P: Support OSC 2's defense.



Arianian Most Likely Battlefield Architecture



OSC 2



Most Dangerous COA

OSC 2 Most Dangerous Defense Plan

Phase 1 (Disrupt CF Deployment)

(No change from Most Likely Defense Plan)

SPF (ME)

T: Conduct Special Recon and Direct Action throughout ATROPIA and GORGAS.

P: Disrupt CF deployment, deny critical infrastructure and provide INFOWAR opportunities targeting CF cohesion.

23rd DTG (SE)

T: Prepare to defend within sector.

P: Consolidate defensive preparations, including obstacles.

25th DTG (SE)

T: Prepare to defend within sector.

P: Consolidate defensive preparations, including obstacles.

24th DTG (SE)

T: Prepare to defend within sector.

P: Consolidate defensive preparations, including obstacles.

353rd Antitank & 351st Recon BDEs (SE)

T: Guard KURA River crossings.

P: To preserve freedom to maneuver.


349th Tank BTG (SE)

T: OSC2 reserve.

Air Force

T: Conduct Defensive Counter Air, Air Interdiction, and Air Sustainment.

P: Support OSC 2's defense.



OSC 2 Most Dangerous Defense Plan

Phase 2 (Disruption Zone Battle)

(No change from Most Likely Defense Plan)

23rd DTG (ME)

T: Disrupt CF approach using Yevlakh-Parsabad corridor.

P: Destroy CF HVTs to degrade offensive capability.

25th DTG (SE)

T: Disrupt CF approach to potential Kura River crossing sites.

P: Degrade CF water crossing capability.

24th DTG (SE)

T: Prepare to defend within sector.

P: Consolidate defensive preparations, including obstacles.

353rd Antitank & 351st Recon BDEs (SE)

T: Guard Kura and Araks River crossings.

P: To deny CF crossings and preserve freedom to maneuver.

SPF (SE)

T: Conduct Special Recon and Direct Action throughout ATROPIA and GORGAS.

P: Disrupt CF deployment, deny critical infrastructure, destroy CF HVYs and provide INFOWAR opportunities targeting CF cohesion.

349th Tank BTG (SE)

T: OSC2 reserve.

Air Force

T: Conduct Defensive Counter Air, Air Interdiction, and Air Sustainment.

P: Support OSC 2's defense.



OSC 2 Most Dangerous Defense Plan

Phase 3 (Main Defense)

25th DTG (ME)

T: Accept Kura River crossing of up to two BDEs for destruction in depth engagement areas.

P: Destroy one CF division.

23rd DTG (SE)

T: Block Yevlakh-Parsabad corridor.

P: Retain occupied territory.

24th DTG (SE)

T: Defend within sector.

P: Deny CF approach to Atropia-Ariana border.

353rd Antitank & 351st Recon BDEs (SE)

T: Guard Kura and Araks River crossings.

P: To deny CF crossings and preserve freedom to maneuver.

SPF (SE)

T: Conduct Special Recon and Direct Action throughout ATROPIA and GORGAS.

P: Disrupt CF deployment, deny critical infrastructure, destroy CF HVYs and provide INFOWAR opportunities targeting CF cohesion.

349th Tank BTG (SE)

T: OSC2 reserve. Be prepared to reinforce/counterattack in order of priority 25th then 23rd DTG sectors.

Air Force

T: Conduct Defensive Counter Air, Air Interdiction, and Air Sustainment.

P: Support OSC 2's defense.



OSC 2 Most Dangerous Defense Plan

**Phase 4 (Contermoves)****92nd DTG (ME)**

T: Counterattack across the Kura River to sever CF lines of communication and isolate CF Forces to the East.

P: Destroy one CF division.

25th DTG (SE)

T: Destroy CF on the near bank of the Kura River.

P: To restore occupied territory.

23rd DTG (SE)

T: Block Yevlakh-Parsabad corridor.

P: Retain occupied territory.

24th DTG (SE)

T: Defend within sector.

P: Deny CF approach to Atropia-Ariana border.

353rd Antitank & 351st Recon BDEs (SE)

T: Secure Kura River crossings.

P: To facilitate the forward passage of 13th DTG.

SPF (SE)

T: Conduct Special Recon and Direct Action throughout ATROPIA and GORGAS.

P: Disrupt CF deployment, deny critical infrastructure, destroy CF HVYs and provide INFOWAR opportunities targeting CF cohesion.


349th Tank BTG (SE)

T: OSC2 reserve. Be prepared to reinforce/counterattack in order of priority 25th then 23rd DTG sectors.

Air Force

T: Conduct Defensive Counter Air, Air Interdiction, and Air Sustainment.


P: Support OSC 2's defense.



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Arianian Air Force Bed Down Locations



Arianan Navy Basing Locations

Fourth Naval District

3rd Coastal Defense Sqn
 12 X SSC-2A
 Amphibious Support Sqn
 6 X POLNOCYN MAASLT
 2 X P-6 PT BOAT
 Arianan Naval Infantry Regt
 1 X SONYA Minesweeper
 4th Patrol Torpedo Boat Sqn
 2 X P-6 PT Boat
 2 X TURYA HYFL
 4th Missile Attack Boat Sqn
 2 x TY 148 FAC
 2 X TY 021 FAC

Second Naval District

2nd Missile Attack Boat Sqn
 3 X TY 021 FAC
 3 X TY 148 FAC
 2nd Coastal Defense Sqn
 12 X SSC-2A
 2nd Patrol Torpedo Boat Sqn
 2 X Turya HYFL
 2nd Missile Attack Boat Sqn
 2 X TY 148 FAC

Third Naval District


1 X KONI
 3rd Patrol Torpedo Boat Sqn
 2 x P-6 PT Boat
 1 X SONYA Minesweeper

First Naval District

1 X Koni Frigate
 2nd Submarine Sqn
 2 x KILO Sub
 4 x FOXTROT Sub
 1st Coastal Defense Sqn
 12 X SSC-2A
 1st Missile Attack Boat Sqn
 4 X TY 021 FAC
 2 X TY 148 FAC
 1st Patrol Torpedo Boat Sqn
 4 X TURYA HYFL
 4 X P-6 PT Boat
 1st Minesweeper Sqn
 4 X SONYA Class


Naval Base – Indian Ocean

1st Submarine Chaser Sqn
 6 X SO-1 ASW
 1st Submarine Sqn
 4 X KILO Sub
 2 x FOXTROT Sub
 3rd Missile Attack Boat Sqn
 2 X TY 021 FAC
 2 X TY 148 FAC




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Recent SA-20 BDE Radar Operating Locations




Big Bird

1 per Brigade
4 Total
300km Range



Tombstone


12 per Brigade
48 Total
300km Range



Giraffe

2 per Brigade
8 Total
100km Range


■ Air Bases
■ Naval Bases



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
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Recent Arianian SA-20 TEL Operation Locations




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Recent Arianian SA-12 BDE EW / TA Radar Operating Locations




Recent Arianian SA-12 Operation Locations



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
Recent Arianian SA-17 BDE EW / TA Radar Operating Locations




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Recent Arianian SA-17 Operation Locations



■ Air Bases
■ Naval Bases






SA-17 Battery
8 TELs
360 Total
45km Range

Radars and TELs are highly mobile. Depictions are of recent operating locations

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Recent Arianian LRAD Operation Locations




Radars and TELs are highly mobile. Depictions are of recent operating locations

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
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Recent Arianian LRAD Operation Locations




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Recent Arianian SS-21 Operating Areas



Radars and TELs are highly mobile. Depictions are of recent operating locations


Recent Arianian SS-26 Operating Areas




Recent Arianian NODONG Operating Areas




SS-21
18 per Brigade
54 Total
Total
120km Range



SS-26
18 per Brigade
36 Total
400km Range



Nodong
18 per Brigade
18 Total
1,200km Range



Radars and TELs are highly mobile. Depictions are of recent operating locations

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

**APPENDIX 2 (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI)) TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO
OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

(U) **References:** Refer to Annex B (Intelligence).

(U) **Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD:** ZULU

1. (U) **Situation**.

a. (U) **Foreign Intelligence and Security Services (FISS)**.

(1) (U) **Threat**. Hostile Intelligence Services (HIS) conventional and irregular forces operating within the CFLCC AO/AI are capable of significant Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection. SPF and /or irregular intelligence operatives may use "third parties" in an attempt to impede, disrupt, and/or degrade friendly operations.

(2) (U) Counterintelligence matters concerning citizens of other countries shall be handled in accordance with existing agreements between the United States (operating as lead nation for Intelligence/Counterintelligence) and each country's respective government.

b. (U) **Friendly**.

(1) (U) **U.S. National Agencies**.

(a) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). CIA provides in-country support in the form of introduction to host-nation security officials, database support, general advice, and assistance. CIA provides strategic, operational, and tactical area intelligence within means and capabilities.

(b) (U) U.S. Department of State (DOS). DOS provides in-country support by providing information regarding known terrorist threats and information on numbers and location of U.S. citizens living/visiting the country.

(c) (U) National Security Agency (NSA). NSA provides Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) support and cryptologic support group to CFLCC, as required, and assists in developing effective electronic warfare strategies while advising the commands of potential losses in intelligence capability.

(2) (U) **Coalition Assets, Agencies and Organizations**

(a) (U) **Dependent upon exercise and supporting National structure**.

(3) (U) **Command CI Structure**.

(a) (U) The CFLCC counterintelligence structure consists of CFLCC, Major Subordinate Commands (MSC), Supporting Commands, Coalition Partners, and other agencies.

(b) (U) CFLCC G-2X coordinates requests for and monitors CI activities of US national agencies and supporting forces to ensure CI coverage within the CFLCC AO.

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(c) (U) CFLCC Counterintelligence Staff Officer (CISO) assists and advises the command by functioning as the Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority (CICA). The CICA conducts liaison with all friendly agencies that have CI capabilities and/or functions in the CFLCC AO. Coordination will ensure receipt of appropriate information required to support this OPORD when executed.

2. (U) **Mission**. Provide for the receipt and dissemination of counterintelligence information in a coordinated and timely manner.

3. (U) **Execution**.

a. (U) **Concept of Operations**. CICA shall summarize the scope and objectives of obtaining and disseminating counterintelligence information in CFLCC.

b. (U) **Procedures**.

(1) (U) Subordinate units will ensure adequate procedures are established in their respective commands.

(2) (U) Except in cases where it is believed they may be mistreated, or where National policy of a Coalition partner differs, ensure hostile forces, paramilitary deserters, defectors, refugees, and similar persons are remanded to host government authorities once initial interview is completed. Combatants shall be segregated from non-combatant evacuees at the earliest time possible based upon situation and circumstances of coming under CFLCC control.

(3) (U) After interrogation by appropriate forces, and where National policy allows, remand internees/detainees to host-nation custody.

(4) (U) Expedite to parent unit for debriefing of captured, missing, or detained personnel returned to friendly control. Essential life-saving or pain reduction medical treatment for those requiring it shall take precedence over debriefing.

(5) (U) Return U.S. deserters to their parent unit for intelligence debriefing.

(6) (U) Submit counterintelligence plans, programs, and projects to TFCICA for review before implementation.

(7) (U) Counterintelligence matters concerning citizens of countries in the Coalition are handled in accordance with existing agreements between the United States and the concerned nation.

c. (U) **Tasks**.

(1) (U) **Counterintelligence Collection and Reporting**.

(a) (U) **Targets**. Priority Information Requirements and a thorough review of available CI reports will determine targets. Targets will include, but are not limited to, personalities (Black, Gray, and White lists), as well as installations, organizations, groups, documents, and materials.

(b) (U) **Priorities**. CFLCC priorities shall take precedence when assigning targets and collection missions. TFCICA shall consider other requests on an individual basis.

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(2) (U) Counterintelligence Analysis and Production.

(a) (U) Investigative Memorandum for Record (IMFR) and Reports of Investigation (ROI) shall be written in conjunction with routine non-critical investigative actions. Initial, interim, and terminal spot reports shall be submitted, as required, for critical non-routine actions.

(b) (U) Subordinate units shall maintain liaison with intelligence agencies in their areas of responsibility to ensure timely receipt and dissemination of counterintelligence information bearing on military operations specified in this plan.

(c) (U) Responsibility of CFLCC is to ensure commanders are advised of available counterintelligence capabilities and resources.

(d) (U) CI operations are coordinated throughout the planning stage with OPSEC staff officer.

(e) (U) Submit CI plans, programs, and projects through TFCICA for review before implementation.

(f) (U) Publications, reports, and communications that contain classified information shall be marked, controlled, transmitted, and safeguarded in accordance with Service Components' security regulations.

(3) (U) Counterintelligence Investigations. All incidents conducted by organizations or personalities directed against U.S. or Coalition forces, which could disrupt operations, and/or activities, shall be investigated.

(4) (U) Counterintelligence Operations. Tactical Exploitation and CI Source Operations. Prepare detailed and coordinated plans for seizure and exploitation of counterintelligence targets. Target lists should include responsibilities for:

- (a) (U) Interrogation of hostile force detainees and defectors;
- (b) (U) Screening indigenous refugees, displaced persons, and detained suspects;
- (c) (U) Debriefing of U.S. or other friendly personnel who evade, escape, or are released from hostile force control; and
- (d) (U) Exploiting captured hostile force documents and materiel.

4. (U) **Sustainment.** Refer to base OPORD and Annex F (Sustainment).

5. (U) **Command and Signal.** Refer to base OPORD and Annex H (Signal).

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

APPENDIX 3 (SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT)) TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(U) References:

- a. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence).
- b. Joint Pub 3-51, Electronic Warfare in Joint Military Operations, 7 April 2000.
- c. DIAM 58-17, Defense Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Requirements Manual, May 2001.
- d. USSID SP0018, Legal Compliance and U.S. Persons Minimization Procedures, 25 Jan 2011

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU

1. (U) **Situation**. This appendix provides a general statement of responsibility and planning guidance for the use of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) resources.
2. (U) **Mission**. SIGINT organizations and forces conduct collection activities to satisfy intelligence needs of CFLCC through all phases of Op IRON GUARDIAN.
3. (U) **Execution**.
 - a. (U) **Concept of Operations**.
 - (1) (U) Conduct cryptologic operations in accordance with the above references.
 - (2) (U) Commence SIGINT operations in support of preparation and employment into the CFLCC AO.
 - b. (U) **Responsibilities**.
 - (1) (U) **CFLCC G-2**.
 - (a) (U) Determine intelligence staffing requirements.
 - (b) (U) Coordinate Liaison Officer (LNO) and personnel requirements between the subordinate units, Coalition partners and the Analysis and Control Element (ACE).
 - (c) (U) Prepare a SIGINT summary every 24 hours.
 - (d) (U) Conduct emitter mapping and relay information to the DCGS-A architecture within 15 minutes of receipt.
 - (e) (U) Responsible for intelligence oversight and must:
 1. (U) Safeguard the rights and privacy of U.S. persons in accordance with USSID SP0018, Executive order 12333, Department of Defense 5240.1-R, Classified Annex, NSA/CSS Policy 1-23, National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) 6, as well as relevant Signals Intelligence Directives (SID), policies, and intelligence oversight in all operations involving collection processing, dissemination, and retention of SIGINT.

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX B TO OPOD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

2. (U) Ensure Chain of Command and command staff awareness of intelligence oversight for SIGINT operations.

3. (U) Provide required annual, periodic, or special intelligence oversight training to all SIGINT personnel.

4. (U) Report, upon recognition, incidents of non-compliance of Executive Order 12333, as amended, or USSID SP0018.

5. (U) Coordinate with the Army Technical Control and Analysis Element (TCAE) for access to National Security Agency (NSA)/Central Security Service (CSS) managed databases.

6. (U) Ensure the unit handles SIGINT as required by policy and guidance provided by NSA/CSS and Army oversight.

7. (U) Ensure SIGINT information is not disseminated outside of SIGINT reporting channels or the SIGINT production chain and that SIGINT technical or production information is not shared except by established procedures.

(f) (U) Review the information needs (IN) for the Area of Operations (AO) and respond to those INs and other advisory taskings.

(g) (U) Collect, record, decrypt, and analyze target signals IAW applicable USSID management directives.

(h) (U) Conduct time-sensitive reporting and analytical collaboration of previously unevaluated and non-disseminated SIGINT. The SIGINT section may issue the following reports as delegated by NSA:

1. (U) KLEIGHTS (KL), Tactical Reports (TACREP), and Tactical ELINT Reports (TACELINT) in accordance with (IAW) USSID 1500.

2. (U) Report distress signals in accordance with USSID CR1521.

(i) (U) Notify command and National Security Operations Center (NSOC) of an immediate threat to national security that requires presidential attention.

(2) (U) Subordinate Units.

(a) (U) Deploy SIGINT collection teams.

(b) (U) Deploy assets to provide SIGINT mission management, collection, processing, analysis, and reporting; EAC high frequency direction finding; and to establish communications with theater subscribers.

(c) (U) Identify and allocate collection teams to maximize collection capabilities.

(d) (U) Establish TROJAN SPIRIT II connectivity.

(e) (U) Report the employment, targets, and status of assigned SIGINT assets to CFLCC.

(f) (U) Report all TACREPs and TACELINTs to CFLCC and to National Databases within 10 minutes of identification.

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(g) (U) Send an equipment status report every 12 hours to CFLCC and the appropriate overseers.

(h) (U) Prepare a SIGINT Summary every 24 hours to CFLCC.

(i) (U) Prepare Informal Technical Notes that answer commander's priority intelligence requirements and submit to higher commands as appropriate.

c. (U) Coordinating Instructions.

(1) (U) National signal intelligence support requirements and advisory tasking of SIGINT collection assets shall be coordinated through CFLCC ACE Chief.

(2) (U) Monitor and report via Satellite Communication (SATCOM), Digital Secure Voice Terminal (DSVT), organic communications, or National Security Agency Time Sensitive System (NTSS).

4. (U) **Sustainment.** Procedures for specialized technical logistics support to be published by the Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA) in coordination with Chief, Central Security Service (CHCSS).

5. (U) **Command and Signal.**

a. (U) The National Security Agency shall continue to exercise SIGINT Operational Tasking Authority (SOTA) over the SIGINT assets until SOTA is delegated to CFLCC.

b. (U) Communications Systems.

(1) (U) The cryptologic communications architecture shall include:

(a) (U) Defense Special Security Communications Systems (DSSCS).

(b) (U) Ultra High Frequency (UHF) SATCOM.

(c) (U) Digital Secure Voice Terminal (DSVT).

(d) (U) Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications Systems (JWICS), including Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) capability.

(e) (U) Top Secret Sensitive Compartmented Information Keyed STU-III.

(f) (U) AUTODIN/GENSER record message traffic.

(g) (U) National Security Agency Time Sensitive System (NTSS). The National Security Agency shall establish the requirements for telecommunications support to the signals intelligence resources designated to support this OPORD.

(h) (U) Integrated Broadcast Service – Simplex.

(i) (U) Integrated Broadcast Service – Interactive.

(2) (U) The SIGINT section has access to the following communications networks:

(a) (U) JWICS.

(b) (U) NSA Network (NSANet).

(c) (U) Single Source Workstation (SSWS).

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

- (d) (U) SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).
 - (e) (U) Non-Classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET).
 - (f) (U) NSA/CSS Secure Telephone System (NSTS).
 - (g) (U) Defense Switched Network (DSN).
 - (h) (U) Secret and Top Secret Voice Over Internet Protocol (SVOIP/TSVOIP)
- (3) (U) Coalition Networks as applicable.

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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

APPENDIX 4 (HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT)) TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(U) **References:** Refer to Annex B (Intelligence).

(U) **Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD:** ZULU

1. (U) **Situation.**

a. (U) Refer to base OPORD.

b. (U) Assumptions.

(1) (U) HUMINT uses humans as both sources and collectors of intelligence information. It includes, but is not limited to, the gathering of foreign intelligence information through observation, elicitation, exploitation, debriefing or the acquisition of material and documents.

(2) (U) HUMINT assets will be employed by national collectors and **ARFOR** elements before and during execution of this OPORD.

(3) (U) All HUMINT operations conducted by CFLCC personnel are directed and coordinated by the CFLCC Chief, HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC). (Refer to Tab A (HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC) of this appendix.)

2. (U) **Mission.** HUMINT organizations and forces shall conduct collection activities to satisfy intelligence needs of CFLCC.

3. (U) **Execution.**

a. (U) Organization.

(1) (U) Elements of HUMINT organizations assigned to, or OPCON to CFLCC and its subordinate units before and during this operation are tasked to collect information in response to Information Operations (IOs), Operations Directives (ODs), and Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs).

(2) (U) Specific language qualifications and technical skills will be identified to the CJ-2 and the CJ-2X.

b. (U) Concept of Operations. Overt and clandestine HUMINT operations will be managed through CJ-2 and CJ-2X channels.

c. (U) Tasks.

(1) (U) Subordinate units will ensure that information derived from HUMINT operations is reported through channels to CFLCC CJ-2X.

(2) (U) Exploitation of EPW/civilian detainees (DETs) and debriefing of refugees (Refer to Tab B (Enemy Prisoner War/Civilian Detainees) of this appendix):

(a) (U) To ensure maximum intelligence exploitation, subordinate units shall prepare plans and procedural instructions required for the screening, identification, segregation, and treatment of detainees, apprehended agents, defectors, and inhabitants.

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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(b) (U) Exploitation of detainees shall be coordinated with counterintelligence, psychological operations, and other detainee exploitation operations.

(c) (U) All interrogations will be conducted according to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. All detainees shall be accorded humane treatment and interrogations shall not interfere with necessary medical treatment.

(d) (U) Within 48 hours, the extent of the source's knowledge of priority intelligence information shall be determined and reported to CJ-2X and CJ-2, HOC.

(3) (U) Captured Documents.

(a) (U) Subordinate units shall develop procedural instructions to ensure documents are expeditiously processed, exploited for their tactical intelligence value, and subsequently evacuated to the appropriate echelon that can fully exploit them.

(b) (U) Technical documents of material design shall be evacuated with the equipment or with photographs of the equipment when possible.

(4) (U) Captured Materiel.

(a) (U) Subordinate units shall develop procedural instructions to ensure that acquired foreign materiel is properly protected and fully exploited by qualified personnel.

(b) (U) Procedures shall be established to turn over captured weapons, munitions, documents, and equipment that are not required for further exploitation to the host government.

(5) (U) Provide support to and maintain mutual activities with other US and Coalition intelligence collection activities such as Measurement and Signature Intelligence and Signals Intelligence. Coordination between HUMINT and other intelligence collection activities will be conducted in order to utilize a multi-discipline approach to intelligence collection. All intelligence collection activities will be coordinated with the CFLCC collection manager.

(6) (U) Debriefing of Returnees.

(a) (U) Subordinate units will conduct an intelligence debriefing of military personnel upon their return to National control.

(b) (U) Debriefings will be conducted in accordance with survival, evasion, resistance and escape (SERE) regulations.

(c) (U) Intelligence debriefings of returnees must be in coordination with SERE/ Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) and CI personnel, pending National approval.

(d) (U) Coalition personnel will be debriefed by appropriate SERE/CI personnel from the allied soldier's country.

(7) (U) Requirements and Reporting.

(a) (U) Upon execution of this OPORD, HUMINT organizations shall submit their acquisition of material and documents plans to the CFLCC CJ-2X.

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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(b) (U) HUMINT reports will be prepared and forwarded through HUMINT channels in Intelligence Information Reports (IIR) format. Reports of immediate tactical value shall be in SALUTE format and sent to CFLCC subordinate units.

(c) (U) CFLCC will validate all HUMINT requirements within the AO.

(d) (U) Requirements for validation shall be nominated through collection management channels.

d. (U) Coordination. HUMINT liaison with the Atropian and/or Gorgan government or military is the responsibility of the CFLCC CJ-2X.

4. (U) **Sustainment**.

a. (U) Transportation. Transportation requirements for HUMINT personnel are the responsibility of the supported command.

b. (U) Billeting. Billeting requirements for HUMINT personnel in support of the OPORD are the responsibility of the supported command.

c. (U) Clothing. CFLCC HUMINT personnel are not authorized to use civilian clothing except when it is deemed advantageous to the mission and only within areas in control of CFLCC forces. The CFLCC CJ-2 is the approval authority for exceptions to this policy. All other HUMINT personnel operating in support of this operation will comply with the clothing policies of their organizations.

d. (U) Equipment. Equipment requirements for HUMINT teams are the responsibility of the supporting command IAW National policy. HUMINT teams will be issued the equipment required in order to accomplish their military mission IAW National TO&E, e.g. automation systems, communication devices, etc.

e. (U) Operational or Contingency Funds. These will be managed in accordance with authorized accounting procedures as outlined by existing regulations and National caveats.

5. (U) **Command and Signal**. Refer to base OPORD and Annex H (Signal).

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ATTACHMENTS:

Tab A – HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC)

Tab B – Interrogation and Debriefing

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TAB A TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

TAB A (HUMINT OPERATIONS CELL (HOC)) TO APPENDIX 4 (HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT)) TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(U) References:

Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 07 (Op IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC.

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU

1. (U) **Purpose.** To coordinate Human Intelligence (HUMINT) operations in the CFLCC AO. HUMINT organizations and forces will conduct collection activities to satisfy the intelligence needs of CFLCC.

2. (U) **HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC) Responsibilities.**

a. (U) Direct and coordinate the activities of interrogators/debriefers assigned and/or attached to Joint Intelligence Debriefing Cells (JIDCs) within the CFLCC AO.

b. (U) Coordinate closely with CFLCC Counterintelligence, CFLCC nations and with the CJSOTF to maximize collection opportunities and to minimize duplication between counterintelligence, Special Operations Forces (SOF), and HUMINT operations.

c. (U) Establish and maintain a requirements and reports element to manage requirements for tasking on collectors in the CFLCC AO; expedite the preparation and dissemination of intelligence information reports (IIR) (Counterintelligence, Force Protection, and HUMINT) to consumers at all appropriate levels. National-level tasking of CFLCC HUMINT collection elements is through channels established by CFLCC.

d. (U) Coordinate CFLCC HUMINT support to document exploitation with the Joint Document Exploitation Center (JDEC).

e. (U) Coordinate CFLCC HUMINT support to foreign material exploitation activities with CFLCC's Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center (JCMEC).

f. (U) Coordinate HUMINT operations with Unconventional Warfare, Psychological Operations, Evasion and Escape, Deception Operations, and other elements of Information Operations (IO).

g. (U) **Required Liaisons.**

(1) (U) National Intelligence Support Team (NIST).

(2) (U) US Defense Attaché Offices (USDAOs), other Department of Defense (DoD) HUMINT activities, and non-DoD HUMINT elements in the CFLCC AO.

(3) (U) Coalition and Atropian military HUMINT elements in CFLCC AO to de-conflict HUMINT activities particularly with 4 MND, and, if in the US national interest, establish bilateral operations.

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**TAB A TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON
GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

(4) (U) Coordinate HUMINT support to Document Exploitation (DOCEX) and foreign material exploitation activities with the CFLCC JCMEC.

h. (U) HOC Composition and Organization.

(1) (U) The HOC is under the direction of the CFLCC CJ-2X. The HOC is usually composed of 10 individuals in the following positions, grades, and MOSs (proposed).

Position	Grade	MOS
OIC x 1	O-4	35F
Deputy OIC x 1	CW4	351M
NCOIC x 1	E-8	35M
Shift Lead x 2	CW2/CW3	351M
HUMINT NCOs x 2	E-5/E-6/E-7	35M
Intel Analyst x 3	E-3/E-4	35F

(2) (U) Specific personnel language qualifications and technical skills shall be identified to support the HOC, if required.

i. (U) Miscellaneous. CFLCC will manage Intelligence Contingency Funds (ICF) to support national HUMINT collection activity in accordance with applicable policies and directives.

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**TAB B TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON
GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

**TAB B (ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR (EPW)/CPERS INTERROGATION &
DEBRIEFING) TO APPENDIX 4 (HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT)) TO ANNEX B
(INTELLIGENCE) TO CFLCC OPORD 07**

(U) **References:** Nil.

(U) **Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD:** ZULU

1. (U) **Purpose.** To establish general policies and procedures governing interrogation/debriefing of hostile force and other detained personnel and the relationships among the participants in the process. Upon execution, CFLCC will establish a Joint Documentation Exploitation Center (JDEC) and a Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center (JCMEC).

2. (U) **Organization.**

a. (U) 16 MP BDE is responsible to conduct detention operations in order to maintain care, custody, and control of enemy combatants and segregate them from the battlefield. 16 MP BDE will plan for the establishment of the CFLCC Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW)/Captured Personnel (CPERS) Holding Area, and coordinate other EPW/CPERS Holding Area requirements through the CFLCC Provost Marshal that will include facilities and logistics support for a collocated Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC). The JIDC provides the CFLCC AO collection and reporting of tactical intelligence information obtained through the interrogation and debriefing of EPW/CPERS and other human sources.

b. (U) Upon execution of this OPORD, each Division is responsible for establishing a Div-level Detainee Holding Area (DHA) for EPW/CPERS in its AO.

3. (U) **Procedures.**

a. (U) Hostile Force Detainees (EPW/CPERS, Civilian Internees, and Inhabitants (CIVIN)). To ensure maximum intelligence exploitation, subordinate units shall prepare plans and procedural instructions required for the screening, identification, segregation, and treatment of all manner of detainees, apprehended agents, defectors, and inhabitants.

(1) (U) All interrogations shall be conducted according to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. All detainees shall be accorded humane treatment and interrogations will not interfere with necessary medical treatment.

(2) (U) Within 48 hours, the extent of the source's knowledge of priority intelligence information shall be determined and reported through CFLCC G-2X to the Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF).

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**TAB B TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON
GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

(3) (U) Subordinate units shall locate interrogation teams at detainee collection points (DCPs), airfields, ports, and facilities throughout the JOA. These tactical interrogation teams shall:

(a) (U) Screen detainees and other personnel to identify those suitable for interrogation and exploitation on matters of immediate tactical interest.

(b) (U) Conduct tactical interrogations of detainees based on the intelligence requirements of the tactical commander.

(c) (U) Prepare and disseminate interrogation reports.

(d) (U) Identify detainees for further interrogation and exploitation at higher echelons.

(4) (U) Detainees will be divided into intelligence categories at the initial interrogation or screening. Assigned categories are not permanent and may be changed at higher echelons.

(a) (U) Category "A". High level detainees whose broad or specific knowledge of immediate tactical, psychological, or strategic information makes it necessary for them to be interrogated without delay by specially qualified interrogators at the highest echelon.

(b) (U) Category "B". Detainees who have enough information about the hostile force or any subject of intelligence value that warrant a second interrogation.

(c) (U) Category "C". Detainees who only have information of an immediate tactical value and do not warrant a second interrogation.

(d) (U) Category "D". Detainees who are of no interest to intelligence.

(5) (U) Subordinate units' screening and debriefing shall be accomplished in coordination with tactical, Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Counterintelligence (CI), Military Information Support Operations (MISO), and Civil Affairs (CA) elements to satisfy their collection requirements.

(6) (U) Detaining forces will attach capture tags to detainees which provide the following information:

(a) (U) Identification of detaining unit,

(b) (U) Geographic location,

(c) (U) Date and time of detention, and

(d) (U) Circumstances.

(7) (U) To provide higher echelon support for the collection and reporting of intelligence information through interrogation and exploitation of detainees and other sources, CFLCC, with augmentation and support from all subordinate units and national elements, shall establish JIF and Mobile JIF debriefing teams. The principal task of the JIF shall be detailed and intensive debriefings on a joint service and/or a combined forces basis, of selected Category "A" detainees. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/Department of HUMINT Services shall augment interrogators at the JIF and other centers and migrant camps as needed.

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**TAB B TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON
GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

Mobile JIF debriefing teams shall be available to carry out the following missions upon request from subordinate units:

(a) (U) Assist in screening and identification of sources at lower echelons for exploitation at the JIF,

(b) (U) Conduct debriefings for tactical information to satisfy area of responsibility and multi-national requirements,

(c) (U) Conduct debriefings for strategic information to satisfy area of responsibility and multi-national requirements,

(d) (U) Support Foreign Positive Intelligence (FPI) and foreign Counterintelligence (FCI) operations,

(e) (U) Debrief captured, detained, and other U.S. personnel released or escaped from hostile force control, and

(f) (U) Prepare and disseminate debriefing reports.

(8) (U) A Debriefing Serial Number (DSN) shall be used by subordinate units to identify detainees who are debriefed. A DSN shall be allocated to each detainee by his or her initial interrogator. Only one DSN shall be allocated to each detainee. DSNs shall be noted on the initial and all subsequent detainee debriefing reports. DSNs shall be composed as follows:

(a) (U) Two letters indicating the subordinate unit or hostile force to which the detainee belongs:

1. (U) Paramilitary – PM

2. (U) Irregular – IR

(b) (U) Four digits to designate the initial debriefing team:

1. (U) 1ID 1000 through 1999

2. (U) 4 MND 2000 through 2999

3. (U) 82 ABN DIV 3000 through 3999

4. (U) 3 CAV 4000 through 4999

5. (U) 66 MIB 5000 through 5999

6. (U) 75 FAB 6000 through 6999

7. (U) 360 CAB 7000 through 7999

8. (U) 16 MP 8000 through 8999

9. (U) Other CFLCC units 9000 through 9999

(c) (U) U.S. Army Regulation 525-100 defines the detainee designation system in further detail and shall be used by subordinate units.

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**TAB B TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON
GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

- (9) (U) Distribution of subordinate unit debriefing and spot reports shall be as follows:
- (a) (U) One copy to detaining subordinate unit to assist with further screenings and debriefings,
 - (b) (U) One copy to CFLCC, and
 - (c) (U) One copy evacuated with the detainee.
- (10) (U) The JIF shall submit its reports in Intelligence Information Report (IIR) Format as described in DIAM 58-11 (S//NF). Distribution of JIF reporting shall be as proscribed in the manual, but at a minimum, the following organizations shall be on the distribution list:
- (a) (U) CFLCC G-2,
 - (b) (U) Each subordinate CFLCC unit, and
 - (c) (U) One copy to other forces, as required.
- b. (U) Civilians. The initial interrogations of detained civilians shall be accomplished concurrently with medical treatment consistent with the situation and the significance or perishability of the information. The scope of the debriefing should be limited to obtaining information of immediate tactical significance and information concerning Coalition personnel detained by hostile forces.

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APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

**APPENDIX 5 (GEOSPATIAL INTELLIGENCE (GEOINT)) TO ANNEX B
(INTELLIGENCE) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

(U) References:

Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 07 (Op IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC.

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU

1. (U) Situation.

a. (U) Enemy Forces. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence).

b. (U) Friendly. The following organizations provide Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) support to CFLCC and its subordinate units.

(1) (U) US National Agencies. Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) will be used to the fullest extent.

(2) (U) CJTF-OIG 416 ENCOM. 70 Engineer Company (Topo) is available to provide theater-level geospatial support.

(3) (U) CFLCC.

(a) (U) CFLCC has Medium Range UASs to provide tactical imagery intelligence (IMINT).

(b) (U) The combat divisions of CFLCC have both long range and tactical UAS's to provide tactical IMINT.

2. (U) Mission. CFLCC G-2 establishes GEOINT tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and secondary imagery product and dissemination instructions for CFLCC and its subordinate commands. In coordination with the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and partners, CFLCC G-2 will develop, maintain, and sustain a flexible GEOINT architecture to meet collection efforts in the CFLCC AO.

3. (U) Execution.

a. (U) Concept of Operations for GEOINT Collection, Processing, and Production.

(1) (U) The Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE) conducts GEOINT fusion.

(2) (U) Collection Management & Dissemination (CM&D) coordinates day to day control of GEOINT tasking.

(3) (U) CFLCC G-2 through the CM&D will request, allocate, or assign GEOINT platforms based on the CFLCC Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) and collection requests from subordinate units.

(4) (U) Neither Gorgas nor Atropia will be able to provide any host nation GEOINT support.

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APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

b. (U) Types of GEOINT data and products.

(1) (U) Full Motion Video (FMV) obtained by CFLCC forces will be posted on an URL by CFLCC JISE.

(2) (U) Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program (TENCAP) imagery will be available IAW most current Defense Intelligence Agency Manual (DIAM).

(3) (U) Moving Target Indicator (MTI)/NATO Imagery will be made available IAW most current DIAM.

(4) (U) Reconnaissance Exploitation Report (RECCEXREP) will be forwarded and/or generated by CFLCC JISE.

c. (U) Employment.

(1) (U) National. IAW guidance from CFLCC G-2 Collection Manager.

(2) (U) CFLCC Assets. IAW guidance from CFLCC G-2 Collection Manager.

(3) (U) Interoperability. The geographic datum used in support of OPORD 07 is WGS84.

d. (U) Geospatial Engineering Activities:

(1) (U) Generate, manage, analyze, and disseminate accurate GEOINT that is tied to some portion of the earth's surface.

(2) (U) Provide mission-tailored data, tactical decision aids (TDAs), and visualization products that enable the commander and staff to visualize the area of operations.

(3) (U) Provide the foundation for developing shared situational awareness, improve understanding of capabilities and limitations for friendly forces (as well as the adversary), and highlight other conditions of the AO.

(4) (U) Employ the resources of the organic Geospatial Team to develop and distribute near real-time tactical decision products and terrain/weather affects visualization products to support planning, military decision-making, and the execution of operations.

e. (U) Tasks.

(1) (U) Review incoming requests to ascertain if GEOINT could assist in satisfying the supported unit's Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFIs).

(2) (U) Obtain target and en-route METT-TC conditions that will influence sensor selection and/or collection asset utilization. Identify both theater and national collection assets and supporting systems and how and when employed.

(3) (U) National Technical Means (NTM) and Commercial. CFLCC G-2 CM&D will submit NTM requirements through the GEOINT Information Management System (GIMS).

(4) (U) Subordinate units will report any long term shortfall in processing and exploitation capability to CFLCC G-2.

(5) (U) Determine the best source of GEOINT (NTM, Airborne, or Commercial) and best GEOINT strategy to satisfy the supported unit's requirement.

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APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(a) (U) End of Mission Reports (EOMs). Combat Divisions and CFACC will submit EOMs using Jabber Chat on the UAS web portal provided by CFLCC either upon completion of mission (to include relief on station) or upon change of mission commander for UASs that are direct support (DS) to the Division/CFACC.

(b) (U) Combat Divisions and CFACC will immediately notify the CFLCC JISE when a GEOINT asset or one of their subordinate elements answers a CFLCC PIR.

f. (U) Coordinating Instructions.

(1) (U) Collection requirements will be maintained within CFLCC JISE for synchronization and tasking with other intelligence disciplines.

(2) (U) Subordinate units are responsible for submitting Collection Plans for IMINT platforms 24 hours prior to arrival of assets in theater and 72 hours in advance thereafter.

(3) (U) Subordinate units are authorized to request a UAS diversion across command. Dynamic re-tasking of an UAS asset is at the discretion of the mission commander or CFLCC JISE Chief. CFLCC G-2 will be copied on all requests for diversion.

(4) (U) Immediate requests for all other GEOINT assets will be sent to CFLCC JISE Chief.

4. (U) Sustainment.

a. (U) Logistics. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment).

b. (U) Supply and Storage. Refer to the most current DIAM.

(1) (U) Procedures for acquiring geospatial products. Refer to the most current DIAM.

(2) (U) Type and quantity of products held by the command's units and agencies. (Refer to the most current DIAM.)

(3) (U) Intra-theater Distribution Plan. Refer to the most current DIAM.

c. (U) Reporting.

(1) (U) CFLCC GEOINT section is responsible for responsive and timely reporting and dissemination of IMINT collection results and updated Geospatial Information. A copy of all reports will be forwarded to CJFLC G-2.

(2) (U) The CFLCC GEOINT section will produce Imagery Interpretation Reports (IIR) via the Imagery Exploitation Support System (IESS) as directed by the CFLCC Imagery Requirements Manager. Primary reporting formats:

(a) (U) In-flight Report.

(b) (U) Mission Report.

(c) (U) RECCEXREP.

(d) (U) Initial Photographic Interpretation Report (IPIR).

(e) (U) Supplemental Photographic interpretation Report (SUPIR).

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APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

d. (U) Dissemination.

(1) (U) All GEOINT products will be reviewed for quality and classification prior to being uploaded to the designated URL. Classification of the Secondary Imagery Products must be coordinated with the CFLCC Classification Authority.

(2) (U) CFLCC JISE is responsible for disseminating imagery products produced by organic assets to the originating requester and any other organization that requires the product.

5. (U) Command and Signal.

a. (U) If collection is not being satisfied as specified in the daily requirements, contact CFLCC JISE Collection Manager.

b. (U) Communications. Automated Data Processing Systems Requirements.

(1) (U) Subordinate elements will ensure that “Windows Media Player” v10 is uploaded on devices intended to receive FMV.

(2) (U) MTI will be pushed to Joint Surveillance, Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) Common Ground Stations (CGS) at the “SECRET NOFORN” level.

(3) (U) TENCAP will publish GEOINT images.

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APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

**APPENDIX 7 (OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE (OSINT)) TO ANNEX B
(INTELLIGENCE) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

(U) References:

Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 07 (Op IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC.

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU

1. **(U) Situation**. Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is an essential and critical component in intelligence analysis and operational support. It is the most fundamental and expeditious means of satisfying basic informational needs. Its unclassified nature encourages and enables information sharing across all agencies.

2. **(U) Mission**. Refer to base OPORD.

3. **(U) Execution**.

a. **(U) Scheme of OSINT Support**.

(1) (U) The CFLCC OSINT program is a component of the G-2 JISE All Source Team.

(2) (U) The CFLCC OSINT program is managed by the G-2 who is responsible for the planning and coordination of OSINT products. The G-2 ensures the CFLCC Commander and subordinate unit commanders are provided with timely, mission relevant and regionally focused open source information, assessments, and products.

(3) (U) OSINT Information is derived from, but not limited to, traditional and non-traditional publicly available domestic and foreign published hard and soft copy information, broadcast media, grey literature, and internet.

b. **(U) Tasks to Staff**.

(1) (U) G-2 OSINT executes operations at the CFLCC Main in order to facilitate coordination with the CFLCC staff sections responsible for Inform and Influence Activities.

(2) (U) CFLCC OSINT updates will supplement other collection disciplines.

(3) (U) CFLCC CJ-2 OSINT will provide a report every six hours.

(4) (U) The reports will be published and disseminated at times TBD and will be located on the CFLCC Tactical **SIPR Sharepoint Portal in the Intelligence Warfighting Function tab**.

4. **(U) Sustainment**. Refer to base OPORD and Annex F (Sustainment).

5. **(U) Command and Signal**. Refer to base OPORD and Annex H (Signal).

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ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

ANNEX C (OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(U) Reference:

CFLCC OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) Base Order (enter date)

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu.

1. (U) **Situation.** No change from base order.
2. (U) **Mission.** CFLCC conducts decisive counter-moves and offensive operations to clear all Arianian forces from Atropian sovereign territory.
3. (U) **Execution.** Given that the AN Armed Forces are a near peer, force ratios facing the LCC are a challenge.

a. (U) Therefore, in addition to that information contained in para 3a of the base order, it is important for Commanders to note three aspects of Op IRON GUARDIAN that I have underscored as follows:

(1) (U) **Deception.** A clear understanding and timely execution of the planned deception tasks found at Appendix 2 to Annex C will be fundamental to the achievement of our mission. We need to remind ourselves that the sum of the available AN ground forces, should they be committed against the LCC, would jeopardize our success. It is imperative that the enemy misread our main effort and scheme of maneuver so he is committing resources where they will not have a decisive effect. Refer to Appendix 14 of this annex for further detail.

(2) (U) **Air and Aviation.** The Commander CJTF-OIG has been clear in stating that his center of gravity is the Coalition's air power. My center of gravity, as already stated, is our attack helicopter forces. Again this comes back to a near peer competitor and difficult force ratios. Not only do we need the CFACC to achieve air superiority over our AO but we need him to significantly attrit the enemy. Commanders should be prudent in their tasking of these precious resources.

(3) (U) **Risk versus Audacity.** I expect all commanders to assume risks of varying degrees during the execution of their missions. I also embrace the notion of commanders who lead with audaciousness. Having said this, commanders will need to balance both of these tenets wisely in the prosecution of their plans. We will use mission command but Commanders are expected to give me accurate and informed reports on their actions, both present and future.

b. (U) **Air Operations.** As the main effort for this phase of the CJTF-OIG plan, the CFLCC will enjoy the largest apportionment of air that is available within the JOA. Op IRON GUARDIAN assumes that local air superiority will be achieved over our forces by D Day and thereafter. If the enemy re-establishes air parity for a limited period of time, we should expect the CFACC to prioritize re-achieving air superiority and the LCC doing with less CAS and AI. See Appendix 7 to this annex.

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ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

- c. (U) Concept of Support. See base order and Annex F (Sustainment).
 - d. (U) Information Operations. Information operations will also support the objectives of the deception plan. See Appendix 15 to this annex. Military Information Support Operations (MISO) will also support the deception plan. Refer to Appendix 13 to this annex.
 - e. (U) Joint Fires. Refer to Annex D (Joint Fires) and supporting appendices as well as Appendix 7 (Air Operations) and Appendix 10 (Airspace Control) to this annex.
 - f. (U) Rules of Engagement. Refer to Appendix 11 to this annex.
 - g. (U) Reconnaissance. Due to the nature of the deception plan, only very limited reconnaissance will be authorized forward of the TAAs, except in the 1 ID AO. In lieu there will need to be a strong reliance placed on ISR platforms and UAVs.
 - h. (U) Explosive Ordnance Disposal. Refer to Appendix 11 to Annex E.
 - i. (U) Critical Asset Risk Management. The protection of civilian critical infrastructure within the AO is an AP Government responsibility, executed through AP reserve forces and civil police. CFLCC forces will secure any infrastructure required for the projection and sustainment of combat power during Op IRON GUARDIAN and beyond, until conditions are favorable for handover to AP authorities.
 - j. (U) Cyberspace Operations. CJTF-OIG will conduct all cyberspace operations in support of this operation in accordance with ICASS guidance. Divs will nominate targets and operations to the CFLCC G3 for vetting and submission to CJTF-OIG CJ3. Divs and other major subordinate commands (MSC) will report suspected adversary cyber operations to the CFLCC OPSEC and EW officers.
 - k. (U) Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMND). The CFACC Commander remains the designated Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) and Airspace Control Authority (ACA) See Appendix 12 to Annex E for further details.
 - l. (U) CFLCC Operations Sketch. Refer to Appendix 2 to this Annex for a graphic portrayal of the Op IRON GUARDIAN, including supporting control measures.
4. (U) Sustainment. Refer to the base order. It is imperative that ground dumping of ammunition be absolutely limited, due to the GLOC challenges that the MSCs will face.
5. (U) Command and Signal. Refer to base order and Annex H.

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LTG, USA
COM CFLCC

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ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

ATTACHMENTS:


- Appendix 1 - Omitted
- Appendix 2 - Scheme of Maneuver and Control Measures
 - Tab A - TAAs (Falconview)
 - Tab B - Objective Areas (Falconview)
 - Tab C - MSRs (Falconview)
 - Tab D - Phase Lines (Falconview)
 - Tab E - Boundaries Initial Defense (Falconview)
 - Tab F - Boundaries Phase II (Falconview)
 - Tab G - Boundaries Phase III (Falconview)
 - Tab H - Boundaries Phase IV (Falconview)
- Appendix 3 - Omitted
- Appendix 4 - Omitted
- Appendix 5 - Omitted
- Appendix 6 - Omitted
- Appendix 7 - Air Support
- Appendix 8 - Omitted
- Appendix 9 - Omitted
- Appendix 10 - Airspace Control
- Appendix 11 - Rules of Engagement
 - Tab A - Numbered ROE
- Appendix 12 - Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA)
- Appendix 13 - Military Information Support Operations (MISO)
- Appendix 14 - Military Deception
- Appendix 15 - Information Operations

APPENDIX 2 (SCHEME OF MANEUVER AND CONTROL MEASURES) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC


CFLCC AO-OP IRON GUARDIAN



CFLCC Op IRON GUARDIAN – PHASE I (SHAPE)




CFLCC Op IRON GUARDIAN – PHASE II (CLEAR)




**(U) CFLCC TAC RES –
PH 3 - Mech TF 1ID**




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
CFLCC Op IRON GUARDIAN – PHASE III (DOMINATE) 3/4



CFLCC Op IRON GUARDIAN – PHASE III (DOMINATE) 4/4




CFLCC Op IRON GUARDIAN – PHASE IV (STABILIZE)



CFLCC CONTROL MEASURES

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


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
**TAB A TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION
IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC**




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TAB B TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION
IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC


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
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TAB C TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION
IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC



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
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TAB D TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION
IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC



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
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
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TAB E TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION
IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC



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
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TAB F TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION
IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC



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
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
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TAB G TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION
IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC



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
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TAB H TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION
IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC



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APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

APPENDIX 7 (AIR SUPPORT) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(U) References:

- (a) (U) ADP 3-09, Fires, 31 Aug 12.
- (b) (U) ADP 3-90, Offense and Defense, 31 Aug 12.
- (c) (U) ADRP 3.0, Unified Land Operations, 16 May 12.
- (d) (U) ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process, 17 May 12.
- (e) (U) ATP 3-09.30, Techniques for Observed Fire, 2 Aug 13.
- (f) (U) ATP 3-09.32, JFIRE Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower, 30 Nov 12.
- (g) (U) ATP 3-09.24, Techniques for the Fires Brigade, 21 Nov12.
- (h) (U) FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, 5 May 14.
- (i) (U) FM 3-52, Airspace Control, 8 Feb 13.
- (j) (U) FM 3-6, The Targeting Process, 26 Nov 10.
- (k) (U) JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support, 25 Nov 14.
- (l) (U) JP 5.0, Joint Operations Planning, 11 Aug 11.
- (m)(U) JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 31 Jan 13.
- (n) (U) AFTTP 3-3, Combat Fundamentals, Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC), 24 Oct
- (o) (U) CFACC Baseline SPINs (*dated*)
- (p) U) CFACC ACP OIG (*dated*)

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU

1. (U) Situation. See para 1 CFLCC OPORD 07 OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN).

2. (U) Mission. No change.

3. (U) Execution.

a. (U) Scheme of Fires. No change.

b. (U) Scheme of Field Artillery Support. No change.

c. (U) Scheme of Air Support. Throughout Operation IRON GUARDIAN, CFLCC utilizes apportioned and integral air support to achieve decisive effects on Arianian (AN) Armed Forces occupying Atropia or capable of influencing operations in Atropia (AP). Air support extends CFLCC's area of influence thus enabling CFLCC to dominate the battlespace. Specifically, air operations isolate AN Armed Forces in AP from reinforcement and resupply thus contributing to a sense of hopelessness and despair among Arianian leaders and soldiers. Compounding the fear of AN Armed Forces, air operations support defeat of the 23 and 25 DTGs while destroying the 24 DTG.

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APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

Air support facilitates force protection through the provision of defensive counter air (DCA) over friendly forces, gradually expanding to include the landmass of AP. Finally, air support, both apportioned and integral to the LCC, provides close air support (CAS) for friendly forces in contact.

d. (U) Supported/Supporting Relationships. CFACC is the supported commander during CJTF-OIG Phase I operations. During this phase, CJTF-OIG directed priorities are 1) neutralize Integrated Air Defense Systems to allow the unhindered use of the JOA airspace; 2) disrupt Arianian C2 capabilities; 3) destroy long-range fire support systems; 4) degrade OSC 2 assault formations, and 5) disrupt and/or delay the Arianian operational reserves. CFLCC fires will be integrated in Phase I to meet CJTF-OIG, CFACC, and CFLCC objectives. CFLCC will become the supported Component during CJTF-OIG Phase II operations (Decisive Operations). During this Decisive Operations Phase, the CFACC air apportionment will be weighted towards Close Air Support tasks in support of CFLCC objectives.

e. (U) Air Control System. USAF Air Support Operations Squadrons (ASOSs)/Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs) are aligned with and integral to all CFLCC echelons down to battalion level, to assist units with preplanned request process in the ATO planning cycle, as well as to submit immediate CAS requests as necessary.

f. (U) Pre-planned CAS Target Nominations. Preplanned CAS will be included in the Target Synchronization Board nominations. The Air Support Request (ASR) numbering system will be used. Updates to the ASR numbering system will be published in the SPINS.

g. (U) Immediate Air Support Requests. Immediate requests for air support are those requests made after the deadline for inclusion in the ATO, typically less than 72 hours prior to ATO execution. Immediate CAS requests may be routed through Army Fires channels, or by TACP via USAF support channels. Immediate requests are sourced by the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC).

h. (U) Priority of Fires. Priority of Fires for CAS are: 1) High Payoff Targets; 2) Time Sensitive Targets requiring rapid lethal response; 3) Massed Forces; 4) Point Targets, to include armor, buildings, tracked vehicles, and other soft targets; 5) Moving Targets; 6) Interdiction targets or second echelon forces.

i. (U) Organization for Combat.

(1) (U) Air Interdiction (AI) Operations. CFLCC will control all AI operations within the CFLCC AO short of the FSCL. The CFACC will control all AI operations beyond the FSCL. Priority of interdiction is initially to disrupt and attrit C3 nodes, isolate AN Armed Forces in AP from resupply and reinforcement, depth and reserve forces, and counterattacking forces.

(2) (U) Close Air Support Operations. CFLCC will allocate air sorties daily to Divisions for CAS, based on COM CLFCC priorities. These will supplement the available attack helicopter sorties resident within Divisions and CFLCC, and be allocated consistent with Division and CFLCC priorities. Lethal CAS options are also available from some CFACC ISR platforms, but the priority for these assets is collection and SOF operations.

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APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(3) (U) Air Reconnaissance Operations. Air RECCE targets that support deep operations and future planning will be nominated through G2 channels to CFLCC G2, and CFACC will provide resources on a case-by-case basis consistent with CJTF-OIG higher priorities.

(4) (U) Miscellaneous.

(a) (U) Joint Tactical Airstrike Requests (JTAR). Airstrike requests will be submitted to CFLCC ASOC NLT 1200L hours the day prior to execution to ensure requests are included in the Air Tasking Order (ATO) if prioritized at the CFLCC level. If sending more than one JTAR to the ASOC, then Division Fires must also prioritize their JTARs. Failure to meet the ASOC's pre-planned JTAR timeline may result in unfilled JTARs due to higher priorities in adjacent Division AOs.

(b) (U) Requests for pre-planned CAS are to be submitted through fire support cells from Battalion through CFLCC. Army Fires channels, not attached TACP personnel, are responsible for tracking and submitting pre-planned JTARs.

(c) (U) JTARs submitted to/by Division after 1200L are considered immediate JTARs and will be submitted through Air Force TACP channels. Immediate JTARS are approved and processed through the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) and coordinated with the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) Senior Operations Duty Officer (SODO) and CFLCC Fires.

(d) (U) Pre-planned requests submitted to CFLCC Fires after 1200L hours will be denied and must be re-submitted as immediate requests to the ASOC.

(e) (U) JTARs must utilize the numbering system approved and disseminated by the ASOC. Failure to use this numbering system will result in JTARs not being approved.

(f) (U) JTARs will be completed IAW guidance from FM 3-09.32 and JP 3-09.30.

(g) (U) Artillery. Friendly firing points, Points of Impact (POIs), Gun Target Lines (GTLs), and Maximum Ordinance (MAX ORD) are required for all ground-based fires affecting the CAS mission.

(h) (U) Clearance. A Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) will provide CAS aircrew with clearance to expend ordnance and will use the best available type of control (Type I, II, or III (see SPINs)).

(5) (U) CAS Execution. CAS will be executed with a certified JTAC utilizing Types I, II, and III controls, as required, IAW JP 3-09.3. Utilizing CAS to strike targets without control from a qualified JTAC should be considered an extreme situation with enhanced probability of fratricide.

(a) (U) Observer Plan. Mission planners must ensure friendly observers are able to see the target area and report details directly to the JTAC. JTACs are a unique fires enabler and difficult to replace. Consequently, planners must balance mission priority against JTAC safety when developing an observer plan and when considering JTAC location(s).

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APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

The following is a general, yet prioritized, planning guide for JTAC locations to ensure mission success:

1. (U) JTAC located at an Observation Point (OP) or in a patrol, and thus able to see the target area directly.
2. (U) JTAC not able to see target area directly, but can utilize Full Motion Video (FMV) to view targets.
3. (U) A qualified Joint Fires Observer (JFO) has eyes on the target area with radio contact to the JTAC. The JTAC maintains radio contact with aircrew.
4. (U) A Forward Observer (FO) has eyes on the target area with radio contact to the JTAC. The JTAC maintains radio contact with aircrew.
5. (U) Never plan to utilize a non-qualified JTAC for final control of CAS assets. This is for *in extremis*/contingency situations only.
- (6) (U) Counterfire Missions. Brigade and Battalion staffs must include the TACP in battle drills when conducting counter-fire missions, to ensure clearance of airspace above and below the Coordinating Altitude (CA). In addition, they may be in a position to employ conveniently aligned CAS assets to provide timely and effective counterfires.
 - (a) (U) Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD). Although some fixed-wing CAS platforms have inherent SEAD capabilities, ground commanders should not plan on aircraft providing their own SEAD when striking targets. Ground commanders and planners must consider the following:
 1. (U) If enemy surface-to-air threats are a factor to CAS assets, then Army fires may be required for SEAD to ensure success.
 2. (U) If enemy surface-to-air threats exist for rotary wing assets, but not for fixed-wing CAS due to range or altitude (Small caliber AAA, etc), then CAS can provide SEAD or Destroy Enemy Air Defenses (DEAD) in support of aviation assets.
 3. (U) FSOs and aviation elements must integrate with the JTAC or TACP to plan and execute SEAD/DEAD missions.
- (7) (U) Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCMs). FSCMs should enable efficient fire support by maximizing asset capabilities and providing simultaneous integration. FSCMs should be simple to employ and well understood, thus allowing seamless adaptation to changing battlefield conditions and providing the ground commander with the ability to quickly and safely mass fires when desired.
 - (a) (U) Pre-planned FSCMs and ACMs are critical to integrating joint fires. The goal for FSOs and TACPs and others in the fire support chain should always be to build a plan that allows joint fires to quickly mass on the enemy. Pre-planned FSCMs and ACMs will be included in the Airspace Control Order (ACO) and must be activated /deactivated through coordination between the CFLCC and the Divisions.

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APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

j. (U) Scheme of Naval Fire Support. No change.

k. (U) Scheme of Cyber/Electromagnetic Activities. No change.

l. (U) Battlefield Obscuration Support. No change.

m. (U) Target Acquisition. No change.

n. (U) Tasks to Subordinate Units. No change.

o. (U) Coordinating Instructions.

(1) (U) Requests for Forward Air Controller-Airborne (FAC-A). FAC-A support requests are to be submitted through the Brigade Air Liaison Officer (ALO) to the Division ALO for approval, and should be annotated on the associated ASRs.

(2) (U) Requests for specific ordnance should be submitted through the Brigade ALO to the Division ALO for coordination and approval through the CAOC.

4. (U) Sustainment. No change.

5. (U) Command and Signal. No change.

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APPENDIX 10 TO ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

APPENDIX 10 (AIRSPACE CONTROL) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(U) References:

- (a) (U) JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, 20 May 2010.
- (b) (U) FM 3-52, Airspace Control, 12 July 2012.
- (c) CFACC Baseline Special Instructions (SPINs).
- (d) CFACC Airspace Control Plan (ACP).
- (e) CFACC Air Operations Plan.

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU

1. (U) Situation.

- a. (U) Area of Interest. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN).
- b. (U) Area of Operations. Refer to Appendix 2 (Operations Overlay) to Annex C (Operations) to OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN).
- c. (U) Enemy Forces. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN).
- d. (U) Friendly Forces. Refer to Annex A (Task Organization) to OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN).

2. (U) Mission. CFLCC establishes, coordinates and executes an airspace control plan within the AO to facilitate the efficient and effective employment of airpower.

3. (U) Execution.

a. (U) Concept of Operations. All air space within the OIG JOA remains under the ultimate control of the CFACC/ACA. Management of airspace below the coordinating altitude (CA), beginning at the CFLCC's rear boundary and within the CFLCC's AO extending to the FSCL, is delegated to COM CFLCC.

(1) (U) The CFACC, through the CAOC provides airspace de-confliction throughout the JOA. All Airspace Control Measure Requests (ACMR) are forwarded through CFLCC to the Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) within the CAOC for approval and inclusion in the Airspace Control Order (ACO). The ACO facilitates the safe and expedient movement of aircraft throughout the CJTF-OIG JOA, synchronizes surface to surface fires, and prevents fratricide. The ACO shall be published daily indicating active ACMs for the ATO period including any ACM changes. The ACO is in effect daily coinciding with the ATO effective times. The ATO, ACO and master ACM files will be available on the Sharepoint site.

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APPENDIX 10 TO ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(2) (U) The CAOC manages, coordinates and de-conflicts all airspace use within its Joint Operational Area (JOA). The CFLCC ASOC manages the airspace within the assigned AO. Coupled with Air Traffic Control (ATC), airspace control is accomplished by positive and procedural means. Through the use of ACMRs, the CAOC manages airspace for all Coalition forces in the JOA, provides for safe aviation operations and maximizes the ground commander's intent for forces and effects.

(a) (U) The CFLCC Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) will develop a safe and effective airspace control plan in support of Operation IRON GUARDIAN. CFLCC airspace will be subdivided into three or four areas (depending on the phase of the operation and the number of Divisional formations in the field) to de-conflict operations between all subordinate manoeuvre Divisions. All but one of these areas will align with the Division boundaries, with the last area consisting of the balance of the airspace in the AO for which there is no Division ownership, and which will be the responsibility of the CFLCC ASOC to manage. Likewise, responsibility for the airspace in the Atropian Divisional AO will rest with the CFLCC ASOC as well. Refer to Appendix 2 (Scheme of Maneuver and Control Measures) to Annex C (Operations) to OPORD.

(b) (U) UAS operating below the Coordinating Altitude will be under the procedural control of the CFLCC

(c) (U) Airspace Control will coincide with the three Divisional ground boundaries beyond Phase I. Refer to Appendix 2 (Operations Overlay) to Annex C (Operations) to OPORD

b. (U) Scheme of Airspace Control.

(1) Airspace usage above the Coordinating Altitude (CA) or forward of the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) must be requested through the CFLCC ASOC. Approval of the airspace below the CA and within the Division AOs has been delegated to the Divisions. The CFLCC ASOC will be the point of coordination for airspace within the CFLCC AO. The Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) will be established in the CAOC by the CFLCC.

(2) The airspace below the CA and forward of the Divisions forward boundaries (to the CFLCC forward boundary/FSCL as applicable) will be managed by the CFLCC ASOC using procedural airspace control methods.

(3) The initial Airspace priorities are (in sequence):

- (a) Air MEDEVAC
- (b) Air Defense
- (c) Manoeuvre
- (d) Indirect Fires
- (e) Close Air Support
- (f) ISR Assets
- (g) Aerial re-supply

c. (U) Tasks to Subordinate Units. Refer to Base Order to OPORD

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APPENDIX 10 TO ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

d. (U) Coordinating Instructions.

(1) (U) CFLCC ASOC.

(a) (U) Identify and resolve airspace user conflicts, maintain AC overlays, develop AC plans, procedures and control measures and distribute the ACO on a daily basis consistent with the ATO cycle.

(b) (U) Coordinate and integrate airspace user requirements with other Components/adjacent units and approve staff requests for airspace control measures.

(2) (U) Division AC Elements.

(a) (U) Coordinate and integrate airspace requirements within the Division AO and identify/resolve airspace user conflicts.

(b) (U) Maintain AC overlays and information displays. Forward AC overlays to the CFLCC ASOC.

(c) (U) Develop AC procedures, plans, SOPs, and annexes for their respective Division airspace.

(d) (U) Advise subordinate and higher headquarters of significant activities affecting airspace use and the impact of airspace control measures on the ground battle.

(e) (U) Compile and submit the Aviation flight schedule for the following day in accordance with CFLCC guidance, for situational awareness and de-confliction.

(3) (U) Airspace Control Measure Request (ACMR) process.

(a) (U) Requests for ACMRs will be submitted to the CFLCC ASOC 72 hours prior to ACO execution. ACMRs that are not received within the timeline will be considered immediate and must be requested from the CFLCC G3 through the ASOC. Approval authority for immediate requests is the CFLCC G3 and is based on the mission requirements.

(b) (U) CFLCC ASOC will establish a 1 km radius Restricted Operations Zone (ROZ) around all MEDEVAC locations from the surface to the Coordination Level (CL) and all aircraft are required to maintain this distance from any MEDEVAC site, taking all advisories and direction from the appropriate flight following facility.

(c) (U) All ACMRs must contain the following information at a minimum:

1. (U) A 6 digit UTM grid or ACPs to outline the operating area.
2. (U) A minimum of a 500ft buffer.
3. (U) Altitude boundaries.
4. (U) Effective times in ZULU.
5. (U) Operating frequency/channel.
6. (U) Purpose of the ACMR.
7. (U) Accurate point of contact information (phone number and email address).
8. (U) Any special instructions/restrictions.

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APPENDIX 10 TO ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(d) (U) The Division G2s will coordinate with the CFLCC G2 for all UAS mission requests requiring CFLCC airspace that are developed during the ISR Collection Working Group. The information may be contained in a storyboard format. Division UAS requests must be submitted to the CFLCC G2 the day prior to execution. Any requests submitted late will require a justified task and purpose that should be briefed by the Division G3 to the CFLCC G3.

(4) (U) Aviation Ground Support Elements. Divisions shall submit ACMRs for all tactical towers, non-directional beacons and all FARPs with the CFLCC ASOC in order to be placed on the ACO as soon as possible.

(5) (U) Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCM). Refer to Annex D (Fires). All FSCMs must be forwarded to the CFLCC ASOC for inclusion in the ACO.

(6) (U) Close Air Support (CAS). Refer to Annex D (Fires) to CFLCC OPORD 07 and the CFACC Baseline SPINs.

(7) (U) Standard-use Army Aircraft Flight Routes (SAAFR). SAAFRs are established below the CL to facilitate movement of Army aircraft and HN support aircraft in the Divisions' AO. Units desiring to utilize SAAFRs while transiting shall adhere to the published SAAFR structure and restrictions.

(8) (U) Coordination Level (CL). CLs are a procedural method to separate fixed- and rotary wing aircraft. The established CL in the Joint Operating Area is 3000' AGL with a 500' fixed wing buffer from rotary wing IAW Ref. C.

(9) (U) Coordinating Altitude (CA). CAs are an airspace coordinating measure that uses altitude to separate users and as the transition between different airspace coordinating entities. The established CA in the Joint operating Area is 18,000' MSL.

(10) (U) Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). The minimum vertical separation between UAS is 500 feet. The minimum vertical separation between UASs and manned aircraft is 1000 feet, unless otherwise directed or coordinated. The minimum vertical separation between manned aircraft is 500 feet. The following are normal altitude blocks unless otherwise coordinated or superseded by the SPINs. All altitudes are "inclusive."

(a) (U/FOUO) Raven UAS missions. SFC to 1000' AGL.

(b) (U/FOUO) Rotary wing. Remain at or below CL 3000' AGL.

(c) (U/FOUO) RQ-7 Shadow/Scan Eagle. 5000' AGL to 8000' AGL.

(d) (U/FOUO) MQ1-C Gray Eagle Predator/Gray Eagle/Reaper. 8500' MSL to 15,000MSL.

(11) (U) Air Defense Warning and Weapons Control Status. Refer to Appendix 7 (Air and Missile Defense) **to Annex D (Fires) (Not Issued)**.

(12) (U) Minimum Operating Altitude. Minimum operating altitudes will be Component Commander directed IAW mission requirements, aircraft defense capabilities and specific operating area threat assessment.

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(13) (U) Helicopter Procedures. Rotary-wing aircraft should remain at or below the Coordination Level (CL) unless otherwise coordinated. All rotary-wing aircraft will squawk appropriate IFF/SIFF codes and use see and avoid de-confliction procedures at all times.

4. (U) Sustainment. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment).
5. (U) Command and Control. Refer to the Base OPORD.

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**APPENDIX 11 (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS) TO
OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC (UNCLASSIFIED)**

(U) References:

- (a) UN General Assembly Resolutions: National Sovereignty Principles (A/RES/50/172) and (A/RES/63/308) Responsibility to Protect (R2P).
- (b) UNSCR Resolution 7739.
- (c) UNSCR Resolution 7752.
- (d) Rules of Engagement. CJCSI 3121.01A, "CJCS Rules of Engagement (Standing ROE) for US Forces," 13 Jun 05.
- (e) Legal Review of Rules of Engagement. DODD 3000.3, "Policy for Nonlethal Weapons;" DODD 3025.14, "Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad" (Short Title: "Noncombatant Evacuation Operations").
- (f) Law of War/Law of Armed Conflict. DOD Directive 5100.77, "DOD Law of War Program," 9 Dec 98; DOD Instruction 1000.1, "Identity Cards Required by the Geneva Conventions," 30 Jan 75 with CH-1, 03 Jun 75 and CH-2, 05 Jun 91; CJCSI 5810.01B, "Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program," 25 Mar 02; CJCSM 3141.01A, "Procedures for the Review of Operation Plans," 15 Sep 98.
- (g) Reporting Violations of the Law of War. DODD 5100.77, "DOD Law of War Program;" CJCSI 5810.01, "Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program."
- (h) Treaties and International Agreements. Charter of the United Nations, 26 Jun 45; DA Pam 27-1, "Treaties Governing Land Warfare;" DA Pam 27-24, "Selected International Agreements, Vol. II;" DA Pam 27-161-1, "Law of Peace, Vol. I;" FM 27-10, "Law of Land Warfare;" SECNAVINST 5820.4F, "NWP 9 (Rev. A)"/FM 1-10, "Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations;" NWIP 10-2, "Law of Naval Warfare;" SFP 110-20, "Selected International Agreements;" AFP 110-31, "International Law – The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations;" AFP 110-34, "International Law – Commander's Guide to the Law of Armed Conflict."
- (i) Nonlethal Weapons. "Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons (NLW)," FM 3-22.40; AFTTP (I) 3-2.45; USCG Pub 3-07.31; MCWP 3-15.8; NTTP 3-07.3.2. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons. E.O. 11850, "Renunciation of Certain Uses in War of Chemical Herbicides and Riot Control Agents," 8 Apr 75; CJCSI 2030.01A, "Chemical Weapons Convention Compliance Policy Guidance," 09 Aug 01.
- (j) Captured Weapons, War Trophies, Documents and Equipment. AR 608-4, "Control and Registration of War Trophies and War Trophy Firearms," 28 Aug 69; AR 870-20/OPNSVINST 3460.7A/AFR 125-13/MCO 5800.6A; VCSA Message DTG 301301Z Mar 98.

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(k) Enemy Prisoners of War. DODD 2310.1, “DOD Program for Enemy Prisoners of War (EPWs) and Other Detainees” (Short Title: “DOD Enemy POW Detainee Program”), 18 Aug 94; CJCSI 3290.01, “Program for Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detained Personnel,” 20 Mar 96; AR 190-8/OPNAVINST 3461.6/AFJI 31-304/MCO 3461.1, “Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees,” 1 Oct 97.

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu.

1. (U) Situation.

a. (U) Enemy. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) to CFLCC OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRONE GUARDIAN).

b. (U) Friendly. Refer to Annex A (Task Organization) to CFLCC OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN).

2. (U) Mission. O/O CFLCC and AP Armed Forces apply Rules of Engagement to support military operations against Arianian (AN) Armed Forces, AN surrogate forces, and non-military adversaries within the Area of Operations.

3. (U) Execution.

a. (U) General.

(1) (U) Nothing in these Rules of Engagement (ROE) limits a commander’s inherent right, authority, and obligation to use all necessary and lawful means available in the self-defense of the commander’s unit, other CFLCC or AP Armed Forces, and designated personnel in the AO.

(2) (U) CFLCC and AP Armed Forces personnel will comply with the Law of War (LOW)/Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) set forth in Reference f during the conduct of operations.

(3) (U) Military necessity does not justify any of the measures expressly prohibited by the LOW/LOAC. Every possible safeguard will be used to avoid noncombatant casualties and indiscriminate destruction of private property when actions are conducted in populated areas. If noncombatant casualties occur, medical treatment will be provided by the responsible commander’s forces, subject to tactical considerations and available resources.

b. (U) Applicability.

(1) (U) These ROE apply to all US and multinational forces assigned, attached, OPCON or TACON to CFLCC until superseded.

(2) (U) ROE used by one national force may not be applicable to other national forces. Some Coalition forces may have a national obligation to abide by treaties and other international agreements to which another force is not a party and/or does not recognize as expressions of customary international law. Refer interoperability problems arising from these differing legal obligations to your servicing judge advocate.

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c. (U) Rules of Engagement. These ROE apply to all operations conducted within OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN. The most current CFLCC ROE authorization contained in any CFLCC FRAGO will verify ROE posture. ROE are based upon tactical, political, and legal requirements. Rules may change as circumstances change. ROE are in addition to restrictions imposed by the LOW/LOAC.

(1) (U) Weapons Release Authority Matrix (TAB A). This matrix shows level of command with release authority to employ various weapons systems in operations other than self-defense. "X" marks the lowest level of release authority. Subordinate commanders may further restrict release authority below their levels. Weapon systems used should be proportional to the threat and consider collateral damage.

Serial	Weapon	Level of Command With Release Authority								Notes
		CJTF-OIG	CFLCC	DIV	BDE	BN	CO	PLT	IND	
(a) 1.	(b) Personal Weapon	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j) X	(k)
2.	Machine Gun								X	
3.	Grenade								X	
4.	Light AT Weapon								X	Javelin
5.	Heavy AT Weapon							X		TOW
6.	Mortar (Illum/Smk)							X		
7.	Mortar (HE)							X		
8.	Artillery						X			
9.	Air Defense System						X			
10.	Attack Helicopters						X			
11.	Close Air Support						X			
12.	Mines		X							Subject to emplacement restrictions.
13.	Demolition					X				

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(2) (U) Request for Changes to ROE. Commanders may request changes to current ROE. Supplemental measures consist of detailed instructions established by senior authorities to keep the actions of subordinates within political and military policies. Subordinate commanders will only modify ROE to make modifications more restrictive. Subordinate commanders will not make modifications less restrictive than the original CFLCC ROE authorization. Subordinate commanders may request that their higher command issue a specific ROE provision that is less restrictive than the original ROE in the OPORD. Submit requested changes with rationale and conditions through command channels to CFLCC SJA for initial review prior to submission to COM CFLCC.

d. (U) Definitions.

(1) (U) Inherent Right of Self-Defense. Unit commanders retain the right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Unless otherwise directed by a unit commander as detailed below, military members may exercise individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. When assigned and acting as part of a unit, individual self-defense will be considered a subset of unit self-defense. Unit commanders may limit individual self-defense by members of their unit. Both unit and individual self-defense includes defense of other CFLCC or AP Armed Forces in the vicinity.

(2) (U) Principles of Self-Defense. All necessary means available and all appropriate actions may be used in self-defense. Determining appropriate level of force requires consideration of the following:

(a) (U) De-escalation. When time and circumstances permit, forces committing hostile acts or demonstrating hostile intent will be warned and given the opportunity to withdraw or cease threatening actions.

(b) (U) Necessity. Exists when a hostile act occurs or a force demonstrates hostile intent. When such conditions exist, self-defense is authorized while the force continues to commit hostile acts or exhibit hostile intent.

(c) (U) Proportionality. Levels of self-defense should be sufficient to respond decisively to hostile acts or demonstrations of hostile intent. Use of force may exceed the means and intensity of the hostile act or hostile intent, but the nature, duration and scope of force used will not exceed requirements. The concept of proportionality in self-defense should not be confused with attempts to minimize collateral damage during offensive operations.

(3) (U) Collective Self-Defense. Defense of designated non-US military forces and/or designated foreign nationals and their property from a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.

(4) (U) Hostile Force. Any civilian, paramilitary or military force, or terrorist unit, with or without national designation, that has been declared hostile by the President of the U.S. Once declared hostile by appropriate authority, U.S. units need not observe a hostile act or a demonstration of hostile intent before engaging that force.

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(5) (U) Hostile Act. An attack or other use of force against the United States, U.S. forces, AP Armed Forces, or other Coalition forces. It also includes force used directly to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of U.S. forces, including the recovery of U.S. personnel or vital U.S. government property.

(6) (U) Hostile Intent. The threat of imminent use of force against the United States, U.S. forces, AP Armed Forces, or other Coalition forces. It also includes the threat of force to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of U.S. forces, including the recovery of U.S. personnel or vital U.S. government property.

(7) (U) Imminent Use of Force. The determination of whether the use of force against U.S. forces, AP Armed Forces, or other Coalition forces is imminent will be based on an assessment of all facts and circumstances known to US forces, AP Armed Forces, or other Coalition forces at the time and may be made at any level. Imminent does not necessarily mean immediate or instantaneous.

(8) (U) Economic Objects. Facilities, structures, and related equipment customarily associated with the production, refinement, and/or storage of critical commercial products.

(9) (U) Infrastructure. Facilities, structures, and related equipment customarily associated with sustaining the population (public works).

(10) (U) Lines of Communication. Structures and related equipment such as roads, highways, bridges, tunnels, and rail systems used for transportation.

e. (U) Lawful Targets. The following types of targets may be engaged by all lawful means subject to the restrictions contained in these ROE:

(1) (U) Hostile Forces. Once declared hostile by appropriate authority, a hostile force may be engaged by all lawful means upon identification until neutralized, destroyed, or captured. Hostile forces may be engaged on their status alone. Engagement of hostile forces is subject to the following restrictions:

- (a) (U) Do not engage anyone who has surrendered.
- (b) (U) Do not engage anyone who is out of battle due to sickness or wounds.
- (c) (U) Do not engage aircrews descending by parachute from disabled aircraft.
- (d) (U) Do not engage shipwrecked personnel.

(2) (U) Military Objectives. Positive target identification is required prior to engagement of any military objective or target.

(a) (U) Subject to any restraints outlined in these ROE, military objectives may be engaged by all lawful means. Military objectives are those objects which, by their purpose, nature, location, or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose destruction offer a definite military advantage.

(b) (U) The military objectives analysis must apply the principle of proportionality – the anticipated loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage to be gained.

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(c) (U) The concept of distinction prohibits indiscriminate attacks that result in the specific targeting of civilian populations, civilian individuals, or results in unnecessary or excessive collateral damage. While collateral damage is not considered a LOW/LOAC violation, any collateral damage should be reported to the Commander, CFLCC through G3 channels, with notice to SJA, as soon as possible with the location and extent of the collateral damage being detailed.

(3) (U) Cultural and historic buildings, nonmilitary structures, civilian population centers, mosques and other religious places, hospitals, and facilities displaying the Red Crescent or Red Cross will not be attacked except when they are being used for military purposes and the force used is justified by military necessity. A list of NO STRIKE targets will be maintained by CFLCC in support of this operation.

(4) (U) Operations will be conducted to limit adverse impact on the indigenous civilian population and ensure that collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects is not excessive.

(5) (U) Captured and Detained Personnel. All personnel captured, surrendering, or otherwise coming into custody of CFLCC forces will be treated humanely IAW with domestic and international obligations under the LOW/LOAC and other international obligations. All efforts will be made to expeditiously process, transport, and detain those individuals determined to be Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW).

f. Treatment of Noncombatants.

(1) (U) Protected persons. Civilians are protected persons entitled to respect of both their person and property. Do not target civilians unless in self-defense, defense of others, or defense of designated property in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Report all engagements of protected persons to the servicing judge advocate as well as the appropriate civil affairs element.

(2) (U) Civilian restraint and movement restriction.

(a) (U) Civilians may be restrained to protect lives, property, or the security of operational facilities and areas and when all other means have failed.

(b) (U) Civilian movement may be restricted by military necessity. Civilians failing to comply with movement restrictions in areas under CFLCC control may be stopped and required to show identification and/or apprehended and detained (including their means of transportation) using the minimum amount of force necessary.

(3) (U) Civilian Property. Do not seize civilian property without approval of a company-level commander, and only for articulated military purposes. If the property is occupied when seized, provide the owner with a receipt describing the condition of the property and keep a copy.

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APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

g. (U) Demolitions, Mines, and Obstacles.

(1) (U) Destruction of infrastructure is not authorized without approval COM CFLCC.

(2) (U) Commander CFLCC may approve use of self-deactivating and command detonated mines in support of assigned missions. Commander CFLCC may delegate approval authority for the use of self-deactivating and command detonated mines to formation commanders.

(3) (U) Use of scatterable mines within AP without AP Government approval is prohibited.

h. (U) Electronic Warfare (EW).

(1) (U) Electronic Protection (EP) Authorized. Included are actions to protect personnel, facilities, or equipment from effects of friendly or enemy EW that degrades, neutralizes, or destroys friendly combat capability.

(2) (U) Electronic Warfare Support (EWS) Authorized. Included are actions by, or under the control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of radiated electro-magnetic energy for immediate threat recognition in support of EW operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing.

(3) (U) Electronic Countermeasures (EC) Authorized.

i. (U) Air Defense Artillery. Weapons control status (WCS) Tight.

j. (U) Close Air Support Targets. Positive target identification is required prior to engagement.

k. (U) Coordinating Instructions.

(1) (U) Subordinate headquarters and supporting commands will disseminate this annex and supplemental ROE authorization serials to subordinate organizations. Subordinate headquarters and supporting commands will ensure that their soldiers know, understand, and follow all ROE. Subordinate headquarters and supporting commands will prepare ROE cards. Cards will be submitted to CFLCC staff judge advocate for review and approval prior to distribution.

(2) (U) Provisions for supplementation or interpretation will not have the effect of circumventing any part of these ROE.

(3) (U) Commanders can expect to receive amended supplemental ROE measures from higher authority that provide modifications, deletions, or additions to current ROE. ROE may be modified by:

(a) (U) Direction of high authority.

(b) (U) Subordinate commanders can modify this ROE, provided such modifications are compatible with the intent of these ROE and readiness procedures, result in a more restrictive or definitive rule, enhance mission accomplishment, and do not impair the commanders' inherent right of self-defense.

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APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(c) (U) Subordinate commanders will develop additional ROE/amplified ROE guidance applicable to forces under their command and will submit them to COM CFLCC for review/approval as required. Commanders will be instructed to ensure that modified ROE:

1. (U) Remain compatible with the intent of these ROE.
2. (U) Result in more definitive guidance to subordinate commanders.
3. (U) Do not impair the commander's inherent right of self-defense.

(4) (U) CFLCC forces should not assume future changes to these ROE are approved by all other national forces. Coalition force commanders reserve the right to seek guidance or clarification of ROE with their national command elements.

(5) (U) Reporting IAW CFLCC Staff requirements.

(6) (U) Subordinate and supporting commands will submit requests for supplemental ROE when necessary. Requests for supplemental ROE measures will conform to format in Appendix F to Enclosure J to CJCSI 3121.01A but will use measure numbers specified in this annex and subsequent serials. Requests in narrative format are authorized. Should situation require immediate response, voice requests for supplemental ROE may be submitted to COM CFLCC via the command net. Voice requests will be followed by an amplifying message.

(7) (U) Violations of ROE will be reported immediately through command channels to COM CFLCC for investigation.

4. (U) **Sustainment**. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) to CFLCC OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN).

5. (U) **Command and Signal**. Refer to Annex H (Signal) to CFLCC OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRONE GUARDIAN).

Attachment:

Tab A Numbered ROE

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**TAB A TO APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON
GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

**TAB A (NUMBERED ROE) TO APPENDIX 11 (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO
ANNEX C (OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

(U) References:

- (a) MC 362/1 NATO Rules of Engagement dated 23 July 2003.
- (b) Appendix 2 (Decisive Offensive Operations) to Annex E (Rules of Engagement) to CJTF-OIG OPORD 01.

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu.

- 1. (U) The following ROE are issued under the authority of COM CFLCC. They were developed and approved in consultation with the COM CJTF-OIG and the Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs).
- 2. (U) The ROE listed below are designed to encompass combat operations by Atropian (AP) Armed Forces and CFLCC forces during CJTF-OIG Phase II, Decisive Offensive Operations (CFLCC Operation IRON GUARDIAN).

(U) GEOGRAPHIC POSITIONING OF FORCES

(U) 100 – Entry into the landmass of Ariana (AN) by CFLCC forces or AP Armed Forces is prohibited without COM CFLCC approval.

(U) 101 – Entry into the landmass, airspace, and littoral waters of AN for the purposes of conducting combat search and rescue operations is authorized.

(U) 103 – Entry into the airspace of AN by CFLCC and AP aviation forces is authorized.

(U) 104 - The use of force, up to and including deadly force for the protection of AP Armed Forces and AP law enforcement members stationed within the landmass of AP is authorized.

(U) RELATIVE POSITIONING OF OWN FORCES

(U) 111 – Within the limitations placed in 100, 101 and 103, positioning of CFLCC forces and AP Armed Forces relative to any AN Armed Forces occupying the sovereign territory, airspace and/or littoral waters of AP is unrestricted.

**(U) PREVENTION OF BOARDING, DETENTION, OR SEIZURE OF AP OR CJTF-OIG
PROPERTY**

(U) 132 – The use of force, up to and including deadly force, to prevent the boarding, detention or seizure of AP military or civilian vessels under contract carrying military equipment, aircraft, or vehicles is authorized.

(U) 133 – The use of force, up to and including deadly force, to prevent the boarding, detention, or seizure of CJTF-OIG military vessels, aircraft, or vehicles is authorized.

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**TAB A TO APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX C TO OPOD 07 (OPERATION IRON
GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

(U) INTERVENTION IN NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES

(U) 145 – The use of non-deadly force to detain persons for force protection purposes in AP is authorized.

(U) 146 – The use of force, up to and including deadly force, to disarm persons for force protection purposes in AP is authorized.

(U) 147 – The use of non-deadly force to prevent the escape of unarmed individuals for force protection purposes is authorized.

(U) 148 – Intervention in AP civilian law enforcement activities is prohibited.

(U) DIVERSIONS

(U) 161 – The ordering of diversions to all commercial and private vessels, aircraft, vehicles, and persons for force protection purposes is authorized.

(U) 162 – The use of force, up to and including deadly force, to compel compliance with the ordering of diversions to all commercial and private vessels, aircraft, vehicles, and persons for force protection purposes is authorized.

(U) DETENTION OR SEIZURE

(U) 181 – The detention and/or seizure of AN vessels, aircraft, vehicles, personnel, goods, cargos, and/or equipment within the landmass or littoral waters of AP is authorized.

(U) 183 – The detention and/or seizure of AN vessels, aircraft, vehicles, personnel, goods, cargos, and/or equipment for the purposes of enforcement of UNSCR 7739 is authorized.

(U) 184 – The use of force, up to and including disabling force to detain or seize AN vessels, aircraft, vehicles, and/or personnel is authorized.

(U) 187 - The use of restraints such as Flex Cuffs and mechanical restraints on PW/detainees is authorized for force protection purposes. Once brought into a secure holding area, restraints shall normally be removed, unless the tactical situation dictates otherwise.

(U) 188 - If there is doubt of PW status, CJTF-OIG forces will treat a detainee as a PW until a competent tribunal is able to determine his/her status IAW Article 5 of *Geneva Convention III relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War* (GC III).

(U) ILLUMINATION

(U) 221 – The illumination of AN Defense Force vessels, aircraft, personnel, and equipment by white light, spotlight, projectiles, or infrared means is authorized.

(U) 222 – The use of lasers and laser target markers against AN Armed Forces vessels, aircraft, personnel, and equipment is authorized.

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**TAB A TO APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX C TO OPOD 07 (OPERATION IRON
GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

(U) IDENTIFICATION OF TARGETS

(U) 232 - Identification is to be established visually or by at least two of the following means: IFF (or other systems that require a response from an unidentified unit); electro-optical, electronic warfare support measure; track behavior, flight plan correlation; thermal imaging; acoustic intelligence; or other secure active/passive systems not requiring a positive response from an unidentified unit prior to an engagement.

(U) DESIGNATION OF TARGETS

(U) 280 – Designation of targets by any means is authorized.

(U) USE OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS

(U) 321 - Use of pepper spray in self-defense and for force protection is authorized.

(U) USE OF FORCE IN DESIGNATED OPERATIONS

(U) 337 – Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to prevent the commission of serious crimes that are occurring or about to occur is authorized.

(U) 339 – Use of ASP batons in self-defense and for force protection is authorized.

(U) PROHIBITING OR RESTRICTING USE OF SPECIFIC WEAPONS IN DESIGNATED CIRCUMSTANCES

(U) 351 – The use of anti-personnel mines by CFLCC, less AP Armed Forces, is not authorized.

(U) 352 – The use of command-detonated mines and cluster munitions by CFLCC and AP Armed Forces is in accordance with national policy.

(U) 353 – The use of weapons of mass destruction to include chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear by CJTF-OIG forces is prohibited.

(U) INFORMATION OPERATIONS

(U) 361 – The control of AN military information distribution mechanisms with the intent to disrupt and deny AN command and control nodes is authorized.

(U) 366 – Conduct of Computer Network Attack (CNA) against AN adversary computers or computer systems that have intruded into and damaged CJTF-OIG computers, computer networks, or information in CJTF-OIG computers or computer networks, including actions that may result in intrusion into AN intermediary systems or networks and damage to AN systems or networks is authorized subject to COM CJTF-OIG approval.

(U) 367 – The use of electronic warfare measures by CFLCC forces and AP Armed Forces is authorized.

(U) 368 – Psychological operations directed against AN military forces is authorized.

(U) 369 – The use of physical military deception through the use of dummies and/or decoy equipment by CFLCC forces and AP Armed Forces is authorized.

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**TAB A TO APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX C TO OPOD 07 (OPERATION IRON
GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

(U) USE OF ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES

(U) 374 - The unrestricted use of ECM against AN military targets is authorized.

(U) ATTACK

(U) 421 – Attack against AN Armed Forces demonstrating hostile intent against CFLCC or AP Armed Forces is authorized.

(U) 422 – Attack against AN Armed Forces which commit or directly contribute to a hostile act (not constituting an actual attack) against CFLCC or AP Armed Forces is authorized.

(U) 425 – Attack against AN Armed Forces which have previously attacked, or directly contributed to an attack, is authorized.

(U) 426 - COM CFLCC is authorized to judge whether an attack is the first of a series and, in this event, to attack all units constituting a continuing threat.

(U) 427 - Attack on AN Armed Forces military installation(s), facility(ies), equipment, and unit(s) which are engaged in or make an effective contribution to military activity that threatens CFLCC or AP Armed Forces person(s) or property is authorized.

(U) 428 – Attack on AN Armed Forces, which make an effective contribution to the conduct of hostile military operations against CFLCC forces or AP Armed Forces, or persons or property designated special status is authorized.

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APPENDIX 12 TO ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

**APPENDIX 12 (CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES) TO ANNEX C
(OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN CFLCC**

(U) References:

- a. CJTF-OIG OPORD 01 (OP IRON GUARDIAN)
- b. CFLCC OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN)
- c. Annex B (Intelligence) To CFLCC OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN)
- d. Annex C (Operations) to CFLCC OPORD 07 (OP IRONGUARDIAN)
- e. FM 3-38, Cyber Electromagnetic Activities, February 2014
- f. JP 6-01, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations, 20 March 2012
- g. JP 3-51, Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare, 7 April 2000

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu.

1. (U) Situation.

a. (U) Area of Interest. Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. Operations in cyberspace contribute to gaining a significant operational advantage for achieving military objectives. As Ariana courses of action may involve avenues of approach that reside solely within cyberspace, a geographic area is too limiting, and is insufficient to contain cyberspace. As such the CEMA area of interest must be expanded beyond the geographic area of local interest to worldwide consideration.

b. (U) Area of Operations. CEMA are conducted where Ariana and neighbor nations' information technology infrastructures, along with the people and systems that use them, exist. To varying degrees, Atropia, Donovia, Gorgas and Limaria populations, governments, security forces, businesses and other actors rely upon these infrastructures and supporting networks or systems. Given these dependencies, CEMA require deliberate coordination and integration to ensure effects are created that directly support achievement of operational objectives, but do not detract from the bona-fide requirement for affected nations to govern. Accordingly, CEMA operations are only within cyberspace and EMS which directly affect Ariana's ability to conduct military operations in Atropia, with due consideration for the collateral impact on Atropia, Gorgas, Donovia, and Limaria.

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c. (U) Enemy Forces.

(1) (U) Ariana Armed Forces.

(a) (U) Land Forces. Ariana employs an INFOWAR BDE, which consists of a Deception BN, Computer Warfare/Information Attack BN, Perception Management BN, Electronic Warfare BN, Intelligence Management Company, and Information Protection Company, as well as integral defense and service support capabilities. The INFOWAR BDE includes both offensive and defensive EW capabilities, including:

1. (U) Vehicle-mounted 1L222 ELINT (8-18 GHz) signals intercept (pulsed airborne radars, fire control radars, terrain following radars and ground mapping radars as well as missile data links. Modifications have been performed to receive and locate emissions associated with satellite telephones);

2. (U) Aviaconversia jamming transmitter (jams civilian and military frequencies for GLONASS and GPS within a 200 km range);

3. (U) Ground surveillance radar, RASIT (detects, tracks, and identifies all targets).

4. (U) Tigr-M REI PP LEER 2 Mobile EW System (mobile technical control for developing radio emitters, jamming, and suppressing cellular phone systems, imitate various radio electronic systems). It operates close to the FLOT in support of motorized, mechanized or armored forces moving at high rates of speed;

5. (U) The Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) network is fully integrated and supported by advanced early warning, search, target acquisition and tracking radars. The IADS network C2 employs modern encrypted communications systems using landline, fiber, microwave radio-relay and tactical military radio. The IADS is well integrated with Land Force elements to provide point defense as well as area defense.

6. (U) A moderate heliborne EW jamming capability, employing HIP-J/K and HORIZON platforms; and

7. (U) Various other (tier 3) HF/VHF radio intercept and DF systems.

(b) (U) Computer Attack. Ariana has successfully conducted OCO, including Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) computer network attacks on both Atropian government networks and Atropian commercial ventures. It is assessed that Ariana effectively employs its INFOWAR resources to achieve military tactical and operational objectives.

(c) (U) Information Attack. In concert with computer attack operations, Ariana has also performed coherent and coordinated strategic and operational messaging activities, with a view to discrediting the Atropian government's ability to govern. This has achieved good effect.

(d) (U) Signals Intelligence. Ariana SIGINT programs consistently demonstrate success in combating Western communications systems, especially units that demonstrate poor OPSEC. CFLCC can expect Arianian SIGINT to provide useable indications and warning, capabilities assessment, and targeting intelligence.

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(e) (U) Ariana's military C4I systems are modern and sophisticated threats. The Arianian military forces use their information capabilities to promote disinformation in order to manipulate public perception and maintain control and they will use asymmetric techniques to counter the ASAM/CJTF-OIG narrative using INFOWAR.

(f) (U) Given demonstrated EW and CO capabilities, Ariana has a proven ability to disrupt Coalition command and control.

d. (U) Friendly Forces.

(1) (U) CJTF-OIG Integral EW. A CJTF-OIG multinational force (MNF) EWCC conducts joint planning, coordination, and control of disruption (EA), protection (EP), and monitoring (ES) of the EM spectrum.

(2) (U) CEMA in the Coalition. The conduct of CEMA must align with joint information operations, cyber operations (CO), EW, and spectrum management operations (SMO). EW LNOs are required at CJTF-OIG from each Component Command, as well as each TCN. These EW LNOs form the MNF EWCC at HQ CJTF-OIG. Any EW support required from another Component must be coordinated by the MNF EWCC, although direct liaison is authorized for development of the requirement. CFLCC will provide one EWO to CJTF-OIG MNF EWCC.

(3) (U) Asymmetric Forces. SAPA ostensibly employs civilian telecom infrastructure as their primary means of communications, with commercial-off-the-shelf radios for low-level tactical communications when required.

e. (U) Third Party Actors.

(1) (U) Donovia. Donovia has historically conducted intelligence operations in areas where it maintains or is creating extensive trade relationships. Donovia uses its commercial entities as vectors for collection and recruitment activities. Donovia maintains a very close relationship with both Atropia and Ariana. It is highly likely that Donovia has ongoing intelligence operations and has penetrated some aspects of the Atropia intelligence and security apparatuses given their level of economic interest in Atropia.

(2) (U) Host Nation Atropia. All media emanate from Baku with respect to TV programming, transmission towers, Internet servers etc., although most major outlets are controlled by the government or by confederates of the President, this includes broadcast and print media and internet, as well as social media access.

f. (U) Civil Considerations.

(a) (U) Telecommunications.

1. (U) The telephone system in Atropia does not work very well, although it is being upgraded. The city of Baku has 4G LTEA connectivity and the areas around Sumgait, Shemaka, Ganja, Astara, Mingchevir, and Agstafa have 3G HSPA. Cellular telephones can be purchased and used locally. Two companies share the market, Atropcel - a subsidiary of Atroptelecom - and Bakcell (Motorola). GSM (Global System for Mobile) coverage is still basic, but growing fast. The Ministry of Communications controls the telephone system through Atroptelecom. An estimated 200,000 clients are awaiting telephone installation, providing a bonanza for mobile phone operators.

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2. (U) Cellular system integration and hardware are supplied by Atroptelecom, and the networks are supported by extensive microwave relay links. Fiber optic trunks linking major cities form the backbone for the 4G and 3G networks. The public telephone system is based on open wire technology with microwave radio relays. Broadcasters are owned and operated by the State monopoly Atroptelecom. The Ministry of Communications has licensed the Atroptelecom to provide the following telecom services: Public Switched Telecommunication Service; GSM 900Mhz Mobile Telecommunication Service; Internet Service Provision; and Digital Data Communication. Fixed line and mobile telephone services are provided exclusively by Atroptelecom, although work is shared by Atropcel and Bakcell. GSM service is concentrated around major routes. The state has a monopoly on access and routinely monitors all communications.

3. (U) PSTN Telephone Service. The majority of telephones are in the capital city Baku and other main cities - about 700 villages still don't have public phone service. Baku has approximately 280,000 telephones. All long distance calls must use Atroptelecom's lines.

4. (U) Internet. E-mail via several local internet service providers is available, as well as for public access from a number of internet cafés. Internet access is broadly enjoyed in urban areas, quite less so in more remote rural areas. Social media interactions are closely monitored by the government of Atropia.

g. (U) Attachments and Detachments.

(1) (U) Attachments. EWO from United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

(2) (U) Detachments. EWO to CJTF-OIG MNF EWCC.

2. (U) **Mission**. CFLCC will seize, retain, and exploit an advantage over Ariana in both cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, while simultaneously denying and degrading Ariana's use of the same, in order to clear all Arianian forces from Atropian sovereign territory.

3. (U) **Execution**.

a. (U) Scheme of Cyber Electromagnetic Activities. CFLCC will employ integrated and synchronized CO, EW, and SMO to deceive the Ariana Armed Forces, manage regional perception, and deny the enemy's ability to exploit cyberspace, in order to shape the operational environment for unified land operations. Employment of CEMA will strictly support CFLCC maneuver and, will not detract from the Atropian government's ability to govern within its own territorial boundaries.

(1) (U) Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO). CFLCC will conduct DCO by detecting, identifying, and responding to Arianian offensive actions against friendly networks and the information resident in those networks, and in particular LandWarNet (LWN). Internal defensive measures will involve counter reconnaissance within LWN to locate internal threats and respond to unauthorized activity or alerts. This includes a perimeter router, firewall, an intrusion detection and protection system, domain name server, web proxy, and host-based security system that blocks, deceives, or redirects the threat. In addition, mission-specific tailored computer code will be employed inside LandWarNet to identify and mitigate threats that have bypassed routine defense measures.

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(2) (U) Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO). During Phase I, cyberspace attack capabilities will be coordinated to support deception operations by creating simultaneous and complementary effects. Cyberspace attack will be employed in conjunction with electronic silence, offensive space control, and fires, to deceive the Ariana into believing that CFLCC, as CJTF-OIG main effort, is moving into a defensive posture within Atropia. Maneuver will be supported by cyberspace manipulation, which includes decoying, conditioning, and spoofing within Arianian information systems. Civil social networking and unclassified regional government networks will not be targeted for OCO, in order to prevent undesired collateral impact on the bona-fide requirement for regional nations to govern.

b. (U) Scheme of Electronic Warfare. During Phase I, electronic deception techniques to project false targets and duplicate existing targets, along with defensive EA, will be employed. EP will be employed throughout. Regular and recurring awareness briefs to all Coalition personnel will be provided in order to create and enhance a wide understanding of how to safeguard against Arianian EA. ES will be employed throughout to corroborate other sources of information/intelligence and identify any EM vulnerabilities within Arianian electronic capabilities and systems. Priority of EW support during Phase I and Phase II is 1 ID. Priority of EW support will be 4 (MN) DIV for Phases III and IV. For Phases II-IV, EA will be employed O/O. Within EA, passive radio-frequency countermeasures are authorized for employment throughout. ES assets will be tasked to provide threat recognition, targeting, and future/deep operations planning. Coordination responsibility rests with CFLCC EWO and G2.

c. (U) Scheme of Spectrum Management Operations. Theatre spectrum management will be coordinated through the Joint Frequency Management Office (JFMO) at HQ CJTF-OIG. CFLCC spectrum management, frequency assignment, and host-nation coordination will place a high priority on ensuring that the host nation is unimpeded by CFLCC access to and usage of the electromagnetic operational environment. The host-nation spectrum worldwide database portal on CENTRIXS-OIG will be employed throughout, with extension to TCNs. Frequency deconfliction will occur at each command level, with the overall authority being HQ CJTF-OIG.

d. (U) Tasks.

(1) (U) All

- (a) (U) Provide CEMA input to High Payoff Target List,
- (b) (U) Provide CEMA input to Target Information Folders,
- (c) (U) Contribute CEMA input to target Synchronization Matrix,
- (d) (U) Provide frequency spectrum requirements and nominations to the JRFL,
- (e) (U) Maintain and update CEMA-related critical information requirements,
- (f) (U) Maintain and update CEMA-related EEFI,
- (g) (U) Maintain and update own spectrum plan, as integrated into CFLCC plan.

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- e. (U) Coordinating Instructions.
 - (1) (U) Running CEMA Estimate POC: CFLCC G3 EWO.
 - (2) (U) CEMA input to Targeting Working Group: fires, signals, intelligence.
 - (3) (U) CEMA Asset Status Reports (CASR): daily addressed to CFLCC G3 EWO.
- 4. (U) Sustainment. See Annex F.
- 5. (U) Command and Signal.
 - a. (U) Command.
 - (1) (U) CEMA POC: CFLCC G3 EWO
 - (2) (U) Liaison: EWO from United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. CFLCC EWO to CJTF-OIG. Unclassified liaison with host nation telecom and computer companies through Atropia Armed Forces only.
 - b. (U) Reports. See Annex R.

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APPENDIX 13 (MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(U) References:

- (a) JP-3-13.2 Psychological Operations 07 January 2010
- (b) US Army FM 3-13 Inform and Influence Activities 25 January 2013
- (c) Joint Publication 3-13.2 Military Information Support Operations 20 Dec 2011

1. (U) Situation.

a. (U) Background. See paragraph 1 of the main body of CFLCC OPORD 07, Annex B - Intelligence and Appendix 15 to Annex C Information Operations. CJTF- Op IRON GUARDIAN (OIG) Phase I (Deployment and Defensive Operations) has been completed and all CFLCC formations and Military Information Support Operations (MISO) units and enablers are in theater. The 82nd Airborne Division and Atropian (AP) Armed Forces have successfully stalled the Arianian advance into Atropia. As the main effort in the CJTF-OIG next phase, Phase II (Decisive Offensive Operations), CFLCC will now conduct Op IRON GUARDIAN, entailing decisive joint operations to clear all Arianian forces from Atropian sovereign territory.

b. (U) General. MISO employs Psychological Operations (PSYOP), which are planned activities using methods of communication and other means directed at approved audiences in order to influence perceptions, attitudes, and behavior, affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. The overall aim is to contain the situation and prevent escalation within the framework of a comprehensive approach. There is significant scope for MISO and PSYOP effects in the context of the planned CFLCC mission.

c. (U) Host Nations Considerations. The size of the Area of Operations (AO) and nature of the information environment and the population of Atropia will necessitate some reliance on the Host Nation's means to broadcast and disseminate messages to identified Target Audiences (TAs). Atropia has openly agreed to cooperate with CJTF-OIG and CFLCC and has granted Coalition forces with access to state controlled media as a means to address Target Audiences.

d. (U) Threat Considerations.

(1) (U) The Arianian information environment is strongly influenced by strict censorship with the resultant self-censorship of the actors in the media domain. Consequently, the PSYOP ability to penetrate and influence audiences is highly limited and requires indirect/intermediate audiences and methods to achieve the desired effects.

(2) (U) The Arianian regime has historically used propaganda to influence or attempt to influence the Atropian populace and the International Community and it is expected that they will continue such activities. The Arianian government and the South Atropian People's Army (SAPA) have mounted a carefully constructed, well-orchestrated, world-wide propaganda campaign as part of their strategic agenda.

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Arianian information activities (IA) have already successfully affected the information environment of Host Nations (HNs), mainly leveraging ethnic, political, security, and commercial issues, leading to further de-stabilization. Arianian state broadcasting services and military forces undertake extensive measures to understand, paralyze, and persuade their adversaries. Arianian military PSYOP elements provide a coordinating function for overarching information operations, including the systematic misinformation of a range of Target Audiences using multiple social media platforms.

(3) (U) Arianian PSYOP themes and messages are spread through an extended use of local radio, national TV, social media, Key Leader Engagements (KLE) and interviews with foreign press. There have been indications of undercover Arianian Special Forces, agents and proxies engaging with local Atropian populations as well as International Organizations and NGOs. CJTF-OIG-assessed Arianian main PSYOP themes and master messages are listed in para 1.d(6) of Appx 1 (Information Operations) to Annex C

2. (U) **Mission.** 9th Military Information Support Battalion (9th MISB) supported by CFLCC enablers and operating as part of an integrated Influence Activities campaign, conducts operations to minimize the impact of the Arianian PSYOP narrative and weaken the will and efficiency of the Arianian (AR) Armed Forces and other threat elements, while gaining and maintaining popular support for Coalition actions.

3. (U) **Execution.**

a. (U) **Concept of Operations.** MISO will contribute to Coalition achievement of Information Superiority in the Information Environment (IE) through the development of enhanced situational awareness, influence activities and exploitation of the Human Terrain (HT). MISO elements will ensure coordination with Atropian authorities in order to set the stage for Influence Activities to support CFLCC operations. Existing assessments of the IE will be further developed based on continuing in-theatre inputs. To support CFLCC decisive operations and to achieve information superiority, deployed MISO elements will diminish the effectiveness of the Arianian PSYOP narrative. In order to support stability, MISO will highlight AP Armed Forces' achievements and promote a safe and secure environment, thereby setting the stage for transition to a follow-on force and the redeployment of CJTF-OIG / CFLCC. Particular care should be taken regarding Arianian offensive cyber activities and attacks. All MISO elements, in close coordination with Info Ops, should be prepared to plan and execute mitigating actions. PSYOP will make use of existing Atropian media. Own media capabilities for production and dissemination/broadcast require radio (including FM, RIAB and short-wave broadcast), video/TV, print, tactical PSYOP (including loudspeakers/maritime, VHF broadcast and Internet/Social Media (SM)). MISO will support the CFLCC Military Deception Plan.

b. (U) **COM CFLCC Intent.** Throughout Operation IRON GUARDIAN, 9th MISB operating as part of an integrated Coalition Influence Activities campaign, will be employed with a focus on combat PSYOP and perception management to multiply the effects along the operational functions of command, sense, shield, and act. Whenever possible, 9th MISB will allocate a MISO company to each to 1st Inf Div, 82nd Abn Division and 4 (MN) Div throughout.

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c. (U) MISO End State. All Arianian forces have been expelled from Atropia and a lasting safe and secure environment exists, the Government of Atropia is regionally perceived as the legitimate state authority and the AP Armed Forces are capable of countering any threat from foreign forces, internal proxy forces, and organized armed groups within the country.

d. (U) Operational Design. MISO will contribute to the achievement of the following PSYOP operational decisive conditions (DC) and operational effects (OE):

(1) (U) PSYOP Line of Operation 1 - Theater Sustainment. MISO will support OE and DCs for smooth and unhindered Freedom of Movement and sustainment operations throughout the AO. Supported DCs:

- (a) (U) Threat against CFLCC Lines of Communication (LOC) is minimized.
- (b) (U) CFLCC Freedom of Movement is maintained.

(2) (U) PSYOP Line of Operation 2 – ASAM, CJTF-OIG and CFLCC Integrity. MISO will mainly address AN Armed Forces, its proxies, and supporters to diminish Arianian willingness and commitment to continue an aggressive posture and conduct hostile actions against Atropia. Integrated Influence activities will be also directed to the Atropian general public to better portray Coalition forces and AP Armed Forces and, simultaneously, toward both CFLCC and AP Armed Forces themselves so that they continue to display a professional and capable attitude and posture. Supported DCs:

- (a) (U) AN Armed Forces are deterred from further aggression.
- (a) (U) AN Armed Forces are removed from Atropia.
- (b) (U) AP Armed Forces capability and capacity is enhanced.
- (c) (U) Atropia takes the lead in maintaining national sovereignty, security, and stability.

(3) (U) PSYOP Line of Operation 3 - Support to Stability. Once CJTF-OIG / CFLCC legitimacy is consolidated in Atropia, CFLCC MISO will concentrate Influence Activities to ensure continuous support of Atropia, both in promoting governmental institutions' achievements and in AP Armed Forces capability to manage internal and external security. With a safe and secure environment, favorable conditions for Humanitarian Assistance activities will be more visible and effective and International Organizations and NGOs will benefit from a more permissive environment in which to operate. Supported DCs:

- (a) (U) Effective coordination mechanisms with Atropian civil authorities, AP Armed Forces, IOs, and NGOs in place.
- (b) (U) Atropian authorities are committed to improving governance, economic, and social conditions.
- (c) (U) Security conditions are favorable for Humanitarian ops.
- (d) (U) Favorable conditions set for stabilization and reconstruction efforts.
- (e) (U) Population in AO is supportive or at least neutral towards CFLCC.

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(f) (U) Positive CJTF-OIG / CFLCC contributions to regional stability recognized by Atropia and IC.

(g) (U) IDP/Refugee/Humanitarian situation is improved

e. (U) PSYOP Effects. Consistent with an integrated CJTF-OIG / CFLCC Information Activities campaign, intended PSYOP effects are:

(1) (U) Support for ASAM as a legitimate mission and CJTF-OIG / CFLCC as legitimate, determined, and capable forces is increased.

(2) (U) Effectiveness of Arianian hostile propaganda and misinformation directed against CJTF-OIG / CFLCC and Atropia is reduced.

(3) (U) Arianian offensive posture directed towards Atropia, CJTF-OIG, CFLCC and IC is reduced.

(4) (U) Ariana is compelled to withdraw from occupied Atropian territory.

(5) (U) Ariana influence into Atropia is degraded.

(6) (U) Atropian civil and military authorities' legitimacy and integrity is promoted.

(7) (U) The perception of AP Armed Forces is enhanced.

f. (U) Target Audiences. The following ICASS-approved Target Audiences are authorized for MISO:

(1) (U) General populations within the AO.

(2) (U) Atropian political and governmental decision makers, influencers, and communicators.

(3) (U) Atropian religious/ethnic/community/group influencers.

(4) (U) Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Refugees.

(5) (U) AP Armed Forces.

(6) (U) Atropian media.

(7) Ariana Government and AR Armed Forces.

(8) (U) Arianian civil Institutions and political parties.

(9) (U) Arianian paramilitaries, proxy forces, and cyber assets operating within the AO.

g. (U) Limitations.

(1) (U) The ICASS-approved PSYOP effects are the guidelines for all CFLCC MISO activities within the AO. Any requested change to these objectives must be submitted through CFLCC for CJTF-OIG support and ICASS approval.

(2) (U) CFLCC MISO activities acknowledge the source, and all PSYOP and products in the CFLCC AO should be ultimately attributable to CFLCC.

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(3) (U) CJTF-OIG / CFLCC MISO will not target the international media, the UN, ASAM /ICASS Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs), or the forces and civilian audiences of TCNs outside of the CJTF OIG JOA.

h. (U) Themes to Avoid.

(1) (U) Any discrepancy or disagreement within the Coalition or TCNs or between the Coalition and TCNs.

(2) (U) Any discrepancy or disagreement between CJTF-OIG /TCNs and HNs.

(3) (U) Any criticism of the UN, ASAM, ICASS or other International Organizations (IOs).

(4) (U) Any comments on the national policy of CJTF-OIG TCNs.

(5) (U) Any religious reference or innuendo.

(6) (U) Any ultimatum that cannot be immediately carried out.

i. (U) Scheme of Manoeuvre. As part of an integrated Influence Activities campaign, 9th MISB will provide MISO support to CFLCC for Op IRON GUARDIAN throughout the four operational phases as follows:

(1) (U) Phase I – Shape. MISO will contribute to the continuous development of a shared understanding, confirm Target Audience Analysis (TAA) identification, and contribute to the Information Preparation of the Operating Environment (IPOE). MISO enablers will confirm liaison with Atropian Governmental agencies and AP Armed Forces, and ensure a coordinated approach regarding messages, utilizing dedicated slots and space in Governmental media. Concurrently, MISO will mitigate the effectiveness of Arianian propaganda and misinformation directed against CJTF-OIG /CFLCC and Atropia. Special attention is to be paid to the Arianian ethnic minority in southern Atropia. PSYOP Objectives to be stressed in this phase will focus on supporting Coalition unity and resolve, legitimacy and credibility of the CFLCC, securing and maintaining Atropian support, countering Arianian propaganda, and attacking AR Armed Forces will to fight. MISO will support Information Ops in preparing the information environment to demonstrate CJTF-OIG and CFLCC close alignment and partnership with the rest of the international community to increase pressure on the Ariana government to withdraw its military forces from Atropia and to refrain from threatening CJTF-OIG / CFLCC LOC. MISO will support the CFLCC Military Deception Plan throughout.

(2) (U) Phase II – Clear. Continue as for Phase I, plus conduct full spectrum MISO operations within the Information Environment to contribute to the achievement of Information Supremacy and intensive support to the CFLCC tactical plan. This will be done through combat PSYOP, counter-PSYOP, and a targeted psychological campaign. We will gain and maintain information superiority, ensuring that the Arianian PSYOP narrative is neutralized and its offensive posture is degraded. In order to support CJTF-OIG / CFLCC decisive operations, MISO will affect the morale and the cohesion of Arianian security forces, especially HQs, First and Second Echelon elements and tactical reserves of AR Armed Forces OSC 2 but also communication nodes and logistics centers. This approach is also intended as a means to indirectly influence Arianian leadership.

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MISO will also expose the links between Ariana and its proxies operating in Atropia. We will direct and coordinate information activities to defeat the Ariana forces and provoke their full withdrawal from Atropia. IO will disrupt Arianian C4I by supporting Physical Destruction (PD), Electronic Warfare (EW), and MISO to diminish its propaganda, disrupt C2, degrade situational awareness and delay its decision-making in order to compel the withdrawal of Arianian military forces from Atropia. PSYOP will support Info Ops to degrade the Arianian will to fight by supporting Military Deception (MILDEC), MISO, and PD to elicit surrender and desertion from Arianian forces.

(3) (U) Phase III – Dominate. Same as for Phases I and II, plus we will focus on maintenance of Information Supremacy and domination of the Information Environment to reinforce complete CFLCC tactical success, bolster Atropian resolve and support, and to deter any slippage in Arianian compliance with the will of the International Community. Special attention is to be paid to AR Armed Forces OSC 1 in Ariana and asymmetric threats inside Atropia during this phase. The role of the Atropian government and AP Armed Forces in supporting CFLCC to achieve the Ariana withdrawal from Atropia is to be highlighted. Through timely coordination and information planning with enablers, MISO will provide early support to Info Ops in preparing the way for transition to the next phase of Op IRON GUARDIAN, which may include CFLCC support to Atropian civil and military capacity-building, reconstruction, and support to civil authorities and international organizations engaged in HA.

(4) (U) Phase IV – Stabilize. Same as Phase III, in addition MISO will directly support any CFLCC role in stabilization activities in Atropia. MISO main effort of this phase will be the improvement of the perception and achievements of the Government of Atropia and AP Armed Forces. In this phase, messaging will emphasize the continuous International Community effort, for Atropia specifically and the Caucasus generally, to reassure audiences during the disengagement of forces. Early attention is to be paid to the capture of CFLCC lessons learned and best practices, shaping regional and international perceptions of the mission and establishing a positive legacy for ASAM, CJTF-OIG and CFLCC. MISO must anticipate playing a strong role in supporting Info Ops in facilitating CFLCC support of the CJTF-OIG Phase III (Redeployment) which will likely include handover to a follow-on force or the Host Nation security forces.

j. (U) Coordinating Instructions.

(1) (U) Reach-Back. CFLCC MISO reach-back capability will be provided by the US (lead nation).

(2) (U) Intelligence. MISO support will identify intelligence gaps on Target Audience related issues for further processing and feedback.

(3) (U) Host Nation Assets. CFLCC and 9th MISB to arrange for MISO access to Atropian Government media. Private Atropian media has also been contracted based on operational requirements.

(4) (U) Influence Activities Coordination and Integration. MISO staff will ensure that planning, execution, and assessments are coordinated with Influence Activities at all levels.

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(5) (U) Requests for MISO support. 9th MISB, on behalf of CFLCC may request additional support for assets, capabilities, and products from 6th MISB (EUCOM) providing support to HQ CJTF-OIG.

(6) (U) Approval Authority.

(a) (U) Operational level MISO. COM CJTF-OIG will approve PSYOP products intended to achieve effects at the operational level.

(b) (U) Tactical level MISO. COM CFLCC is the approving authority for PSYOP products and actions intended to achieve effects at the tactical level. If a PSYOP product is likely to have operational effects, approval will be sought at the operational level (COM CJTF-OIG).

(7) (U) Allocation of 9th MISB Sub-units. A MISO Company allocated to 1st Inf Div, B Company to 82nd Abn Division and C Company to 4 (MN) Div.

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APPENDIX 14 TO ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

APPENDIX 14 (MILITARY DECEPTION) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(U) References:

- (a) JP 3-13.4 dated 13 July 2006
- (b) FM 6-0 dated May 2014
- (c) FM 90-2 dated 3 October 1988

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU.

1. (U) Situation.

a. (U) General. Military deception remains a key component in supporting the commander's plan. It is yet another tool or capability which is conducted as a process to manipulate the enemy's key decision-making. During OP IRON GUARDIAN, deception will play an important role towards the achievement of our military success. AN Armed Forces have occupied portions of southern Atropia for more than six months. AN forces have culminated and no doubt intend to retain the occupied territory as a challenge to the resolve of the United Nations generally, and CJTF-OIG specifically. The continued build-up of CJTF-OIG forces, supported by existing UNSCRs, signals an impending CJTF-OIG offensive. Deception operations will be employed to manipulate the enemy's decision-making process to set the conditions for CFLCC success

b. (U) Enemy.

(1) (U) Capabilities. AN has the capability to employ all aspects of information warfare against friendly forces, the civilian population of AP and social media writ large. AN can and will continue to employ a wide range of HUMINT operatives through its SPF forces, co-opted Atropian civilians, members of the proxies (SAPA, SAF etc.) and military eavesdropping and jamming assets. The AN Air Force has very limited assets available to conduct EW operations. The AN Navy has little or no EW capability remaining within their fleet.

(2) (U) Vulnerabilities. AN military vulnerabilities currently include:

(a) (U) Difficulties in communicating rapidly over long distances while under electronic attack.

(b) (U) A preponderance of non-compatible, unprotected, off-the shelf types of electronic equipment from multiple sources.

(c) (U) A heavy reliance on international media to provide the "Arianian Story" and direct messaging to international audiences and stakeholders.

(3) (U) Deception Targets. For the purposes of this order, the following players comprise CFLCC intended targets:

- (a) (U) Senior leadership of OSC 1 and OSC 2
- (b) (U) Senior leaders of the Arianian government
- (c) (U) Enemy HUMINT operatives and SPF forces operating inside of AP

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c. (U) Friendly Forces. Key players in the development, execution, monitoring and assessment of the deception plan for OP IRON GUARDIAN will include:

(1) (U) The CFLCC G-5 Military Deception (MD), who will coordinate all elements of the deception plan

(2) (U) CFLCC G2

(3) (U) 4 MND

(4) (U) Elements 82 ABN DIV

(5) (U) 10th SIG BDE

(6) (U) 9th MIS BN

(7) (U) 66th MI BDE

(8) (U) Elements 36 EN BDE

(9) (U) Elements 77 AVN BDE

(10) (U) Joint Fires

d. (U) Attachments and Detachments: Nil

2. (U) Mission. CFLCC conducts military deception operations in support of Op IRON GUARDIAN in order to mask friendly force intentions and influence Arianian actions.

3. (U) Execution.

a. (U) General. Refer to the main body of the OPORD, para 3a. This deception plan will follow the commander's intent within the four phases which make up Op IRON GUARDIAN. The overall intent during Phases I and II is to deceive the enemy with regard to the nature of our defensive posture as well as where the main effort will lie. In Phase III, the nature of deception will focus on what the future intentions of 1 ID are. In Phase IV, deception will be required along the southern border area of AP to make the enemy believe there is a stronger defensive force protecting the border area.

b. (U) Deception Goal. The CFLCC deception effort will portray the CFLCC main effort to be in the west, encouraging the already demonstrated desire of AN to seize GLOCs centered on Yevlakh/Khaldan/Mingecevir.

(1) (U) Phase I Objective. Deceive the enemy leadership of OSC 2 that CFLCC and Atropian forces are strengthening their defense along the FEBA rather than conducting preliminary moves in preparation for decisive counter attack.

(2) (U) Phase II Objectives.

(a) (U) Portray 1 ID attack in the west as the CFLCC main effort in order to cause OSC 2 to commit their assessed Reserve (i.e. 349 Tank and 353 Anti-Tank BTG).

(b) (U) Subsequently portray 3 CAV's hasty crossing of the Karu River in the north as the CFLCC main crossing (4 MND then crosses the Karu River further to the south).

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(3) (U) Phase III Objective. Continue to portray 1 ID in the west as CFLCC main effort to fix OSC 2.

(4) (U) Phase IV Objectives. Depict defense along the AN/AP border as stronger than it is and portray main effort in the west in order to discourage commitment of OSC1.

c. (U) Groupings and Tasks. See Tab A for outline tasks to be developed and promulgated separately by G5 CFLCC.

d. (U) Coordinating Instructions

(1) (U) Timings. Timings for all tasks and activities will be established as part of the task matrix at Tab A.

(2) (U) Assessment. Divisions and selected LCC Troops will participate in the assessment process. CFLCC G5 MD will prepare a daily assessment report in coordination with CFLCC G2 and CFLCC G3 Current Operations cells to highlight the following:

(a) (U) An evaluation of the deception measure(s) in place to ensure it continues to support Commander's intent.

(b) (U) An evaluation of how the target (enemy) is acting or not acting in response to the deception measure(s).

(c) (U) Monitoring for unintended consequences of the deception measure effected.

(d) (U) A determination of when criteria for termination are met.

4. (U) Service Support. No change, except that as part of the CFLCC ammunition supply process, there will be a number of selected locations where small-scale dumping will take place during daylight hours, and reloaded /repositioned on vehicles by night.

5. (U) Command and Signal.

a. (U) Command.

(1) (U) CFLCC POC for deception operations is G5 DM, Col XXXXXXXXXX

(2) (U) Divisions and 3 CAV to nominate and inform POCs for MD to CFLCC G5 MD.

b. (U) Signal. No change.

ATTACHMENTS:

Tab A- Task Matrix for Military Deception Operations

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**TAB A TO APPENDIX 14 TO ANNEX C TO OPOD 07 (OPERATION IRON
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**TAB A (TASK MATRIX) TO APPENDIX 14 (MILITARY DECEPTION) TO ANNEX C
(OPERATIONS) TO OPOD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC (UNCLASSIFIED)**

SERIAL	DATE	UNIT/FMN	TASK	LOCATION	SPT BY	REMARKS
			PHASE I			
001	D-2to D	75 FA BDE/82 ABN DIV	Establish initial positions fwd of TAA GOLD within 82 ABN DIV sector, then relocate on evening of D Day	82 ABN DIV	16 MP BDE	82 ABN DIV to coord arty posn area locs
002	D-1 to D+3	4MND/3 CAV/16 MP BDE	Conduct decoy Mov Con CPX from area TAA GOLD and BRONZE	TAA GOLD/BRONZE	10 SIG BDE to coord	Liaise with 1 ID and 3 CAV on locations
003	D to D+2	4 MND	Conduct move from FAA to TAA SILVER under electronic silence	TAA SILVER	16 MP BDE	
004	D to D+2	3 CAV(-)	Conduct move from FAA to TAA BRONZE under electronic silence	TAA BRONZE	16 MP BDE	

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TAB A TO APPENDIX 14 TO ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

			PHASE II			
005	D+3 to D+6	Elms 82 ABN DIV	Conduct road move to Naftalan air assault staging area under rad silence		15 SUST BDE and 16 MP BDE	16 MP BDE to coord with 82 ABN DIV
006	D+3 to D+4	77 AVN BDE	Conduct feint airmobile operation	IVO Mirzəcamalli airfield (Fuzuli District)	CFACC	No med tpt hel to be tasked
			PHASE III			
007	D+8	CFACC	Conduct sustained jamming on AN 24 Mtzd DTG	24 Mtzd Div HQ		
008	D+9	CFACC	Conduct jamming missions onto OSC 2 elms from 1 ID Phase IV sector	Line Parsabad- Horadiz		
			PHASE IV			
009	From D+15	77 AVN BDE	BPT reinforce 1 ID through atk by fire demonstrations along 1 ID sector	IB along 1 ID sector	82 ABN DIV CAB	
010	From D+15	77 AVN BDE	Conduct support by fire demos in 3 CAV sector	IB along 3 CAV sector		
011	From D+15	CFACC	Provide CAP missions weighted within 1 ID sector.	IB along 1 ID sector		

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**TAB A TO APPENDIX 14 TO ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON
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012	From D+15	CFACC	BPT provide immed CAS spt to 3 CAV within sector.	IB along 3 CAV sector		
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APPENDIX 15 TO ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

**APPENDIX 15 (INFORMATION OPERATIONS) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS) TO
OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

(U) References:

- (a) FM 3-13 Inform and Influence Activities, Jan 2013
- (b) Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations, Nov 2012
- (c) Joint Publication 3-53 Civil-Military Operations, 08 Jul 2008
- (d) Joint Publication 3-13.2 Military Information Support Operations 20 Dec 2011
- (e) Atropia Country Study
- (f) Ariana Country Study
- (g) CJTF-OIG OPORD 01 Op IRON GUARDIAN, Annex O- Information Operations (insert date)

1. (U) Situation

a. (U) Background. See paragraph 1 of the main body of CFLCC OPORD 07, Annex B - Intelligence and Reference g. CJTF- Op IRON GUARDIAN (OIG) Phase I (Deployment and Defensive Operations) has been completed and all CFLCC formations and IO enablers are in theatre. The 82nd Airborne Division and Atropian forces have successfully stalled the Arianian advance into Atropia. As the main effort in CJTF-OIG next phase, Phase II (Decisive Offensive Operations), CFLCC will now conduct Op IRON GUARDIAN, entailing decisive joint operations to clear all Arianian forces from Atropian sovereign territory.

b. (U) General. Information Operations (IO) is the military advisory and coordinating function that targets and affects information and information systems, human or technical, of approved parties and audiences in order to achieve desired effects while protecting one's own. The goal of IO is to gain and maintain information superiority in the Area of Operations (AO).

c. (U) Strategic Guidance. During Op IRON GUARDIAN, IO will contribute decisively to Domain Awareness, Situational Understanding and Domination of the Information Environment in support of COM CJTF-OIG's and COM CFLCC's plans. CFLCC will deny Arianian forces and their proxy groups, insurgents, and/or Arianian-supported criminal elements the ability to effectively command and control their forces by defeating their command, control, communications, computer and Intelligence (C4I) systems. Communications for this operation will continue in support of crisis resolution and humanitarian assistance across diplomatic, information and economic domains. They will attempt to mitigate the potential for further Arianian incursion into Atropia, attacks on CJTF-OIG forces or interference in LOCs and encourage an Arianian withdrawal from Atropia. We must ensure that key audiences clearly understand the ASAM mission and CJTF-OIG / CFLCC deployment, intentions and determination to succeed. This will reinforce our deterrence function, help to de-escalate the situation and contribute to Coalition cohesion and legitimacy. The prioritized audiences are: Arianian civil and military leadership and opinion formers; Atropian civil and military leadership, opinion formers and populations; and our Coalition members' populations and opinion formers.

APPENDIX 15 TO ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

d. (U) Threat Considerations. (Also see Annex B - Intelligence).

(1) (U) Ariana's activities in the cognitive domain are fully integrated with its manipulation and management of the Information Environment (IE) within its borders. Ariana's narrative, linked to its overarching national strategy, is focused on its right to access additional oil resources in the Caspian Sea and on the abuse of the Arianian minority in Atropia. With the invasion of Atropia, Ariana wants to force Atropia to accept an agreement that would meet its needs and gain de facto control and distribution of more oil resources. Ariana's government is reliant on public acquiescence, driven by misinformation. Ariana's home audiences are likely to be largely supportive of the invasion of Atropia. The Ariana regime has historically used propaganda to influence or attempt to influence the Atropian populace and the international community and it is expected that they will continue such activities.

(2) (U) Ariana's information campaign is supported by controlled state media and state-sponsored censorship of all forms of media. Consequently, self-censorship at all levels has become normalized. With its monopoly on provision of information, the Arianian Government has presented a distorted picture to international audiences of the actual humanitarian situation, especially in the occupied part of Atropia, in attempting to justify the presence of its troops in that country. Access to the Internet is heavily controlled. The favoured means of mass communication is to utilize government-funded radio and TV. Rural communities are isolated and state propaganda is accepted at face value.

(3) (U) Ariana's military C4I systems are modern and sophisticated threats. Arianian military forces use their information capabilities to promote disinformation in order to manipulate public perception and maintain control. They will use asymmetric techniques to counter the ASAM/CJTF-OIG narrative using Information Warfare (IW). Ariana employs proxy forces to conduct Psychological Operations within Atropia, in order to incite the Arianian minority there and to provide false information to interfere with International Organizations and NGOs. The South Atropian People's Army (SAPA) operating in the area appears to have the support of the Arianian government.

(4) (U) Expect Arianian forces to continue to mount sophisticated information operations in support of their overall military campaign. During operations, Ariana forces will use messengers, and Frequency-Modulated (FM) and Amplitude-Modulated (AM) radios for routine communications. There are reports of recent acquisitions throughout the region of commercial hand-held FM radios, which are vulnerable to monitoring, jamming, and exploitation. Face-to-face communication has been influential and effective among the local populace in crisis situations. Ariana and its proxies can organize a network of human intelligence (HUMINT) operatives supported with sufficient off-the-shelf electronic eavesdropping and jamming devices to interfere with friendly operations throughout the AO. Conversely Ariana's counter-battery radars are vulnerable to Electronic Warfare (EW),

(5) (U) Ariana's GPS jammers are capable of disrupting UAS guidance and GPS guided munitions. In addition, Ariana has demonstrated the ability to conduct Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks against Atropian and Coalition unclassified networks as well as commercial and local networks within the civilian sector. With the combination of Electronic Warfare (EW) and Cyberspace Operations (CO) capabilities, Ariana possesses the ability to disrupt command and control.

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(6) (U) It is assessed that the Arianian government will continue to mount, both regionally and world-wide, a carefully constructed, well-orchestrated propaganda campaign in an attempt to:

- (a) (U) Justify its incursion into Atropian territory.
- (b) (U) Undermine the premise for and legitimacy of ASAM.
- (c) (U) Deny and discredit allegations leveled at Ariana by Atropia, the UN and the International Community.
- (d) (U) Undermine the legitimacy and credibility of CJTF-OIG and CFLCC as a well-organized, trained, capable, determined UN-sanctioned multinational force.
- (e) (U) Undermine government and public support in Atropia and Gorgas for CJTF-OIG, especially their support and cooperation as Host Nations.
- (f) (U) Support claims of abuse and denial of rights of Arianian minorities in Atropia.
- (g) (U) Undermine Atropian claims and correspondingly support Arianian claims to petroleum assets in the Caspian Sea.
- (h) (U) Undermine the impartiality of International, state actors, and media organizations reporting on Ariana's actions in the region.

e. (U) Host Nation Civil Considerations.

(1) (U) The Government of Atropia has only recently begun to transition away from an authoritarian type government to a more representational democracy. Atropia faces significant internal issues that must be factored into all Information Operations. While the Host Nations, Gorgas and Atropia, support Coalition intentions in the region, it can be expected that their military and police forces may sometimes use non-democratic means to control their populations. These may include psychological operations against their own citizens and especially against ethnic minorities within their borders.

(2) (U) The size of the AO and nature of the information environment and population in Atropia will necessitate some reliance on the Host Nation's means to broadcast and disseminate messages to identified Target Audiences (TAs). Host Nations have agreed to cooperate with CJTF-OIG and grant access to state controlled media as means to address Target Audiences.

(3) (U) The presence of large numbers of Atropian citizens displaced from their homes because of collateral damage, or fleeing in the face of hostile operations, will require careful targeting and restrictive ROE to prevent civilian casualties. Air assets may be required to conduct Non-Traditional Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (NTISR) to monitor displaced civilian movements and civil unrest/demonstrations. Existing IDP camps will need to be identified in coordination with HN, Interagency, and NGO representatives.

2. (U) **Mission.** Operating as part of an integrated Coalition Influence Activities campaign, Information Operations will shape the AO to achieve Information Superiority and dominate the Information Environment through the coordinated contribution of enablers in support of the COM CFLCC's mission.

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APPENDIX 15 TO ANNEX C TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

3. (U) Execution

a. (U) Concept of Operations.

(1) (U) General. In order to achieve Information Superiority and dominate the Information Environment, the coordinated contribution of all IO enablers will be essential throughout all phases. This will produce synchronized effects on the determination, will and morale of targeted audiences. It will also serve to deter and defeat threats to CFLCC objectives while maintaining the support and confidence of Coalition partners, local populations and the International Community. An important focus will be on mitigating negative responses to CJTF-OIG/CFLCC operations, marginalizing Arianian forces and their proxies, and influencing key decision makers.

(2) (U) Intent. In the Information Environment, IO will contribute to the achievement of CFLCC Information Superiority as early as possible and gradually move towards achieving Information Supremacy. IO enablers will be employed within an overall Coalition Information Activities campaign, with a view to support Information Objectives in an aggressive and pro-active manner in order to maintain the IO initiative. Coordination and synchronization of associated enabling functions are to focus on flexible responses to consequence management and exploitation of opportunities. IO will support this mission by disrupting Arianian C4I, diminishing the Arianian “will to fight,” persuading the Atropian civilian populace to cooperate with Coalition operations, and by protecting friendly information systems in order to compel the withdrawal of Arianian forces, thereby enabling the restoration of a secure and stable environment and contributing to the capacity of Atropian civil authority and security forces. IO supports operations during all phases to shape the Information Environment in the AO and the Area of Influence by synchronizing, coordinating and de-conflicting Information Related Capabilities (IRC). IO disrupts enemy C4I by supporting Physical Destruction (PD), Electronic Warfare (EW) and Military Information Support Operations (MISO) to diminish enemy propaganda, disrupt enemy C2, degrade enemy situational awareness and delay enemy decision-making in order to compel the withdrawal of Arianian military forces from Atropia. IO degrades the Arianian will to fight by supporting Military Deception (MILDEC), MISO and PD to elicit surrender and desertion from Arianian forces in order to discredit the Arianian military presence in Atropia. IO protects friendly information systems by employing OPSEC and Cyberspace Operations (CO) to deny enemy access to friendly force capabilities in order to enhance Force Protection. IO influences the Atropian populace to cooperate with CFLCC forces by employing MISO, EW, CMO, PSYOPS and leveraging unity of effort with interagency, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions and the private sector in order to achieve security and stability in the AO.

b. (U) IO Objectives. IO objectives in support of COM CFLCC’s mission are:

(1) (U) Promote Coalition unity, capability, and resolve.

(2) (U) Promote the legitimacy and credibility of ASAM, CJTF-OIG, and CFLCC. Influence the Host Nation civil authorities, military forces, and population, as well as International Organizations and NGOs operating in the AO, to trust, support and cooperate with CJTF-OIG and CFLCC.

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(3) (U) Persuade Atropian forces to continue to fight in order to set conditions for the re-establishment of a safe and secure environment and promote efforts to build the Atropian population's trust and confidence in the Atropian government and military forces.

(4) (U) Counter Arianian propaganda and its narrative. Refute Arianian justifications for its incursion into Atropia. Disrupt Ariana's C4I and degrade its "will to fight".

(5) (U) Protect Coalition information systems and decision-making processes by employing OPSEC and physical security to deny enemy access to friendly capabilities.

(6) (U) Protect CJTF-OIG/CFLCC Freedom of Movement in the Information Environment.

c. (U) IO Themes. These are general thoughts or ideas that augment the IO Lines of Effort to inform and/or influence a target audience, used in engagements and to develop messages and talking points. The themes will be updated regularly. Examples include:

(1) (U) Security and Stability. All Atropians deserve freedom from violence and fear. The fight is not against the Arianian people, but the brutal Arianian government. The Arianian military and people are misled by their government's lies and ambitions. The Atropia Security and Assistance Mission (ASAM) was authorized by the UN to protect the territorial integrity of Atropia and to help restore a secure and stable environment for the Atropian people.

(2) (U) Legitimacy. The future of Atropia is in the hands of the Atropian people and the Atropian government. Humanitarian assistance is a high priority to the people of the Atropia and is supported by the Commanders of Atropian and Coalition forces. ASAM is a UN-sanctioned mission and CJTF-OIG/CFLCC forces are well-trained, ethical, competent, credible, acting under a UN mandate with the welcome support and assistance of the international community, in particular the governments of Gorgas and Atropia.

(3) (U) Economic and Social Progress. Acting in accordance with the Rule of Law, and with the support of the international community, Atropian authorities will continue to promote effective democratic governance and economic and social progress to the benefit of all its citizens throughout the CJTF-OIG/CFLCC deployment and after it has withdrawn.

d. (U) Scheme of Manoeuvre. IO support to CFLCC corresponds to the four operational phases for Op IRON GUARDIAN as follows:

(1) (U) Phase I – Shape. IO will contribute to the continuous development of a shared understanding and will conduct Information Preparation of the Operating Environment (IPOE) in cooperation with the Intelligence IPOE process. The IPOE, Target Audience Analysis (TAA) and enemy electronic ORBAT should be refined to the point where they can be used to inform the targeting process. An IO Supporting Plan will be developed and will include refinement of Information Objectives (above) to enable the development of tactical plans by enablers to support operational objectives.

Information Objectives to be stressed in this phase will focus on supporting Coalition unity and resolve, legitimacy and credibility of the CFLCC, securing and maintaining Atropian support and countering Arianian propaganda. Approval of Target Audiences will continue to be sought from respective authorities at all levels, as appropriate. We will prepare the information environment

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to demonstrate CJTF-OIG and CFLCC close alignment and partnership with the rest of the international community to increase pressure on the Ariana government to withdraw its military forces from Atropia and to refrain from threatening CJTF-OIG LOC. We will direct and coordinate information activities in the AO, focusing on setting the conditions to counter Ariana's dominance of the Information Battlespace and will conduct offensive Information Operations against Ariana with the means that are available. Support the CFLCC Military Deception Plan.

(2) (U) Phase II – Clear. Continue as for Phase I, plus IO enablers will conduct full spectrum operations within the Information Environment to achieve Information Supremacy and intensive support to the CFLCC tactical plan. We will direct and coordinate information activities to defeat the Ariana forces and provoke their full withdrawal from Atropia. IO will disrupt Arianian C4I by supporting Physical Destruction (PD), Electronic Warfare (EW) and MISO to diminish its propaganda, disrupt C2, degrade situational awareness and delay its decision-making in order to compel the withdrawal of Arianian military forces from Atropia. IO will degrade the Arianian will to fight by supporting Military Deception (MILDEC), MISO and PD to elicit surrender and desertion from Arianian forces in order to discredit the Arianian military presence in Atropia

(3) (U) Phase III – Dominate. Same as for Phases I and II, plus we will focus on maintenance of Information Supremacy and domination of the Information Environment to reinforce complete CFLCC tactical success, bolster Atropian resolve and support, and to deter any slippage in Arianian compliance with the will of the International Community. Through timely coordination and information planning with enablers, IO will start to prepare the way for transition to Phase IV (Stabilize), which may include CFLCC support to Host Nation civil and military capacity-building, reconstruction and support to civil authorities and international organizations engaged in HA.

(4) (U) Phase IV – Stabilize. Same as Phase III, plus IO will directly support any CFLCC role in stabilization activities in Atropia. Early attention is to be paid to the capture of lessons learned and best practices, shaping regional and international perceptions of the mission and establishing a positive legacy for ASAM, CJTF-OIG and CFLCC. IO must anticipate playing a strong role in facilitating CFLCC support of the CJTF-OIG redeployment, which will likely include handover to a follow-on force or the Host Nation security forces.

e. (U) Tasks. Operating within an orchestrated Information Activities campaign, tasks for CFLCC IO staff and enablers include:

- (1) (U) Coordinate the CFLCC Information Operations campaign.
- (2) (U) Disrupt Arianian C4I and reduce Arianian Forces will to fight.
- (3) (U) Influence the local populace to cooperate with Coalition forces.
- (4) (U) Exploit Arianian military personnel captures/surrenders.
- (5) (U) Counter Arianian propaganda and media inaccuracies.
- (6) (U) Exploit Arianian atrocities.
- (7) (U) Protect friendly information systems.

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(8) (U) Develop and coordinate target lists to disrupt, damage, and destroy Arianian military/paramilitary ability to develop, produce, and disseminate propaganda activity.

(9) (U) Develop and coordinate target lists to disrupt Arianian C4I capabilities.

(10) (U) Conduct MISO to prevent local civilian interference with operations and to gain support for coalition forces.

(11) (U) Coordinate with civil affairs for Humanitarian Assistance support.

(12) (U) Nominate Captured HVI target packages for exploitation.

(13) (U) Submit evidence of enemy use of schools, hospitals, and other prohibited sites for military purposes to de-legitimize Arianian government/military and protect the local populace.

(14) (U) Inform national and international audiences of friendly force progress and efforts to reinforce the strength, legitimacy and good intentions of ASAM, CJTF-OIG and CFLCC.

(15) (U) Inform Arianian audiences of CJTF-OIG successes and inevitable victory in order to diminish the Arianian political and military will.

(16) (U) Exploit any brutality by Arianian paramilitary forces (e.g., kidnapping, torture, murder, IDF and IED attacks that injure civilians, and use of residential areas or protected sites as operational bases).

(17) (U) Exploit Atropian participation in successful IDP/refugee returns.

(18) (U) Report locations of broadcast facilities (radio, TV, print facilities).

(19) (U) Be prepared to conduct security area leaflet drops utilizing CJTF-OIG/CFLCC air/aviation assets.

f. (U) Coordinating Instructions.

(1) (U) IO Enablers. IO enablers will contribute to mission success through the following functions:

(a) (U) Influence Activities (IA). Influence behaviour, perception, and will.

(b) (U) Military Information Support Operations (MISO). Additional details in Appendix 13 to Annex C.

(c) (U) Civil Affairs Operations. Additional details in Annex K.

(d) (U) Key Leader Engagements (KLE) and Outreach Activities.

(e) (U) Presence, Posture and Profile (PPP).

(f) (U) Military Deception (MILDEC).

(g) (U) Public Affairs (PA). Additional details in Annex J.

(h) (U) Information Protection Activities (IPA). Protect and control information.

(i) (U) Computer Network Operations (CNO).

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(j) (U) Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA). Additional details in Appendix 12 to Annex C.

(k) (U) Operations Security (OPSEC).

(l) (U) Information Security (INFOSEC).

(m)(U) Counter Intelligence (CI).

(n) (U) Counter Command Activities (CCA). Affect the C2 capability of the adversary through the targeting process.

(o) (U) Manoeuvre.

(p) (U) Physical Attack/Destruction.

(2) (U) OPSEC Violations. Report possible OPSEC violations to Protection Cell as soon as possible. Protect Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI).

(3) (U) Video images (COMCAM, PA, EOD, Soldier Cam). Employ COMCAM and other still photo/video capabilities to capture images in support of objectives and effects. Images are submitted for exploitation. Images desired for use by any unit will be declassified by the unit involved in capturing the image. During crisis situations, special arrangements will be made to transport images, video, or data from field locations to areas where images can be exploited.

(4) (U) Coordinating Bodies. Additional coordinating bodies will be activated, such as Information Operations Working Groups (IOWG), the Information Operations Coordination Boards (IOCB), and the Products Approval Boards.

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**APPENDIX 16 (ENEMY PRISONER-OF-WAR (EPW)/CPERS) TO ANNEX C
(OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

(U) References:

- (a) STANAG 2195 (AJP 2.5) Allied Joint Doctrine for Captured Persons, Materiel, and Documents
- (b) FM 3-39.40 Internment, February 2010
- (c) CFLCC-OPORD 07 OP IRON GUARDIAN

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU

1. General.

a. Command and National Responsibilities. EPW/CPERS detainee operations are a command responsibility at all levels, supported by Military Police (MP). The safe and humane handling of detainees is a national responsibility. The EPW/CPERS process is structured to provide the requisite care, custody and control of all persons detained under Coalition/multi-national forces' authority. Given the fluidity of operations this process must have the inherent flexibility that will permit us to minimize the impact of EPW/CPERS operations on our forces in the conduct of tactical operations. The US has agreed to be Lead Nation for the handling and disposition of EPWs.

b. Categorization. In accordance with references A and B, all detainees (Captured Persons (CPERS) IAW reference A) will be categorized as soon as possible and treated as either Enemy Prisoners-of-War (EPW), other detainees/CPERS (criminals, non-EPW entitled belligerents, etc.), Civilian Internees or Retained Personnel (medical or religious). Retained Personnel are considered as EPWs, but with additional considerations/provisions as indicated under Article 3 of the Geneva Convention. EPWs will be treated in accordance with accepted international agreements and references. EPWs will be processed according to the agreed US-led process within accepted agreements, and other detainees/CPERS will be processed and evacuated under the nationally-controlled processes of the holding power.

c. Capture/Release. Although tactical situations may oblige commanders to detain persons during the conduct of operations, it is the responsibility of National Commanders at all levels to determine individual categorization as either an EPW or other detainee/CPERS, and immediately field release all others IAW their national directives. Once a determination has been made to further retain the detained person and a CPERS Internment Serial Number has been assigned, only the National Commander of the capturing nation has the authority to release or transfer to other nations those categorized as CPERS. In any case, those categorized as EPW are captured enemy combatants, and are to be held as EPWs IAW references until cessation of hostilities.

2. Reporting.

a. EPW/CPERS Reporting. In accordance with national directives, all EPW or other CPERS in Coalition custody shall be reported via official means by using a Common Capture Report (COMCAPREP).

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b. Facility Reporting. All temporary holding facilities (subordinate formation Detainee Holding Areas (DHAs) and Detainee Collection Points (DCPs)) established for use in the CLFCC AO shall be identified and reported to the CFLCC PM.

3. **Facilities**.

a. Due to differing legal, custodial and handling requirements, EPW and other CPERS are not to be held together in the same facility (i.e., if in the same facility they must be segregated), unless exceptional circumstances warrant. 1 ID and 4 MND will initially establish Div-level EPW/CPERS DHAs in assigned TAAs by D+5. Subordinate divisions will coordinate the further movement of EPWs to a CFLCC DHA in Mingecevir, Atropia. CFLCC, specifically 16 MP Bde, will coordinate the onward movement of EPWs to one of the CJTF-OIG-controlled Theatre Detention Facilities (TDFs) at either Gazakh, Atropia or Marneuli, Gorgas, depending upon the location/country of capture. Movement and transfer of CPERS other than EPW will be done consistent with national policies, under the control of the holding nation and in accordance with their national agreements for transfer of custody.

b. As required, Divs and below will establish national or other temporary or semi-permanent Collection Points and Holding Areas in the vicinity of main supply routes and appropriate medical and support facilities.

c. The US National Commander will establish CJTF-OIG EPW/CPERS Theatre Detention Facilities at Gazakh, Atropia and Marneuli, Gorgas.

4. **Procedures for Interrogation/Debriefing**. See Tab A (EPW/Civilian Detainees) to Appendix 4 (HUMINT) to Annex B (Intelligence).

5. **Transfer/Evacuation**.

a. Transfer/Movement. Transfer of EPW to CLFCC/CJTF-OIG and of other detainees/CPERS to Host Nation custody may occur, with follow-up on their care activities as detailed fully at the **Host Nation Transfer Agreement**. Operational requirements may force acceptance of EPW or other Detainees from, or transfer to, other Coalition nations but this shall be the exception and not the norm. Only the National Commander or his designated representative can authorize the acceptance or transfer of EPW or other Detainees to or from another nation.

b. Transportation. In accordance with the references, all modes of transportation available within CFLCC shall be prepared to transport EPW/CPERS. Maximum use of empty vehicles conducting replenishment to Division Support Areas, 310th ESC, etc. should be used. If integral transport is not available, a request for transport of EPW/CPERS must be made to CFLCC. The formation requesting transport support shall provide own escort. Other nations' transport may be used to transport detainees but they must be escorted by national-capturing personnel at all time until such time as formal transfer is made.

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6. Tasks.

a. Common to All.

(1) Provide engineer, MP and guard force support to the establishment, collapse, movement and re-establishment of Div/formation-level EPW/CPERS facilities, sited as the tactical situation warrants.

(2) Provide security escort of EPW/CPERS moving rearward to the CFLCC-level EPW and/or other (national) detention facilities.

(3) Transfer to Atoprian Authorities. Transfer of CPERS other than EPWs to Atropian authorities will be IAW respective national policies.

7. Staff Responsibilities.

a. CFLCC PM. Oversee, with the support of a Prisoner of War Holding Organization (PWHO), the CLFCC DHA.

b. CFLCC Surgeon. Coordinate (coord) health specialist support to the CFLCC EPW/CPERS process.

c. G1. Coord EPW/CPERS administration and welfare including the transfer/movement to the CJTF-OIG long-term TDF.

d. G2. Coord Interrogation process.

e. G3. Coord terrain management of facilities, tasking of guards/escorts and the EPW/CPERS reporting process.

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ANNEX D (JOINT FIRES) TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(U) References:

- (a) Joint Pub 3-0, *Joint Operations*, 11 August 2011.
- (b) Joint Pub 3-03, *Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations*, 10 April 1997.
- (c) Joint Pub 3-09, *Joint Fire Support*, 13 November 2006.
- (d) Joint Pub 3-56.1, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*, 14 November 1994.
- (e) Joint Pub 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*, 17 January 2002.

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu

1. (U) Situation.

- a. (U) Enemy Forces. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN), DTG.
- b. (U) Friendly Forces. Refer to Annex A (Task Organization) and paragraph 1e (Friendly Forces) to OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN), DTG.

2. (U) Mission. When directed, as a Component of CJTF-OIG, CFLCC employs joint firepower in support of Coalition operations in the CJTF-OIG Joint Operations Area (JOA).

3. (U) Execution.

a. (U) Commander's Guidance for Joint Firepower. Employ lethal and nonlethal capabilities to achieve prioritized effects that will contribute directly to the achievement of strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. As the Arianian (AN) OSC 2 has culminated, conditions are set to commence CJTF-OIG Phase II, Decisive Offensive Operations. In preparation, we will position field artillery rocket assets well forward to support deep fires and participate in J-SEAD while simultaneously maintaining air superiority over areas occupied by CJTF-OIG forces. As CFLCC forces commence the clearing of AN forces from Atropia (AP), joint fires will quickly neutralize enemy fire support, command and control systems, and destroy enemy air defense. Following the expulsion of AN forces from AP, joint fires will strike the forward elements of OSC 1, focused on command and control, air defense, and other core enablers along the international border; this will not only significantly reduce its combat power but send an unambiguous message to AN military and political leadership.

b. (U) Concept of Operations. Refer to paragraph 3a, Concept of Operations, to OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN), DTG.

c. (U) Concept of Joint Firepower. The CFLCC Joint Fires Effects Coordination Cell (JFECC) coordinates, synchronizes, and controls the employment of joint fires. Joint fires focus on the enemy in the operational environment affecting CFLCC operations. Joint fires provide decisive effects against the AN Armed Forces, anything less is unacceptable. A counterfire capability, under control of the Force Field Artillery Commander, remains extant throughout the operation. Initially, joint fires focus on shaping operations to isolate OSC 2 formations currently

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in AP from potential reinforcement and sustainment, setting the conditions for the expulsion of the enemy. As clearance operations commence, joint fires strike deep into the OSC 2 depth DTG and command and control structure, thus enhancing the sense of isolation within the two lead Division Tactical Groups (DTG). Upon defeat of OSC 2, joint fires support efforts reduce the combat power OSC 1 forward DTGs through the defeat of integrated air defense systems (IADS), long-range artillery systems, and command and control systems. Attack helicopters assist in the defeat of remaining maneuver elements of OSC 2 during the clearance of AN Armed Forces from AP before conducting, as required, attack by fire missions against OSC 1 first echelon DTGs.

(1) (U) Phase I (Shape).

(a) (U) Concept of Joint Firepower. CFLCC joint fires shape the battlespace degrading AN forces in AP while isolating them from potential reinforcement and sustainment while preparing for Phase II (Clear) operations. Air superiority over Coalition forces within AP will be maintained while setting the conditions for air superiority over northern AN.

(b) (U) Task. CFACC supports CFLCC by setting the conditions for CFLCC ground operations through attrition of the 24th Mtzd DTG. Joint fires initially isolate OSC 2 through defeat of their operational-level command and control and disruption of lines of communication. Air superiority is maintained over Coalition forces in AP gradually expanding to include those areas in AP currently under AN control. Joint fires support the expansion of air interdiction (AI) into AN through the application of J-SEAD.

(c) (U) Purpose. To set the conditions for successful clearance of AN Armed Forces from AP.

(d) (U) Execution. 75 FA Bde is designated the CFLCC Counterfire Headquarters (CFHQ) and will coordinate the positioning of all radars in order to locate and attack long-range fire support assets. Additionally, 75 FA BDE is designated the Force Field Artillery Headquarters and ATACMS authority for the duration of OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN. One MLRS battalion is GSR to 1 ID DIVARTY with two MLRS battalions GS to CFLCC. The HIMARS battalion is R to the 82 ABN DIV DIVARTY. J-SEAD is employed to support the expansion of air superiority over AP territory currently held by the AN Armed Forces and, when able, to support AI operations into northern AN. IO focuses on convincing OSC 2 leadership that further resistance is futile and to cease combat operations. IO garners and maintains public support of JTF-OIG and CFLCC while continuing to undermine public support and legitimacy of AN Armed Forces. Priority of fires is the provision of joint fires. FSCL is xxx.

(e) (U) Assessment. OSC 2 forward DTG air defense destroyed, command and control neutralized and divisional-level fire support reduced to 50percent. OSC 2 leadership wavering in its resolve and OSC 2 incapable of providing responsive fires. OSC 2 depth DTG unable to move forward and lines of communication to all three OSC 2 DTGs are disrupted.

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(f) (U) Targeting Priorities.

1. (U) Neutralize OSC 2 command and control.
2. (U) Destroy air defense of OSC 2 forward DTGs.
3. (U) Neutralize IADS preventing the expansion of AI into northern AN.
4. (U) Disrupt lines of communication from AN to OSC 2 DTGs in AP.
5. (U) Neutralize maneuver formations of OSC 2 depth DTG.

(g) (U) CJTF-OIG Air Apportionment.

1. (U) Defensive Counter Air (DCA) – 15percent
2. (U) Offensive Counter Air (OCA) – 20percent
3. (U) Air Interdiction (AI) – 40percent
4. (U) SEAD – 20percent
5. (U) Close Air Support (CAS) – 5percent

(h) (U) CFLCC CAS Distribution.

1. (U) 1 ID -
2. (U) 4 MND -
3. (U) 82 ABN DIV –
4. (U) AP OSC Southern Command (ASC) -
5. (U) CFLCC -

(2) (U) Phase II (Clear).

(a) (U) Concept of Joint Firepower. CFLCC joint fires continue to shape the battlespace through the destruction of OSC 2 command and control and continuing the attrition of OSC depth echelon DTG. Air superiority is maintained over AP and begins to extend into northern AN. Joint fires ensure that OSC 2 depth DTG in AP remains immobile, unable to reinforce forward DTGs.

(b) (U) Task. CFACC supports CFLCC operations in AP through the provision of CAS, particularly in support of 1 ID defeat of 23 Mech DTG and 347 Mech BTG. CFACC provides AI against OSC 2 depth DTG defeating their air defense systems and ensuring that they remain immobile. Counterfire destroys any identified AN Armed Forces fire support assets in AP.

(c) (U) Purpose. Set the conditions for the destruction of OSC 2 as a fighting force.

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(d) (U) Execution. 75 FA BDE remains the CFLCC Counterfire Headquarters (CFHQ) and will coordinate the positioning of all radars in order to locate and attack long-range fire support assets. One HIMARS battalion is provided R to 82 ABN DIV DIVARTY and one MLRS battalion R to 1 ID DIVARTY. One MLRS battalion is GSR to 3 CAV ARTY and one MLRS battalion remains GS to CFLCC. J-SEAD supports AI operations against the OSC 2 depth DTG. CFLCC continues IO to influence the surrender of AN Armed Forces in AP while garnering public support of CJTF-OIG and CFLCC forces while undermining public support and legitimacy of AN Armed Forces. Priority of fires is to 1 ID. FSCL is xxx.

(e) (U) Assessment. OSC 2 DTGs in AP rendered combat ineffective. Lines of communication from AN denied to AN Armed Forces inside AP. IADS preventing entry into northern AN neutralized. Local populace remains supportive of CJTF-OIG and CFLCC actions while resolve of OSC 2 leadership continues to degrade.

(f) (U) Targeting Priorities.

1. (U) Deny lines of communication to AN Armed Forces in AP.
2. (U) Neutralize fires and air defense capabilities of OSC 2 depth DTG.
3. (U) Neutralize AN IADS preventing entry into AN.

(g) (U) CJTF-OIG Air Apportionment.

1. (U) DCA – 15percent
2. (U) OCA – 20percent
3. (U) AI – 30percent
4. (U) SEAD – 15percent
5. (U) CAS – 20percent

(h) (U) CFLCC CAS Distribution.

1. (U) 1 ID –
2. (U) 4 MND –
3. (U) 82 ABN DIV –
4. (U) ASC –
5. (U) CFLCC –

(3) (U) Phase III (Dominate).

(a) (U) Concept of Joint Firepower. Joint fires continue to shape the battlespace with the interdiction of OSC 1 forward DTGs while expanding air superiority into northern AN.

(b) (U) Task. CFACC continues to support CFLCC with the provision of CAS, particularly in support of 4 MND destruction of 24 Mtzd DTG and ASC guard of 25 Mech DTG. Counterfire destroys any remaining identified fire support assets in AP while commencing the attrition of OSC 1 divisional-level fire support. Following the establishment of air superiority in northern AN, AI commences attrition of OSC 1 forward DTGs.

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(c) (U) Purpose. To re-establish and dominate the international border.

(d) (U) Execution. 75 FA BDE remains the CFLCC Counterfire Headquarters (CFHQ) and will coordinate the positioning of all radars in order to locate and attack long-range fire support assets. The HIMARS battalion is provided R to the 82 ABN DIV DIVARTY while one MLRS battalion each is provided GSR to 3 CAV ARTY and ASC ARTY. The remaining MLRS battalion is GS to CFLCC. On order, the MLRS battalion GSR to 3 CAV ARTY becomes R 4 MND DIVARTY. CFLCC continues IO to maintain public support of CJTF-OIG and CFLCC operations while undermining public support and legitimacy of AN Armed Forces. Priority of fires 4 MND. FSCL is xxx.

(e) (U) Assessment. OSC 2 defeated. OSC 1 forward DTGs attritted to 85percent with operational-level command and control neutralized, critical air defense systems destroyed, and OSC and divisional-level fire support assets neutralized. Air superiority maintained over AP and extended over northern AN.

(f) (U) Targeting Priorities.

1. (U) Destroy 24 Mtzd DTG (OSC 2 depth DTG).
2. (U) Defeat 25 Mech DTG (OSC 2 right forward DTG).
3. (U) Neutralize OSC 1 forward DTGs' command and control.
4. (U) Destroy OSC 1 forward DTGs' critical air defense systems.
5. (U) Neutralize OSC 1 forward divisional-level fire support assets.

(g) (U) CJTF-OIG Air Apportionment.

1. (U) DCA – 15percent
2. (U) OCA – 20percent
3. (U) AI – 20percent
4. (U) SEAD – 15percent
5. (U) CAS – 30percent

(h) (U) CFLCC CAS Distribution.

1. (U) 1 ID –
2. (U) 4 MND –
3. (U) 82 ABN DIV –
4. (U) ASC -
5. (U) CFLCC -

(4) (U) Phase IV (Stabilize).

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(a) (U) Concept of Joint Firepower. Joint fires are prepared to counter any threats posed by the AN Armed Forces or its surrogates. Joint fires concurrently support stabilization operations in AP while simultaneously maintaining the capability to provide cross-border fires, particularly those focused against the lead DTGs of OSC 1.

(b) (U) Task. CFACC BPT enforce NFZ over northern AN. CFLCC BPT execute joint fires as necessary throughout the AO to maintain territorial integrity of AP. CAS priority to ASC defeat of 25 Mech DTG.

(c) (U) Purpose. Establish the military conditions necessary to allow the AP Government to exercise its legitimate authority throughout AP without undue external or internal threat.

(d) (U) Execution. 75 FA BDE remains the CFLCC Counterfire Headquarters (CFHQ) and will coordinate the positioning of all radars with a BPT mission to locate and attack OSC 1 long-range fire support assets. The HIMARS battalion is R 4 MND DIVARTY. One MLRS battalion is R 3 CAV ARTY and one MLRS battalion is GSR ASC, on order R 1 ID DIVARTY. The remaining MLRS battalion is GS CFLCC. Execute joint fires as necessary to maintain territorial integrity of AP. IO to maintain public support of CJTF-OIG and CFLCC operations while bolstering the legitimacy of the AP government. Priority of fires 3 CAV. O/O FSCL is xxx.

(e) (U) Assessment. OSC 1 poses no immediate offensive threat to AP.

(f) (U) Targeting Priorities. TBD.

(g) (U) CJTF-OIG Air Apportionment.

1. (U) DCA – 70percent
2. (U) OCA – 0percent
3. (U) AI – 5percent
4. (U) SEAD – 5percent
5. (U) CAS – 20percent

(h) (U) CFLCC CAS Distribution.

1. (U) 1 ID –
2. (U) 4 MND –
3. (U) 82 ABN DIV –
4. (U) ASC -
5. (U) CFLCC -

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d. (U) Air Operations.

(1) (U) General. CFACC will be located at Incirlik, Turkey. The CFACC allocates sorties based on apportionment guidance received from COM CJTF-OIG. CFACC initially maintains air superiority over Coalition forces in AP while setting the conditions for the expansion of air superiority into northern AN. BPT to conduct CAS in support of CFLCC defeat of OSC 2 forces in AP.

(2) (U) Air Interdiction. Assist in the destruction of OSC 2 forces not in contact with CFLCC. Shape the battlespace through the isolation of OSC 2 forward DTGs and isolation of OSC 2 from OSC 1, disrupt lines of communication, and prevent forward movement of potential reinforcement from OSC 1. Attrit lead DTGs of OSC 1 to promote a sense of hopelessness amongst OSC 1 leadership. Destroy critical air defense systems in cooperation with long-range artillery fires.

(3) (U) CAS. Priority of CAS employment occurs during Phases II (Clear) and III (Dominate), which will see the defeat of OSC 2 forces in AP. CAS priority of support to be determined by COM CFLCC. Type I, II, or III CAS determined by the supported ground commander.

(4) (U) Coordinating Altitude. xxx

(5) (U) Coordination Level. 3000 ft AGL. Fixed wing aircraft will operate 3500 ft AGL and above and rotary wing aircraft will operate 2500 ft AGL and below.

(6) (U) CFLCC Intent for Airpower. Maintain air superiority as necessary to allow for freedom of maneuver, provide CAS for troops in contact, and conduct shaping operations via AI.

e. (U) Artillery Support.

(1) (U) Organization for Combat.

(a) (U) Phase I (Shape).

1. (U) 75 FA BDE GS to CFLCC and will act as the CFLCC CFHQ
2. (U) 2-4 FA (M270A1, MLRS) GSR 1 ID DIVARTY
3. (U) 3-13 FA (M270A1, MLRS) GS
4. (U) 1-14 FA (M142, HIMARS) R 82 ABN DIV DIVARTY
5. (U) 2-18 FA (MLRS) GS
6. (U) A/2-18 FA designated CJTF-OIG ATACMS "Hot" Battery

(b) (U) Phase II (Clear).

1. (U) 75 FA BDE GS to CFLCC and will act as the CFLCC CFHQ
2. (U) 2-4 FA (M270A1, MLRS) R 1 ID DIVARTY
3. (U) 3-13 FA (M270A1, MLRS) GSR 3 CAV ARTY
4. (U) 1-14 FA (M142, HIMARS) R 82 ABN DIV DIVARTY
5. (U) 2-18 FA (M270A1, MLRS) GS

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6. (U) A/2-18 FA designated CJTF-OIG ATACMS “Hot” Battery

(c) (U) Phase III (Dominate).

1. (U) 75 FA BDE GS to CFLCC and will act as the CFLCC CFHQ
2. (U) 2-4 FA (M270A1, MLRS) GSR ASC ARTY
3. (U) 3-13 FA (M270A1, MLRS) GSR 3 CAV ARTY, O/O R 4 MND

DIVARTY

4. (U) 1-14 FA (M142, HIMARS) R 82 ABN DIV DIVARTY
5. (U) 2-18 FA (M270A1, MLRS) GS
6. (U) A/2-18 FA designated CJTF-OIG ATACMS “Hot” Battery

(d) (U) Phase IV (Stabilize).

1. (U) 75 FA Bde GS to CFLCC and will act as the CFLCC CFHQ
2. (U) 2-4 FA (M270A1, MLRS) GSR ASC ARTY, O/O R 1 ID DIVARTY
3. (U) 3-13 FA (M270A1, MLRS) R 3 CAV ARTY
4. (U) 1-14 FA (M142, HIMARS) R 4 MND DIVARTY
5. (U) 2-18 FA (MLRS) GS
6. (U) A/2-18 FA designated CJTF OIG ATACMS “Hot” Battery

f. (U) Naval Surface Fires. Tomahawk missions are vetted through the JTCB. COM CJTF-OIG maintains release authority on expending Tomahawk. TLAM missiles are apportioned by CJTF-OIG. Turnaround time for unplanned Tomahawk missions is 12 hours.

g. (U) Target Acquisition/Counterfire. 1 ID, 4 MND and 82 ABN DIV retain control of their organic radars and report to CFLCC JFECC their locations and azimuth of search. 75 FA BDE is designated the CFLCC Counterfire Headquarters with primary responsibility for coverage beyond the Division-established CFLs/CSBs. MSCs will ensure they maintain digital communications with 75 FA BDE to process acquisitions beyond the CFL.

h. (U) Information Operations/Nonlethal Fires. Information operations and nonlethal fires objectives, effects, and priorities are coordinated through the CJTF-OIG Information Operations Working Group.

i. (U) Coordinating Instructions.

(1) (U) Joint Fires Element. CJTF-OIG J-3 establishes the Joint Fires Element to assist in the planning, coordination, and synchronization of fires in the CJTF-OIG JOA.

(2) (U) Target Lists. Refer to Appendix 1 (Fire Support Coordination Plan) to Annex D (Joint Fires), to OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUIDANCE).

(3) (U) Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCM). CFLCC establishes Fire Support Coordination Lines (FSCL) as necessary in coordination with the CFACC. FSCL changes coincide with the new Air Tasking Order (ATO) execution time period in so far as is practicable.

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Other FSCMs will be established as required and will be reported through direct liaison for dissemination to all forces.

(4) (U) Fire Support Coordination Lines. Phase I – xx. Phase II – xx. Phase III – xx. Phase IV – xx. FSCL changes require a minimum establishing time of six hours for preplanned and 12 hours for an unplanned FSCL.

(5) (U) Coordinated Fire Lines. Divisions will establish and report their CFL.

(6) (U) No Fire Area. NFA TUNGSTEN (city of Baku) effective commencement Phase I.

(7) (U) SPINS. Applies to all Coalition fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft (including all UAV) operating in the JOA. SPINS will be produced and/or updated daily by the CFACC CAOC.

(8) (U) Border Crossing Authority. Only aircraft so tasked in the ATO are authorized to cross the border into AN airspace.

(9) (U) Airspace Control. CFLCC, CFMCC, and CJFSOCC must be included in the Airspace Control Plan (ACP) as they all have organic aviation and small UAV assets.

(10) (U) Air Tasking Order. A 72 hr Air Operations Directive (AOD) to the ATO tasking cycle will be used. ATOs will be issued daily at 1900Z, to take effect 12 hrs following issue (0700Z). Requests for non-forecasted support must be submitted to the CAOC planning cell 36 hours ahead of the applicable ATO effective time. Requests for effects received inside of 36 hours will be considered immediate requests and coordinated by the CAOC Combat Operations (COPS) ATO planners.

4. (U) Sustainment.

a. (U) Logistics. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) to OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN).

b. (U) Ammunition. The following minimum Class V CSRs are in effect:

(1) (U) 105 MM (HE)

(2) (U) 105 MM (SMK)

(3) (U) 155 MM (HE)

(4) (U) 155 MM (HE RAP)

(5) (U) 155 MM (DPICM)

(6) (U) 155 MM (HC SMK)

(7) (U) 155 MM (Excalibur)

(8) (U) MLRS M26A1

(9) (U) MLRS ERG

(10) (U) GMLRS

(11) (U) GMLRS Unitary

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(12) (U) ATACMS BLK 1

(13) (U) ATACMS BLK 1A

5. (U) Command and Signal.

a. (U) Command.

(1) (U) Locations. Force Field Artillery Commander (Comd 75 FA BDE) located with COM CFLCC.

(2) (U) Succession of Command. DCOM 75 BDE, COM 82 ABN DIVARTY, COM 1 ID DIVARTY, COM 4 MND DIVARTY.

(3) (U) Liaison.

(a) (U) 75 FA BDE to HQ CFLCC.

(b) (U) 75 FA BDE to CJTF-OIG CAOC.

(c) (U) 1 ID DIVARTY to 75 FA BDE.

(d) (U) 4 MND DIVARTY to 75 FA BDE.

(e) (U) 82 ABN DIV DIVARTY to 75 FA BDE.

b. (U) Control.

(1) (U) Command Posts.

(a) (U) CFLCC TOC (fwd)- located Ujar opened (G+119).

(b) (U) CFLCC Main HQ located Yevlakh airfield opened (G+48).

(c) (U) CFLCC Rear HQ - located Tblisi opened (G+119).

(d) (U) CFLCC Alternate HQ - HQ 82 ABN DIV, located XXXXXXXX.

(a) (U) 75 FA BDE HQ located with CFLCC TOC (fwd) Ujar.

(2) (U) Reports. Refer to Annex R (Reports).

c. (U) Signal. Refer to Annex H (Signal).

ATTACHMENTS:

Appendix 1 Fire Support Coordination Plan

Appendix 2 Dynamic Targeting

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX D TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

APPENDIX 1 (FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION PLAN) TO ANNEX D (JOINT FIRES) TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu.

1. **(U) TARGET NUMBERING BLOCKS.** Target number blocks and letter designators will be assigned as indicated below:

<u>UNIT DESIGNATION</u>	<u>LETTER DESIGNATOR</u>
CJTF-OIG	AA, AB
CFLCC	AC, AD
CFACC	AE
CFMCC	AF
CJFSOCC	AG
310 ESC	AH
1 ID	BA - BZ
4 MND	CA - CZ
82 ABN DIV	DA - DZ
3 CAV	EA - EZ
77 AVN BDE	FA - FZ
75 (US) FA BDE	GA - GZ
ASC	HA - HZ
1-43 AD BN	IA - IZ
Spare	JA - JZ
Spare	KA - KZ
Spare	LA - LZ

2. **(U) CFLCC Target Block Assignments (MSCs assign their own):**

<u>TARGET BLOCK</u>	<u>SECTION</u>
AC0001 to 1999	CFLCC JFECC
AC2000 to 2999	CFLCC JFECC Counter Fire
AC3000 to 3999	CFLCC JISE FAIO
AC4000 to 4999	CFLCC JISE ASAS – RWS
AC5000 to 5999	CFLCC FUOPS
AC6000 to 6999	Special Munitions (CFLCC JFECC)
AC7000 to 9999	Not Assigned

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX D TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

AD0001 to 1999	36 EN BDE
AD2000 to 2999	10 SIG BDE
AD3000 to 3999	415 CBRNE BDE
AD4000 to 4999	360 CA BDE
AD5000 to 5999	52 EOD BDE
AD6000 to 6999	9 MIS BN
AD7000 to 7999	16 MP BDE
AD8000 to 8999	66 MI BDE
AD9000 to 9999	Not assigned

3. (U) **PRF Codes.** PRF Pulse Repetition Frequency (PRF) Codes are four digit values. Insert any number from 1 to 7 in the _ (blank) spaces. Organizations within the CFLCC are assigned a unique set of codes, as follows:

UNIT

1 ID	1_11 to 1_18
4 MND	1_41 to 1_48
82 ABN DIV	1_61 to 1_68
3 CAV	1_71 to 1_78
77 AVN BDE	1_81 to 1_88
ASC	1_91 to 1_98

4. (U) **Attack Guidance Matrix.** Published separately. (Notional)

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX D TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

APPENDIX 2 (DYNAMIC TARGETING) TO ANNEX D (JOINT FIRES) TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) – CFLCC

(U) Reference: Joint Publication 3-60, *Joint Fires*, 31 January 2013

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: **Zulu.**

1. **(U) Situation.**

a. **(U) Enemy Forces.** Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN), **DTG.**

b. **(U) Friendly Forces.** Refer to Annex A (Task Organization) and paragraph 1e (Friendly Forces) to OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN), **DTG.**

2. **(U) Mission.** CFLCC targets moving enemy surface forces in the Area of Operations (AO) IAW established priorities using procedures described below.

3. **(U) Execution.** CFLCC formations will nominate mobile enemy targets for engagement by CJTF-OIG fixed wing assets by using the Joint Target Working Group (JTWG) and the Joint Target Coordination Board (JTCB).

a. **(U) Nominating Area Targets.** CFLCC formations will nominate mobile targets as outlined below.

(1) **(U) Target Locations.** To plan a strike against a mobile target, a prediction must be made regarding the location of the target at the time the Air Tasking Order is executed. The predicted location will almost certainly not have “BE” field numbers. These areas will be identified in target lists, joint tactical air strike requests (JTARs), and the Air Tasking Order (ATO) using a GARS grid box identifier, the forces name and type of equipment to be targeted. CFLCC formations will submit JTARs to the Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) Plans section who in turn generates the predicted location using the GARS grid box identifier. If the nominated target is approved by the JTCB, the target will be handed off to the CFACC and assigned to a fixed wing asset for servicing with the target data and JTAR number entered in the Air Tasking Order. This type of target will normally be assigned to a strike coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR) mission that takes place in a GARS kill box.

(2) **(U) Target Tracking.** CFLCC formations will track nominated target locations and enter the information in the JTAR remarks section. Target location updates will be made only if the predicted GARS grid box identified changes or if the prediction can be made more accurate (by subdividing the GARS grid). In the case of a change in the predicted GARS grid box, the information should be passed to either the combined air operations center (CAOC) Combat Plans or Combat Operations divisions as soon as the new predicted location is determined. As the target location is further refined, the information should be passed to Combat Operations approximately four to eight hours prior to mission execution.

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX D TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

b. (U) Joint Fires Area (JFA) Procedures. CFLCC formations will use the procedures below to plan and execute JFAs.

(1) (U) JFA Definition. A JFA is a three-dimensional fire support coordination measure (FSCM) used by COM CJTF-OIG and his component commanders to facilitate the engagement of targets with fires without additional coordination. All coordination, deconfliction, and integration are accomplished prior to establishment. As a three-dimensional FSCM, a JFA location is comprised of an effects area and airspace.

(a) (U) Effects Area. The area on the surface or subsurface where weapons effects are desired and permitted.

(b) (U) Airspace. The airspace above the effects area that is reserved for maneuvering aircraft and ordnance trajectory / terminal attack headings. The airspace is defined so aircraft can safely and effectively deliver air-to-surface fires while being de-conflicted from surface-to-surface indirect fires, surface-to-air fires and other aircraft.

(2) (U) JFA Purpose. The JFA is an airspace coordination measure (ACM) that can be used for air, land, maritime, and special operations forces (SOF) operational areas. All CJTF-OIG Components must be aware of JFAs since they have the ability to project joint fires across the entire JOA with a common FSCM. JFAs are not intended to replace close air support (CAS) procedures or pre-planned air interdiction against fixed targets. All target engagements within a JFA are aligned to the CJTF-OIG or requesting Component targeting priorities.

(3) (U) JFA Establishment. JFAs are established by the requesting Component commander that has jurisdiction over an assigned operational area or is designated as the supported commander. The establishing commander will coordinate JFA airspace with the CFACC as the Airspace Control Authority. A JFA is established when the requesting commander defines the area dimensions, effects and time, has de-conflicted the area with other Components and this is disseminated to all affected commanders. This is referred to as being “in effect.” Aircraft and ordnance trajectories not supporting the JFA are restricted from entry unless approved by the establishing commander.

(4) (U) JFA Terminology.

(a) (U) Open. Term used to describe a portion or portions of an “in effect” JFA that are open to fires without further coordination or deconfliction. A JFA that is “in effect” is open until closed or cancelled.

1. (U) Active. A JFA that is “in effect” and has aircraft flying and / or ordnance delivery within the airspace and inside the boundaries of the JFA.

2. (U) Cold. A JFA that is “in effect” and is not active. All portions of the JFA are open to fires unless identified as “closed.”

(b) (U) Closed. Means fires or ordnance delivery within a portion or portions of an “in effect” JFA are prohibited without further coordination.

4. (U) Sustainment.

a. (U) Logistics. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) to OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN).

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX D TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

b. (U) Personnel. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) to OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN).

c. (U) Health Service Support. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) to OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN).

5. (U) Command and Signal.

a. (U) Command. Refer to para 5 (Command and Signal) to OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN).

b. (U) Control. Refer to para 5 (Command and Signal) to OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN).

c. (U) Signal. Refer to para 5 (Command and Signal) to OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN).

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ANNEX E TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

ANNEX E (PROTECTION) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(U) References:

- (a) AR 25-2 Information Assurance, June 2013.
- (b) AR 190-51 Security of Unclassified Property, 2013.
- (c) AR 190-58 Personal Security, 1989.
- (d) AR 525-13 Antiterrorism, Sep 2008.
- (e) AR 530-1 OPSEC, Sep 2014.
- (f) FM 3-37 Protection Aug 2012.
- (g) FM 3-37.2 Antiterrorism, Feb 2011.
- (h) FM 3-0 Operations – United States Army Feb 2003.

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu

1. (U) Situation.

a. (U) Background. See paragraph 1 of the main body of CFLCC OPORD 07 and Annex B (Intelligence). CJTF- Op IRON GUARDIAN (OIG) Phase I (Deployment and Defensive Operations) has been completed and all CFLCC formations are in theater. The 82 ABN DIV and Atropian forces have successfully stalled the Arianian advance into Atropia (AP). As the main effort in CJTF-OIG next phase, Phase II (Decisive Offensive Operations), CFLCC will now conduct Op IRON GUARDIAN, entailing decisive joint operations to clear all Arianian forces from Atropian sovereign territory.

(1) (U) General. Commanders and staffs synchronize, integrate, and organize capabilities and resources throughout the operations process to preserve combat power and the freedom of action and to mitigate the effects of threats and hazards. Protection safeguards the force, personnel (combatants and non-combatants), systems, and physical assets of the unified action partners. Survivability refers to the capacity, fitness, or tendency to remain alive or in existence. For the military, survivability is about much more than mere survival - it is also about remaining effective. Military forces are composed of personnel and physical assets, each having their own inherent survivability qualities or capabilities that permit them to avoid or withstand hostile actions or environmental conditions while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission. The protection warfighting function, the Army Protection Program, and force protection are important aspects of protection that reinforce each other.

(2) (U) The Protection Warfighting Function. These inherent qualities or capabilities are affected by various factors (dispersion, redundancy, morale, leadership, discipline, mobility, situational understanding, terrain, and weather conditions) and can be enhanced by tasks within the protection warfighting function. The protection warfighting function supports unified action and unified land operations and focuses on preserving the force and protecting personnel (friendly combatants and non-combatants) and physical assets of the unified action partners.

(3) (U) The US Army Protection Program. The Army Protection Program manages and executes the programs within the non-warfighting functional elements. It is a management

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ANNEX E TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

framework to synchronize, prioritize, and coordinate protection policies and resources. It includes the twelve non-warfighting functional elements namely: Emergency Management; Computer Network Defense; Continuity of Operations; Critical Infrastructure Risk Management; Operations Security (OPSEC); Antiterrorism (AT); Fire and Emergency Services; Force Health Protection; High-risk Personnel; Law Enforcement; Information Assurance and Physical Security.

(4) (U) Force Protection (FP). Force protection is defined as preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel, resources, facilities, and critical information.

b. (U) Protection within the Operations Process. The synchronization, integration, and organization of capabilities and resources to preserve combat power from the effects of threats and hazards are essential. The ability to protect and preserve the force and secure the area of operations is vital in seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative. Protection emphasizes the importance of planning and expanding our protection priorities, to include protecting unified action partners, civilian populations, equipment, resources, infrastructure, and cultural landmarks across the range of military operations. It focuses on adapting our force to better leverage, integrate, and synchronize unified action capabilities and better understand operational environments. It emphasizes the need for soldiers, leaders, and organizations to identify, prevent, or mitigate threats and hazards. Mutually supporting and overlapping protection capabilities through operational and tactical level actions better respond, and recover from threat and hazard effects and to deter, counterattack, neutralize, and defeat the threats. Appendix 15 illustrates how Protection planning fits into the operations process.

c. (U) Protection Principles. The following principles of protection provide military professionals with a context for implementing protection efforts, developing schemes of protection, and allocating resources:

(1) (U) Comprehensive. Protection is an all-inclusive utilization of complementary and reinforcing protection tasks and systems available to commanders, incorporated into the plan, to preserve the force.

(2) (U) Integrated. Protection is integrated with other activities, systems, efforts, and capabilities associated with unified land operations to provide strength and structure to the overall effort. Integration must occur vertically and horizontally with unified action partners throughout the operations process.

(3) (U) Layered. Protection capabilities are arranged using a layered approach to provide strength and depth. Layering reduces the destructive effect of a threat or hazard through the dispersion of energy or the culmination of the force.

(4) (U) Redundant. Protection efforts are often redundant anywhere that a vulnerability or a critical point of failure is identified. Redundancy ensures that specific activities, systems, efforts, and capabilities that are critical for the success of the overall protection effort have a secondary or auxiliary effort of equal or greater capability.

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ANNEX E TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(5) (U) Enduring. Protection capabilities are ongoing activities for maintaining the objectives of preserving combat power, populations, partners, essential equipment, resources, and critical infrastructure in every phase of an operation.

d. (U) Threat and Risk Assessment.

(1) (U) Conventional threats. See reference B. The Ariana (AN) Armed Forces essentially represent a “near peer” threat with a wide range of capabilities. As they have demonstrated they have sufficient land forces' capability to seize and control key infrastructure and large areas of terrain. They also possess the necessary capabilities to destroy key infrastructure using weapons based within their national boundaries (i.e. TBM/IRBM).

(2) (U) Unconventional Threats.

(a) (U) South Atropian People's Army (SAPA) Insurgents. AN exploits SAPA as a method of creating unrest /lack of confidence in the Atropian government and its policies. SAPA receives most of its training, equipment, and supplies from AN.

(b) (U) Salasyl Insurgents. Operating in Southeast Atropia with nation-wide capabilities, Salasyl insurgents seek to target Atropian government facilities and leaders.

(c) (U) Bilasuvar Freedom Brigade (BFB) Insurgents. Operating in Northern Vetlia and Erdabil Provinces of AP, Donovanian-supported BFB insurgents seek to target Atropian government facilities and leaders.

(d) (U) Provisional Army of Lezgin (PAL) Insurgents. Operating in Southern Erdabil and Western Sirvaki Provinces of AP, PAL insurgents seek to target Atropian government facilities and leaders.

(e) (U) Bocyowicz Crime Family. Operating in the Ungoverned Territories, the Bocyowicz Crime Family seeks to acquire political power in poorly-governed regions and is a threat to Atropian police and security forces.

(f) (U) Atropian Organized Crime (AOC). Operating in Baku, AOC has taken advantage of the recent growth of illegal narcotics, smuggling, and human trafficking channels. Many of those involved in Atropian illegal activities live in communities of displaced Atropians from Lower Janga and persons who fled Donovia. Atropia serves as a transit point for narcotics travelling to Donovia and Western countries.

(g) (U) Al Iksir Cartel Criminal. Operating in Northern Atropia and Southern Donovia, the Al Iksir Cartel is exploiting the recent growth of illegal narcotics, smuggling, and human trafficking channels.

(3) (U) Non-Military Threats. See also CJTF-OIG OPORD 01 Annex K (Medical Services) and CFLCC OPORD 07, Appendix 2 (Medical) to Annex F.

(a) (U) Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs) / Contaminated Grounds. AP produces a large amount of toxic industrial chemicals for multiple purposes, including hydrocarbon production activities, water purification, wastewater management, and fertilizer to increase agricultural output.

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ANNEX E TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(b) (U) Pollution. All five Caucasus-region countries face significant pollution problems stemming from poor industrial practices. High levels of air pollution require mitigating measures to ensure soldier health and safety.

(c) (U) Potable Water. The majority of the Caucasus region's urban population has access to potable water. In rural areas people must rely on local sources such as rivers, streams and wells to obtain water for cooking, drinking and washing. Currently, about 78percent of all Atropians can access potable water, with 95percent of the population in urban areas and 59percent of the population in rural areas having access. Heavy pollution, especially in areas that contain oil and gas fields, has contaminated groundwater. All water sources are considered to be potentially contaminated and not potable until tested.

(d) (U) Sewage. The Atropian citizens' access to modern sewage services, like almost all other communal services, depends on their location. About 90percent of all urban Atropians can access improved sanitation infrastructure, but only 70percent of rural Atropians can, for a national average of 80percent. Poor sewage treatment methods lead to pollution, ground water contamination and increased likelihood of some diseases.

(e) (U) Disease. The following diseases are known to be present in AP:

1. (U) Diarrheal diseases;
2. (U) Hepatitis A;
3. (U) Malaria;
4. (U) Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic fever;
5. (U) Cutaneous Leishmaniasis;
6. (U) Leptospirosis;
7. (U) Schistosomiasis;
8. (U) Hepatitis;
9. (U) Tuberculosis; and
10. (U) Q Fever.

2. (U) Mission. CFLCC protects the force and conserves combat power against threats and risks associated with the conduct of operations throughout the CFLCC AO during Op IRON GUARDIAN.

3. (U) Execution.

a. (U) General. Commanders must deliberately plan and integrate the application of military force against an enemy or adversary while protecting the force and preserving combat power. Operational and functional concepts are translated through the warfighting functions into tasks for the development of plans, orders and, ultimately, unit missions. Commanders develop protection systems for each phase of an operation or major activity. They integrate and synchronize protection tasks to reduce risk, mitigate identified vulnerabilities, and act on opportunity.

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ANNEX E TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

When properly integrated and synchronized, the tasks and systems that comprise the protection warfighting function effectively protect the force, enhance the preservation of combat power, and increase the probability of mission success.

b. (U) Risk. The Force Protection (FP) posture should be based on risk management, not risk elimination. Deliberate or accidental casualties are a reality of military operations, as are material and equipment losses and an overemphasis in avoiding them may impact adversely on the achievement of the mission. The commander therefore must balance risk within the context of mission accomplishment. Commanders should establish FP awareness within their staffs and provide suitable advice and direction to subordinate units. FP functions should be fully integrated and coordinated in the operational planning process from the outset.

c. (U) Tasks Throughout. CFLCC formations and units conduct Protection operations to protect the force and conserve combat power in the AO. Large troop concentrations and sustainment facilities shall be protected from Arianian missile/CBRN attacks by establishing an integrated Air Missile Defense system. Vulnerability assessments are to be conducted for staging areas, C2 nodes, and MSRs / ASRs concerning threats from CBRN, IEDs, missile attacks and other indirect fires and direct attack throughout this operation. Friendly air superiority must be achieved as soon as possible. Operational threats from enemy UAVs/UASs must be determined and mitigated. We must take clear measures and undertake effective coordination to ensure inter-operability between various TCNs within CFLCC and with AP Armed Forces. The implementation of successful Force Protection measures will be particularly important for safeguarding the CFLCC Center of Gravity (our attack helicopter units). Supporting tasks of the protection warfighting function include:

- (1) (U) Conduct operational area security.
- (2) (U) Employ safety techniques (including fratricide avoidance).
- (3) (U) Implement OPSEC.
- (4) (U) Provide intelligence support to protection.
- (5) (U) Implement physical security procedures.
- (6) (U) Apply anti-terrorism (AT) measures.
- (7) (U) Conduct law and order.
- (8) (U) Conduct survivability operations.
- (9) (U) Provide force health protection.
- (10) (U) Conduct chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) operations.
- (11) (U) Provide explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and protection support.
- (12) (U) Coordinate air and missile defense.
- (13) (U) Conduct personnel recovery.
- (14) (U) Conduct internment and resettlement.

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ANNEX E TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

d. (U) Protection by Phase of Op IRON GUARDIAN.

(1) (U) Phase I-Shape. This Phase includes preliminary moves of 1 ID, 4 MND and 3 CAV into TAAs. Protection during this phase to be enhanced by an effective deception plan (portrayal that moves are simply reinforcing defense) and movement under electronic silence. Additionally, local air superiority will be maintained over friendly force concentrations. Operational threats from enemy UAVs/UASs will be determined and mitigated. The protection effort will emphasize OPSEC and safety measures, but will also address area security and survivability operations. CFLCC forces are vulnerable to cyber-attacks and information warfare as C4I systems are established throughout the AO, requiring an ongoing focus on cyber security.

(2) (U) Phase II-Clear. This phase is the northwest pincer. 1 ID will conduct a forward passage of lines with 82 ABN DIV, seize Objectives (Objs) RUBY and EMERALD, defeat 23 Mech DTG and 347 Inf BTG, and secure Obj DIAMOND blocking oriented east and south. It is expected that OSC 2 will react to the 1 ID attack by committing some or all of 353 AT and 349 Tk Bdes. O/O 3 CAV will then cross Kura River north of Objective OPAL and guard the right flank of 4 MND against 25 Mech DTG and any OSC 2 corps troops remaining in that area. Main effort in this phase is 1 ID. Protection to be enhanced by OPSEC, measures to eliminate fratricide (during forward passage of lines), 3 CAV attack across the Karu River that causes the enemy to divide fires between 1 ID and 3 CAV, and deep fires on the OSC 2 assessed Reserve of 353AT and 349 Tk BTGs.

(3) (U) Phase III-Dominate. In this phase, we will conduct decisive counter-moves. 4 MND will advance to destroy enemy depth formation 24 Mtzd DTG. Bde(-) 82 ABN DIV, OPCON 4 MND, will seize crossings of the Kura River, Objs OPAL and GARNET, by air assault. 4 MND will then cross the Kura River seizing Obj PEARL and destroying 24 Mtzd DTG. 4 MND and 1 ID will then adjust and reorient quickly to re-establish the IB. Any Arianian formations that have been bypassed and isolated by this maneuver, that have not surrendered, will be cleared by the ASC. Priority of fires will initially be 24 Mtzd DTG, shifting to OSC 1. 4 MND will be the main effort in this phase. Protection to be enhanced by OPSEC, measures to eliminate fratricide during forward passage of lines, deception measures portraying 1 ID as main effort, re-positioning 3 CAV to guard the right flank of 4 MND against 25 Mech DTG and by electronic attack against AN 24 Mtzd DTG and 25 Mech DTG. Commanders will implement measures to mitigate the risk of isolating units. As Arianian forces are defeated, their use of chemical weapons becomes more likely.

(4) (U) Phase IV-Stabilize. This Phase includes re-positioning of 1 ID and 4 MND to establish a defense in depth along the AP/AN border, general stabilization of the AO and assistance and capacity-building to the AP government and Armed Forces as well as assistance (within capabilities) to IO/NGO HA and reconstruction. Protection to be enhanced by masking re-constitution of 82 ABN DIV, the size of the 3 CAV economy of force mission to the far southeast corner of the AP/AN border and portrayal of 1 ID as main effort to discourage commitment of OSC 1. Protection measures will begin to put greater emphasis on non-conventional threats, law and order, health, crime, drugs, safety, protection of captured enemy personnel, operational area security, physical security, antiterrorism and on coordination of Protection measures with Host Nation.

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The potential for kidnapping or capture of friendly forces increases significantly in this phase requiring the establishment of a Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC). Key risks to CFLCC forces throughout this phase include accidents caused by fatigue or failure to adhere to published SOPs and standards. The Atropian government assumes responsibility for their own security and infrastructure maintenance.

e. (U) Coordinating Instructions.

(1) (U) Electronic Counter Measures (ECM). In order to prevent mutual interference between other ECM equipment and communications systems, coordination between nations and other agencies is required for Spectrum Management control.

(2) (U) Training. Personnel and units are to receive appropriate FP training, particularly in Escalation of Force procedures.

(3) (U) Vulnerability Assessments (VA). In order to ensure that FP measures meet required standards, site assessments must be conducted for any semi-permanent sites (FOBs, main camps, etc.). The assessments routinely involve sites visits with interviews with key specialists and inspection of all FP related procedures and infrastructure, ranging from defensive positions through classified document handling procedures to food hygiene. The process is intended to be consultative and can be used by site commanders to reinforce their cases for improvements to their FP posture.

(4) (U) Protection Working Groups. Protection Working Groups have been established at CFLCC HQ and at subordination formation level (1 ID, 4 MND, 82 ABN DIV and 3 CAV).

4. (U) Sustainment. See Annex F to CFLCC OPORD 07.

5. (U) Command and Signal.

a. (U) Command. FP measures issued by COM CJTF-OIG and COM CFLCC are valid for all Coalition members and facilities in the AO. Nevertheless, following a threat and risk assessment, Senior National Commanders may increase CFLCC FP measures within their national elements.

b. (U) Reporting. Deviations from the prescribed FP measures, changes in threat, and FP incidents are to be reported via the CFLCC reporting chain. CBRN incidents are to be reported to COM CFLCC via the CFLCC CBRN Warning and Reporting chain.

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ATTACHMENTS:

- Appendix 1 - Operational Area Security (omitted)
- Appendix 2 - Safety (omitted)
- Appendix 3 - Operations Security (omitted)
- Appendix 4 - Intelligence Support to Protection (omitted)
- Appendix 5 - Physical Security (omitted)
- Appendix 6 - Anti-terrorism
- Appendix 7 - Police Operations (omitted)
- Appendix 8 - Survivability Operations (omitted)
- Appendix 9 - Force Health Protection (omitted)
- Appendix 10 - Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense
 - Tab A - CBRN Defensive Organization
 - Tab B - CBRN THREATCON
 - Tab C - CBRN Network
- Appendix 11 - Explosive Ordnance Disposal
 - Tab A - EOD 9 liner
- Appendix 12 - Air and Missile Defense
- Appendix 13 - Personnel Recovery (omitted)
- Appendix 14 - Detainee and Resettlement (omitted)
- Appendix 15 - Protection Planning Within the Operations Framework

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APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX E TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

APPENDIX 6 (ANTITERRORISM) TO ANNEX E (PROTECTION) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(U) References:

- (a) AR 25-2 Information Assurance, Mar 2009
- (b) AR 190-51 Security of Unclassified Property, Oct 1993
- (c) AR 190-58 Personal Security, Mar 1989
- (d) AR 525-13 Antiterrorism, Oct 2008
- (e) AR 530-1 OPSEC, Oct 2014
- (f) FM 3-37 Protection, Dec 2009
- (g) FM 3-37.2 Antiterrorism, Feb 2011

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu

1. (U) **Situation.**

a. (U) General. CFLCC forces will be conducting full spectrum operations in a complex threat environment. The presence of active and capable adversarial non-state actors within the Joint Operations Area (JOA) poses a significant threat to CFLCC personnel, infrastructure, and warfighting functions in general.

b. (U) Area of Interest. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence).

c. (U) Joint Operations Area. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence).

d. (U) Enemy Forces. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence).

e. (U) Friendly Forces. Refer to LCC OPORD 07.

f. (U) Civil Considerations. Refer to LCC OPORD 07.

g. (U) Assumptions.

(1) (U) Available Class IV material is on-hand for improvements to base clusters and hardening of defensive positions.

(2) (U) Atropian (AP) Armed Forces will cooperate with and be receptive to CFLCC antiterrorism (AT) measures and activities.

2. (U) **Mission.** Refer to Annex E (Protection).

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APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX E TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

3. (U) **Execution.**

a. (U) **Concept of Operations.**

(1) (U) **General.** AT is CFLCC's defensive program to protect against terrorism. The combination of AT, Counter Terrorism (CT), consequence management, and intelligence support constitute the overall Combatting Terrorism Program. AT plans must incorporate its five principles: assess, detect, defend, warn, and recover. As an element of the protection warfighting function, AT will be integrated throughout the operations process and across full spectrum operations. AT tasks play a critical role in the defense against terrorist acts and how CFLCC forces preserve combat power against actions by non-state actors. AT will play the greatest role in a commander's actions to protect the force when the likelihood of conventional enemy contact is minimal. AT continues to serve as a foundation for CFLCC units' security posture and how it applies actions within the protection warfighting function, even as forces transition to offensive operations.

(2) (U) **Phases.** Op IRON GUARDIAN will be conducted in four phases – Phase I Shape, Phase II Clear, Phase III Dominate, and Phase IV Stabilize. AT tasks and processes will continue throughout all phases, but will be more critical in Phases I and IV.

(3) (U) **Priorities.** Priorities for Antiterrorism and Force Protection are to Fires, C2, aviation assets, APODs, Class V and Class III storage locations, and rear operations. Throughout all phases of the operation, AT operations will focus on identifying and reducing friendly vulnerabilities, collection and dissemination of threat information, assessing and reducing identified critical vulnerabilities and maintaining a defensive posture. Essential is the implementation of Force Protection Conditions (FPCON) and Random Antiterrorism Measures (RAM), physical security of property, operations security (OPSEC), information security (INFOSEC) and protection of critical information lists (CIL). Field and base security operations are critical to the success of the CFLCC formations and units. In Phase IV Stabilize, units will frequently operate from base locations. Units within bases and base clusters will conduct patrolling, establish early warning, and conduct defensive operations. In conjunction with defeat of enemy threats, base cluster commanders must implement area damage control measures immediately.

b. (U) **Tasks.** Commanders are to communicate the spirit and intent of AT doctrine throughout the chain of command by establishing AT tasks and measures to develop and disseminate terrorist-related information.

(1) (U) Commanders are to:

(a)(U) Establish an AT Program for their formation/unit.

(b) (U) Collect, analyze and disseminate threat information.

(c)(U) Assess and reduce critical vulnerabilities.

(d) (U) Increase AT awareness.

(e)(U) Maintain defenses taking into account the AT threat.

(f)(U) Establish partnerships with AP Armed Forces and local police forces when and where feasible.

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- (g) (U) Develop terrorist threat incident responses.
- (h) (U) Conduct exercises and evaluate/assess their AT plan.

(2) (U) Commanders are to provide specific direction/guidance regarding:

- (a)(U) Intelligence focus for AT efforts.
- (b) (U) Areas or events where risk is acceptable.
- (c)(U) Critical assets and high-value targets.
- (d) (U) Force Protection Condition (FPCON) status.
- (e)(U) Random AT Measures (RAM) implementation.
- (f)(U) CBRNE risk guidance.
- (g) (U) Information operations condition.
- (h) (U) OPSEC risk tolerance.
- (i) (U) Rules of Engagement and interaction.

c. (U) AT Program. The key to an effective AT program is a comprehensive plan. Commanders are to develop an AT plan which addresses:

- (1) (U) Application of AT measures.
- (2) (U) Terrorist threats and other threat activities.
- (3) (U) Measures to reduce vulnerabilities to terrorist acts and attacks.
- (4) (U) AT physical security measures.
- (5) (U) AT measures for critical asset security.
- (6) (U) Entry Control Point (ECP) procedures.
- (7) (U) Force Protection Condition (FPCON) implementation measures, including site-specific AT measures.
- (8) (U) On-site security elements.
- (9) (U) Operations and information security.
- (10) (U) AT measures for High-Risk Personnel (HRP), when appropriate.
- (11) (U) Reaction to terrorist incidents.
- (12) (U) CBRNE plans and measures.
- (13) (U) Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) operations.
- (14) (U) Alert notification procedures.
- (15) (U) Incident response management procedures.
- (16) (U) AT construction and building considerations.
- (17) (U) AT measures for logistics and other contracting.

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(18) (U) AT measures for in-transit movement, when appropriate.

d. (U) AT Working Group (ATWG). ATWGs will be established at LCC and divisional levels. Battalions and above are to establish AT organizations to both advise respective commanders and feed into higher level ATWGs. ATWG composition includes representatives from Operations, Intelligence, Civil Affairs, and CBRNE. The ATWG will provide vulnerability mitigation measures to help reduce risks associated with a particular course of action and conduct planning and oversight for full spectrum operations that are specific to irregular threats

4. (U) Sustainment. Damage control will be supported by military police, engineer units, medical units, and aviation assets providing medical evacuation.

5. (U) Command and Signal. See Annex A.

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**APPENDIX 10 (CBRN DEFENSE) TO ANNEX E (PROTECTION) TO OPORD 07
(OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

(U) References:

- (a) (U) NATO AJP 3-8 Allied Joint Doctrine for CBRN Defence (STANAG 2451)
- (b) (U) NATO ATP 45(C), Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Biological and Chemical Attacks, and Predicting and Warning of Associated Hazards and Hazards Areas, December 2005 (STANAG 2103)
- (c) (U) CJTF-OIG OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) *Insert Date*
- (d) (U) CFLCC OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) *Insert Date*

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu

1. Situation.

- a. (U) Area of Interest. Refer to base OPORD 07.
- b. (U) Area of Operations. Refer to base OPORD 07.
- c. (U) Terrain. The Atropian terrain alternates between rugged mountain and relatively flat lowlands. Mountainous terrain will channel winds through valleys and along riverbeds resulting in reduced hazard areas, while locations to execute thorough decontamination are limited. Larger downwind hazard areas can be expected in the Kura-Aras lowland areas.
- d. (U) Weather. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence).
- e. (U) Ariana (AN).

(1) (U) General. AN possesses a capable and growing CBRN capability although nuclear weapon production is still a few years away (refer to paragraph 1.e. (3) below). AN strategic policy supports a CBRN first strike in the event it believes its national security is in jeopardy. National policy also supports the use of pre-emptive CBRN strikes against a neighbor either to deter aggression or as a response to an attack. It may also use, or threaten to use, CBRN weapons as a way of applying political, economic or psychological pressure. It is currently assessed as unlikely that AN will use CBRN weapons until CJTF-OIG forces cross into Atropia (AP). When used, the most likely reasons for employment by AN include: canalizing approaching CFLCC forces, key terrain denial, or to facilitate the withdrawal of Arianian forces in contact. Additionally, both persistent and non-persistent agents could be employed by AN to cause civilian casualties as a distraction, an impediment to the CFLCC advance, or as a terror act and warning to weaken Coalition solidarity and Atropian civilian support.

(2) (U) Chemical/Biological. AN has a wide variety of Chemical/Biological delivery means. In addition to surface-to-surface missiles and artillery systems capable of delivering chemical munitions, AN can also use aircraft or Special Purpose Forces (SPF) as delivery means. Arianian CBRN offensive and defensive capabilities are largely of Donovanian origin. Exact numbers of warheads and their operational status is unknown, and Arianian willingness to employ chemical and biological weapons in the current strategic context is uncertain.

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(3) (U) Nuclear. With respect to nuclear capabilities, AN has carried out secretive research supporting a uranium enrichment program over the past two decades, which violated policy issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency. During this time period, AN strongly refuted any claims that it sought nuclear weapons, while covertly pursuing uranium enrichment programs. It is currently assessed that AN is at least several years away from a capability to exploit nuclear weaponry in any form.

(4) (U) Radiological Threats. Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs or so-called dirty bombs) may be fabricated from isotopic material readily available in the region. Americium 241 from oil well surveying equipment, Cesium 137 from nuclear medical equipment, Cobalt 60 from food irradiation plants, and Strontium 90 from thermoelectric generators could be packaged with high explosives. Fabricated devices could be delivered by terrorist, guerrillas or Special Forces using unconventional delivery systems.

(5) (U) CBRN Defense. Arianian forces have a well-developed CBRN defense capability. Operational Strategic Command 2 (OSC 2) located in AP is believed to include a Chemical Defense Brigade, a Smoke Brigade, a Chemical Defense Battalion in each Division Tactical Group (DTG), and chemical defense companies or platoons within brigade-level organizations. OSC 1, still located in AN, likely has the same CBRN Defense structure. AN is also well-prepared to employ civilian CBRN protection measures. Refer to Tab 1 to this Appendix.

f. (U) Atropia (AP).

(1) (U) CBRN Weapons. AP has the capability to produce Chemical and Biological munitions from its own resources. It has long been suspected, but not proven, that AP may already possess very limited CBRN munitions. Atropian strategic policy does not include a CBRN first strike, and contingency plans are primarily for the Defense of AP. In the event of an impending CBRN strike against the Atropian homeland, however, it may decide to use pre-emptive CBRN strikes. Should any opponent conduct a CBRN attack against AP, it may retaliate in kind. AP has a wide variety of CBRN delivery means organic to its military forces. Atropian willingness to assemble and employ chemical and biological weapons in the current strategic context is assessed as LOW.

(2) (U) Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs).

(a) (U) AP produces a large quantity of toxic industrial chemicals for multiple purposes, including industrial oil and gas extraction activities, water purification, wastewater management, and fertilizer to increase agricultural output. TICs pose a risk to CFLCC forces due to the availability of large quantities of highly toxic stored materials which could have a lethal or debilitating effect on humans. Their availability, proximity to urban areas, low cost, and the limited security of storage facilities, make them an attractive option for terrorist or military targeting. In addition to the threat from the intentional use of stored TICs, accidental releases of industrial chemicals may result from collateral damage associated with military operations, electrical power interruption, or improper facility procedures or maintenance. To date AP has maintained effective environmental control over TICs and contaminated areas. The CFLCC CBRN Center will issue a listing of known TIC sites.

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(3) (U) CBRN Defense. AP is also well-prepared to employ CBRN protection measures—civilian and military—and has company-sized chemical defense units organic to all maneuver Brigades. Atropian Southern Command (ASC) contains 3702 Chemical Defense Battalion which is organized with a Battalion HQ, Decon Company, NBC Recon Company and Support Platoon. It is equipped with mostly Donovanian Tier 2 equipment and has a personnel manning of approximately 90percent. It is generally considered combat ready but will be easily overwhelmed by significant CBRN attacks.

g. (U) Gorgas (GO). There is no indication that GO possesses or is pursuing chemical or biological weapons. In addition, GO has also asserted effective environmental control over TICs and contaminated areas.

h. (U) Attachments and Detachments. Refer to Annex A (Task Organization).

2. (U) Mission. CFLCC conducts CBRN Defense operations to protect the force during the execution of Op IRON GUARDIAN.

3. (U) Execution.

a. (U) Concept of Operations. See the main body of CFLCC OPORD 07.

b. (U) Scheme of CBRN Support. CFLCC will conduct CBRN operations IAW the principles of contamination avoidance, protection, and decontamination with the operational goals of maintaining freedom along the CFLCC MSR back to GO, along axis of advance, as well as sustaining combat power for offensive operations. A pro-active CBRN defense posture by Coalition forces and Atropian civil defense authorities will lessen the incentive for AN to use CBRN weapons or TICs. The CBRN concept of support will detach a CBRNE Task Force consisting of CBRN and EOD elements OPCON to each Division (Div) to reinforce chemical recon teams organic to the maneuver BCTs, and provide decon capabilities. Biological detection, Tech Escort and other chemical recon and decon assets remaining under 415 CBRNE BDE control will be located in TAA BRONZE. If necessary, 415 CBRNE BDE will coordinate the CFLCC actions to take custody of TICs and Arianian weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to prevent their proliferation.

c. (U) CBRN Posture. Current THREAT CON GREEN. Refer to Tab B for CFLCC CBRN Defense THREAT CON. The following events could require changes to CFLCC operations and CBRN Defense activities:

(1) (U) Credible and actionable intelligence of a likely or imminent CBRN threat.

(2) (U) Release of a CBRN agent that would stress Host Nation (HN) First Responder's capacities.

(3) (U) Major/multiple CBRN events.

d. Priority of CBRN Support.

(1) (U) Phase I (D-Day – D+3). TAAs GOLD and SILVER.

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- (2) (U) Phase II (D+3 – D+6).
 - (a) (U) 1 ID.
 - (b) (U) TAA SILVER.
- (3) (U) Phase III (D+7 – D+15).
 - (a) (U) 4 MND.
 - (b) (U) 1 ID on Obj DIAMOND.
- (4) (U) Phase IV (D+16 – D+27).
 - (a) (U) 4 MND Defensive Area.
 - (b) (U) Obj GARNET.
- e. (U) Common Tasks.
 - (1) (U) Establish formation CBRN warning and reporting networks.
 - (2) (U) Conduct CBRN route reconnaissance along CFLCC and Div MSRs to facilitate contamination avoidance and freedom of maneuver.
 - (3) (U) Conduct CBRN reconnaissance, surveillance, and decontamination operations as required.
 - (4) (U) Conduct CBRN vulnerability assessments of potential TIC facilities within boundaries.
 - (5) (U) At threat level RED, establish Collective Protection facilities at medical installations, and CFLCC and Div Command Posts.
- f. (U) Specific Tasks.
 - (1) (U) 415 CBRNE BDE.
 - (a) (U) Detach the CBRN Center Team to CFLCC Main and Tactical Command Posts.
 - (b) (U) Assist with the operation of the CFLCC CBRN warning and reporting network.
 - (c) (U) Establish thorough decontamination facilities in Objs GOLD and SILVER by D-1.
 - (d) (U) Conduct CBRN route and surveillance in the CFLCC rear area and along MSR SEATTLE from the GO-AP border up to Div Rear boundaries in coordination with 16 MP BDE.
 - (e) (U) Support EOD operations.
 - (f) (U) BPT to conduct counter-WMD proliferation operations.
 - (g) (U) Maintain a master list of TIC facilities in AP along with vulnerabilities and hazard prediction templates.

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- (h) (U) Coordinate CBRN Defense and TIC response operations with the HN.
- (2) (U) 36 EN BDE. Provide engineer support to CBRN operations IAW the 415 CBRNE BDE plan, including: thorough decontamination site preparation, counter-WMD proliferation operations, and TIC containment.
- (3) (U) 16 MP BDE.
 - (a) (U) BPT to provide security for CBRN operations IAW 415 CBRNE BDE plan.
 - (b) (U) Coordinate CBRN recon and surveillance of the CFLCC rear area with 415 CBRNE BDE.
- g. (U) Coordinating Instructions.
 - (1) (U) Priority Intelligence Requirements.
 - (a) (U) Status, capabilities, and location of AN CBRN offensive weapons and production facilities.
 - (b) (U) Status, capabilities, and location of AN CBRN Defence forces.
 - (c) (U) Locations and types of chemical weapons precursors.
 - (d) (U) Guerrilla group or AN SPF intentions of capturing or releasing AP CBRN munitions or TICs.
 - (e) (U) CBRN, TIC and environmental hazards in AP.
 - (f) (U) Extent of damage to AP critical infrastructure containing TICs, and biological or radiological materials.
 - (2) Friendly Force Information Requirements.
 - (a) (U) Status, locations, and activities of AP CBRN weapons and CBRN Defence forces.
 - (b) (U) Which AP chemical and biological warfare sites (if any) are vulnerable to seizure by AN forces or associated groups.
 - (c) (U) Locations and status of Bde and Div decon sites.
 - (3) (U) Obscuration. Battlefield obscuration is integral to deception, protection, and gap crossing operations. There is one Chemical Company (Obscurant) in the CFLCC. Each Div has a fires brigade capable of providing projected smoke in support of obscuration operations. Requests for mechanized smoke generation are to be submitted to HQ CFLCC by D-6.
 - (4) (U) Reconnaissance. Formations are responsible for CBRN recon in their AO. Non-chemical units will employ unit CBRN teams to detect and mark contaminated areas. Chemical recon systems will be employed along CFLCC MSRs to identify hazard areas that may significantly affect maneuver and rapidly identify bypass routes around contamination that may delay friendly forces.

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Priorities for CBRN recon include:

- (a) (U) MSR SEATTLE and bypasses.
 - (b) (U) Point recon and surveillance of crossing sites, sustainment nodes, and airfield facilities.
 - (c) (U) Assessment of Atropian TICs and Arianian WMD.
- (5) (U) Decontamination. Decon support is provided on an area basis with priority to CFLCC's main effort Div. CFLCC will establish thorough decontamination sites in TAA GOLD (ABBY ONE) and SILVER (ABBY FOUR). Formations will establish one or more thorough decon sites along Div routes. Div decon sites will move forward in pace with divisional maneuver. All non-chemical units must BPT conduct operational decontamination to minimize residual contamination casualties and reduce masking time.
- (6) (U) TICs and WMD Exploitation/Elimination. CFLCC will take action to prevent the proliferation of WMD including their component materials or relevant technical expertise. The most likely scenario involving WMD materials is CFLCC forces encountering abandoned or discarded materials as Arianian forces are defeated or withdraw back to AN. 415 CBRN BDE has one Tech Escort (TE) company available to conduct exploitation and limited elimination operations. Units encountering abandoned or discarded CBRN materials should take the following actions.
- (a) (U) Evacuate and secure the immediate area.
 - (b) (U) Report the discovery of these sites to HQ CFLCC Force Protection staff and 415 CBRN BDE.
 - (c) (U) Consolidate and secure the materials under the guidance of organic CBRN units.
 - (d) (U) Hand the site over to the 415 CBRNE BDE response team.
 - (e) (U) Provide site security while the 415 CBRNE BDE response team is working.
- (7) (U) Individual Protective Equipment. Ensure all personnel have immediate access to 1 x Individual Chemical Equipment (ICE) pack (or equivalent for other Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs)) and 1 x ICE pack available within two hours. Commanders are authorized to upgrade Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) Levels as deemed appropriate to the tactical situation. MOPP levels are:
- (a) (U) Phase I - MOPP xxxx.
 - (b) (U) Phase II-III - MOPP xxxx.
 - (c) (U) Phase IV - MOPP xxxx.
- (8) (U) Collective Protection. At threat level RED, formations will establish Collective Protection facilities at medical facilities, and CFLCC and Div Command Posts.

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(9) (U) Radiation Exposure Guidance. Commanders at all levels are required to reduce the risks from ionizing radiation by avoiding unnecessary exposure. TCNs will ensure that their troops are equipped with appropriate dosimetry equipment and establish maximum permissible doses. For US Forces OIG is 50cGy.

(10) (U) CBRN Reporting.

(a) (U) Conduct CBRN reporting to the CFLCC CBRN Center in accordance with reference B. See Tab C for the CFLCC Network diagram.

(b) (U) Report contaminated area bypass routes to CFLCC CBRN Center.

(c) (U) Biological Casualty Reporting. Special monitoring and reporting arrangements will be instituted by medical staff, and careful attention paid to any changes in the rate of sickness or infectious diseases.

(11) (U) Environmental Protection. CFLCC personnel employed in CBRN Defense operations must protect the environment as much as possible. Commanders will employ environmentally responsible practices that minimize adverse impacts on human health to the greatest extent practicable. Close coordination with HN agencies and Coalition partners during CBRN response actions is needed to avoid negative environmental consequences.

4. Sustainment.

a. (U) Resupply.

(1) (U) Mission critical shortages of NBC defense equipment/supplies should requisitioned immediately.

(2) (U) Upon the commencement of Phase II, the US forces will push at least 1 X ICE pack per soldier every 30 days. US units are authorized to requisition CBRN ICE between pushes as required. 15 Sustainment BDE in AP will hold an additional set per person. Other TCNs will ensure their units hold sufficient CBRN protective equipment and may place additional equipment with 15 Sustainment BDE.

b. (U) CBRN contaminated casualties will be segregated and decontaminated as far forward as possible at casualty collection points (CCPs).

c. (U) CBRN contaminated remains will be segregated. Further direction will be issued.

5. Command and Signal.

a. (U) Command.

(1) (U) CFLCC CBRN Defense Officer. LTC XXXXXX (US) (CM).

(2) (U) COM 415 CBRNE BDE. Colonel XXXXXX (US)(CM).

b. (U) Location. HQ 415 CBRNE BDE will be established at RAMAL, AP by XXXXXX.

c. (U) Warning and Reporting.

(1) (U) CFLCC CBRN Center (-) will be located in the CFLCC Main Command Post at Yevlakh airfield. An element of the CFLCC CBRN Center will be located at the Tactical Command Post at Ujar.

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(2) (U) Primary means of communication between the CFLCC CBRN Center and subordinate CBRN Centers is secure E-mail (for record keeping), followed by secure voice. Operational information will not be discussed over unsecure means.

d. (U) Reachback. HQ 415 CBRNE BDE will facilitate CBRN reachback support through HQ CJTF-OIG.

e. (U) CBRN Liaison. 415 CBRNE BDE will be prepared to deploy an LNO to the Atropian Supreme High Command (SHC).

ATTACHMENTS:

Tab A	- Arianian CBRN Defense Organization
Tab B	- CFLCC CBRN THREATCON
Tab C	- CFLCC CBRN Warning and Report Network Diagram (To be issued)

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**TAB A TO APPENDIX 10 TO ANNEX E TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON
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**TAB A (ARIANIAN CBRN DEFENSE CAPABILITY) TO APPENDIX 10 (CBRN
DEFENSE) TO ANNEX E (PROTECTION) TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION
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(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu

1. **(U) Operational Strategic Command 2 (OSC 2)**. (located in Atropia)
 - a. (U) 23 Mechanized Infantry Division (IFV) - 23 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - b. (U) 24 Motorized Infantry Division - 24 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - c. (U) 25 Mechanized Infantry Division (APC) - 25 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - d. (U) 361 Chemical Defense Brigade.
 - (1) (U) 361 Chemical Defense Brigade Headquarters.
 - (2) (U) 1/361 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - (3) (U) 2/361 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - (4) (U) 3/361 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - (5) (U) 4/361 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - (6) (U) 361 NBC Reconnaissance Battalion.
 - (7) (U) 361 Decontamination Battalion.
 - (8) (U) 361 Smoke Battalion.
 - (9) (U) 361 Materiel Support Battalion.
 - e. 363 Smoke Brigade.
 - (1) (U) 363 Smoke Brigade Headquarters.
 - (2) (U) 1/363 Smoke Battalion.
 - (3) (U) 2/363 Smoke Battalion.
 - (4) (U) 3/363 Smoke Battalion.
 - (5) (U) 363 Materiel Support Company.

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2. (U) **Operational Strategic Command 1 (OSC 1)**. (located in Ariana)
 - a. (U) 11 Mechanized Infantry Division (IFV) - 11 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - b. (U) 12 Motorized Infantry Division - 12 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - c. (U) 13 Mechanized Infantry Division - 13 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - d. (U) 14 Motorized Infantry Division - 14 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - e. (U) 317 Chemical Defense Brigade.
 - (1) (U) 317 Chemical Defense Brigade Headquarters.
 - (2) (U) 1/317 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - (3) (U) 2/317 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - (4) (U) 3/317 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - (5) (U) 4/317 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - (6) (U) 317 NBC Reconnaissance Battalion.
 - (7) (U) 317 Decontamination Battalion.
 - (8) (U) 317 Smoke Battalion.
 - (9) (U) 317 Materiel Support Battalion.
 - f. (U) 319 Smoke Brigade.
 - (1) (U) 319 Smoke Brigade Headquarters.
 - (2) (U) 1/319 Smoke Battalion.
 - (3) (U) 2/319 Smoke Battalion.
 - (4) (U) 3/319 Smoke Battalion.
 - (5) (U) 319 Materiel Support Company.
3. (U) **Operational Strategic Command 2 (OSC 2)**. (located in Atropia)
 - a. (U) 23 Mechanized Infantry Division (IFV) - 23 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - b. (U) 24 Motorized Infantry Division - 24 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - c. (U) 25 Mechanized Infantry Division (APC) - 25 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - d. (U) 361 Chemical Defense Brigade.
 - (1) (U) 361 Chemical Defense Brigade Headquarters.
 - (2) (U) 1/361 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - (3) (U) 2/361 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - (4) (U) 3/361 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - (5) (U) 4/361 Chemical Defense Battalion.

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**TAB A TO APPENDIX 10 TO ANNEX E TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON
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- (6) (U) 361 NBC Reconnaissance Battalion.
- (7) (U) 361 Decontamination Battalion.
- (8) (U) 361 Smoke Battalion.
- (9) (U) 361 Materiel Support Battalion.
- e. 363 Smoke Brigade.
 - (1) (U) 363 Smoke Brigade Headquarters.
 - (2) (U) 1/363 Smoke Battalion.
 - (3) (U) 2/363 Smoke Battalion.
 - (4) (U) 3/363 Smoke Battalion.
 - (5) (U) 363 Materiel Support Company.
- 4. **(U) Operational Strategic Command 1 (OSC 1).** (located in Ariana)
 - a. (U) 11 Mechanized Infantry Division (IFV) - 11 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - b. (U) 12 Motorized Infantry Division - 12 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - c. (U) 13 Mechanized Infantry Division - 13 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - d. (U) 14 Motorized Infantry Division - 14 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - e. (U) 317 Chemical Defense Brigade.
 - (1) (U) 317 Chemical Defense Brigade Headquarters.
 - (2) (U) 1/317 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - (3) (U) 2/317 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - (4) (U) 3/317 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - (5) (U) 4/317 Chemical Defense Battalion.
 - (6) (U) 317 NBC Reconnaissance Battalion.
 - (7) (U) 317 Decontamination Battalion.
 - (8) (U) 317 Smoke Battalion.
 - (9) (U) 317 Materiel Support Battalion.
 - f. (U) 319 Smoke Brigade.
 - (1) (U) 319 Smoke Brigade Headquarters.
 - (2) (U) 1/319 Smoke Battalion.
 - (3) (U) 2/319 Smoke Battalion.
 - (4) (U) 3/319 Smoke Battalion.
 - (5) (U) 319 Materiel Support Company.

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TAB B TO APPENDIX 10 TO ANNEX E TO OPOD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

TAB B (CBRN THREATCON) TO APPENDIX 10 (CBRN DEFENSE) TO ANNEX E (PROTECTION) TO OPOD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC


CBRN THREATCON				
THREAT CONDITION	ATTACK PROBABILITY	CBRN THREAT STATUS (STANAG 2984)	ENEMY INDICATORS	MINIMUM PROTECTIVE ACTIONS
WHITE	Negligible	Serial 0 (None)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- no offensive CBRN capability- TICs in AO, no interest of employment	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Verify CBRN defense equipment holdings- Routine maintenance
GREEN	Possible	Serial 1 (Low)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- CBRN offensive capability- No indicators of use in next 12 hrs- TICs in AO, some interest of use by enemy	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Above Plus- CBRN training and rehearsals- Prepare eqpt and vehicles- Activate CBRN Warning and Reporting Network- MOPP 0
AMBER	Probable	Serial 2 (Medium)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Wearing protective gear- Preparing to employ- CBRN munitions moving forward to delivery units- CBRN munitions or TICS already employed in JOA	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Above Plus- Emplace alarms- MOPP 1 - verify mask seals- Cover equipment/supplies- Verify alarms/warnings- Brief CBRN teams- Decon site preparation
RED	Imminent	Serial 3 (High)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- CBRN munitions/TICs ready for employment- intelligence indicates certain use- CBRN weapons used in JOA- SSM launch- air attack in progress- no contamination present	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Above Plus- MOPP 2- Continuous monitoring- Use vehicle overpressure- CBRN RV NAI Overwatch
BLACK	Attack Occurred		<ul style="list-style-type: none">- CBRN/TIC contamination is present in AO	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Above Plus- Unit CBRN surveys- Mark contaminated areas- Find uncontaminated routes- Decontamination as necessary- CBRN defense equipment resupply

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TAB C TO APPENDIX 10 TO ANNEX E TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON
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TAB C (CBRN WARNING NETWORK) TO APPENDIX 10 (CBRN DEFENSE) TO
ANNEX E (PROTECTION) TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(U) CFLCC CBRN WARNING AND REPORTING NETWORK



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APPENDIX 11 (EOD) TO ANNEX E (PROTECTION) TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(U) References:

- (a) (U) CJTF-OIG OPORD 01 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) (enter date)
- (b) (U) CFLCC OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) (enter date)
- (c) (U) STANAG 2143 Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance and Disposal
- (d) (U) STANAG 2389 Minimum Standard of Proficiency for Trained Explosive Ordnance Disposal Personnel
- (e) (U) Weapons Technical Intelligence IED Lexicon
- (f) (U) ATP 4-32 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations, 30 September 2013.
- (g) (U) ATP 4-32.16 Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal, 8 May 2015.
- (h) (U) ATP 3-11.23 Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Weapons Of Mass Destruction Elimination Operations, 1 November 2015.

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout OPORD: ZULU

1. (U) **Situation.**

- a. (U) Area of Interest / Operations. Refer to CFLCC OPORD 07.
- b. (U) Terrain. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence). The Atropian terrain alternates between rugged mountain and relatively flat lowlands.
 - (1) (U) Mountainous terrain will channel CFLCC forces along roads through valleys and over numerous waterways which will provide opportunity for the employment of IEDs to disrupt and delay movement.
 - (2) (U) The road networks of Atropia (AP) are mainly paved; however, there are numerous unimproved dirt and gravel roads throughout the area. In the Kura-Aras lowland, many of the unimproved roads are located on berms. Disrupting mobility would be easily affected by damaging paved roads through the use of IEDs or cratering charges. Rural roads do not receive proper maintenance, leaving them susceptible to damage from the weather and neglect.
 - (3) (U) The Kura-Aras lowland is composed primarily of agricultural fields divided by berms and irrigation ditches which will restrict movement. Agricultural fields are trafficable only during the late summer months or when frozen during the winter.
- c. (U) Weather. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence).
- d. (U) Enemy Forces. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence).

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APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX E TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

e. (U) Explosive Threats. Explosive hazards may include threats from conventional ordnance such as munitions and mines produced by many nations. Potential threats also include improvised explosive devices (IED), homemade explosives (HME), and booby-traps. Explosive hazards may incorporate CBR agents and toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) and materials.

(1) (U) IEDs.

(a) (U) IEDs have been used by various anti-government guerrilla groups for several years. The two primary groups of concern are Salasyl which operates in southeastern AP and advocates the violent overthrow of the Atropian Government, and South Atropian People's Army (SAPA) which is a group with cultural ties to Ariana (AN) who advocates creating a separate country out of southern AP and northern AN provinces. The primary focus of these uncoordinated attacks was on Atropian government officials, military forces, and against other guerrilla groups.

(b) (U) IED incidents have been initiated against CJTF-OIG forces in Gorgas over the past three months by Arianian Special Purpose Forces (SPF) and anti-government guerrillas. Arianian SPF has been using sophisticated TTPs and devices involving military components. Devices have been primarily VBIED and ordnance IEDs that are command detonated either through the use of hard wire or remote control devices. Ordnance IEDs have been primarily used in road ditches and culverts as well as in urban areas. Use of victim actuated devices including anti-disturbance/anti-open switches and trip wires is increasing. There has been little use of suicide vests at this time. IEDs employed by SAPA and Salasyl are less sophisticated, involve homemade materials, and have largely been employed ineffectively.

(c) (U) 82 ABN DIV was targeted upon arrival in AP, and in the past month attacks have increased with the move of CFLCC forces into AP. Technical exploitation of recovered IEDs and materials has been incorporated into render safe procedures. Lessons learned from 82 ABN DIV counter-explosive operations will be distributed to CFLCC forces.

(d) (U) It is likely that Arianian SPF will continue to operate in both Gorgas and AP and target Coalition soft targets and high value targets such as communications and headquarters units, air defense equipment, and medical, POL, and ammunition assets with the goal of disrupting the CFLCC deployment into AP and Coalition cohesion. Once Coalition forces cross into AP IED efforts will become more aggressive, and may include the potential targeting of TICs. Salasyl and SAPA guerrilla groups will likely expand targets to include industrial facilities and soft civilian targets such as mosques and large crowds to deflate civilian support for the Atropian government and Coalition operations.

(2) (U) UXO. There are explosive remnants of war remaining in AP from previous conflicts as well as current operations. The Atropia National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) has been actively conducting mine clearance operations in northwest AP in accordance with International Mine Action Standards. Most of the remaining explosive hazards are located in the Rayons along the Lower Janga - AP border. The most likely UXO threats in theater are: RPG 7 and RPG 9 HEAT projectiles, BK881 HEAT Recoilless Rifle Projectiles, 82mm Mortars rounds, 122mm rockets, 152mm arty projectiles, various foreign AT and AP mines, and POM-2S AP and PTM-3 AT scatterable mines.

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- (3) (U) CBRN and TIC Threats. Refer to Appendix 10 to Annex J.
- f. (U) Friendly Forces.
 - (1) (U) Atropia. AP has rudimentary EOD capabilities in their Army Engineers and CivPol.
 - (2) (U) Available EOD Forces.
 - (a) (U) 310 Expeditionary Support Command. 242 Ordnance (EOD) Bn.
 - (b) (U) CFLCC. 415 CBRNE BDE.
 - (3) (U) National Level Support. EOD forces should capitalize on reach back capabilities to counter the complexity of current and emerging weapon systems.
 - (4) (U) Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. ANAMA is conducting demining operations in the Rayons bordering Lower Janga.
- g. (U) Attachments and Detachments. Refer to Annex A (Task Organization).
- 2. (U) **Mission**. CFLCC will conduct counter-explosive hazard operations to protect the force and maintain mobility during the execution of Op IRON GUARDIAN.
- 3. (U) **Execution**.
 - a. (U) CFLCC Concept of Operations. See the main body of Reference B for further details.
 - (1) (U) Phase I – Shape (D-Day – D+3). 82 ABN DIV maintains defense forward while 1 ID and 4 MND move forward to TAAs.
 - (2) (U) Phase II – Clear (D+3 – D+6). 1 ID seizes Objs RUBY, EMERALD and DIAMOND. 3 CAV crosses Kura River and conducts a guard operation.
 - (3) (U) Phase III – Dominate (D+7 – D+15). 4 MND movement, crossing of the Kura River, and subsequent offensive operations, supported by 1 ID disruption operations.
 - (4) (U) Phase IV – Stabilize (D+16 – D+27). Defensive operations along the international border and stability operations.
 - b. (U) Concept of EOD Support. HQ 415 CBRNE BDE will coordinate and control CFLCC counter-explosive hazard operations. EOD elements as part of CBRNE TF1, TF4 and TF82 will be detached OPCON to CFLCC divisions and then placed in direct support (DS) of BCTs as necessary. Additionally, 79 EOD BN supports non-division formations, maintains mobility on MSRs and supports CFLCC rear area security operations. EOD forces must focus on protecting the force and maintaining mobility during Phase I-III. During these Phases, explosive hazards should not be allowed to undermine mission completion. Hazards that do not constitute an immediate and grave or indirect threat to CFLCC personnel and mission success will be marked, bypassed, and dealt with when the situation permits. EOD forces will identify ordnance and strive to identify IED system components/operation as much as possible to assist in the development of friendly TTPs to respond to enemy TTPs. Phase IV will potentially see Counter-IED task forces created to deal more deliberately with the anticipated increase in IED threats and unexploded ordnance. There will be more focus on attacking IED networks and exploiting captured material and forensic evidence.

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- c. (U) EOD Priority of Effort by Phase.
 - (1) (U) Phase I – Shape (D-Day – D+3).
 - (a) (U) Support the move of 1 ID and 4 MND.
 - (b) (U) TAAs BRONZE, SILVER, and GOLD.
 - (2) (U) Phase II – Clear (D+3 – D+6).
 - (a) (U) Support 1 ID operations to seize Objs RUBY, EMERALD, and DIAMOND.
 - (b) (U) Support 3 CAV crossing of Kura River and subsequent guard operations.
 - (c) (U) Support 4 MND movement.
 - (3) (U) Phase III – Dominate (D+7 – D+15).
 - (a) (U) Support 4 MND crossing of the Kura River, and subsequent offensive operations.
 - (b) (U) Support 1 ID blocking operations.
 - (c) (U) CFLCC MSR SEATTLE to Alyat and MSR HOUSTON to TAA GOLD.
 - (4) (U) Phase IV – Stabilize (D+16 – D+27).
 - (a) (U) Support defensive operations along the international border.
 - (b) (U) Support to stability operations.
 - (c) (U) CFLCC MSRs.
- d. Common Tasks to Subordinate Formations.
 - (1) (U) Receive attached EOD forces.
 - (2) (U) Provide logistical, medical, and communications support for EOD elements.
 - (3) (U) Provide security for EOD teams during EOD operations.
 - (4) (U) Conduct EOD and route clearance operations within assigned AOs.
 - (5) (U) Support the recovery and exploitation of IEDs and foreign ordnance for intelligence purposes.
 - (6) (U) Submit appropriate EOD reports and returns.
- e. (U) 415 CBRNE BDE.
 - (1) (U) Detach EOD elements OPCON CFLCC formations as per Annex A to this order.
 - (2) (U) Coordinate and control the CFLCC counter-explosive hazard operation.
 - (3) (U) Provide EOD support for route clearance in the CFLCC rear area.
 - (4) (U) Support CBRN munition disposal.
 - (5) (U) BPT to assist 4 SUST BDE with the destruction of abandoned weapons and munitions.

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- (6) (U) BPT support HN civilian authorities.
- (7) (U) Provide EOD representative to the CFLCC force protection board.
- f. (U) 16 MP BDE. Provide security for EOD missions in the CFLCC rear area.
- g. (U) 36 EN BDE. Synchronize route clearance operations in the CFLCC rear area with 415 CBRNE BDE.
- h. (U) 61 MI BDE. Provide intelligence support to EOD / C-IED operations.
- i. (U) 77 AVN BDE. Support EOD/C-IED operations by assisting with security and medevac at incident sites. Move EOD teams by air if necessary.
- j. (U) 9 MISO BN. Support EOD/C-IED operations by influencing the local population.
- k. (U) Coordinating Instructions.
- (1) (U) EOD Priority Intelligence Requirements.
 - (a) (U) Arianian SPF capacity, techniques, and procedures for employing explosive hazards.
 - (b) (U) Guerilla group capacity, techniques, and procedures for employing explosive hazards within Gorgas and AP.
 - (c) (U) Employment of IEDs and booby-traps targeting CJTF-OIG forces in the JOA.
 - (d) (U) Employment of IEDs and booby-traps targeting Atropian civilians and infrastructure.
 - (e) (U) Employment of mines in the JOA.
 - (f) (U) Cache locations of bomb making materials, munitions, and weapons.
 - (g) (U) Type, location, status, and composition of Arianian obstacles within AP.
 - (h) (U) CBRN, TIC and environmental hazards in AP.
- (2) (U) EOD Friendly Force Information Requirements.
 - (a) (U) Restrictions on the employment of national EOD assets.
 - (b) (U) Loss of friendly EOD assets.
 - (c) (U) The development of new EOD equipment and render safe procedures.
 - (d) (U) Status, locations, and activities of Atropian EOD elements.
- (3) (U) Categories. EOD categories will be established in accordance with NATO doctrine at reference C.
 - (a) (U) Category A. EOD threats that constitute a grave and immediate threat to CFLCC personnel, critical assets, and mission completion. These incidents may cause mass destruction, widespread contamination, and significant reduction of combat power or loss of critical infrastructure. Category A incidents will be given priority over all other tasks. Render safe and disposal operations will be started immediately regardless of personal risk upon request from the Supported Commander and on order of the EOD Plt Leader or Company CO.

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(b) (U) Category B. EOD threats that constitute an indirect threat to CFLCC personnel and mission completion. These incidents impair unit maneuver and mission capabilities. Before render safe and disposal operations are started a safe waiting period may be observed to reduce the hazard to EOD personnel. EOD mission conducted upon request from the Supported Commander and on order from the EOD Company CO.

(c) (U) Category C. EOD missions that constitute little threat to CFLCC personnel or mission completion but reduces unit maneuver and mission capabilities or threatens non-critical infrastructure. These incidents will normally be conducted after Category A and B incidents are resolved, as the situation permits and with minimum hazard to personnel. These missions will be executed upon request from the Supported Commander and with the authority of the formation CBRNE TF CO.

(d) (U) Category D. Assigned to EOD missions that constitute no threat at present. These EOD missions will not be conducted without authority of COM 415 CBRNE BDE.
NOTE: These threats are still deadly, and will be marked and left to EOD forces for disposal.

(4) (U) EOD Priorities. EOD categories are not to be confused with EOD priorities. EOD forces establish categories while Commanders set priorities. The five EOD priorities are:

(a) (U) Priority 1 - Immediate. The EOD threat stops maneuver and significantly degrades mission capability, or causes the closure and evacuation of critical assets.

(b) (U) Priority 2 - Direct. The EOD threat reduces the maneuver and mission capability or threatens critical assets important to the mission.

(c) (U) Priority 3 – Exploitation. Intelligence gathering on first seen and unusual ordnance and IEDs.

(d) (U) Priority 4 - Minor. The EOD threat reduces maneuver and mission capability or threatens non-critical assets of value.

(e) (U) Priority 5 - No Threat. EOD threats that have little or no effect on tasks, capabilities, or assets. This includes the destruction of unserviceable equipment and ammunition.

(5) (U) EOD Qualification. Only properly qualified EOD personnel that meet the standards stated at reference D and EOD units shall conduct EOD procedures against explosive ordnance, UXO, or IEDs. EOD units undertake the following tasks in DS of the CFLCC.

(a) (U) Conduct IED mitigation and disposal.

(b) (U) Conduct UXO render safe procedures and disposal missions.

(c) (U) Conduct post blast investigations of all types of IED incidents.

(d) (U) Conduct an assessment and disposal of designated munitions caches throughout the AO.

(e) (U) Clear MSRs and essential operational areas and facilities.

(f) (U) Support the recovery and exploitation of IEDs and foreign ordnance for intelligence purposes.

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(6) (U) Disruptive Direct Fire. Commanders are authorized to employ direct fire against identified Category A and B UXO and IED threats during Phase I-III while in contact or maneuvering into contact against the opposing forces provided the action will not threaten CFLCC forces, the local population, and restricted or critical infrastructure.

(7) (U) Counter-IED. In addition to EOD, Counter-IED operations involve attacking the IED network and adapting the force to changing explosive threats. HQ 415 CBRNE BDE will establish the CFLCC Explosive Hazards Coordination Cell (EHCC) to gather information, and coordinate CFLCC EOD and Counter-IED operations. HQ 415 CBRNE BDE will publish guidance and coordinate C-IED operations and sensitive site exploitation within the CFLCC AO to defeat the insurgent IED network.

(a) (U) Intelligence and Collection. EOD forces will identify ordnance and strive to identify IED components/operation during Phase I-III, and will focus on this during Phase IV.

(b) (U) Exploitation and Analysis. All EOD forces will be prepared to conduct level 1 exploitation and analysis of devices during Phases I-III, and level 2 exploitation and analysis of explosive hazard events during Phase IV.

(c) (U) Counterterrorist Operations. EOD forces will mitigate explosive hazards employed by terrorist/insurgent activities. Minimal effort will be placed on material exploitation, forensic prosecution, and targeting IED networks by conventional forces until Phase IV.

(8) (U) CBRN and TIC. All EOD forces will be prepared to respond to a CBRN event and conduct initial hazard containment, sealing of leaking ordnance, and packaging for transport. Chemical units should BPT assist with CBRN operations and overall decontamination efforts.

(9) (U) Vulnerability Assessments. Subordinate formations will coordinate with supporting EOD forces to conduct vulnerability assessments on critical infrastructure and bases as appropriate.

(10) (U) Safety. Formations and EOD forces must adhere to EOD cordon and safety actions to prevent unnecessary risk and possible fratricide.

(11) (U) Host Nation Support.

(a) (U) Counter-explosive hazard operations will be coordinated with HN leaders to ensure the safety of CFLCC and HN personnel.

(b) (U) HN requests for EOD support will be submitted to HQ 415 CBRNE BDE prior to any action being taken.

4. (U) Sustainment.

a. (U) General. Detached EOD elements will deploy with their basic load, and will receive logistic and medical support from supported formations.

b. (U) Administration. Munitions report (MUREP) will be submitted weekly commencing in Phase IV to CJTF-OIG CJ-4 to maintain visibility of expenditures/requirements.

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c. (U) Logistics.

- (1) (U) EOD forces will deploy with all available robotic platforms.
- (2) (U) Only qualified technicians will repair specialized EOD equipment such as robots.
- (3) (U) All specialized EOD equipment Operational Needs Statements will be submitted to 415 CBRNE BDE for CJTF-OIG approval.

5. (U) Command and Signal.

a. (U) Command.

- (1) (U) CFLCC EOD Staff Officer. LTC XXXXXX (US) (Ord).
- (2) (U) COM 415 CBRNE BDE. Colonel XXXXXX (US) (CM).
- (3) (U) Location. HQ 415 CBRNE BDE will be established at Ramal, AP by XXXXXX.

b. (U) Control. HQ 415 CBRNE BDE will coordinate and control the CFLCC counter-explosive hazard operation. EOD forces as part of CBRNE TFs will be detached OPCON to CFLCC formations and then placed in DS of maneuver BCTs.

c. (U) Terminology. Reference E which is used by US Forces and has been approved for use by NATO will be used to facilitate a common understanding.

d. (U) Reporting.

(1) (U) Formations will submit EOD support requests as per the EOD 9-Liner message as per Tab A to this Appendix.

(2) (U) 415 CBRNE BDE will provide a daily summary of EOD incidents/responses to HQ CFLCC.

(3) (U) EOD forces will employ the EOD Information Management System (EODIS).

(4) (U) EOD forces will provide a SPOTREP within four hours to CBRNE TF HQ and HQ 415 CBRNE BDE, and a comprehensive report within 24 hours.

e. (U) Reachback. HQ 415 CBRNE BDE will facilitate EOD reachback support to the: Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Picatinny Arsenal, Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division (NAVEODTECHDIV), Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and the FBI Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC), Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF), Sandia National Laboratories, National Ground Intelligence Agency (NGIC), and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

f. (U) EOD Liaison.

(1) (U) 415 CBRNE BDE will be prepared to deploy an EOD LNO to the Atropian Southern Command (ASC).

(2) (U) CBRNE TFs will provide a liaison cell to division tactical CP. EOD forces must provide a concept of EOD support brief to their supported organization. Companies will liaison with their supported BCTs as required to ensure EOD operations are integrated.

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APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX E TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

g. (U) Signal. Refer to Annex H (Signal). Supported formations will provide communications to assigned EOD forces. The primary means of communication is secure E-mail followed by secure voice. EOD forces require both NIPR and SIPR access. Operational information will not be discussed over unsecure means.

Attachments:

Tab A. EOD Nine Liner

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**TAB A TO APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX E TO OPOD 07 (OPERATION IRON
GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

**TAB A (EOD 9-LINER) TO APPENDIX 11 (EOD) TO ANNEX E (PROTECTION) TO
OPOD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

(U) References:

(U) ATP 4-32, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations, 30 September 2013.

Line 1	Date Time Group	131200ZAUG13
Line 2	Reporting Unit/Location	11 CAV 39T TE 7514 6247
Line 3	Contact Method	F400, Sapper Six, CPT Windsor
Line 4	Type of Ordnance /quantity	82 mm Mortar 1 each
Line 5	CBRN Contamination	Yes, M8 paper confirms H
Line 6	Resources Threatened	Personnel, engineer equipment
Line 7	Impact on Mission	Mine clearance operations halted
Line 8	Protective Measures	Personnel evacuated to 300m
Line 9	Recommended Priority	Immediate

(U) Line 1 - Date Time Group. The DTG when the item was discovered.

(U) Line 2 - Reporting Unit/Explosive Location. The reporting unit designation and the 8-digit grid reference of the explosive ordnance location.

(U) Line 3 - Contact Method. Provide the radio frequency and the call sign, and/or the telephone number and name of the point of contact.

(U) Line 4 - Type of Ordnance /Quantity. The size, quantity, type of ordnance (dropped, thrown, projected, placed, or possible IED). Indicate the emplacement method and type of initiation device.

(U) Line 5 - CBRN Contamination. Indicate the type of CBRN contamination, and/or symptoms being experienced by personnel.

(U) Line 6 - Resources Threatened. Report any equipment, facilities, or other asset that are threatened.

(U) Line 7 - Impact on Mission. Provide a short description of your current situation and how the presence of explosive ordnance affects the mission, such as delayed, diverted, or cancelled.

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**TAB A TO APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX E TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON
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(U) Line 8 - Protective Measures. Describe measures taken to protect personnel, equipment or facilities.

(U) Line 9 - Recommended Priority. Immediate (Category A), Indirect (Category B), Minor (Category C), and No Threat (Category D. Ensure the recommended priority matches the situation described in Line 7. Priorities refer only to the impact of explosive ordnance on the current mission.

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APPENDIX 12 TO ANNEX E TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

**APPENDIX 12 (AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE) TO ANNEX E (FORCE PROTECTION)
TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

(U) References:

- (a) CJTF OIG Air Operations Plan.
- (b) CJTF OIG Airspace Control Plan.

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu

1. (U) Situation.

a. (U) Enemy Forces. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence Estimate) to CFLCC OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN).

b. (U) Friendly Forces.

(1) (U) CFLCC Air Defense Forces.

- (a) (U) 11 AD BDE (-) (DS CFACC) (DAADC) (TAAMDCOORD)
- (b) (U) 3-43 AD (PATRIOT)
- (c) (U) 5-52 AD (PATRIOT)
- (d) (U) A/2 AD (THAAD)
- (e) (U) A/4 AD (THAAD)
- (f) (U) 1-43 AD (AVENGER/PATRIOT) (GS CFLCC)
- (g) (U) 3-4 AD (AVENGER) (DS 82 ABN DIV)
- (h) (U) 2-43 AD (AVENGER/PATRIOT) (DS 4 MND)
- (i) (U) 1-62 AD (AVENGER/PATRIOT) (DS 1 ID)

(2) (U) Atropian (AP) Air Defense Command (TACON to CFAAC).

- (a) (U) 361 AD BDE (SA-20)
- (b) (U) 362 AD BDE (SA-11)
- (c) (U) 363 AD BDE (SA-22).

(3) (U) Every AP maneuver brigade contains 6 x SA-15 and 12 x 2S6.

(4) (U) Naval Air Defense. Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) is provided by TG 150.1, TG 150.2, TG 160.1 and TG 160.2. However, naval forces are unable to provide TBMD coverage over the landmass of Atropia.

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APPENDIX 12 TO ANNEX E TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(5) (U) Counter-Air Forces (TACON to CFAAC). Fighter Engagement Zones (FEZ) and Combat Air Patrols (CAP) will consist of fourth generation fighter aircraft from Atropia, France, Great Britain, Australia and the United States. Sensors include E-3C AWACS, E-8 JSTARS, RC-135 Rivet Joint, CP140 Aurora, MQ-4 Global Hawk, MQ-9 Reaper and the WK-450 Watchkeeper. Electronic warfare is provided by the EA-18G Growler.

(6) (U) Coalition Air Defense Vulnerabilities.

(a) (U) Atropian Armed Forces use Donovanian aircraft, which include Flankers, Fencers, Backfires, Hips, and Hinds. Since the Arianian Air Force flies the same types of aircraft, the risk of fratricide is greatly increased. Systems that rely on a visual identification (VID) prior to engagement, such as Short Range Air Defense systems, will be adversely impacted with delayed or aborted engagement attempts.

(b) (U) Avenger weapon systems and Sentinel radars are lightweight and extremely vulnerable to direct and indirect fire.

(c) (U) With a full Patriot battery normally requiring a site of one square km, this makes it a high payoff target for the enemy. Patriot equipment is vulnerable to both direct and indirect fire, enemy special operations forces and they are well within Arianian surface to surface missile (SSM) threat rings.

(d) (U) The CJTF-OIG Patriots have overlapping Missile Engagement Zones (MEZ) with Atropian SA-20 and SA-11 rings. Atropian AD systems cannot be networked with CJTF-OIG systems. This results in two separate AD operating pictures and C2 with associated delayed engagement decisions and an increased risk of fratricide.

(e) (U) In a more general sense, Atropian Armed Forces are unable to link with NATO Data Link, which results in a dependency on voice communications and liaison officers.

(7) (U) Critical Coalition Air Defense Capabilities. Aegis TBMD, PATRIOT, and THAAD are the only CJTF Ballistic Missile Defense capabilities. 3-4 AD, 1-43 AD, 2-43 AD, and 1-62 AD Sentinel C2 nodes broadcast digital air picture over the Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) to Avenger batteries, platoons, fire units, and Air Defense Airspace Management (ADM) cells after correlation with their respective Air Battle Management Operations Center's (ABMOC) integrated air picture.

2. (U) Mission. On order, air and missile defense supports active force protection measures within the area of operations.

3. (U) Execution.

a. (U) Concept of Operations.

(1) (U) During Phases I-IV, PATRIOT forces provide TBM point defense for operationally significant assets including ports, airbases, senior echelon command posts, and assembly areas. Army Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS) provides satellite based integrated, in-theater missile warning to provide near real-time dissemination of ballistic missile threats through joint Link 16 communication networks and to Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS). CFACC conducts Defensive Counter Air (DCA) to maintain local air superiority over

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APPENDIX 12 TO ANNEX E TO OPOD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

CJTF-OIG and AP Armed Forces, gradually extending DCA and air superiority over the landmass of Ariana. Concurrently, CFACC conducts Offensive Counter Air (OCA) to defeat the air and missile threat presented by AN Armed Forces. See Annex N (Space Operations) to CFLCC OPOD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN).

(2) (U) During Phases I-IV, Atropian Low, Medium, and High Altitude Air Defense systems provide layered defense in depth of the national capital Baku and coastal oil fields to defeat Arianian air threats. Due to no interoperability of C2 systems, Atropian Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs) are limited to self-defense and remain TACON to CFAAC.

(3) (U) During Phase II-IV, CFACC and CFMCC multi-role and air-to-air capable aircraft provide DCA with electronic warfare and battle management platforms. DCA intercepts are planned to occur at the maximum range from CJTF-OIG forces and before enemy aircraft weapons release to protect geopolitical and high value assets. Dynamic and deliberately planned Offensive Counterair operations are simultaneously conducted against time sensitive air threat targets. Coalition aircraft will operate outside the ranges of friendly AD forces that rely only on visual ID, while minimum-risk routes (MRRs) and procedural controls will mitigate degraded communications environments.

(4) (U) During Phases II-IV, air defense forces, in direct support of the three divisions, defend troop concentrations, command posts and sustainment assets to defeat Arianian Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), rotary wing, and low level fixed wing aircraft attacks. MANPADS, with the most survivability and stealth, should be used to protect maneuver elements during these phases. Sentinel Radars protect friendly forces from fratricide; provide situational awareness, and early warning.

(5) (U) At endstate, CFLCC remains capable of effectively conducting any assigned task.

(6) (U) Commander, CJTF-OIG accepts risk in the TBM defense of Baku. Because of the international legitimacy sought by Ariana, it is unlikely that Baku will be targeted by TBM. Following Phase III operations, Commander CJTF-OIG will reassess TBM defense priorities.

b. (U) Tasks.

(1) (U) 11 AD Bde.

(a) (U) Provide in-depth air defense coverage of in-theater CFLCC and CFACC assets.

(b) (U) BPT provide air defense coverage of Atropian critical infrastructure.

(c) (U) In support of CFACC, designate air defense sectors for CJTF-OIG and Atropian Air Defense Command forces.

(d) (U) Integrate, as able, CJTF-OIG and Atropian Air Defense Command C2 to create and maintain a common operating picture (COP).

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(2) (U) Atropian Air Defense Command.

(a) (U) Provide air defense coverage of Baku.

(b) (U) Coordinate air defense coverage for Atropian Southern Command forces.

(U) Coordinating Instructions.

(3) (U) The Engagement Authority for PATRIOT Air Breathing Threat engagements is Commander, CFAAC. At no time will TBM defense be denied.

(4) (U) Counterair Target Nominations should be submitted through the CFLCC Fires Cell to the Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) in advance of the Air Tasking Order cycle. The BCD provides Army forces liaison at the combined air operations center (CAOC). Offensive Counter-Air (OCA) and strike actions are the preferred method to preclude the enemy from using air and missile systems against friendly forces and assets. Dynamic targets should be selected and nominated for inclusion in the ATO.

(5) (U) All commanders are responsible for passive air and missile defense (AMD) to minimize, mitigate, or recover from aircraft and missile attack. Passive AMD measures include early detection, early warning, camouflage, concealment, deception, dispersion, and the use of protective construction. Commanders should assess if passive air defense measures alone satisfy an asset's required defensive posture and only then submit considerations for additional active air defense through the CFLCC Fires Cell to the BCD. Following Component nominations, the Defended Asset List (DAL) is developed IAW the Commander CJTF-OIG's concept of operation and objectives.

(6) (U) Strict compliance with the ATO, airspace control order (ACO), and airspace control measures (ACMs) are vital to preclude fratricide. Aircraft traveling towards friendly lines should follow Safe Passage Procedures and observe Missile Engagement Zones (MEZs) within which engagement is designated to a SAM equipped unit. Each Army aircraft flight must be included in the ATO or dynamically coordinated with CFAAC. Input to the CFAAC Airspace Control Plan, including FSCMs and ACMs, should be submitted through the CFLCC Fires Cell to the BCD.

(7) (U) Positive Identification is derived from visual recognition, electronic support systems, noncooperative target recognition techniques, IFF systems, or other physics-based ID techniques. To prevent fratricide or undesired engagements, positive ID is required prior to engagement. Mode 1, 2, or 4 Identify Friend or Foe (IFF), will be used on all capable aircraft, regardless of destination or route, to minimize the potential of fratricide. If AD sensors cannot cover desired airspace NAIs, requests for aerial sensor coverage should be sent through CFLCC Fires Cell to the BCD.

(8) (U) All units are responsible for disseminating Air Defense Warning (ADW) /Weapons Control Status (WCS). Units will promulgate via any and all available means. ADW conditions are degrees of enemy air strike probability, while WCS prescribes the relative degree of control of AMD fires depending on the tactical situation.

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APPENDIX 12 TO ANNEX E TO OPOD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(9) (U) AD units DS to the divisions respond directly to their respective divisional commanders, but are subject to weapons control status established by the CFACC.

4. (U) **Sustainment**.

a. (U) **Logistics**. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) to CFLCC OPOD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN).

b. (U) **Personnel**. Refer to Appendix 3 (Personnel) to Annex F (Sustainment) to CFLCC OPOD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN).

c. (U) **Health Service Support**. Refer to Appendix 2 (Medical) to Annex F (Sustainment) to CFLCC OPOD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN).

5. (U) **Command and Signal**.

a. (U) **Command**.

(1) (U) COM 11 AD BDE commander is the Deputy Area Air Defense Commander (DAADC) to CFAAC in order to integrate land-based coalition AD forces with Defensive Counter-Air (DCA).

(2) (U) COM 11 AD BDE serves as CFLCC's theater army air and missile defense coordinator (TAAMDCOORD) to ensure CFLCC integration into the joint counterair plan.

(3) (U) 11 AD BDE provide liaison to CFACC.

(4) (U) 11 AD BDE and Atropian Air Defense Command exchange liaison.

(5) (U) 3-4 AD, 2-43 AD, and 1-62 AD provide liaison to 11 AD BDE.

(6) (U) Succession of Command COM 11 AD BDE, DCOM 11 AD BDE, COM 1-43 AD.

b. (U) **Control**.

(1) (U) 11 AD BDE (-) TOC will collocate with CFLCC Main Command Post.

(2) (U) 11 AD BDE controls assignment of air defense sectors for CJTF-OIG and Atropian Air Defense Command forces.

c. (U) **Signal**.

(1) (U) Air Defense frequencies, identifiers, and participants will be detailed in the CFAAC's TACOPDAT, OPTASKLINK Messages and ATO SPINS.

(2) (U) RF-LINK-16 will be the primary means of information exchange between all air defense resources that share that capability. Should the RF-LINK-16 capability fail, the secondary method of information exchange would be via Data Link 11. LOS limitations must be considered.

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
APPENDIX 12 TO ANNEX E TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(3) (U) Emission Control for all air defense emitters shall be consistent with those techniques commonly practiced by the respective emitter types and shall not violate right of self-defense.

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APPENDIX 15 TO ANNEX E TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

APPENDIX 15 (PROTECTION PLANNING WITHIN THE OPERATIONS FRAMEWORK) TO ANNEX E
(PROTECTION) TO OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN CFLCC



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ANNEX F TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

ANNEX F (SUSTAINMENT) TO OP O 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(U) References:

CJTF-OIG OPORD 01 Annex R (Sustainment)

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD – ZULU

1. (U) Situation.

- d. (U) Enemy Forces. See main order.
 - e. (U) Friendly Forces.
 - (1) (U) Boundaries.
 - (a) (U) CFLCC AO. Land mass of AP less the area bounded by Lower Janga.
 - (b) (U) 310 ESC AO. GO
 - (2) (U) Units and installations.
 - (a) (U) 310 ESC. Tblisis, GO
 - (b) (U) 15 Sust BDE. Tblisis, GO
 - (c) (U) 15 Sust BDE (Forward). Akstafa, AP
 - (d) (U) DSA 1 ID. **TBD**
 - (e) (U) DSA 4 MND. Area of TAA Silver GR 38T QK 251 929 from D+5
 - (f) (U) DSA 82 ABN DIV. **TBD**
 - (g) (U) RSA 3 CAV. **TBD**
 - (h) (U) 1 MED BDE. Tbilisi GO
 - 1. (U) 31 Combat Support Hospital. Marneuli, GO.
 - 2. (U) 21 Combat Support Hospital. Tsnori GO.
 - 3. (U) Field Hospital Regiment 41 (GE). Sangachal GR 39T UE 692 426 (estimate D + 8).
2. (U) **Mission.** CFLCC conducts logistics and sustainment operations throughout all phases of Op IRON GUARDIAN.
3. (U) **Execution.**
- a. (U) General Concept of Support.
 - (1) (U) Intent. Support to elements of the CFLCC will be provided by a combination of integral sustainment assets and area resources. Non-US CFLCC formations and units will be supported via a combination of Troop Contributing Nation (TCN) support assets and US sustainment organizations (with US operating as logistics lead nation (LLN) for sustainment).

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ANNEX F TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

The lead organization for the provision of support is 310 ESC. 310 ESC has coordinating authority for all sustainment activities in the JOA.

(2) (U) US formations and units will deploy with combat loads as per standard operating procedures. All classes of supply will be provisioned using normal replenishment means. Non-US CFLCC formations and units have been directed to deploy with a minimum of **30 DOS** of all classes of supply for those natures and classes not provided by the LLN. TCN provided classes of supply are as detailed below:

- (a) (U) Class I. Combat rations and bottled water.
- (b) (U) Class II. Gen and Tech stores.
- (c) (U) Class III. National unique requirements for POL, lubricants and industrial gasses.
- (d) (U) Class V. Ammunition.
- (e) (U) Class VI. Personal demand items.
- (f) (U) Class VII. Major end items.
- (g) (U) Class VIII. Medical items not common to US medical system.
- (h) (U) Class IX. Repair parts.
- (i) (U) Class X. Non-Military support.

b. (U) Scheme of Maneuver.

(1) (U) The Theater Support Area (TSA) is designated as the country of GO and will fall under the authority of 310 ESC. There will be no designated CFLCC support area separate from the TSA although CFLCC will establish a rear area controlled by 16 MP BDE. Subordinate formations of the CFLCC will designate Divisional/Regimental Support Areas (DSA) within the boundaries of AP (as indicated above at 1. b. (2)).

(a) (U) 310 ESC has assigned area support responsibility as follows.

- 1. (U) GO. 230 Sust BDE.
- 2. (U) AP. 15 Sust BDE.

(2) (U) 1 MED BDE has established Role 3 hospital coverage as identified in para 1. Support affiliations will be based solely on proximity. In addition to Role 3 hospitals 1 MED BDE has deployed area support companies from 12 Area Support Medical Battalion to provide routine medical support across the CJTF-OIG AOR for those units that do not have integral medical support or lack capacity. 1 MED BDE will BPT deploy Field Hospital Regiment 41 (GE) forward to Sangachal GR 39T UE 692 426 (**estimate D + 8**) in support of CFLCC requirements.

(3) (U) All CFLCC US bdes are deployed with integral Role 2 facilities and have been augmented by Forward Surgical Teams (FST). The 4 MN Div has been directed to deploy with Role 2E medical capability. If the 4 MN Div is unable to deploy with surgical capability at Role 2, the deficiency is to be identified to 1 MED BDE info CFLCC Surgeon.

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ANNEX F TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

c. (U) Tasks and Responsibilities.

(1) (U) 1 Sust BDE.

- (a) (U) Provide sustainment support to 1 ID.
- (b) (U) BPT conduct artillery ammo dumping program during Phase I in support of cross border fires.
- (c) (U) BPT conduct defensive stores dumping program to forward defensive positions for Phase IV.

(2) (U) 82 Sust BDE.

- (a) (U) Provide sustainment support to 82 ABN DIV.
- (b) (U) BPT conduct artillery ammo dumping program during Phase I in support of cross border fires.
- (c) (U) BPT conduct defensive stores dumping program to forward defensive positions for Phase IV.

(3) (U) 17 (AS) Sust BDE.

- (a) (U) Provide sustainment support to 4 MND.
- (b) (U) Coordinate with National Support Elements (NSE) for the provision of national level support to affiliated bdes.
- (c) (U) Operate supply points (SP) in conjunction with NSE for the provision of third line supply support to non-US bdes.
- (d) (U) BPT conduct artillery ammo dumping program during Phase I in support of cross border fires.
- (e) (U) BPT conduct defensive stores dumping program to forward defensive positions for Phase IV.

d. (U) Support Affiliations.

(1) (U) 1 Sust BDE

(a) (U) 541 Combat Sustainment Support Battalion (CSSB).

- 1. (U) Direct and general support to 1 ID divisional troops.
- 2. (U) General support to 1 ID.

(b) (U) 101 Brigade Support Battalion (BSB). Direct support to 1 ABCT

(c) (U) 201 BSB. Direct support to 2 ABCT.

(d) (U) 299 BSB. Direct support to 2 SBCT.

(e) (U) 1 Aviation Support Battalion (ASB). Direct support to 1 AVN BDE.

(f) (U) 111 BSB. Direct support to 1 ARTY BDE.

(g) (U) 555 BSB. Direct support to 555 MEB.

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ANNEX F TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(2) (U) 82 Sust BDE.

(a) (U) 189 CSSB.

1. (U) Direct and general support to 82 ABN DIV divisional troops.
2. (U) General support to 82 ABN DIV.

(b) (U) 307 BSB. Direct support to 1 ICBT .

(c) (U) 407 BSB. Direct support to 2 ICBT.

(d) (U) 82 BSB. Direct support to 3 ICBT.

(e) (U) 782 BSB. Direct support to 4 ICBT.

(f) (U) 122 ASB. Direct support to Combat Aviation Bde.

(3) (U) 17 (AS) Sust BDE.

(a) (U) 9 & 10 (AS) Force Spt Bn

1. (U) Direct and general support to 4 MND divisional troops.
2. (U) General support to 4 MND.

(b) (U) 577 (US) Combat Sustainment Support Bn

1. (U) Direct and general support to 4 MND divisional troops.
2. (U) General support to 4 MND

(c) 180 (US) Transport Bn

1. (U) Direct and general support to 4 MND divisional troops.
2. (U) General support to 4 MND

(d) (U) 4 (UK) Close Support Regiment (REME)

1. (U) Direct and general support to 4 MND divisional troops.
2. (U) General support to 4 MND

(e) (U) 4 (UK) Logistics Support Regiment (LSR). Direct support to 12 (UK) AIB.

(f) (U) **X** (AS) CSS Bn. Direct support to **X** (AS) Bde.

(g) (U) 2 (CA) Svc Bn. Direct support to 2 CMBG.

(h) (U) 6 Franco/German Logistics Battalion. Direct support to 6 Franco-German

Bde.

(4) (U) 3 Support Squadron. Direct and General Support to 3 CAV.

e. (U) Material and Services.

(1) (U) Classes of Supply.

(a) (U) Class 1- Rations and Water.

1. (U) All bdes are to have available within their national supply systems in theater 30 DOS of combat rations. Holdings of 4 DOS are to be held within bdes. An additional 7 DOS are to be available in the DSA.

2. (U) Fresh rations will be provided through DSAs as appropriate to the situation for those bdes that have the capability to feed fresh meals in Forward Assembly Areas. Fresh rations will be distributed through 15 Sust BDE to divisional sustainment bdes. Fresh rations will not be provided during Phase II and Phase III.

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ANNEX F TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

3. (U) Bdes are to hold 4 DOS bottled water. An additional 7 DOS of bottled water will be held in DSAs.

4. (U) Bulk water will be drawn only from water points established by 15 Sust BDE.

(b) (U) Class II – General and Technical Stores. 15 DOS of Class II stores are to be held in BSAs. The remaining 15 DOS are to be distributed as deemed appropriate in the DSA and TSA.

(c) (U) Class III – POL.

1. (U) Bdes are to hold 4 DOS of POL on wheels within the bde area.

2. (U) Sustainment bdes are to hold 1 DOS on wheels and an additional 3 DOS on wheels or in storage tanks within the DSA.

3. (U) Non-US bdes are to hold or have available within the divisional area 10 DOS of national specific oils and lubricants.

4. (U) POL resupply points will be established by 15 Sust BDE.

5. (U) Aviation POL will, to the maximum extent possible, be provided through airfield refuelling facilities along with US Army and USAF refuelling facilities.

(d) (U) Class IV – Construction and Barrier Material. Divs are to hold a minimum of one company defensive pack per Infantry Company in the formation. Each company pack will be suitable for a 500 meter frontage. Additional bulk defensive stores and barrier material will be held in the TSA sufficient to establish 48 company defensive positions. For phase IV Sustainment bdes BPT conduct defensive stores dumping program to forward defensive positions.

(e) (U) Class V – Ammunition. Bdes are to hold 4 DOS of ammunition on wheels. An additional 7 DOS of all ammunition natures are to be held within the DSA, either on wheels or in field storage. A further 19 DOS are to be held in the TSA.

1. (U) US Forces. Required Supply Rates and Controlled Supply Rates will be as determined by CFLCC (HQ CFLCC) based on the operational plan and availability of ammunition natures. Push delivery of ammunition forward to artillery units will be in accordance with the ammunition supply rates resulting from staff planning.

2. (U) Non-US Forces. 17 (AS) Sust BDE to establish ammo supply points in co-operation with NSEs for TCN bdes. Ammunition requirements will be met on a pull basis within 4 MND. 15 Sust BDE and 17 (AS) Sust BDE have available lift capacity to deliver non-US ammunition requirements forward to an ammunition supply point in the DSA if TSN NSEs are not capable.

3. (U) Sust bdes BPT conduct artillery ammo dumping program during phase I in support of cross border fires.

(f) (U) Class VI – Personal Demand Items. Personal Demand Items remain a national responsibility. US sustainment organizations will provide Class VI items to non-US units and formations on a cost-recovery basis.

(g) (U) Class VII – Major End Items.

1. (U) US Forces. Replacement of major end items will be met on a demand basis subject to priorities established by CFLCC.

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2. (U) Non-US Forces. Replacement of major end items remains a national responsibility. Sustainment bdes have capacity to assist with the forward delivery of Class VII items.

(h) (U) Class VIII – Medical Supply. Details provided at annex K.

(i) (U) Class IX – Repair Parts and Components. 10 DOS of repair parts and components are to be held within Divisions. A further 20 DOS are to be held in the TSA. For non-US forces Class IX supplies are a national responsibility.

f. (U) Engineering Support. Sustainment engineering support will be provided by 36 EN BDE. Priority throughout will be on the maintenance of freedom of movement on routes in AP.

g. (U) Movements and Transport.

(1) (U) Movements.

(a) (U) Road Movements. Freedom of movement of formations and units of the CFLCC is essential during Phase I and Phase II. In order to guarantee freedom of movement the following controls are in place:

1. (U) IDP traffic will be directed to reserved routes to maintain MSR for military traffic only.

2. (U) 16 MP BDE will maintain positive control over CFLCC routes with traffic control measures.

3. (U) Divisions will ensure positive control of MSR within boundaries through traffic control measures.

4. (U) March credits are required for any movement on CFLCC MSRs. March Credits are to be requested from 16 MP BDE.

5. (U) 15 Sust BDE will establish route clearance teams on all CFLCC MSRs to rapidly clear obstructions that occur.

6. (U) Divisions may request additional route clearance resources from 15 Sust BDE if integral resources are insufficient.

(b) (U) Air Movement. ITAS routes established by CFACC. Details are available at Appx 7 (Air Operations) to Anx C (Operations).

(c) (U) Rail Movement. Priority for rail movement will be for the establishment of supply points and the forward movement of sustainment operations.

(d) (U) Main Supply Routes. See Appendix 1 to this Annex

1. (U) CHICAGO – CJTF-OIG
2. (U) NEW YORK – CJTF-OIG
3. (U) SEATTLE – CFLCC
4. (U) DENVER – CFLCC
5. (U) BOSTON – CFLCC
6. (U) HOUSTON – CFLCC
7. (U) LOS ANGELES – CFLCC
8. (U) MIAMI - CFLCC

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h. (U) Salvage Operations.

(1) (U) Salvage operations are a national responsibility. Subordinate formations will establish collection/classification points in their area of responsibility. Classification/disposition is IAW national policies and procedures. Subordinate formations will inform CFLCC G-4 of problems relating to recovery, disposition and/or retrograde movement of salvage items.

(2) (U) Captured supplies and materiel will be turned over to salvage point control teams for classification/disposition.

i. (U) Repair, Recovery and Back-loading. Repair recovery and back-loading of ground equipment is a national responsibility. 15 Sust BDE has capacity to assist Divisions in recovery and back-loading tasks, however, priority will be the clearance of routes to maintain freedom of movement of CFLCC combat forces. Priority for back-loading shall be for vehicles and equipment that can reasonably be assumed to be repairable for return to operations within 48 hours.

j. (U) Postal. Postal service is a national responsibility.

k. (U) Contracting. Contracting will be centrally controlled throughout by 310 ESC. All requirements for contracting support are to be routed through the appropriate Component Command to the 310 ESC ACOS Support Operations (SPO) who will be the contracting authority for CJTF-OIG;

l. (U) Health Service Support. See Appendix 1 to this annex.

m. (U) Military Police (MP).

(1) (U) Assigned MP Assets. MP assets will be assigned based on various structures and roles.

(a) (U) 16 MP BDE is assigned to CFLCC and will support the force through the operation of EPW/CPERS facilities, provision of traffic control services on CFLCC controlled routes, force protection operations, and police investigations.

(b) (U) 1 ID.

1. (U) 555 Maneuver Enhancement Brigade will provide MP assets for TC
2. (U) 2 MP Bn, 16 MP BDE

(c) (U) 82 ABN DIV.

1. (U) 503 MP Bn will provide MP assets for TC

(d) (U) 4 MND.

1. (U) TCN will deploy national MP assets
2. (U) 1 (AS) MP Bn

(e) (U) 3 CAV. 91 MP Co, 519 MP Bn

(2) (U) Discipline, Law and Order. Discipline remains a national responsibility. CFLCC PM will coordinate policing operations to ensure adherence to law and maintenance of order within the CFLCC AO.

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ANNEX F TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(3) (U) Investigations. All investigations involving Coalition troops or civilians will be directed to the appropriate Coalition MP unit and may include liaison, or operate jointly with the appropriate civilian police force. Investigations that involve personnel from more than one nation shall be coordinated by the CFLCC, at which level lead agency for joint investigative support shall be determined.

(4) (U) Handling of EPW. 385 MP Bn, 16 MP BDE will establish an EPW/CPERS Holding Area at Mingecevir, AP. If EPWs have not yet been transferred to US custody (Article 3 nations only), national forces are required to provide their own MPs at this facility. Divisions are responsible for the movement of EPW rearward but they may coordinate for transportation assistance from 15 Sust BDE, 310 ESC. Divisions are responsible for all administrative support for EPW in location. 18 MP BDE, 310 ESC will establish CJTF-OIG-level Theatre Detention Facilities in Gazakh, AP and Marneuli, GO. EPW requiring surgical care will be moved to the facility in Marneuli for treatment at 21 Combat Support Hospital.

(5) (U) Handling of Detainees. Captured persons other than those holding an EPW status as defined by the Geneva Conventions shall be retained by the capturing nations or by the Coalition lead nation under pre-arranged national agreements. Treatment of detainees shall respect the highest standards established by the Geneva Conventions for EPW. Captured persons determined not to be EPW shall be turned over to host nation legal authorities as soon as possible while respecting any caveats or limitations in force for the capturing TCN.

(6) (U) Displaced Persons, Refugees, Evacuees (DPRE) Control. MP units will be prepared to assist in DPRE control. Priority is to keep MSRs clear.

n. (U) Personnel

(1) (U) Replacements. Replacements are a national responsibility.

(2) (U) Mortuary Affairs. Although mortuary affairs are a national responsibility, the CFLCC and 310 ESC will establish common nodes to support the evacuation and handling of fatalities which occur in the AO. Formations are to have casualty collection teams in place to recover the remains of the fallen. Details of the mortuary affairs plan are included at Appendix 5 to this Annex.

(3) (U) Labor Resources. Use of local civilian labor is to be coordinated through 310 ESC.

(4) (U) Religious Services. National responsibility. Where provided, formations are to deploy with integral staffs.

(5) (U) Legal Services. Legal services for CFLCC will be coordinated by the staff Judge Advocate General. Staff JAG will provide guidance on the following areas:

- (a) (U) Assistance dealing with local authorities and Government officials.
- (b) (U) Interpretation and coordination of all SOFA arrangements.
- (c) (U) Assistance and advice in investigating claims involving injury, death, or extensive damage to civilian property.

o. (U) Civil Affairs. See Annex K

p. (U) Miscellaneous.

(1) (U) Lines of Communication Security. TBI

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ANNEX F TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC


4. (U) Command and Signal.
 - a. (U) Locations. See Appendix 1.
 - b. (U) Signals. TBI.

ATTACHMENTS:

- Appendix 1 - Sustainment Geometry
- Appendix 2 - Medical
- Appendix 3 - Personnel (Omitted)
- Appendix 4 - Movements
 - Tab A - Move Details Staging to FAA
 - Tab B - Move Details FAA to TAA
 - Tab C - Div Move Trace (Falconview)
 - Tab D - Div MSRs (Falconview)
- Appendix 5 - Mortuary Affairs

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APPENDIX 1 (THEATER SUSTAINMENT OVERLAY) TO ANNEX F (SUSTAINMENT) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC



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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX F TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC



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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX F TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

**APPENDIX 2 (MEDICAL) TO ANNEX F (SUSTAINMENT) TO OPORD 07
(OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

Reference:

CJTF-OIG OPORD 01 Annex K Dated **XX XXX XX**

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU

1. **(U) Situation**. CJTF-OIG OPORD 01 Annex K remains in effect except for the following.
 - a. (U) Para 1.f. (5) has been amended to read “Legal authorization has been granted for the provision of non-emergency medical support to foreign nationals assigned to CJTF-OIG by US medical facilities.”
 - b. (U) Para 3.a. (7) has been amended to read “The CJTF-OIG Surgeon will establish an area Joint Blood Program Office (JBPO) and Blood Trans-shipment Center (BTC) that will coordinate blood management procedures within Component Commands. 1MED BDE will establish Blood Supply Units (BSU) as needed and notify CJTF-OIG Surgeon of the location of BSU. The use of whole blood or blood products from other than US sources is not authorized. Blood donations from TCN force members (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, and UK) collected in theater by JBPO are considered to be from a US source.”
2. **(U) Mission**. 1 MED BDE provides emergency and routine medical support to all elements of the CFLCC.
3. **(U) Execution**.
 - a. **(U) Concept of Medical Support**. Medical support is provided to the CFLCC through a combination of integral support at the unit and brigade levels and area support from 1 MED BDE. Medical support to the Coalition is controlled and coordinated at the CJTF-OIG level. As such this appendix must be read in conjunction with Annex K to CJTF-OIG OPORD 01 which is attached as Tab A.
 - b. **(U) Medical Installations**.
 - (1) (U) 31 CSH – Marneuli, Gorgas.
 - (2) (U) 21 CSH – Tsnori, Gorgas.
 - (3) (U) Field Hospital Regiment 41(GE) – in reserve Kutaisi, GO available as a step-up as the medical situation develops.
 - (4) (U) PW / Detainee Medical Treatment Facility – Mingecevir, AP.
 - (5) (U) 12 Area Support Med Bn (Det) – Tbilisi GO. (Role 2)
 - (6) (U) 12 Area Support Medical Bn (Det) – Yevlakh AP. (Role 2)
 - (7) (U) 14 Medevac Bn – Tbilisi GO
 - (8) (U) 14 Medevac Bn Det – Yevlakh AP.

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX F TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

c. (U) Air-MEDEVAC Support. In addition to integral Air MEDEVAC capabilities 57 Aviation Company and Light Transport Helicopter Regiment 10 (GE) – Tbilisi, GO will provide Air MEDEVAC support for CJTF-OIG.

d. (U) Tasks.

(1) (U) 82 ABN DIV

(a) (U) Receive OPCON 1 x FST from 1 MED BDE.

(b) (U) Continue to provide full Role 2 resuscitative surgery with each BCT.

(2) (U) 1 ID

(a) (U) Receive OPCON 1 x FST from 1 MED BDE.

(b) (U) Provide full Role 2 resuscitative surgery with each BCT.

(3) (U) 4 MND. Provide Role 2 (+) / Role 2 E capability within the Div to provide full Role 2 resuscitative surgery. Provide a Role 1 within each Cbt Brigade.

(4) (U) 3 CAV.

(a) (U) Receive OPCON 1 x FST from 1 MED BDE.

(b) (U) Provide full Role 2 resuscitative surgery.

e. (U) Coordinating Instructions.

(1) (U) Direct Liaison is authorized between Division/Regimental surgeon staffs, CFLCC Surgeon and Comd 1 MED BDE.

(2) (U) HSS requirements which exceed capabilities are to be passed to CFLCC Surgeon and informally through technical channels to Comd 1 MED BDE. Formal requests for augmented capability will be through CFLCC Surgeon.

4. (U) Sustainment.

a. (U) No change to Reference.

b. (U) 1, 17 and 82 Sust BDEs and 3 Sp Sqn are responsible to coordinate the delivery of medical sustainment with 13 MED LOG Bn.

5. (U) Command and Signal. No change to Reference.

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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX F TO OPOD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

APPENDIX 4 (MOVEMENTS) TO ANNEX F (SUSTAINMENT) TO OPOD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU

1. (U) **Situation**. See base order.
2. (U) **Mission**. CFLCC formations and units conduct administrative moves from staging areas into forward assembly areas (FAA) on declaration of OPRED and subsequently into tactical assembly areas (TAA) on order.
3. (U) **Execution**.
 - a. (U) **Concept of Movements**. The move into TAA will occur in two phases.
 - (1) (U) **Phase 1**. On declaration of OPRED CFLCC formations and units will move forward from staging areas in Gorgas to FAA in AP. Movement will occur on separate routes allowing for concurrent move of 1 ID and 4 MND. The move of Corps Troops will commence once 1 ID is clear of Staging Area Rustavi. For 1 ID, 4 MND and 3 CAV wheeled and most tracked vehicles will move by road. Tracked vehicles unable to maintain convoy speeds will be moved by tractor trailer. For Corps Troops, tracked vehicles will move by rail and/or tractor trailer.
 - (2) (U) **Phase 2**. On order Divs and Corps Troops will move from FAA to TAA.
 - b. (U) **Grouping**. No Change.
 - c. (U) **Tasks**.
 - (1) (U) **CFACC**. Maintain air coverage for the protection of columns on all routes as coordinated with G3 and AAMDCC CFLCC.
 - (2) (U) **15th Sust BDE**.
 - (a) (U) Be prepared to (BPT) provide tractor trailer lift to 1 ID and 4 MND to move slow moving tracked vehicles and engineering equipment.
 - (b) (U) BPT provide refueling support to 1 ID, 4 MND, and 3 CAV.
 - (c) (U) BPT assist 1 ID, 4 MND, and 3 CAV in route clearance tasks and recovery operations.
 - (3) (U) **230th Sust BDE**.
 - (a) (U) Provide tractor trailer lift to Corps Troops units for move of tracked vehicles and engineering equipment.
 - (b) (U) Coordinate rail movement of Corps Troops tracked vehicles and engineering equipment for Phase 1.
 - (c) (U) Provide refueling support to Corps Troops units through Convoy Support Centers (CSC) and additional locations as requested for Phase 1.

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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX F TO OPOD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(d) (U) BPT assist Corps Troops units in route clearance tasks and recovery operations.

(4) (U) 18 MP BDE.

(a) (U) Provide traffic control (TC) for move of Corps Troops units on MSR CHICAGO.

(b) (U) Coordinate TC support with Gorgas civil police on MSR CHICAGO.

(c) (U) Facilitate crossing of international border into Atropia.

(5) (U) 16 MP BDE.

(a) (U) Provide TC for MSR LOS ANGELES/MSR SEATTLE.

(b) (U) Maintain positive TC and information posts for road junctions in vicinity of Yevlakh.

(c) (U) Coordinate TC support with Atropian civil police on MSRs.

(6) (U) 1 ID.

(a) (U) All phases.

1. (U) Provide refueling and feeding from integral resources.

2. (U) Identify shortfall in refueling capability to 15 Sust BDE.

(b) (U) Phase 1.

1. (U) Designate Start Point (SP) on MSR CHICAGO/MSR SEATTLE.

2. (U) Designate Release Point (Rel P) on MSR CHICAGO/MSR SEATTLE.

3. (U) Establish Waiting Areas on MSR CHICAGO/MSR SEATTLE

(c) (U) Phase 2.

1. (U) Designate SP on MSR SEATTLE/MSR DENVER.

2. (U) Designate Rel P on MSR SEATTLE/MSR DENVER.

3. (U) Establish Waiting Areas on MSR SEATTLE/MSR DENVER.

(7) (U) 4 MND.

(a) (U) All Phases.

1. (U) Provide refueling and feeding from integral resources.

2. (U) Identify shortfall in refueling capability to 15 Sust BDE.

(b) (U) Phase 1.

1. (U) Designate SP on MSR LOS ANGELES.

2. (U) Designate Rel P on MSR LOS ANGELES.

3. (U) Establish Waiting Areas on MSR LOS ANGELES.

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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX F TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

- (c) (U) Phase 2.
 - 1. (U) Designate SP on MSR LOS ANGELES/MSR SEATTLE.
 - 2. (U) Designate Rel P on MSR LOS ANGELES/MSR SEATTLE.
 - 3. (U) Establish Waiting Areas on MSR LOS ANGELES/MSR SEATTLE.
- (8) (U) 3 CAV.
 - (a) (U) All Phases.
 - 1. (U) Coordinate provision of refueling and feeding resources with 4 MND.
 - 2. (U) Identify shortfall in refueling capability to 15 Sust BDE.
- d. (U) Routes. See Tabs A and B for routes.
- e. (U) Move Timings. See Tabs A and B for move timings.
- f. (U) SP. See Tabs A and B
- g. (U) Rel P. See Tabs A and B
- h. (U) Distance. See Tabs A and B.
- i. (U) Routes to SP. Most direct.
- j. (U) Routes from Rel P. Most direct.
- k. (U) TC. See Tabs A and B.
- l. (U) Halts. See Tabs A and B.
- m. (U) Waiting Areas. 1 ID and 4 MND to designate waiting areas along routes as per paras 3.c.(6) and 3.c.(7) with sufficient capacity for two battalions. Along MSR CHICAGO 49 Mvt Ctl BN is to designate waiting areas sufficient to hold one battalion.
- n. (U) Speed.
 - (1) (U) Average:
 - (a) (U) Daylight. 60 km in the hour
 - (b) (U) Darkness. 50 km in the hour
 - (c) (U) Blackout. 30 km in the hour
 - (2) (U) Maximum.
 - (a) (U) Daylight. 80 km per hour
 - (b) (U) Darkness. 70 km per hour
 - (c) (U) Blackout. 40 km per hour.

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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX F TO OPOD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

o. (U) Lights.

(1) (U) Phase 1. Full low beam lights throughout.

(2) (U) Phase 2.

(a) (U) MSR SEATTLE – WEST of Yevlakh, MSR DENVER, MSR LOS ANGELES. Full low-beam lights throughout.

(b) (U) MSR SEATTLE – EAST of Yevlakh. Blackout drive.

4. (U) Sustainment.

a. (U) Logistics.

(1) (U) Fuel. Integral resources augmented by 15 and 230 Sust BDEs as necessary.

(2) (U) Rations. Integral resources for Divisions. CSCs are to provide feeding for Corps Troops units moving on MSR CHICAGO.

b. (U) Maintenance.

(1) (U) Recovery. Integral resources augmented by 15 and 230 Sust BDEs as necessary. Vehicle and equipment casualties are to be recovered forward to FAAs for repair or assessment.

(2) (U) Repair. Integral resources.

c. (U) Medical.

(1) (U) Attached / integral resources.

(2) (U) Aerial medevac remains available through 1 MED BDE.

(3) (U) Role 3 Hospitals established at Marneulli, GO and Tsnori, GO.

5. (U) Command and Signal.

a. (U) Command.

(1) (U) Movement on MSR CHICAGO/MSR SEATTLE and MSR SEATTLE/MSR DENVER will be conducted under control of 1 ID.

(2) (U) Movement on MSR LOS ANGELES and MSR LOS ANGELES/MSR SEATTLE will be conducted under control of 4 MND.

(3) (U) Movement on MSR CHICAGO will be controlled by 49 Mvt Ctl BN.

b. (U) Signal.

(1) (U) Phase 1. Normal radio procedures in effect.

(2) (U) Phase 2.

(a) (U) MSR SEATTLE – West of Yevlakh/MSR DENVER. Radio communications will be ACTIVE with reporting of control points to support deception plan.

(b) (U) MSR LOS ANGELES/MSR SEATTLE – West of Yevlakh. All movement will be conducted under radio silence to support deception plan.

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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX F TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(3) (U) Reporting.

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Codeword</u>
1.	Division crossing SP	SALAD GREENS
2.	Brigade crossing Sp	ONION SOUP
3.	Battalion crossing SP	CARROT CAKE
4.	Division entering MSR DENVER	ORANGE MARMALADE
5.	Brigade entering MSR DENVER	STRAWBERRY JAM
6.	Battalion entering MSR DENVER	PLUM PRESERVES
7.	Division crossing Rel P	RABBIT STEW
8.	Brigade crossing Rel P	FISH STICKS
9.	Battalion crossing Rel P	PORK CHOP
10.	Division clear of Rel P	MEAT LOAF

ATTACHMENTS:

- Tab A - Move Detail Staging Areas to FAA.
- Tab B - Move Detail FAA to TAA.
- Tab C - Div Move Trace (Falconview)
- Tab D - Div MSRs (Falconview)

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TAB A TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX F TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

TAB A (MOVEMENT DETAILS - STAGING AREAS TO FAA) TO APPENDIX 4 (MOVEMENTS) TO ANNEX F (SUSTAINMENT) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU

1. **(U) Situation.** The CFLCC will occupy Forward Assembly Areas (FAA) on declaration of OPRED in order to position forces for transition to combat operations. 82 ABN DIV and Atropian Southern Command (ASC) occupy a main defence area that has culminated the enemy and allows the CFLCC to move forward to occupy FAA.

2. **Mission.** The CFLCC moves from Staging Areas to FAA.

3. **Execution.**

a. **(U) Concept of Movement.** 1 ID and 4 MND/3 CAV will move concurrently over separate routes to occupy FAA. Movement will be by Administrative Road moves. CFACC will ensure air superiority over routes.

(1) (U) 1 ID will move from Staging Area Rustavi into FAA BRASS.

(2) (U) 4 MND and 3 CAV will move from Staging Area Lagodokhi into FAA COPPER.

(3) (U) Corps troops will move from Staging Area Kutaisi into Staging Area Rustavi which is designated FAA TIN.

b. **(U) Routes.**

(1) (U) 1 ID. MSR CHICAGO/SEATTLE.

(2) (U) 4 MND and 3 CAV. MSR LOS ANGELES.

(3) (U) Corps Troops. MSR CHICAGO/LOS ANGELES.

c. **(U) Start Points.**

(1) (U) 1 ID. As designated by Comd 1 ID.

(2) (U) 4 MND. As designated by Comd 4 MND.

(3) (U) 3 CAV. As designated by Comd 3 CAV.

(4) (U) Corps Troops. 38T MM 9585 0406

d. **(U) Release Points.**

(1) (U) 1 ID. As designated by Comd 1 ID.

(2) (U) 4 MND. As designated by Comd 4 MND.

(3) (U) 3 CAV. As designated by Comd 3 CAV.

(4) (U) Corps Troops. 38T MM 9585 0406

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**TAB A TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX F TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON
GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

(5) (U) Traffic Control (TC). CFLCC level TC will be established by 18 MP BDE in coordination with Gorgas civil police. All critical junctions on MSRs CHICAGO, SEATTLE, and Corps Troops' Start Points/Release Points will be manned by 18 MP BDE. Divisions/3 CAV are to provide TC from current locations to joining the above MSRs and from point of departure from MSRs. These locations are to be identified to HQ CFLCC not later than **X Day-1**.

e. (U) Distance.

- (1) (U) 1 ID. 143 km.
- (2) (U) 4 MND and 3 CAV. 118 km
- (3) (U) Corps Troops. 234 km

f. (U) Movement Timings.

- (1) (U) 1 ID. Move commences **X Day** and concludes **X+4**.
- (2) (U) 4 MND. Move commences **X Day** and concludes **X+2**
- (3) (U) 3 CAV. Move commences **X+3** and concludes **X+4**.
- (4) (U) Corps Troops. Move commences **X+5** and concludes on **X+8**. Earlier movement may be arranged through 49 Mov Ctl BN subject to concurrence with CFLCC that areas are available for occupation and there is no conflict for routes.

g. (U) Order of March. Order of march as indicated below. Within Divisions, order of march is as directed by their commanders.

- (1) (U) 1 ID.
- (2) (U) 4 MND.
- (3) (U) 3 CAV.
- (4) (U) 10 Signal BDE.
- (5) (U) 66 MI BDE.
- (6) (U) 36 EN BDE.
- (7) (U) 1/43 AD BN.
- (8) (U) 75 Field Artillery Bde.
- (9) (U) 415 CA BN.
- (10) (U) 415 CBRNE Bn.
- (11) (U) 16 MP BDE (-).
- (12) (U) 360 CA BN.
- (13) (U) 9 MISO BN
- (14) (U) 77 AVN BDE (-).

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**TAB A TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX F TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON
GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

- h. (U) Recce and Advance Parties. Recce and advance parties authorized from receipt of movement order.
 - i. (U) Halts.
 - (1) (U) 1 ID. As designated by Comd 1 ID.
 - (2) (U) 4 MND. As designated by Comd 4 MND
 - (3) (U) 3 CAV. As designated by Comd 3 CAV.
 - (4) (U) Corps Troops. Designated halts are Convoy Support Centers (CSC) previously established on MSR CHICAGO.
 - (a) (U) Samtretia GO.
 - (b) (U) Kashuri GO
 - (c) (U) Gori GO
 - j. (U) Waiting Areas. No change to Annex F Appendix 4.
 - k. (U) Speed.
 - (1) (U) Average:
 - (a) (U) Daylight. 60 km in the hour
 - (b) (U) Darkness. 50 km in the hour
 - (2) (U) Maximum.
 - (a) (U) Daylight. 80 km per hour
 - (b) (U) Darkness. 70 km per hour
 - l. (U) Lights. Full low beam lights throughout.
4. (U) **Service Support**.
- a. (U) Logistics.
 - (1) (U) Fuel. Integral resources to be used. Top up will be affected through normal replenishment.
 - (2) (U) Rations. Integral resources for Divisions. CSCs are to provide feeding for Corps Troops units moving on MSR CHICAGO.
 - b. (U) Maintenance.
 - (1) (U) Recovery. Integral resources to be used recovering forward.
 - (2) (U) Repair. Integral resources.
 - c. (U) Medical.
 - (1) (U) Attached / integral resources.
 - (2) (U) Air MEDEVAC remains available through 1 MED BDE.

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**TAB A TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX F TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON
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(3) (U) Role 3 Hospitals established at Marneulli GO and Tsnori GO.

5. (U) **Command and Signal.**

- a. (U) Command. No change to Annex F Appendix 4.
- b. (U) Signal. EMCON 4.

Acknowledgement: Ack to G3 CFLCC HQ

TAB A OFFICIAL

**TAB B TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX F TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON
GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

**TAB B (MOVEMENT DETAILS - FAA TO TAA) TO APPENDIX 4 (MOVEMENTS) TO
ANNEX F (SUSTAINMENT) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU

1. **(U) Situation.** The CFLCC (-) will occupy Tactical Assembly Areas (TAA) in order to transition to decisive combat operations. 82 ABN DIV along with Atropian Southern Command (ASC) continue to hold defensive positions which allow the occupation of TAAs to their rear. CFLCC will occupy these TAAs so as to portray the development of a defense in depth.

2. **(U) Mission.** The CFLCC moves tactically from Forward Assembly Areas (FAA) to TAAs.

3. **(U) Execution.**

a. **(U) Concept of Movement.** 1 ID, 3 CAV and 4 MND will move from FAA BRASS and COPPER to TAAs GOLD, BRONZE and SILVER respectively, over separate routes. 4 MND and 3 CAV elements are restricted to night time movement only. 1 ID movement will be conducted predominantly, but not exclusively during daylight hours. Movement will be by Tactical Movement (Regulating HQs in place, waiting areas, etc.), although given current threat is expected that vehicle flow will be more akin to an Administrative Road move.

b. **(U) Groupings.** As per CFLCC main order.

c. **(U) Routes.**

(1) **(U) 1 ID.** MSR SEATTLE/MSR DENVER to TAA GOLD.

(2) **(U) 4 MND.** MSR LOS ANGELES/MSR SEATTLE to TAA SILVER.

(3) **(U) 3 CR.** MSR LOS ANGELES/MSR SEATTLE to TAA BRONZE.

(4) **(U) Corps Troops.** MSR LOS ANGELES to LCC Rear Area.

d. **(U) Distance**

(1) **(U) 1 ID.** 203 km.

(2) **(U) 4 MND.** 197 km.

(3) **(U) 3 CAV.** 108 km.

e. **(U) Start Points (SP).**

(1) **(U) 1 ID.** As designated by Comd 1 ID.

(2) **(U) 4 MND.** 38T PL 7977 4801.

(3) **(U) 3 CAV.** 38T PL 7977 4801

(4) **(U) Corps Troops.** 38T PL 7977 4801.

f. **(U) Release Points (Rel P).**

(1) **(U) 1 ID.** As designated by Comd 1 ID.

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**TAB B TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX F TO OPOD 07 (OPERATION IRON
GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

- (2) (U) 4 MND. 39T TE 7456 6155.
- (3) (U) 3 CAV. 38T QK 2343 7637.
- g. (U) Movement Timings.
 - (1) (U) 1 ID. Move commences **Y Day** and complete **Y+9**.
 - (2) (U) 4 MND. Move commences **Y Day** and complete **Y+7**.
 - (3) (U) 3 CAV. Move commences **Y + 7** and complete **Y+9**.
 - (4) (U) Corps Troops. Move commences **Y+ 9** and complete **Y+11**.
- h. (U) Order of March.
 - (1) (U) MSR SEATTLE/MSR DENVER. As designated by Comd 1 ID.
 - (2) (U) MSR LOS ANGELES/MSR SEATTLE.
 - (a) (U) 4 MND (-)
 - (b) (U) Sqn, 3 CAV
 - (c) (U) Bde 4 MND
 - (d) (U) 3 CAV (-)
- i. (U) Recce and Advance Parties. Recon and advance parties authorized for 1 ID from receipt of movement order. Recon parties only authorized for 4 MND and 3 CAV on receipt of order. No move of 4 MND and 3 CAV Advance parties prior to **Y- 12 hours**.
- j. (U) Traffic Control.
 - (1) (U) MSR SEATTLE/MSR DENVER. 1 ID
 - (2) (U) MSR LOS ANGELES/MSR SEATTLE. 16 MP BDE (necessary elements of 16 MP BDE OPCON to 4 MND and subsequently 3 CAV as their Regulating HQ. Direct liaison authorized between 16 MP BDE and 4 MND/3CAV)
- k. (U) Halts.
 - (1) (U) 1 ID. As designated by Comd 1 ID.
 - (2) (U) 4 MND/3CAV. As designated by Comd 4 MND.
- l. (U) Waiting Areas. Divisions to designate Waiting Areas along routes to allow up to a Bde to be pulled off from the roads. Waiting Areas are to be Battalion Task Force size with no less than four Waiting Areas per route. 16 MP BDE will man Waiting Areas along MSRs LOS ANGELES and SEATTLE once identified by 4 MND
- m. (U) Speed.
 - (1) (U) Average:
 - (a) (U) Daylight. 60 km in the hour
 - (b) (U) Darkness. 50 km in the hour

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**TAB B TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX F TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON
GUARDIAN) CFLCC**

- (c) (U) Blackout. 30 km in the hour
- (2) (U) Maximum.
 - (a) (U) Daylight. 80 km per hour
 - (b) (U) Darkness. 70 km per hour
 - (c) (U) Blackout. 40 km per hour.
- n. (U) Lights.
 - (a) (U) MSR SEATTLE - WEST of Yevlakh, MSR DENVER, MSR LOS ANGELES. Full low beam lights throughout.
 - (b) (U) MSR SEATTLE - EAST of Yevlakh. Blackout drive.
- 4. (U) **Service Support**.
 - a. (U) Logistics.
 - (1) (U) Fuel. Integral resources. Refueling will be done in TAA through normal replenishment process.
 - (2) (U) Rations. Integral resources.
 - b. (U) Maintenance.
 - (1) (U) Recovery. Integral resources augmented by 15 and 230 Sust BDEs as necessary. Vehicle and equipment casualties are to be recovered forward to TAA for repair or assessment.
 - (2) (U) Repair. Integral resources.
 - c. (U) Medical.
 - (1) (U) Attached / integral resources.
 - (2) (U) Air MEDEVAC remains available through 1 MED BDE.
 - (3) (U) Role 3 Hospitals established at Marneulli, GO and Tsnori, GO.
- 5. (U) **Command and Signal**.
 - a. (U) Command. Subordinate formations will control their own moves forward. As described in paragraph 3.j.(2) elements of 16 MP BDE OPCON 4 MND and subsequently 3 CAV as their Regulating HQ for moves to TAA.
 - b. (U) Signal.
 - (1) (U) MSR SEATTLE - WEST of Yevlakh, MSR DENVER. Radio Communications to be active with reporting of control points.
 - (2) (U) MSR LOS ANGELES, MSR SEATTLE - EAST OF Yevlakh. All movement will be conducted under radio silence.

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**TAB B TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX F TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON
GUARDIAN) CFLCC**


(3) (U) Reporting.

Serial	Action	Codeword
1.	Division crossing SP	SALAD GREENS
2.	Brigade Crossing SP	ONION SOUP
3.	Battalion Crossing SP	CARROT CAKE
4.	Division crossing Rel P	RABBIT STEW
5.	Brigade crossing Rel P	FISH STICKS
6.	Battalion crossing Rel P	PORK CHOP
70.	Division clear of Rel P	MEAT LOAF

TAB A OFFICIAL


TAB C TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX F TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

TAB C (DIV MOV TRACE) TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX F TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC



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TAB C TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX F TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC



F4-C-2/2
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TAB D TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX F TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC



F4-D-1/2
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APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX F TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

APPENDIX 5 (MORTUARY AFFAIRS) TO ANNEX F (SUSTAINMENT) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU

(U) References:

- (a) JP-4-06 Mortuary Affairs (MA) dated 12 October 2011
- (b) AR 638-2 Army Mortuary Affairs Program dated 28 June 2015
- (c) USACHPPM Technical Guideline 195 dated October 2001

1. **(U) Situation.** This appendix describes MA activities and scope for search, recovery, identification, preparation, and movement to CONUS or TCN home nation of all CFLCC military and civilian personnel remains and personal effects resulting from hostile or non-hostile causes. It is in effect throughout the JOA during all of Op IRON GUARDIAN

2. **(U) Mission.** The human remains and personal effects of fatal casualties occurring in Op IRON GUARDIAN are repatriated with dignity in a timely manner.

3. **(U) Execution.**

a. **(U) Concept of Operations.** Repatriation of human remains is a national responsibility. The CFLCC Joint MA Office will provide guidance, assign appropriate tasks, and allocate resources to subordinate formations and units. Human remains of Coalition military and civilian personnel will be recovered, identified, and evacuated by mortuary personnel of the CFLCC mortuary evacuation point. Rearward movement to a theater MA collection point and subsequent repatriation to TCN will be managed by 310 ESC.

b. **(U) Tasks.**

(1) **(U) CFLCC.**

- (a) **(U)** Establish and staff the CFLCC MA Office.
- (b) **(U)** Establish and operate AO mortuary evacuation points within the CFLCC AO.
- (c) **(U)** Coordinate the evacuation of human remains to a MA collection point with 310th ESC.
- (d) **(U)** Establish and operate a personal effects depot for receipt, storage, safeguarding, and further disposition of personal effects for all Coalition personnel in the CFLCC AO.
- (e) **(U)** Coordinate refrigeration requirements for holding of human remains pending evacuation by 310 ESC.
- (f) **(U)** In coordination with HN (AP) authorities, continue to function after cessation of military operations as a central office of record to oversee operations in resolving status and permanent disposition of remains and personal effects not previously accomplished.

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(2) (U) TCN Components (NSE).

- (a) (U) Coordinate national requirements for MA.
- (b) (U) Provide a point of contact for the CFLCC MA Office.

(3) (U) Divisions.

- (a) (U) Establish and staff divisional MA office.
- (b) (U) Establish and operate within boundaries, mortuary evacuation points.
- (c) (U) Coordinate the rearward movement of human remains with the CFLCC MA Office.
- (d) (U) Coordinate the rearward movement of personal effects to the CFLCC Personal effects depot.

c. (U) Coordinating Instructions.

(1) (U) Subordinate units and agencies BPT:

- (a) (U) Process remains through the CFLCC mortuary evacuation points prior to evacuation to CONUS/TCN.
- (b) (U) Maintain coordination with the CFLCC MA office and the Armed Forces Medical Examiner.
- (c) (U) Perform mortuary services for TCN civilians employed by Coalition forces.
- (d) (U) Recover and initially identify deceased personnel in areas of operation including transportation arrangements to the nearest medical treatment facility or designated mortuary evacuation point.
- (e) (U) Establish and record temporary interment sites if authorized based on operational considerations upon approval from COM CJTF-OIG.
- (f) (U) Decontaminate remains prior to evacuation if required.

(2) (U) The Armed Forces Medical Examiner will waive jurisdictional authority for deaths other than those of suspicious, unexpected, or unexplained nature. Jurisdiction for non-US forces will be in accordance with national procedures.

(3) (U) Remains and personal effects of Coalition, enemy, and civilian personnel will be processed in accordance with US procedures, pending any contrary direction from TCN authorities.

(4) (U) Remains of unknown persons will be processed in a similar manner as other deceased personnel.


(5) (U) Authority for the local interment of deceased enemy personnel rests with Division commanders. All interment sites are to be appropriately marked and recorded for future reference. Every effort is to be made to identify and record the identities of deceased enemy personnel and safeguard personal effects that could be used to identify remains.

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(6) (U) Military Death Certificates are to be issued by a medical officer at the first opportunity in the evacuation chain. Where no certificate has been issued, 310 ESC will arrange for a military death certificate to be issued by 1 MED BDE at the MA Collection Point.

(U) Figure 1-2-I: Mortuary Evacuation Chain



4. (U) Sustainment.

a. (U) Personal effects shall be accounted for and disposed of in accordance with US service Component or TCN current policies and procedures.

b. (U) HN has no capacity to provide morticians and graves registration facilities do not exist.

5. (U) Command and Signal.

a. (U) Command.

(1) (U) CFLCC MA Office located at CFLCC Rear HQ in Tbilisi.

(2) (U) CFLCC Personal Effects Depot location TBD.

TAB A OFFICIAL

ANNEX G TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

ANNEX G (ENGINEER SUPPORT) TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(U) References:

(U) CJTF-OIG CFLCC OPORD 03 *(omitted)*

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu

1. (U) Situation

a. (U) Background. See paragraph 1 of the main body of CFLCC OPORD 07 and Annex G - Land Operations.

b. (U) Purpose. The purpose of this Annex is to describe the Scheme of Engineer (Engr) Operations and provide Engr guidance for OP IRON GUARDIAN.

c. (U) CFLCC Area of Operations (AO). No change.

d. (U) Terrain. For detailed information see Tab A to Appendix 1 to Annex B to this order. The country possesses two geographic regions: the mountain ranges and the vast flatlands (sometimes referred to as the Kura-Aras lowland).

(1) (U) There are two major river systems which cut through AP, the Kura River and the Aras River. The Mingachevir Reservoir, a manmade lake located in the central portion of the operational area, is a major obstacle and the dam on its southeast corner is a key facility.

(a)(U) Kura River. The average width of the Kura River from the Mingachevir Reservoir to the delta is around 150 meters, with some sections of the river, particularly the sections east of Yevlakh prior to the confluence with the Aras where irrigation is at its largest, can be as little as 90 meters in width. The river is navigable for the last 300 km, to just below the town of Mingachevir. The mean velocity is about 1.65 m/s. The Kura River is one of the most turbid rivers in the world, moving over 100,000 cubic meters of silt annually. Typical flooding for the region occurs in June and July when snow melt in the lesser Caucasus ranges are at their greatest. There were 12 bridges on the Kura River that were assumed to be Military Load Classification (MLC) 100. ISR reports that the existing bridges over the Kura River are not intact, and therefore deliberate crossing operations will be required.

(b) (U) Aras River. The un-navigable Aras River flows eastward, and joins the Kura River in AP 75 miles (121 km) from its mouth on the Caspian Sea. The swift-flowing Aras has a discharge of approximately twice that of the Kura and provides most of the sediment forming the Kura-Aras delta. It is approximately 60 meters at its narrowest points through the area of operations. The river also contains several areas where the river is braided. The banks of the Aras are susceptible to erosion. Recon of potential crossing sites is required to determine bank suitability. The soil along the Aras is gravel and sand or loam and humus. There are two existing bridges crossing the Aras River at Barhamtepe and Imishli, both assumed MLC 100.

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(2) (U) The Kura-Aras lowland is composed primarily of agricultural fields divided by berms and irrigation ditches which will seriously affect movement. Agricultural fields are trafficable only during the late summer months or when frozen during the winter. Lateral movement will be difficult.

(3) (U) The Atropian and Arianian road networks are mainly paved; however, there are numerous unimproved dirt and gravel roads throughout the area. In the Kura-Aras lowland, many of the unimproved roads are located on berms. Disrupting mobility would be easily affected by damaging paved roads through the use of IEDs or cratering charges. Rural roads do not receive proper maintenance, leaving them susceptible to damage from the weather and neglect.

(4) (U) Obstacles. The AN forces have consolidated their gains in Atropia and have adopted a deliberate defense with fortified positions. Obstacles, including minefields, road craters and barriers, and bridge demolitions have been incorporated into the defense. Imagery confirms that the major bridges over the Kura River have been destroyed, and it appears that other bridges in the 23 and 25 DTG sectors have been prepared for demolition.

(5) (U) IED/UXO.

(a)(U) IEDs have been used by various anti-government guerrilla groups for several years. The two primary groups of concern are Salasyl which operates in southeastern AP and advocates the violent overthrow of the AP government, and the South Atropian People's Army (SAPA) who have ties with AN and aims to create a separate country out of southern AP and northern AN. The primary focus of these uncoordinated attacks was on AP government officials, AP military forces, and against other guerrilla groups.

(b) (U) Sporadic IED strikes have been conducted against CJTF-OIG convoys over the past three months by AN Special Purpose Forces (SPF) and anti-government guerrillas. AN SPF have been using sophisticated TTPs and devices involving military components. IEDs employed by SAPA and Salasyl are less sophisticated, involve homemade materials, and have been largely employed ineffectively.

(c)(U) 82 ABN DIV was targeted upon arrival in AP, and in the past month attacks have increased with the move of CFLCC forces into AP. Technical exploitation of recovered IEDs and materials has been incorporated into revised render safe procedures. Lessons learned from 82 ABN Div counter-explosive hazard operations will be shared with CFLCC forces.

(d) It is likely that AN SPF will continue to operate in Gorgas and AP and target CJTF-OIG soft targets and high value targets to disrupt the CFLCC deployment into AP and coalition cohesion. Once CFLCC combat forces cross into AP, IED attacks will become more aggressive and complex. Salasyl and SAPA will likely expand their targets to include industrial facilities and civilian soft targets to create mass casualties and weaken support for the AP government.

(e)(U) UXO. There are explosive remnants of war (ERW) remaining in AP from previous conflicts. The Atropia National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) has been actively conducting mine clearance operations in the northwest parts of AP. Most of the remaining ERW are located in the Rayons along the Lower Janga border.

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- e. (U) Weather. See Tab B to Appendix 1 to Annex B to this order.
- f. (U) Enemy Forces. See paragraph 1d of the main body of CFLCC OPORD 07 and Annex B – Intelligence. See Appendix 1 to this Annex for the suspected AN engr ORBAT. It is estimated that the engr units in the front line AN Division Tactical Groups(DTG) (23 and 25) were at 70percent strength and the depth DTG (24) was at 80percent strength at D-3 months.
- g. (U) Friendly Forces. See paragraph 1e of the main body of CFLCC OPORD 07. See Appendix 2 to this Annex for information on AP Engrs.
- h. (U) Attachments and Detachments. Refer to Annex A of CFLCC OPORD 07.
 - (1) (U) 1 ID. 8 EN BN attached OPCON 555 MEB for Phases II and III.
 - (2) (U) 4 MND. 20 EN BN attached OPCON 130 MEB for Phases II and III.
 - (3) (U) 82 ABN DIV. 27 EN BN attached OPCON.
 - (4) (U) 3 CAV.
 - (a)(U) 579 EN BN attached OPCON for Phase II and III.
 - (b) (U) 814 MRBC attached OPCON for Phase II.
- 2. (U) Mission. CFLCC engineers conduct mobility, counter-mobility, survivability, and general engr support activities in support of CFLCC Operation IRON GUARDIAN.
- 3. (U) Execution.
 - a. (U) Concept of Engr Support. Engrs will provide mobility, counter-mobility, survivability, and general engr support for CFLCC operations to defeat Arianian forces and support Atropian civil authorities. The engr effort will be centrally coordinated with decentralized execution by formation organic and additionally assigned engr. As such, while 36 EN BDE will coordinate efforts throughout the CFLCC area, it will concentrate on actual engr support to the Corps rear area and maintaining the main supply routes (MSR). Assuring mobility and freedom of movement for CFLCC forces will be the primary effort to enable combat power to be applied as required. Counter-mobility activities will be undertaken, if necessary, to isolate and disrupt Arianian forces. Theater-level engineering support continues to be provided by 18 EN BDE. Host Nation engineering capabilities will be used, where possible, to assist with mobility and survivability efforts, as well as the provision of construction materiel.
 - b. (U) Priority of Engineer Effort by Phase.
 - (1) (U) Phase I – Shape (D-Day – D+3).
 - (a)(U) Support the move of 1 ID and 4 MNDs.
 - (b) (U) Maintain CFLCC MSRs to TAAs GOLD and SILVER.

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- (2) (U) Phase II – Clear (D+3 – D+6).
 - (a)(U) Support 1 ID operations to seize Objs RUBY, EMERALD and DIAMOND.
 - (b) (U) Support 3 CAV crossing of Kura River and subsequent guard operations.
 - (c)(U) Maintain CFLCC MSR SEATTLE to TAA SILVER and MSR DENVER to TAA GOLD.
- (3) (U) Phase III – Dominate (D+7 – D+15).
 - (a)(U) Support 4 MND movement, crossing of the Kura River, and subsequent offensive operations.
 - (b) (U) Support 1 ID disruption operations.
 - (c)(U) Maintain CFLCC MSR SEATTLE to Alyat and MSR DENVER to TAA GOLD.
- (4) (U) Phase IV – Stabilize (D+16 – D+27).
 - (a)(U) Defensive operations along the international boundary.
 - (b) (U) Support to stability operations.
 - (c)(U) Maintain CFLCC MSR SEATTLE to Alyat, MSR MIAMI to Objs GARNET/OPAL, and MSR DENVER to TAA GOLD.
- c. (U) Common Tasks.
 - (1) (U) Receive additional engr assets.
 - (2) (U) Clear and maintain Div MSRs within AO.
 - (3) (U) Identify, mark, and report obstacles in Div AO.
 - (4) (U) Conduct deliberate gap crossings as necessary.
 - (5) (U) Coordinate Explosive Hazard information collection and counter-explosive hazard operations in Div AOs.
 - (6) (U) Liaise with HN Engineers, and coordinate HN engr support in AOs.
- d. (U) Tasks to Subordinate Formations.
 - (1) (U) 1 ID. Open and maintain MSR HOUSTON from TAA GOLD forward.
 - (2) (U) 4 MND.
 - (a)(U) Open MSR SEATTLE from TAA SILVER to Alyat (junction with MSR MIAMI, and maintain it until relieved by 36 EN BDE, likely concurrent with the breakout from Objs GARNET and OPAL.

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(b) (U) Open MSR MIAMI from Alyat to Objs GANET and OPAL, and maintain it until relieved by 36 EN BDE which will be not before the start of Phase IV.

(c)(U) Given that ISR reports that existing bridges at Objs GARNET and OPAL are destroyed:

1. (U) Conduct recon of potential float bridge sites.
2. (U) Establish crossings over the Kura River.
3. (U) Secure and maintain two crossings until replaced by LOC bridging.

(d) (U) If an existing bridge over the Kura River is seized, render the bridge safe and attempt repairs if necessary.

(3) (U) 3 CAV.

(a)(U) Establish, secure, and maintain crossing sites over the Kura River north of OBJ OPAL.

(b) (U) Close Kura River crossing sites on order.

(4) (U) 36 EN BDE.

(a)(U) Detach 8 EN BN OPCON to 555 MEB/1 ID for Phases II and III.

(b) (U) Detach 20 EN BN OPCON to 130 MEB/4 MND for Phases II and III.

(c)(U) Detach 27 EN BN OPCON to 82 ABN DIV.

(d) (U) Detach 579 EN BN OPCON to 3 CAV for Phases II and III.

(e)(U) Detach 814 MRBC OPCON to 3 CAV for Phase II.

(f)(U) Maintain CFLCC MSRs to Div rear boundaries.

(g) (U) Conduct bridge assessments and route recon to identify CFLCC MSR alternate routes and bypasses.

(h) (U) Replace or coordinate the replacement of tactical bridging with LOC bridging on CFLCC and Div MSRs.

(i) (U) Provide survivability support for critical assets, including FA firing units, counter battery radar systems, Patriot air defense systems, C2 nodes, hospitals, crossing sites, and critical logistics nodes.

(j) (U) Assist 415th CBRNE BDE with the conduct of counter-explosive hazard and CBRN operations in the CFLCC area.

(k) (U) Coordinate CFLCC geospatial support.

(l) (U) Coordinate the employment of HN military and civilian engrs to support CFLCC mobility and survivability.

(m) (U) Provide Corps-level general engr support.

(n) (U) Manage CFLCC facilities, real estate, and construction contracts.

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(o) (U) Be prepared to assist Atropian authorities with the repair of critical infrastructure that impacts CFLCC operations.

(p) (U) Be prepared to coordinate engr support for humanitarian assistance and to create a safe environment in AP.

e. (U) Information Requirements.

(1) (U) Engr Priority Intelligence Requirements.

(a)(U) Capacity, limitations, and damage of bridges over major waterways on the CFLCC lines of advance.

(b) (U) Potential water crossing sites with priority to the Kura River and Aras River.

(c)(U) Disruption to the CJTF-OIG and CFLCC MSRs in Gorgas (GO) and AP.

(d) (U) Employment of improvised explosive devices, booby-traps, and mines.

(e)(U) Type, location, status, and composition of Arianian obstacles within AP.

(f)(U) Location and disposition of Arianian breaching and bridging assets within AP.

(g) (U) Extent of damage to Atropian critical infrastructure, including airfields and oil facilities.

(h) (U) Environmental hazards in AP.

(2) (U) Engr Friendly Force Information Requirements.

(a)(U) Restrictions on the employment of national engr and engr resources.

(b) (U) Loss of friendly breaching and bridging assets

(c)(U) Status of crossing sites and breached lanes.

(d) (U) Status, locations, and activities of Atropian Engrs.

(e)(U) Location and extent of construction materials in AP.

f. (U) Mobility Support. Additional engr mobility assets have been assigned to CFLCC formations, with the remainder under 36th EN BDE command for CFLCC rear area support. Maneuverability and the crossings of the Kura and Aras Rivers will be crucial to the success of OP IRON GUARDIAN.

(1) (U) CFLCC and Div Engrs will conduct bridge assessments and route recon to identify alternate routes and bypasses.

(2) (U) Div Engrs clear and maintain Div MSRs within AO.

(3) (U) Divisions may have to construct lateral routes to support their advance.

(4) (U) Divs will conduct hasty combined arms breaching and gap crossing operations to facilitate movement throughout all phases of the operation.

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(5) (U) Divs will use existing bridges that retain structural integrity or the ability to be over-bridged. If existing bridges are not available, Divs will install tactical bridges to cross dry/wet gaps. 36th EN BDE will follow up and install LOC bridging along the major routes.

(6) (U) Divs will submit deliberate crossing plans to CFLCC NLT 48 hours prior to execution. Include graphics, synchronization matrix, and unit crossing timelines.

g. (U) Counter-Mobility Support. Additional engr counter-mobility assets have been assigned to CFLCC formations. Division engr units will emplace obstacles as necessary to canalize the enemy and disrupt any counterattacks.

(1) (U) Refer to ROE for latest restrictions on mines and cluster munitions. ROE takes precedent over other information in this OPLAN. CFLCC will not employ booby-traps or IEDs. Anti-tank mines will be surface laid.

(2) (U) Scatterable Mines. COM CFLCC is emplacement authority for scatterable mines in the CFLCC AO. Ground or artillery delivered mines with less than 48-hour self-destruct times may be delegated to Div commanders, who may further delegate to BCT commanders as needed. Greater than 48 hours remains with COM CFLCC. The emplacement authority for U.S. Air Force delivered GATOR mines regardless of self-destruct time is retained by COM CJTF-OIG. Emplacement authority for Air VOLCANO delivered mines is retained by COM CFLCC. MOPMS use as a protective minefield is delegated to the emplacing commander. When utilized as part of an obstacle plan, MOPMS must be reported as a scatterable minefield. Divs will request scatterable mines during the CFLCC Target Synchronization Board (TSB).

(3) (U) Citizens of AP and AN hold their religion in high esteem. Religious centers and structures should not be incorporated into obstacles.

h. (U) Survivability.

(a)(U) Divs will undertake survivability tasks to safeguard critical assets, including FA firing units, counter battery radar systems, Patriot air defense systems, C2 nodes, hospitals, crossing sites, and critical logistics nodes.

(b) (U) Once the international border is re-established and major combat operations cease, survivability tasks will be refocused to safeguard CFLCC units and infrastructure from insurgent activity.

i. (U) Explosive Hazards. Paramilitary, insurgent, and guerilla forces operate in AP and AN. This could lead to an increased use of IEDs, particularly on unimproved dirt and gravel roads and berms.

(1) (U) HQ 415 CBRNE BDE will establish the CFLCC Explosive Hazards Coordination Cell (EHCC) to gather information, and coordinate CFLCC EOD and Counter-IED operations. HQ 415 CBRNE BDE will publish guidance and coordinate C-IED operations and sensitive site exploitation within the CFLCC AO to defeat the insurgent IED network.

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(2) (U) US Army EOD units and Engineer Clearance units have been assigned to CFLCC formations as per Annex A to OPORD 07. Only properly qualified EOD personnel and EOD units shall conduct EOD procedures against explosive ordnance, UXO, or IEDs. Attempts will be made to render safe explosive devices for intelligence gathering efforts if the situation does not affect the local population and CFLCC's ability to accomplish the mission being undertaken.

(3) (U) Counter-explosive hazard operations will be coordinated with HN leaders to ensure the safety of Coalition and HN personnel.

j. (U) Geospatial. Formations will deploy with organic terrain analysis capabilities. Requests for Theater geospatial support by 70 EN Company (Topo) or reachback will be coordinated by 36th EN BDE. Priorities:

- (1) (U) Existing and alternate crossings of the Kura and Aras Rivers.
- (2) (U) Counter-explosive hazard operations.
- (3) (U) Arianian obstacles and defensive works.
- (4) (U) Identification of key infrastructure.

k. (U) General Engineering. General engineering operations will be prioritized and resourced by the CFLCC Civil Engineering Work Group.

(1) (U) Infrastructure. Commanders must maximize the use of local facilities to meet mission requirements IAW civil military operations and service Component policies. Contracting support should be used to augment military capabilities.

(a)(U) Joint Engineer Planning and Execution System (JEPES). The JEPES program will be used to provide the general requirements for Engr Support Planning (ESP).

(b) (U) Construction Standards. No permanent construction will be undertaken. When new construction is the only means of sourcing facility requirements, it will be done using expedient and temporary guidelines (less than six months) found in USAREUR Contingency Base Camp Construction Red Book, or using respective TCN standards. Any exemptions for more permanent construction standards must be approved by the CJTF-OIG Engineer.

(2) (U) Real Property. The United States is the Lead Nation and HQ 416 ENCOM is the action agency for all real CJTF-OIG property requirements in AP and GO. No military commanders will enter into real estate acquisition or lease agreements without involving HQ 416 ENCOM. Real Property belonging to the HN will not be altered except in the case of urgent military necessity, and then only as permitted by applicable agreements. Using agencies will maintain original and current condition status record of all facilities, as well as the extent of all alterations.

(3) (U) Environment Considerations. Commanders at all levels must make an effort to mitigate impacts on the natural environment, but these considerations will be subordinated to operational requirements. Environment protection direction remains as per CFLCC OPORD 03.

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(4) (U) Firefighting. Fire protection will be coordinated with AP. 36th EN BDE will provide firefighting support with priorities:

- (a)(U) Medical facilities.
- (b) (U) Ammunition and Fuel storage facilities.
- (c)(U) Aviation sites.
- (d) (U) Communications sites.
- (e)(U) Personnel accommodation.

1. (U) Support to Host Nation.

(1) (U) AP contains a number of heavily populated areas. Enemy operations in these areas could result in the HN asking for engr to provide survivability/force protection, and general engineering assistance. Military, LOGCAP, and HN's general engineering capacity will be limited during all phases of the operation. During Phase IV, be prepared to provide engr support to assist Atropan government restoration of key LOCs, bridges, and priority infrastructure to enable restoration of basic services. Commanders at every level must continually assess essential services in their AO and the local governments' ability to provide these services to the local population. Commanders must prioritize requests to ensure critical projects are properly resourced IOT meet the immediate needs.

(2) (U) Humanitarian Demining (HDM). Demining is a HN responsibility; however, CFLCC may be asked to assist AP through mine awareness education and training of HN personnel during the transition to stability operations. This activity will not be undertaken without the authority of COM CFLCC. Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 407, specifically states that no member of the US armed forces, while providing HDM assistance or stockpiled conventional munitions assistance, may engage in the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of land mines or other explosive remnants of war, or stockpiled conventional munitions, as applicable (unless the member does so for the concurrent purpose of supporting a US military operation).

4. (U) Sustainment.

a. (U) General. Engr units will deploy with their own organic logistic and medical support, and will receive additional support from their supported Components and formations.

b. (U) Combat Supplies. Engr units will deploy with their basic and maintenance loads on wheels.

c. (U) Host Nation Support. CFLCC Engineers will maximize the use of HN engr support for MSR maintenance, construction materials, and survivability tasks.

d. (U) Construction Materiel. Construction materiel is available for local purchase and will be coordinated by 36th EN BDE. 36th EN BDE will establish gravel pits as necessary.

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5. (U) Command and Signal.

a. (U) Command.

(1) (U) CFLCC Engr. Colonel XXXXXXX (US).

(2) (U) COM 36th EN BDE. Colonel XXXXXXX (US).

b. (U) Location. HQ 36th EN BDE will be established at Goycay, AP by XXXXXXX.

c. (U) Engr Coordinating Boards.

(1) (U) The CFLCC Engr and COM 36 EN BDE will participate in the following:

(a)(U) CJTF-OIG Engr Synchronization teleconference.

(b) (U) CJTF-OIG Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board.

(c)(U) CJTF-OIG Joint Facilities Utilization Board (JFUB).

(d) (U) CJTF-OIG Joint Environmental Management Board.

(2) (U) CFLCC Engr will direct the CFLCC Civil Engineering Working Group.

d. (U) Reachback. HQ 36th EN BDE will facilitate engr reachback support through HQ 416 ENCOM.

e. (U) Engr Liaison. Formations will liaise with Atropian Engrs in AOs. 36th EN BDE will deploy an Engr LNO to 370th EN BDE (AP)

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COM CFLCC

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ATTACHMENTS:

Appendix 1 - Arianian Engineers

Appendix 2 - Atropian Engineers (To be issued)

TAB A OFFICIAL

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX G TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

APPENDIX 1 (ARIANIAN ENGINEER SUPPORT) TO ANNEX G (ENGINEER SUPPORT) TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

ARIANIAN FORCES FIELD ARMY ATROPIA - ENGINEERS

1. (U) **Operational Strategic Command 2 (OSC 2)**. (located in Atropia).
 - a. (U) 23rd Mechanized Infantry DTG (IFV) - 23rd Engineer Battalion
 - (1) (U) Brigade Engineers - 231st, 232nd, 233rd and 234th Engineer Company
 - b. (U) 24th Motorized Infantry DTG - 24th Engineer Battalion (Mtzd)
 - (1) (U) Brigade Engineers - 241st, 242nd, 243rd, and 244th Engineer Company
 - c. (U) 25th Mechanized Infantry DTG (APC) - 25th Engineer Battalion
 - (1) (U) Brigade Engineers - 251st, 252nd, 253rd and 254th Engineer Company
 - d. (U) 347th Separate Mech Infantry Bde (IFV) - 347th Engineer Battalion (Sep)
 - e. (U) 349th Separate Tank BTG - 349th Engineer Battalion (Sep)
 - f. (U) 351st Reconnaissance BTG - 351st Engineer Battalion (Sep)
 - g. (U) 3rd Engineer Command
 - (1) (U) 3rd Engineer Command Headquarters
 - (2) (U) 31st Combat Engineer Brigade
 - (a) (U) 31st Combat Engineer Brigade Headquarters
 - (b) (U) 1/31st and 2/31st Combat Engineer Battalions
 - (c) (U) 31st Obstacle Battalion
 - (d) (U) 31st Obstacle Clearing Battalion
 - (e) (U) 31st Camouflage Cover Concealment and Deception (C3D) Battalion
 - (f) (U) 31st Fabrication Battalion
 - (g) (U) 31st Pontoon Bridge Battalion
 - (h) (U) 31st Road and Bridge Battalion
 - (i) (U) 31st Engineer Reconnaissance Company
 - (j) (U) 31st Heavy Transport Battalion
 - (k) (U) 31st Materiel Support Battalion
 - (l) (U) 31st Signal Company

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- (3) (U) 36th Pontoon Brigade
 - (a) (U) 36th Pontoon Brigade Headquarters
 - (b) (U) 1/36th, 2/36th and 3/36th Pontoon Battalions
 - (c) (U) 36th Engineer Reconnaissance Platoon
 - (d) (U) 36th Chemical Platoon
 - (e) (U) 36th Materiel Support Battalion
 - (f) (U) 36th Medical Platoon
- (4) (U) 33rd Assault Crossing Brigade
 - (a) (U) 33rd Assault Crossing Brigade Headquarters
 - (b) (U) 1/33rd, 2/33rd and 3/33rd Assault Crossing Battalions
 - (c) (U) 33rd Chemical Platoon
 - (d) (U) 33rd Medical Platoon
 - (e) (U) 33rd Signal Company
- 2. (U) **Operational Strategic Command 1 (OSC 1)**. (located in Ariana).
 - a. (U) 11th Mechanized Infantry Division (IFV) -11th Engineer Battalion
 - (1) (U) Brigade Engineers - 111th, 112th and 113th Engineer Company
 - b. (U) 12th Motorized Infantry Division - 12th Engineer Battalion (Mtzd)
 - (1) (U) Brigade Engineers - 121st, and 122nd and 124th Engineer Company
 - c. (U) 13th Mechanized Infantry Division - 13th Engineer Battalion (APC/Mtzd)
 - (1) (U) Brigade Engineers - 131st, 132nd, 133th and 134th Engineer Company
 - d. (U) 303rd Separate Mech Infantry Bde (APC) - 303rd Engineer Battalion (Sep)
 - e. (U) 305th Separate Tank Brigade - 305th Engineer Battalion (Sep)
 - f. (U) 307th Reconnaissance Brigade - 307th Engineer Battalion (Sep)
 - g. (U) 1st Engineer Command
 - (1) (U) 1st Engineer Command Headquarters
 - (2) (U) 11th Combat Engineer Brigade
 - (a) (U) 11th Combat Engineer Brigade Headquarters
 - (b) (U) 1/11th and 2/11th Combat Engineer Battalions
 - (c) (U) 11th Obstacle Battalion
 - (d) (U) 11th Obstacle Clearing Battalion
 - (e) (U) 11th C3D Battalion

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- (f) (U) 11th Fabrication Battalion
- (g) (U) 11th Pontoon Bridge Battalion
- (h) (U) 11th Road and Bridge Battalion
- (i) (U) 11th Engineer Reconnaissance Company
- (j) (U) 11th Heavy Transport Battalion
- (k) (U) 11th Materiel Support Battalion
- (l) (U) 11th Signal Company
- (3) (U) 13th Assault Crossing Brigade
 - (a) (U) 13th Assault Crossing Headquarters
 - (b) (U) 1/13th, 2/13th and 3/13th Assault Crossing Battalions
 - (c) (U) 13th Engineer Reconnaissance Company
 - (d) (U) 13th Heavy Transport Battalion
 - (e) (U) 13th Materiel Support Battalion
 - (f) (U) 13th Signal Company
- (4) (U) 16th Pontoon Brigade
 - (a) (U) 16th Pontoon Brigade Headquarters
 - (b) (U) 1/16th, 2/16th and 3/16th Pontoon Battalions
 - (c) (U) 16th Engineer Reconnaissance Company
 - (d) (U) 16th Heavy Transport Battalion
 - (e) (U) 16th Materiel Support Battalion
 - (f) (U) 16th Signal Company

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ANNEX H (SIGNAL) TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(U) References:

- a. CJTF-OIG OPORD 01 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) (insert date)
- b. CFLCC OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) (insert date)
- c. JP 6-0, Joint Communications Systems, 10 Jun 2015
- d. JP 6-01, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations, 20 March 2012

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu

1. (U) Situation.

- a. (U) General. See OPORD 07, Paragraph 1, Situation.
- b. (U) Enemy. See Annex B (Intelligence), to CFLCC OPORD 07 and current intelligence summary (INTSUM).

(1) (U) Threat - General. See Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 07 and current INTSUM.

(2) (U) Threat to Signal Networks.

(a) (U) Network Attack. Ariana possesses the capability to infiltrate commercial networks and is expected to continue to disrupt Atropia and Gorgas commercial and national systems in conjunction with any commencement of hostilities. Of the Caucasus countries, Ariana maintains the second most robust computer attack capability through a large and capable cyber militia. While doubtful Ariana could effectively penetrate major nation state-systems, Ariana possesses significant overmatch to any regional opponent except Donovia, due to their relatively large population of computer experts.

(b) (U) Electronic Warfare. Ariana employs an Integrated Network and Electronic Warfare (INEW) doctrine which calls for the immediate seizure of information supremacy at the beginning of a conflict. As such, it is assessed that Atropia's commercial communications and information systems have been exploited to the maximum extent possible by Ariana. In addition, Ariana has demonstrated its ability to co-ordinate and integrate geographically dispersed elements, especially for air-defense, into a comprehensive C2 network.

(c) (U) Information Warfare (IW) Brigade. Ariana's land forces employ a specialized brigade to develop electronic and computer warfare capabilities. The IW Bde includes electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support capabilities. Notable capabilities are derived from Ariana's employment of:

1. (U) Vehicle-mounted 1L222 ELINT (8-18 GHz) signals intercept,
2. (U) Tigr-M REI PP LEER 2 Mobile EW System, and
3. (U) Various other (tier 3) HF/VHF radio intercept and DF systems.

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a. (U) Frequency Spectrum. Availability of frequencies will be limited due to the large number of Coalition forces sharing available space in the EM spectrum. Spectrum Management will be coordinated by the Joint Frequency Management Office (JFMO) at HQ CJTF-OIG.

b. (U) Terrain and Weather. See Annex B (Intelligence) to CFLCC OPORD 07 (Op IRON GUARDIAN).

(1) (U) Effects of Terrain Relief. The drastic changes in terrain found in the non-coastal region of Atropia will increase reliance on satellite-based transmission systems. High Capacity Line-of-sight (HCLOS) systems will likely be restricted to avenues of approach. Placement of relays in areas outside of command post perimeters may require additional security procedures.

(2) (U) Effects of Weather. Sand storms and sea-effect rain from the Caspian Sea may impact satellite communications and HCLOS EHF systems localized in low-lying areas. Average temperatures and winds are within normal operating parameters of standard Coalition-owned communications equipment.

c. (U) Friendly Forces.

(1) (U) Higher. CJTF-OIG connectivity to CFLCC HQ is being provided by the CJTF-OIG SIG BN. CJTF-OIG SIG BN has established two Command Post Node (CPN) sections with CFLCC HQ and is prepared to move with and support Main HQ and TOC(Fwd) as required. GIG and CENTRIXS-OIG connectivity via satellite time division multiple access (TDMA) and frequency division multiple access (FDMA) for CFLCC forces is being provided by the Regional Hub Node, 7 SIG BDE, located in Landstuhl, Germany. Six CJTF-OIG Signal BN CPN assemblages are positioned in CFLCC and designated as LNO Data Packages. Primary C4I will remain CENTRIXS-OIG, alternate will be TACSAT. Coalition classified data sharing is through CENTRIXS-OIG. USEUCOM J6 sponsors CENTRIXS-OIG service.

(2) (U) Within CFLCC, high-capacity classified and unclassified data, voice, VTC and teletypewriter services are provided through employment of AN/TSC 85 and AN/TSC 93 mobile TACSAT terminals configured to connect LANDWARNET (LWN), with gateway/interface to CENTRIXS-OIG. Blue Force Tracker connectivity is provided through L-Band satellite circuits located in Germany and controlled by USEUCOM.

(3) (U) Subordinate. 35 SIG CMD network operations (NETOPS) will augment CFLCC C6 to provide regulatory authority over CFLCC supporting signal assets.

2. (U) Mission. CFLCC Signal subordinate commands support the provision of integrated and synchronized command, control, communications, computer, and information (C4I) services for OP IRON GUARDIAN by establishing, maintaining, and defending the signal architecture to support all phases of the operation.

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3. (U) Execution.

a. (U) Intent. Provide CFLCC forces with a reliable, robust, and redundant communications network that provides voice, data, and video services that will enable commanders throughout CFLCC.

b. (U) Key Tasks.

(1) (U) Allocate CFLCC communications assets to key nodes in order to ensure unity of command under CFLCC.

(2) (U) Provide an integrated NETOPS capability to ensure a flexible and reliable communications network throughout all phases.

(3) (U) Provide a communications capability to Coalition forces to ensure unity of command and minimize risk of fratricide.

c. (U) Endstate. CFLCC organizations are able to effectively utilize seamless communications architecture in order to exercise effective command and control.

d. (U) Concept of Signal Support.

(1) (U) Phase I-Shape. EMCON 1. Movement by CFLCC enablers and tasked divisions will be supported by Tactical Hubs. Priority of use for allocated SC(T) TACSAT and single-channel terrestrial frequencies will go to 75 FA BDE, 77 AVN BDE, and 3 CAV. All stations on listening watch throughout. EAM/DCS Systems are main signal effort.

(2) (U) Phase II-Clear. On order - EMCON 3. ESBs maintain access as directed in Phase I. Priority of any bandwidth increase and use for allocated SC(T) TACSAT frequencies and single channel terrestrial frequencies goes to the 1 ID.

(3) (U) Phase III-Dominate. EMCON 3. ESBs maintain access as directed in Phase II. Priority of any bandwidth increase and use for allocated SC(T) TACSAT frequencies and single channel terrestrial frequencies goes to 4 MND. On order, Electronic Protection (EP), SIGSEC, and INFOSEC measures will be enhanced during this phase by prohibiting access to all unclassified data, unclassified voice and unclassified VTC services for all CFLCC personnel. See Appendix 12 to Annex C (Cyber Electromagnetic Activities) to CFLCC OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) for coordinated CEMA instructions.

(4) (U) Phase IV-Stabilize. EMCON 3. ESBs return to standard LWN access, including the reconnection of unclassified networks. Priority of use for allocated SC(T) TACSAT and single-channel terrestrial frequencies will go to 310 ESC and 36 ENGR BDE.

e. (U) Tasks to Subordinate Units.

(1) (U) Tasks to all ESBs.

(a) (U) Sign for allocated AN/TSC 85 and AN/TSC 93 mobile TACSAT terminals from 35 HHC.

(b) (U) Provide one SIG LNO to CFLCC G6 NETOPS.

(c) (U) Submit requirements for additional communication assets to CFLCC G6.

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- (d) (U) Notify CFLCC G6 of planned CP locations for each phase.
- (e) (U) Provide planned network diagrams to CFLCC G6.
- (f) (U) Submit final CEOI entries to CFLCC G6 Frequency Manager.
- (g) (U) Submit reports IAW CFLCC G6 SOP.
- (h) (U) Place router tunnel configurations for LWN connectivity IAW NETOPS direction.
- (i) (U) Install, operate, and maintain FM retransmission of the theater MEDEVAC net within own AO.
- (j) (U) Provide VoIP telephone directory to CFLCC G6 and amend as required.
- (2) (U) 35 SIG CMD.
 - (a) (U) Place tactical hub node (THN) in standby status with the regional hub node (RHN) in Landstuhl. Direct coordination is authorized with 7 SIG BDE.
 - (b) (U) Provide NETOPS section to CFLCC G6 for all phases to ensure an integrated NETOPS with CFLCC C6 staff.
 - (c) (U) Provide 2 x LNOs to 7 SIG BDE at the regional hub node for all phases of the operation.
- f. (U) 63 ESB.
 - (1) (U) Provide one Joint/area Signal Company to CFLCC HQ/10 SIG BDE
 - (2) (U) Conduct enhanced tactical installation and networking for installations at CFLCC HQ
 - (3) (U) Be prepared to conduct enhanced tactical installation and networking for installations at tactical DIV HQ(s)
- g. (U) Coordinating Instructions.
 - (1) (U) JISR reports sent to CFLCC G6 frequency manager for all interference issues requiring resolution (enemy and friendly).
 - (2) (U) Reports will be sent IAW CFLCC G6 SOP.
- 4. (U) Sustainment.
 - a. (U) SIG Maintenance and Support.
 - (1) (U) SECOMP, JNTC. CJTF-OIG SIG BN.
 - (2) (U) CENTRIXS-OIG. JNCC.
 - (3) (U) LWN. CFLCC NETOPS.
 - b. (U) Priority for Restoral.
 - (1) (U) TACSAT links.
 - (2) (U) LWN secure data.

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- (3) (U) LWN secure voice.
- (4) (U) CENTRIXS-OIG.
- (5) (U) TACRAD.
- c. (U) Request for CJTF-OIG CIS Services. Request for Coalition CIS will be coordinated directly through CFLCC G6. Requirements, as appropriate will be further staffed through the HQ CJTF-OIG CJ3 to the HQ CJTF-OIG CJ6 for coordination.
- 5. (U) **Command and Signal**.
 - a. (U) Operational Authority. COM CFLCC remains operational authority over all component SIG assets and information.
 - b. (U) Technical Authority. 35 SIG CMD will maintain technical authority over 10 SIG BDE ESBs. Daily oversight will be performed by NETOPS, with direction from CFLCC G6.
 - c. (U) Reports and Returns. CFLCC G6 will provide a consolidated daily COMMSTATE to HQ CJTF-OIG. ESBs will provide a DSR to 35 SIG CMD.
 - d. (U) Points of Contact. The primary staff POC for this annex is CFLCC G6.

ATTACHMENTS:

- Appendix 1 - Information Assurance (IA) (omitted)
 - Tab A - Information Security (INFOSEC) (omitted)
- Appendix 2 - Satellite Communications (SATCOM) (omitted)
 - Tab A - UHF Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Network List (omitted)
 - Tab B - Super High Frequency SATCOM Network List (omitted)
 - Tab C - Extreme High Frequency SATCOM Network List (omitted)
 - Tab D - Commercial SATCOM Network List (omitted)
- Appendix 3 - Defense Courier Service (DCS) (omitted)
- Appendix 4 - Foreign Data Exchanges (omitted)
- Appendix 5 - Electromagnetic Spectrum Management (omitted)
 - Tab A - Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Reporting (omitted)
 - Tab B - LWN Communications-Electronics Operating Instructions (CEOI) (omitted)

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ANNEX J (PUBLIC AFFAIRS) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(U) References:

- (a) JAR 25-55, The Freedom of Information Act Program
- (b) US Army FM 3-13 Inform and Influence activities 25 January 2013
- (c) FM 3-13, Information Operations: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, Nov. 2003
- (d) FM 3-61.1 Public Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, Oct. 2003
- (e) AR 360-1, The Army Public Affairs Program, Sept. 2000
- (f) FM 46-1, Public Affairs Operations, Jan. 2006.
- (g) JP 3-61, Public Affairs, Sept. 2005
- (h) Annex F (Public Affairs) to CJTF-OIG OPORD O1 (insert date)

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu

1. (U) Situation.

a. (U) Background. See paragraph 1 of the main body of CFLCC OPORD 07, Annex B (Intelligence), Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations), Appendix 13 (Military Information Support Operations) and Appendix 15 (Information Operation) to Annex C (Operations), and Reference H.

b. (U) General. The Public Affairs (PA) office is assigned as a Special Staff section to HQ CFLCC. PA provides timely and accurate information in support of the Commander's objectives for strategic communication. PA informs, educates and counters misinformation with respect to key audiences (both civilian and military) regarding CFLCC objectives, accomplishments, and challenges. By engaging local and international media, as well as through social media, PA is able to disseminate key themes and messages to a wide audience in order to engender and maintain support for the Coalition and CFLCC and to correct misinformation in the public domain. Via spoken and written word and through still and video images, including the use of Internet and social media, PA represents a trusted and powerful tool to reach diverse audiences. Robust and effective PA activities are fundamental to CFLCC's ability to proactively communicate to audiences in an accurate, transparent and timely manner. PA aims to be 'first with the truth,' providing the facts regarding ongoing events and military and humanitarian activities, and by assisting the media in reporting accurately by providing context. It also informs public perception and opinion by providing reliable, timely and accurate information to local and international media, while monitoring media outlets to ensure that information is disseminated. Media monitoring collects reports from all open sources in order to disseminate a complete picture of media coverage to assist Key Leaders in decision-making and ensure consistency with other PA organizations throughout the Area of Operations (AO). All components of CFLCC as well as Atropian (AP) Armed Forces and IO and NGOs are primary sources regarding security-related and humanitarian issues. This annex provides policy guidance and tasking concerning the public affairs coverage of CFLCC operations.

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c. (U) Communication in the Information Environment.

(1) (U) Host Nation Atropia. Atropia's state-run and public media compete with private and opposition publications and broadcasters. Internet, television and mobile phone networks are more accessible to much of the population in the AO, notably in urban areas. TV is the most-popular medium. In more isolated rural areas, traditional communication print media remain the most influential communication tools. In Atropia, freedom of expression through the press is somewhat respected. Atropian government bodies are in the lead for shaping and influencing their publics' opinions regarding progress made in re-establishing regional development and security. CFLCC will deliver support and assistance in this area to local authorities. CFLCC PA effort is aimed at attaining and maintaining popular support for the mission at the higher level by explaining the goals and legitimacy of the UN-sanctioned ASAM mission and of CJTF-OIG's and CFLCC's intentions, actions and achievements and by developing a media campaign based on success stories that appeal to publics.

(2) (U) International Media. All personnel must understand the power of the international media and the importance they play in helping the public understand and maintain support for ongoing operations. The international media, to include traditional journalists, documentarians and reputable bloggers, will significantly influence western public and political opinion. The international media is strongly augmented by local stringers, who will accompany the other local media representatives at media functions. These stringers will feed the international media from Coalition events as well as from adversary spokesmen.

(3) (U) Ariana. Transparency in political and social debate is subject to extremely tight governmental control in Ariana, resulting in this being perceived by the population as propaganda. The Arianian government continues to use a wide range of media as an integral part of its activities to influence the populace and international actors. Ariana and its affiliated partners and proxies will attempt to shape the information environment based on their interests.

d. (U) Core Audiences.

(1) (U) Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) members, countries and regional policymakers, opinion leaders, publics, service members, and families.

(2) (U) Regional, national, and international News Media Representatives (NMRs).

(3) (U) Atropian and Arianian publics.

(4) (U) CFLCC TCN service members and civilian staff.

(5) (U) Host Nations Defense Forces.

(6) (U) International Organizations and NGOs.

e. (U) Assumptions.

(1) (U) The Arianian government and the Arianian Armed Forces can be expected to mount a massive, carefully constructed, well-orchestrated, world-wide propaganda campaign as part of its military campaign.

(2) (U) Ariana will use political, economic, cultural, and military issues and events as opportunities to discredit Coalition resolve, military capability and intentions in the free press.

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Ariana will use the media to further its propaganda goal to weaken public support and confidence in Coalition military resolve and/or intentions.

(3) (U) Non-state organizations and proxies associated with Ariana can be expected to use the media to further their goals.

3. (U) **Mission.** CFLCC plans and executes active public affairs and communications activities in support of Operation IRON GUARDIAN in order to provide responsive, timely, and accurate information regarding Coalition and CFLCC activities to both domestic and foreign audiences and to counter enemy misinformation in order to support the goals and objectives of the Commander.

4. (U) **Execution.**

a. (U) **Concept of Operations.** PA policy is maximum disclosure with minimum delay, but consistent with operational security and Privacy Act provisions. PA will assist in the creation of conditions that maintain Coalition integrity and the confidence of TCNs and the International Community in CFLCC operations by:

(1) (U) Providing timely information and news products that demonstrate the core messages, provide timely information about CFLCC operations to public and news media representatives and facilitate news media operations;

(2) (U) Providing internal command information programs and products to keep units and family members informed;

(3) (U) Countering effects of Arianian propaganda attempts through an active PA posture by informing and educating external and internal publics of the actual situation and facts;

(4) (U) Conducting a media embed program consistent with US and/or TCN media embed directives;

(5) (U) Facilitating outreach engagement initiatives to inform and educate local, national and international opinion leaders, academics, and defense-issues analysts; and

(6) (U) Maintaining and managing CFLCC social media.

b. (U) **PA Effects.**

(1) (U) CFLCC is recognized as a regional stabilizing force by national and international audiences.

(2) (U) TCNs and public audiences receive timely updates of CFLCC mission progress and significant events to include enemy and friendly casualty status without compromising operational security.

(3) (U) International recognition and support for the ICASS Coalition in support of the UN-mandated ASAM mission is strong and unwavering.

(4) (U) Arianian propaganda is effectively countered by increased accurate and independent reporting from international, national, and local news agencies.

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(5) (U) International public understands that Arianian people are not the targets of CFLCC and Coalition military efforts.

(6) (U) ICASS, TCNs, and CFLCC forces are informed of mission progress and critical issues of force protection and safety and efforts to sustain health, welfare, and morale.

(7) (U) Increased reporting of defeats suffered by Arianian military forces by international, national, and local media.

(8) (U) Key audiences recognize CFLCC will transition authority to follow-on forces or the Host Nation for stability or peace support operations once security conditions permit.

c. (U) CFLCC PA Tasks.

(1) (U) Coordinate across the CFLCC staff sections and subordinate formations as well as AP Armed Forces to synchronize communications efforts.

(2) (U) Provide PA guidance to CFLCC subordinate formations.

(3) (U) Prepare for media coverage throughout all phases of the operation, including social media coverage and support to outreach engagement initiatives.

(4) (U) Plan for and support the media embed program.

(5) (U) Inform public of ICASS initiatives and diplomatic stances.

(6) (U) Coordinate with national reps of TCNs as appropriate.

(7) (U) Consolidate daily CFLCC PA SITREP to be sent to HQ CJTF-OIG.

(8) (U) Inform the public in order to support CFLCC mission and objectives.

(9) (U) Illustrate CFLCC units' capabilities and resolve, as well as their professionalism through external and internal media coverage, social media outlets, and visual imagery

(10) (U) Support internal communications efforts to reach and inform internal audiences and protect them from enemy misinformation and propaganda.

d. (U) PA Support to Inform and Influence Activities.

(1) (U) Coordinate daily messages and talking points consistent with strategic objectives.

(2) (U) Coordinate efforts to counter Arianian propaganda by having international news media presence in critical locations to accurately report events.

(3) (U) Coordinate to ensure PA activities do not compromise or conflict with CFLCC Strategic Communications, Civil Affairs, Information Operations, PSYOP, and MISO operations.

(4) (U) Coordinate and focus media attention on operational and strategic isolation of Arianian regime, destruction of Arianian military capability, and CFLCC humanitarian assistance efforts.

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e. (U) Coordinating Instructions to CFLCC Subordinate Formations PAOs.

(1) (U) Submit daily Public Affairs Situation Reports (PA SITREP) to CFLCC PAO. CFLCC will consolidate all reports.

(2) (U) Keep CFLCC Public Affairs Officer (PAO) informed of any critical information requirements such as media requests, military and civilian casualties, large-scale or significant incidents, injuries to PAO personnel or NMRs.

(3) (U) Lead, plan, coordinate, and conduct operational and tactical PA activities within their AOs.

(4) (U) Obtain still and video imagery of events/activities and send to CFLCC PAO for approval and release.

(5) (U) Safeguard classified information and imagery by retaining the release authority at the Public Affairs office.

(6) (U) Key Leader Engagements (KLE) are critical to the success of all PA operations. They should be used as frequently and in as many situations and mediums as possible.

(7) (U) Provide PA support to CFLCC to highlight the successes of Op IRON GUARDIAN to Target Audiences through internal and external media coverage, KLE, and visual imagery.

(8) (U) Keep CFLCC military personnel and family members informed, provide the local and International audiences information through News and TCN Department of Defense Media Representatives.

(9) (U) Support higher level PA plans to help gain, and maintain the support of the Local and International Communities, counter rumors and misinformation and deter further Arianian aggression.

(10) (U) Be prepared to receive media embeds and provide support to media during the operation.

(11) (U) Designate Unit Public Affairs Representatives (UPAR) for each BN sized element. UPARs are responsible for briefing commanders on current Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) and ensuring PAG is disseminated and units are prepared to facilitate media engagements.

(12) (U) All appropriate military personnel should be provided with Talking Points prior to media engagements to help facilitate communication synchronization and ensure they understand the overarching intent on the mission.

(13) (U) Ensure that subordinate commanders and PA personnel are familiar with approved PAG and ground rules concerning this operation, including communications, transportation and other media support requirements..

(14) (U) Do not interfere with News Media Representatives (NMR) as long as they do not interfere with the execution of the mission or threaten to violate OPSEC.

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(15) (U) Advise CFLCC PAO immediately of news media exposure to classified information or any possible media ground rules violations.

(16) (U) CFLCC personnel are not authorized to confiscate media cameras, film, audio/videotape, or reporter's notebooks. Any questions regarding the specific application of this policy should be referred to the CFLCC PAO.

(17) (U) All entitled media are to have approved credentials before joining any unit with a CFLCC PAO task organization.

(18) (U) Provide CFLCC PAO with a press kit for their formation or unit, to include a formation/unit fact sheet and Commander's biography with photo.

(19) (U) Utilize best practices in media interviews when talking to reporters (see Appendix 1).

(20) (U) In the event of a large scale incident, critical information leak, capture/kill of a key leader, or mass casualty situation which may require communications consequence management, all key information (5Ws) must be forwarded immediately to CFLCC PAO.

(21) (U) In the event of a crisis, the CFLCC PAO will coordinate with higher headquarters to determine release authority and appropriate public statements.

f. (U) Requests for Public Affairs Information (RFIs). Submit all RFIs to HQ CFLCC.

g. (U) Support for News Media Representatives.

(1) (U) Media Escort

(2) (U) Accreditation. Requirements for accreditation will be established by the Coalition/national-level defense agencies and supported by CFLCC PAO. As a minimum, the CFLCC Information Bureau (CIB) will institute procedures to determine the legitimacy of individuals as *bona fide* media representatives entitled to receive support afforded by TCN and CFLCC forces. News media representatives must have a valid passport, an accreditation letter from their news agency and a working visa identifying them as journalists to fulfill CFLCC accreditation requirements.

(3) (U) Assignment. CIB, in consultation with subordinate formation PAOs, will determine the assignment of NMR to specific subordinate units within the AO to preclude overloading any single unit. Where possible, media representatives will be assigned to their preferred location.

(4) (U) Facilities. CFLCC units will provide media embeds with adequate billeting, meals, and transportation.

(5) (U) Inoculations. NMR accompanying CFLCC in the field will be required to have the same inoculations, at their own expense, that have been administered to military personnel participating in the operations.

(6) (U) Communications. CFLCC and major subordinate commands will provide communications services free of charge to civilian media representatives when commercial facilities are not available. Transmission by military communication facilities will be on a non-interference basis. News media will be advised of the status of their traffic.

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(7) (U) Courier Flights. Courier flights may carry news material to appropriate processing or distribution points on a non-interference basis without charge. News media will be informed of the status of their material.

(8) (U) Transportation. CFLCC will provide accredited media representatives with military transportation into and within the AO when such travel is in connection with assignments to cover the operation and when commercial transportation is restricted into the area or unavailable.

(9) (U) Security. The presence of news media representatives in operational areas will require the following considerations concerning security:

(a) (U) Procedures will be implemented to preclude the unauthorized release of classified or sensitive information. NMRs violating embargo agreements will be immediately disembedded.

(b) (U) Media representatives can access operations, intelligence, and other classified areas only in case of strong need and under strict escort and control.

(c) (U) Individuals are not authorized to release information to media nor are they permitted to agree to a personal interview without prior coordination with the PAO supporting that unit or formation. When the PAO has coordinated the media visit, personnel may grant media requests for interviews and provide only unclassified information in interviews, briefings, and written materials. Do not make “off the record” statements to media representatives.

(10) (U) Audio-Visual. CFLCC will assist the media as necessary in obtaining audio-visual coverage.

h. (U) Embedded media will be expected to abide by established ground rules on releasable and non-releasable information.

5. Sustainment.

a. (U) Administration.

(1) (U) Media are required to carry their own equipment.

(2) (U) CFLCC PAO will maintain a DVIDS system. PAOs requiring use of the system should coordinate.

b. (U) Logistics.

(1) (U) Non-embedded accredited media covering our operations should be “self-sustaining”. CFLCC PAO will coordinate additional logistical support to media as required. Intent is to maximize use of Host Nation Support (HNS). Host Nation Contract Support is used if support/service is not available through military logistic means or through HNS.

(2) (U) Media embeds will have their own protective equipment. Military embeds will be provided with military transportation (ground or air) into and within the AO while covering the operation.

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6. (U) Command and Signal.

a. (U) Media will use commercial means of communications if available. If commercial lines are not available, official military means will be authorized. Military satellite transmission facilities can be provided when operationally feasible.

b. (U) Media may use independent satellite uplinks for transmission of products from field locations when the on- scene commander determines transmission will not violate OPSEC or compromise an ongoing operation.

c. (U) CFLCC PAO located at CFLCC HQ.

d. (U) CFLCC PAO will facilitate and coordinate use of LOGPACs in the absence of electronic means in order to facilitate dissemination of media and information products to higher-level PAO channels.

ATTACHMENTS:

Appendix 1 - Best Practices in Media Interviews

Appendix 2 - Visits

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX J TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

APPENDIX 1 (BEST PRACTICES IN MEDIA INTERVIEWS) TO ANNEX J (PUBLIC AFFAIRS) TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

1. (U) Units may discuss general capabilities and training they have recently conducted.
2. (U) Soldiers should “stay in their lanes” when discussing daily operations, duties, and responsibilities and should not discuss specific aspects of the units, including number of personnel, shortages, and/or equipment.
3. (U) Soldiers should not discuss or speculate on how the unit might be employed.
4. (U) No discussion of operational details, plans, or possible future operations.
5. (U) No discussion of exact unit deployment destination to include arrival/departure locations.
6. (U) Do talk about the training we do.
7. (U) Do not discuss specifics of Rules of Engagement.
8. (U) Do talk about your job and what you do.
9. (U) Leaders - Do talk about your Soldier’s and unit/formation.
10. (U) Everything is on the record.
11. (U) Deal in the facts – do not speculate or address hypothetical questions.
12. (U) Avoid speculating or commenting on things “outside your lane”, such as other governments or government officials.
13. (U) Do not discuss classified information. The media is not the enemy, but remember OPSEC. If not sure, say “Due to Operational Security, I cannot discuss that subject.”

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ANNEX K TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

**ANNEX K (CIVIL-AFFAIRS OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 07(OP IRON GUARDIAN)
CFLCC**

(U) References:

- (a) (MC 411/2 NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil Military Interaction (CMI), 28 March 2014
- (b) JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, 24 June 2011
- (c) JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, 03 January 2014
- (d) JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, September 2013
- (e) FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, October 2011
- (f) FM 3-07. Stability Operations, July 2008
- (g) FM 6.0, Commander and Staff Organization, May 2014
- (h) GTA 41-01-001, Civil Affairs Planning and Execution Guide, October 2002
- (i) GTA 41-01-003, Civil Affairs Foreign HA Planning Guide, August 2009
- (j) GTA 41-01-004, Joint Civil Affairs Operations and Joint Civil-Military Operations, September 2007
- (k) Annex W (Civil Military Operations) to CJTF-OIG OPORD 01 for Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)
- (l) Atropia Country Study
- (m) Ariana Country Study
- (n) Government of Atropia Micro Operational Environment Assessment: The Ministry of Emergency Situations, Feb 2016
- (o) Red Crescent Society of Atropia Micro Operational Environment Assessment, Feb 2016
- (p) United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian affairs – Baku: Preliminary Assessment Report South-Central Atropia (insert date – when Atropian advance halted but before CFLCC OPORD)

1. (U) Situation

a. (U) Background. See paragraph 1 of the main body of CFLCC OPORD 07, Annex B - Intelligence and Reference K. CJTF- Op IRON GUARDIAN (OIG) Phase I (Deployment and Defensive Operations) has been completed and all CFLCC formations, including 360th Civil Affairs Brigade are in theater. The 82nd Airborne Division and Atropian forces have successfully stalled the Arianian advance into Atropia. As the main effort in CJTF-OIG next phase, Phase II (Decisive Offensive Operations), CFLCC will now conduct Op IRON GUARDIAN, entailing decisive joint operations to clear all Arianian forces from Atropian sovereign territory.

b. (U) General. The purpose of this Annex is to provide guidance for Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) and Civil-Military Operations (CMO – also called Civil Military Cooperation CIMIC)) concerning relationships between military forces, civil authorities, agencies of the Host Nation, agencies of Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs), UN agencies, international

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organizations, and civilians in the LCC AO. CAO are activities of a commander that focus on relations between military, government and non-governmental organizations, and civilian authorities and populace. These activities may be performed by designated Civil Affairs (CA) forces, by other military forces, or by a combination of the two. Activities performed or supported by CA forces include but are not limited to: Populace and Resource Control; Humanitarian Assistance (HA); and Support to Civil Administration. CFLCC units will often encounter civilians and a host of other agencies. CAO require a collaborative relationship between military and civilian actors in a conflict environment. In a complex crisis, CAO plays a crucial role with focused and coordinated engagement to integrate and synchronize military activities with those of the wider International community, Host Nations (HN) and other key stakeholders. CAO also supports the de-confliction of military and civil activities and provides assessments of the civil situation. Military and civil efforts may place competing demands on limited HN infrastructure and resources, especially when the resources are already restrained by geographical, environmental, and conflict challenges. CAO enables COM CFLCC to participate effectively in a broad spectrum of Civil-Military interaction with diverse non-military actors.

c. (U) Policy. Civil Affairs activities shall be executed consistent with applicable international laws, conventions, agreements, and pertinent laws and policies of TCNs. The scope of CAO in CFLCC is to provide minimum Populace and Resource Control and emergency HA. CAO will be accomplished within the limits of the CFLCC mission and resources to minimize civilian impact on CFLCC and CJTF-OIG operations, alleviate suffering, prevent humanitarian crises, and set conditions for future operations or handover to Atropian Government control.

d. (U) Threat Considerations. See Annex B (Intelligence). It may be expected that some civilians will attempt to interfere with friendly operations either with or without malicious intent. Civilian actions that hamper friendly forces could possibly be aided or encouraged by the enemy. Special Purpose Force (SPF) units operating within the AO will conduct terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure high value targets in order to destabilize Atropia and create possible consequence management challenges for CFLCC. Dislocated civilian movements will most likely hinder military operations during all phases of this operation. Citizens may be allowed to relocate from forward areas and urban areas will likely be expected to absorb dislocated persons that relocate from forward areas. The impact on the local authorities and aid agencies to care for dislocated persons may be significant.

e. (U) Friendly Forces. See CFLCC OPORD 07. 360th Civil Affairs Brigade has four CA battalions. 431 CA Bn is allocated to support 1st ID, 450 CA Bn to support 4 MN Div and 489 CA Bn to support 82nd Abn Div. 412 CA Bn to be retained under 360th CA Bde for LCC tasks.

f. (U) Government of Atropia. Atropia is a functioning secular country that is still not truly democratic in all respects. It has a developed, albeit limited, civil infrastructure and bureaucracy. Atropia has a significant and ongoing internally displaced persons (IDP) problem resulting from the invasion by Ariana that has stretched the government's capacity. A number of NGOs and IOs are active in the country and focused on a variety of development and HA initiatives. The Government of Atropia retains authority and responsibility for the welfare and care of all civilians (including IDPs) within its borders. Atropia has recently established outlets and camps to house civilians affected by the invasion. At the request of the United Nations, the Atropian Red Crescent Society will establish refugee and IDP camps to provide humanitarian relief for

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dislocated civilians as required. The local government is responsible to administer civilian control measures, and provide essential shelter, food, water, and medical assistance for civilians in the AO.

g. (U) Assumptions.

(1) (U) In areas of heavy combat, there will be displaced civilians and significant damage to civil infrastructure.

(2) (U) HN government organizations and citizens will be generally supportive towards CFLCC forces and operations.

(3) (U) HN authorities and humanitarian actors (international and national) will be able to handle the humanitarian situation where and when a safe and secure environment is established.

h. (U) CAO Objectives

(1) (U) Effective Military Liaison with HNs, International Community, and other relevant actors established.

(2) (U) CFLCC and CJTF-OIG Freedom of Movement supported.

(3) (U) Situational awareness and understanding of the Civil Environment maintained.

(4) (U) Contribution to the permissive environment provided.

i. (U) Lines of CAO Activity

(1) (U) Facilitating Civil-Military Interaction. CAO provides the commander with a capability to reach out and interact with the relevant civil stakeholders in order to exchange information, synchronize, coordinate, and de-conflict activities on all levels.

(2) (U) Support to the Force. CAO contributes to the situational awareness on all relevant aspects of the civil domain and contributes to the planning and assessment cycles at all levels. Additionally CAO supports own forces RSOMI by coordinating and deconflicting the use of the HN infrastructure and LOCs.

(3) (U) Protection of the Population and Environment. CAO contributes to the situational awareness and understanding of the civil environment to reduce the environmental impact and minimize any collateral damage to critical infrastructure, key life support factors, as well as religious and historical sites. Additionally CAO supports consequence management efforts in order to mitigate negative impacts of the conducted military operations.

2. (U) Mission. CFLCC conducts Civil Affairs Operations to establish and maintain trust and cooperation between and the Coalition and HN military and civilian authorities, local population and other actors including IOs, NGOs, and/or government organizations, in order to create an acquiescent environment within the local civil context that facilitates CFLCC and CJTF-OIG operations.

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3. (U) Execution

a. (U) Intent. A CA Bn has been allocated to support each CFLCC maneuver division. The intent is to support CFLCC operations throughout all phases by providing, in cooperation with other enablers, CAO expertise and efforts where needed to support an effective collaboration and cooperation with HN authorities, the local populace and other actors, including UN and international organizations and NGOs, facilitating operations that will lead to the establishment and maintenance of a secure and stable environment.

b. (U) Scheme of Manoeuvre. CAO support will be conducted throughout CFLCC Op IRON GUARDIAN's four operational phases as follows:

(1) (U) Phase I – Shape. CAO staff and units will contribute to the development of a shared understanding and will conduct Information Preparation of the Operating Environment (IPOE). CAO forces' capability will steadily increase during this phase. Establish liaison and coordination mechanisms with the HNs and IC actors. Facilitate the RSOMI and sustainment of forces by creating a framework for liaison, coordination and de-confliction in relation to the use of the HN infrastructure and resources. Establish and maintain situational awareness and understanding of the HA efforts of the HNs and civil organizations. Establish an IDP/refugee mapping and tracking system to facilitate CFLCC freedom of manoeuvre. Support minimizing the negative impact of our operations on the local economy. Coordination with other relevant stakeholders to de-conflict the competitive use of HN resources. Set up and maintain an Inter-Agency Center to support a Civil Military Interaction process. Increase situational awareness concerning the civil environment to reduce environmental impact and minimize collateral damage to critical infrastructure, key life support factors as well as religious, historical, and cultural sites. Correlate data with the HNs. Update the Theatre Civil Assessment. Support the CFLCC information campaign to strengthen STRATCOM messaging and reduce the impact of Arianian and proxy propaganda. Facilitate the transition to decisive offensive operations, including the integration of additional CAO units and enablers.

(2) (U) Phase II – Clear. Continue activities from Phase I. The CAO units and enablers will conduct full spectrum operations. Support assessment efforts as required by HNs related to the consequences of the conducted operations. If required by the HNs and the IC actors, within means and capabilities, provide assistance to the civil environment, with priority to areas and most vulnerable populations affected by operations. Contribute to monitoring and assessing the situation related to human rights violations, inter-ethnic and gender-based violence, children affected in armed conflicts, and any other vulnerable groups in the AO in cooperation with the other CFLCC units, international organizations and HN agencies involved. Conduct liaison and coordination with civil organizations involved to support the implementation of the UNSCRs 7730, 7739, and 7752.

(3) (U) Phase III – Dominate. Same as for Phase II. Returning populations and services in areas cleared of Arianian forces will result in greater access for our CAO. Through timely coordination and information planning with enablers, CAO will start to prepare the way for transition to Phase IV (Stabilize), which may include CFLCC support to Host Nation civil and military capacity-building, reconstruction and support to civil authorities and international organizations engaged in HA.

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(4) (U) Phase IV – Stabilize. Same as Phase III, plus CAO will directly support any CFLCC role in stabilization activities in Atropia. Once a secure and stable environment and other appropriate conditions allow, the focus will be on capacity-building/support to HN civil authorities and security forces. Support the continuing efforts of applicable Security Assistance Missions. Support COM CFLCC participation in a Joint Military Commission (JMC), if established, with CAO expertise as a part of an integrated effort. Contribute to CFLCC assessment of HN capabilities and correlate with projected capacity-building requirements to be developed between Atropia and CFLCC, including facilitating consistent communication at ministerial level upon transfer of C2 in the AO. Facilitate handover or termination of operational activities. Begin planning for eventual transition and redeployment efforts by coordinating and de-conflicting the use of HN infrastructure.

c. (U) Assigned Tasks.

(1) (U) Establish the required liaison and coordination mechanisms with the HN authorities and civil organizations, building upon the initial contacts established.

(2) (U) Set up and maintain an Inter-Agency Center to support the HQ-wide Civil-Military Interaction process.

(3) (U) Establish and maintain situational awareness of the humanitarian situation in the AO in order to identify any potential gaps in the provision of HA and basic civil services.

(4) (U) Integrate all aspects of the civil dimension of the AO in the Theater Civil Assessment.

(5) (U) Support RSOMI process and sustainment in identifying the HN's available resources/infrastructure that may be used by CFLCC. Ensure coordination and deconfliction with the HN authorities and UN and wider humanitarian community on the use of HN infrastructure.

(6) (U) Ensure that all necessary steps are taken to identify culturally relevant property and critical infrastructure.

(7) (U) Contribute to CFLCC assessment of HN capabilities and correlate with projected capacity-building requirements to be developed between HN and CFLCC, including facilitating communication at ministerial level.

(8) (U) Support assessment efforts as required by the HN related to the consequences of the conducted operations.

(9) (U) Support the COM CFLCC participation with CAO expertise in a Joint Military Commission (JMC), if established, as a part of the integrated effort.

d. (U) Implied Tasks

(1) (U) Coordinate security needs for the effective provision of HA with relevant actors.

(2) (U) Support CFLCC freedom of manoeuvre by minimizing negative influences of the civil environment on military operations and vice versa.

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(3) (U) Ensure that CAO are conducted in a way that is both consistent and coordinated with an integrated CFLCC Influence Activities campaign. Support CFLCC information campaign to strengthen STRATCOM messaging and reduce impact of Arianian and proxy propaganda.

(4) (U) Support minimizing CFLCC negative impact on the local economy and the coordination with other relevant stakeholders about the competitive use of HN resources.

(5) (U) Increase situational awareness concerning the civil environment to reduce environmental impact and minimize collateral damage on critical infrastructure, key life support factors as well as religious, historical, and cultural sites.

(6) (U) Support the implementation of Security Assistance Missions by liaison and cooperation.

(7) (U) Establish a mapping and tracking system reflecting the IDP and refugee situation in the AO.

(8) (U) Be prepared to provide assistance, if required, by HNs, and the IC actors, within means and capabilities.

(9) (U) Use the Information Clearing House for effective exchange of information between CFLCC, IC, and HN agencies.

(10) (U) Through COM CFLCC, support COM CJTF-OIG's effective contributions to the International Committee for Atropia Sovereignty and Security (ICASS) and the ICASS Military and Security Subcommittee in support of the UN-sanctioned ASAM mission by providing regular assessments and liaison support.

(11) (U) Contribute to monitoring and assessing the situation related to human rights violations, inter-ethnic and gender-based violence, children affected in armed conflicts and any other vulnerable groups in the AO in cooperation with the other CFLCC entities involved.

(12) (U) Support the implementation of the UNSCRs 7730, 7739, and 7752 by liaison and coordination with the civil organizations involved.

e. (U) Coordinating Instructions.

(1) (U) During this operation, CA units assist conventional forces in securing the HN's populace and resources, conducting civil information management; assisting the established government or providing interim authority over occupied area for public administration; coordinating HA with HN, IO, NGO, and supporting stability operations.

(2) (U) CAO will include coordinating with local governments on all civil emergencies planning affecting military operations, with special attention to control, support, and movement of displaced persons and evacuees.

(3) (U) Coordination within CFLCC and with HN and other applicable actors, agencies and organizations is conducted to ensure maximum support of CAO.

(4) (U) CAO, Information Operations and MISO will be closely coordinated.

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(5) (U) CAO will coordinate local military, civil defense, and disaster plans with rear area security and area damage control plans.

(6) (U) The Government of Atropia maintains lawful civil authority over civilians whenever possible.

(7) (U) Establish liaison with local government officials located in designated AOs.

(8) (U) When civilian interference with military operations is likely, forces shall provide temporary population control until government law enforcement agencies regain control.

(9) (U) Forces shall provide emergency assistance to dislocated civilians, when required.

(10) (U) Forces shall make every effort to protect religious shrines and historical landmarks.

(11) (U) Dislocated civilians will be directed to IO/NGO locations in Atropia.

(12) (U) HA may be provided but without detriment to military operations; to the extent that supports the COM CFLCC desired effects; and to meet the requirements of international law. Essential HA needs are defined as food, water, shelter, medical needs, and security.

(13) (U) All units will be prepared to supervise or assist relief, rehabilitation, or other assistance provided by non-military organizations that are authorized to function within the AO.

(14) (U) CAO assessments will focus on identification of serviceable civilian and military infrastructure that can support military operations and civil-military operations. Priority in locating infrastructure will be given to medical, power generation, secure warehousing, fuel storage, and transportation facilities and assets. Military resource priority will be to POL transportation, distribution, and storage capabilities for use by CFLCC units.

(15) (U) Report locations of IDPs, actions, conditions, or movements that can interfere with military operations through normal operation reporting channels.

4. (U) **Sustainment.** See Annex F (Sustainment) to CFLCC OPORD 07.

a. (U) **Civilian Personnel.** Civilian labor may be required for transportation of clothing and medical supplies.

b. (U) **Civilian Facilities and Supplies.** Non-perishable food items are available for distribution on a limited basis.

c. (U) For planning purposes one Humanitarian Daily Ration (HDR) provides enough calories for one individual per day.

d. (U) CFLCC will rely on the support of the Atropian Government for HA supply and transportation as much as possible. CFLCC will coordinate HA resource requirements to ensure that the Atropian Government is prepared to fully support units and CAO.

ATTACHMENTS:

Appendix 1 - Humanitarian Organizations Operating in Atropia

Appendix 2 - IDP and refugee Camps in Atropia

Tab A - IDP Movement Corridor (Falconview)

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APPENDIX 1 (HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS OPERATING IN ATROPIA) TO ANNEX K (CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(U) References:

- (a) Government of Atropia Micro Operational Environment Assessment: The Ministry of Emerging Situations, (insert date)
- (b) Red Crescent Society of Atropia Micro Operational Environment Assessment, (insert date)
- (c) United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – Baku: Preliminary Assessment Report South-Central Atropia (insert date – when Atropian advance halted but before CFLCC OPORD)
- (d) UN Backgrounder – South Caucasus Humanitarian Assistance and Refugee /IDP Situation (insert date)

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu

5. (U) UN Organizations

Organization Name	Acronym	Main Office Location in Atropia
United Nations Children’s Fund	UNICEF	Baku
World Health Organization	WHO	Baku
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	UNHCR	Baku
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights	OHCHR	Baku
United Nations Development Program	UNDP	Baku
World Food Program	WFP	Baku

6. (U) International Organizations

Organization Name	Acronym	Main Office Location in Atropia
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies	IFRC	Baku, in locations with Atropian Red Crescent Society
International Organization for Migration	IOM	Baku
US Agency For International Development	US AID	Baku
European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department	ECHO	Baku
World Bank		Baku

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7. (U) International Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs)

Organization Name	Acronym	Main Office Location in Atropia
Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere International	CARE	Baku,
Relief International	RI	Baku, Bilasuvar
International Rescue Committee	IRC	Baku, Shirvan
Medecins sans Frontiers	MSF	Baku, Beylagan
Norwegian Refugee Council	NRC	Shirvan
Action Contre la Faim	ACF	Baku, Imishli
International Islamic Relief Organization	IIRO	Baku
Danish Relief Council	DRC	Fizuli, Jalilabad
Save the Children		Baku
Georgia A. Smith Human Development Trust		Shirvan

8. (U) Atropian Organizations and NGOs

Organization Name	Acronym	Main Office Location in Atropia
Atropian Committee for Refugees and IDPs	CRI	Baku
Atropian Red Crescent Society		Baku (Regional Centres in Baku, Ganja, Sumgayit, Mingechevir, Sabirabad, Lenkaran, Garabakh)
Ministry of Emergency Situations	MES	Baku

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

APPENDIX 2 (IDP AND REFUGEES IN AP) TO ANNEX K (CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(U) References:

- (a) Government of Atropia (AP) Micro Operational Environment Assessment: The Ministry of Emergency Situations, Feb 2016
- (b) Red Crescent Society of AP Micro Operational Environment Assessment, Feb 2016
- (c) United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – Baku: Preliminary Assessment Report South-Central AP (insert date – when APn advance halted but before CFLCC OPORD)
- (d) UN Backgrounder – South Caucasus Humanitarian Assistance and Refugee /IDP Situation (insert date)

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu

1. (U) Background. The AN invasion of southern AP has reached its farthest point of penetration into AP territory, where it is currently stopped by 82 ABN DIV and the AP Armed Forces. The conflict-affected area is heavily populated. The invasion and combat in southern/central AP has created an unprecedented humanitarian crisis.

2. (U) AP Conflict-Affected Areas. AP Government sources, as well as the most recent report (reference C) of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) in Baku indicate that the AP areas most directly affected by the conflict so far are as follows:

- a. (U) Ujar Province - Beylagan, Fizuli and Jabrayli Rayons;
- b. (U) Hajigabul Province - Imishli, Bilasuvar and Saatly Rayons;
- c. (U) Agjabadi Province - Agjabadi Rayon;
- d. (U) Kurdamir Province - Jalilabab Rayon; and
- e. (U) Goychay province - Kurdamir and Zardab Rayons.

3. (U) Humanitarian Situation. The humanitarian situation in the most-affected AP Rayons is dire. Significant numbers of AP citizens are literally “on the move” driven from their homes by the conflict. The fighting has greatly affected communities, households, and individuals in the conflict area and created a significant humanitarian crisis with the following characteristics:

- a. (U) Widespread civilian casualties (fatalities and wounded);
- b. (U) Significant damage to/destruction of all types of AP facilities (hospitals, schools, public and private buildings) and infrastructure (communication, transport routes, water, power, and sanitation);

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- c. (U) Complete disruption of normal commercial and economic activity in the conflict affected area (harvests and markets);
 - d. (U) Minefields and unexploded ordnance; and,
 - e. (U) Significant movement of local population from combat zones into safer areas (real or perceived), creating an IDP crisis.
4. (U) Access to Conflict-affected areas. There is no or very limited non-combatant access into the conflict-affected areas at this time. OCHA staff members on the ground have been interviewing IDPs who are crossing into AP-controlled territory. Anecdotal evidence indicates that significant numbers of IDPs are seeking to exit the combat-affected areas south of the Kura River line moving north in numbers that could range from 40-80,000 (estimate only).
5. (U) Movement of IDPs. There appear presently to be three main flows of IDPs:
- a. (U) Inflows to Agjabadi Province. IDPs from the Beylagan/Fuzuli/Jabrayli areas and surrounding countryside number in the 15-20,000 range (estimate only) moving north on route R32.
 - b. (U) Inflows to Goychay Province. IDPs from Imishli/Bilasuvar/Saatly areas and surrounding countryside number in the 20-25,000 range (estimate only) moving north on route R11.
 - c. (U) Inflows to Zardab Province. IDPs from the Bilasuvar/Salyan/Sabirabad areas and surrounding countryside numbers in the 20-30,000 range (estimate only) moving northeast on route M6, east on E119, and north on route R45.
6. (U) AP Government Response. Rayon Councils are struggling to cope with the humanitarian situation. They are the main local government points of contact and coordination on the ground for the humanitarian agencies. The AP Ministry of Emergency Situations and the state sponsored Committee for Refugees and IDPs (CRI) are spearheading the government response in cooperation with the AP Red Crescent Society.
7. (U) International Response. The UN-OCHA offices in Baku are acting as the central coordination point for international donors and major NGOs and IOs involved in humanitarian activities, as well as with the AP central government. The Baku-UN offices are also the primary point for humanitarian civil-military coordination. The initial focus of the OCHA-coordinated humanitarian effort is as follows:
- a. (U) Establishment of “safe havens” (IDP camps) where services and aid can be delivered to affected/displaced populations;
 - b. (U) The provision of “basic human needs” such as water, sanitation, medical, food, and nutrition to affected populations, directly into established IDP camps.
 - c. (U) A UN-coordinated “cluster” system has been established to coordinate sectoral inputs as follows:
 - (1) (U) Nutrition (UNICEF);
 - (2) (U) Health (WHO);

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- (3) (U) Water/Sanitation (UNICEF);
 - (4) (U) Emergency Shelter (UNHCR/IFRC);
 - (5) (U) Camp Coordination/Management (UNHCR/IOM);
 - (6) (U) Protection (UNHCR/OHCHR/UNICEF);
 - (7) (U) Early Recovery (UNDP);
 - (8) (U) Logistics (WFP); and
 - (9) (U) Emergency Telecommunications (OCHA/UNICEF/WFP).
8. (U) Civilian-Military Cooperation/Coordination. Significant coordination with international and national IOs/NGOs will be necessary in this early humanitarian response period. The primary points for initial coordination are the offices of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for AP in Baku and the AP Ministry of Emergency Situations. Humanitarian assistance operations will be carried out within the context of the UN Humanitarian Principles with an aim to provide the immediate and essential humanitarian response and to reduce the restrictions that the humanitarian situation may impose on military operations. Information-sharing and general coordination between civilian and military organizations will be guided by the following general factors:
- a. (U) General information on the security situation, areas of particular risk (including criminal activity, land mines, security incidents);
 - b. (U) Condition and needs (humanitarian and security) of the population, major population movements;
 - c. (U) Conditions in “shared space” such as roads and airports;
 - d. (U) Coordinates and planned movements of humanitarian operations;
 - e. (U) Military plans/capacity to provide assistance to the population; and
 - f. (U) Information on the effects of military operations, as soon as the requirements of military security allow, for example:
 - (1) (U) General post-strike information on strike locations and explosive munitions used in order to assist the planning of humanitarian relief and mine-action/UXO activities;
 - (2) (U) changes in control of territory; and
 - (3) (U) effects of fighting on civilian population, including degradation of infrastructure.

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

g. (U) Preliminary IDP Assistance Centres. Initial IDP reception and assistance centers have been established (table below). Other centers may be established as necessary and if warranted by changing humanitarian factors and conditions.

Camp (Nearest town)	Capacity	Involved “Cluster” Agencies
Hajar (Ujar)	40,000	ICRC, AZRC (Red Crescent Society of AP)
Sabira (Kurdamir)	20,000	CARE International, IIRO (International Islamic Relief Org), ICRC
Khalisa (Hajigabul)	27,000	UN cluster agencies, IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies), ICRC


ATTACHMENTS:

Tab A - IDP Movement Corridor

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
TAB A TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

TAB A (IDP MOVEMENT CORRIDOR) TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC



K2-A-1/2
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TAB A TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO OPOD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC



K2-A-2/2
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ANNEX L TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

**ANNEX L (INFORMATION COLLECTION) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN)
CFLCC**

(U) References:

- (a) FM 3-55, Information Collection, May 13.
- (b) FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, May 14.
- (c) CFLCC OPORD 07-OP IRON GUARDIAN

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU

1. (U) Situation.

- a. (U) Area of Interest. Refer to Annex B.
- b. (U) Area of Operations. Refer to Annex B.
 - (1) (U) Terrain. Refer to Tab A to Appendix 1 to Annex B.
 - (2) (U) Weather. Refer to Tab B to Appendix 1 to Annex B.
- c. (U) Enemy Forces. Refer to Tab E to Appendix 1 to Annex B.
- d. (U) Friendly Forces. Refer to Annex B.
- e. (U) Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Refer to Appendix 1 to Annex K.
- f. (U) Civil Considerations. Refer to Annex K.
- g. (U) Attachments and Detachments. Refer to Annex A.
- h. (U) Assumptions. Refer to base OPORD.

2. (U) Mission. CFLCC will focus its Information Collection assets and operations on answering the commander's PIR at his decision points, ensuring consistent coordination with staff elements (Fires, IO, etc.) and contributing to / drawing from various working.

3. (U) Execution.

a. (U) Concept of Operations. The collection assets will provide coverage for the entire AO. Collection assets will assist the commander in making decisions at critical points and in answering PIR. As the commander's PIRs are changed so too will the assets' focus to conform to CFLCC advance across Atropia.

- (1) (U) Movement and Maneuver. Refer to base OPORD.
- (2) (U) Intelligence. Refer to Annex B.
- (3) (U) Fires. Refer to Annex D.
- (4) (U) Protection. Refer to Annex E.
- (5) (U) Engineer. Refer to Annex G.
- (6) (U) Sustainment. Refer to Annex F.

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ANNEX L TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

- (7) (U) Signal. Refer to Annex H.
- (8) (U) Soldier and Leader Engagement. Refer to Annexes J (Public Affairs) and K (Civil Affairs Operations).
- b. (U) Tasks to Subordinate Units. Refer to Appendix 1 of this Annex.
- c. (U) Coordinating Instructions.
- (1) (U) Subordinate units will develop collection plans for their assets that will begin collecting immediately upon arrival in the CFLCC AO. These collection plans will be developed 24 hours prior to arrival and will be developed 72 hours in advance thereafter.
- (2) (U) Named Area of Interest (NAI) Numbering Convention. CFLCC will use a four digit numbering systems for NAIs within the AO. The first two digits are based on the subordinate unit and, the second two digits are based on the NAI number for that command.

CFLCC	30XX
1 ID	31XX
4 MND	32XX
82 ABN DIV	33XX
3 CAV	34XX
75 FAB	35XX
415 CBRNE BDE	36XX
66 MIB	37XX
Other CFLCC units	38XX

- (3) (U) Subordinate unit commanders are authorized to coordinate across commands with an information copy to the CFLCC G2.
- (4) (U) Specific requests for national assets will be sent through the CFLCC G-2.
- (5) (U) Priority Intelligence Requirements.
- (a) (U) What is the disposition, composition, and strength of OSC 2 Integrated Fire Command (IFC) nodes and Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS)?
- (b) (U) What is the strength and disposition of the OSC 2 forces?
- (c) (U) Are there indicators that OSC 1 is reinforcing the OSC 2?
- (d) (U) Are there indicators that the SHC or FG intend to employ the strategic or operational reserve?
- (e) (U) What routes and border crossing points is Ariana using to sustain its forces in Atropia?

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ANNEX L TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

- (f) (U) What is the status of Kura River crossings?
 - (g) (U) Where are the Arianian SSMs with WMD capability in the AO or within range of the AO?
 - (h) (U) Are there indications the Arianian National Command Authority (NCA) has approved the use of WMD?
 - (i) (U) What are the locations of the criminal, insurgent, or SPF elements that are planning to negatively impact CFLCC LOCs within Gorgas and Atropia and do they have that capability?
 - (j) (U) Are the Arianians or any non-state actors preparing to commit an action that would trigger a consequence management activity (Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO), loss of WMD accountability, etc)?
 - (k) (U) What is the primary cyber target of Arianian INFOWAR capabilities?
 - (6) (U) Essential Elements of Friendly Information.
 - (a) (U) Location and disposition of the CFLCC reserve.
 - (b) (U) Location and disposition of potential crossing sites over the Kura River.
 - (c) (U) Evacuation routes and collection points for IDP.
 - (d) (U) Locations and dispositions of IO/NGO in the AO.
 - (7) (U) Rules of Engagement. Refer to Appendix 11 to Annex C.
4. (U) Sustainment. Refer to Annex F.
5. (U) Command and Signal. Refer to base OPORD and Annex H.

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G-2

ATTACHMENTS:

- Appendix 1 - Information Collection Plan
- Appendix 2 - Information Collection Overlay (Omitted)
- Appendix 3 - Named Areas of Interest (NAI)

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APPENDIX 1 (INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN) TO ANNEX L (INFORMATION COLLECTION) TO OPORD 07 (OP RESOLUTE GUARDIAN) CFLCC (U)

Unit: CFLCC													
Information Collection Plan													
PIR	EEI	INDICATORS	SIR	NAI	LTIOV	UNIT TO COLLECT							
						66MIB	1ID	4MND/4ID	82 ABN DIV	3CAV	415 CBRNE BD	75FAB	360CA
1. What is disposition, composition, and strength of OSC2 Integrated Fire Command (IFC) nodes and Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS)?	What IFC assets have been destroyed?	Destroyed SS-21s / SHAHAB-3s, SS-26Ms / 9P140s	Where have SS-21s / SHAHAB-3s, SS-26Ms / 9P140s been destroyed?	3001 - 3003, 3021	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
			What SS-21s / SHAHAB-3s, SS-26Ms / 9P140s been destroyed?	3001 - 3003, 3021	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x		
	Where are IFC assets located?	SS-21s / SHAHAB-3s, SS-26Ms / 9P140s	Where are IFC assets located?	3001 - 3004, 3021	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x		
	What friendly assets will enemy IFC target?	Present SS-21s / SHAHAB-3s, SS-26Ms / 9P140s within range	Where are IFC assets located?	3001 - 3004, 3021	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x		

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APPENDIX 1 (INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN) TO ANNEX L (INFORMATION COLLECTION) TO OPORD 07 (OP RESOLUTE GUARDIAN) CFLCC (U)

PIR	EEI	INDICATORS	SIR	NAI	LTIOV	UNIT TO COLLECT							
						66MIB	11D	4MND/4ID	82 ABN DIV	3CAV	415 CBRNE BD	75FAB	360CA
1. What is disposition, composition, and strength of OSC2 Integrated Fire Command (IFC) nodes and Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS)?	What IADS assets have been destroyed?	Destroyed Buk-M1-2 (SA-11 FO)s, FM-90 w/SA-18, BMP-2M w/SA-24s, 2S6M1s, SA-15b w/SA-18 2S6M1s	Where have Buk-M1-2 (SA-11 FO)s, FM-90 w/SA-18, BMP-2M w/SA-24s, 2S6M1s, SA-15b w/SA-18 been destroyed?	3001-3004, 3006, 3014	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
			What Buk-M1-2 (SA-11 FO)s, FM-90 w/SA-18, BMP-2M w/SA-24s, 2S6M1s, SA-15b w/SA-18 2S6M1s been destroyed?	3001-3004, 3006, 3014	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
	Where are IADS assets located?	Present Buk-M1-2 (SA-11 FO)s, FM-90 w/SA-18, BMP-2M w/SA-24s, 2S6M1s, SA-15b w/SA-18, 2S6M1s locations	Where are IADS assets located?	3001-3004, 3006, 3014	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	

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APPENDIX 1 (INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN) TO ANNEX L (INFORMATION COLLECTION) TO OPORD 07 (OP RESOLUTE GUARDIAN) CFLCC (U)

PIR	EEI	INDICATORS	SIR	NAI	LTIOV	UNIT TO COLLECT							
						66MIB	1ID	4MND/4ID	82 ABN DIV	3CAV	415 CBRNE BD	75FAB	360CA
2. What is the strength and disposition of the OSC2 forces?	What OSC2 assets have been destroyed?	Destroyed BMP-2s, T-90Ss, BTR-80As, BTR-80s, TY63s, BRM-3Ks, BDRM-2s, 2S19M1s, 2A65Ms, 9P149(AT-9)s, AMX-10 HOT3s, G-6s, 9A51/PRIMAs, 9P140s, or SA-15s	What destroyed BMP-2s, T-90s, BTR-80As, BTR-80s, TY63s, BRM-3Ks, BDRM-2s, 2S19M1s, 2A65Ms, 9P149(AT-9)s, AMX-10 HOT3s, G-6s, 9A51/PRIMAs, 9P140s, or SA-15s	3001 - 3004	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x		
	Where are 23DTG assets?	BMP-2s, T-90Ss, TY63s, BRM-3Ks, BDRM-2s, 2S19M1s, 2A65Ms, 9P149(AT-9)s, AMX-10 HOT3s, G-6s, 9A51/PRIMAs, 9P140s, or SA-15s	Where are enemy units?	3001	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
	Where are 25DTG assets?	BTR 80As, T-90Ss, TY63s, BRM-3Ks, BDRM-2s, 2S19M1s, 2A65Ms, 9P149(AT-9)s, AMX-10 HOT3s, G-6s, 9A51/PRIMAs, 9P140s, or SA-15s	Where are enemy units?	3002-3003	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	

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APPENDIX 1 (INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN) TO ANNEX L (INFORMATION COLLECTION) TO OPORD 07 (OP RESOLUTE GUARDIAN) CFLCC (U)

PIR	EEI	INDICATORS	SIR	NAI	LTIOV	UNIT TO COLLECT							
						66MIB	1ID	4MND/4ID	82 ABN DIV	3CAV	415 CBRNE BD	75FAB	360CA
2. What is the strength and disposition of the OSC2 forces?	Where are 24DTG assets?	BTR 80s, T-90Ss, TY63s, BRM-3Ks, BDRM-2s, 2S19M1s, 2A65Ms, 9P149(AT-9)s, AMX-10 HOT3s, G-6s, 9A51/PRIMAs, 9P140s, or SA-15s	Where are enemy units?	3004	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
	Where are 349Tank BTG assets?	T-90A, Ty63, BMP-2, AMX-10 HOT 3, G6, BRM-3K	Where are enemy units?	3001-3004	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
	What is the current location of Arianian attack helicopter assets?	Mi-35M2	Where are enemy units?	3001-3004	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
	What are the locations of Arianian barriers/obstacles in Atropia?	PMR-3, GMZ-2, UMZ, heavy engineer equipment	Where are enemy barriers/obstacles?	3001-3005	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

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APPENDIX 1 (INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN) TO ANNEX L (INFORMATION COLLECTION) TO OPORD 07 (OP RESOLUTE GUARDIAN) CFLCC (U)

PIR	EEI	INDICATORS	SIR	NAI	LTIOV	UNIT TO COLLECT							
						66MIB	11D	4MND/4ID	82 ABN DIV	3CAV	415 CBRNE BD	75FAB	360CA

3. Are there indicators that OSC1 is reinforcing the OSC 2?	Where are 11DTG assets?	Presence of BMP-2 and T-90Ss not part of the 23DTG	Where are BMP-2s and T-90s not part of the 23DTG	3001 - 3003	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x		x
	Where are 12DTG assets?	Presence of BTR-80s and T-90Ss not part of the 24DTG	Where are BTR-80s and T-90s not part of the 24DTG	3001 - 3003	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x		x
	Where are 13DTG assets?	Presence of BTR-80As and T-90Ss not part of the 25DTG	Where are BTR-80As and T-90Ss not part of the 25DTG	3001 - 3003	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x		x
	Are OSC1 bridging and engineer mobility assets being staged form follow-on attack?	Pontoon bridging, MTK-2, BAT-2, BAT-2M, IMR-2M	Where are OSC1 bridging and engineer mobility units?	3005, 3014, 3021	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
	Have additional formations joined OSC1?	Presence of unique equipment	Have additional formations joined OSC1?	3021	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

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APPENDIX 1 (INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN) TO ANNEX L (INFORMATION COLLECTION) TO OPORD 07 (OP RESOLUTE GUARDIAN) CFLCC (U)

PIR	EEI	INDICATORS	SIR	NAI	LTIOV	UNIT TO COLLECT							
						66MIB	1ID	4MND/4ID	82 ABN DIV	3CAV	415 CBRNE BD	75FAB	360CA
4. Are there indicators that the FG or OSC2 intend to employ the strategic or operational reserve?	Where are elements of the 349 TKBDE?	Presence of BMP-2s and T-90Ss	Where are BMP-2s in formation or placement to reinforce?	3001-3004	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x			x
			Where are T-90Ss in formation or placement to reinforce?	3001-3004	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x			x
	Where are elements of the 92 MECHDIV?	Presence of BTR-80As and T-90s	Where are BTR-80s in formation or placement to reinforce?	3001-3004	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x			x
			Where are T-90As in formation or placement to reinforce?	3001-3004	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x			x

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APPENDIX 1 (INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN) TO ANNEX L (INFORMATION COLLECTION) TO OPORD 07 (OP RESOLUTE GUARDIAN) CFLCC (U)

PIR	EEI	INDICATORS	SIR	NAI	LTIOV	UNIT TO COLLECT							
						66MIB	1ID	4MND/4ID	82 ABN DIV	3CAV	415 CBRNE BD	75FAB	360CA
5. What routes and border crossing points is Ariana using to sustain its forces in Atropia?	What routes and crossings are being used to resupply 23DTG	Presence of logistics traffic	Where are the Araks River crossing points on the Ariana-Atropia Border	3006, 3014	Ongoing	x	x		x	x		x	x
			What is the status of the the Araks River crossing points on the Ariana-Atropia Border	3006, 3014	Ongoing	x	x		x	x		x	x
		Defence of crossing sites	Are crossings being defended? If so, in what strength?	3006, 3014	Ongoing	x	x		x	x		x	x
	What routes and crossings are being used to resupply 25DTG	Presence of logistics traffic	Where are the crossing points on the Ariana-Atropia Border to resupply 25DTG	3020	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x		x	x
		Defence of crossing sites	Are crossings being defended? If so, in what strength?	3020	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x		x	x

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APPENDIX 1 (INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN) TO ANNEX L (INFORMATION COLLECTION) TO OPORD 07 (OP RESOLUTE GUARDIAN) CFLCC (U)

PIR	EEI	INDICATORS	SIR	NAI	LTIOV	UNIT TO COLLECT							
						66MIB	1ID	4MND/4ID	82 ABN DIV	3CAV	415 CBRNE BD	75FAB	360CA
5. What routes and border crossing points is Ariana using to sustain its forces in Atropia?	What routes and crossings are being used to resupply 24DTG	Presence of logistics traffic	Where are the crossing points on the Ariana-Atropia Border to resupply 24DTG?	3005, 3020	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x		x	x
		Defence of crossing sites	Are crossings being defended? If so, in what strength?	3005, 3020	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x		x	x
	What routes and Araks River crossings are being used to support lateral traffic between 23DTG and 25DTG?	Presence of logistics and combat vehicle traffic	Where are the Araks River crossing points between 23DTG and 25DTG?	3004	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x		x	x
		Defence of crossing sites	Are crossings being defended? If so, in what strength?	3004	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x		x	x

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APPENDIX 1 (INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN) TO ANNEX L (INFORMATION COLLECTION) TO OPORD 07 (OP RESOLUTE GUARDIAN) CFLCC (U)

PIR	EEI	INDICATORS	SIR	NAI	LTIOV	UNIT TO COLLECT							
						66MIB	11D	4MND/4ID	82 ABN DIV	3CAV	415 CBRNE BDE	75FAB	360CA

6. What is the status of Kura River crossings?	Are Kura River bridges intact?	Presence of civilian traffic.	Is civilian traffic flowing freely?	3007-3013	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x		x	x
	Is Ariana defending these bridges?	Presence of military units/equipment	Are the bridges being defended? If so, in what strength?	3007-3013	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x		x	x
	Is there evidence that bridges have been prepared for demolition?	Presence of military engineer vehicles.	Are bridges prepared for demolition?	3007-3013	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x		x	x
		Evidence of demolition preparations		3007-3013	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x		x	x

7. Where are the Ariana SSMs with WMD capability in the AO or within range of it?	Where are Ariana SSM assets located?	Present SS-21s / SHAHAB-3s, SS-26Ms within range	Where are Ariana SSM assets located?	3001 - 3004, 3021	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
	What is the location/disposition of NODONG -II SSM Bns?	Relocation of NODONG-II SSMs	Where are Arianian NODONG-II SSMs?									x	

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APPENDIX 1 (INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN) TO ANNEX L (INFORMATION COLLECTION) TO OPORD 07 (OP RESOLUTE GUARDIAN) CFLCC (U)

PIR	EEI	INDICATORS	SIR	NAI	LTIOV	UNIT TO COLLECT							
						66MB	1ID	4MND/4ID	82 ABN DIV	3CAV	415 CBRNE BD	75FAB	360CA
8. Are there indications that the Ariana NCA has approved the use of WMD?	Will Ariana employ WMD?	Change in Ariana personal; protective posture	Have Ariana forces changed their personal protective posture?	3001-3004	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
		Special protected convoys	Have special protected convoys been observed?	3004, 3005, 3006, 3014, 3020	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
		Decontamination preparations	Have Ariana NBCD units undertaken any special preparations?	3001-3004	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

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APPENDIX 1 (INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN) TO ANNEX L (INFORMATION COLLECTION) TO OPORD 07 (OP RESOLUTE GUARDIAN) CFLCC (U)

PIR	EEI	INDICATORS	SIR	NAI	LTIOV	UNIT TO COLLECT						
						66MIB	11D	4MND/4ID	82 ABN DIV	3CAV	415 CBRNE BD	75FAB

8. What are the locations of the criminal, insurgent, or SPF elements that are planning to negatively impact CFLCC LOCs within Gorgas and Atropia and do they have that capability?	In what towns / villages is there negative sentiment re CFLCC?	Negative sentiment towards CFLCC	What violence or hostility has been shown towards CFLCC?	3015 - 3019, 3022 -3025	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
			What reluctance to speak to CFLCC personnel has presented itself?	3015 - 3019, 3022 -3025	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
	What capabilities exist within criminal, insurgent, and SPF elements?	Planning cells, observation, weaponry in civilian hands	Where have CFLCC elements been monitored?	3015 - 3019, 3022 -3025	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
			What planning against CFLCC has been conducted?	3015 - 3019, 3022 -3025	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
			What weapons are accessible to the population?	3015 - 3019, 3022 -3025	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

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APPENDIX 1 (INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN) TO ANNEX L (INFORMATION COLLECTION) TO OPORD 07 (OP RESOLUTE GUARDIAN) CFLCC (U)

PIR	EEI	INDICATORS	SIR	NAI	LTIOV	UNIT TO COLLECT							
						66MIB	11D	4MND/4ID	82 ABN DIV	3CAV	415 CBRNE BD	75FAB	360CA
8. What are the locations of the criminal, insurgent, or SPF elements that are planning to negatively impact CFLCC LOCs within Gorgas and Atropia and do they have that capability?	What groups have negative sentiment towards CFLCC?	Negative press statements, rallies, etc.	What is the source of negative press against CFLCC?	305 - 3019, 3022 -3025	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
			Who has started anti-CFLCC rallies?	3015 - 3019, 3022 -3025	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
	Where/how has SAPA attempted to coordinate its activities with other groups?	Planning cells, movements of known leaders	Has SAPA coordinated its activities with other groups?	3015 - 3019, 3022 -3025	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
	What SAPA leaders in Baku pose the greatest threat to the Atropian government	Planning cells, movements of known leaders, negative press statements	What SAPA leader in Baku poses the greatest threat?	3022	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

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APPENDIX 1 (INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN) TO ANNEX L (INFORMATION COLLECTION) TO OPORD 07 (OP RESOLUTE GUARDIAN) CFLCC (U)

PIR	EEI	INDICATORS	SIR	NAI	LTIOV	UNIT TO COLLECT							
						66MIB	1ID	4MND/4ID	82 ABN DIV	3CAV	415 CBRNE BD	75FAB	360CA

9. Are the Arianans or any non-state actors preparing to commit an action that would trigger a consequence management activity (Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO), loss of WMD accountability, etc.)?	What disruptive or otherwise inefficient and non-offensive (and thereby questionable) activities have the Arianans been engaged in?	Rebel rousing	What activities have been negative for CFLCC or Atroplan forces / control?	3001 - 3005, 3015 - 3019, 3022	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
		Negative media reporting	What activities are disrupting Atroplan DPWs and civilians, discrediting CFLCC presence?	3001 - 3005, 3015 - 3019, 3022	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
		Odd or unfruitful crimes											
		Interethnic harassment	What activities have captured international attention?	3001 - 3005, 3015 - 3019, 3022	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
	What highly volatile situations have Arianans and other non-state actors been participating in?	Rebel rousing	What activities have captured international attention?	3015 - 3019, 3022	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
		Interethnic harassment	What activities are disrupting Atroplan DPWs and civilians, discrediting CFLCC presence?	3015 - 3019, 3022	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

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APPENDIX 1 (INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN) TO ANNEX L (INFORMATION COLLECTION) TO OPORD 07 (OP RESOLUTE GUARDIAN) CFLCC (U)

PIR	EEI	INDICATORS	SIR	NAI	LTIOV	UNIT TO COLLECT							
						66MIB	11D	4MND/4ID	82 ABN DIV	3CAV	415 CBRNE BD	75FAB	360CA
9. Are the Arianans or any non-state actors preparing to commit an action that would trigger a consequence management activity (Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO), loss of WMD accountability, etc.)?	What areas are potential targets for a disruptive triggering of a consequence management activity?	-Highly tense demonstrations or social activities / hostility -Large congregations of Ariana sympathizers -Large congregations of displaced persons	What interethnic violences have occurred and where?	3015 - 3019, 3022	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
			Where are displaced persons congregating outside of CFLCC areas of control?	3015 - 3019, 3022	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
			Where are Arianan sympathizers located / congregating?	3015 - 3019, 3022	Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

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
APPENDIX 1 (INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN) TO ANNEX L (INFORMATION COLLECTION) TO OPORD 07 (OP RESOLUTE GUARDIAN) CFLCC (U)

PIR	EEI	INDICATORS	SIR	NAI	LTIOV	UNIT TO COLLECT							
						66MIB	11D	4MND/4ID	82 ABN DIV	3CAV	415 CBRNE BD	75FAB	360CA
What is the primary cyber target of Arianian INFOWAR capabilities?	Has 331st INFOWAR Bde been conducting cyber attack?	Disruption of non-secure and secure civilian and military networks	What networks have been subject to cyber attack?		Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
	Has 9th INFOWAR Bde been conducting cyber attack?	Disruption of non-secure and secure civilian and military networks	What networks have been subject to cyber attack?		Ongoing	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX L TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

APPENDIX 3 (NAMED AREAS OF INTEREST) TO ANNEX L (COLLECTION) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN)
CFLCC



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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX L TO OPOD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

NAI	Description	Grid NE (MGRS)	Grid NW (MGRS)	Grid SW (MGRS)	Grid SE (MGRS)
3001	23DTG Defensive Positions	38TQK16234386	38SPK88302164	38SQJ17638405	38SQK48660455
3002	25DTG Defensive Positions	39SUE16512700	39TTEP6623551	39STE98850242	39SUE21100201
3003	25 and 24DTG Defensive Positions	39SUD23689544	39SUD07219346	39SUD11107100	39SUD27467225
3004	Atropia Aras River Crossings	39TTE91043329	39TTE70943742	38SQK48340721	38SQJ56829741
3005	Possible Reserve and Resupply Routes	39SUC16979785	39SUC04559711	39SUC05735444	39SUC15965375
3006	Aras River Border Crossing	38SQJ10527585	38SPJ95777547	38SPJ96146067	38SQJ10926105
3007	Kura River Crossing 38TQK178499	38TQK21465387	38TQK14075365	38TQK14284625	38TQK21684647
3008	Kura River Crossings <u>Telishli</u>	39TTE54965056	39TTE47645072	39TTE47424177	39TTE54824145
3009	Kura River Crossings <u>Saribad and Ulacali</u>	39TTE92343933	39TTE86584208	39TTE81063268	39TTE87003066
3010	Kura River Crossings <u>Qaraguney and Shirvan</u>	39SUE23812733	39SUE16982732	39SUE18841847	39SUE24421967
3011	Kura River Crossing <u>Salvan</u>	39SUD30129111	39SUD22729128	39SUD22558387	39SUD29958371
3012	Kura River Crossing <u>Qarabucaq</u>	39SUD33587304	39SUD26167320	39SUD25996580	39SUD33426564
3013	Kura River Crossing Banka	39SUD52396774	39SUD44996788	39SUD44846048	39SUD52256034
3014	Aras River Combat Bridge	38SQJ35339005	38SQJ20608962	38SQJ21037481	38SQJ35787525

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX L TO OPOD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

NAI	Description	Grid NE (MGRS)	Grid NW (MGRS)	Grid SW (MGRS)	Grid SE (MGRS)
3015	SPF/Insurgent Disruption Activities	39TUE26533747	39TUE18493855	39SUE18362981	39TUE26582999
3016	SPF/Insurgent Disruption Activities	39TTE63197493	39TTE54317507	39TTE54076781	39TTE62656732
3017	SPF/Insurgent Disruption Activities	38TPL87670228	38TPL78160216	38TPK78349475	38TPK88159503
3018	SPF/Insurgent Disruption Activities	38TQL13080667	38TQL05680646	38TQK05899906	38TQK13299927
3019	SPF/Insurgent Disruption Activities	38TPL18381037	38TPL11351003	38TPK11289989	38TPL18770001
3020	Border crossing routes	39STD93737846	39STD58457074	39STD60565260	39STD97906265
3021	Ariana Border Defense Area	39STD56087067	38SQJ52578829	38SQJ33206809	39SQJ53195111
3022	SPF/Insurgent Disruption Activities	39TVE12758257	39TUE96258263	39TUE96276294	39TVE12676317
3023	SPF/Insurgent Disruption Activities	38TMM88543162	38TMM76723128	38TMM74971655	38TMM95760674
3024	SPF/Insurgent Disruption Activities	38TLM13608476	38TLM02088515	38TLM02037811	38TLM13647787
3025	SPF/Insurgent Disruption Activities	37TGG24217368	37TGG16827344	37TGG17056604	37TGG24446627

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ANNEX N TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

ANNEX N (SPACE OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

References:

- (a) UN General Assembly Resolutions: National Sovereignty Principles (A/RES/50/172), and (A/RES/63/308) Responsibility to Protect (R2P).
- (b) UNSCR Resolution 7739
- (c) UNSCR Resolution 7752
- (d) CJTF-OIG Operation Order 01 dated XXXXXX
- (e) CJTF-OIG Operation Order 03 dated XXXXXXXX (G+75 days)(notional)
- (f) JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, 10 Jun 10.
- (g) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3320.03A, "Joint Communications Electronic Operating Instructions," 19 Nov 07.
- (h) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 6215.01C, "Policy for Department of Defense Voice Networks," 23 Sep 01.
- (i) Allied Communications Publication (ACP) 127, "Allied Message Handling Procedures."

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout OPORD: ZULU

1. (U) **Situation.**

a. (U) **General.**

(1) (U) **Weather.**

(a) (U) **Space Weather.** Space weather that degrades friendly space systems is probable during the operation and solar events can occur with little or no warning. The most probable effect on friendly systems includes degradation of Global Positioning System (GPS) accuracy and loss of UHF SATCOM channels. Other effects include false tracks in missile warning systems and the loss of a satellite itself. The effect on enemy space systems is low as Ariana has limited reliance on space systems for operations.

(b) (U) **Terrestrial.** Terrestrial weather that degrades friendly space systems is probable during the operation. Cloud cover or similar obscuration, such as dust storms, prevents electro-optical (EO) imagery collection and delays early warning during enemy missile attack.

(2) (U) **Terrain.**

(a) (U) **Effects on Friendly Forces.** Maneuver navigation systems and precision-guided munition (PGM) systems may experience degradation of GPS accuracy from terrain masking caused by mountainous terrain regions. Terrain masking may obscure overhead collection systems. Enemy camouflage, concealment, and deception (CC&D) measures will be highly effective.

(b) (U) **Effects on Enemy Forces.** Limited effect on the enemy due to low reliance on space-based capabilities.

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ANNEX N TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

b. (U) Enemy.

(1) (U) General. While possessing a growing indigenous space capability, Ariana's space threat capabilities will continue to be augmented to a more robust standard by those state/non-state actors willing to provide or disseminate technology to Ariana. Ariana has limited national space capabilities, consisting of a single Geostationary SATCOM satellite, and a single imaging satellite in low Earth orbit. They can be expected to make the maximum use possible of available commercial services.

(2) (U) Communication. Ariana has limited national communication satellite capability, consisting of a single, first-generation SATCOM satellite in geostationary orbit; however, they will exploit civil/commercial communications constellations either overtly or through proxies.

(3) (U) Imagery Reconnaissance and Remote Sensing. Ariana has limited indigenous space-based imaging and SIGINT capability, consisting of a single imaging satellite in low Earth orbit. This satellite is capable of collecting low-resolution (three meters) images, and is believed to have a relatively short life span (four months). This results in an indigenous satellite-based reconnaissance capability able to provide full theatre coverage to support Ariana's tactical commanders. This satellite downlinks somewhere in Ariana, and is subject to significant persistence of re-visit time limitations. Ariana can be expected to purchase commercial imagery of the area to supplement its own capabilities.

(4) (U) Navigation. Arianian forces have no indigenous space-based navigation support capability, but their use of satellite navigation systems, namely the GPS and Russia's Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) is increasing. Ariana's military is believed to be using commercial L-band receivers which emphasize the significance of dual-use technology (civilian equipment being used for military purposes). These commercial receivers are also believed to provide the backbone for time-keeping requirements of SATCOM systems.

(5) (U) Meteorological Data. Ariana has no indigenous space-based weather systems but can easily download meteorological data from foreign satellites. Most civil meteorological systems provide weather imagery that is easily received using off-the-shelf equipment and technology giving reasonably current regional weather information. Additionally, enemy forces have access to basic weather pictures from the US NOAA, Russian METEOR/Resurs, and Japanese GMS satellites with minimal ground equipment.

(6) (U) Threats to US Space Operations. Enemy forces anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities are limited to the following active and passive measures for negating US and Coalition space capabilities:

(7) (U) Passive Measures. Arianian forces can be expected to employ decoys, camouflage, and underground facilities in an attempt to defeat Coalition reconnaissance and surveillance assets.

(8) (U) SATCOM Intercept & Jamming. Ariana has one suspected SATCOM ground transceiver facility. Ariana will likely rely on COTS technologies for any attempts to block or deny Friendly Forces access to SATCOM; however, for this to be successful on a wide scale it would require access to infrastructure and international assistance not currently or likely to be at their disposal.

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ANNEX N TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(9) (U) GPS Jamming. Ariana's ability to counter GPS signals, or disrupt PNT signals, is dependent on their ability to acquire sufficient COTS technology, or jammers acquired from Donovia.

(10) (U) Ballistic Missile Threat. Arianian forces have access to space launch systems through the Arianian Space Agency, primarily using the Safir-2 SLV operational launcher.

(11) (U) Ground Attack/Sabotage. Ariana will likely strike space ground assets in the JOA or even beyond. SATCOM ground facilities will be high-payoff targets for enemy field artillery (FA).

c. (U) Friendly. Success depends heavily on the use of space assets to support military operations. Space assets support several crucial mission areas providing theater missile warning, space environmental sensing, communications, navigation, meteorology and oceanography (METCO), space control, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance data. The following military space systems provide force enhancement to the operation:

(1) (U) Communication. USSTRATCOM supports responsive space communications through the Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) and exercises command and control of the Air Force Satellite Communications (AFSATCOM), the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS), Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM), Leased Satellite (LEASAT), UHF Follow-on (UFO), and Military Strategic and Tactical Relay (MILSTAR) systems. USSTRATCOM facilitates effective use of these assets through the Global Satellite Support Center (GSSC) and three regional satellite support centers (RSSC). Terminals for access to these systems are available at the CFLCC Main CP and the Main CPs of CFLCC MSCs as well as at other critical command nodes.

(2) (U) Commercial Satellite Communications. Augmentation from commercial SATCOM assets will be coordinated on an as-needed basis through the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).

(3) (U) Commercial Environmental Satellites. In addition to the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, several non-military satellites such as GOES, NOAA/TIROS, GMS, METEOSAT, METEOR, LANDSAT, and SPOT may also be available for environmental applications to include near real time weather picture, forecast and terrain analysis for operations. These products are available through local weather support agencies. Staff Weather Officers at all echelons will provide for access and interpretation of weather data from these systems.

(4) (U) Navigation (positioning and timing). GPS will be used to provide accurate navigation and timing capabilities to CFLCC units. LNOs dispatched to non-US coalition units will be provided with GPS equipment to ensure coordination with all Coalition elements.

d. (U) Assumptions.

(1) (U) US Government space agencies and programs, specifically NRO, NSA, CIA, NGA, NASA, and NOAA, will provide support to the operation.

(2) (U) Commercial satellite capabilities of corporations owned by US and Coalition nations will support CJTF-OIG.

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ANNEX N TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(3) (U) Commercial space capabilities owned by international consortia may be available to support the theater of operations.

(4) (U) The civil weather satellites of sympathetic nations will continue to operate in normal (unencrypted) transmission mode in support of enemy forces.

2. (U) **Mission.** CFLCC conducts military space operations through organic, ARSTRAT, and USSTRATCOM employed space forces to ensure and maintain space superiority, optimize space support, and provide missile warning and force protection.

3. (U) **Execution.**

a. (U) **Concept of Support.**

(1) (U) **General.** Space Operations will be executed to effect force enhancement and space control measures favorable for CFLCC operations. Priority of support is to aid situational awareness (SA) and command and control (C2).

(2) (U) **USSTRATCOM will support CJTF-OIG.** Space operations will assist with intelligence preparation of the battlefield, planning for space-based communications, monitoring of navigation systems for crucial PGM and maneuver systems, space environmental support, and mapping data for operational planning.

b. (U) **Space Support by Phase.** (See OPORD 07.)

(1) (U) **Phase I: Shape (D-Day - D-Day+3).** **Omitted.**

(2) (U) **Phase II: Clear (D-Day+3 - D-Day+6).** The priority for CFLCC space operations during this phase is to support actions necessary to secure LOCs and the forward movement of Coalition forces and the conduct of the defense on PL RED.

(3) (U) **Phase III: Dominate (D-Day+7 - D-Day+15).** The priority for CFLCC space operations during this Phase III is support of offensive planning and execution. CFLCC will provide space support as required for Coalition forces during this phase.

(4) (U) **Phase IV: Stabilize (D-Day+16 - D-Day+27).** The priorities for CFLCC space operations during Phase IV are to monitor Arianian activities to detect any potential attempt to cross the border and to support humanitarian relief efforts in liberated areas.

c. (U) **Tasks and Responsibilities.**

(1) (U) **CFLCC C-3.**

(a) (U) Request USSTRATCOM Strategic Support Teams to integrate into CFLCC's battle staff operations and plan for their reception and integration.

(b) (U) Ensure close coordination with CJTF-OIG to ensure successful dissemination of JOA ballistic missile warning data.

(c) (U) Ensure navigational receivers and associated materials are available in sufficient quantities to support operations as directed or specified in this OPORD.

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ANNEX N TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(d) (U) Ensure sufficient quantities of voice and data capable receivers and terminals are available to disseminate JOA ballistic missile warning information in an accurate and timely manner.

(e) (U) Plan for the use of space-based assets including communications, intelligence, environmental, weather, GPS, and reconnaissance and surveillance.

(2) (U) CFLCC C-6.

(a) (U) Identify and plan for the use of space-based force enhancements including communications, intelligence, environmental, weather, GPS, and reconnaissance and surveillance.

(b) (U) Integrate subordinate unit space related requirements into respective OPORDs.

(c) (U) Forward space-based asset requirements to CJTF-OIG's J-6 for consolidation and integration.

d. (U) Coordinating Instructions.

(1) (U) Intelligence. The use of intelligence systems supported by national strategic assets and systems will be closely controlled by guidance provided in Annex B, Intelligence, and this OPORD. CFLCC will identify force enhancement requirements as early as possible.

(2) (U) Communications. The Joint Chiefs of Staff apportions voice and data receivers and access. Individual voice and data receiver system managers will ensure apportioned access is available to CFLCC:

(a) (U) Subordinate units provide space-based requirements to the CFLCC C-6.

(b) (U) CFLCC C-6 will consolidate and forward space-based requirements to CJTF-OIGJ-6.

(c) (U) CFLCC C-3 will identify force enhancement requirements as early as possible.

(3) (U) Subordinate Units.

(a) (U) Plan for reception and integration of supporting space support teams.

(b) (U) Plan for utilization of space capabilities in unit OPORDs.

4. (U) Sustainment. Refer to the CFLCC OPORD 07 (IRON GUARDIAN) basic order and Annex D (Logistics).

a. (U) Resupply. Resupply for USSTRATCOM support teams is the responsibility of the supported unit, less those items specifically supported by USSTRATCOM.

b. (U) Sensitive Materials Support. Requirements for sensitive materials and applications (e.g., GPS, Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, etc.) will be established by the user as requested.

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ANNEX N TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

5. (U) **Command and Control.**

a. (U) **Command.**

(1) (U) USSTRATCOM personnel and capabilities deployed in support of the OPORD will be OPCON.

(2) (U) **Command Relationships.**

(a) (U) **USSTRATCOM.** CDR, USSTRATCOM exercises COCOM of JCS-designated DOD space forces and is responsible for all military space operations and requirements. Composition of the team will be tailored to best support required operations.

(b) (U) **Army Strategic Command (ARSTRAT).** The Commander, ARSTRAT exercises OPCON of assigned, dedicated, collateral, and/or contributing Army forces. COMARSTRAT forces consist of Wideband Operations Centers (WSOCs), AN/MSQ-114 Detachments, JTAGS, and the Schriever AFB Detachment. The RSSC-EUR is the SATCOM Support Center and supports USSTRATCOM requirements by establishing operations procedures, training, personnel management, and logistics management for these forces.

(c) (U) **Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).** The DISA is the SATCOM System Expert for DSCS and CSCI. The Director, DISA has designated DSCS and CSCI Network Management functions as operational elements of the GSSC; CDR USSTRATCOM exercises operational control and direction of these assets.

(d) (U) **US Civil and Civilian Satellite Systems.** US Civil and Civilian satellite system owners and operators will exercise operational control of their space systems. When notified by USSTRATCOM of an impending hazard or threat, they will take any/all required protective measures consistent with the impending threat.

(3) (U) **Command, Control, and Communications (C3) Systems.**

(a) (U) See Annex K (Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems).

(b) (U) Deployed USSTRATCOM personnel will have access to the supported unit's communications systems for transmittal of voice, recorded and data traffic to HQ ARSTRAT and HQ USSTRATCOM using IMMEDIATE precedence.

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ANNEX P TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

ANNEX P (HOST NATION SUPPORT) TO OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(U) References:

- (a) FM 3-16
- (b) FM 6-0
- (c) Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Atropia/CJTF-OIG
- (d) Technical Arrangements to the Status of Forces Agreement Atropia/CJTF-OIG
- (e) Annex F (Sustainment) to OPORD 07 (Op IRON GUARDIAN)

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU

1. (U) **Situation.** The country of AP has limited resources available for ongoing support to the significant military force deployed into the country in response to the current situation. To that end Atropia's main effort will be on supporting Atropian national forces to the extent possible, resulting in severe limitations on the availability of Host Nation Support (HNS) for the CFLCC elements located in AP.

2. (U) **Mission.** 310 ESC coordinates the provision of HNS to CFLCC elements located in Atropia.

3. (U) **Execution.**

a. (U) **Scheme of HNS.** Resources are severely constrained within Atropia. To that end it is the intent of Comd CFLCC that forces operating within Atropia shall be self-sufficient and will not impose a significant support bill on the host nation (HN). In order to reduce demands on HN, all HNS requests shall be made through 310 ESC/15 Sust BDE.

b. (U) **HNS Considerations.**

(1) (U) **Accommodations.** HN has agreed that CFLCC will have access to military accommodations where they are available. Requests are to be made through 306 Real Estate Team/18 EN BDE. Support is available in the following areas:

- (a) (U) Personnel accommodation/billeting.
- (b) (U) Offices.
- (c) (U) Warehousing.
- (d) (U) Workshops.
- (e) (U) Vehicle parks.
- (f) (U) Firing ranges.
- (g) (U) Training areas.
- (h) (U) Airfields.
- (i) (U) Ammunition storage facilities.

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ANNEX P TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(2) (U) Ammunition and Weapons. There is no excess capacity of weapons and ammunition within AP.

(3) (U) Communications. Atropian telephone (cell and land-line) networks are relatively advanced and provide a high degree of functionality for military communications as does the national data network. CFLCC will have access to Atropian telephone and data networks subject to the continuing availability of bandwidth. Requirements are to be addressed through 10 SIG BDE.

(4) (U) Finance. The government of AP has agreed that there will be no charge for the use of government and military facilities for CJTF-OIG. For those services which AP contracts out, charges levied to CJTF-OIG shall be at the same rate as paid by the Atropian government for those services.

(5) (U) Fuel. Fuel shall be drawn from Atropian sources only in emergency circumstances. Where it is necessary to draw from Atropian sources fuel will be replaced in kind as soon as practicable.

(6) (U) Local Labor. Local labor is available to support CFLCC operations. Payment for labor shall be at agreed rates identified in the technical arrangement to the SOFA. All requests for local labor are to be made through 15 Sust BDE.

(7) (U) Maintenance. CFLCC units shall have access to maintenance facilities and equipment not in use in support of Atropian units. Access is strictly controlled through advance requests to 310 ESC/15 Sust BDE for use of facilities.

(8) (U) Medical. CFLCC units and personnel shall not use Atropian medical facilities. Any emergency treatment by Atropian medical services to save life or limb shall be reported to Comd 1 MED BDE immediately.

(9) (U) Movement. CFLCC has full access to the transportation infrastructure of Atropia to include airfields, roads, railroads, rolling stock, motive power and railway terminals. Any associated requirement for refueling is to be met through CJTF-OIG sources. Requests for transportation support from the HN are to be made through 152 Mvt Ctl BN/15 Sust BDE.

(10) (U) Rations. No rations are available within Atropia. CFLCC units are to be self-sufficient for rations through a combination of combat rations and fresh rations provided through 310 ESC.

(11) (U) Supplies and Equipment. Not available.

(12) (U) Translation. Translation and interpreter services are available within AP. Payment for translation and interpreter services shall be at agreed rates identified in the technical arrangement to the SOFA. Requests for translation and interpreter services are to be made through 15 Sust BDE.

(13) (U) Transportation Equipment. Available transportation equipment is limited to railway rolling stock and motive power as identified in sub-para 3.b. (9) and hire of local commercial trucks. Hired transportation service providers are specifically excluded from transporting CFLCC ammunition and explosives.

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ANNEX P TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

(14) (U) Water. CFLCC units and personnel are to draw water exclusively from military sources. Units responsible for acquiring and treating bulk water may draw water from Atropian military and government facilities.

c. (U) Tasks to Subordinate Units.

(1) (U) 15 Sust BDE.

(a) (U) Coordinate requests for local labor services.

(b) (U) Coordinate requests for translation and interpreter services.

(c) (U) Coordinate contracting for commercial transport services.

(d) Coordinate requests for the use of transportation infrastructure.

(2) (U) 18 EN BDE. Coordinate requests for use of Atropian military facilities and locations.

4. (U) Sustainment. No change to base order.

5. (U) Command and Signal. No change to base order.

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ANNEX R TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC

ANNEX R (REPORTS) TO OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) – CFLCC

(U) Reference:

FM 6-99, *U.S. Army Report and Message Formats*, 19 August 2013.

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu

(U) General. The table below identifies the reports most commonly used by CFLCC and subordinate formations. The list may be amended by COM CFLCC at any point during the operation. Unless otherwise indicated all reports are applicable to formations or units assigned, attached, OPCON or TACON to CFLCC.

Reports	Acronym	FM 6-99 Page Reference	Notes
Serious Incident Report	SIR	A-2	
Air Support Request	AIRSUPREQ	A-8	
Ammunition Fire Unit-Ammunition Status	AFU.AMS	A-14	
Aviation Mission/Support Request	AVIAREQ	A-28	
Battle Damage Assessment Report	BDAREP PHASE 1	A-31	
Casualty Report	CASREP	A-47	
CBRN 1 Report	CBRN 1	A-48	
Commander's Situation Report	SITREP	A-68	
Intelligence Report	INTREP	A-119	
Intelligence Summary	INTSUM	A-120	
Logistics Resupply Request	LOGRESREP	A-122	
Logistics Situation Report	LOGSITREP	A-123	
Medical Evacuation Request	MEDEVAC	A-132	
Operation Report	OPREP	A-154	
Operations Summary	OPSUM	A-158	
Personnel Status Report	PERSTAT	A-160	
Request for Information	RI	A-176	
Rules of Engagement Authorization	ROEAUTH	A-181	
Rules of Engagement Implementation	ROEIMPL	A-182	
Scatterable Minefield Record	SCATMINREQ	A-183	
Scatterable Minefield Request	SCATMINREQ	A-185	
Unit Situation Report	UNITSITREP	A-222	
War Crime Reportable Incident Report	WCRIR	A-226	