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CJTF-OIG OPORD 01 OP IRON GUARDIAN

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HQ CJTF-OIG

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References:

- a. UN General Assembly Resolutions: National Sovereignty Principles (A/RES/50/172) and (A/RES/63/308) Responsibility to Protect (R2P).
- b. The White House, Office of the President, National Security Strategy, May 20XX.
- c. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)7730.
- d. UNSCR 7739.
- e. UNSCR 7752.
- f. UN Policy Guidance for the International Committee for Atropian Sovereignty and Security (ICASS) Military and Security Subcommittee.
- g. Status of Forces Agreement – ICASS/ASAM/Multilateral
- h. Gorgas (GO) Country Study.
- i. Atropia (AP) Country Study.
- j. Ariana (AN) Country Study.
- k. ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook.
- l. ABCA Coalition Logistics Handbook.
- m. AJP-2.5(A) Captured Persons, Materiel and Documents.
- n. AJP-3.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting.
- o. COM CJTF-OIG Campaign Plan for Operation IRON GUARDIAN (OIG)

Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU

1. Situation.

a. Background. In response to international concerns regarding the security and humanitarian situation in the Caucasus region, the United Nations Security Council passed UNSCR 7730, determining that the systematic campaign of state-sponsored intimidation, disruption and threats undertaken by AN against AP constituted a significant and grave threat to international peace and stability.

Member States were requested to contribute resources to reinforce and strengthen AP's capabilities through the provision of military assistance programs focused on training and

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capacity building. Subsequently, condemning the continued and systematic increase in political and military intimidation as well as threats being directed by AN towards AP,

UNSCR 7739 denounced the unprovoked attack by AN naval units on an Atropian survey ship operating in the Caspian Sea.

Acting under Chapter VII, Article 41 of the UN Charter, the Security Council authorized Member States to plan for the establishment and deployment of a multinational force in AP. If necessary, Member States are to enforce an end to state-initiated hostile action by AN or other belligerents, should such actions commence and encroach on Atropian sovereign territory.

The Security Council also decided to establish an economic and arms embargo. UNSCR 7739 called upon Member States to deploy maritime forces to the area and to use all necessary means to halt all maritime shipping to and from the area in order to inspect their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the arms embargo.

Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, UK and US have agreed to provide maritime elements to enforce the embargo within a coalition context. The name of the UN-sanctioned mission is the AP Security and Assistance Mission (ASAM). The coalition force will be known as CJTF-OIG and will consist of land, sea, air and special operations units from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The United States has offered to be the lead Troop Contributing Nation (TCN), providing the majority of critical force enablers. The Governments of AP, Gorgas (GO) and Turkey (TU) have consented, subject to SOFAs, to allow CJTF-OIG forces to stage through their territories, to station forces, materiel and installations involved in supporting its operations and to overflights.

On (insert date) AN military forces invaded Atropian territory with a significant and well-supported ground force. The defending Atropian forces finally succeeded in stopping the AN force. The AN Forces have adopted a defensive posture occupying a pocket extending approximately 60 kilometers into southern AP.

The UN Security Council passed UNSCR 7752 and authorized the deployment of the CJTF-OIG in support of the UN-sanctioned ASAM mission for an initial period of 12 months, with the objectives of expelling Arianian forces from Atropian territory and deterring further aggression, preserving human life and alleviating and re-establishing a safe and secure environment in AP.

b. Strategic Aim. The aim of the international community is to:

- (1) end Arianian aggression against AP
- (2) expulsion of all Arianian military forces from Atropian sovereign territory
- (3) creation of a free, safe, secure and stable environment
- (4) continuation of Atropian democratic national governance and developmental programs.

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c. Strategic Objectives. In order to achieve the desired end state, the strategic objectives of the international intervention include:

- (1) Expelling all Arianian military forces from Atropian sovereign territory.
- (2) Restoring a secure and stable environment throughout the AP Joint Operations Area (JOA).
- (3) Effecting force protection for coalition military forces deployed throughout the JOA.
- (4) Assisting the government of AP to strengthen the capacities of their national security forces and institutions to enforce central control.
- (5) Preserving and enforcing the freedom of navigation throughout the JOA.
- (6) Establishing and enforcing an economic and arms embargo IAW UNSCR 7739.
- (7) Supporting ICASS implementation partners, including UN Agencies, International Organizations (IOs) and NGOs within capabilities and limitations in order to preserve human life and alleviate the suffering of IDPs and refugees within the JOA.
- (8) Gradually reducing the size, role and profile of the ICASS force contribution.

This process will be guided by reviews of tasks, environment, threat, risks, follow-on forces and Host Nation (HN) capacities as part of a Transition and Exit Strategy that is linked to the achievement of the Desired Military Strategic End State.

d. CJTF Center of Gravity. The operational center of gravity is assessed as the CJTF offensive air capability which allows CJTF Forces to achieve air superiority over the CFLCC AO and degrade Arianian forces to the required level.

e. Operational Objectives. With the support and agreement of the international community, ICASS has undertaken to end the crisis in AP by deploying a combined joint task force to AP and GO to repel Arianian invading forces and restore Atropian territorial sovereignty.

The force, hereafter referred to as the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation IRON GUARDIAN (CJTF-OIG), will deploy under the authority of UNSCR 7752 (ref E). The objectives of this military intervention are as follows:

(1) Establish military superiority in the maritime and air space within the JOA in a manner which supports decisive operations.

(2) Establish and enforce an arms and economic embargo through Maritime Interdiction Zone (MIZ) and No Fly Zone (NFZ).

(3) Conduct decisive military operations which lead to the restoration of Atropian sovereignty; stabilize the region; and deter further external aggression against AP. Coalition military operations will not encompass the landmass and airspace of the disputed Lower Janga.

(4) Assist humanitarian assistance efforts and IO/NGO activities in AP.

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(5) Assist the government of AP to re-establish and maintain a safe and secure environment to facilitate the continuance of democratic government institutions and programmes.

(6) Support the reconstitution of Atropian Armed Forces (AAF).

(7) Support any applicable International Criminal Court (ICC) investigations of crimes against humanity through the preservation and collection of evidence.

f. Desired Operational End State. The Desired End State remains the establishment of a sufficiently secure and stable environment in AP and improved capability of Atropian security forces such that state-sponsored hostilities have ceased, territorial borders are secure, humanitarian assistance programs operate unhindered and transition to a UN-sanctioned and/or HN follow-on security force is complete.

A safe and secure environment in AP exists when:

(1) It allows IOs and NGOs safe and unrestricted access to the entire Atropian population.

(2) It encourages the return of IDPs and refugees.

(3) It fosters the rapid re-establishment of representative government institutions.

(4) It allows economic reconstruction and development.

g. Limitations.

(1) Constraints. In conducting its operations, CJTF-OIG will:

(a) Minimize the use of scarce Atropian and Gorgan resources.

(b) Minimize collateral damage and civilian casualties in AP.

(c) Deploy to the JOA as soon possible in a sequence coordinated by this headquarters.

(d) Work closely with the ICASS to facilitate the work of UN agencies, IOs and NGOs.

(e) Minimize the demand on Atropian resources.

(f) Operate in accordance with the SOFAs with AP, GO and TU (refs F and G).

(2) Restraints. In conducting its operations, CJTF-IOG will not:

(a) Disrupt the use of civilian air routes in and out of GO, TU and LM.

(b) Plan, deploy or employ coalition land forces within the landmass of Lower Janga.

(c) Adversely effect the Atropian and Gorgan economies.

(d) Disrupt maritime traffic in the Black Sea west of EASTINGS XXXXXX.

h. Operational Areas.

(1) JOA. The JOA includes the landmasses, national air space and territorial waters of AP (less the province/region of Lower Janga), GO, AN, and TU,

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and the waters and associated airspaces of the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas east of 24 degrees longitude, the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea south of 41 degrees 51.5 minutes north latitude,

the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea north of 22 degrees 30 minutes north latitude, less the territorial waters and national air spaces of bordering sovereign nations.

- (2) CFLCC Area of Operations (AO). The CFLCC AO is comprised of the landmass, airspace and territorial waters (12NM) of AP less Lower Janga.
- (3) Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) AO. The ESC AO is comprised of the landmass of GO.

i. Threat Assessment.

- (1) General. The Caucasus Region has a long history of warfare, ethnic and religious factionalism and general political, military and civil unrest. Outside actors like the US, the European Union (EU), and Middle East nations have increasing strategic interests in the region. China and Japan have financial involvement with Caspian energy projects but have no military interests in the region at this stage.

Oil and gas resources drive the region's economy. International commerce centers on oil extraction and refining, and development of an energy transportation corridor that serves as an outlet for hydrocarbon resources from both the Caucasus region and the Central Asian countries. AN, AP, and DV possess significant oil and gas reserves while GO provides pipeline access required to ship abroad.

The LM conflict with AP over the Lower Janga region and historic disputes preclude its feasibility as a transshipment hub. The Caucasus thus represents a flashpoint where highly localized conflict can spill over into widespread unrest or general war. A shift in the regional power balance from AN towards AP could provide the catalyst for regional instability.

- (2) Country of AP. AP is a pro-western, secular, majority Shia, oligarchy closely aligned with GO. It perceives potential threats on three fronts from AN, DV and LM, who may covet AP's oil and gas resources and intend to prevent its rise as a viable commercial competitor.

AP has recently signed an oil and gas agreement with DV, improving relations and prospects for future economic future stability. AP's relationship with neighbour LM is historically complicated. LM's occupation of the Atropian Lower Janga province is a sore point; however, the two nations have signed a cease-fire and a peace and reconciliation agreement, significantly reducing tensions on this point for the present.

AP's relations with AN are poor on historical, ethnic and religious lines and there exists an unresolved dispute with AN over ownership of oil and gas resources in the Caspian Sea. AP has endemic corruption issues, limited industrial capacity and a limited but improving military capability. Its economy is heavily dependent on oil and gas extraction and shipment; AP aspires to be a regional

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energy hub, improving ties with its neighboring countries in region and making the most of its oil and gas to advance its prosperity.

- (3) Country of AN. AN is an anti-western, Shia theocracy mired in pervasive corruption. It has poor relations with AP due to a longstanding historical conflict along ethnic and religious lines. AN's covert support for insurgency activities in AP's Lower Janga and in areas in which the South Atropian People's Army (SAPA) operates is an ongoing source of tension.

Its economic fortunes have recently declined despite significant oil and gas reserves in the south-west. AN aspires to spread its vision of Islamic governance, establishing and restoring an Arianian hegemony, partly by exploiting the Shia schism with AP. There is an unresolved dispute with AP over offshore oil and gas in the Caspian Sea.

AN is disturbed by the recent improvements in AP's relationships with LM and DV, seeing it as risking loss of its traditional allies and increasing its economic isolation. AN maintains a nuclear weapons program, hoping to produce weapons in three to five years despite a UN sanctions regime.

AN is preoccupied with its loss of influence as a regional power and its increasing isolation as neighbors become more independent economically and more friendly towards AP.

- (4) See Annex B, as well as the Country Studies at References j to l inclusive for more detail.

j. Friendly Forces. CJTF-OIG will operate within the established JOA and will be led by the US. CJTF-OIG consists of a HQ, CFMCC, CFLCC, CFACC, CJFSOCC, and ESC. Troop contributing nations currently include Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, United Kingdom and the United States.

Other like-minded nations may contribute forces or provide materiel support at a future date. As Lead Nation, the United States will provide critical force enablers. The US will partner with HN, GO and AP in the provision of strategic-level support such as intelligence and logistics. The composition of CJTF-OIG is as follows:

(1) HQ.

- (a) Commander, General, XXXXXXXXXX, (United States).
- (b) Deputy Commander (Operations), Lieutenant-General XXXXXXXXXXXX (AP).
- (c) International staff.
- (d) XXX Signals Battalion (US).
- (e) 310 ESC. Brigadier-General XXXXXXXXXX, reporting to 21 Theatre Support Command (TSC).
- (f) 416 Engineer Command (416 ENCOM). Brigadier-General XXXXXXXXXX, reporting to 21 TSC.
- (g) Commander 1 MED BDE, Colonel XXXXXXX, reporting to Army Medical Command (AMC).

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(2) Combined Forces Maritime Component Command (MCC).

- (a) United States – Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC) (TBN) and HQ;
two (2) Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) (each consisting of one aircraft carrier, one cruiser, three destroyers, four Mine Counter Mine (MCM) vessels, two replenishment ships, and two nuclear attack submarines;
and two (2) Expeditionary Strike Groups, each consisting of an Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA), Dock Landing Ship (LSD), Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD) and a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), with associated fixed and rotary wing aircraft and a replenishment ship.
- (b) Canada – Three frigates (one configured for C2) each with one helicopter; one replenishment ship; one submarine; and two Enhanced Naval Boarding Parties with their special boats.
- (c) Australia/New Zealand/United Kingdom – Five frigates; one replenishment ship; two attack submarines and four MCM ships.

(3) Combined Forces Land Component Command.

- (a) United States – Land Component Commander (TBN) and staff CFLCC HQ, 82nd Airborne Division complete, 1 Infantry Division complete, 4 MND, and corps enablers.
- (b) United Kingdom – 12 Armoured Infantry Brigade, division artillery HQ, and field artillery regiment.
- (c) Canada – 2nd Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, 4 General Support Regiment, squadron 4 Engineer Support Regiment, and expeditionary aviation wing(-).
- (d) Australia/New Zealand – HQ 1st Australian Division, divisional Force Protection battalion, HQ Force Support Group, Divisional Signals Battalion, Role 2 Enhanced Field Hospital, Military Police Battalion, and a composite ANZAC brigade.
- (e) France/Germany – Franco-German Brigade and reconnaissance battalion (GE).

(4) Combined Forces Air Component Command.

- (a) United States – Air Component Commander (TBN) and HQ, 12x A-10C; 3 x RC-135V/W Rivet Joint, 5X E3 AWACS, 11x KC10/135, 8x EA-18G Prowlers, 24x F-18E/F, 12xF-16CM, 12XF-22, 6xC-130J, 6x RQ-4 Global Hawk, 4x HH-60 CSAR, 15xHH-60 MEDEVAC, 555 and 560 RED HORSE Squadrons.
- (b) United Kingdom – 12x Tornado GR4, 12x Typhoon FGR4, 8x HC-2(147), 4x MQ9 Reaper, and 4x WK450 (Watch keeper) (MRUAV).

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- (c) Canada - 2x CC150T, 8x CF-188, 4xCC-130J, 4x CP-140, 8X CH-146, 4x CH-147, and three CH-124. Although declared assets, the CH-146 and CH-147 helicopters will remain OPCON to 2nd Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group throughout. Similarly, the CH-148 helicopters will remain OPCON to the Royal Canadian Navy.
- (d) Australia/New Zealand - 10x F/A-18, 6xEA-18G, 8x MRH90 helicopters, 8x ARH, 3x CH47J, and 4 x C-130J.
 - (e) France – 12 x Rafale C and 3 x KC-135.
 - (f) Germany -15 x NH90 MEDEVAC.
- (5) Combined Joint Forces Special Operations Forces Component.
 - (a) United States – a Special Operations Component Commander (TBN) and HQ, a Special Operations Task Force (SOTF), a Naval Special Warfare Task Group (NSWTG), and a Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC).
 - (b) Canada – a SOTF.
 - (c) Australia/New Zealand –a SOTF.
- (6) Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC).
 - (a) United States - 310 ESC, 18 EN BDE, 15 Sust BDE, 230 Sust BDE, and 49 Mvt Ctl Bn 18 MP Bn, 1 Sust BDE, 4 Sust BDE, 82 Sust BDE.
 - (b) United Kingdom- NSE (undeclared but under coordinating authority of 310 ESC).
 - (c) Canada- Joint Task Force Support Component- Sustain (undeclared but under coordinating authority of 310 ESC).
 - (d) Australia- NSE (undeclared but under coordinating authority of 310 ESC).
 - (e) France- NSE (undeclared but under coordinating authority of 310 ESC).
 - (f) Germany- NSE (undeclared but under coordinating authority of 310 ESC).
 - (g) New Zealand. NSE (undeclared but under coordinating authority of 310 ESC)
- (7) Combined Forces Medical Command.
 - (a) United States – 1 (MED BDE), 31 Combat Support Hospital (CSH), and 21 CSH.
 - (b) Germany- Field Hospital Regiment 41.
- k. International Organizations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Some IOs and NGOs are currently operating in AP. Their presence is expected to increase dramatically once a more secure operating environment is created. See Annex W for further details.
- l. National Command Elements (NCE). Each troop-contributing nation (TCN) may deploy an NCE to manage national command issues. All NCEs will remain undeclared but it is anticipated that they will collocate with HQ CJTF-OIG, in terrain to be allocated by this HQ.

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m. NSEs. Each TCN may deploy an NSE or equivalent capability. The headquarters of those elements will be located in the area of Tbilisi, collocated with the HQ of 310 ESC. 310 ESC will retain coordinating authority over all NSEs.

n. Reserves. Each TCN has been requested to be prepared to consider requests for additional forces should the need arise. Specific forces have not been earmarked and the deployment time is estimated at 90-120 days.

o. GO. GO has agreed to act as the HN to support the deployment and staging of CJTF-OIG.

p. Rotation of Forces. The timeframe for OIG is situation dependent. The initial operating mandate provided by the UN is of 12 months duration, with extensions as required. The initial force deployment is to be for **XX** months. TCNs may plan for the rotation of forces after that period of time.

2. **Mission**. CJTF-OIG is to conduct military operations to expel all AN forces from Atropian sovereign territory in order to create conditions for the re-establishment of a safe and secure environment in AP and the surrounding region.

3. **Execution**.

a. Commander's Analysis. The people of AP have been subjected to political and military intimidation from AN for some months, culminating with the invasion of Atropian territory by Arianian forces in **XXXXXX (month/year)**.

The international community has shown resolve through its willingness to deploy combat forces to repel Arianian aggression. CJTF-OIG must act with similar resolve; the economic and political stability of the region will be directly affected by our collective actions.

Subordinate commanders at all levels must be alert to these factors in the conduct of all of their operations, particularly as we transition from combat operations.

Having said this, CJTF-OIG must act in a manner which permits the rapid return to a stable economic environment, with minimal negative impact on the strategic infrastructure of AP.

b. Commander's Intent. Capacity building of the AAF commenced with the encouragement of UNSCR 7730 a number of months ago.

As Arianian aggression increased, the ICASS through UNSCR 7739 agreed to the establishment of the AP Security and Assistance Mission (ASAM) which subsequently resulted in the deployment of a deterrent force (based on 82 ABN DIV and maritime/air assets) and establishment of a Maritime Interdiction Zone (MIZ) and a No-Fly Zone (NFZ).

That deterrent force, with the AAF, will continue to conduct defensive operations against the Arianian invasion in order to allow CJTF-OIG to deploy. CJTF-OIG will now complete its deployment with a robust, well-trained and equipped force capable of conducting decisive operations throughout the spectrum of conflict.

Our operations will be in three Phases: deployment and defensive operations; decisive offensive operations; and redeployment (concurrent with a handover of responsibilities to a follow-on force).

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During all Phases CJTF-OIG will be prepared to use appropriate force as required, but applied with precision and being cognizant of the need to reduce collateral damage.

Phase I will consist of defensive operations, continued deterrence operations and movement into the JOA. This will further demonstrate our capabilities and resolve, thereby giving pause to the Arianian regime.

If Arianian forces do not withdraw, Phase II operations will utilize the full strength of our forces to swiftly and decisively degrade Arianian military forces and repel those forces from AP.

In Phase III our forces will be repositioned in a manner which fosters a safe, secure and stable environment for AP. The end state is a smooth transfer of CJTF-OIG responsibilities to a designated follow-on force, with OIG forces returned to national control.

c. Main Effort. The main effort is the restoration of Atropian territorial sovereignty to a peaceful and stable environment.

d. Concept of Operations. OIG will be conducted in three phases as follows:

(1) Phase I – Deployment and Defensive Operations.

- (a) 82 ABN DIV and AAF continue to conduct defensive operations against the Arianian invasion. Maritime and air assets support that defence, including continuation of the MIZ (the NFZ is superseded by the larger air campaign).
- (b) Establish Sea Port of Debarkation (SPOD) at Poti, GO and Air Port of Debarkation (APOD) at Tbilisi, GO. Prepare for reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSO&I) activities.
- (c) Establish a Theater Logistics Base in GO under direction of the 310 ESC. which will co-ordinate the sustainment support among participating nations, component commands, HN and non-military organizations at the operational level.
- (d) Establish Role 3 Health Service Support (HSS) capability.
- (e) When RSO&I capabilities are in place, component forces deploy into the JOA.
- (f) On declaration of CFACC HQ OPRED, it assumes OPCON over Atropian Air Force assets becoming the de facto ACC of the Atropian Supreme High Command.
- (g) The CFMCC will broaden its MIO capacity as TCNs deploy their declared assets.
- (h) CJTF-OIG will establish its HQ at Tbilisi by G+45 and once CFLCC declares OPRED, TOA will occur to allow OPCON of all AAF and coalition forces.

(2) Phase II – Decisive Offensive Operations.

- (a) Establish favorable conditions for counter-offensive operations by CJTF-OIG.
- (b) Degrade Arianian strategic and long-range air, air defence, missile and maritime capabilities to 60 percent effectiveness.

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- (c) Degrade Arianian first echelon land Division Tactical Groups (DTGs) of 2nd Operation Support Command (OSC) to 60 percent.
 - (d) CFACC to establish local air superiority and support CFLCC operations.
 - (e) CFMCC to neutralize the Arianian Navy in support CJTF operations.
 - (f) Conduct counter- move operations with land forces to repel remaining Arianian forces from AP and restore the Atropian sovereignty.
 - (g) Enforce a cessation of hostilities between all parties.
 - (h) Support the re-establishment of a safe and secure environment in AP.
- (3) Phase III - Redeployment. Conduct a relief in place to a follow-on force (UN and/or Atropian) and to withdraw CJTF-OIG forces to locations directed by TCNs.
- e. A graphical representation of the Concept of Operations is provided in Annex A.
- f. Limitations.
 - (1) Restraints. No change from para 1.g.
 - (2) Constraints. Defensive ROE will be in place prior to deployment and into AP/GO. Revert to Combat /Offensive ROE on order.
- g. Common Tasks.
 - (1) During all phases ensure the security of coalition air, sea and land lines of communication.
 - (2) Support the Atropian government and established IO/NGOs in their ongoing humanitarian efforts while remaining cognizant of the need to create and maintain a safe and secure environment.
- h. Specific Tasks.
 - (1) CFMCC.
 - (a) Continue MIZ operations to enforce UNSCR 7739.
 - (b) Coordinate the deployment of maritime forces into the JOA.
 - (c) Provide maritime force protection for deploying forces and sustainment shipping.
 - (d) Continue deterrent operations (Phase I).
 - (e) Be prepared to (BPT) neutralize the Arianian navy with a priority on sub-surface platforms (Phase II).
 - (f) Participate in Joint Targeting in Phases I and II.
 - (g) BPT support SOF operations throughout all phases.
 - (h) Support, in priority, SOF, land and maritime operations in Phase II. BPT conduct littoral operations in support of ground forces (Phase II).
 - (2) CFLCC.
 - (a) Coordinate with HQ CJTF-OIG and 310 ESC the deployment of subordinate land forces into AP.

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- (b) BPT support defensive land operations being conducted by AAF/82 ABN DIV (Phase I).
 - (c) (Participate in Joint Targeting in Phases I and II.
 - (d) BPT conduct counter offensive operations to expel Arianian forces from AP, taking OPCON AAF land forces (less SOF) and 82 ABN DIV.
 - (e) Once Atropian territorial sovereignty has been restored, establish stability and security within your Area of Operations (AO).
 - (f) BPT neutralize armed factions opposing the establishment of stability and security throughout your AO.
 - (g) Facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid.
 - (h) BPT support SOF operations in all phases.
- (3) CFACC.
- (a) Continue to support Atropian Air Force defensive operations (with deterrent force early deployers).
 - (b) Coordinate the deployment of air forces to the region to include the establishment of the CAOC (initially) and HQ CFACC in TU and assume the role of Designated Airspace Control Authority.
 - (c) On declaration of your HQ OPRED, assume OPCON over Atropian Air Force assets, becoming the de facto ACC of the Atropian Supreme High Command. On declaration HQ CJTF-OIG OPRED, TOA back to coalition as CFACC.
 - (d) Achieve air superiority over the CFLCC AO to set the conditions for decisive land operations.
 - (e) Support decisive counter-offensive operations in priority land, SOF and maritime forces.
- (4) CJFSOCC. Tasks to be issued separately.
- (5) 416 ENCOM.
- (a) Coordinate combat engineering and general engineering support for CJTF-OIG.
 - (b) Provide geospatial support for CJTF-OIG.
 - (c) Operate the CJTF-OIG Explosive Hazard Coordination Center.
 - (d) Coordinate engineer project planning, contract construction, real estate acquisition, environment and infrastructure support for CJTF-OIG.
 - (e) Coordinate HN engineer support.
 - (f) Be prepared to assist Atropian and GO authorities with the repair of critical infrastructure that impacts CJTF-OIG operations.
 - (g) Be prepared to coordinate engineer support to create a safe environment in AP.

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(6) 310 ESC.

- (a) Establish APOD and SPOD in GO to facilitate the deployment of CJTF-OIG elements.
- (b) Negotiate and arrange for HN and HN Contracting Support for CJTF-OIG in GO and AP.
- (c) Coordinate the deployment of CJTF-OIG into the JOA.
- (d) Conduct RSOM for CJTF-OIG elements deploying into GO and AP.
- (e) Conduct ongoing sustainment operations for all phases.
- (f) Coordinate support requirements with all component commands.

(7) 1 MED BDE.

- (a) Manage the deployment of Role 3 medical facilities into GO and AP.
- (b) Negotiate and arrange for additional HN medical support from GO.
- (c) Conduct ongoing medical support for CJTF-OIG for all phases.
- (d) Coordinate medical support requirements for all component commands.

i. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Timings.

- (a) APOD and SPOD established – by XXXXXX.
- (b) Theatre Support Area established in GO – by XXXXXX.
- (c) G Day- main body deployment for OIG begins.
- (d) CFACC establishes air superiority over CFLCC AO – by XXXXXX.
- (e) Phase II operations to commence not before XXXXXX.
- (f) D Day- commencement of Phase II decisive operations.
- (g) R Day – Redeployment of OIG forces begins.

(2) Transfer of Authority.

- (a) AAF. AP's SHC will continue to command defensive operations until declaration of CJTF-OIG OPRED (most probably coincident with CFLCC OPRED). At that time, AAF maritime, land and air combat forces will TOA OPCON to CJTF-OIG for Phase II decisive operations.
- (b) CFACC. On declaration of CFACC HQ OPRED, it will assume ACC responsibilities for the Atropian Supreme High Command with OPCON of both deterrent early deployed US assets and Atropian Air Force aircraft. When HQ CJTF-OIG is declared OPRED, CFACC will revert back to the CJTF.

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- (c) Troop Contributing Nations. TCNs will deploy forces to the JOA under national command arrangements but in coordination with 49 Mvt Ctl BN staff and the respective component command. On arrival in the JOA and declared OPRED by respective National Commanders maritime, land, air and SOF forces will be transferred OPCON to CJTF-OIG and subsequently to their component commands
 - (d) Sustainment Forces. Undeclared Combat Service Support resources that are not transferred OPCON as part of the combat force will be transferred TACON to COM 310 ESC for space allocation, movement control, local defense and coordination. NSEs will remain under national command while deployed in GO but 310 ESC will have coordinating authority over NSE.

NSE elements deploying into AP will be transferred TACON to COM CFLCC. All elements of 310 ESC deploying into AP will be similarly transferred TACON to COM CFLCC.
- (3) EPWs and Captured Persons (CPERS). Handling and disposition of EPWs and CPERS will be in accordance with Appx 1 to Anx R. The US has agreed to be Lead Nation on the handling and disposition of EPW and CPERS.
- (a) National Responsibilities on EPW/CPERS. For reasons of National sensitivity and ownership of processes relating to EPW/CPERS, all Coalition personnel will respect their own national procedures following guidelines in accordance with the Geneva Convention:
 - (b) Custody of EPW/CPERS. EPW/CPERS operations are a National responsibility. As such, it is imperative that all persons detained by Coalition personnel remain in the care and custody of authorized personnel only. It is understood that operational requirements may force acceptance of EPW/CPERS from, or transfer to, other Allied nations of the Coalition. This shall be the exception and not the norm. Should such circumstance become necessary, only the respective National Commander or his designated representative can authorize the acceptance or transfer of an EPW/CPERS to or from another nation.
 - (c) Treatment. EPW and CPERS are to be treated in accordance with all accepted international laws and conventions.
 - (d) Transfer or Release. Although tactical situations may oblige commanders to detain persons during the conduct of operations, it is the responsibility of National Commanders at all levels to determine who will be categorized as a CPERS and immediately field release all others. Once a determination has been made to further retain the detained person and an EPW/CPERS number has been assigned, only the National Commander of the capturing nation has the authority to release or transfer EPW/CPERS to other nations. For the specific purpose of an individual clearly detained as an EPW, there is no requirement to determine status upon capture, as EPW are captured enemy combatants and remain in detention for the duration of hostilities. The detaining power has an obligation to make a determination of EPW versus other CPERS status as soon as practical after capture.

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- (e) EPW and CPERS Reporting. In accordance with national directives, all EPW or CPERS in Coalition custody shall be reported via official means by using an EPW/CPERS Capture Report.
- (f) EPW/CPERS Holding Facilities. All subordinate temporary holding facilities shall be identified and reported to the CJTF-OIG PM. Holding facilities are considered to be semi-permanent facilities used to process EPW or CPERS and include formation and unit level Holding Areas and Collection Points. The following facilities will also be established:
 - i. CJTF-OIG EPW/CPERS Theatre Detention Facilities. The US will establish an EPW/CPERS Theatre Detention Facility (TDF) at Marneuli, GO (for EPW/CPERS captured in the territory of GO or international waters or EPW requiring surgical intervention), and another in Gazakh, AP for EPW/CPERS captured in the territory of AP. The TDF will be constituted to accept the transfer of EPW/CPERS from other nations as required and permitted by their national policies.
 - ii. National Collection Points/Holding Areas. These facilities will be established to facilitate the rearward passage of PW/CPERS in custody of the various nations. Nations will advise CJTF-OIG of their respective locations. Nations will keep CPERS at collection points and holding areas only as long as circumstances require based on security/operational conditions, national policies and available transportation.

(4) Reports and Returns. The Battle Rhythm schedule for Reports and Returns are to be published once the CJTFHQ has declared OPRED.

4. Sustainment.

a. Outline Concept.

- (1) Sustainment support to CJTF-OIG is to be coordinated and led by 310 ESC. While TCNs retain overall responsibility for the sustainment of national formations and units, 310 ESC retains coordinating authority.
- (2) 310 ESC is to establish a Theater Support Area (TSA) within GO in order to execute sustainment operations and will project sustainment facilities, potentially including a Forward Theater Support Area (FTSA) into AP as required. Area support will be provided by 230 Sust BDE for the rear area (GO – ESC AO)) while 15 Sust BDE provides support to the forward area (AP – CFLCC AO). Division level support will be provided by integral sustainment brigades (1 Sust BDE, 17 Sust BDE (4 MN Div), and 82 Sust BDE).
- (3) TCN should aim to establish in-theater op-stocks sufficient for 30 days, by the completion of Phase I (Deployment and Defensive Operations). US will act as lead nation for fuel and water.
- (4) Component command logistic staffs are responsible for their own logistics plans and co-ordination.

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b. Movements. 49 Mvt Ctl BN is to coordinate all deployments into GO on behalf of 310 ESC. Staging areas will be established in GO to facilitate RSOM. Movement forward into AP will be coordinated by CFLCC HQ.

c. Medical Support. Medical and health support to CJTF-OIG is to be coordinated and led by 1 MED BDE. While TCN retain overall responsibility for the medical support of their troops, economies of effort will be achieved through the coordination provided by 1 MED BDE, who is to have coordinating authority for medical matters:

- (1) TCN formations will deploy with integral HSS capabilities for Role 1 and 2 treatment, to include surgical capability.
- (2) Role 3 medical support will be provided on an area support basis with the deployment of 31 and 21 CSH, and Field Hospital Regiment 41(GE) (in reserve) which will be determined and coordinated by Commander 1 MED BDE.

d. HN Support. The HNS Agreements with both GO and AP will be brokered, developed, and administered by the US for all elements of the CJTF-OIG, regardless of their nation of origin. Implementation will be carried out through the 310 ESC ACOS Support Operations (SPO).

e. Military Police. MP are to be force generated to support national and coalition operations as independently formed MP Units or as Coalition MP Units. Guidance and direction on the conduct of MP operations, their limitations and employment is contained in NATO STANAG 2226. MP are to be responsible for the following activities:

- (1) Policing.
- (2) Security.
- (3) Detention.
- (4) Support to Stability Operations.
- (5) Support to Mobility.
- (6) Support to Tactical Operations.

f. General Engineer Support. 416 ENCOM is to set CJTF-OIG policy, standards, and is to coordinate all theatre-level general engineer support to include horizontal and vertical construction, real property and lease agreements, engineering contracts, force protection engineering, environmental engineering, and fire services.

18 Engineer Brigade (EN BDE) 310 ESC contains specialist engineer elements, and is to execute theatre-level engineer activities.

Geospatial support is to be provided by 70 EN CO (Topo).

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5. Command and Signal.

a. Command.

- (1) COM CJTF-OIG –General XXXXXX (US).
- (2) Deputy Commander (Ops) – Lieutenant-General XXXXXX (AP).
- (3) COM CFMCC – Vice -Admiral XXXXXX (US).
- (4) COM CFLCC- Lieutenant-General XXXXXX (US).
- (5) COM CFACC – Lieutenant-General XXXXXX (US).
- (6) COM CJFSOCC– Brigadier-General XXXXXX (US).
- (7) COM 416 ENCOM - Brigadier-General XXXXXX (US).
- (8) COM 310 ESC - Brigadier-General XXXXXX (US).
- (9) COM 1 MED BDE - Colonel XXXXXX (US).

b. Headquarters Locations. (see C2 overlay)

- (1) HQ CJTF-OIG will be established at Tbilisi, GO by G+45.
- (2) HQ CFMCC will establish ashore at XXXXXX by XXXXXX.
- (3) HQ CFLCC will establish at XXXXXXXX by XXXXXXXX.
- (4) HQ CFACC will establish at Incirlik, TU by XXXXXXXX.
- (5) HQ 416 ENCOM will establish at Tbilisi, GO by XXXXXX.
- (6) HQ 310 ESC will establish at Tbilisi, GO by XXXXXX.

c. Communication and Information Systems (CIS). Effective C2 of CJTF-OIG will be highly dependent upon the flexible and interoperable CIS between Components and contributing nations.

(1) CJTF-OIG Sig BN is to:

- (a) Establish force level CIS down to Component HQs, including the management of network interface gateways.
 - (b) Coordinate theatre-wide CIS plans.
 - (c) Perform theatre spectrum management.
- (2) CJTF-OIG CIS will provide secure voice, VTC and Coalition WAN (based on NATO-CENTRIXS) to provide secure email, chat and other C3 tools down to Naval Task Group/Bde/Wing level. Requests for extension of coalition CIS in support of national, component or other requirements will be coordinated through the CJTF-OIG CJ6 and funded as appropriate.
- (3) Component commands are to provide the primary CIS and command support within respective (U) Component HQs.
- (4) Use of HN communication infrastructure to supplement military networks are to be coordinated by HQ CJTF-OIG CJ6, but contracted independently by TCN.

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(5) TCN are responsible for national CIS communications to NCEs and NSEs, and within national contingents.

(6) Network Operations.

(a) Defensive Measures. CJTF-OIG networks are targets for Computer Network Attack (CNA) by enemy seeking to sabotage or exploit coalition information or services. The primary vulnerabilities are through gateways with external systems and inadvertent transfer of viruses from open systems. All contributing nations are responsible for effective COMSEC and Computer Network Defence (CND) on all national networks and systems; these measures are vital for effective C2 and the maintenance of information dominance. CJTF-OIG CJ6 is responsible for the coordination of defensive measures and COMSEC for all CJTF-OIG systems through the Network Operations Center located with HQ CJTF-OIG (deployed).

(b) Offensive Measures Offensive network operations or Computer Network Attack (CNA) will not be conducted by coalition partners against adversary networks without approval of COM CJTF-OIG.

ACKNOWLEDGE:

Commander's last name

Commander's rank

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Authenticator's Name

Authenticator's Position

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
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ANNEXES:


Annex A	Conduct of Operations
Annex B	Intelligence
Annex C	Task Organization and Command Relationships
Annex D	Spare
Annex E	Rules of Engagement
Annex F	Maritime Operations
Annex G	Land Operations
Annex H	Air Operations
Annex I	Amphibious Operations (omitted)
Annex J	Force Protection (omitted)
Annex K	Medical Services
Annex L	Military Information Support Operations
Annex M	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense
Annex N	Nuclear Operations (omitted)
Annex O	Information Operations
Annex P	Electronic Warfare
Annex Q	Communications and Information Systems
Annex R	Logistics
Annex S	Movements
Annex T	Environmental Support (omitted)
Annex U	Spare
Annex V	Spare
Annex W	Civil Military Affairs
Annex X	Public Affairs
Annex Y	Casualty Estimation (omitted)
Annex Z	Spare
Annex AA	Legal (omitted)
Annex BB	Training and Exercises (omitted)
Annex CC	Documentation, Records and Reports (omitted)
Annex DD	Space Operations
Annex EE	Engineering Support
Annex FF	Financial Support (omitted)
Annex GG	Spare
Annex HH	Targeting
Annex ZZ	Distribution (omitted)

Annex A to CJTF-OIG OPORD 01 OP IRON GUARDIAN CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS


Phase 1 – Deployment and Defensive Operations



Phase 2 – Decisive Offensive Operations



Phase 3 – Redeployment



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ANNEX B TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

**ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)
CJTF-OIG**

References:

- (a) Joint Pub 2-0, 22 June 2007, Joint Intelligence
- (b) Joint Pub 2-01.5 January 2002, “Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations
- (c) Joint Pub 2-01.3, 16 June 2009, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace.
- (d) JP 5-0 11 August 2011 “Joint Operation Planning
- (e) DIAM 57-5
- (f) DIAM 57-5-1
- (g) DIAM 57-5-4
- (h) Decisive Action Training Environment version 2.2 April 2015
- (i) TC 7-100 Hybrid Threat September 2010
- (j) FM 7-100-1 Opposing Force Operations December 2004
- (k) TC 7-100.2 Opposing Force Tactics December 2011
- (l) TC 7-100.3 Irregular Opposing Forces January 2015
- (m) TC 7-100.4 Hybrid Threat Force Structure Organization Guide June 2015
- (n) Worldwide Equipment Guide TRADOC DCSINT Threat Support Directorate

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu.

1. Situation

a. Characteristics of the Operational Environment (OE).

(1) Refer to Base Plan para. 1. Situation.

b. Enemy.

(1) Under the stated aim of “liberating ethnic Arianians from the oppressive governance of the despotic Atropian regime”, Ariana (AN) invaded Atropia (AP) with the AN Armed Forces crossing the AP border on (insert date). Ground operations were preceded by a phased attack by the AN Air Force (ANAF).

The first phase focused on offensive counter-air operations that successfully achieved AN air superiority over southeast AP. Theatre ballistic missile (TBM) strikes targeting AP airfields and surface to air missile (SAM) installations were conducted concurrently as were information warfare attacks targeting AP military and civilian communications networks.

The second phase of the ANAF attack targeted AP air defense installations.

The final phase of the ANAF attack consisted of fighter ground attack targeting AP and US ground forces. Concurrent with this final phase, AN ground forces crossed the international border in three separate areas. In the west, what has subsequently been assessed as a Division Task Group (DTG) based on 23rd (AN) Mechanized Infantry (Mech) Division (Div) crossed the border in the area of Parsabad (38S QJ 5092) and advanced northwest.

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The assessed DTG objectives were the transportation centers of Yevlax (38T PK 8198) and Mingachevir (38T PL 7315).

In the center, what has subsequently been assessed as a DTG based on 25th (AN) Mech Infantry Div (APC), crossed the border in the area of Bilasuvar (39S TD 727619) and advanced towards the Kura River crossing in the area of Ali Bayramli (39S UE 2222).

The assessed objective of this DTG was the critical junction at Kazi Magomed (39T UE 2433).

A tank brigade task group (BTG), believed to be based on 349th (AN) Tank Brigade (Bde), crossed the border in the area of Astara (39S UC 1456) and advanced north towards the Kura River crossing in the area of Salyan (39S UD 2685).

The assessed objective of the 349th (AN) Tank BTG was the Alat (39S UE 6423).

349th (AN) Tank BTG was followed on this route by elements of an AN Motorized Infantry (Mtzd) Div.

After several days of hard fighting the ANAF was unable to retain local air superiority. 82 ABN DIV fought a successful mobile defense and halted the 23rd (AN) Mech DTG in the area of Salmanbayli (38S QK 0228).

The 350th (AP) (Mtzd) Bde, reinforced by elements from 352nd (AP) Tank Bde and 356th (AP) Antitank Bde was able to defeat an initial crossing of the Kura River by 25th (AN) Mech DTG.

AP Special-Purpose Forces (SPF), supported by Coalition air, was successful in denying a crossing attempt by 349th (AN) Tank BTG. The assessed objective of the AN cross-border attack was to isolate Baku and secure the key routes to deny LCC entry into AP. Having been unsuccessful,

AN ground forces have transitioned to defensive operations. 23th (AN) Mech DTG has established a defense centered on Yeni Qaradolag (38S QK 1015) oriented to the northwest.

25th (AN) Mech DTG has established a defense along the Kura River centered on Ali Bayramli (39S UE 2222).

An unidentified Mtzd Div has occupied the southeastern sector of AP.

All of the formations that have crossed the border are part of 3rd Mechanized Infantry Army, normally stationed in northeast AN. This would suggest that an operational-strategic command (OSC) has been formed to conduct cross border operations.

The unidentified (AN) Mtzd Div is likely either 24th or 26th Mtzd Div, also from 3rd Mechanized Infantry Army. There has been no indication of units or formations from 1st Mechanized Infantry Army having crossed into AP at this time.

(2) Overall, the AN Armed Forces are well trained and capable of conducting combined arms and joint operations but are limited to regional power-projection capabilities. AN's military maintains a robust ground force with smaller, agile air and sea force capabilities.

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The latest intelligence assessments indicate AN's military has largely Tier Two capabilities with four separate Army Divisions with Tier One capabilities. The tier two military forces consist of modern competitive military systems from two decades ago, fielded in significant numbers across the military's force structure.

AN recently upgraded equipment and weapon systems to attain select tier one niche capabilities for certain divisional units that are retained directly subordinate to the Supreme High Command (SHC). These tier one divisional units reflect a major military force with fielded state-of-the-art technology that is on par with Coalition capabilities. The SHC consists of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff.

(3) Enemy Strengths

(a) General. AN maintains the second largest military of the five Caucasus countries, only behind Donovia. Militarily, it is a dominant actor within the region, capable of conducting military action across the spectrum of operations. The AN military conducts overt, covert, and clandestine operations with ripple effects across the region. Reporting also suggests ties between elements of AN's military and criminal and terror groups within the region, which further extends the potential for a global threat.

(b) Army. The AN Army is the largest and most influential of the AN Armed Forces. The composition of the Army reflects the great diversity of the geography in which it operates and the AN Armed Forces' notions about the value of tempo in offensive operations.

The Army is equipped with tier one through tier three equipment. The divisions and commands that are directly under the SHC are either equipped with tier one equipment (91st Tank Division, 92nd Mechanized Division, 93rd Artillery Command, and 7th Air Defense Command), or have strategic implications in their employment (96th ABN Division, 94th Missile Command (SSM), 98th Internal Security Command, and the 99th Special-Purpose Forces Command).

The SHC may task organize components of these formations to an Operational-Strategic Command (OSC) or Field Group (FG) or it may assign these units to a general support role in the theater of operations.

The bulk of the Army is comprised of three numbered mechanized infantry armies. These units are generally equipped with tier 2 equipment though some units may have tier 3.

(c) Air Force. The ANAF, is organized around four wings of like aircraft (SU-30, SU-27SM, etc) and eight separate squadrons. Each wing has three squadrons of like aircraft. In past exercises, squadrons from the numbered Air Wings have been task organized to support FGs.

Like the Navy, it is fundamentally a supporting arm, though the ANAF is considered a symbol of national pride. Its existence serves as both a regional threat to its neighbors and vital to the defense of the country against attack from outside powers.

The ANAF has developed a significant regional capability and the AN Armed Forces have adequate air defenses to challenge outside air intervention.

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(d) Navy. The AN Navy may pose a threat to CJTF-OIG forces if air corridors over the Caspian Sea are utilized. The principal threat posed by the AN Navy is to off shore energy platforms and attacks against the AP port of Baku.

(4) Enemy Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities.

(a) Army. The limited number of bridges and suitable crossing sites across the Kura River will canalize the AN ground forces in any further advance into AP.

(b) Air Force: In the event of full-scale combat engagement by modern air forces, the ANAF would not be able to accomplish more than local air parity for a short period of time.

The ANAF ability to project force against AN's neighbors is not only a source of national prestige but represents a significant investment on the part of the National Command Authority (NCA). The AN NCA is unlikely to risk more than a token loss to a superior force. The training and equipment of the ANAF is below the level of CJTF-OIG.

(c) Navy. The AN Caspian Sea Fleet Navy has a limited capability of transporting their Naval Infantry Regiment; they can only transport troops, not equipment. They can be expected to try to employ some of their Naval assets to interdict air corridors into Baku.

(5) Enemy Courses of Action (COAs)

(a) Most Likely Course of Action. The AN Supreme High Command (SHC) uses SPF and leverages Zabzimek and South Ostremek Separatists to disrupt the deployment of CJTF-OIG into and through Gorgas (GO). It will use SPF and South Atropian People's Army (SAPA) insurgents in AP to further disrupt CJTF-OIG and AP Armed Forces deployment and operations within AP.

The SHC will use information warfare to discredit CJTF-OIG and AP Armed Forces, challenge the legitimacy the AP government, tell its "liberation of ethnic Arianians" story and promote its claim to Caspian Sea oil and gas resources. The AN SHC will deploy additional forces into AP to reinforce the 23rd Mech DTG defense and to conduct crossings of the Kura River between Ali Bayramli (39S UE 2222) and Salyan (39S UD 2685) in order to seize the critical junction in the area of Kazi Magomed to isolate Baku.

(b) Most Dangerous Course of Action. The AN SHC uses Special-Purpose Forces (SPF) and leverages Zabzimek and South Ostremek Separatists to disrupt the deployment of CJTF-OIG into and through GO. It will use SPF and SAPA insurgents in AP to further disrupt CJTF-OIG and AP Armed Forces deployment and operations within AP.

The SHC will use information warfare to discredit CJTF-OIG and AP Armed Forces, challenge the legitimacy of the AP government, tell its "liberation of ethnic Arianians" story and promote its claim to Caspian Sea oil and gas resources.

The AN SHC will commit additional forces to breakout from its current defense to seize the transportation centers of Yevlakh (38T PK 8198) and Mingechaur (38T PL 7315) in order to block the entry of CJTF-OIG land forces while isolating Baku.

The SHC will use long range and joint fires to decisively defeat CJTF-OIG land forces between this block and the GO-AP border.

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c. Friendly Forces.

(1) Coalition Intelligence Capability. Coalition intelligence organizations, including those nested within the CJTF will provide all-source intelligence utilizing all possible means, including the establishment of a Multi-National intelligence operations center that will serve as a central all-source intelligence fusion center supporting operations in the JOA.

2. Mission

a. Coalition intelligence is to conduct intelligence operations in order to enable operations against AN and affiliated groups in AP within the JOA.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Intelligence Operations. Coalition intelligence will conduct intelligence support to operations to enhance Indications and Warning (I&W) and situational awareness in the region. Intelligence support will focus along three lines of effort to achieve objectives in AP and regional partner nations. Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) will be modified to support emerging operations and will drive intelligence operations during the execution of this plan.

b. Purpose. Coalition intelligence will support a long term, comprehensive approach. Intelligence assessments must account for and connect all factors within the political, military, economic, social, infrastructural, information, physical environment and time domains (PMESII-PT) - and actors influencing the dynamics in the JOA and Area of Interest (AOI).

The main priorities are to provide threat I&W to Coalition forces and friendly sites, identify and exploit opportunities that achieve optimal results against the enemy, and provide kinetic and non-kinetic targeting information leading to mission success.

c. Method. Coalition intelligence capabilities are to organize and conduct intelligence operations that drive collection, production and analysis, contributions to target development, reporting, and collaboration with partners to provide timely and actionable support to the CJTF while maintaining support to the Coalition's ongoing operations in the JOA.

In order to achieve this, the Coalition intelligence architecture must synchronize and share information that produces comprehensive intelligence assessments. Working with partner nations, the Coalition will employ all intelligence capabilities and provide timely and relevant intelligence in order to support operations.

Three primary intelligence Lines of Effort complement each other and remain constant throughout each phase of the operation.

(1) Intelligence Lines of Effort (LOEs).

(a) Intelligence Line of Effort I – ISR and Collection. This line of effort focuses on collection coordination of Coalition ISR capabilities across the JOA. This LOE seeks to synchronize the collection effort in order to satisfy operational and intelligence requirements and continue to update and refine the operational environment.

LOE I monitors the JOA and AOI for I&W, builds situational awareness, supports targeting operations, and conducts battle damage assessments (BDA).

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(b) Intelligence Line of Effort II – Analysis and Production. This LOE is designed to ensure a common comprehensive understanding of the operational environment and to support kinetic and non-kinetic targeting operations within the JOA.

LOE II focuses on multisource analysis encompassing PMESII-PT that satisfies operational and intelligence requirements.

(c) Intelligence Line of Effort III – Information Sharing. LOE III enables a comprehensive Coalition approach to defeat AN. This LOE seeks to ensure information sharing to the maximum extent possible allowed or in accordance with each partner nation's perspective, national policies and laws. Information sharing is critical to this effort and must be placed within key nodes of Coalition intelligence enterprise.

(2) Intelligence Phasing.

(a) Intelligence Support to CJTF-OIG. Intelligence support to CJTF-OIG to defeat AN is tied to three operational phases. This section will identify the main activities of intelligence support LOEs and integrate them into each respective phase.

1. Phase I - Deployment and Defensive Operations. During this Phase the main effort of intelligence operations will be to support preparation for CJTF counteroffensive operations against AN forces operating in AP, and against their supporting forces within AN. Joint Coalition intelligence organizations will also provide support to kinetic and non-kinetic strikes.

2. Phase II - Decisive Offensive Operations. During this phase the main effort of the intelligence operations shifts to supporting the execution of CJTF counteroffensive operations. In Phase II the intelligence architecture will also be required to support Coalition engagement with key leaders and entities throughout the JOA.

As AN ground forces are expelled from AP territory, the main effort will shift from direct action against invading AN Armed Forces to operations against indigenous hostile forces inside AP.

Despite the main effort shift to supporting indigenous forces, intelligence support will still likely be required to support CJTF-OIG and AP Armed Forces as they hold territory regained from the invading AN Armed Forces.

Intelligence support to targeting, I&W, ISR, and OE refinement will continue throughout this phase as well.

3. Phase III - Redeployment. During this phase, the main effort conducts continuing ISR operations in order to monitor the situation and identify threats towards a safe and secure environment.

(3) Intelligence Tasks.

(a) Common Tasks to Coalition Intelligence Organizations.

1. Allocate resources and funding to support intelligence operations specified in the base plan.

2. Monitor I&W for threats to Coalition partners and partner interests.

3. Develop and refine ISR and I&W process to support mission requirements by phase.

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4. Support Advise and Assist (AA), Build Partner Capacity (BPC), Key Leader Engagements (KLEs), Humanitarian Assistance (HA), and Force Protection as necessary by phase.
 5. Assist the development of CJTF organic intelligence capabilities by phase.
 6. Provide reach-back capability to deployed forces, as necessary.
 7. Produce and disseminate intelligence summaries, Battle Damage Reports, ISR Collection Plan, and ad hoc intelligence products.
 8. Shape allocation and apportionment of theater collection assets to support collection priorities and Campaign Plan objectives.
 9. Establish the necessary intelligence architecture to support Coalition Military Campaign Plan.
 10. Provide and receive Coalition partner liaisons to and from the CJTF.
 11. Enable intelligence training that supports regional partners' actions against enemy threats to include Advise and Assist (AA), Build Partner Capacity (BPC), and engagement (OAAs) missions.
 12. Identify shortfalls to improve existing intelligence organization, architecture and procedures to optimize collaboration and synchronize orientation, collection, rapid fusion, and timely dissemination of intelligence.
 13. Submit and process intelligence requirements throughout the implementation of this plan for intelligence needs and support to planning.
 14. Task and synchronize ISR collection assets to satisfy Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs).
 15. Identify and recommend opportunities for Coalition intelligence exchanges and training to further develop and refine regional partner forces, as needed.
 16. Support kinetic and non-kinetic targeting operations during appropriate phases of this plan.
- (4) Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs).
- (a) What is the threat to CJTF-OIG operations within the JOA?
 - (b) What is the threat to CJTF-OIG land operations within the JOA?
 - (c) What is the threat to CJTF-OIG air operations within the JOA?
 - (d) What is the threat to CJTF-OIG maritime operations within the JOA?
 - (e) What is the threat to CJTF-OIG Lines of Communication, specifically with respect to choke points (Straits of Hormuz, the Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits)?
 - (f) How will AN info-war operations affect the CJTF-OIG?
 - (g) What are the environmental (incl. PMESII) factors that could impact CJTF-OIG operations within the JOA?
 - (h) What is the intent and capacity of AP Armed Forces to provide external and internal security, maintain operational readiness, sustain interoperability with CJTF-OIG forces and defend against AN Armed Forces?

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ANNEX B TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

(i) What are the threats to AP and other authorized citizens, interests and infrastructure?

(j) Where have SAPA and other hostile elements positioned their leaders, C2 facilities, interior lines and concentrations of manpower and supplies?

(k) What is the capacity of AN Armed Forces to include SAPA in AP to sustain their offensive campaign, gain territory and control the population?

(l) What are the intentions of SAPA regarding their opposition to the government of AP and incentives to support and cooperate with CJTF-OIG activities?

(m) What are the intentions of AN Armed Forces with respect to their posturing and potential employment of chemical /biological weapons and the associated impact on CJTF-OIG operations?

(n) (What are the intentions of AP Armed Forces and leadership with respect to own assembly/use of chemical/biological weapons?

(5) Intelligence Activities.

(a) Collection Management (CM). Collection activities will focus on the PIRs and emerging intelligence gaps and will be conducted and deconflicted in accordance with established national policies and procedures, and subsequently published CJTF guidance. Each respective Coalition member will determine an appropriate level of support for its respective theatre collection assets. Wherever possible, Coalition intelligence will participate in collection management working group forums in order to synchronize Coalition and ISR operations.

(b) Analysis and Production (A&P). Coalition intelligence will analyze, produce, and provide current intelligence and assessments in support of PIRs and provide collateral releasable products to other partners as required.

(c) Dissemination and Information Sharing. The Coalition will seek to allow greater sharing of intelligence on a more regular basis; however, disclosure decisions must be in accordance with each partner nation's policies. Safeguarding of information remains a responsibility of each Coalition member in order to prevent unauthorized release.

During Phases 1-3, intelligence dissemination will be conducted through intelligence LNOs geographically located within the Multi-National Intel Operations Center at CJTF-OIG HQ via the agreed C4I architecture.

4. Sustainment.

a. Foreign Disclosure Office is responsible to ensure all US classified and controlled unclassified information released to Coalition members supporting OIG is in accordance with national disclosure policies. Joint intelligence or non-US produced intelligence must be adjudicated by its originators.

b. (Shortfalls and Limiting Factors. Primary shortfalls include intelligence resources needed to protect the force and ground-based collection assets that cannot access the JOA due to operational restrictions.

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ANNEX B TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

5. Command and Signal

a. Communications. Refer to Annex Q to OPORD 01 or detailed communications requirements.

Appendices

- Appendix 1 - Essential Elements of Information (Omitted)
- Appendix 2 - Signals Intelligence (Omitted)
- Appendix 3 - Counterintelligence (Omitted)
- Appendix 4 - Targeting (Omitted)
- Appendix 5 - Human Intelligence (Omitted)
- Appendix 6 - Intelligence Support to C2W (Omitted)
- Appendix 7 - Imagery Intelligence (Omitted)
- Appendix 8 - Measurement and Signature Intelligence (Omitted)
- Appendix 9 - Captured Enemy Equipment (Omitted)
- Appendix 10 - National Intelligence Support Team (Omitted)
- Appendix 11 - Centers of Gravity Analysis (Omitted)
- Appendix 12 - Irregular Threats

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APPENDIX 12 TO ANNEX B TO OPOD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

**APPENDIX 12 (IRREGULAR THREATS) TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO
OPOD 01(OP IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG (UNCLASSIFIED)**

1. Guerrilla / Insurgent Groups in Atropia.

a. Bilasvar Freedom Brigade (BFB). This organization considers itself to be a guerrilla force and is openly supported by the Donovanian government. The BFB constitutes the military wing of the Bilasvar National Freedom Movement (BNFM) and their main objective is to manifest, through violence, the BNFM's political goals and objectives of establishing an autonomous region encompassing northern Vetlia and Erdabil provinces in Atropia and southern Bagdir province in Donovan.

2. Donovanian support is intended to destabilize the Atropian government. It is assessed there are BFB fighters throughout Erdabil Province within every known population center. The BFB is assessed to pose a minimal threat to CJTF-OIG operations unless they encroach upon the BFB's area.

a. South Atropian Peoples' Army (SAPA). SAPA, another major insurgent group, relates culturally to Ariana and wants to create a separate country composed of southern Atropia and Ariana's northwestern provinces that contain an ethnic Atropian majority. The SAPA feels that the South Atropian People's Party (SAPP) carries little weight in the Atropian political system, and reforms to assist the local people show few signs of progress.

The SAPA, while it operates throughout Atropia, focuses on eight provinces in the south due to cultural ties with Ariana. The SAPA operates in three separate major units—Northern, Central, and Southern Commands. The group conducts most of its training in Ariana, where it receives most of its equipment and supplies.

Reports indicate that Arianian SPF or other "advisors" may support the SAPA with logistics and training in the country. SAPA also clashes violently with Salasyl over ideology, limited resources, and similar recruiting pools. SAPA is assessed as being a medium threat to CJTF-OIG operations in southern Atropia.

b. Salasyl (SAL). Salasyl is one of the largest groups within Atropia, second only in size to SAPA. Its center of gravity is in the southeast portion of the country, but the group is fully capable of conducting operations throughout the country, and in reality does so. It is also reported that the group may have ties to transnational criminal and terrorist actors.

The extent and dynamic of the relationship between Salasyl and these transnational actors is unknown at this time. For the last two decades, Salasyl has engaged the current Atropian regime in a low-level insurgency.

Salasyl encourages the local populace to violently oppose the legitimate Atropian government due to state taxation policies, a lack of reliable public services (electrical power, sewage treatment, and potable water), substandard preventive medical services, lack of access to state education programs for working class citizens and a state judicial system that illegally favors the political party currently in control of the government's executive and legislative branches.

Assessments indicate that SAL will initially wait and see if western intervention will have any influence of the Government of Atropia.


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APPENDIX 12 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

The threat from SAL is initially assessed as low. However, this could change to medium should SAL not be satisfied that CJTF-OIG is having a positive influence on the provision of services by the Government of Atropia.

Provisional Army of Lezgin (PAL). The socio-economically disenfranchised Lezgin minority, in southern Erdabil Province, has experienced ever-increasing marginalization by the Government of Atropia. The strengthening militant separatist organization, PAL, seeks to force the Government of Atropia to concede to their demands for semi-autonomy. To achieve this result, the PAL will likely resort to violence.

Of greater concern, the Lezgin fear being forced out of Erdabil Province by the ultra-nationalist Bilasuvars. The result of such fears have already manifested in sporadic violence between BFB and PAL fighters. The threat to CJTF-IOG operations from PAL is assessed as low.



Operating Areas of Insurgent Groups in Atropia

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APPENDIX 12 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

3. Guerrilla / Insurgent Groups in Gorgas.

a. Zabzimek Separatists (ZS). The breakaway republic of Zabzimek maintains a small military force. The Zabzimek military's current numbers are unknown. The Zabzimek ground troops are believed to operate as a battalion-size force and possess tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and artillery pieces. Zabzimek's "navy" operates smaller patrol boats. Zabzimek has also converted fishing vessels into patrol boats, which make up the remainder of its fleet.


b. South Ostremek Separatists (SOS). The breakaway republic of South Ostremek also maintains a small military force, believed to be of battalion size with an unknown number of military personnel, tanks, APCs, and artillery pieces.

c. People's Liberal Republican Martyrs Group (PLRMG) and Falcon Brothers (FB). Two partisan paramilitary groups operate in the vicinity of the Zabzimek-Gorgas border. People's Liberal Republican Martyrs Group and the Falcon Brothers both contain ethnic Gorgans who remained behind in Zabzimek after the civil war.

These two groups conduct low-level guerrilla warfare in an attempt to reunite Zabzimek with Gorgas. Both groups will support any attempts by Gorgas to force Zabzimek back under Gorgan control.

d. Zabzimek Irregular Forces (ZIF). Pro-Zabzimek irregular forces operate freely within Zabzimek and occasionally conduct cross-border operations into Gorgas. These forces coordinate with and receive support from Donovanian and Zabzimek regular and SPF units. Their primary goal is to insure an independent Zabzimek. They regularly harass and intimidate ethnic Gorgan civilians.

e. these small irregular units are capable of conducting disruption, fixing, physical destruction, and RISTA tasks.



Operating Areas of Insurgent Groups in Gorgas

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APPENDIX 12 TO ANNEX B TO OPOD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

4. Criminal Networks in Atropia. Organized crime and its interrelationships in irregular warfare are active throughout the region. Crime is widespread and mostly linked to historical traditions and ancestral allegiances. This distinguishes crime as distinct from ongoing ethnic feuds, ideological and theological extremism, or elements of the society that incite insurgency for particular political expectations is problematic at best. At its worst, this category of violence is enmeshed in the daily lives of most people whether they reside in urban centers or are part of a rural ecosystem.

The region contains criminal organizations such as the Bocyowicz Crime Family, the Atropian Organized Crime (AOC) group, and the Al Iksir Cartel, some of which have developed into sophisticated transnational criminal organizations (TCO) with ambitious economic and political agendas.

The AOC operates primarily in Baku while the Al Iksir Cartel operates in northern Atropia and southern Donovia. The Bocyowicz Crime Family is a third-generation criminal organization with the ability to control ungoverned territory within nation-states, acquire political power in poorly-governed regions, and eventually vie for geographic controlled space.

These political actions are intended to provide security and freedom of movement for the criminal organization's activities. As a result, the third-generation criminal organization and its leadership challenge the legitimate state authority on exercise of political control and use of criminal violence within a given geographical area.

5. Private Security Organizations in Atropia. Some of the foreign companies that help operate the Atropian oil and gas industry hire private security guards to protect the infrastructure.

6. Nonmilitary Armed Combatants in Atropia. The insurgent and guerrilla forces operating in Atropia are generally hostile to US and western involvement in the region. The criminal organizations are predominantly neutral in their view of the Coalition as long as the criminals' economic interests are not compromised. For the most part, the private security organizations that protect the Atropian oil and gas infrastructure are predominately neutral to somewhat friendly, since some of them work for foreign companies.

7. Criminal Networks in Gorgas. A great variety of criminal activity occurs throughout Gorgas. The country serves as a prime transshipment point for drugs from Central Asia and corruption exists, driven in part by organized crime. The Gorgan state apparently lacks the resources to effectively tackle crime, especially in the mountainous northeastern border with the Republic of Failaq in Donovia.

It remains likely that much of the support provided to anti-Donovian elements in Failaq comes from criminal and terrorist organizations that operate in this region. Zabzimek and South Ostremek are also dangerous, and organized crime permeates both areas. In addition, while Gorgas enacted a limited official trade embargo against Limaria in order to placate Atropia and Kalaria, it purposefully turns a blind eye to illegal Gorgan-Limarian cross-border trade.

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APPENDIX 12 TO ANNEX B TO OPOD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)


8. Private Security Organizations in Gorgas. Any company that operates near Zabzimek and South Ostremek hires locals to provide security against attacks by local insurgents. Additionally, companies involved in the maintenance of the oil and gas pipelines across Gorgas hire guards to protect this hydrocarbon infrastructure critical to the country's economy.

9. Non-military Armed Combatants in Gorgas. The insurgent and guerrilla forces that operate primarily in the runaway republics and the adjacent Gorgan areas are predominately hostile to the US and its allies, as they fear a return of Gorgan control to their areas.

The criminal organizations in Gorgas are generally neutral to any western presence in their country as long as it does not interfere with their enterprises. Most private security organizations that provide protection to the hydrocarbon pipelines that cross the country support US and coalition presence in Gorgas.

ANNEX C TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

**ANNEX C (TASK ORGANIZATION) TO OPORD 01(OP IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-
OIG (UNCLASSIFIED)**



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ANNEX E TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

ANNEX E (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG

References:

- (o) MC 362/1 NATO Rules of Engagement (ROE), dated 23 JUL 03
- (p) UN Security Council Resolution 7739 dated XXXXXXXX
- (q) UN Security Council Resolution 7752 dated XXXXXXXX
- (r) ICASS Military Strategic Guidance dated XXXXXXXX

10. General Principles

a. Introduction. In the conduct of military operations, military forces are authorized to use force in self-defense, pursuant to authorized Rules of Engagement (ROE) or under the application of the Law of Armed Conflict. The right to use force in self-defense is universally considered to be an inherent right and is not restricted by ROE.

The United Nations and in particular International Committee for Atropia Sovereignty and Security (ICASS), has issued policy and military guidance on the strategic objectives for operations in Atropia. For the Atropia Security and Assistance Mission (ASAM), given that ICASS is not a standing alliance, it has been decided to adopt NATO principles and procedures in the formulation, issuance and amendment of ROE.

General guidance in relation to NATO ROE, is set out in Ref A.

b. Authority. The authority providing the legal framework for the operation is set out in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) in accordance with Refs B. and C. The current authority provides for ASAM to take all necessary measures to carry out the tasks listed in UNSCRs 7739 and 7752, including the use of deadly force in order to fulfil its mission.

c. ROE Definition. ROE are directives that define the circumstances, conditions, degree and manner, in which force or actions, which might be construed as provocative, may or may not be applied or taken. The ROE implemented for this operation provide the sole authority for ASAM to use force.

Although the ROE do not limit the inherent right of self-defense, different national approaches to the definition of self-defense may result in inconsistency between multinational forces as to where the right to use force in self-defense ends and the use of force authorized by the mission ROE package begins.

d. Self-Defense. Nothing in the ICASS-authorized ROE shall negate a commander's right to take all necessary action for unit and individual self-defense.

(1) Individuals and units have a right to defend themselves against attack or an imminent attack. In exercising this right, individuals and units will act in accordance with national law. Therefore more detailed and specific guidance from Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) applicable for their respective forces will be required.

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ANNEX E TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

Self-defense is the use of such necessary and proportional force, including deadly force, to defend against an attack or an imminent attack. The principles of necessity and proportionality, together with terms “imminent” and “attack” defined in Ref. A para 7 will apply for all CJTF-OIG forces.

(2) Within the general concept of self-defense, CJTF-OIG forces have the right to use force that is necessary and proportional to defend civilians accompanying CJTF-OIG forces, including UN personnel, who have been taken hostage.

e. Extended Self-Defense. Ref A stipulates, “In keeping with the principles of the Alliance, within the general concept of self-defense, NATO/NATO-led forces and personnel also have the right to take appropriate measures, including the use of necessary and proportional force to defend other NATO/NATO-led forces and personnel from attack or from imminent attack”.

As regards “NATO led forces”, ICASS has approved an interpretation that would include any ASAM forces OPCON, TACOM or TACON (for the time being) to Combined Joint Task Force-Operation IRON GUARDIAN (CJTF-OIG).

f. Application of ROE and the Use of Force. Within this coalition for Operation IRON GUARDIAN, ROE are authorized by the ICASS member states. This implies that the chain of command has been involved and has taken the responsibility to disseminate them, ensure understanding, request clarifications and, seek amendments as required. The chain of command also assumes the responsibility to ensure compliance and determine incompatibilities. During the conduct of the operation the use of force principles described in Ref A para 10-12 apply.

g. Applicable Law. CJTF-OIG forces are, by NATO and UN doctrine, following international law and reflect the ROE package requested. The ASAM/CJTF-OIG mission must be communicated and perceived as being lawfully requested by the UN. COM CJTF-OIG will engage with non-military entities mitigating any incorrect perception of the Coalition presence in the Joint Operations Area (JOA) (once authority to coordinate is delegated). Simultaneously, coordinating efforts will be conducted at the strategic level, communicating the legitimacy of this UN-sanctioned operation.

(1) International Law. The conduct of CJTF-OIG forces is circumscribed by international law, including the applicable principles derived from the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). When applicable, CJTF-OIG forces also have a responsibility to obey other International treaties that affect military operations. In particular, CJTF-OIG forces must comply with the LOAC principles: distinction, military necessity, proportionality, and humanity.

(2) National Laws. TCNs shall adhere to their national laws. They are not obliged to execute tasks or operations that would constitute a breach of their national laws. Therefore, nations should issue national restrictions and/or clarifying instructions in order to ensure compliance with national law. Any such national clarifying instructions should be minimized and must not be more permissive than the ROE authorized for this operation.

When national laws are at variance with the CJTF-OIG ROE or a nation’s caveats or clarifying instructions have the effect of limiting CJTF-OIG ROE, nations must inform the ICASS and

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ANNEX E TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

COM CJTF-OIG of any inconsistencies as early as possible. The normal mechanisms for notification of such national restrictions and/or clarifying instructions are FORCEPREP/Order of Battle Transfer of Authority (ORBATTOA) messages. In the case of sending enabling forces to the JOA, TCN should communicate their caveats prior to that, facilitating an initial package of ROE being implemented for theater enablers.

Where nations have expressed caveats on involvement or the use of force, such caveats will be summarized and the resultant impact on the mission identified. The full range of national caveats held by ICASS should be communicated to the operational level, analyzed and applied as soon as possible. CJTF-OIG Point of Contact (POC) for this activity is the CJ35.

11. ICASS Authorized ROE

a. General Outline and Application. ICASS authorized ROE enable the successful execution of the mission, while safeguarding CJTF-OIG forces. The only authorized ASAM ROE are those contained in the current ROE Implementation (ROEIMPL) message. They apply to all CJTF-OIG forces, and can only be deviated from on the basis of national caveats or restrictions. Such caveats and/or restrictions must be provided to ICASS and HQ CJTF-OIG as soon as possible.

b. ROE Request /Authorization and Implementation Procedure. The procedures to request, authorize, and implement ROE are set out in Ref A.

c. ROE Changes and Supplemental ROE The ROE authorized by the ICASS are found in ROE Authorization Messages (ROEAUTHs) and implemented by COM CJTF-OIG in ROE Implementation Messages (ROEIMPLs) may only be changed with the approval of ICASS.

Any limitation or restriction that is viewed as a potential threat to the safety of the force and/or the successful conduct of the mission should be addressed immediately upon discovery and reported up the chain of command.

Supplemental ROE measures that may be required due to changes in the operational situation or otherwise may be submitted in a ROE Request Message (ROEREQ). This includes requests for ROE previously requested but denied, new or additional ROE.

d. Dissemination. The ROE for ASAM forces will be appropriately classified to allow dissemination to all TCN. The full ROE and use of force guidance might contain sensitive material, publication of which could harm operations. ASAM ROE authorization should be accompanied by guidance in the form of a Political Policy Statement (PPS). The PPS should be complemented by Political Policy Indicators (PPIs).

e. Protection of Persons and Property with Designated Special Status. CJTF-OIG forces may protect Persons with Designated Special Status (PDSS) and Property with Designated Special Status (PRDSS) against hostile intent or hostile acts only pursuant to ROE.

The authority to designate PDSS or PRDSS is restricted to COM CJTF-OIG. Appendix 4 to this Annex explains the mission's policy for protecting members and property of international, regional, or local organizations (e.g., NGOs) and defines relevant terms and policies.

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ANNEX E TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

12. Other Considerations. The instructions outlined below are amplifying mission-specific guidance based on international law, but should only be undertaken pursuant to ICASS authorized ROE:

a. Detention. During the course of executing their duties, CJTF-OIG forces may be authorized by ROE to detain persons. COM CJTF-OIG guidance on actions to be taken when detaining persons can be found in Appendix 1 to Annex R and must be adhered to by all CJTF-OIG forces involved in detention.

b. Warning Shots Warning shots may be fired at the discretion of the On-Scene Commander in the following circumstances:

(1) To deter an armed hostile or potentially hostile individual or group from obstructing the mission, or from threatening the safety of members of CJTF-OIG forces, HA,IO, governmental organizations, NGO, PDSS, or PRDSS; or

(2) To deter or prevent an individual, group or crowd from engaging CJTF-OIG forces, force property, PDSS or PRDSS; or

(3) To enforce the arms and economic embargo pursuant to implemented ROE; or

(4) To show resolve to an armed hostile or potentially hostile individual or group, if necessary for accomplishing the mission; or

(5) Otherwise when the use of warning shots is considered appropriate in the circumstances, after due consideration has been given to the principles of necessity and proportionality including whether or not the individual, group, or crowd to be warned is armed.

c. Riot Control Means. Riot control means may be used if authorized pursuant to current implemented ROE at the discretion of the Appropriate Commander whenever in his judgement the use of armed force or warning shots would be ineffective or inappropriate. The Appropriate Commander may use riot control means in the following circumstances:

(1) The safety of CJTF-OIG forces, HA, IO, governmental organizations and / or NGO or PDSS is threatened; or

(2) Property belonging to CJTF-OIG forces, HA, IO, governmental organizations, NGO or PDSS is threatened; or

(3) Such usage is necessary for mission accomplishment; or

(4) The passage of CJTF-OIG forces, HA, IO, governmental organizations, NGO or PDSS is blocked and the use of armed force or warning shots is not at that time necessary.

d. Prevention of Serious Crimes. Appropriate measures, up to and including the use of deadly force, may be used to prevent serious crimes in the following circumstances:

(1) (U) CJTF-OIG forces may use minimum force to protect PDSS.

(2) (U) CJTF-OIG forces may use minimum force against an individual or civilian who unlawfully commits, or is about to commit, an act which endangers life, or is likely to cause serious bodily harm, in circumstances where there is no other way to prevent the act.

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ANNEX E TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

(3) The On-Scene Commander may detain persons who commit or are about to commit a serious crime in the presence of a member of CJTF-OIG or who commit or are about to commit a serious crime against a member of the CJTF-OIG forces.

(4) All such situations must be reported through the chain of command.

(5) CJTF-OIG forces may use minimum force to counter Trafficking in Human Beings.

e. (U) Soldiers' Cards. All members of CJTF-OIG shall carry a Soldiers' Card issued by the relative Component Command or national authorities adhering to authorized ROE. TCN may issue translations of the Soldiers' Card issued by the Component Commands.

The TCN Soldiers' Card may include national clarifying instructions issued by national authorities in accordance with the main body of this Annex. The nationally authorized Soldiers' Card and translations of Soldiers' Card issued by Component Commands or any clarifying instructions issued by national authorities must be developed in consultation with or disclosed to COM CJTF-OIG.

The nationally authorized Soldiers' Card may not permit a wider use of force than authorized by the CJTF-OIG ROE.

f. Avoidance of Collateral Damage. In all cases, CJTF-OIG forces should make every effort to minimize, to the maximum extent possible, any loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects resulting from their use of force.

Collateral damage shall never be deliberate, but is instead incidental to military action, even if foreseeable. The key is that such unintended damage must not be excessive or disproportionate to the military advantage to be gained from the specific act or attack.

g. Prohibition Against Reprisals. The punitive use of force is prohibited.

h. Duty to Report. Each situation resulting in a detention, or involving the use of deadly force, or the firing of warning shots, or use of riot control means (if authorized), whether it results in casualties or not, is to be reported through the chain of command as soon as possible.

i. Right to Position Defense. CJTF-OIG forces are not required to withdraw or surrender their position, personnel, or equipment in order to avoid the authorized use of force.

j. ROE for Open Sources. Bringing ROE into the open discourse may become beneficial for many reasons (e.g. STRATCOM). Because ROE contain sensitive information, the release of which could be harmful to the mission, ICASS may indicate what information is releasable to the public, parallel to ROEAUTH message, by giving guidance on Public Information (PI) policy concerning release of ROE.

ATTACHMENTS:

Appendix 1 Defensive ROE for Phase 1 Operations

Appendix 2 Offensive ROE for Phase 2 Operations

Appendix 3 Persons with Designated Special Status (PDSS) and Property with Designated Special Status (PRDSS). (TBI)

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX E TO OPOD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

APPENDIX 1 (DEFENSIVE ROE) TO ANNEX E (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO OPOD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG

References:

- (a) MC 362/1 NATO Rules of Engagement dated 23 July 2003
- (b) MC 54/1

1. The following ROE are issued under the authority of COM CJTF-OIG. They have been developed and approved in consultation with the ICASS and the Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) and are based on extant ROE issued under reference A.

2. The ROE listed below were designed to encompass deterrence and defensive operations by Atropian and CJTF-OIG forces which commenced in Phase 1 with the deployment of the 82nd Abn Div, maritime interdiction forces and elements of the CFACC.

3. Geographic Positioning of Forces

a. 100 – Entry Into The Landmass Or Territorial Waters of Ariana by CJTF-OIG land and naval forces is prohibited.

b. 101 – Entry into the landmass, airspace and littoral waters of Ariana for the purposes of conducting combat search and rescue operations is authorized.

c. 103 – Entry into the airspace of Ariana by CJTF-OIG and Atropian air forces for the purposes of enforcing the designated No Fly Zone is authorized.

d. 104 – The use of force, up to and including deadly force for the protection of Atropian Armed Forces and Atropian law enforcement members stationed within the landmass of Atropia is authorized.

4. Relative Positioning of Own Forces

a. 111 – Within the limitations placed in 100,101, and 103, positioning of CJTF-OIG and Atropian land and naval forces relative to any Arianian forces who have invaded the sovereign territory, airspace and/or littoral waters of Atropia is unrestricted.

5. Prevention Of Boarding, Detention, or Seizure Of Atropian or CJTF-OIG Property

a. 132 – The use of force, up to and including deadly force to prevent the boarding, detention or seizure of Atropian military or civilian vessels, aircraft or vehicles is authorized.

b. 133 – The use of force, up to and including deadly force to prevent the boarding, detention, or seizure of CJTF-OIG military vessels, aircraft, and vehicles is authorized.

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX E TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

6. Intervention in Non-Military Activities

- a. 140 – Intervention in Arianian flagged non-military maritime shipping to enforce the provisions of UNSCR 7739 is authorized.
- b. 143 – The use of force, up to and including disabling fire to interdict Arianian flagged shipping vessels is authorized
- c. 145 – The use of non-deadly force to detain persons for force protection purposes in Atropia is authorized.
- d. 146 – The use of force, up to and including deadly force, to disarm persons for force protection purposes is authorized.
- e. 147 – The use of non-deadly force to prevent the escape of unarmed individuals for force protection purposes is authorized.

7. Warnings

- a. 152 – The use of warning bursts by CJTF-OIG and Atropian air forces to induce compliance by an intercepted aircraft is authorized.
- b. 153 – The use of warning shots by CJTF-OIG land and naval forces is authorized.

8. Diversions

- a. 161 – The ordering of diversions to all commercial and merchant shipping and aircraft for force protection purposes is authorized.
- b. 164 – The ordering of diversions to any aircraft to enforce the provisions of the No Fly Zone is authorized.

9. Boarding

- a. 171 – If unopposed, the boarding of Arianian flagged civilian vessels for the purposes of inspection in compliance with UNSCR 7739 is authorized. Boarding operations will be conducted under the provisions of Annex D of reference A.
- b. 172 – If uncooperative, the boarding of Arianian flagged civilian vessels for the purposes of inspection in compliance with UNSCR 7739 and under the provisions of Annex D to reference A is authorized.
- c. 173 – If opposed, the boarding of Arianian flagged civilian vessels for inspection and/or detention/diversion is authorized. The use of force, up to and including disabling force against persons and property is authorized.
- d. 174 – The boarding of any commercial or merchant shipping vessel within the JOA to determine if there has been a contravention of the arms and economic embargo established under UNSCR 7739 is authorized.

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX E TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

10. Detention or Seizure

- a. 181 – The detention and/or seizure of Arianian vessels, aircraft, vehicles, personnel, goods, cargos and/or equipment within the landmass or littoral waters of Atropia is authorized.
- b. 183 – The detention and/or seizure of Arianian vessels, aircraft, vehicles, personnel, goods, cargos and/or equipment for the purposes of enforcement of UNSCR 7739 is authorized.
- c. 184 - The use of force, up to and including disabling force to detain or seize Arianian vessels, aircraft, vehicles and /or personnel is authorized.
- d. 185 - Any vessel within the CJTF-OIG JOA proceeding to or from a seaport of Ariana may be boarded, diverted, detained and/or or seized, should there be compelling evidence to suggest non-conformity with the provisions of UNSCR 7739 regarding the economic and arms embargo.

11. Illumination

- a. 221 – The illumination of Arianian Armed Forces vessels, aircraft personnel, and equipment by white light, spotlight, projectiles, or infrared means is authorized.
- b. 222 - The use of lasers and laser target markers against Arianian Armed Forces vessels, aircraft personnel, and equipment is authorized.
- c. 223 – The use of illumination for harassment operations is prohibited.

12. Identification of Targets

- a. 232 – Potential targets are to be identified by visual means and by one or more of the following means:
 - (1) IFF (or other systems that require a response from an unidentified unit);
 - (2) electro-optical; electronic warfare support measure;
 - (3) track behaviour, flight plan correlation; thermal imaging; acoustic intelligence; or
 - (4) other secure active/passive systems not requiring a positive response from an unidentified unit prior to an engagement.

13. Prohibited Use of Certain Weapons

- a. 350 – The use of riot control agents by CJTF-OIG forces against civilian or military threats is prohibited.
- b. 351 – The use of anti-personnel mines by CJTF-OIG forces is prohibited.
- c. 352 – The use of anti-personnel mines, cluster munitions and explosive and non-explosive booby traps by CJTF-OIG forces is prohibited.

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d. 353 – The use of weapons of mass destruction to include chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear by CJTF-OIG forces is prohibited.

14. Information Operations

a. 361 – The control of Arianian military information distribution mechanisms with the intent to disrupt and deny Arianian command and control nodes is authorized.

b. 367 – The use of electronic warfare measures by CJTF-OIG forces is authorized.

c. 368 – Psychological operations directed against Arianian military forces is authorized.

d. 369 – The use of physical military deception through the use of dummies and/or decoy equipment by CJTF-OIG and Atropian Armed Forces is authorized.

15. Use of Electronic Countermeasures

a. 374. The unrestricted use of ECM against Arianian military targets is authorized.

16. Air Operations

a. (U) 400 – The use of air-to-surface and sub-surface munitions against targets belonging to the Arianian Armed Forces is permitted.

b. (U) 401 – The use of precision-guided air-to-surface munitions within the JOA is authorized.

c. (U) 402 - Beyond visual range air-to-air engagement is permitted as long as the criteria laid out in ROE 232 are met.

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX E TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

APPENDIX 2 (DECISIVE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS) TO ANNEX E (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG

Reference:

MC 362/1 NATO Rules of Engagement dated 23 July 2003

1. The following ROE are issued under the authority of COM CJTF-OIG. They have been developed and approved in consultation with the ICASS and the Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) and are based on extant ROE issued under reference A.

2. The ROE listed below are designed to encompass combat operations by Atropian (AP) Armed Forces and CJTF-OIG forces during Phase II, Decisive Offensive Operations.

3. Geographic Positioning of Forces

a. 100 – Entry into the landmass or territorial waters of Ariana (AN) by CJTF-OIG land and naval forces is prohibited without COM CJTF-OIG approval.

b. 101 – Entry into the landmass, airspace and littoral waters of AN for the purposes of conducting combat search and rescue operations is authorized.

c. 103 – Entry into the airspace of AN by CJTF-OIG Air Forces, AP Air Forces, and CFLCC aviation forces is authorized.

d. 104 - The use of force, up to and including deadly force for the protection of AP Armed Forces and AP law enforcement members stationed within the landmass of AP is authorized.

4. Relative Positioning of Own Forces

a. 111 – Within the limitations placed in 100, 101, and 103, positioning of CJTF-OIG and AP land and naval forces relative to any AN forces occupying the sovereign territory, airspace and/or littoral waters of AP is unrestricted.

5. Prevention of Boarding, Detention, or Seizure Of AP or CJTF-OIG Property

a. 132 – The use of force, up to and including deadly force, to prevent the boarding, detention or seizure of AP military or civilian vessels under contract carrying military equipment, aircraft or vehicles is authorized.

b. 133 – The use of force, up to and including deadly force, to prevent the boarding, detention, or seizure of CJTF-OIG military vessels, aircraft or vehicles is authorized.

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6. Intervention in Non-Military Activities

- a. 140 – Intervention in AN flagged non-military maritime shipping to enforce the provisions of UNSCR 7739 is authorized.
- b. 143 – The use of force, up to and including disabling fire, to interdict AN flagged vessels is authorized.
- c. 145 – The use of non-deadly force to detain persons for force protection purposes in AP is authorized.
- d. 146 – The use of force, up to and including deadly force, to disarm persons for force protection purposes in AP is authorized.
- e. 147 – The use of non-deadly force to prevent the escape of unarmed individuals for force protection purposes is authorized.
- f. 148 – Intervention in AP civilian law enforcement activities is prohibited.

7. Diversions

- a. 161 – The ordering of diversions to all commercial and private vessels, aircraft, vehicles, and persons for force protection purposes is authorized.
- b. 162 – The use of force, up to and including deadly force, to compel compliance with the ordering of diversions to all commercial and private vessels, aircraft, vehicles, and persons for force protection purposes is authorized.

8. Boarding

- a. 171 – If unopposed, the boarding of AN flagged civilian vessels for the purposes of inspection in compliance with UNSCR 7739 is authorized. Boarding operations will be conducted under the provisions of Annex D of Reference A.
- b. 172 – If uncooperative, the boarding of AN flagged civilian vessels for the purposes of inspection in compliance with UNSCR 7739 and under the provisions of Annex D to Reference A is authorized.
- c. 173 – If opposed, the boarding of AN flagged civilian vessels for inspection and/or detention/diversion is authorized. The use of force, up to and including disabling force against persons and property, is authorized.
- d. 174 – The boarding of any commercial or merchant shipping vessel within the JOA to determine if there has been a contravention of the arms and economic embargo established under UNSCR 7739 is authorized.

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9. Detention or Seizure

- a. 181 – The detention and/or seizure of AN vessels, aircraft, vehicles, personnel, goods, cargos and/or equipment within the landmass or littoral waters of AP is authorized.
- b. 183 – The detention and/or seizure of AN vessels, aircraft, vehicles, personnel, goods, cargos and/or equipment for the purposes of enforcement of UNSCR 7739 is authorized.
- c. 184 – The use of force, up to and including disabling force to detain or seize AN vessels, aircraft, vehicles and/or personnel is authorized.
- d. 185 – Any vessel within the CJTF-OIG JOA proceeding to or from a seaport of AN may be boarded, diverted, detained and/or seized, should there be compelling evidence to suggest non-conformity with the provisions of UNSCR 7739 regarding the economic and arms embargo.
- e. 187 - The use of restraints such as Flex Cuffs and mechanical restraints on PW/detainees is authorized for force protection purposes. Once brought into a secure holding area, restraints shall normally be removed, unless the tactical situation dictates otherwise.
- f. 188 - If there is doubt of PW status, CJTF-OIG forces will treat a detainee as a PW until a competent tribunal is able to determine his/her status IAW Article 5 of *Geneva Convention III relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War* (GC III).

10. Illumination

- a. 221 – The illumination of AN Armed Forces vessels, aircraft, personnel, and equipment by white light, spotlight, projectiles, or infrared means is authorized.
- b. 222 – The use of lasers and laser target markers against AN Armed Force vessels, aircraft, personnel, and equipment is authorized.

11. Identification of Targets

- a. 232 - Identification is to be established visually **or** by at least two of the following means: IFF (or other systems that require a response from an unidentified unit); electro-optical, electronic warfare support measure; track behavior, flight plan correlation; thermal imaging; acoustic intelligence; or other secure active/passive systems not requiring a positive response from an unidentified unit prior to an engagement.

12. Designation of Targets

- a. 280 – Designation of targets by any means is authorized.

13. Use of Riot Control Agents

- a. 321 - Use of pepper spray in self-defense and for force protection is authorized.

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14. Use of Force in Designated Operations

- a. 337 – Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to prevent the commission of serious crimes that are occurring or about to occur is authorized.
- b. 339 – Use of ASP batons in self-defense and for force protection is authorized.

15. Prohibiting or Restricting Use of Specific Weapons in Designated Circumstances

- a. 351 – The use of anti-personnel mines by CJTF-OIG forces is in accordance with national policy.
- b. 352 – The use of command-detonated mines, cluster munitions and explosive and non-explosive booby traps by CJTF-OIG forces is in accordance with national policy.
- c. 353 – The use of weapons of mass destruction to include chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear by CJTF-OIG forces is prohibited.

16. Information Operations

- a. 361 – The control of AN military information distribution mechanisms with the intent to disrupt and deny AN command and control nodes is authorized.
- b. 366 – Conduct of Computer Network Attack (CNA) against AN adversary computers or computer systems that have intruded into and damaged CJTF-OIG computers, computer networks, or information in CJTF-OIG computers or computer networks, including actions that may result in intrusion into AN intermediary systems or networks and damage to AN systems or networks is authorized subject to COM CJTF-OIG approval.
- c. 367 – The use of electronic warfare measures by CJTF-OIG is authorized.
- d. 368 – Psychological operations directed against AN military forces is authorized.
- e. 369 – The use of physical military deception through the use of dummies and/or decoy equipment by CJTF-OIG and AP Armed Forces is authorized.

17. Use of Electronic Countermeasures

- a. 374 - The unrestricted use of ECM against AN military targets is authorized.

18. Mines

- a. 380 – The laying of mines in recognized international straits is prohibited.
- b. 382 – COM CJTF-OIG is the approval authority for the employment of naval mines.
- c. 383 – Offensive mining shall be limited to AN territorial waters on or near the approaches to AN naval bases.

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX E TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

19. Action Against Suspected Submarine Contacts

- a. 391 – Tracking submarine contact(s) within the CJTF-OIG JOA with shipborne and airborne sensors is authorized.
- b. 393 – Prosecution to destruction against AN submarine contacts within the CJTF OIG JOA is authorized.

20. Attack

- a. 421 – Attack against AN Armed Forces demonstrating hostile intent against CJTF-OIG or AP Armed Forces is authorized.
- b. 422 – Attack against AN Armed Forces which commits or directly contributes to a hostile act (not constituting an actual attack) against CJTF-OIG or AP Armed Forces is authorized.
- c. 425 – Attack against AN Armed Forces which have previously attacked, or directly contributed to an attack, is authorized.
- d. 426 - Component Commanders are authorized to judge whether an attack is the first of a series and, in this event, to attack all units constituting a continuing threat.
- e. 427 - Attack on AN Armed Force military installation(s), facility(ies), equipment, and unit(s) which are engaged in or make an effective contribution to military activity that threatens CJTF-OIG forces or AP Armed Forces person(s) or property is authorized.
- f. 428 – Attack on AN Armed Force forces, which make an effective contribution to the conduct of hostile military operations against CJTF-OIG forces or AP Armed Forces, or persons or property designated special status is authorized.

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ANNEX F TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

ANNEX F (MARITIME OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG

Reference:

CJTF-OIG Campaign Plan – Operation IRON GUARDIAN

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu.

21. Situation

a. Strategic Guidance. Strategic objectives and the CJTF OIG Commander's priorities/Lines of Operation (LOO) are detailed at the reference. The aim of the international community is to end the crisis in Atropia, with the view of creating the conditions under which the Atropian people can govern themselves in a free, safe, secure and inclusive society that values the primacy of human rights and the equality of all individuals. The main effort is the re-establishment of Atropian sovereign territory.

b. Desired Strategic End State. The desired end state is the establishment of a sufficiently secure and stable environment throughout the JOA and an improved Atropian capability to the extent that all government responsibilities may be transferred to the local civil authorities.

c. Enemy Forces.

(1) (U) The Arianian navy patrols the Persian Gulf and maintains a small, agile contingent on the Caspian Sea. The navy has attempted to upgrade its capabilities with the purchase of Donovanian ships and equipment, including submarines, missiles, and fast attack craft.

Recently, the Arianian navy conducted exercises in the Persian Gulf that demonstrated at least a tier 2 rating for both equipment and training. Ariana maintains the strongest regional naval force after Donovania, and only the US Navy possesses enough ships and firepower to open the Strait of Hormuz if Ariana attempted to close it. If Ariana blocked shipment lanes in the Strait of Hormuz, many Middle Eastern countries would become essentially landlocked.

Arianian naval strategy has four main priorities:

- (2) Control the Strait of Hormuz and thereby access to the Persian Gulf;
- (3) Project naval power into the Persian Gulf and dominate the disputed islands there;
- (4) Disrupt sea lines of communication for nearby countries; and
- (5) Intimidate other countries through its naval presence.

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(6) Although Ariana maintains the second most capable regional naval force, it will likely operate more or less as a “guerilla navy.” The Arianian navy would employ small boats in hit-and-run type missions, deploy mines, fire anti-ship cruise missiles, and use fixed wing and helicopter forces against stronger naval forces. Arianian naval missions include:

- (a) Mine laying, particularly of narrow channels and coastal areas;
- (b) Insertion/extraction of SOF;
- (c) Seizure of disputed islands;
- (d) Raids on coastal areas and isolated oil rig platforms
- (e) Harassment and closure of the Strait of Hormuz; and
- (f) Defensive patrolling of coastal areas.

d. Joint Operations Area (JOA). The CJTF-OIG JOA includes the landmasses, national air space and territorial waters of Atropia (less the province/region of Lower Janga), Ariana, Gorgas, and Turkey.

It also includes the waters and associated airspaces of the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas east of 24 degrees longitude, the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea south of 41 degrees 51.5 minutes north latitude, the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea north of 22 degrees 30 minutes north latitude, less the territorial waters and national air spaces of bordering sovereign nations.

The independent state of Limaria is specifically excluded from the JOA.

22. **Mission.** CJTF-OIG CFMCC is to conduct Maritime operations in support of all phases of Op IRON GUARDIAN.

23. **Execution.**

a. General. CFMCC is headquartered in Naples and drawn principally from NAVEUR staff supported by NAVCENT staff and supports CJTF-OIG with an aggressive operation to establish maritime dominance in the Arabian Sea and local maritime security superiority elsewhere throughout the JOA and, on order, defeats Ariana maritime forces.

CFMCC supports MEU Expeditionary Force deception planning in the Persian Gulf and prepares to support amphibious operations in both the Persian Gulf to fix Ariana forces and in the Black Sea to reinforce CJTF-OIG Land Forces.

CFMCC protects shipping through Escort, Force Protection, Theatre ASW and Mine Detection, and interdicts the movement of terrorists, weapons, ammunition and equipment to Ariana by sea by enforcing UN Sanctions and Embargo. Additionally, CFMCC supports coordinated Joint Strike and Fires, as well as Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense.

b. Due to the JOA covering maritime portions of both CENTCOM and EUCOM AORs, maritime forces are structured around two Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). CMF Middle East, located at NAVCENT HQ in Bahrain, is responsible for full spectrum maritime operations in the geographic regions of the JOA which include the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz in the CENTCOM/NAVCENT AOR.

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CMF Europe, co-located with the CFMCC at NAVEUR HQ in Naples, is responsible for full spectrum maritime operations in the geographic regions of the JOA. The JOA includes the Eastern Mediterranean, Black Sea and Dardanelles, and the Caspian Sea in the EUCOM/NAVEUR AOR. Because the Caspian Sea is landlocked, a dedicated Atropian Surface Action Group TG 160.3 has been created.

In order to ensure that maritime effects are coordinated across the JOA, the Atropian authorities have agreed to assign all Atropian naval forces OPCON to CMF Europe throughout all phases of the operation. OPCOM of Atropian naval forces will be retained by Atropian Naval HQ, located in Baku.

c. Tasks. Maritime operations to support the joint coalition campaign will be conducted in three phases as follows:

(1) Phase I - Deployment and Defensive Operations. This phase begins with CFMCC forces positioning in the JOA with CMF Middle East operating off the coast of Ariana in the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz.

CMF Europe will operate in the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea to establish local maritime superiority, enforce the Maritime and Arms Embargo, demonstrate a show of force, and prepare for future coordinated joint operations.

Atropian Naval Forces in the Caspian Sea will maneuver to defend Baku, conduct defensive patrolling of coastal areas, protect isolated oil rig platforms and prepare to conduct on order defensive mine laying and the insertion/extraction of Coalition Special Forces.

CFMCC forces will employ and support CJTF-OIG Information Operations and Special Operations as required. CFLCC is the CJTF-OIG supported Component.

Phase I ends with the CFMCC enforcing a Maritime Embargo and achieving local maritime superiority in the JOA, forces positioned for future operations, and threat maritime forces unable to adversely affect CFMCC freedom of action.

(a) Combined Maritime Forces (Middle East).

1. (CFMCC Main Effort) Task Force 150 Carrier Strike Group (CSG).

Consisting of one aircraft carrier, one cruiser, three destroyers, positions in the Persian Gulf, TF 150 maneuvers as a show of force to assist in establishing maritime superiority and deterring further Ariana aggression, and prepares for future coordinated Joint Strike operations.

2. TG 150.1 Surface Action Group (SAG). Positions in the Persian Gulf as a show of force to assist in establishing maritime superiority, deterring further Ariana aggression, enforcing UN Sanctions and Maritime Embargo, supporting Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence, supporting Theatre ASW, and preparing for future coordinated Joint Fires. TG 150.1 integrates **RAN** Frigates.

3. TG 150.2 Surface Action Group (SAG). Positions in the Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz, as a show of force to assist in establishing maritime superiority, deterring further Ariana aggression, enforcing UN Sanctions and Maritime Embargo, supporting Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense, supporting Theatre ASW, and preparing for future coordinated Joint Fires.

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4. Task Force 151 Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG). Consisting of an Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA), Dock Landing Ship (LSD), Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD) and a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), with associated fixed and rotary wing aircraft, TF 151 conducts rehearsals for possible amphibious operations in the Persian Gulf to fix forces in Ariana rear areas.

5. Task Force 152 Mining/Demining (MIW). Positions in the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz and conducts mine hunting to determine the presence or absence of mines for the SLOCs within the JOA.

6. Task Force 153 Logistics Force (LOG). Conducts prepositioning and sustainment in the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz.

7. TG 153.1 Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS). Conducts movement through the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz, supporting strategic maritime lift and supports future operations.

8. TG 153.2 Underway Replenishment Group (URG). Conducts the fleet underway replenishment (UNREP) plan in order to sustain CMF Middle East operations and is supported for protection of replenishment assets by the forces being replenished. TG 153.2 integrates **RAN** AOR.

9. TG 153.3 Maritime Logistics Aviation (Helicopter and Tactical Airlift). Conducts CMF Middle East sustainment.

10. TG 153.4 Afloat Medical Group. Consists of USNS COMFORT and conducts medical support in the Persian Gulf.

11. Task Force 154 Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Force. Prepares for operations in support of CJFSOCC.

12. Task Force 155 Naval Expeditionary Support Force. Conducts EOD, Diving and Salvage, Naval Construction, Force Protection of land/port/littoral waterway operations for Coalition assets, as well as point defense of strategic platforms and MPS/URG vessels in the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz.

13. Task Force 156 Submarine Force (SUB). Positions in SUBOPAREAs in Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz providing SUW/ASW and ISR support to protect the force and prepares for future Joint Fires. TF 156 integrates the **RAN** SSK.

14. Task Force 157 Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Force (MPRA). Positions in Atropia and Turkey and conducts patrols throughout the JOA to support ISR and targeting as well as providing SUW/ASW protection to both CMF Middle East and CMF Europe.

(b) Combined Maritime Forces (Europe).

1. Task Force 160 Carrier Strike Group (CSG). Consisting of one aircraft carrier, one cruiser, three destroyers, positions in the Eastern Mediterranean, TF 160 maneuvers as a show of force to assist in establishing maritime superiority and deterring further Ariana aggression and prepares for future coordinated Joint Strikes.

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2. TG 160.1 Surface Action Group (SAG). Positions in the Eastern Mediterranean as a show of force to assist in establishing maritime superiority, deterring further Ariana aggression, enforcing UN Sanctions and Maritime Embargo, supporting Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense, supporting Theatre ASW and preparing for future coordinated Joint Fires.
3. TG 160.2 Surface Action Group (SAG). Positions in the Black Sea, as a show of force to assist in establishing maritime superiority, deterring further Ariana aggression, enforcing UN Sanctions and Maritime Embargo, supporting Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence, supporting Theatre ASW and preparing for future coordinated Joint Fires. TG 160.2 integrates UK, Australian and New Zealand Frigates/Destroyers.
4. TG 160.3 Surface Action Group (SAG) Caspian Sea. Composed solely of Atropian Naval Forces, this Caspian Sea SAG positions to defend Baku, conducts defensive patrolling of coastal areas, protects isolated oil rig platforms and, on order, prepares to conduct defensive mine laying and the insertion/extraction of Coalition special operations forces.
5. Task Force 161 Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG). Consisting of an Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA), Dock Landing Ship (LSD), Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD) and a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), with associated fixed and rotary wing aircraft, TF 161 conducts rehearsals for possible amphibious operations in the Black Sea in support of CFLCC operations to repel Ariana from Atropia.
6. Task Force 162 Mining/Demining Force (MIW). Positions in the Black Sea and Dardanelles, conducting mine hunting to determine the presence or absence of mines for the SLOCs within the JOA. TF 162 integrates UK Mine Warfare vessels.
7. Task Force 163 Logistics Force (LOG). Conducts prepositioning and sustainment in the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea.
8. TG 163.1 Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS). Conducts movement through the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea, supporting strategic maritime lift between Staging Bases and the SPOD in Gorgas, and supports future operations.
9. TG 163.2 Underway Replenishment Group (URG). Conducts fleet underway replenishment (UNREP) plan in order to sustain CMF Europe operations and is supported for protection of replenishment assets by the forces being replenished. CTG 163.2 integrates UK, Australian and New Zealand AORs.
10. TG 163.3 Maritime Logistics Aviation (Helicopter and Tactical Airlift). Conducts CMF Europe sustainment.
11. Task Force 164 Naval Special Warfare Defense (NSW) Force. Prepares for operations in support of CJFSOCC.
12. Task Force 165 Naval Expeditionary Support Force. Conducts EOD, Diving and Salvage, Naval Construction, Force Protection of land/port/littoral waterway operations for Coalition assets, as well as point defense of strategic platforms and MPS/URG vessels in the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea.

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13. Task Force 166 Submarine Force (SUB). Positions in SUBOPAREAs in the Eastern Mediterranean providing SUW/ASW and ISR support to protect the force and prepares for future coordinated Joint Fires. TF 166 integrates UK SSN and **Australian SSK**.

Phase II – Decisive Offensive Operations. This phase begins with the CFMCC demonstrating local maritime superiority in Persian Gulf, Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea approaches to Atropia. Forces are postured to engage and destroy Ariana maritime forces.

Atropian Naval Forces in the Caspian Sea continue to defend Baku, conduct defensive patrolling of coastal areas, protect isolated oil rig platforms and, on order, conducts defensive mine laying and the insertion/extraction of Coalition Special Operations.

CFMCC forces will employ and support CJTF-OIG Information Operations and Special Operations as required. CFLCC is the CJTF-OIG supported Component.

Phase II ends with Ariana maritime forces incapable of conducting organized maritime operations in the JOA, CFMCC forces achieving maritime dominance in the Persian Gulf and achieving maritime superiority in the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Eastern Mediterranean, Black Sea approaches to Atropia and Caspian Sea, naval power continuing to flow into the JOA, and CFMCC forces positioned to conduct a relief in place to follow on forces.

(c) Combined Maritime Forces (Middle East).

1. (CFMCC Main Effort) Task Force 150 Carrier Strike Group (CSG).

Supports coordinated Joint Strikes in order to destroy Ariana forces in support of friendly force operations, supports TF 151 (ESG) in the execution of deception plan in Persian Gulf to cause Ariana forces command and control to draw combat power away from northern border with Atropia.

TF 150 prepares to support TF 151 (ESG) in the execution of Amphibious Operation to block Ariana forces from reinforcing its forces in the North of Ariana.

2. TG 150.1 Surface Action Group (SAG). Maneuvers forces in the Persian Gulf in order to destroy Ariana naval forces to prevent further Ariana aggression, supports coordinated Joint Fires, establishes maritime dominance in the Persian Gulf, enforces UN Sanctions and Maritime Embargo, supports Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense, and supports Theatre ASW.

3. TG 150.2 Surface Action Group (SAG). Maneuvers in the Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz in order to destroy Ariana naval forces to prevent further Ariana aggression, supports coordinated Joint Fires, establishes maritime superiority in the Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz, enforces UN Sanctions and Maritime Embargo, supports Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense, and supports Theatre ASW.

4. Task Force 151 Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG). On order, execute deception plan in Persian Gulf to cause Ariana forces command and control to draw combat power away from northern border with Atropia. On order, execute Amphibious Operation to deny Ariana forces from reinforcing its forces in the north of Ariana. CFMCC main effort shifts to CTF 151 on order to execute Amphibious Operation. A separate AO will be established as necessary.

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5. Task Force 152 Mining/Demining Force (MIW). No change.
 6. Task Force 153 Logistics Force (LOG). No change.
 7. Task Force 154 Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Force. No change.
 8. Task Force 155 Naval Expeditionary Support Force. No change.
 9. Task Force 156 Submarine Force (SUB). Maneuvers in SUBOPAREAs in Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz, provides SUW/ASW and ISR support to reduce adversary capabilities and protect the force in Eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf, supports coordinated Joint Fires as required to destroy Ariana forces and protect the force.
 10. Task Force 157 Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Force (MPRA). No change.
- (d) (Combined Maritime Forces (Europe)).
1. Task Force 160 Carrier Strike Group (CSG). Supports coordinated Joint Strikes in order to destroy Ariana forces in support of friendly force operations.
 2. TG 160.1 Surface Action Group (SAG). Maneuvers forces in the Eastern Mediterranean, supports coordinated Joint Fires, maintains maritime superiority in the Eastern Mediterranean, enforces UN Sanctions and Maritime Embargo, supports Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense, and supports Theatre ASW.
 3. TG 160.2 Surface Action Group (SAG). Maneuvers forces in the Black Sea, supports coordinated Joint Fires, maintains maritime superiority dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean, enforces UN Sanctions and Maritime Embargo, supports Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense, and supports Theatre ASW.
 4. TG 160.3 Surface Action Group Caspian Sea (SAG). Maneuvers forces in the Caspian Sea to defend Baku, conducts defensive patrolling of coastal areas, protects isolated oil rig platforms and, on order, prepares to conduct defensive mine laying and the insertion/extraction of Coalition Special Forces.
 5. Task Force 161 Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG). On order, be prepared to execute Rear Area Security operations in the 310th Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) AO.
 6. Task Force 162 Mining/Demining Force (MIW). No change.
 7. Task Force 163 Logistics Force (LOG). No change.
 8. Task Force 164 Naval Special Warfare Force (NSW). No change.
 9. Task Force 165 Naval Expeditionary Support Force. No change.
 10. Task Force 166 Submarine Force (SUB). Maneuvers in SUBOPAREAs in Eastern Mediterranean, provides SUW/ASW and ISR support to reduce adversary capabilities and protect the force in Eastern Mediterranean, supports coordinated Joint Fires as required to destroy Ariana forces and protect the force.

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(2) Phase III – Redeployment. This phase begins with Ariana maritime forces incapable of conducting organized maritime operations in the JOA, CFMCC forces achieving maritime dominance in the Persian Gulf and achieving maritime superiority in the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea approaches to Atropia.

CFMCC forces are also positioned to conduct a relief in place to follow on forces and prepared to provide support to Humanitarian Assistance, refugees/IDPs, Host Nation reconstruction efforts and capacity-building of Host Nation naval forces.

During drawdown, CFMCC is prepared to transfer OPCON of TF 161 to COM CFLCC for stability operations.

d. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Timings.

(a) G Day is the day assigned for the commencement of Phase I deployment and defensive operations.

(b) D Day is the day assigned for the commencement of Phase II counter-moves/decisive operations.

(2) Maritime CCIRs.

(a) CFMCCIR01 - Modifications in the level of readiness or demonstration of Ariana intent to conduct offensive mining or offensive SSK Ops.

(b) CFMCCIR02 - Evidence of disruption to delivery of humanitarian assistance.

(c) CFMCCIR03 - Disruption/denial of critical infrastructure (SLOCs, SPODs).

(d) CFMCCIR04 - Interruption to international merchant traffic in JOA which may indicate a denial of Freedom of Navigation.

(e) (U) CFMCCIR05 - Increased military activity within the Caspian Sea oil fields which may indicate Ariana attempts to create an environmental disaster or expand the scope of conflict.

(3) Rules of Engagement and the Use of Force. CJTF-OIG Rules of Engagement requested for the Maritime environment **TBD**. Limitations imposed by National ROE are to be communicated to CFMCC.

(4) Targeting. The targeting concept will be in accordance with CJTF-OIG direction and guidance and national limitations.

(5) Force Protection. Ensure force protection measures for all forces deploying to the JOA are evaluated based on potential adversary/terrorist actions. Ensure vulnerability analysis and vulnerability assessments routinely conducted to evaluate impacts on operational effectiveness.

(6) Operations Assessment. Operations Assessment follows CJTF-OIG approved process and enables the measurement of the effectiveness and performance of maritime operations, and the development of conclusions and recommendations that support decision making.

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ANNEX F TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

(7) CFACC Theatre Special Instructions (SPINS). SPINS will apply to all Coalition fixed and rotary wing aircraft (including all UAV) operating in the JOA. SPINS will be produced and/or updated daily by the CFACC CAOC.

(8) ISR Operations. Priority of effort for ISR aircraft will be to establish and maintain the Common Operating Picture (COP) for air defensive operations, followed by information gathering to establish the required freedom of manoeuvre for CJTF-OIG forces to support Phase II operations.

Task Force 157 and 167 Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Force (MPRA) ISR missions will be coordinated with CFACC CAOC and published in the ATO.

(9) Air Operations. Priority of effort in Phase I will be focused on DCA operations, enforcement of the NFZ, CAP, SEAD, and ISR.

The priority of effort in Phase II will be OCA, ground attack and deep strike operations to attain and maintain the freedom of movement for all CJTF-OIG CFLCC forces.

Carrier and Amphibious TF air operations will be coordinated with CFACC CAOC and published in the ATO.

(10) Transfer of Authority (TOA). Troop contributing nations to offer TOA of declared assets as early as possible, but no later than upon entering the JOA.

(11) Airspace Control. For all phases, air operations in Atropia, Gorgas, and Turkey will conform to the requirements of their respective national Air Traffic Control Authorities.

Normal airspace regulations will apply for transport and civil aircraft in Atropia, Gorgas, and Turkey.

CFMCC assets must be included in the Airspace Control Plan as they all have organic aviation and small UAV assets. An Airspace Control Order (ACO) will be issued daily.

(12) Air Tasking Order (ATO). A 72-hour Air Operations Directive (AOD) to the ATO tasking cycle will be used. ATOs will be issued daily at 1900Z, to take effect 12 hours following issue (0700Z).

In order to be included in the ATO, requests for non-forecasted support must be submitted to the CAOC planning cell 36 hours ahead of the applicable ATO effective time. Requests for effects received inside of 36 hours will be considered immediate requests and coordinated by the CAOC Combat Operations (COPS) ATO planners.

24. Service Support.

a. Concept. Sustainment is a national responsibility; however, TF 153 and TF 163 will provide in-theatre support and coordinate with 310th Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) as required. 310th ESC has been assigned the task of coordinating inter-service support requirements.

Atropian Naval Forces (TG 160.3) will operate independently in the Caspian Sea and will be sustained through the national chain of command. Requests for support above and beyond national capabilities will be submitted to CFMCC through TF 153.

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ANNEX F TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

Logistics requirements, fuel and ammunition status, and days of supplies will be reported in daily ASSESSREP. TF and TG Commanders to promulgate OPGEN and OPTASK Messages for their respective TF/TG. All ships to be at 30 minutes notice to RAS while at sea.

b. Logistic Support Concept.

(1) Delivery of Logistics coordination remains a 310th ESC responsibility. The CFMCC will also be required to support and be supported by the CJTF-OIG when operating in the vicinity of Atropia and Gorgas. CFMCC has established TG 153 and TF 163 to manage afloat and ashore maritime logistic support in the JOA, coordinating support with 310th ESC.

(2) Co-operation between 310th ESC and TF 153 and TF 163 will be essential across the full spectrum of logistics. CFMCC will exercise influence through respective LNOs to ensure the best use of limited resources.

(3) CFMCC will deploy Forward Logistic Sites (FLS) to provide ashore support to the CJTF. FLS teams will be established in Poti, Gorgas (SPOD). An Advanced Logistics Support Site (ALSS) will be established in Souda Bay, Crete, co-located with AORs fuel bunkering as well as in Bahrain.

(4) Logistics Afloat Support C2 will be coordinated by the Force Logistic Coordinator (FLC) of the CFMCC supported by the Group Logistics Coordinators within each TF. The CFMCC will task TF 153 and TF 163 URGs to provide continuous afloat support to enable ships to remain at sea for extended periods. Supplementary to this, units are to make full use of Port Visits (PVSTs) to replenish.

(5) Maintenance of an accurate Recognized Maritime Logistic Picture (RMLP) is of paramount importance. The RMLP will be maintained by the FLC and passed to TF 153, TF 163 and 310th ESC to consolidate with the whole force logistic picture.

c. Logistic Standards and Requirements.

(1) ALSS/FLS will facilitate continuous flows of stocks from ashore to afloat in order to sustain the maritime force during the operational tempo.

(2) Maritime units are to arrive in the JOA with sufficient quantities of Class II, Class V and blood for the operational tempo until the arrival of the follow-on Forces.

(3) TF 153 and TF 163 will provide the required level of sustainment for the operation. AOR support is limited and stocks will be allocated in line with CFMCC priorities.

(4) The initial start level of sustainment of the maritime units (except MCM) is 30 DOS.

d. Movement Concept. The 310th ESC will plan and conduct theatre level sustainment and distribution. Strat Ro-Ro will move to SPODs. Air movement will be provided by Strat Airlift into APODs. Maritime Intra Theatre Lift (MITL) will be conducted using all available air and sea transportation means coordinated by CFMCC FLC, TF 153 and TF 163.

e. Host Nation Support Concept. CFMCC TF and TG will make maximum of all available Host Nation Support (HNS), through the ALSS/FLS and SPOD/APOD in Gorgas construct, to reduce the logistic footprint while maintaining effective sustainment of the force throughout the operation.

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ANNEX F TO OPOD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

f. Supply and Maintenance Concept. Contributing Nations are responsible for supply of Class II and IV to either Souda Bay or to JOA APOD/SPOD in Gorgas. Maintenance that requires external support will be coordinated through CFMCC who will escalate issues to 310th ESC through TF 153 and TF 163 as required. 310th ESC has no intrinsic naval maintenance capability but can arrange contracted support when required.

g. Contractor Support Concept. The 310th ESC intends to exploit commercial supply and contractor capabilities for the CFMCC. It is anticipated that this will not be established prior to arrival of the maritime forces in the JOA; therefore, national contracts should be invoked for initial Class I.

h. Military Engineering Concept. CFMCC TF 155 and TF 165 organic engineering will be exploited. CFMCC will allocate a maintenance base if required (with Souda Bay and Fujairah the most likely options).

i. Medical Support Concept. The Medical Support concept will be based on medical afloat services from units with Role 1 and Role 2 capability. There will be no initial Role 3. Ashore Medical Support coordinated through 1st Medical Bde via TF 153 and TF 163.

The overall medical support which includes medical treatment, evacuation, supply and blood management, will be overseen by the CFMCC Medical Advisor who will be in direct contact with 1st Medical Bde. A mass evacuation plan will be established.

STRATEVAC remains a national responsibility. TG 153.4 Afloat Medical Group consists of USNS COMFORT, operating in the Persian Gulf. In accordance with the Geneva Conventions, USNS COMFORT and her crew do not carry any offensive weapons.

Firing upon Comfort would be considered a war crime as the ship only carries weapons for self-defense.

j. Manpower. 310th ESC will authorize entry of all personnel into the JOA. Manpower in maritime environment will be managed by CFMCC. Intention is to reduce manpower to as low as practical.

25. Command and Signal.

a. Command

(1) CFMCC - VADM XXXX (US) Commander Joint Force Maritime Force Commander (CFMCC-OIG) based out of Naples.

(2) Commander Combined Maritime Forces (Middle East) CMF (ME) - VADM XXXX (US) Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) and U.S. 5th Fleet (based in Bahrain).

(3) Commander Task Force 150 Carrier Strike Group (CSG)

(a) TG 150.1 Surface Action Group (SAG) Arabian Gulf)

(b) TG 150.2 Surface Action Group (SAG) Gulf of Aden and Strait of Hormuz

(4) Task Force 151 Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) Arabian Gulf

(5) Task Force 152 Mining/Demining (MIW) Arabian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz

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ANNEX F TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

- (6) Task Force 153 Logistics Force (LOG)
 - (a) TG 153.1 Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS)
 - (b) TG 153.2 Underway Replenishment Group (URG)
 - (c) TG 153.3 Maritime Logistics Aviation (Helicopter and Tactical Airlift)
 - (d) TG 153.4 Afloat Medical Group
- (7) Task Force 154 Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Force
- (8) Task Force 155 Navy Expeditionary Support Force (NESF)
 - (a) (TG 155.1 EOD, Expeditionary Diving and Salvage TG
 - (b) TG 155.2 Naval Construction TG
 - (c) TG 155.3 Maritime Security TG
 - (d) TG 155.4 Riverine TG
- (9) Task Force 156 Submarine Force (SUB)
- (10) Task Force 157 Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Force (MPRA)
- (11) Commander Combined Maritime Forces (Europe) CMF (EU) - VADM
XXXX (US) Commander, U.S. Naval Forces European Command (NAVEUR) and U.S. 6th Fleet (based in Naples)
- (12) Task Force 160 Carrier Strike Group (CSG)
 - (a) TG 160.1 Surface Action Group (SAG) Mediterranean
 - (b) TG 160.2 Surface Action Group (SAG) Black Sea and Dardanelles
 - (c) TG 160.3 Surface Action Group (SAG) Caspian Sea (Atropian Navy)
- (13) Task Force 161 Expeditionary Strike Group Black Sea (ESG)
- (14) Task Force 162 Mining/Demining Force Black Sea and Dardanelles (MIW)
- (15) Task Force 163 Logistics Force (LOG)
 - (a) TG 163.1 Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS)
 - (b) TG 163.2 Underway Replenishment Group (URG)
 - (c) TG 163.3 Maritime Logistics Aviation (Helicopter and Tactical Airlift)
- (16) Task Force 164 Naval Special Warfare(NSW) Force
- (17) Task Force 165 Navy Expeditionary Support Force (NESF)
 - (a) TG 165.1 EOD, Expeditionary Diving, and Salvage TG
 - (b) TG 165.2 Naval Construction TG
 - (c) TG 165.3 Maritime Security TG
 - (d) TG 165.4 Riverine TG
- (18) Task Force 166 Submarine Force (SUB)

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ANNEX F TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)


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Appendix 1 CFMCC Task Organization

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX F TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

APPENDIX 1 (CFMCC TASK ORGANIZATION) TO ANNEX F (MARITIME OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG



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ANNEX G TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

ANNEX G (LAND OPERATIONS EXTRACTS) TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu.

1. Situation.

a. Background. See CJTF-OIG Campaign Plan for Op Iron Guardian and Annex B Intelligence.

b. Command Relationships. CJTF-OIG is a United Nations sanctioned military force with a single joint force commander. The Combined Forces Land Component (CFCFLCC) is comprised of:

(1) CF CFLCC HQ with a mix of international staff from the TCNs.

(2)) 82nd AB Division (US) complete

(3) 1st Infantry Division (US) complete

(4) 4th Multinational Division (HQ based on 1 (AS) Div) incorporating:

(a) 12th Armored Infantry Brigade Group (UK) with integral CS and CSS

(b) 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, with integral CS and CSS and an aviation wing (-)

(c) 6th Franco/German Mechanized Brigade Group with integral CS and CSS

(d) Combined Australian/New Zealand Mechanized Brigade Group with integral CS and CSS; and

(5) Corps support troops.

c. CFLCC Lead Nation and Relationships. The CFLCC Lead Nation (LN) is the United States and CFLCC Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) are:

(1) Australia,

(2) Canada,

(3) France,

(4) Germany,

(5) New Zealand

(6) United Kingdom.

The United States will contribute most of the critical force enablers as required and the CFLCC Commander.

Assigned forces, following Transfer of Authority (TOA) from national authorities, will be OPCON to COM CFLCC.

d. Operational Guidance. An estimated 120-150 days are required to build-up the CFLCC forces in Gorgas/Atropia prior to the conduct of CFLCC decisive operations.

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ANNEX G TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

CJTF-OIG and national ROE are to be in place prior to the conduct of operations in Atropia. CJTF-OIG ROE are detailed in Annex E.

The SOFA between Gorgas and CJTF-OIG will be the principle guidance document for all activities conducted on Gorgas territory. Land operations will be conducted in four phases:

- (1) Phase I - Deployment and Defensive Operations.
- (2) Phase II - Decisive Operations.
- (3) Phase III – Transition and Assistance Operations.
- (4) Phase IV- Redeployment.
- e. Armed Factions. Annex D.
- f. Friendly Forces.
 - (1) CFLCC Organization Chart. Appendix 1.
 - (2) IOs and NGOs. Annex W.

2. **Mission**. On order, Land Component Command forces, in partnership with Atropian land forces, are to conduct decisive counter-moves against Arianian forces in order to clear all Arianian forces from Atropia, restore Atropian sovereign territory, and set conditions for follow-on stability operations within Atropia.

3. **Execution**

a. Commander's Intent. The purpose of CFLCC operations in support of Operation Iron Guardian is to quickly re-establish a secure and stable environment throughout Atropia. As a minimum, all Arianian forces must be expelled from Atropian soil.

Atropian land forces will require our assistance in bringing stability and security back into southern Atropia after months of Arianian aggression/occupation.

My end state sees a sufficiently secure environment that allows for humanitarian assistance to take place, IDPs to safely return home, the continuance of government institutions and conditions that allow for economic reconstruction and development.

Key tasks include establishing military superiority, conducting decisive operations to restore Atropian sovereignty, supporting humanitarian assistance and, if required, assisting in the reconstitution of the Atropian forces.

b. Concept of Operations. As a clear demonstration of our resolve, the 82nd AB Div was deployed to Atropia to assist Atropian forces in the defense of their southern border and act as a further deterrent to Arianian aggression.

While deterrence has now failed, the Atropian Operational Strategic Command (OSC), with 82nd AB Div TACOM, is managing to hold the Arianian advances along the Kava River between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

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ANNEX G TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

My concept of operations is divided into four phases as follows:

(1) Phase I – Deployment and Defensive Operations. Phase I includes the mounting and deployment of all TCN land combat forces and associated enablers at division and corps (CFLCC) level into the Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) AO (Gorgas) and onward into the CFLCC AO (Atropia).

82nd AB Div will continue with defensive operations in support of Atropian land forces. Main effort in this phase is the successful establishment of the C3 apparatus once in theatre.

Phase I will be complete once we have amassed sufficient combat power and sustainment capabilities to proceed with counter-move operations.

Priority of deployment will be corps enablers, logistics formations, then fighting divisions and formations.

(2) Phase II – Decisive Operations. This phase will commence on order, but not earlier than G +120 days to allow sufficient time for TCNs to conduct RSOMI and declare their respective in-theatre forces operationally ready (including Transfer of Authority [TOA]).

In this phase, all Atropian land forces plus 82nd AB Div will be placed OPCON to the CFLCC. Using an established defensive line, the CFLCC will launch sufficient combat power to destroy all remaining Arianian forces in southern Atropia and secure the southern and eastern borders of the AO.

The CFLCC must be prepared to conduct a limited advance into Arianian territory with a combination of ground and aviation forces in order to clear any and all combat forces capable of destabilizing the border area with direct and indirect fire systems. Main effort will be expulsion of all Arianian ground forces from Atropia.

Phase II will be complete once all Arianian ground forces within Atropian sovereign territory have been destroyed or expelled; a buffer zone has been established; and that all CFLCC forces are disposed in a manner which provides for a solid defense of Atropia.

(3) Phase III – Transition and Assistance Operations. This phase will commence with the Atropian forces reverting to full national command and control. We will need to be ready to conduct limited stability operations to meet existent and emerging insurgent threats.

The CFLCC must also be prepared to assist Atropian military and police forces in the rapid establishment of the humanitarian effort required to address IDPs and refugees.

Tasks may include: clearing and improving lines of communication; supporting local government with engineer resources; the provision of potable water; and assisting IOs and NGOs with the provision of humanitarian aid.

This phase will see an increase in RISTA tasks at all levels, and a dedicated ground force of at least one mechanized brigade to be prepared to meet any further Arianian provocation/threats. Main effort will be the effective monitoring and deterrence of Arianian military or insurgent offensive actions.

There will be no clear break between Phases III and IV.

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ANNEX G TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

(4) Phase IV - Redeployment. This phase will see the CFLCC commence an orderly draw-down of its combat power and a staged withdrawal back through Gorgas under national arrangements.

It is assumed at this point that a UN-led/sanctioned follow-on-force and or Atropian forces will replace CJTF-OIG in theatre. This phase will be fluid by nature and driven by Atropian government intent, domestic and international political factors and the willingness of the international community.

Phase IV main effort will be the smooth and timely handover of the AO to either a follow-on force or the Atropian Armed Forces (AAF).

Phase IV will be complete when all CFLCC combat forces and assigned enablers have withdrawn from the AO and have reverted to national control for redeployment.

- c. Information Operations. See Annex O.
- d. Civil Military Affairs (CMO). See Annex W.
- e. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) G-Day is established as (date)

(2) Phase II to commence not before G+120 days

(3) CFLCC expected to declare OPRED by G+90 days after all assigned TCN elements have achieved TOA.

4. Service Support.

a. General. Preliminary force build-up will be through Poti (SPOD) and the Tbilisi International Airport (APOD) in Gorgas.

b. Logistic Concept. As a general concept, TCNs remain responsible for their own national logistic and administrative support requirements via their National Support Elements (NSEs) until TOA. Thereafter, as LN, the US will provide some common user Class I-Class IV items to assist in the sustainment effort.

TCNs will need to liaise with 310th ESC. Mutual support arrangements will be used to the fullest extent possible to achieve economies and efficiencies. 310th ESC will establish 15th Sustainment Brigade at Tbilisi to provide sustainment of the CFLCC and provide overall coordination of support in the AO including coordination between TCNs and Host Nation. Movement details are covered in Annexes R and S respectively.

c. Medical. Role 1 and Role 2 Health Services Support (HSS) will be provided by TCNs. Role 3 and 2E HSS will be provided by the 31st Combat Surgical Hospital supporting 1st Inf Div) and 2nd General Health Battalion (AS) supporting 4th MN Division.

Further details on HSS issues are covered in Annex K.

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ANNEX G TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

5. Command and Signal.

a. Command

- (1) Commander CFLCC - Lieutenant General XXXXXXX (US)
- (2) Deputy Commanding General – Major-General XXXXXXX (US)
- (3) Deputy Commanding General-Operations- Brigadier General XXXXXXX (UK)
- (4) CFLCC HQ TOC- to be located in Naftalan (proximity airport) XXXXXXX not before G+30

(5) CFLCC HQ Main- to be located at Ganja (Airport) XXXXXXX not before G+45

b. Communication and Information Systems (CIS)

(1) CFLCC/Corps level CIS and Command Support will be provided by CFLCC Signal Battalion down to Div HQs and Corps troops' formation HQ.

(2) CFLCC CIS will be satellite based, initially, with the ability to extend tactical radio and non-line-of-site communications as formations move into Atropia and self-declare OPRED. Host nation telecommunication infrastructure, where available, will only be used to augment military networks.

(3) National CIS are the responsibility of each national formation (or as agreed upon within multinational units/formations) to include all internal tactical networks and access to national strategic services.

XXXXXXXX


Lieutenant-General
Commander

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Appendix 1: CFLCC Organization Chart for Phases II-IV

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APPENDIX 1 (LCC ORGANIZATION CHART) TO ANNEX G (LAND OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG

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ANNEX H TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

**ANNEX H (AIR OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)
CJTF-OIG**

Reference:

Campaign Plan – Operation IRON GUARDIAN (CJTF-OIG)

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu.

1. Situation

a. Strategic Guidance. The aim of the international community is to end the crisis in Atropia, with the view of creating the conditions under which the Atropian peoples can govern themselves in a free, safe, secure and inclusive society that values the primacy of human rights and the equality of all individuals. The main effort is the re-establishment of Atropian sovereign territory.

Strategic objectives and the CJTF OIG Commander's priorities/Lines of Operation (LOO) are detailed at Reference A.

b. Desired Strategic End State. The desired end state is the establishment of a sufficiently secure and stable environment throughout the JOA and an improved Atropian capability to the extent that all government responsibilities may be transferred to the local civil authorities.

c. Enemy Forces. Ariana is well protected by a modern integrated air defense system, complemented with tactical all-arms air defense capabilities. Ariana divides its air force into three commands: Western, Southern, and Eastern.

The Arianian Air Force (AF) consists of four air divisions, with the 10th Fighter Aviation Division as the premier air force formation. The air force primarily supports its ground forces and is positioned near strategic sites such as nuclear plants, dams, and government buildings in order to intercept enemy air activity.

The four Arianian AF air divisions are divided into one fighter, two bomber and one fighter/bomber regiments. The Arianian AF also possesses several other air regiments designed for ground attack, reconnaissance, transportation, or Special Purpose Force (SPF) support. The Arianian AF also has limited heliborne jamming capabilities.

The Arianian AF operates mainly tier 2 equipment and weapons, but possesses limited modern upgrades and the potential for some tier 1 niche capabilities. It can successfully conduct day and night operations. Arianian AF Dispositions are detailed in Appendix 1.

d. Joint Operations Area (JOA). The JOA includes the landmasses of Turkey, Ariana, Gorgas and Atropia. The JOA includes the airspace above it and the maritime and airspace above the Black Sea, southern Caspian Sea, the Persian Gulf/Gulf of Oman and the eastern Mediterranean exclusive of the nations' sovereign territories, airspace and territorial waters. More information about the JOA is provided in Appendix 2. Some cities described as OPEN CITIES could potentially constrain the execution of CFACC operations within those city limits.

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ANNEX H TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

2. **Mission.** CJTF-OIG CFACC is to conduct air operations in support of all Phases of OP IRON GUARDIAN while continuing to support the enforcement of the economic/arms embargo against Ariana.

3. **Execution**

a. **General.** Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) Air Component (AC) resources not already deployed in theater will deploy to operating bases in Turkey, Gorgas and Atropia as rapidly as possible. CFACC air forces will use basing as detailed at Appendix 3, supported by strategic air assets based outside of the JOA.

The AC will support the CJTF-OIG scheme of manoeuvre through the application of decisive airpower. As the Phase I deterrence posture has not achieved the desired effects on the ground, CFACC, on order, is to transition to Phase II decisive operations, with the intent to attain and maintain air superiority over Atropia by defeating the Arianian AF and neutralizing the Arianian AF C2 and integrated air defense (IAD) capabilities.

Concurrently, CFACC is to support the other CJTF-OIG components in the completion of their mission.

b. **Tasks.** Air operations to support the joint coalition campaign are to be conducted in three phases in accordance with CJTF-OIG direction contained in the Common Tasks (para 3.e) and CFACC Specific Tasks (para 3.g.(3) of OIG OPORD 01.

This Annex supports the completion of Phase I and the transition to Phase II operations. Additional tasks to subordinate units are as follows:

(1) **Phase I**

(a) TCNs complete the deployment of declared units/capabilities. CFACC bed down locations by nation and aircraft are detailed at Appendix 5 (TBI). Tactical aviation units committed to the CFLCC will be covered separately under CFLCC orders and instructions.

Materiel and equipment deploying by air and sea transport through the APOD/SPOD is to be coordinated with 49th Movement Control Battalion in accordance with the flow at Annex S.

(b) TCNs complete national requirements for OPRED declaration.

(c) CAOC based on 603rd Air and Space Operations Centre deploys and coordinates with Atropian AF HQ on transition to coalition operations. On order, CAOC assumes control and tasking authority over all coalition and Atropian air forces.

(d) Upon declaration of OPRED, national units will be placed OPCON to COM CJTF-OIG and the COM CFACC. Once Transfer of Authority (TOA) has been affected, units will be op tasked through the normal AOD/ATO process.

(e) On order, HQ CFACC assumes OPCON of Atropian AF.

(2) **Phase II** - Specific tasks will be issued under SEPCOR. See CFACC OPORD 01(TBI)

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ANNEX H TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Timings:

(a) G Day is the day assigned for the commencement of Phase I deployment and defensive operations.

(b) D Day is the day assigned for the commencement of Phase II counter-moves/decisive operations.

(c) CAOC formed from 603rd Air and Space Operations Centre, Ramstein, GE and deployed to Incirlik, Turkey by not later than G+30

(d) CFACC HQ to be OPRED by not later than G+40

(2) Theatre Special Instructions (SPINS). SPINS will apply to all Coalition fixed and rotary wing aircraft (including all UAV) operating in the JOA. SPINS will be produced and/or updated daily by the CFACC CAOC.

(3) ISR Operations. Priority of effort for ISR aircraft will be to establish and maintain the Common Operating Picture (COP) for air defensive operations, followed by information gathering to establish the required freedom of manoeuvre for CJTF OIG forces to support Phase II operations.

(4) Air Priorities. Priority of effort in Phase I will be focused on DCA operations, enforcement of the NFZ, CAP, SEAD and ISR. The priority of effort in Phase II will be OCA, ground attack and deep strike operations to attain and maintain the freedom of movement for all CJTF OIG LCC forces.

(5) No Fly Zone (NFZ). The NFZ is defined as the airspace bounded by the following coordinates: N3958 E04656; N3923 E04922; N3924 E05102; N3822 E05103; N3823 E04857; and, N3852 E04632. Although this is no longer applicable now that combat operations have begun, it can be expected that the NFZ will be re-established once Arianian forces have been expelled from Atropia.

(6) Border-Crossing Authority. Only aircraft so tasked in the ATO are authorized to cross the border into Arianian airspace during Phase I.

(7) CFACC Tactical Aviation Operations (Tac Avn). Priority of effort for Medium Lift Helicopters will be medevac, tactical troop lift, and then logistics resupply operations within the JOA.

(8) Transport Operations. Priority of effort will be the support to AC operations, followed by intra-theatre operational movements and logistic movements controlled by the Movement and Transportation Co-ordination Cell (MTCC).

(9) Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR). CSAR will continue to be limited to operations inside the JOA. In the event rescue is required outside the JOA, CJTF OIG will be responsible for coordination into other national territory or territorial waters. Fighter aircraft, armed helicopters and appropriate C2 platforms will escort any rescue operation inside Ariana.

(10) Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC). CFACC- controlled MEDEVAC flights into Ariana will be escorted by armed /attack helicopters wherever possible. Flights from Role 2 to Role 3 medical facilities do not require direct escort.

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ANNEX H TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

(11) Transfer of Authority (TOA). TOA from TCN declared assets will take place for the CJTF OIG AC forces as soon as possible after arrival in the JOA. TOA for those strategic air assets supporting the operation will be in effect for the duration of their mission.

(12) Airspace Control. For all Phases, air operations in Turkey, Gorgas, and Atropia will conform to the requirements of their respective national Air Traffic Control Authorities. Normal airspace regulations will apply for transport and civil aircraft in Turkey, Gorgas, and Atropia.

CFLCC, CFMCC and CJFSOCC must be included in the Airspace Control Plan (ACP) as they all have organic aviation and small UAV assets. The CFMCC retains all organic air associated with the Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group (CSG RR), whose operations must also be included in the ACP and reflected in the Airspace Control Order (ACO).

An ACO is to be issued daily.

(13) Air Tasking Order (ATO). A 72 hr Air Operations Directive (AOD) to the ATO tasking cycle is to be used. ATOs are to be issued daily at 1900Z, to take effect 12 hrs following issue (0700Z). In order to be included in the ATO, requests for non-forecasted support must be submitted to the CAOC planning cell 36 hours ahead of the applicable ATO effective time. Requests for effects received inside of 36 hours will be considered immediate requests and coordinated by the CAOC Combat Operations (COPS) ATO planners.

(14) Airfield Defense. All airfields being used by CJTF OIG air forces will have local air and ground force protection deployed. Coordination with host nation agencies is the responsibility of the designated ADA.

(15) Airfield Engineering Support. 555th and 560th Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron Engineers (REDHORSE) squadrons will provide airfield repair and maintenance support to Turkey and Gorgas respectively. Deployment locations TBD.

4. Service Support

a. Concept. Sustainment is a national responsibility, with the exception of aircraft fuel as described in the following paragraphs.

(1) Shelters/Aircraft Protection on Ground. National commanders are to take appropriate actions to ensure that the vulnerability of parked aircraft is minimized. The CFACC has under OPCON two (2) Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadrons (REDHORSE) that will be based at XXXXXX and XXXXXX. AC staff are to liaise with 310th ESC for additional heavy engineer resources that might be required for any additional construction engineer support. National commanders will ensure all aircraft are guarded when on the ground in Turkey, Gorgas and Atropia.

(2) Ammunition. Seven days of supply of air munitions is to be stocked at airfields under national control arrangements. Continuous pull re-supply of air munitions is to be implemented. Temporary resupply/replenishment may be possible on a bilateral basis or through requests to CFACC A4.

(3) Spare Parts. 30 days supply of spare parts are to be maintained by TCNs within the JOA.

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ANNEX H TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

(4) Fuel. Aircraft and aviation fuel is to be supplied by the designated Lead Nation (US).

5. Command and Signal

a. Command

(1) LG **XXXXX** (US) is designated COM CFACC.

(2) CFACC HQ and the CAOC are to be established at Incirlik.

(3) CFACC is the designated Area Air Defense Commander (AADC);

(4) BG **XXXXXXX** (US Army) is designated the Deputy AADC, and appointed as TAAMDCOORD for CJTF-OIG. TAAMDCOORD will be collocated at HQ CJTF-OIG in Tbilisi.

(5) CFACC is further designated as the Coalition Airspace Control Authority (ACA) for all aspects of airspace control and coordination – including civil operations where applicable – in coordination with appropriate civil authorities;

(6) CFACC is the Supported Commander for CJTF OIG level ISR and for Joint Accelerated (Time Sensitive) Targeting;

(7) CFACC will assume OPCON of assigned assets upon TOA from each participating nation. The ORBAT for the CJTF OIG AC is attached as Appendix 4.

b. Command Relationships

(1) CFACC will provide an Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE) to the CJTF-OIG HQ to act as direct liaison;

(2) CFACC will provide an Air Operations Coordination Element – Land (AOCC-L) to the CJTF-OIG CFLCC HQ to facilitate coordination and planning;

(3) CFACC will provide an Air Operations Coordination Element - Maritime (AOCC-M) to the CJTF-OIG CFMCC HQ to facilitate coordination and planning;

(4) CFACC will assume OPCON of assigned assets upon TOA from each participating nation;

(5) CFLCC will provide a Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE) to the CAOC; and

(6) CFMCC will provide a Maritime Coordination Element (MCE) to the CAOC.

c. Communication and Information Systems (CIS)

(1) CJTF OIG force level CIS is to be provided to component HQs by CJTF OIG Signal Battalion.

(2) Command support to CFACC HQ and CIS within the CFACC down to contributing nations' air units is to be provided by CFACC.

(3) CFACC CIS will be satellite and trunk based initially, with the ability to extend tactical radio and non-line-of-site communications as operations extend into Ariana if needed. Host nation telecommunication infrastructure, where and when available, will only be used to augment military networks.

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ANNEX H TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

(4) (U) A Tactical Air Request Net (TARN) will be established with HQ CFLCC and formation TACPs and will be controlled by CAOC. For immediate Close Air Support (CAS) requests, the Component Commanders are authorized a veto of requests to the CAOC.

(5) Tactical Data Link (TDL) management is a CFACC responsibility.

(6) National rear-link CIS are the responsibility of each national contingent to include all internal tactical networks and access to national strategic services.

ATTACHMENTS:

Appendix 1	Arianian Air Force Disposition
Appendix 2	CJTF OIG JOA
Appendix 3	CJTF OIG CFACC Bed-Down and Sortie Generation
Appendix 4	CJTF OIG CFACC ORBAT

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX H TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

APPENDIX 1 (DISPOSITION OF ARIANIAN AIR FORCES) TO ANNEX H (AIR OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG

1. **DOSHAN TAPPEH**

- a. (U) Air Force HQ
- b. (U) 1 Mixed Aviation Regiment:
 - (1) (U) 12 x IL-76 MAINSTAY
 - (2) (U) 36 x AN-124
 - (3) (U) 8 x MI-171V

2. **MEHRABAD**

- a. 10 Fighter Aviation Division:
 - (1) 72 x SU-30
 - (2) 36 x MIG-25 PD
- b. 1 Transport Aviation Regiment:
 - (1) 24 x MI-26
 - (2) 24 x MI-171A
- c. 1 Materiel Support Regiment:

3. **BANDAR-ABBAS**

- a. 11 Fighter Bomber Division:
 - (1) 72 x SU-30
 - (2) 36 x SU-27SM

4. **TABRIZ**

- a. 12 Bomber Aviation Division:
 - (1) 72 x Tornado IDS
 - (2) 2 x TU-22M/BACKFIRE
- b. 1 Heliborne Jamming Squadron:
 - (1) 15 x HIP J/K
 - (2) 6 x HORIZON

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX H TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

5. HAMAAN MILITARY

- a. 13 Bomber Aviation Division:
 - (1) 72 x Tornado IDS
 - (2) 42 x TU-22M/BACKFIRE
- b. 1 Ground Attack Regiment (Independent):
 - (1) 45 x SU-25TM

6. (U) DEZFUL

- a. (U) Reconnaissance Aviation Regiment (Independent):
 - (1) 15 x Tornado
 - (2) 15 x Fencer-E
 - (3) 15 x SU-27SU

7. MASHAD

- a. 17 Mixed Aviation Regiment:
 - (1) 12 x IL-76 MAINSTAY
 - (2) 36 x AN-124
 - (3) 8 x MI-171V
- b. 17 Reconnaissance Squadron:
 - (1) 5 x Fencer-E
 - (2) 6 x HORIZON
 - (3) 6 x HIND-G1

8. GHALE MORGHI

- a. 1 Combat Helicopter Regiment:
 - (1) 30 x MI-35M2
 - (2) 15 x MI-171V
- b. (U) 17 Transport Aviation Regiment:
 - (1) 24 x MI-26
 - (2) 24 x MI-171A

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX H TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

9. **ZAHEDAN**

a. 1 Special Forces Aviation Regiment:

(1) 16 x MI-171

(2) 16 x GAZELLE

(3) 72 x AN-2 COLT

10. **SHIRAZ**

a. 1 Aviation Maintenance Squadron

b. 1 Signal Regiment

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX H TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

APPENDIX 2 (AIR OPERATIONS JOA) TO ANNEX H (AIR OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)
CJTF-OIG




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
APPENDIX 3 (CJFACC BED-DOWN AND SORTIE GENERATION) TO ANNEX H (AIR OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 01
(OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG

ATROPIAN AIR ASSETS BED DOWN



APPENDIX 3 (CJFACC BED-DOWN AND SORTIE GENERATION) TO ANNEX H (AIR OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 01
(OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG


COALITION AIR ASSETS BED DOWN WILD WEASELS, FIGHTER AND ATTACK



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APPENDIX 3 (CJFACC BED-DOWN AND SORTIE GENERATION) TO ANNEX H (AIR OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 01
(OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG


COALITION AIR ASSETS BED DOWN INTRA THEATRE TRANSPORT



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
APPENDIX 3 (CJFACC BED-DOWN AND SORTIE GENERATION) TO ANNEX H (AIR OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 01
(OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG

COALITION AIR ASSETS BED DOWN ISR




APPENDIX 3 (CJFACC BED-DOWN AND SORTIE GENERATION) TO ANNEX H (AIR OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 01
(OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG

COALITION AIR ASSETS BED DOWN TANKER, AWACS AND RIVET JOINT



APPENDIX 3 (CJFACC BED-DOWN AND SORTIE GENERATION) TO ANNEX H (AIR OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 01
(OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG

COALITION AIR ASSETS BED DOWN HELICOPTERS



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**APPENDIX 3 (CJFACC BED-DOWN AND SORTIE GENERATION) TO ANNEX H (AIR OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 01
(OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG**

DATA OF DATE AIRFIELDS

ATROPIA AIR BASES				
DATE NUMBER	NAME	MGRS	LAT/LONG	DIST
POINT OF ORIGIN	BAKU CITY	13U DU 49987 94158	N 53° 11.6639' W 105° 44.9164'	0
201	AKSTAFI	12U VE 67669 44694	N 53° 39.0009' W 111° 29.3481'	384.44KM/207.58NM
202	BAKU KALA	13U DU 77625 94542	N 53° 11.9839' W 105° 20.0970'	27.75KM/15.20NM
204	BAKU	13U DU 66424 99680	N 53° 14.7195' W 105° 30.1904'	17.3KM/9.39NM
205	DOLLYAR	12U WE 13995 13350	N 53° 22.1453' W 110° 47.3795'	335.76KM/181.30NM
206	GANJA	12U WD 46580 88634	N 53° 08.7035' W 110° 18.2149'	302.80KM/163.50NM
208	SANGACHALY	13U DU 05873 78055	N 53° 02.6226' W 106° 24.2414'	46.22KM/24.96NM
207	LANKARAN	13U CT 85793 00046	N 51° 26.4049' W 106° 38.5936'	203KM/110.11NM
210	STEPANAKERT	12U XC 02793 98895	N 52° 19.8435' W 109° 29.4886'	268.45KM/144.95NM
211	NASOSNAYA	13U DV 25500 17871	N 53° 24.2789' W 106° 07.2379'	33.33KM/18NM
212	SITAL CHAY	13U DV 10626 37237	N 53° 34.5822' W 106° 20.9899'	58.3KM/31.52NM
213	KYURDAMIR	13U CU 05811 71254	N 52° 57.3419' W 107° 53.4571'	145.48KM/78.55NM
214	TANRYKULULAR	12U WE 92141 11453	N 53° 20.6517' W 109° 36.9576'	258.09KM/139.36NM

GORGAS AIR BASES				
301	BATUMI	10U EG 62525 30006	N 55° 18.7486' W 122° 00.8924'	1047KM/565.33NM
302	BAMBORA	10V EJ 52516 19133	N 57° 00.7624' W 122° 08.1117'	1126KM/608NM
303	KUTAI SI	10V FH 40797 30575	N 56° 11.9558' W 120° 43.8331'	1019KM/607NM
305	TBILISI	11U PB 47517 31594	N 55° 18.5162' W 114° 40.5493'	627.9KM/339NM
306	MARNEULI	11U PA 51956 72123	N 54° 46.3974' W 114° 38.2553'	609KM/328.83NM
307	SOGANLUG	11U PB 62869 08153	N 55° 05.6000' W 114° 26.8616'	605KM/326.27NM
308	WAZIANI	11U PB 58326 21061	N 55° 12.6409' W 114° 30.6964'	613.7KM/331NM
309	BOLSHIJE	12U UG 91054 31302	N 55° 18.9618' W 112° 43.0033'	511KM/276NM
310	BABUSHARA-SUKHUMI	10V EH 73353 90893	N 56° 45.3734' W 121° 48.0180'	1097KM/592NM

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APPENDIX 3 (CJFACC BED-DOWN AND SORTIE GENERATION) TO ANNEX H (AIR OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 01
(OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG

TURKISH AIR BASES				
	INCIRLIK	09U YS 04714 54113	N 56° 11.9558' W 120° 43.8331'	1419KM/766NM
	BATMAN	10U FB 80275 20076	N 50° 42.2711' W 120° 26.8126'	1016KM/549NM

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APPENDIX 3 (CJFACC BED-DOWN AND SORTIE GENERATION) TO ANNEX H (AIR OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 01
(OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG

HOST NATION SORTIE GENERATION

HOST NATION	AIRCRAFT	DAILY SORTIE GENERATION CAPABILITY	Basing/Notes
ATROPIA	45 x SU-27SM	50 sorties ¹ per day	Nasosnaya, Atropia
	45 x TU-22M	40 sorties per day	Kyurdamir, Atropia
	15 x SU-24M	15 sorties per day	Sangachaly, Atropia
	15 x MI-35M2	20 sorties per day	Baku Kala, Atropia
	15 x MI-171V	20 sorties per day	Baku Kala, Atropia
	15 x MI-26	20 sorties per day	Baku Kala, Atropia
	24 x AN-12	20 sorties per day	Ganja, Atropia
	12 x IL-76	15 sorties per day	Ganja, Atropia

CJTF OIG SORTIE GENERATION

CONTRIBUTING NATION	AIRCRAFT	DAILY SORTIE GENERATION CAPABILITY	Basing/Notes
USA	8 x EA-18G	8 sorties ¹ per day	USS Harry S Truman. Can surge to 10 sorties per day for 48 hours.
	24 x F/A-18E/F	48 sorties per day	USS Harry S. Truman.
	12 x F-16CM	12 sorties per day	Bolszije Sziraki, Gorgas. Can surge to 16 sorties per day for 48 hours.
	12 x F-22	24 sorties per day	Batumi, Gorgas
	4 x HH60	3 x Alert 15 ² for 24 hour coverage	Tbilisi, Gorgas . Backed up by 1 x Alert 30
	12 A-10C	24 sorties per day	Tanrykulular, Atropia. 2 hour sorties without refueling

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**APPENDIX 3 (CJFACC BED-DOWN AND SORTIE GENERATION) TO ANNEX H (AIR OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 01
(OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG**

	TLAM	25 missiles (50 additional on request)	Sea launched missiles
	JASSM	50 missiles available	Sea launched missiles
	6 x C130J	6 x lines of task per day	Tbilisi, Gorgas. Max 7 hour line of task
	6 x KC135 (Tanker)	6 x lines of task per day	Incirlik, Kamalia. 8 hours on station
	5 x KC-10	5 x lines of task per day	Incirlik, Kamalia
	5 x AWACS	2 x orbits 24/7	Incirlik, Kamalia
	3 x RC-135RJ	1 x orbit 24/7	Incirlik, Kamalia
	6 x MQ-4 Global Hawk	3 x orbits 24/7	Batman, Kamalia
AUSTRALIA	10 x F18E	16 sorties per day	Akstafa, Atropia. 2 hour sortie length w/o tanking,
	6 x EA-18G	6 x sorties per day	Bolszije Sziraki, Gorgas. Can surge to 8 sorties per day for 48 hours.
	4 x C130J	8 x lines of tasking ⁴	Tbilisi, Gorgas. 4 hour lines of tasking
	6 x MRH-90	4 x lines of tasking	Tbilisi, Gorgas. 6 hour line of task
CANADA	8 x CF188	12 x sorties per day	Sital Chay, Atropia. 2 hour sortie length w/o tanking
	4 x CC130J	4 x sorties per day	Tbilisi, Gorgas. 6 hour lines of tasking
	4 x CP140	3 x sortie per day	Batman, Kamalia. 6-8 hours on station
	2 x CC-150T	2 x sorties per day	Incirlik, Kamalia. 6 hours on station
UNITED KINGDOM	12 x Tornado GR4	20 x sorties per day	Dollyar, Atropia
	12 x Typhoon	20 x sorties per day	Soganlug, Gorgas

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**APPENDIX 3 (CJFACC BED-DOWN AND SORTIE GENERATION) TO ANNEX H (AIR OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 01
(OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG**

	8 x HC-2	4 x lines of tasking	Tbilisi, Gorgas. 8 hour line of task
	4 x MQ-9 Reaper	2 x line of tasking	Batman, Kamalia. 24 hour LOT. ISR or kinetic packages
	4 x WK450 Watchkeeper	2 x line of tasking	Batman, Kamalia. 12 hour LOT. ISR.
FRANCE	12 x RAFALE	8 x sorties per day	Soganlug, Gorgas
	3 x KC-135	3 x lines of task per day	Incirlik, Kamalia. 8 hours on station
GERMANY	15 x NH-90	10 x lines of tasking	Tbilisi, Gorgas. 6 hour line of task

LCC AVIATION CONTRIBUTING NATION	AIRCRAFT	DAILY SORTIE GENERATION CAPABILITY	Notes
CANADA	8 x CH146	2 x lines of tasking	8 hour LOT (with refueling) Can surge to 3 x lines of tasking
	6 x CH147	2 x lines of tasking	8 hour LOT (with refueling)

Note:

1. Orbit = operational capability. (For fighters, 1 sortie equals 1 x aircraft. Fighters will operate in pairs of two aircraft. Growlers can work as single aircraft in a permissive environment, or as pairs (2 x EA-18Gs or 1 x EA-18G with 1 fighter escort.)
2. Alert 15 = take off on mission 15 minutes after notification.
3. CONUS = Continental United States
4. Lines of tasking = block of availability time and not takeoffs and landings

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**APPENDIX 3 (CJFACC BED-DOWN AND SORTIE GENERATION) TO ANNEX H (AIR OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 01
(OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG**

CJTFACC ORBAT

Host Nation

Fighters

45 x SU-27SM NASOSNAYA, ATROPIA

Ground Attack

45 x TU-22M KYURDAMIR, ATROPIA

Reconnaissance

15 x SU-24M SANGACHALY, ATROPIA

Coalition

CAOC - INCIRLIK, TURKEY

Wild Weasels

12 x F-16CM (US) BOLSZIJE SZIRAKI, GORGAS

6 x EA-18G (AUS) BOLSZIJE SZIRAKI, GORGAS

8 x EA-18G (US) USS Harry S Truman

Fighters

8 x CF-18 (CAN) TANRYKULULAR, ATROPIA

24 x F-18E/F (US) USS Harry S Truman

10 x F-18E (AUS) AKSTAFI, ATROPIA

12 x F-22 (US) BATUMI, GORGAS

12 x Typhoon (UK) SOGANLUG, GORGAS

12 x Rafale (F) SOGANLUG, GORGAS

Ground Attack

12 x A-10C (US) SITAL CHAY, ATROPIA

12 x Tornado GR4 (UK) DOLLYAR, ATROPIA

Cruise Missiles (For SEAD)

25 x TLAM (US)

50 x JASSM (US)

**APPENDIX 3 (CJFACC BED-DOWN AND SORTIE GENERATION) TO ANNEX H (AIR OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 01
(OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG**

AWACS

5 x E3 AWACS (US) INCIRLIK, TURKEY

RIVET JOINT

3 x RC-135RJ (US) INCIRLIK, TURKEY

ISR

4 x CP-140 (CAN) BATMAN, TURKEY

6 x Global Hawk (US) BATMAN, TURKEY

4 x Reaper (UK) BATMAN, TURKEY

4 x Watchkeeper (UK) BATMAN, TURKEY

Tankers

2 x CC-150T (CAN) INCIRLIK, TURKEY

3 x KC-135 (F) INCIRLIK, TURKEY

6 x KC-135 (US) INCIRLIK, TURKEY

5 x KC-10 (US) INCIRLIK, TURKEY

Transport – Intra Theatre

4 x CC-130J (CAN) TBILISI, GORGAS

4 x C-130J (AUS) TBILISI, GORGAS

6 x C-130J (US) TBILISI, GORGAS

Helicopters

8 x HC2 (UK) TBILISI, GORGAS

4 x HH-60 (US) TBILISI, GORGAS

15 x NH-90 (GER) TBILISI, GORGAS

6 x MRH-90 (AUS) TBILISI, GORGAS

LCC Helicopters

Attack Helicopters

16 x WAH-64 (UK)

16 x AH-1Z (US)

8 x ARH Tiger (AUS)

8 x CH-146 (CAN)

3 x CH-147 (CAN)

3 x CH-47J (AUS)

APPENDIX 3 (CJFACC BED-DOWN AND SORTIE GENERATION) TO ANNEX H (AIR OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 01
(OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG

ATROPIA BEDDOWN



APPENDIX 3 (CJFACC BED-DOWN AND SORTIE GENERATION) TO ANNEX H (AIR OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 01
(OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG


GORGAS BEDDOWN



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APPENDIX 3 (CJFACC BED-DOWN AND SORTIE GENERATION) TO ANNEX H (AIR OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG

TURKEY BEDDOWN



H3-16/17
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APPENDIX 3 (CJFACC BED-DOWN AND SORTIE GENERATION) TO ANNEX H (AIR OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 01
(OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG

OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN SOUTHERN SECTOR









Note to Exercise Designers:
Default condition is that no southern sector Carrier Strike Group assets are apportioned to the CJTF-OIG CFACC. Their main role is integral naval air, and strategically, to fix ARIANA forces in the south.

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX H TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

APPENDIX 4 (CFACC ORBAT) TO ANNEX H (AIR OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 01 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG


Based in TURKEY

	5 x AWACS	2 Orbits on station 24/7
	3 x RC-135RJ	
	4 x CP140	
	6 x Global Hawk	
	4 x MQ9 Reaper	
	4 x WK450	

(U) CJTF OIG - CFACC Air Forces
CFACC



FORCE ATROPIA
CAOC (FWIC)



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ANNEX K TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

ANNEX K (MEDICAL SERVICES) TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG

References:

- a. Health Service Support Planning Guidance outlined in CJCSI 3110.10 (Logistics Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan).
- b. Joint Pub 3-11, Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense.
- c. Joint Pub 5-00.2 Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.
- d. Joint Pub 4-02, "Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations," Current Edition.
- e. Joint Pub 4-02.2, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Patient Evacuation in Joint Operations," Current Edition.
- f. Joint Pub 4-02.1, "Doctrine for Health Service Support Logistics in Joint Operations," Current Edition.
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- p. Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense, "Medical Management of Chemical Casualties." Current Edition.
- q. DOD Instruction 6490.03, Deployment Health, Current Edition.
- r. USTRANSCOM Policy for Patient Movement of Contaminated, Contagious or Potentially Exposed Casualties, 14 Mar 08.
- s. DoD I 6000.11, Patient Movement, 9 SEP 98.
- t. USEUCOM Directive 67-4, 22 August 1999, USEUCOM Joint Blood Program.
- u. FM 8-33, NAVMED P-5038, Control of Communicable Diseases Manual.
- v. Emergency War Surgery, NATO Handbook.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU.

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ANNEX K TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

1. Situation

a. General

(1) Purpose. This Annex provides a concept of operations, assigns tasks, and provides guidance to ensure an effective health service support (HSS) system operations described in the Base order.

(2) Applicability. This annex applies to all units listed in the task organization section of Annex A as well as those commands listed as having a supporting role.

b. Operational Area

(1) JOA. The JOA includes the landmasses, national air space and territorial waters of AP (less the province/region of Lower Janga), GO, AN, and TU,

The waters and associated airspaces of the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas east of 24 degrees longitude, the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea south of 41 degrees 51.5 minutes north latitude,

The Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea north of 22 degrees 30 minutes north latitude, less the territorial waters and national air spaces of bordering sovereign nations.

(2) CFLCC Area of Operations (AO). The CFLCC AO is comprised of the landmass, airspace and territorial waters (12NM) of AP less Lower Janga.

(3) Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) AO. The ESC AO is comprised of the landmass of GO.

c. Enemy Forces/Medical Threats. Refer to Mission Analysis Brief (Intelligence Estimate).

(1) Medical Threats in the Operational Area.

(a) Food and waterborne diseases are the number one cause of illness in the area.

(b) Unsanitary conditions in and around populated areas have made diarrheal diseases a principle concern.

(c) A limited risk of malaria exists in parts of Atropia, Gorgas, and Limaria.

(d) There is a slight risk of Diphtheria-Tetanus, primarily in areas of Gorgas and Atropia where people are inadequately immunized.

(e) Dengue fever, Leishmaniosis, and plague are other diseases carried by insects in the Southeastern portions of the region (Atropia and Ariana).

(2) Environmental Health

(a) All water sources are to be considered non-potable until tested and approved by preventive medicine personnel and therefore must not be consumed by personnel.

(b) Local subsistence items shall be kept to a minimum and shall be inspected and tested by veterinary personnel prior to procurement.

(c) The control or eradication of animal and insect vectors of disease, and the application of pesticides to control these vectors may be required. All pest control operations shall be coordinated through the servicing Preventive Medicine unit.

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(d) Heat and cold injuries are possible depending on the season and location in the CJTF-OIG Joint Operations Area (JOA).

(3) Civilian Medical Infrastructure. Basic medical infrastructure within all host countries is restricted. Except under emergency circumstances, CJTF-OIG military forces will not use HN medical facilities.

(4) Military Medical Care Infrastructure. Gorgan, Turkish, and Atropian military medical care facilities are limited, and will likely not have excess capacity during this operation. HN military medical facilities will be used for treatment under emergency conditions only (i.e., if treatment is required to save life, limb, eyesight, or prevent undue suffering).

(5) Bio-scientific Capabilities and Bio-threats. Although Ariana has attempted to develop a biological capability, the effectiveness of the biological weapons program is unknown at this time. Ariana has the potential to deliver biological weapons using the same delivery means as for chemical weapons. However, the extent to which biological agents have been weaponized is unknown, but is assessed to be unlikely.

(6) Likelihood of Enemy Targeting Medical Facilities. Medical facilities are potential targets for a range of irregular groups in Atropia and Gorgas as follows:

(a) Atropia – South Atropian Peoples’ Army (SAPA) and Salasyl (SAL)

(b) Gorgas – Zabzimek Separatists (ZS) and Zabzimek Irregular Forces (ZIF)

For more detail about irregular forces refer to Tab D, Irregular Threats, to Appendix 11, Intelligence Estimate, to Annex B, Intelligence. It is likely that CJTF-OIG medical facilities may be targeted by Level I forces in the rear area.

d. Friendly Forces. CJTF-OIG will operate within the established JOA and will be led by the US. CJTF-OIG consists of a HQ, CFMCC, CFLCC, CFACC, CJFSOCC, and ESC. Troop contributing nations currently include Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, United Kingdom and the United States.

Other like-minded nations may contribute forces or provide materiel support at a future date. As Lead Nation, the United States will provide critical force enablers. The US will partner with HN, GO and AP in the provision of strategic-level support such as intelligence and logistics.

The operation is to be conducted in a developed environment. Forces shall be task organized and tailored to meet the mission requirements. External agencies are defined as any agency or force not under the command and control of the CJTF Surgeon to include the U.S. Department of State and other operating Agencies of the U.S. Government.

d. Assumptions.

(1) Preventive medicine countermeasures shall provide basic protection for deployed CJTF-OIG forces and reduce residual risk to low.

(2) The number of civilian internees, detainees, and displaced civilians requiring medical treatment from CJTF-OIG resources will be within manageable levels, and that they will be turned over to the appropriate civilian authority as soon as possible.

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(3) Adequate civilian medical facilities to sustain the combined forces of CJTF-OIG are not available in theater.

(4) US military casualties may be treated by coalition medical personnel in emergency situations which preclude treatment by US medical personnel. US medical personnel will provide treatment to casualties Other Than US Forces (OTUSF), such as Coalition forces and may be required to provide treatment to OTUSF such as HN, IO, and Government Organizations (GO).

(5) Deploying troops are healthy, fit, and have received immunizations, personal protective equipment (PPE) and Medical CBRN Defense Materiel (MCDM) in accordance with current pre-deployment requirements.

(6) Contaminated individuals who are uninjured will be decontaminated without medical assistance.

(7) Lines of Communication will remain open for AEROMEDICAL evacuation. Necessary over-flight rights are granted.

(8) Other than limited unit capability for a prescribed number of patients, medical units are not equipped to provide general decontamination support.

(9) A Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) event will produce major consequences that will severely degrade healthcare delivery and overwhelm the medical infrastructure at the incident site and within the region.

e. Limitations.

(1) HN medical assets are extremely limited throughout the CJTF-OIG JOA with primary focus on the civilian population. Except under emergency circumstances, CJTF-OIG military forces will not use HN medical facilities.

(2) Long distances exist between forces and supporting medical treatment facilities.

(3) Limitations on in-theater Role 2 and Role 3 medical capacity necessitate an early operating joint system for medical regulation and evacuation.

(4) In mass casualty situations, the capacity of hospitals, pharmaceuticals for advanced treatment, and detection equipment will be overwhelmed.

(5) Legal authorization is required before Coalition medical forces provide any non-emergency care to foreign nationals

(6) Current policy dictates that only decontaminated or non-infectious patients will be transported on aeromedical evacuation aircraft (fixed wing) unless the aircraft and receiving facilities are prepared and authorized to receive contaminated or infected casualties.

(7) Medical equipment will require deliberate decontamination or reconstitution if supporting a CBW event, impacting medical sustainment operations.

(8) No Class VIIIA/B limitations have been identified.

2. Mission CJTF-OIG Med Forces are to maintain the physical and psychological well-being of FE deployed on OP IRON GUARDIAN.

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3. Execution

a. Concept of Health Service Support Operations. Role 3 HSS (31 Combat Support Hospital) is currently established in Marneuli, Gorgas. 21 Combat Support Hospital is to be located and operational at Tsnori, Gorgas by G+60. 41 Field Hospital Regiment (GE) is to arrive in theatre no later than G+80 and will be held in reserve until deployment is directed by Comd 1 Medical Brigade (1 Med Bde). USNS Comfort is currently deployed with CFMCC.

Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) will deploy with integral Role 1 and Role 2 medical units to include surgical capability. The arrangement of Role 2+ facilities, Role 3 facilities and medevac assets provide complete coverage within a 60-minute mission window for the entire population at risk.

Units operating in the rear will receive Role 2+/Role 3 support from the nearest facility on an area support basis. Personnel requiring medevac forward of lines are to be evacuated by theater personnel recovery assets. The CASF at Tbilisi is to evacuate casualties anticipated to exceed or are exceeding the four day evacuation policy to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (LRMC).

1 Med Bde is to be prepared to provide an additional Role 3 facility when and where required. CFACC will provide an additional CASF at Baku to further expedite evacuation of casualties to LRMC.

(1) Transition. As forces start to flow into theater during Phase I, CJTF-OIG is to develop the medical system necessary to support forces during subsequent phases. Initial Role 3 medical care and treatment within the JOA is in place now in support of 82 Abn Div.

(2) Responsibility and Command Relationships. Medical service is a national, service component, and/or supporting command responsibility per existing Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Arrangements (ACSA) and Inter-Service Support Agreements (ISSA). Coalition forces are to be provided health care in accordance with existing ACSAs and evacuated to or returned to control of their appropriate national medical channels.

(3) Hospitalization.

(a) (31CSH is currently established in Marneuli, Gorgas.

(b) Prior to Phase II, 21 CSH will be established in Tsnori, Gorgas.

(c) Field Hospital Regiment 41 (GE) remains in reserve available for deployment as directed by Comd 1 Med Bde from G+80.

(d) USNS Comfort is deployed with CFMCC.

(e) Role 3 facilities are considered CJTF-OIG assets.

(f) Each Component Command is responsible for providing Role 1 and Role 2 (+) medical care within assigned areas of the JOA.

(g) (Except under emergency circumstance, CJTF-OIG military forces will not use HN medical facilities.

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(4) Patient Movement.

(a) Casualty evacuation between Role 1 and Role 2 facilities is a Component Command responsibility. Rotary-wing medevac transport is the preferred means of evacuation. HH60 and NH60 medevac aircraft have been deployed with XX Aviation Company and Light Helicopter Regiment 10 (GE) respectively to provide this capability.

(b) CFACC will establish the Combined Treatment Facility (CTF) Aeromedical Evacuation System. CFACC will coordinate intra-theater, fixed wing aeromedical evacuation between Role 2 and Role 3 facilities as required. CFACC will coordinate inter-theater medical regulating with the USEUCOM Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center (TPMRC).

(c) Coordination of transport of evacuees to/from CFACC Mobile Aeromedical Staging Facilities (MASF) is the responsibility of the losing/gaining medical facility.

(d) A Contingency Aeromedical Staging Facility (CASF) will be established IVO Tbilisi, Gorgas.

(5) Host Nation Support (HNS). Refer to Annex P, HNS. HN medical assets are extremely limited throughout the CJTF-OIG JOA with primary focus on the civilian population. CJTF-OIG military forces will not use HN medical facilities except under emergency circumstances.

(6) Other Health Readiness.

(a) Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW), Civilian Internees, Detainees, and Displaced Civilians. Medical care provided is to be in accordance with the protocols of the Geneva Conventions governing warfare. Captured enemy medical supplies and personnel are to be used to the maximum extent possible in the treatment of EPW. Use of Class VIII supplies from CJTF-OIG stocks is only authorized to provide the minimum accepted standard of care for EPWs. Civilian Internees, Detainees, and Displaced Civilians are to be provided medical care as appropriate and turned over to the appropriate civilian authority as soon as possible.

(b) Civil Affairs. All medical units must be prepared to care for civilian refugees. Independent medical civic action programs are prohibited.

(7) Joint Blood Program. The CJTF-OIG Surgeon is to establish an area Joint Blood Program Office (JBPO) and Blood Trans-shipment Center (BTC) that will coordinate blood management procedures with Component Commands.

Component Commands are to establish Blood Supply Units (BSU) as needed and notify the CJTF-OIG Surgeon of the location of each BSU. The use of whole blood or blood products from other than US/Coalition sources is not authorized.

(a) The Area Joint Blood Program Office (AJBPO) will coordinate and integrate the blood planning of the Components with respect to receipt, distribution, processing, storage and disposition of blood within the JOA. Management of the blood program, not otherwise assigned to Components, will be provided by the AJBPO.

(b) The AJBPO will be located at CJTF-OIG HQ and will function under the staff supervision of the CJTF Surgeon.

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(c) The AJPPO will establish a BSU collocated with 13th MEDLOG Bn. The BSU coordinates all aspects of blood product support for forward based and reinforcing medical treatment facilities and blood distribution in the JOA.

(d) Role 3 facilities may have to draw blood in emergency situations when no blood is available or platelets are required to save the patient.

(e) Deployable Medical Systems (DEPMEDS) facilities have the capability to draw up to 180 units of whole blood. Blood may be drawn for emergency situations. These facilities should use standard DEPMED operating procedures for emergency blood collection and a sample of the blood donor's plasma or serum should be kept for retroactive testing. These facilities will document all donations and transfusions. Emergency donations should be given the donor's social security number as the donor unit number.

(8) Force Health Protection (FHP) and Combat Stress Control.

(a) The CJTF Surgeon is responsible for developing deployment health surveillance and FHP protection policy and programs for all deployed personnel. Commanders are responsible for implementation of these policies and programs. Units will ensure the completion of all pre and post deployment requirements IAW current FHP guidance.

(b) (U) Units will maintain vigorous FHP programs to significantly reduce the disease and injury risk. Programs will be conducted in accordance with applicable directives and regulations.

(c) Personnel will be immunized IAW service directives. Organic FHP capabilities will receive a high priority for deployment in accordance with mission requirements. The main FHP priorities to be targeted include personal hygiene, food and water safety, environmental factors including climatic injuries, infectious diseases, disease vectors and their control, occupational and environmental health surveillance, health risk communication and education, mental health assessment, and dental hygiene.

(d) All water sources within the area of operations are considered non-potable unless approved for use by CF medical personnel and/or treated with iodine tablets or water purification equipment. ROWPU water is considered potable. Service Components and Supporting Commands shall establish water surveillance programs.

(e) Unusual occurrences of disease is to be reported through the CJTF Surgeon.

(f) Command emphasis is required concerning heat, sun, and cold induced injuries.

(9) Theater Evacuation Policy. The theater evacuation policy is four days. Patients expected to remain hospitalized more than four days and whose medical condition allows air evacuation are to be referred to CJTF-OIG Patient Medical Regulating Center (PMRC) for movement out of the JOA.

(10) Dental Services. Dental support is a subordinate command responsibility. Dental care provided within the JOA will be restricted to emergency treatment necessary to relieve suffering and allow continued mission performance.

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(11) Veterinary Services. Veterinary services will be limited. Veterinarians or Service preventive medicine personnel will inspect locally obtained food and water in accordance with service policies. Commanders requiring veterinary services will submit requests to CJTF-OIG Surgeon.

(12) (Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW)).

(a) CBW operations may place U.S. and coalition forces in situations that substantially increase the risk of disease and non-battle injuries (DNBI), particularly the threat of environmental hazards associated with development, deployment, and elimination of CBW. Department of Defense directives mandate that U.S. forces monitor and identify both long- and short-term health effects of US forces during deployments. This requires that the forces conducting CBW operations have robust preventive medicine assets to perform medical and environmental health risk assessments and identify effective preventive medicine measures to counter the threat to U.S. forces.

(b) Decontamination of CBRN casualties is to be accomplished IAW Service doctrine. Casualties contaminated by CBRN material must be decontaminated prior to entering medical treatment facilities. Contaminated casualties are not to be evacuated on tactical or strategic aeromedical evacuation aircraft without approval from appropriate level command authority. Forward medical units/facilities are to be prepared to provide patient decontamination and care for CBRN injured patients and function in a CBRN contaminated environment. Therefore, routine training in CBRN passive defensive skills is required and should be ongoing.

(13) Mass Casualties. All deployed units must be prepared for a mass casualty event. In case of a catastrophic event that creates a mass casualty situation, the principles of triage will be applied. Component Commanders will cross-level patient load and HSS staffing.

(14) Other Areas.

(a) Health Service Support for CJTF-OIG Personnel. The subordinate commands in whose area CJTF-OIG personnel are operating will provide care above first echelon.

(b) Mortuary Affairs. Mortuary affairs are not a medical function. However, the CJTF-OIG Surgeon will assign responsibility for death certificate completion and identification of remains consistent with guidance to be published separately.

(c) Medical Regulating.

1. CJTF-OIG is to establish a CJTF Patient Movement Requirements Center (PMRC) to regulate all intra-theater medical movements.

2. The CJTF PMRC is to coordinate all inter-theater medical regulating with the USEUCOM Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center (TPMRC).

3. Medical regulating of forces from ashore to U.S. Navy shipping is to be coordinated through NAVFOR J4.

4. EPW are not to be moved out of the JOA without Commander, CJTF-OIG approval.

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ANNEX K TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

b. Tasks.

(1) 82 AB Div.

(a) Receive OPCON 1 X Forward Surgical Teams (FST) from 1 MED BDE for each Brigade Combat Team (BCT).

(b) (Continue to provide full Role 2 capability with forward resuscitative surgery with each BCT.

(c) BPT provide medical support to NEO operations IAW CJTF-OIG medical rules of eligibility (MEDROE).

(2) 1 ID.

(a) Receive OPCON of 1 x FST from 1 MED BDE for each BCT.

(b) Provide full Role 2 capability with forward resuscitative surgery with each BCT no later than D-15.

(3) 4 (MN) Div. Establish Role 1 or 2 (+) medical facility to include surgical capability with each brigade BCT no later than D-15.

(4) 1 MED BDE.

(a) Provide Role 3 HSS facilities in support CJTF-OIG at Marneuli, Gorgas.

(b) Provide Role 3 HSS facilities in support CJTF-OIG at Tsnori, Gorgas.

(c) Be prepared to provide a third Role 3 HSS facility in support of CJTF-OIG at a location to be identified.

(d) Provide area medical support across the Theatre Support Area (TSA) (Gorgas).

(e) BPT provide Detainee Care Facility at TBA.

(f) Serve as CJTF-OIG executive agent for single Integrated Medical Logistics Management (SIMLM).

(g) CW the CJTF-OIG Surgeon, establish the CJTF-OIG PMRC.

(5) CFACC.

(a) Establish and operate the CJTF Aeromedical Evacuation System.

(b) Establish an Aeromedical Evacuation Control Center (AECC).

(c) Establish a CASF IVO Tbilisi.

(d) PT Establish a CASF IVO Baku.

(e) BPT establish Mobile Aeromedical Staging Facility (MASF) as directed.

(f) Provide Aeromedical Evacuation Liaison Teams (AELT) as required.

(g) Provide intra-theater medical evacuation.

(h) Coordinate inter-theater evacuation with the USEUCOM TPMRC.

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(6) USNS Comfort.

- (a) Provides Role 3 hospital services to CFMCC.
- (b) BPT provide role 3 hospital services to all elements of CJTF-OIG.

(7) CJTF-OIG Surgeon.

- (a) (Plan, establish, and maintain patient care systems to support the health service support needs of JTF-OIG forces.
- (b) Establish the Joint Medical Operations Center (JMOC) to manage and monitor the wartime patient care systems to support the health service support needs of the CJTF-OIG forces.
- (c) Provide health service support planning and operating guidance to Service Components, Supporting Commands, and Agencies.
- (d) Exercise technical control over all Service Component medical providers.
- (e) Establish and control the Joint Patient Movement Requirements Center (JPMRC) to coordinate patient evacuations and regulate patient movement within and out of the JOA.
- (f) Plan and coordinate the veterinary and preventive medicine assets and systems to support veterinary and preventive medicine support requirements.
- (g) Establish the Area Joint Blood Program Office (AJBPO) to plan, manage, coordinate, and integrate the receipt, distribution, processing, storage and disposition of blood within the JOA.
- (h) Plan and ensure medical supply (Class VIIIA) support is established and maintained in support of the health service support mission.
- (i) Serve as the Chief Health Service Support Advisor to the COM CJTF-OIG.
- (j) Provide all required medical intelligence/medical threat products.
- (k) Conduct HSS rehearsal incorporating CJTF-OIG medical forces and EAD medical enablers.
- (l) Monitor HSS status and execution throughout all phases of the operation.
- (m) O/O coordinate fixed/rotary-wing evacuation.
- (n) Ensure accurate casualty tracking during all phases of the operation and provide updates to current operations staff IAW battle rhythm.
- (o) Provide required personnel to staff CJTF-OIG C2 nodes including ISB and ACP.
- (p) Ensure accurate casualty tracking during all phases of the operation and provide updates to current operations staff IAW battle rhythm.

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ANNEX K TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Direct liaison is authorized between Service Component, Supporting Command, and Agency Surgeons and the CJTF-OIG Surgeon.

(2) Service Components, Supporting Commands, and Agencies shall include in their supporting plans the details of medical planning as follows:

(a) Medical support concept to include command and control lines.

(b) Existing or planned Inter-Service Medical Support Agreements or responsibilities.

(c) Identification of significant environmental factors, special sanitary measures to include food and water discipline, and available preventive medicine support units and facilities.

(d) Communications channels and frequencies used by medical personnel.

(e) Ensure accompanying supplies include nerve agent antidote and treatment kits.

(f) BPT coordinate communication procedures and location of a ship for evacuation of patients by rotary wing aircraft and surface transportation.

(g) Address and be prepared to manage mass casualties due to weapons of mass destruction or biological attacks.

(h) Health Service Support (HSS) requirements, which exceed capabilities, should be passed formally through Command channels and informally through technical channels to the CJTF-OIG Surgeon.

(i) Notify the CJTF-OIG Surgeon if CJTF-OIG personnel are hospitalized in a HN facility under emergency circumstances.

(j) Develop plans for the handling of contaminated casualties.

(k) Establish Blood Supply Units (BSU) as needed, and notify the CJTF-OIG Surgeon of the location of each BSU.

(l) Perform other detailed medical planning as designated in this Annex.

4.

Sustainment

a. Administration.

(1) Medical status (MEDSTAT) reports are due daily NLT 1200Z with cutoff times of 0600Z. Medical reports are to be formatted and submitted per CJTF-OIG Surgeon unless directed otherwise per Annex R (Reports) (TBP).

(2) Planning factors for Class VIIIB (blood and blood products) per initial admission of each Wounded in Action (WIA) and Non-Battle Injury (NBI) are: Red Blood Cells-4 units; Fresh Frozen Plasma-0.08 units; and Platelets-0.04 units.

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ANNEX K TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

b. Concept of Logistics.

(1) Medical logistics support is essential for the sustainment of the health care delivery system. Medical units shall maintain the basic load of medical equipment and materials.

(2) Consumption Estimates. The following is the overall CJTF-OIG Time-Phased Class VIIIA requirements expressed in Short Tons (ST), per day, per phase, per HSS Role of care. Service Components' and Supporting Commands' Time-Phased Class VIIIA requirements shall be forwarded in their OPLANs.

OPLAN PHASE	HSS Roles I & II	HSS Role III
Phase I	1.68 ST per day	2.7 ST per day
Phase II	11.7 ST per day	59.3 ST per day
Phase III	1.68 ST per day	3.2 ST per day

(3) 1 MED BDE is appointed as the Single Integrated Medical Logistics Manager for the JOA.

(4) The CJTF-OIG Surgeon, in coordination with the Single Integrated Medical Logistics Manager (SIMLM) for Class VIIIA, authorizes medical facilities to request medical logistics support on an exception, fill, or kill basis from any other Service Component's supply facility. Requesting organizations shall furnish necessary fund citations. If units require more than occasional support, the affected Service Component, Supporting Command, and Agency shall establish an Inter-Service Support Agreement (ISSA).

(5) The CJTF-OIG Surgeon shall review and facilitate the update of ACSA arrangements with TCN to ensure complete medical coverage of all members of CJTF-OIG regardless of country of origin.

(6) Medical units will deploy with full basic loads. Units will deploy with 100% of Medical Equipment Sets / Dental Equipment Sets (MES/DES).

(7) Primary method of requisitioning CL VIII is via MEDLOG-D.

(8) Blood requests will be forwarded through medical support channels. The JOA Area Joint Blood Program Office exercises overall technical control of the blood program in theater.

(9) Routine resupply of medical materiel will be through medical support channels. CSHs will provide limited emergency resupply to units operating in their vicinity. Medical logistics support consists of medical supply, equipment maintenance, optical fabrication, and blood distribution.

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(10) Medical Material Disposition.

(a) Captured medical supplies and equipment are not to be destroyed. Units having custody of enemy supplies and equipment shall turn them into the supporting medical facility. The CJTF-OIG Surgeon in coordination with the Single Integrated Medical Logistics Manger shall direct the issue and distribution of these supplies and equipment to medical units and/or activities providing medical support to EPW.

(b) Medical supplies are not to be purposely destroyed if imminent capture by the enemy is expected.

(c) Recaptured medical supplies shall be turned into the nearest Medical Treatment Facility for determination on its further use.

- c. Summary of Contractor Support Estimate. The need for contractor support for medical services during this operation is not anticipated.

5. **Command and Signal.**

a. Command Relationships.

(1) Command of medical units rests within normal operational channels. Surgeons are the principal medical advisors to their commanders.

(2) CJTF-OIG has operational control authority for all medical units assigned, attached, or OPCON and operating in the CJTF-OIG JOA, and exercises directive authority over assigned health service resources, ensuring their effective use to meet the health care mission.

(3) The CJTF-OIG Surgeon shall exercise direct control over the Joint Patient Movement Requirements Center and the Area Joint Blood Program Office.

(4) CJTF-OIG Surgeon works, in accordance with the Service Components' and Supporting Commands' Surgeons, to define requirements and policies as follows:

(a) Infrastructure support programs and models.

(b) Force Protection requirements.

(c) Phasing and positioning of medical forces and all JOA health service support resources including hospitals, supply units, and patient movement assets in the CJTF-OIG JOA.

(d) Operational control for medical units operating in the aerial ports of embarkation is vested to the senior Commanders at that location.

(e) The senior medical officer operating in a support base is the medical advisor to that commander and serves as the CJTF-OIG Surgeon's representative for all matters concerning the command's health discipline program.

b. Communications.

(1) Routine coordinating communications between the CJTF-OIG Surgeon and subordinate Component surgeons are to be by secure means whenever possible.

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(2) CJTF-OIG subordinate Component surgeons are to coordinate medical communications internal to their commands.

(3) Pertinent medical information are to be annotated in the Command's Medical Situation Report (MEDSITREP).

(4) External mission requirements and anticipated mission shortfalls are to be transmitted in the MEDSITREP.

(5) Humanitarian support requirements are to be transmitted via separate cover to the CJTF-OIG Joint Medical Operations Center/Surgeon.

(6) Standard U.S. Message Text Formats are to be used. Messages are to be transmitted via the most expedient means. Message centers are to be established at all sites.

(7) Direct liaison among forces operating in the JOA is authorized.

(8) Requests for assistance from external agencies are to be forwarded to the JTF Joint Medical Operations Center/Surgeon. Service Components and Supporting Commands are not authorized to approve medical support to external agencies.

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Surgeon

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ANNEX L TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

**ANNEX L ((MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS (EXTRACTS))
TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG**

References:

- a. JP-3-13.2 Psychological Operations 07 January 2010
- b. US Army FM 3-13 Inform and Influence activities 25 January 2013

1. Situation

a. General. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) are planned activities using methods of communication and other means directed at approved audiences in order to influence perceptions, attitudes and behavior, affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. The overall aim is to contain the situation and prevent escalation within the framework of a comprehensive approach. There is significant scope for PSYOPS effects in the context of the planned CJTF-OIG mission.

b. Host Nations Considerations. The size of the JOA and nature of the information environment and populations in Atropia and Gorgas will necessitate some reliance on Host Nations' means to broadcast and disseminate messages to identified Target Audiences (TAs). Host Nations have agreed to cooperate with CJTF-OIG and grant access to state controlled media as means to address Target Audiences.

c. Threat Considerations.

(1) The Arianian information environment situation is strongly influenced by strict censorship and consequent self-censorship of the actors in the media domain. Therefore the PSYOP ability to penetrate and influence audiences is highly limited and requires indirect/intermediate audiences to achieve effects.

(2) The Arianian regime has historically used propaganda to influence or attempt to influence the Atropian populace and the international community. It is expected that they will continue such activities.

The Arianian government and the South Atropian People's Army (SAPA) will mount a carefully constructed, well-orchestrated, world-wide propaganda campaign as part of the military campaign. Arianian information activities (IA) are being conducted and already affect the information environment of Host Nations (HNs), mainly leveraging ethnic, political, security and commercial issues, leading to further de-stabilizing the situation. Arianian state broadcasting services and military forces undertake extensive measures to understand, paralyze and persuade their adversaries.

Arianian military PSYOP elements provide a coordinating function for overarching information operations, including the systematic misinformation of a range of Target Audiences using multiple social media platforms.

(3) Arianian PSYOP themes and messages are spread through an extended use of local radio, Arianian national TV, social media, Key Leader Engagements (KLE) and interviews with foreign press. There have been indications of undercover Arianian Special Forces, agents or proxies engaging with local populations or with International Organizations and NGOs.

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Arianian main PSYOP themes and master messages will focus on:

- (a) Undermining the premise for and legitimacy of the UN-sanctioned Atropian Security and Assistance Mission (ASAM).
- (b) Denial and discrediting of allegations leveled at Ariana by Atropia, the UN, the International Community, international organizations, NGOs and international media.
- (c) Undermining the legitimacy and credibility of CJTF-OIG as a well-organized, trained, capable, UN-sanctioned multinational force.
- (d) Undermining government and public support in Atropia and Gorgas for CJTF-OIG, especially their support and cooperation as Host Nations.
- (e) Supporting claims of abuse and denial of rights of Arianian minorities in Atropia.
- (f) Undermining Atropian claims and supporting Arianian claims to petroleum assets in the Caspian Sea.
- (g) Undermining the impartiality of International and state actors and media organizations reporting on Atropia's actions in the region.

2. **Mission** On order, PSYOP elements operating as part of an integrated CJTF-OIG Influence Activities campaign, are to influence perceptions, attitudes and behaviors of ICASS-approved Target Audiences in order to diminish the impact of the Arianian PSYOP narrative, weaken the will and efficiency of threat elements, portray ASAM as a legitimate UN-sanctioned mission and CJTF-OIG as a capable and legitimate multi-national force, gain as well as maintain popular support for ASAM and CJTF-OIG, while supporting the achievement of favorable conditions for a safe and secure environment.

3. **Execution.**

a. **Concept of Operations.** PSYOP will contribute to CJTF-OIG achievement of Information Superiority in the Information Environment through the development of enhanced situational awareness, influence and exploitation of the Human Terrain (HT). Early deployed PSYOP elements will ensure coordination with respective HNs in order to set the stage for influence activities to support the overall force deployment.

The existing assessment of the Information Environment (IE) is to be further developed based on in-theatre inputs. To support the decisive actions of CJTF-OIG, deployed PSYOP elements are to diminish the effectiveness of the Arianian PSYOP narrative to subsequently achieve information superiority.

In order to support stability, PSYOP will highlight HN Security Force's achievements and promote a safe and secure environment, thereby setting the stage for the redeployment of the forces.

Particular care is to be taken about offensive cyber activities and attacks. All PSYOP forces, in close coordination with Info Ops, are to be prepared to plan and execute mitigating actions.

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PSYOP is to make use of existing HNs' media. Own media capabilities for production and dissemination/broadcast require radio (including FM, RIAB and short-wave broadcast), video/TV, print, tactical PSYOP (including loudspeakers/maritime, VHF broadcast and Internet/Social Media (SM)).

(1) Intent. PSYOP elements are to be employed with a focus on combat PSYOP and perception management to multiply the effects along the operational functions of command, sense, shield and act.

(2) PSYOP End State. The Government of Atropia is regionally perceived as a legitimate authority and the Atropian Security Forces as capable to counter any threat from foreign forces, internal proxy forces and organized armed groups within Atropia.

(3) Operational Design. CJTF-OIG PSYOP forces are to contribute to the achievement of the following operational decisive conditions (DC) and operational effects (OE):

(a) Line of Operation 1 - Theatre Sustainment. PSYOP forces are to support OE and DCs for a smooth and unhindered deployment into the JOA, contributing to Maritime Freedom of Navigation (FoN) and degrading threats in APOD and SPOD areas. Supported DCs:

1. Threat against Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) is minimized.
2. FoN is maintained.

(b) Line of Operation 2 – ASAM and CJTF-OIG integrity. PSYOP forces are to mainly address Arianian forces, proxies and supporters to diminish willingness and commitment to keep an aggressive posture and conduct hostile actions in the occupied portion of Atropian territory. Influence activities are also to be directed to HNs general public to better portray respective Security Forces and, simultaneously, toward Security Forces themselves so that they display a professional and capable attitude and posture. Supported DCs:

1. Arianian forces are deterred from further aggression.
2. Arianian expeditionary forces are removed from Atropia.
3. Atropian Security Forces enhanced.
4. Atropia takes lead in maintaining security and stability.
5. Atropian Security Forces capacity is enhanced.

(c) Line of Operation 3 - Support to Stability. Once CJTF-OIG legitimacy is recognized and consolidated in the HNs, PSYOP forces will concentrate their Influence Activities to ensure continuous support of the HN, both in promoting governmental institutions' achievements and in Security Force capability to manage internal and external security. With a safe and secure environment, favorable conditions for Humanitarian Assistance activities will be visible and International Organizations, NGOs will benefit from a more permissive environment in which to operate. Supported DCs:

1. Effective coordination mechanism with HNs, IOs, NGOs in place.
2. Security conditions are favorable for Humanitarian ops.
3. Favorable conditions set for stabilization efforts.

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4. Population in JOA is supportive or neutral towards CJTF-OIG.
5. CJTF-OIG contribution to regional stability is recognized by HNs and IC.
6. IDP/Refugee/Humanitarian situation is improved.

(4) PSYOP Effects.

(a) Support for ASAM as a legitimate mission and CJTF-OIG as a legitimate, determined and capable force is increased.

(b) Effectiveness of hostile propaganda and misinformation directed against CJTF-OIG and HNs is reduced.

(c) Arianian offensive posture directed towards HNs, CJTF-OIG and IC is reduced.

(d) Ariana is compelled to withdraw from occupied Atropia territory.

(e) Ariana influence in Atropia is degraded.

(f) HNs legitimacy and integrity is promoted.

(g) The perception of Atropian Security Forces is enhanced.

(5) Target Audiences. The following Target Audiences, once approved by ICASS are to be authorized for PSYOP:

(a) General population within the JOA.

(b) Political and governmental decision makers, influencers, and communicators.

(c) Arianian Government and Armed Forces.

(d) Arianian Civil Institutions and Political Parties.

(e) Military or paramilitary forces / cyber assets or proxies entering or operating within the JOA, without CJTF-OIG or HN approval (see Limitations).

(f) Religious/ethnic and tribal community/group/minorities/influencers.

(g) Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Refugees.

(h) HN's Security Forces.

(i) Local Media.

(6) Limitations.

(a) The ICASS approved PSYOP effects are the guidelines for all CJTF-OIG PSYOP activities within the JOA. Any requested change to these objectives must be submitted through CJTF-OIG for ICASS approval.

(b) CJTF-OIG PSYOP activities acknowledge the source, and all PSYOP and products should be ultimately attributable to CJTF-OIG.

(c) CJTF-OIG PSYOP will not target the international press, the UN, ASAM Troop Contributing Nations or the forces or civilian audiences of TCNs outside the JOA.

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(7) Themes to Avoid.

- (a) Any discrepancy or disagreement within the Coalition or TCNs or between the Coalition and TCNs.
- (b) Any discrepancy or disagreement between CJTF-OIG /TCNs and HNs.
- (c) Any criticism of the United Nations, ICASS or other international organizations (IOs).
- (d) Any comments on the national policy of CJTF-OIG TCNs.
- (e) Any religious reference or innuendo.
- (f) Any ultimatum that cannot be immediately carried out.

(8) Scheme of Manoeuvre. PSYOP support is to be provided to CJTF-OIG throughout the three operational phases:

(a) Phase I - Deployment and Defensive Operations. Operational and tactical PSYOP elements are activated. Collation of information is conducted to prepare the PSYOP Theatre Assessment, Basic PSYOP Study and initial PSYOP Estimate for the CJTF-OIG JOA. This includes the conduct of initial Target Audience Analysis (TAA) identification at the operational level and contribution to the Information Preparation of the Operating Environment (IPOE).

After the deployment of its initial elements, PSYOP is to establish liaison with Host Nation Governmental agencies to develop a coordinated approach regarding messages and to secure dedicated slots and space on Governmental media.

Once outreach capabilities are in place, messaging is to commence and emphasize ASAM as a legitimate and necessary UN-sanctioned mission and CJTF-OIG as a legitimate, determined, disciplined and capable force.

Concurrently, PSYOP forces will mitigate the effectiveness of hostile propaganda and misinformation directed against CJTF-OIG and Host Nations.

(b) Phase II.- Decisive Offensive Operations. PSYOP elements as part of the CJTF-OIG is to conduct full spectrum operations within the Information Environment as directed to contribute to the achievement of Information Supremacy. This is to be done through Combat PSYOP, counter-PSYOP and a targeted psychological campaign. These tasks are to follow the IA scheme of maneuver that will be established based on COM CJTF-OIG guidance.

CJTF-OIG is to gain and maintain information superiority, ensuring that the Arianian PSYOP narrative is neutralized and its offensive posture is degraded. In order to support CJTF-OIG decisive operations, PSYOP is to affect the morale and the cohesion of Arianian security forces, in particular units and personnel already in Atropia or in the border area within Ariana.

This approach is also intended as a means to indirectly influence Arianian leadership. PSYOP is also to expose the links between Ariana and its proxies operating in Atropia.

(c) Phase III - Redeployment. During this phase the focus will be on preparing the way for the transition from CJTF-OIG to a follow-on force, capacity-building and support to Host Nation civil authorities and security forces and CJTF-OIG redeployment.

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Early attention is to be paid to the capture of lessons learned and best practices, shaping perceptions of the mission and redeployment and establishing a positive legacy for CJTF-OIG and ASAM.

A PSYOP main effort of this phase is to be the improvement of the perception of the Atropan Government and Security Forces through a timely and appropriate highlight of their achievements.

In this phase messaging is to emphasize the continuous International Community effort, for Atropan specifically and the Caucasus generally, to properly reassure audiences during the disengagement of forces.

b. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Reach-Back. PSYOP reach-back capability is to be ensured by the US, the PSYOP lead nation.

(2) Intelligence. PSYOP support is to identify intelligence gaps on Target Audience related issues for further processing and feedback.

(3) Host Nation Assets. CJTF-OIG is to arrange for PSYOP access to HN's government media. Private media may be contracted based on operational requirements if required.

(4) Influence Activities Coordination and Integration. PSYOP staff are to ensure that planning, execution and assessments are coordinated with Influence Activities at all levels.

(5) Requests for PSYOP support. Components may request additional support for PSYOP assets, capabilities and products from HQ CJTF-OIG.

(6) Approval Authority.

(a) Operational level PSYOP. COM CJTF-OIG is to approve PSYOP products intended to achieve effects at the operational level.

(b) Tactical level PSYOP. Component Commanders have the approval authority for PSYOP products and actions intended to achieve effects at the tactical level. If a PSYOP product is likely to have operational effects, approval authority is to remain at the operational level (COM CJTF-OIG).

4. Service Support

a. Funding. Funds are to be allocated to enable PSYOP to deliver the full range of effects as tasked in support of COM CJTF-OIG's plan. Funds are to be allocated early in order to enable the start of specific programmes and activities. It is assumed that CJTF-OIG is to fund supplies and maintenance services required to support CJTF-OIG operational level activities. Although close coordination between CJTF-OIG and HN's is crucial for coherent and consistent communication, CJTF-OIG has no responsibility for HN's communication assets.

Component Lead Nations are responsible to coordinate funding for PSYOP at their level. Troop Contributing Nations are responsible for the supply and maintenance of nationally owned equipment and activities.

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HQ CJTF-OIG is to seek budgetary support, including that for consumable supplies, articles for mass consumption, costs for using public media and forecasts for new programmes and projects.

b. Supply. PSYOP materials, products and stocks need fixed installation. Transportation and supply of PSYOP materials and products within the JOA is to be coordinated by CJTF-OIG PSYOP staff.

c. Personnel. CJTF-OIG common funding may apply to contracting linguists, interpreters, journalists, broadcasters and civilian augmentation, if affordable, as local civilian hire (LCH). Otherwise, Lead Nations at all levels will coordinate. TCNs are responsible for LCH for National PSYOP activities. If included in MoU/MTA, HNs may provide support of civilian linguists, interpreters, journalists, cultural advisors and any other relevant required augmentation for communication purposes.

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**ANNEX M (CBRN DEFENSE) TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)
CJTF-OIG**

References:

- a. (U) NATO AJP 3-8 Allied Joint Doctrine for CBRN Defence (STANAG 2451)
- b. (U) NATO ATP 45(C), Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Biological and Chemical Attacks, and Predicting and Warning of Associated Hazards and Hazards Areas, December 2005 (STANAG 2103)
- c. (U) CJTF-OIG OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) *Insert Date*

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu

1. Situation.

- a. Area of Interest. The following operational areas are contained in the area of interest:

- (1) The JOA which includes the landmasses, national air space and territorial waters of AP (less the province/region of Lower Janga), GO, AN, and TU, and the waters and associated airspaces of the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas east of 24 degrees longitude, the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea south of 41 degrees 51.5 minutes north latitude, the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea north of 22 degrees 30 minutes north latitude, less the territorial waters and national air spaces of bordering sovereign nations.
- (2) The CFLCC Area of Operations (AO). The CFLCC AO is comprised of the landmass, airspace and territorial waters (12NM) of AP less Lower Janga.
- (3) The Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) AO. The ESC AO is comprised of the landmass of GO.

- b. Area of Operations. The JOA is the area of operations.

c. Terrain. The Atropian terrain includes both rugged mountains and relatively flat lowlands. Mountainous terrain will channel winds through valleys and along riverbeds reducing hazard areas but also limiting potential thorough decontamination locations. Larger downwind hazard areas can be expected in the Kura-Aras lowland areas. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) for more detailed information.

d. Weather. The JOA has diverse weather conditions. Atropia (AP) exhibits a wide variety of climates dependent on location, elevation, and proximity to the Caspian Sea. Different parts of AP experience dry-subtropical, wet-subtropical, temperate, and alpine climates based on altitude and distance from the Caspian Sea coastline.

The Kura-Aras Lowland has a dry-subtropical climate, while the mountains feature a wet-subtropical climate. Numerous winds traverse AP, but the most common winds include the Gilavar (from the southwest) and Khazri (from the north). In the lowlands, winds usually blow in the southeastern and northwestern directions. In the valleys of AP, surface winds tend to flow from the east at less than 10 knots. On the Absheron Peninsula (Baku area) higher speed and stormy winds are normal.

Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) for more detailed information.

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e. Ariana (AN) WMD.

(1) General. AN possesses a capable and growing CBRN capability although nuclear weapon production is still a few years away (refer to paragraph 1.e. (3) below). AN strategic policy supports a CBRN first strike in the event it believes its national security is in jeopardy.

National policy also supports the use of pre-emptive CBRN strikes against a neighbor either to deter aggression or as a response to an attack. It may also use, or threaten to use, CBRN weapons as a way of applying political, economic or psychological pressure. It is currently assessed as unlikely that AN will use CBRN weapons until CJTF-OIG forces cross into AP.

When used, the most likely reasons for employment include the canalizing of approaching CFLCC forces, key terrain (such as ports and airfields) denial, or to facilitate the withdrawal of Arianian forces in contact.

Additionally, both persistent and non-persistent agents could be employed by AN to cause civilian casualties as an impediment to the CFLCC advance, or as a terror act and warning to weaken Coalition solidarity and Atropian civilian support.

(2) Chemical/Biological. AN is known to possess Mustard/ Lewisite (HL), as well as non-persistent nerve (GB), semi-persistent nerve (GD) and persistent (VX) nerve agents. The primary means of delivery is either SS26 or SS21; however, artillery, aircraft and Special Purpose Forces could also be used. Arianian CBRN offensive and defensive capabilities are largely of Donovanian origin. The exact numbers of warheads and their operational status is unknown, and Arianian willingness to employ chemical and biological weapons in the current strategic context is uncertain.

(3) Nuclear. With respect to nuclear capabilities, AN has carried out secretive research supporting a uranium enrichment program over the past two decades in violation of policy issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency. During this time period, AN strongly refuted any claims that it sought nuclear weapons, while covertly pursuing uranium enrichment programs. It is currently assessed that AN is at least several years away from a capability to exploit nuclear weaponry in any form.

(4) Radiological Threats. Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) may be fabricated from isotopic material readily available in the region. Americium 241 from oil well surveying equipment, Cesium 137 from nuclear medical equipment, Cobalt 60 from food irradiation plants, and Strontium 90 from thermoelectric generators could be packaged with high explosives. Fabricated devices could be delivered by terrorist, guerrillas or Special Purpose Forces using unconventional delivery systems.

(5) CBRN Defense. Arianian forces have a well-developed CBRN defense capability. Operational Strategic Command (OSC) 2 located in AP is believed to include a Chemical Defense Brigade, a Smoke Brigade, a Chemical Defense Battalion in each Division Tactical Group (DTG), and chemical defense companies or platoons within brigade-level organizations. OSC 1, still located in AN, likely has the same CBRN Defense structure. AN is also well-prepared to employ civilian CBRN protection measures.

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f. Atropia.

(1) CBRN Weapons. AP has the capability to produce Chemical and Biological munitions from its own resources. It has long been suspected, but not proven, that AP may already possess very limited CBRN munitions. Atropian strategic policy does not include a CBRN first strike, and contingency plans are primarily for the defense of AP.

In the event of an impending CBRN strike against the Atropian homeland, however, it may decide to use pre-emptive CBRN strikes. Should any opponent conduct a CBRN attack against AP, it may retaliate in kind. AP has a wide variety of CBRN delivery means organic to its military forces. Atropian willingness to assemble and employ chemical and biological weapons in the current strategic context is assessed as LOW.

(2) Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs).

(a) AP produces a large quantity of toxic industrial chemicals primarily for oil and gas extraction activities but also for agricultural purposes. TICs pose a risk to CFLCC forces as their availability, proximity to urban areas, low cost, and the limited security of storage facilities make them an attractive option for terrorist or military targeting.

In addition to the threat from the intentional use of stored TICs, accidental releases of industrial chemicals may result from collateral damage associated with military operations, electrical power interruption, or improper facility procedures or maintenance.

To date AP has maintained effective environmental control over TICs and contaminated areas. The CFLCC CBRN Center will issue a listing of known TIC sites in AP.

(3) CBRN Defense. AP is also well-prepared to employ CBRN protection measures both for civilians and military personnel, and has company-sized chemical defense units organic to all maneuver Brigades. The Atropian Southern Command (ASC) contains 3702 Chemical Defense Battalion that is equipped with mostly Donovanian Tier 2 equipment and has a personnel manning to a level of approximately 90 percent. It is generally considered combat ready but will be easily overwhelmed by significant CBRN attacks.

g. Gorgas (GO). There is no indication that GO possesses or is pursuing chemical or biological weapons. In addition, GO has also asserted effective control over TICs and radiological materials, and has a robust emergency response capability.

h. CJTF-OIG CBRN Defence Forces.

(1) CFMCC. 4 NMCB.

(2) CFLCC. 415th CBRNE BDE.

(3) CFACC. 555th and 560th RED HORSE Squadrons, and the RAF (UK) Regt.

(4) 310th Expeditionary Support Command (ESC). 420th CHEM BN.

1. Mission CJTF-OIG is to conduct CBRN Defense operations to protect the force during OP IRON GUARDIAN (OIG).

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2. Execution

a. Concept of Operations. OIG will be conducted in three phases as follows:

(1) Phase I – Deployment and Defensive Operations.

- (a) 82 ABN DIV and AAF continue to conduct defensive operations against the Arianian invasion. Maritime and air assets support that defence, including continuation of the MIZ (the NFZ is superseded by the larger air campaign).
- (b) Establish Sea Port of Debarkation (SPOD) at Poti, GO and Air Port of Debarkation (APOD) at Tbilisi, GO. Prepare for reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSO&I) activities.
- (c) Establish a Theater Logistics Base in GO under direction of the 310 ESC. which will co-ordinate the sustainment support among participating nations, component commands, HN and non-military organizations at the operational level.
- (d) Establish Role 3 Health Service Support (HSS) capability.
- (e) When RSO&I capabilities are in place, component forces deploy into the JOA.
- (f) On declaration of CFACC HQ OPRED, it assumes OPCON over Atropian Air Force assets becoming the de facto ACC of the Atropian Supreme High Command.
- (g) The CFMCC will broaden its MIO capacity as TCNs deploy their declared assets.
- (h) CJTF-OIG will establish its HQ at Tbilisi by G+45 and once CFLCC declares OPRED, TOA will occur to allow OPCON of all AAF and coalition forces.

(2) Phase II – Decisive Offensive Operations.

- (a) Establish favorable conditions for counter-offensive operations by CJTF-OIG.
 - (b) Degrade Arianian strategic and long-range air, air defense, missile and maritime capabilities to 60 percent effectiveness.
 - (c) Degrade Arianian first echelon land Division Tactical Groups (DTGs) of 2nd Operation Support Command (OSC) to 60 percent.
 - (d) CFACC to establish local air superiority and support CFLCC operations.
 - (e) CFMCC to neutralize the Arianian Navy in support CJTF operations.
 - (f) Conduct counter- move operations with land forces to repel remaining Arianian forces from AP and restore the Atropian sovereignty.
 - (g) Enforce a cessation of hostilities between all parties.
 - (h) Support the re-establishment of a safe and secure environment in AP.
- (3) Phase III - Redeployment. Conduct a relief in place to a follow-on force (UN and/or Atropian) and to withdraw CJTF-OIG forces to locations directed by TCNs.

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b. Scheme of CBRN Support. CJTF-OIG is to adopt a pro-active CBRN defense posture in order to lessen the incentive for AN to use CBRN weapons or TICs. CBRN operations are to be conducted following the principles of protection, contamination avoidance, and decontamination.

TCNs are to ensure their assigned forces are trained, equipped and prepared to provide their own organic CBRN Defense. Components will employ their CBRN defense capabilities with the operational goals of sustaining combat power and maintaining freedom of action.

CFLCC is responsible for the coordination and conduct of CBRN Defense within AP while 310 ESC is responsible for GO. The use of HN capabilities and infrastructure is to be maximized. If necessary, CFJT-OIG forces are to take custody of TICs and Arianian weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in AP to prevent their proliferation.

c. CBRN THREATCON. 310th ESC is to establish the CBRN THREATCON for all CJTF-OIF forces in GO and CFLCC will establish the same in AP. The following events could require changes to the CBRN Defense posture and activities:

- (1) Credible and actionable intelligence of a likely or imminent CBRN threat.
- (2) Release of a CBRN agent that would stress Host Nation (HN) response capacities.
- (3) Major/multiple CBRN events.

d. Priority of CBRN Support.

(1) Phase I – Deployment and Defensive Operations.

- (a) APOD and SPOD.
- (b) 82nd AB DIV.
- (c) Theater Logistic Base in GO.

(2) Phase II – Decisive Offensive Operations.

- (a) CFACC installations in AP, GO, and Turkey.
- (b) CFLCC Divisions.
- (c) Forward Logistic Base in AP.

(3) Phase III - Redeployment. APOD and SPOD.

e. Common Component Tasks.

- (1) Establish Component CBRN warning and reporting networks.
- (2) Conduct CBRN route reconnaissance along MSRs and occupied areas to facilitate contamination avoidance and freedom of maneuver.
- (3) Plan for, and conduct CBRN decontamination operations as required.
- (4) Maintain a master list of facilities containing TICs and radiological material in AO along with vulnerabilities and hazard prediction templates.
- (5) Establish Collective Protection facilities at medical installations and headquarters as required.

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f. Specific Tasks.

(1) CFLCC.

- (a) Coordinate and conduct CBRN Defense operations in AP.
- (b) Coordinate CBRN Defense and TIC response operations with the HN.
- (c) BPT to assist HN CBRN Defense operations.
- (d) BPT to conduct counter-WMD proliferation operations.

(2) 310th ESC.

- (a) Coordinate and conduct CBRN Defense operations in GO.
- (b) Coordinate CBRN Defense and TIC response operations with the HN.
- (c) BPT to assist HN CBRN Defense operations.
- (d) BPT to conduct counter-WMD proliferation operations.

(3) 410th ENCOM. Provide engineer support to CBRN Defense operations, including: decontamination site preparation, counter-WMD proliferation operations, TIC containment and environmental remediation.

(4) 1st MED BDE. Establish and implement policy and procedures for medical reporting and support to contaminated casualties.

g. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Priority Intelligence Requirements.

- (a) Status, capabilities, and location of Arianian CBRN offensive weapons.
- (b) Guerrilla group or Arianian SPF intentions of capturing or releasing Atropian CBRN munitions or TICs.
- (c) Guerrilla group or Arianian SPF intentions of capturing or releasing CBRN munitions or TICs in GO.
- (d) Status, capabilities, and location of Arianian CBRN production facilities.
- (e) Status, capabilities, and location of Arianian CBRN Defense forces.
- (f) Locations and types of chemical weapons precursors in the JOA.
- (g) CBRN, TIC, and environmental hazards in AP or GO.
- (h) Extent of damage to Atropian critical infrastructure containing TICs, and biological or radiological materials.

(2) Friendly Force Information Requirements.

- (a) Status, locations, and activities of Atropian CBRN weapons and CBRN Defense forces.
- (b) Identification of Atropian chemical and biological warfare sites (if any) vulnerable to seizure by Arianian forces or associated groups.
- (c) Reduction of CJTF-OIG individual protection equipment and decontaminants to 50% stocks.

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(3) Reconnaissance. Components are responsible for CBRN recon in their AO. Non-chemical units are to employ unit CBRN teams to detect and mark contaminated areas. Specialist CBRN recon and surveillance systems are to be employed along CFTF-OIG and CFLCC MSRs and critical points to identify hazard areas that may significantly affect maneuver as well as the identification of bypass routes around contamination that may delay friendly forces. Additionally specialist CBRN recon and surveillance systems are to be employed at major concentrations of combat and logistic forces, as well as for the assessment of Atropian TICs and Arianian WMD.

(4) Decontamination. Components are to plan and BPT conduct operational and thorough decontamination to protect their forces and minimize the spread of contamination. HN capabilities are to be used if available.

TIC or Radiological Material. Attempts are to be made to prevent the intentional or accidental release of TICs or radiological material. It is critical that TIC installations are identified, and vulnerability assessments and hazard prediction templates completed as quickly as possible. 415th CBRNE BDE and 420th CHEM BN each have one Tech Escort (TE) company available to assist with this task. Maneuver and fires around the sites must be minimized.

(5) WMD Exploitation/Elimination. Components are to take action to prevent the proliferation of WMD including their component materials or relevant technical expertise. The most likely scenario involving WMD materials is CFLCC forces encountering abandoned or discarded materials as Arianian forces are defeated and withdraw back to AN. The TE units are tasked with dealing with encountered abandoned or discarded CBRN materials.

(6) Individual Protection. All personnel are to have immediate access to individual protective equipment suitable for 48 hours of operations in a contaminated environment and replacement equipment available within four hours. Component Commanders are authorized to order specific Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) Levels as deemed appropriate to the tactical situation.

(7) Collective Protection. Components are to establish Collective Protection facilities at medical facilities and major headquarters locations as necessary.

(8) Radiation Exposure Guidance. Commanders at all levels are required to reduce the risks from ionizing radiation by avoiding unnecessary exposure. TCNs are to ensure that their troops are equipped with appropriate dosimetry equipment and establish maximum permissible doses. For US Forces OEG is 50cGy.

(9) CBRN Reporting and Warning. CFLCC and 310th ESC are to establish CBRN Warning and Reporting networks in AP and GO respectively. TCNs are to ensure that National Command Elements and National Support Elements establish contact with the appropriate CBRN Center. The CJTF-OIG Warning and Reporting Network diagram is detailed in Appendix 1.

(10) Environmental Protection. CJTF-OIG personnel employed in CBRN Defense operations must protect the environment as much as possible. Commanders will employ environmentally responsible practices that minimize adverse impacts to the greatest extent practicable. Close coordination with HN agencies and Coalition partners during CBRN Defense actions is required to avoid negative environmental consequences.

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3. Sustainment

a. Resupply.

(1) Mission critical shortages of CBRN defense equipment/supplies are to be requisitioned immediately.

(2) Upon the commencement of Phase II, the US forces are to push at least 1 x ICE pack per soldier every 30 days. US units are authorized to requisition ICE between pushes as required. 15th SUST BDE in AP is to hold an additional set per person for the CFLCC. Other TCNs will ensure their units hold sufficient CBRN protective equipment and may place additional equipment with 15th SUST BDE.

(3) Decontamination supplies are to be stockpiled forward with 15th SUST BDE, and not procured from the HN.

b. Biological Casualty Reporting. Special monitoring and reporting arrangements are to be instituted by medical staff, and careful attention paid to any changes in the rate of sickness or infectious diseases.

c. CBRN contaminated casualties will be segregated and decontaminated as far forward as possible at casualty collection points (CCPs). 1st MED BDE will establish policy and procedures.

d. CBRN contaminated remains are to be segregated and not buried in the JOA. Further direction is to be issued.

4. Command and Signal

a. Command. 310th ESC has overall CBRN responsibility for GO, and CFLCC responsibility for AP.

(1) CJTF-OIG CJ3 Force Protection (CBRN). LTC XXXXXX.

(2) (COM 415th CBRNE BDE. Colonel XXXXXX is the senior CBRN Defense Officer in theater.

b. Communications. The CJTF-OIG CBRN Center is to be located in the CJTF-OIG Main Command Post. The primary means of communication between the CJTF-OIG CBRN Center and Component CBRN Centers is secure E-mail followed by secure voice.

c. Reach back. CBRN reach back support through HQ CJTF-OIG.

d. CBRN Liaison. 415th CBRNE BDE is to be prepared to deploy an LNO to the Atropian Supreme High Command (SHC).

ATTACHMENTS:

Appendix 1 CJTF-OIG CBRN Warning and Report Network Diagram (To be issued)

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**ANNEX O ((INFORMATION OPERATIONS (EXTRACTS)) TO OPORD 01
(OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG**

References:

- a. FM 3-13 Inform and Influence Activities, Jan 2013
- b. Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations, Nov 2012
- c. Joint Publication 3-53 Civil-Military Operations, 08 Jul 2008
- d. Joint Publication 3-13.2 Military Information Support Operations 20 Dec 2011
- e. Gorgas Country Study
- f. Atropia Country Study
- g. Ariana Country Study

1. Situation

a. Background. On (insert date) AN military forces invaded Atropian territory with a significant and well-supported ground force. The defending Atropian forces finally succeeded in stopping the AN force. The AN Forces have adopted a defensive posture occupying a pocket extending approximately 60 kilometers into southern AP.

The UN Security Council passed UNSCR 7752 and authorized the deployment of the CJTF-OIG in support of the UN-sanctioned ASAM mission for an initial period of 12 months, with the objectives of expelling Arianian forces from Atropian territory and deterring further aggression, preserving human life and alleviating and re-establishing a safe and secure environment in AP.

Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, UK and US have agreed to provide maritime elements to enforce the embargo within a coalition context. The name of the UN-sanctioned mission is the AP Security and Assistance Mission (ASAM). The coalition force will be known as CJTF-OIG and will consist of land, sea, air and special operations units from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The United States has offered to be the lead Troop Contributing Nation (TCN), providing the majority of critical force enablers. The Governments of AP, Gorgas (GO) and Turkey (TU) have consented, subject to SOFAs, to allow CJTF-OIG forces to stage through their territories, to station forces, materiel and installations involved in supporting its operations and to overflights.

Refer to paragraph 1 of the main body of CJTF-OIG OPORD 01, Annex B - Intelligence and Annex G - Land Operations for more detail.

b. General. Information Operations (IO) is the military advisory and coordinating function that targets and affects information and information systems, human or technical, of approved parties and audiences in order to achieve desired effects while protecting one's own. The goal of IO is to gain and maintain information superiority in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).

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During OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN (OIG), IO is to contribute decisively to Domain Awareness and Situational Understanding in support of the COMCJTF-OIG's plans.

CJTF-OIG must deny Arianian forces and Arianian proxy groups, insurgents, and/or Arianian-supported criminal elements the ability to effectively command and control their forces by defeating their command, control, communications, computer and Intelligence (C4I) systems.

c. Threat Considerations.

(1) Armed insurgents remain a viable threat throughout Atropia and Gorgas. Ariana military C4I systems are modern and sophisticated threats. South Atropian People's Army (SAPA) operating in the area will most likely have the support of the Arianian government. Insurgent and terrorist organizations are financially capable of obtaining state-of-the art electronic equipment on the open market. Expect Arianian forces to continue to mount sophisticated information operations in support of their overall military campaign.

(2) The Ariana regime has historically used propaganda to influence or attempt to influence the Atropian populace and the international community and it is expected that they will continue such activities. The Arianian government and the SAPA are expected to continue to mount a carefully constructed, well-orchestrated, world-wide propaganda campaign as part of the military campaign.

(3) During operations Ariana forces will use messengers, and Frequency-Modulated (FM) and Amplitude-Modulated (AM) radios for routine communications. There are reports of recent acquisitions throughout the region of commercial hand-held FM radios, which are vulnerable to monitoring, jamming, and exploitation.

(4) Face to face communication is highly effective and easy to initiate messages. Historically, face to face communications have been influential and effective among the local populace in crisis situations.

(5) Cell phones are mostly utilized in the larger metropolitan areas due to location of available cell towers.

(6) Arianian forces have the capability to employ all facets of information operations against CJTF-OIG. Ariana and supporters in the region can organize a network of human intelligence (HUMINT) operatives supported with sufficient off-the-shelf electronic eavesdropping and jamming devices to interfere with friendly operations throughout the region and to a limited extent the maritime portions of the JOA.

(7) Governments within the JOA have only recently begun to transition away from authoritarian type government to a more representational democracy. Gorgas, Atropia and possibly Ariana face significant internal issues that must be factored into all Information Operations. While friendly nations within the JOA will support Coalition interests in the region, it can be expected that their military may use non-democratic means to control their populations. These may include psychological operations against their own citizens and especially against ethnic minorities within their borders.

(8) Although Ariana's counter-battery radars are vulnerable to Electronic Warfare (EW), Ariana's GPS jammers are capable of disrupting UAS guidance and GPS guided munitions. In addition, Ariana demonstrated the ability to conduct Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks against Atropian and Coalition unclassified networks as well as

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commercial and local networks within the civilian sector. With the combination of Electronic Warfare (EW) and Cyberspace Operations (CO) capabilities, Ariana possesses the ability to disrupt command and control.

(9) More details are contained in Annex B - Intelligence.

d. Civil Considerations. The presence of large numbers of Atropian citizens displaced from their homes because of collateral damage, or fleeing in the face of hostile operations, will require careful targeting and restrictive ROE to prevent civilian casualties. Air assets may be required to conduct Non-Traditional Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (NTISR) to monitor displaced civilian movements and civil unrest/demonstrations. Existing IDP camps are to be identified in coordination with HN, Interagency and Nongovernmental representatives.

2. Mission Information Operations is to shape the JOA to achieve Information superiority and dominate the Information environment through the coordinated contribution of enablers in support of the COMCJTF-OIG mission.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations.

(1) General. In order to achieve Information Superiority and dominate the Information Environment, the coordinated contribution of all enablers is essential throughout all phases. This is to produce synchronized effects on the determination, will and morale of targeted audiences. It is also to deter and defeat threats to CJTF-OIG objectives while maintaining the support and confidence of allies, local populations and the international community. An important focus is to be on mitigating negative responses to CJTF-OIG operations, marginalizing Arianian forces and their proxies and influencing key decision makers.

(2) Intent. In the Information Environment, IO is to contribute to the achievement of CJTF-OIG Information Superiority at the earliest possible moment and gradually move towards Information Supremacy. The IO enablers are to be employed with a view to support the stated objectives in an aggressive and pro-active manner in order to maintain the IO initiative.

Coordination and synchronization of associated enabling functions are to focus on flexible responses to consequence management and exploitation of opportunities. IO is to support this mission by disrupting Arianian C4I, diminishing the Arianian "will to fight," persuading the Atropian civilian populace to cooperate with Coalition operations, and by protecting friendly information systems in order to compel the withdrawal of Arianian forces, thereby enabling the restoration of a secure and stable environment and contributing to the capacity of Atropian civil authority and security forces.

IO is to support operations during all phases to shape the information environment in the JOA and the Area of Influence by synchronizing, coordinating and de-conflicting Information Related Capabilities (IRC).

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IO disrupts enemy C4I by supporting Physical Destruction (PD), Electronic Warfare (EW) and MISO to diminish enemy propaganda, disrupt enemy C2, degrade enemy situational awareness and delay enemy decision making in order to compel the withdrawal of Arianian military forces from Atropia.

IO degrades the Arianian will to fight by supporting Military Deception (MILDEC), MISO and PD to elicit surrender and desertion from Arianian forces in order to discredit the Arianian military presence in Atropia.

IO protects friendly information systems by employing OPSEC and Cyberspace Operations (CO) to deny enemy access to friendly force capabilities in order to enhance Force Protection.

IO influences the Atropian populace to cooperate with CJTF-OIG forces by employing MISO, EW, CMO, CO, and leveraging unity of effort with interagency, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions and the private sector in order to achieve security and stability in the JOA.

b. IO Objectives. IO objectives in support of COMCJTF-OIG's mission are:

(1) Disrupt Ariana C4I by employing PD, EW, STO, MISO to diminish enemy propaganda, disrupt enemy C2, degrade enemy situational awareness and delay enemy decision making in order to mislead the Arianian forces on the location of the decisive effort.

(2) Influence the local populace to cooperate with coalition forces by employing MISO, CMO, CO, PD; and coordinating with IA, IGO, NGO, IPI, and the private sector in order to establish security and stability in Atropia.

(3) Degrade the Arianian "will to fight" by employing MISO, MILDEC, Special Technical Operations (STO), CO, and PD to elicit surrender and desertion from Arianian forces in order to compel the withdrawal of Arianian force.

(4) Persuade Atropian forces to continue to fight by employing PAO and Key Leader Engagements (KLEs) in order to set conditions for the re-establishment of a safe and secure environment and confirm the credibility and legitimacy of civil and military authorities within Atropia.

(5) Protect friendly information systems by employing OPSEC, CO, and physical security to deny enemy access to friendly capabilities in order to enhance FP.

c. IO Themes. These are general thoughts or ideas that augment the Lines of Effort to inform and/or influence a target audience, used in engagements and to develop messages and talking points. The themes are to be updated regularly. Examples include:

(1) Security and Stability. All Atropians deserve freedom from violence and fear. The fight is not against the Arianian people, but the brutal Arianian government. The Arianian military and people are misled by their government's lies and ambitions. The Atropia Security and Assistance Mission (ASAM) was authorized by the UN to protect the territorial integrity of Atropia and to restore a secure and stable environment for the Atropian people.

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(2) Legitimacy. The future of Atropia is in the hands of the Atropian people and the Atropian government. Humanitarian assistance is a high priority to the people of the Atropia and is supported by the commanders of Atropian and Coalition forces. ASAM is a UN-sanctioned mission and CJTF-OIG is a well-trained, ethical, competent, credible, UN-sanctioned force, acting under a UN mandate and with the welcome support and assistance of the international community, in particular the governments of Gorgas and Atropia.

(3) Economic and Social Progress. Acting in accordance with the Rule of Law, and with the support of the international community, Atropian authorities will continue to promote effective governance and economic and social progress to the benefit of all its citizens throughout the CJTF-OIG deployment and after it has withdrawn.

d. Scheme of Maneuver. IO support to Op IRON GUARDIAN corresponds to the three operational phases as follows:

(1) Phase I – Deployment and Defensive Operations. During this phase the various IO enablers are to be activated. Theatre Mission Specific Training (TMST) and enabler specific training are to be conducted. Funds are to be allocated to enable both Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) and Civil Affairs (CO) Operations. Staff are to contribute to the development of a shared understanding and are to conduct Information Preparation of the Operating Environment (IPOE).

Refinement of the IPOE is to continue in cooperation with the Intelligence IPOE process. The IPOE, Target Audience Analysis (TAA) and enemy electronic ORBAT are to be refined to the point where they can be used to inform the targeting process that is to be established. The various IO enablers are to be deployed.

An IO Supporting Plan is to be developed and will include refinement of Information Objectives to enable the development of tactical plans by CJTF-OIG enablers to support operational objectives. Additional structures are to be activated, such as Information Operations Working Groups (IOWG), Information Operations Coordination Boards (IOCB) and the Products Approval Boards. Approval of Target Audiences are to be sought from respective authorities at all levels, as appropriate.

(2) Phase II – Decisive Offensive Operations. The IO enablers will conduct full spectrum operations within the Information Environment to achieve Information Supremacy. The various tasks to be assigned will follow the IO scheme of maneuver that will be established based on COMCJTF-OIG's guidance and plan. Approval of Target Audiences are to continue to be sought, as appropriate.

(3) Phase III – Redeployment. During this phase the focus will be on preparing the way for the transition from CJTF-OIG to a follow-on force, capacity-building and support to Host Nation civil authorities and security forces and CJTF-OIG redeployment. Early attention is to be paid to the capture of lessons learned and best practices, shaping perceptions of the mission and redeployment and establishing a positive legacy for CJTF-OIG and ASAM.

e. End State. The end state is to be achieved once the mission is accomplished and all elements of the IO organization have been redeployed to their home units and bases.

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f. Tasks. Grouping and tasks specific to elements of the IO organization are to be determined. Likely tasks include:

- (1) Disrupt Arianian C4I.
- (2) Reduce Arianian Forces will to fight.
- (3) Influence the local populace to cooperate with coalition forces.
- (4) Exploit Arianian military personnel captures/surrenders.
- (5) Counter Arianian propaganda and media inaccuracies.
- (6) Exploit Arianian atrocities.
- (7) Protect friendly information systems.
- (8) Develop and coordinate target lists to disrupt, damage and destroy Arianian military/paramilitary ability to develop, produce, and disseminate propaganda activity.
- (9) Develop and coordinate target lists to disrupt Arianian C4I capabilities.
- (10) Conduct MISO to prevent local civilian interference with operations and to gain support for coalition forces.
- (11) Coordinate with civil affairs for Humanitarian Assistance support.
- (12) Nominate Captured HVI target packages for exploitation.
- (13) Submit evidence of enemy use of schools and hospitals for military purposes to de-legitimize Arianian government/military and protect the local populace.
- (14) Inform national and international audiences of friendly force progress and efforts to reinforce the strength, legitimacy and good intentions of CJTF-OIG and the ASAM.
- (15) Inform Atropian audiences of CJTF-OIG successes and inevitable victory in order to diminish the Arianian political and military will to pursue their aims through armed intervention and convince Atropian populace to support the legitimacy of the Atropian government, ASAM, and CJTF-OIG.
- (16) Exploit brutality of Arianian paramilitary forces' tactics, to include kidnapping, torture, murder, IDF and IED attacks that injure civilians, and use of residential areas or protected sites as operational bases.
- (17) Exploit Atropian participation in successful IDP/refugee returns.
- (18) Report locations of broadcast facilities (radio, TV, print facilities).
- (19) Be prepared to conduct security area leaflet drops utilizing CJTF-OIG air assets.

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g. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) IO Enablers. IO enablers are to contribute to mission success through the following functions:

- (a) Influence Activities (IA). Influence behaviour, perception and will.
- (b) Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). Additional details in Annex L.
- (c) Civil Affairs (CA). Additional details in Annex W.
- (d) Key Leader Engagements (KLE) and outreach activities.
- (e) Presence, Posture and Profile (PPP).
- (f) Military Deception (MILDEC).
- (g) Public Affairs (PA). Additional details in Annex X.
- (h) Information Protection Activities (IPA). Protect and control information.
- (i) Computer Network Operations (CNO).
- (j) Electronic Warfare (EW). Additional details in Annex P.
- (k) Operations Security (OPSEC).
- (l) Information Security (INFOSEC).
- (m) Counter Intelligence (CI).
- (n) Counter Command Activities (CCA). Affect the C2 capability of the adversary through the targeting process.
- (o) Maneuver.
- (p) Physical Attack/Destruction.

(2) OPSEC Violations. Potential OPSEC violations are to be reported to Protection Cell as soon as possible. Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) are to be protected.

(3) Video images (COMCAM, PA, EOD, Soldier Cam). COMCAM and other still photo/video capabilities are to be employed to capture images in support of objectives and effects. Images are to be submitted for exploitation. Images desired for use by any unit are to be declassified by the unit involved in capturing the image. During crisis situations, special arrangements are to be made to transport images, video or data from field locations to areas where images can be exploited. Designated PAO/G7 reps are to coordinate to have imagery submitted to CJTF-OIG for dissemination approval.

(4) Coordinating Bodies. Additional coordinating bodies are to be activated, such as Information Operations Working Groups (IOWG), the Information Operations Coordination Boards (IOCB), and the Products Approval Boards.

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ANNEX P (ELECTRONIC WARFARE) TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG

Reference:

Joint Publication 3-51 (Joint Electronic Warfare) 7 April 2000

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu.

1. Situation

a. Enemy Forces

(1) Ariana Defense Force (ADF)

(a) Land Forces. Recent improvements to the Arianian Army have brought its C2 networks up to a near-peer capability.

(b) Naval Forces. No specific information regarding C2 systems. Recent upgrades to the naval forces have modernized their C2 and fire control (FC) networks including a network of coastal defense batteries.

(c) Air Forces. The Arianian air defense system network is a fully integrated system supported by advanced early warning, search, target acquisition and tracking radars. Their Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) network C2 employs modern military communications systems using landline, fiber, micro-wave radio-relay and tactical military radio. The IADS is also tightly integrated with Land Force elements.

(d) Information and Electronic Warfare. Ariana defines information warfare (IW) as specifically planned and integrated actions to achieve an information advantage at critical points and times. Ariana conducts IW at all levels of warfare, strategic, operational, and tactical, but without regard to strict definitional boundaries between these levels. Opponents of the State are subject to IW regardless of the level and degree of engagement in other types of operations. Ariana has a robust IW capability.

(e) Cyber Attack. In recent years, the government has allocated a significant share of its oil revenues to military research and development required to manufacture or exploit weapons of mass destruction, advanced conventional weapons, and diverse electronic warfare technologies.

The capabilities “gap” that currently exists in Ariana’s ability to carry out sustained and significant cyber-attacks against other countries is expected to close rapidly. Current hostilities may provide the impetus. This is because all of the resources that Ariana requires, whether human or technological, can be acquired quickly and comparatively cheaply from “gray” and “black” market sources.

Additionally, recent years have seen the Arianian regime receive significant inputs to its strategic programs from abroad, most prominently from Olvana and North Torbia.

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(f) Computer Attack. Of the Caucasus countries, Ariana maintains the second most robust computer attack capability through a large and capable cyber reserve force.

While it is doubtful that Ariana could effectively penetrate major nation state-systems, Ariana possesses significant overmatch to any regional opponent except Donovia, due to their relatively large population of computer experts.

(g) Information Attack. Ariana possesses one of the most-developed Information Attack (IA) capabilities in the region, second only to Donovia even though these capabilities may seem rudimentary by global standards. Ariana maintains a large cyber-focused force and previously attempted to use IA against reformist protesters. These efforts generated limited effects and, while its capabilities continue to improve, Ariana's IA will still probably only operate effectively against non-state actors. AN IA is not very effective against top-tier nation states and their allies.

(h) Open Source Intelligence. Ariana operates a massive open source intelligence (OSINT) program with government and government-affiliated operators who collect primarily via the Internet. The Ariana military continues to mobilize a large force of cyber collectors, most with computer warfare and English language skills, to collect information both on internal opposition to the government and on other adversaries.

(i) Signals Intelligence. Ariana SIGINT programs consistently demonstrate success in combating Western communications systems, especially units that demonstrate poor OPSEC. CJTF-OIG can expect enemy SIGINT to provide useable indications and warning, capabilities assessment, and targeting intelligence. Arianian SIGINT operators have significant "real world" experience and capabilities in all languages of the Caucasus area of operations as well as English.

(2) Integrated Network and Electronic Warfare. The ADF has followed known Donovanian doctrine in the development of Integrated Network and Electronic Warfare (INEW) doctrine which calls for the immediate seizure of information supremacy at the beginning of a conflict or before. This doctrine, which relies on its increasingly integrated C2 systems, allows the Arianian Forces to co-ordinate and integrate geographically dispersed elements, especially its IADS, into a comprehensive C2 network.

(a) Air Forces. The Ariana Air Force has a moderate heliborne EW jamming capability, employing HIP-J/K and HORIZON platforms.

(b) Naval Forces. Recently, the Arianian Navy conducted exercises in the Persian Gulf that demonstrated at least a tier 2 rating for defensive EW capabilities, but no indication of substantive offensive EW has been demonstrated.

(c) Land Forces. Recently, Ariana established an Information Warfare (IW) Brigade to develop electronic and computer warfare capabilities. The IW Bde includes both offensive and defensive EW capabilities, including:

1. Vehicle-mounted 1L222 ELINT (8-18 GHz) signals intercept for pulsed airborne radars, fire control radars, terrain following radars and ground mapping radars as well as weapon (missile) data links. It was reported by at least one source to have been modified to receive and locate emissions associated with satellite telephones;

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2. Aviaconversia, Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) jamming transmitter, which jams civilian and military frequencies for GLONASS and GPS within a 200 km range;

3. Ground surveillance radar, RASIT, which automatically detects, tracks, and identifies all targets. It provides polar and Universal Transverse Mercator coordinates on a TV monitor, plotting table, or mapping computer. The digital data can be transmitted to remote users over a network via standard interface. RASIT E data can be integrated with and displayed on an integrated battle management system using TCP/IP interface;

4. Tigr-M REI PP LEER 2 Mobile EW System, a mobile technical control, electronic emulation and electronic countermeasures system that is designed for developing radio emitters, jamming, and suppressing radio-electronic means including cellular phone systems. The system can also imitate various radio electronic systems. It can operate in a static position and on the move, and operates close to the FLOT in support of motorized, mechanized or armored forces moving at high rates of speed; and

5. Various other (tier 3) HF/VHF radio intercept and DF systems;

(3) Asymmetric Forces. The various armed groups employ civilian telecom infrastructure as their primary means of communications, with commercial-off-the-shelf radios for low-level tactical communications when required.

b. Donovia. This country has historically conducted intelligence operations in areas where it maintains or is creating extensive trade relationships. Donovia uses its commercial enterprises as vectors for collection and recruitment activities. Donovia maintains a very close relationship with both Atropia and Ariana. Comment: It is highly likely that Donovia has ongoing intelligence operations and has penetrated some aspects of the Atropia intelligence and security apparatuses given their level of economic interest in Atropia.

c. Host Nation Atropia. All media emanates from BAKU with respect to TV programming, transmission towers, Internet servers etc. Most major outlets are controlled by the government or by associates of the President, this includes broadcast and print media and internet, as well as social media access.

(1) Telecommunications.

(a) The telephone system in Atropia does not work very well, although it is being upgraded. Atropia has made significant improvements to its telecom services, largely with Donovanian expertise, financing and technology. The city of Baku has 4G LTEA connectivity and the areas around Sumgait, Shemaka, Ganja, Astara, Mingchevir, and Agstafa have 3G HSPA. Cellular telephones can be purchased and used locally. Two companies share the market, Atropcel - a subsidiary of Atroptelecom - and Bakcell (Motorola). GSM (Global System for Mobile) coverage is still basic, but growing quickly. The government, through the Ministry of Communications and Atroptelecom controls the telephone system. An estimated 200,000 clients are awaiting telephone installation, providing a bonanza for mobile phone operators.

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(b) Cellular system integration and hardware are supplied by Atroptelecom, and the networks are supported by extensive microwave relay links. Investment in the Public Switched Telephone Network was scaled back in favor of this expansion. However, fiber optic trunks linking major cities form the backbone for the 4G and 3G networks. The public telephone system is based on open wire technology with microwave radio relays. Broadcasters are owned and operated by the State monopoly Atroptelecom.

The Ministry of Communications has licensed the Atroptelecom to provide the following four telecom services: Public Switched Telecommunication Service; GSM 900Mhz Mobile Telecommunication Service; Internet Service Provision; and Digital Data Communication. Fixed line and mobile telephone services are provided exclusively by Atroptelecom, although work is shared by Atropcel and Bakcell. GSM service is concentrated around major routes. The state has a monopoly on access and routinely monitors all communications.

(c) Telephone Service. The majority of telephones are in the capital city Baku and other main cities. About 700 villages still do not have public phone service. Baku has approximately 280,000 telephones. The quality of local calls varies considerably depending on which telephone exchange is used. All long distance calls must use Atroptel's lines. There are only a few card-operated public phones in Baku. These allow calls to any destination. The cards can be bought from the central post office, telephone offices, and the railway station.

(d) Internet. E-mail via several local internet service providers is available, as well as public access from a number of internet cafés. As smart phones continue to develop more “apps” (applications), TVs, monitors, and smart phones will have the capability to observe the viewer as all these media have imbedded cameras in the screen. This enhanced capability and many more, make the “internet” definition as a ‘modem on a desktop’ computer obsolete. All new TVs and smart phones can access the internet now and accessing the internet is no longer a discrete and independent function. This is extremely significant in a modern urban city such as Baku where you would expect this cutting-edge technology to be available.

d. Friendly Forces.

(1) CJTF-OIG Integral EW. The CJTF-OIG capability consists of EW assets integral to the Component Commands. Each Component has a different approach to organizing their forces in order to plan and execute EW. A CJTF-OIG Joint Frequency Management Office (JFMO) is to be established to support joint planning, coordination, and control of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum for assigned forces. A CJTF-OIG multinational force (MNF) EWCC is also to be established to support joint planning, coordination, and control of disruption (EA), protection (EP), and monitoring (ES) of the EM spectrum.

(2) Coalition Coordination. The planning and coordination of multinational force EW is challenging because of complex security issues, different crypto equipment, differences in the training level of involved forces, and language barriers. These problems are well understood and CJTF-OIG EW planners are required to balance their own national security issues against mission accomplishment. EW staff officers are required at CJTF-OIG from each Component Command, as well as requested from each TCN. These EW staff officers will form the MNF EWCC at HQ CJTF-OIG, under supervision of HQ CJTF-OIG CJ3.

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Components requiring EW support from another component are encouraged to directly liaise and coordinate that support when possible, informing the MNF EWCC planners of the results of such coordination. At the CJTF-OIG level, EW planners must be familiar with coordination efforts across functional component lines in order to be prepared to assist and facilitate when necessary.

2. **Mission** CJTF-OIG is to conduct full-spectrum EW operations and provide unimpeded access to and use of the electromagnetic environment (EME) by coalition forces for military operations.

3. **Execution**

a. **Concept of Operations.** Employment of EW resources integral to each Component Command is to remain within the scope of respective Component Commanders. However, management of the EM spectrum and coordination of EA, EP, and ES across two or more Components is to be conducted centrally at CJTF-OIG. A CJTF-OIG Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL) and CJTF-OIG EMCON Plan (TBI) is to form the basis upon which Components are to develop their own EW plans.

b. (U) **Tasks.**

(1) **CJTF-OIG HQ.**

(a) Establish and maintain a multinational EWCC (MNF EWCC) with contribution and augmentation from all Component Commands and TCN.

(b) Establish and maintain a Joint Frequency Management Office (JFMO).

(c) Monitor for compliance with the JRFL and EMCON Plan by friendly EW assets and be prepared to issue a CEASE BUZZER notification as/if required.

(d) Recommend changes to EW operations based on emerging frequency de-confliction requirements.

(e) Establish ROE for EA employment, and ensure that the EA plan complies with the CJTF-OIG ROE and national ROE as appropriate.

(f) Establish a “chattermark” plan to ensure communications net availability in the presence of jamming, intrusion, or interference

(g) Establish and designate a Jamming Control Authority (JCA) to conduct in-theater coordination, employment, targeting, and de-confliction of EA and ES assets, where such employment may have an effect across more than one Component Command.

(2) **All Component Commands.**

(a) Provide suitably qualified EW staff officers to the CJTF-OIG MNF EWCC.

(b) Coordinate EW operations with other associated Component Commands where such operations may have an impact/effect outside own assigned area of electronic influence, ensuring that the CJTF-OIG MNF EWCC is well positioned to coordinate any such cross-Component EW resource employment.

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(c) Request EW support directly from other Component Commands, ensuring that the CJTF-OIG MNF EWCC is well positioned to coordinate any such cross-Component EW resource employment.

(3) Troop Contributing Nations (TCN).

(a) Provide suitably qualified EW staff officers to the CJTF-OIG MNF EWCC.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Cross-Component EW coordination direct liaison, with support from MNF EWCC.

(2) JRFL. Appendix 1. (not issued)

(3) EMCON Plan. Appendix 2. (not issued)

(4) JSIR Program. Appendix 3. (not issued)

4. **Administration and Logistics**

a. Reports.

(1) Comm Status Report. CJ6

(2) MIJI Report. CJ3/MNF EWCC, via JSIR-formatted messages

(3) CEASE BUZZER Notification. JCA

b. Reprogramming. Reprogramming of EW equipment is a national responsibility. MNF EWCC is to be advised of any challenges or limitations that could result in fratricide so that de-confliction efforts can be coordinated.

c. EW Support Requests. CJ3/MNF EWCC

d. TABOO, PROTECTED, and GUARDED Freq Requests. CJ6

e. Joint Spectrum Management System. SPECTRUM XXI

5. **Command and Control**

a. EW Operational Authority. COMCJTF-OIG remains operational authority over all EW assets and information.

b. Technical Authority. CJ3, through the MNF EWCC and CJ6 acts as the technical authority for coordination of access to and use of the EME.

c. Points of Contact.

(1) CJTF-OIG HQ: MNF EWCC

(2) CJTF-OIG JRFL: CJTF-OIG CJ6

(3) CFMCC: IWC

(4) CFLCC: G3 CEMA

(5) CFACC: Battlefield Coordination Detachment

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- (6) CJFSOCC: IO Cell
- (7) ESC: G3 CEMA
- (8) CF Med: G3 CEMA

ATTACHMENTS:

- Appendix 1 JRFL (TBI – Mission Secret)
- Appendix 2 EMCON Plan (TBI – Mission Secret)
- Appendix 3 JSIR Program (TBI – Mission Secret)

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ANNEX Q (COMMUNICATION SYSTEM SUPPORT) TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG

References:

Joint Publication 6-0 (Joint Communication System) 10 June 2015

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu.

1. **Situation** On (insert date) AN military forces invaded Atropian territory with a significant and well-supported ground force. The defending Atropian forces finally succeeded in stopping the AN force. The AN Forces have adopted a defensive posture occupying a pocket extending approximately 60 kilometers into southern AP.

The UN Security Council passed UNSCR 7752 and authorized the deployment of the CJTF-OIG in support of the UN-sanctioned ASAM mission for an initial period of 12 months, with the objectives of expelling Arianian forces from Atropian territory and deterring further aggression, preserving human life and alleviating and re-establishing a safe and secure environment in AP.

See CJTF-OIG OPORD 01 for more detail.

2. **Mission.** 11 Signal Battalion, in direct support to HQ CJTF-OIG, is to install, operate and maintain CJTF-OIG communication and information system packages, and coordinate C4I support for Operation IRON GUARDIAN by establishing the signal architecture to support all phases of the operation and preparing CJTF-OIG for contingency missions and follow-on combat operations.

3. **Execution.**

a. **Concept of Operations.** Signal Operations are to be conducted by phases in order to build reliable and redundant network architecture in support of all CJTF-OIG Component Command nodes. Primary and alternate means of communications are outlined by phase.

(1) **Phase I: Deployment and Defensive Operations.**

(a) This phase begins with notification of the HQ CJTF-OIG deployment forward to Tbilisi, Gorgas. HQ CJTF-OIG CJ6 is to conduct network engineering and preparations in support of the operational and tactical plan. This phase includes link-up, liaison, and interface with in-place 82nd AB Div and Atropian Armed Forces (AAF), Securing Enroute Communications Package (SECOMP) preparation and installation, the deployment of CJTF-OIG Signal Bn support elements to the CJTF Forward Command Post in Tbilisi, and the SPOD in Poti, Gorgas.

(b) This phase includes the configuration and preparation of the Global Rapid Response Information Package (GRRIP), and Ground Uplink Station (GUS) for use in support of the CJTF-OIG Forward Command Post. Key engineering tasks include developing the Joint

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Network Transport Capability (JNTC) architecture, and integrating the SECOMP, GRRIP, and GUS.

(c) One Joint Network Node (JNN) is to be assigned to the SPOD in Poti, Gorgas. All other available signal assets is to be deployed to Tbilisi and staged for onward movement.

(d) Key NETOPS tasks include establishing a NETOPS presence in the EUCOM Joint Network Control Center (JNCC), establish coordination with the Landstuhl Regional Hub Node (RHN), execute all required frequency request/coordination with EUCOM and the host nations, and produce/distribute operation-specific Joint Signal Operating Instruction (JSOI).

The primary bearer network is to be the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System – Operation IRON GUARDIAN (CENTRIXS-OIG). CENTRIXS-OIG is to integrate into the EUCOM Mission Secret Network (EMSN).

JNCC is to conduct a COMMEX of all digital communications systems and services extended to all Component Commands.

This phase ends once all signal equipment is integrated into the CJTF-OIG network, and staged forward to connect CFMCC, CFLCC, CFACC, CJFSOFC, 310th ESC, and 1st Medical Bde.

(2) Phase II: Decisive Offensive Operations. This phase focuses and sustains the theater network support to HQ CJTF-OIG and its subordinate Component Commands.

Deployable Joint C2 (DJC2) and DTAC signal assemblage is to establish a Joint Forward Network Control Center (JFNCC) in Tbilisi. CJTF-OIG Signal Bn is to establish one JNN forward.

Two Command Post Node (CPN) sections are to stage with CFLCC and CJFSOFC and prepare to move with and support LNOs as required. One CPN is to airland in support of the Atropian LNO team.

Remaining CJTF-OIG Signal Bn CPN assemblages are to be designated as LNO Data Packages. Primary is to remain CENTRIXS-OIG, alternate is to be TACSAT. During formation movement within the JOA, Primary is to be TACSAT, alternate Binary File Transfer (BFT), contingent is Secure Iridium Satellite Phone.

(3) Phase III: Redeployment. On order. Key tasks during this phase include maintaining the JNTC architecture. Key Engineering tasks include re-configuration, power analysis, and jump configuration of SECOMP, GRRIP and GUS equipment to facilitate maximum mobility and survivability. Primary is to remain CENTRIXS-OIG, alternate is to be TACSAT.

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ANNEX R- ((LOGISTICS (EXTRACTS)) TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF OIG

References:

- a. Basic CONPLAN 4404, 191230Z NOV 13 (FOUO).
- b. Joint Pub 4-0, 6 April 2000, "Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations."
- c. Joint Pub 4-01, Mobility System Policies, Procedures, and Considerations.
- d. Joint Pub 4-01.8, 13 June 2000, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration."
- e. Joint Pub 4-06, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations.
- f. Joint Pub 4-07, 11 June 2001, "Joint Doctrine for Common User Logistics during Joint operations."
- g. Joint Pub 4-08, 15 May 2001, "Joint Doctrine for Multi-National Operations."
- h. Joint Pub 5-00.2, 13 January 1999, "Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures."
- i. USEUCOM Contingency Plan 4311-96, 16 February 1998, "Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations."
- j. USEUCOM Directive (ED) 55-11, 17 January 1999, "Joint Task Force Headquarters Policies Procedures and Organization."
- k. USEUCOM Directive (ED) 60-8, 19 September 2001, "Logistics Support Using Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA)."
- l. USEUCOM Directive (ED) 66-1, 15 February 1996, Mortuary Affairs."
- m. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Arrangement between the U.S. DoD and the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense dated 8 Jan 2007.
- n. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Arrangement between the U.S. DoD and the Department of Defense of France, dated 23 Feb 1987.
- o. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Arrangement between the U.S. DoD and the Department of Defense of Italy, dated 15 Apr 2001.
- p. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Arrangement between the U.S. DoD and the Department of Defense of Canada, dated 15 Apr 2001.
- q. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Arrangement between the U.S. DoD and the Department of Defense of Spain dated 19 May 1999.
- r. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Arrangement between the U.S. DoD and the Department of Defense of Norway, dated 20 Aug 1982.
- s. DOD Directive 4000.19 Defense Regional Inter-Service Support.
- t. USEUCOMINST 4000.2N USEUCOM Defense Regional Inter-Service Support.
- u. USEUCOMINST 4000.6A Mutual Logistics Support between the United States and the Governments of other Countries.
- v. USEUCOMINST 4082.1A Wartime Host Nation Support.
- w. USEUCOMINST 4200.4H USEUCOM Contracting Management Policy.

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Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU.

1. Situation.

a. Enemy Forces. Under the stated aim of “liberating ethnic Arianians from the oppressive governance of the despotic Atropian regime”, Ariana (AN) invaded Atropia (AP) with the AN Armed Forces crossing the AP border on (*insert date*). Ground operations were preceded by a phased attack by the AN Air Force (ANAF).

The final phase of the ANAF attack consisted of fighter ground attack targeting AP and US ground forces. Concurrent with this final phase, AN ground forces crossed the international border in three separate areas. In the west, what has subsequently been assessed as a Division Task Group (DTG) based on 23rd (AN) Mechanized Infantry (Mech) Division (Div) crossed the border in the area of Parsabad (38S QJ 5092) and advanced northwest.

The assessed DTG objectives were the transportation centers of Yevlax (38T PK 8198) and Mingachevir (38T PL 7315).

In the center, what has subsequently been assessed as a DTG based on 25th (AN) Mech Infantry Div (APC), crossed the border in the area of Bilasuvar (39S TD 727619) and advanced towards the Kura River crossing in the area of Ali Bayramli (39S UE 2222).

The assessed objective of this DTG was the critical junction at Kazi Magomed (39T UE 2433).

A tank brigade task group (BTG), believed to be based on 349th (AN) Tank Brigade (Bde), crossed the border in the area of Astara (39S UC 1456) and advanced north towards the Kura River crossing in the area of Salyan (39S UD 2685).

The assessed objective of the 349th (AN) Tank BTG was the Alat (39S UE 6423).

349th (AN) Tank BTG was followed on this route by elements of an AN Motorized Infantry (Mtzd) Div.

After several days of hard fighting the ANAF was unable to retain local air superiority. 82 ABN DIV fought a successful mobile defense and halted the 23rd (AN) Mech DTG in the area of Salmanbayli (38S QK 0228).

The 350th (AP) (Mtzd) Bde, reinforced by elements from 352nd (AP) Tank Bde and 356th (AP) Antitank Bde was able to defeat an initial crossing of the Kura River by 25th (AN) Mech DTG.

AP Special-Purpose Forces (SPF), supported by Coalition air, was successful in denying a crossing attempt by 349th (AN) Tank BTG. The assessed objective of the AN cross-border attack was to isolate Baku and secure the key routes to deny LCC entry into AP. Having been unsuccessful,

AN ground forces have transitioned to defensive operations. 23th (AN) Mech DTG has established a defense centered on Yeni Qaradolag (38S QK 1015) oriented to the northwest.

25th (AN) Mech DTG has established a defense along the Kura River centered on Ali Bayramli (39S UE 2222).

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An unidentified Mtzd Div has occupied the southeastern sector of AP.

All of the formations that have crossed the border are part of 3rd Mechanized Infantry Army, normally stationed in northeast AN. This would suggest that an operational-strategic command (OSC) has been formed to conduct cross border operations.

The unidentified (AN) Mtzd Div is likely either 24th or 26th Mtzd Div, also from 3rd Mechanized Infantry Army. There has been no indication of units or formations from 1st Mechanized Infantry Army having crossed into AP at this time.

Overall, the AN Armed Forces are well trained and capable of conducting combined arms and joint operations but are limited to regional power-projection capabilities. AN's military maintains a robust ground force with smaller, agile air and sea force capabilities

For more detail covering en forces see Annex B.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) Boundaries. See Annex CFLCC Overlays.

(2) Main Supply Routes (MSRs)/Locations –TBD.

(3) Units and Installations.

- (a) 310 Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) located Tbilisi, GO;
- (b) 15 Sust BDE located Tbilisi,GO;
- (c) 15 Sust BDE (Forward) Agstfa, AP.
- (d) 230 Sust BDE located Poti, GO.
- (e) 49 Movement Control Battalion located Poti, GO;
- (f) 1 Sust BDE located TBA.
- (g) 17 Sust BDE located TBA.
- (h) 82 Sust BDE located TBA. and
- (i) 1 MED BDE located Tbilisi, GO;
- (j) 31 CSH located Marneuli, GO
- (k) 21 CSH located Tsnori GO; and
- (l) Field Hospital Regiment 41 (GE) In Reserve located TBA.
- (m) USNS Comfort deployed to provide Role 3 medical support to CFMCC.

2. **Mission.** 310 ESC is to conduct sustainment operations in support of CJTF Operation IRON GUARDIAN (CJTF-OIG).

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3. Execution.

a. General Concept of Support.

(1) Intent. In order to sustain this complex multi-national operation, support elements must remain flexible. Although sustainment remains a national responsibility the US has agreed to assume the role of Logistics Lead Nation (LLN) and will provide a significant share of the support to the force.

(2) Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) are to deploy with and maintain a minimum 30 days of supply (DOS) for the following commodities:

- (a) Class I - Combat Rations.
- (b) Class II – Clothing and equipment.
- (c) Class III - National unique POL and lubricant requirements.
- (d) Class V – Ammunition.
- (e) Class VII – Major end items.
- (f) Class VIII – Medical items not common to US medical system. and
- (g) Class IX – Repair parts.

(3) Scheme of Manoeuvre.

(a) Theater Support Area (TSA) is designated as GO and as the AO for 310 ESC. 230 Sust BDE is to provide or arrange for area support within GO for all elements of CJTF-OIG. 15 Sust BDE is to provide area support in AP. Division Support Areas (DSAs) are to be established in the CJTF-OIG LCC AO AP.

(b) As LLN the US is to establish area support structures to cover GO, KL and AP as well as providing the framework for assigned general support. TCN are to provide NSE to manage unique national support requirements. COM 310 ESC has coordinating authority for all sustainment operations.

(c) 1 MED BDE is to establish Role 3 hospitals to provide medical coverage across the JOA. Hospitals are to be assigned to provide area support and casualties are to be directed to a Role 3 facility based on proximity rather than on affiliation.

(d) TCN are to deploy with integral Role 2 medical support which is to include a surgical capability (Role 2 E) or establish bilateral arrangements with a partner nation for this coverage. Where this cannot be achieved the shortfall is to be declared to COM CJTF-OIG.

b. (U) Tasks and Responsibilities

(1) 310 ESC. Coordinate overall sustainment support for CJTF-OIG to include command of sustainment brigades assigned to area support and coordination authority for TCN National Support Elements (NSE).

(2) 15 Sust BDE. Conduct area sustainment operations within CJTF-OIG LCC AO AP;

(3) 230 Sust BDE. Conduct area sustainment operations within the 310 ESC AO GO and in TU;

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(4) 49 Mvt Ctl BN. Conduct theater level movement control across the UN ASAM/CJTF-OIG JOA.

(5) 1 MED BDE.

(a) Coordinate overall medical support to CJTF-OIG.

(b) Establish Role 3 hospitals.

(6) 1 Sust BDE. Provide sustainment to 1 Infantry Division.

(7) 17 Sust BDE. Provide sustainment support to 4 MND. Coordinate NSE in providing national level support to their affiliated brigades.

(8) 82 Sust BDE. Provide sustainment to 82 AB DIV.

(9) 57 AVN BN. Provide HH60 Medevac support to CJTF-OIG as coordinated by COM 1 MED BDE

(10) Light Helicopter Regiment 10 (GE). Provides NH90 Medevac support OPCON to COM CJTF-OIG as coordinated by COM 1 MED BDE.

(11) 18 MP BDE. Provide MP services to CJTF-OIG. TCN maintain policing authority for their members.

c. Support Affiliations

(1) (U) 1 Sust BDE.

(a) 541 Combat Sustainment Support Battalion (CSSB).

1. Direct and general support 1 ID divisional troops

2. General support 1 ID.

(b) 101 Brigade Support Battalion (BSB). Direct support 1/1 SBCT.

(c) 201 BSB. Direct Support 3/1 SBCT.

(d) 299 BSB. Direct support 2/1 SBCT

(e) 111 BSB. Direct support to 1 ARTY BDE.

(f) 555 BSB. Direct support to 1 MEB.

(g) 1 Aviation Support Battalion (ASB). Direct support to 1 AVN BDE.

(2) 17 Sust BDE.

(a) 577 CSSB.

1. Direct and general support 4 MND.

2. General support to 4 MND.

(b) 180 Tpt Bn. General support 4 MND.

(c) 777 ASB. Direct support to 4 AVN BDE.

(d) 130 BSB. Direct support to 130 MEB.

(e) 4 (UK) Logistics Support Regiment. Direct support 12 (UK) AIB.

(f) 4 (CA) Svc Bn. Direct support 4 (CA) CMBG.

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- (g) X (AS) FS Bn. Direct Support X (AS) Brigade.
- (h) 6 Franco-German Logistics Battalion. Direct support 6 Franco-German Infantry Brigade.
- (3) 82 Sust BDE.
 - (a) 189 CSSB.
 - 1. Direct and general support to 82 AB DIV divisional troops
 - 2. General support to 82 AB DIV
 - (b) 307 BSB. 1/82 Brigade Combat Team (BCT).
 - (c) 407 BSB. 2/82 BCT.
 - (d) 82 BSB. 3/82 BCT.
 - (e) 782 BSB. 4/82 BCT.
 - (f) 122 ASB. Combat Aviation Brigade
- (4) 3 Support Sqn. Direct and general support to 3 CAV.
- (5) 1 MED BDE.
 - (a) 31 CSH. Provide area based role 3 hospital capability located Marneuli, GO.
 - (b) 21 CSH. Provide area based role 3 hospital capability located Tsnori, GO.
 - (c) Field Hospital Regiment 41 (GE). In reserve pending deployment direction from 1 MED BDE, thereafter provide area based role 3 hospital capability located TBA.
 - (d) USNS Comfort. USNS Comfort is to deploy OPCON CFMCC to provide role 3 medical coverage to CFMCC and additional support to CFACC and CFLCC.
- d. Materiel and Services
 - (1) Classes of Supply.
 - (a) Class I – Rations and Water.
 - 1. 30 DOS of hard rations are held in theater by all TCN. 4 DOS are to be held within BCTs/Brigades. Divisions are to hold a minimum of 10 DOS in the CFLCC AO.
 - 2. Fresh rations are to be replenished based on a delivery cycle of every 7 to 10 days when authorized. 310 ESC is the lead for all fresh rations procurement. Fresh rations are not to be provided during offensive operations.
 - 3. 30 DOS of bottled water to be held in theater. 4 DOS to be held by BCT/Bde. 310 ESC is the lead for bulk water. and
 - 4. Bulk water is to be drawn from water points established by 310 ESC.
 - (b) Class II – General and Technical Stores. Class II stores are a national responsibility.
 - (c) Class III – Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL) Products. 310 ESC is the lead for POL less national unique requirements. POL points are to be established to facilitate distribution throughout the theatre. Non-common packaged POL products and industrial gases are a national responsibility.

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(d) Class IV – Construction and Barrier Materiel. Formations are to hold a minimum scale of defensive stores packs. 310 ESC is to hold bulk stocks of basic defensive stores for distribution in accordance with CJTF-OIG priorities. TCN are responsible for any specialist or national unique items.

(e) Class V – Ammunition. All natures of ammunition remain a national responsibility.

(f) Class VI – Personal Demand Items. National responsibility.

(g) (U) Class VII – Major End Items. National responsibility including release authority.

(h) Class VIII – Medical Material. National responsibility.

(i) Class IX – Repair Parts and Components. National responsibility.

e. Engineering Support. 18 EN BDE is placed OPCON to 230 Sust BDE for general construction engineering tasks within the 310 ESC AO. Coordination of engineering priorities is to be established by 310 ESC.

f. Movement and Transport

(1) Movement.

(a) Air Movement. Demands for administrative air movement support is to be submitted to 49 Mvt Ctl BN.

(b) Rail Movement. A significant rail network exists in the JOA. Priority is to be for initial deployment of combat forces with movement of replenishment stocks to supply points as the second priority. Sufficient capacity exists to move national materiel, vehicles and equipment. Requests for move by rail are to be submitted to 49 Mvt Ctl BN.

(2) Transport

(a) (CJTF-OIG Main Supply Route (MSR) CHICAGO.

(b) CJTF-OIG MSR NEW YORK. and

(c) Movement Control. All elements more than ten vehicles moving on CJTF – OIG MSRs require movement credits issued by 49 Mvt Ctl BN. Movement of more than five vehicles on other routes require move credits.

g. Salvage. Salvage operations are a national responsibility

h. Repair, Recovery and Backloading.

(1) Ground Maintenance. Repair, recovery and back-loading of ground equipment and weapons are a national responsibility. 310 ESC has capacity to assist in the rearward movement of equipment.

(2) Missile Maintenance Support. National responsibility.

i. Postal. National responsibility.

j. Contracting. Contracting is to be centrally controlled throughout by 310 ESC. All requirements for contracting support are to be routed through the appropriate Component Command to the 310 ESC ACOS Support Operations (SPO) who will be the contracting authority for CJTF-OIG.

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k. Health Services Support

(1) General. Role 1 and Role 2 medical support is a national responsibility. Role 3 medical support will be provided by 1 MED BDE through:

- (a) 31 CSH. Marneuli GO.
- (b) 21 CSH. Tsnori GO.
- (c) Field Hospital Regiment 41 (GE). In reserve. Deployment location TBA.

(2) Holding Policy. Patients are not to be held in excess of three days at Role 2 medical treatment facilities. Patients are not to be held for longer than four days at Role 3 facilities subject to medical limitations on movement of casualties.

(3) Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC).

(a) Ground MEDEVAC. Ground evacuation to Role 3 facilities is to be coordinated by the appropriate division headquarters Patient Evacuation Coordination Cell (PECC).

(b) Air MEDEVAC. Air MEDEVAC is to be the preferred method of evacuation for Category A (URGENT) and Category B (URGENT –SURG) casualties. Requests for forward and tactical Air MEDEVAC within divisional AOs is to be in accordance with Div SOPs and is to be coordinated by Div HQ PECC. Strategic AE is a national responsibility and will be coordinated with 1 MED BDE PECC.

(c) Air MEDEVAC Resources. In addition to Air MEDEVAC helicopters integral to divisions the following resources have been deployed OPCON to 1 MED BDE in support of MEDEVAC operations:

- 1. 57 AVN Co, 15 x HH60, and
- 2. Light Helicopter Regiment 10 (GE), 15 x NH90.

(d) Aeromedical Evacuation (AE). Strategic AE, involving the evac to LANDSTUHL or repatriation of TCN injured personnel is a national responsibility and is to be coordinated by 1 MED BDE PECC,

(4) Medical Stores.

(a) Land. 30 DOS in theater. TCN are to deploy with 30 DOS medical supplies. Common items are to be resupplied through 1 MED BDE, 13 Medical Logistics Battalion.

(b) Air. TCN are to deploy with 30 DOS medical supplies. Common items are to be supplied through 1 MED BDE, 13 Medical Logistics Battalion.

(c) Maritime. National responsibility.

(5) Dental Treatment. National responsibility. Surgical dental capability is to be available at all Role 3 hospitals for emergency treatment.

(6) Use of Civilian Health Facilities. Civilian health facilities are only to be used as coordinated by COM 1 MED BDE.

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(7) Geneva Conventions. HSS personnel, and non-HSS personnel assigned to HSS units in a purely medical assistance support role, are to carry a Geneva Conventions identification card and wear, on the left arm, an armlet bearing the Red Cross/Red Crescent/Red Diamond emblem. They are only to carry arms for their own defence and that of the wounded and sick under their care.

(8) Medical Handling of Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW) and CPERS.

(a) Casualties.

1. EPW and CPERS casualties are to be medically treated in accordance with the Geneva Conventions.

2. EPW and CPERS casualties are to be evacuated through the same channels as CJTF-OIG casualties but, if possible, will be kept segregated. EPW and CPERS casualties are to be admitted to Medical Treatment Facilities, as dictated by their medical condition. and

3. Units are responsible for security of EPW and CPERS while they are under treatment at medical treatment facilities.

(b) Supplies. Captured enemy medical supplies are to be used by enemy medical personnel for treatment of EPW patients. and

(9) (Assistance to International Organizations (IOs), Non-governmental Organizations (NGO) and Humanitarian Aid (HA). Support to civilian personnel is to be limited to emergency treatment and is to include evacuation to a civilian or aid agency medical facility.

1. Military Police (MP).

(1) Assigned MP Assets. 18 MP BDE.

(2) CJTF-OIG Crime Prevention/Security. Plan to be issued by PM CJTF-OIG.

(3) Discipline, Law and Order. Discipline remains a national responsibility. CJTF-OIG PM is to coordinate policing operations to ensure adherence to law and maintenance of order within the CJTF-OIG JOA.

(4) Investigations. All investigations involving coalition troops or civilians are to be directed to the appropriate coalition MP unit and, in GO and KL, may in liaison, or operate jointly with the appropriate civilian police force. Investigations that involve personnel from more than one nation are to be coordinated by the PM CJTF-OIG, at which level lead agency for joint investigative support shall be determined.

(5) Handling of EPW. Initially, co-located national MP elements are to control EPW in national custody at their respective collection points. Formations are responsible for movement to formation EPW holding areas, security and handling whilst in location, as well as rearward movement to the CFLCC Detention Holding Area and eventually OIG-level Theatre Detention Facility. Divisions are responsible for all administrative support for both MP and EPW in location. Tabs A and B to Appendix 1 of this annex apply to the handling of EPW.

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(6) Handling of CPERS. Captured persons other than those holding an EPW status as defined by the Geneva Conventions are to be retained by the capturing nations or by the coalition lead nation under pre-arranged national agreements. This is to include detention at national facilities established within formation/theatre level facilities as negotiated. Treatment of CPERS are to be IAW the highest standards established by the Geneva Conventions for EPW. Detailed information on CPERS is established in Appendix 1 to this annex.

(7) EPW/CPERS movements into EPW and CPERS should not be moved into GO from AP except to receive medical treatment. CPERS other than EPW shall be detained and transferred IAW national policies.

(8) Displaced Persons, Refugees, Evacuees (DPRE) Control. 18 MP BDE units are to be prepared to assist in DPRE control. Priority is to keep MSR clear.

(9) Stragglers. Formations are responsible for straggler control within AOs.

m. Personnel

(1) Replacements. Replacements are a national responsibility.

(2) Mortuary Affairs. Mortuary affairs are a national responsibility. Only in exceptional circumstances, such as contamination of remains, is emergency or temporary burial in the CJTF-OIG JOA authorized. If such is required, all attempts are to be made to contact CJTF-OIG J1 prior to burial taking place. Enemy casualties are to be treated IAW national policy and compliant with Geneva Conventions Article 17. Enemy casualties are to be properly interred on site or gathered for burial at collection points as designated by formations. In all cases, any articles of identification is to be collected and returned through the J1 along with records to include burial location and a description of the means used to mark the grave(s).

(3) Labor Resources. Use of civilian labour is to be coordinated through 310 ESC.

(4) Religious Services. National responsibility.

(5) Legal Services. Legal services for CJTF-OIG is to be coordinated by the staff Judge Advocate General. Staff JAG is to provide guidance on the following areas:

(a) Assistance dealing with local authorities and Government officials.

(b) Interpretation and coordination of all SOFA arrangements.

(c) Assistance and advice in investigating claims involving injury, death or extensive damage to civilian property.

n. Civil Military Operations. See Annex U.

o. Miscellaneous

(1) (U) Lines of Communication Security. TBI.

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4. Command and Signal.

- a. Locations. See CFLCC Overlays.
- b. Signal. TBI.

ATTACHMENTS:

Appendix 1 - PW/Detainee Ops

Tab A - COMCAPREP

Tab B - ISN

Tab C - Capture Report

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX R TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

**APPENDIX 1 (EPW/CPERS) TO ANNEX R (SUSTAINMENT) TO OPORD 01
(OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG**

1. **Introduction.** This document provides direction and clarification regarding the procedures to be used when detaining captured personnel (CPERS in accordance with the Geneva Conventions (GC) within the CJTF-OIG Joint Operations Area (JOA) when deployed on operations. Consideration is to be given at all times as to the status of the CPERS, the gathering of evidence at the point of apprehension (PoA) in support of any allegation to facilitate the collection of intelligence or subsequent prosecution under Coalition or Host Nation (HN) judicial systems.

2. **General.** Individuals may be detained as a force protection measure to prevent them from conducting acts against Coalition forces, Host Nation Security Forces (HNSF) or the HN civilian population. Once the threat has been removed or neutralized, the on-site commander is to determine if the CPERS should be released, transferred to a national temporary holding facility, or, if they are lawful combatants of belligerent forces, detained as enemy prisoners of war (EPW) to be transferred to an EPW holding area or detention facility. The detention process to be followed is dependent on the category in which the CPERS fall, as follows:

a. **Unprivileged Combatant (also referred to as unlawful combatant).** A member of a terrorist group who has committed or has the intent to commit a hostile act against Coalition forces, HNSF, HN government personnel or civilians is considered to be an unprivileged combatant. Unprivileged combatants are essentially criminals whose acts exceed normal private criminal activity. This category does not include civilian warring factions (to include recognized irregular groups) that are supported by the opposing state during an international armed conflict whose status could be determined to be a EPW under the GC.

b. **Criminals.** Pirates, members of a criminal gang, etc are considered to be criminals. CPERS in this category are to be treated in the same manner as unprivileged combatants.

c. **Personnel temporarily detained for Force Protection Measures.** Persons who have been detained under this category by Coalition forces that, for no apparent reason, interfere with operations and pose no threat to the Coalition forces. Such persons may be detained on site and released immediately if it is determined by the on-site commander that they no longer pose a threat to the mission or the force. Examples of such persons can be farmers non-violently defending their fields or property, civilians in the way of Coalition forces, etc. Proper judgement is to be used to not evacuate such persons if they are not deemed to be a continued threat to the Coalition.

d. **EPW.** EPW, or commonly PW, are defined under Art. 4 (a) of the GC III. GC III will apply as a matter of law when, and if, the security situation escalates to an international armed conflict. These include combatants, persons accompanying the armed forces (civilian contractors, maintenance crews), members of crew of merchant marine or aircraft, war correspondents and medical personnel accompanying the force.

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX R TO OPOD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

Combatants include members of an armed force or irregular forces providing they meet the following four criteria:

- (1) Bear arms openly.
- (2) Wear a fixed and distinctive emblem.
- (3) Subject to responsible command.
- (4) Abide by the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).

3. Determination of Status. Where GC III applies as a matter of law, belligerents detained by Coalition forces are presumed to be entitled to EPW status, until the status is determined by a properly constituted status tribunal.

The specific conduct and composition of status tribunals will be defined in the national law of each contributing nation. Questions concerning EPW status determination under GC III are to be directed to the CJTF-OIG Legal Advisor and national legal advisors, as appropriate. If the CPERS are not lawful combatants and have committed, or attempted to commit, an attack against Coalition, HNSF or another authority of the government of the HN, evidence relating to the actions and conduct will be required in support of any subsequent criminal prosecution. If there are no grounds for further detention, the individual must be released.

A Common Capture Report (COMCAPREP) is still required to be compiled and submitted through the chain of command. Wherever possible, HNSF should lead on detention operations. Coalition forces may carry out detention operations where it is impossible for the HNSF to do so, or in the event that abuse of the CPERS by HNSF is feared or suspected, or where it is agreed that Coalition forces should take the lead (e.g. intelligence-led operations).

Children under the age of 18 should not be detained unless categorically necessary to prevent imminent danger to Coalition forces.

In general, no more than 96 hrs should pass between the CPERS point of apprehension (PoA) and their subsequent arrival at a national temporary holding facility. This timeline exists in order to allow for difficult tactical situations where immediate transfer is not possible.

4. Application of National Policy. Coalition forces remain subject to their individual national law, policies, and directives. Where such laws, policies, or directives diverge from CJTF-OIG policies or directives, the more restrictive will apply.

Divergent policies are to be identified through the Troop Contributing Nation's (TCN's) Provost Marshal (PM) to the CJTF-OIG PM to be de-conflicted. National policy is always to be followed in the first instance with respect to detention. However, **the recovery of evidence requirements** are to be adopted as 'best-practice.'

5. Guidance.

a. Decision to Detain. The decision to detain a person or persons is to be based on actions or evidence at the scene. Detention are to be reported to CJTF-OIG HQ as soon as practicable using the format at Tab A. Criminal activities of a localized nature do not generally warrant detention by Coalition forces. Local law enforcement remains the responsibility of the HNSF, if purely criminal activity is observed. Nevertheless, Coalition ROE may permit intervention and the use of force by Coalition forces where a serious crime (such as armed robbery, sexual assault, assault) is observed by Coalition elements.

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX R TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

Where Coalition forces intervene in such circumstances, every effort is to be made to report to and involve the HNSF at the earliest possible opportunity. Appropriate reporting is to be conducted through the chain of command.

CJTF-OIG force elements can detain for one or any combination of the following reasons:

- (1) Force protection.
- (2) Mission accomplishment.
- (3) Observance of a serious crime.
- (4) Self-defence.

b. (U) Detention Process. National responsibility applies.

c. Use of Military Police (MP). MP are to be made available for advice regarding detention and are to be consulted prior to any situation where detention is a likely outcome. However, detention remains a unit and a chain of command responsibility. In general, and as a best practice, MP are not to accept custody or responsibility for CPERS until they are delivered to a formation collection point by the detaining unit/soldier.

MP provide Commanders with a transparent investigative and governance capability that can be tasked to ensure that CPERS are handled in accordance with national and Coalition policy.

When MP are directly supporting detention, they are to be used for:

- (1) Search of personnel, property, and any scene, with the assistance of the detaining unit.
- (2) Advice on what items are of evidential value and then the physical recovery and exhibiting of all items of evidential value, with the assistance of the detaining unit and other specialist requirements (ATO/EOD/C-IED) as required.
- (3) Assistance with the recording of detaining soldier and detaining call sign statements of evidence.
- (4) Training of Force Element personnel in search, detention, and evidence handling procedures.
- (5) Advice on all detention matters and members of an Armed Group,
- (6) Oversight of Division-level facilities, when tasked and within means and capabilities.

6. **Searching**. Whenever an individual other than an EPW is detained, this information will be written in a statement format to provide evidence for continued detention. The search of a dwelling is the responsibility of the on-site commander, based upon a reasonable interpretation of the information available at that time and is to be cleared through the respective Bde HQs. When MP are available, they are to take the lead on searching, with the detaining Force Elements in support.

7. **Evidence Requirements**. For those persons not classified as an EPW, effective collection, transfer and storage of detainee-related evidence is essential to effective prosecution of criminal acts and helps strengthen the rule of law.

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a. Statements. These are additional to the statement on the Capture Card, which only provides a summary of events. In the absence of MP, statements are to be recorded by the appropriate level of chain of command but must include statements of all personnel involved in the capture. There is no format for this statement, but at a minimum the statement is to contain:

- (1) Apprehending soldier,
- (2) Tactical questioner,
- (3) Interpreter (witness and **ICOM** chatter).
- (4) Any local national information who observed the event (if possible and through interpreter).
- (5) Statements from all Coalition unit witnesses.

b. Photographs. (ideally in electronic format)

- (1) CPERS with apprehending soldier and a visible name/number board in photo.
- (2) The Point of Apprehension (PoA), identifying the grid reference and name of location.
- (3) The CPERS at the PoA with all physical evidence recovered, clearly visible in photograph. This should include any forensic evidence if possible.
- (4) Weapons, drugs, large amounts of money or any other items that may indicate criminal activity.
- (5) Vehicles (if applicable) with registration number (license plate) clearly visible with CPERS beside the vehicle.

c. Property of evidentiary value. This can include, but is not limited to:

- (1) Mobile phones are to be retained in the exact state in which they were found. They are not to be switched off, nor should anyone call the last number or answer any incoming calls.
- (2) CPERS notebooks, maps, notes or other documents found on the individual.
- (3) Photocopies of patrol notebooks and notes pertaining to the situation which led to the capture of the individual.
- (4) Small arms (must be cleared and made-safe).
- (5) Suspected IED components (wires, cables, batteries, spider boxes, etc.).
- (6) Forensic evidence (**EXPRA Y** swab).
- (7) Any other item that the detaining call sign may deem necessary.

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d. Chain of Custody. As a best practice, the detaining soldier is to escort the CPERS to the appropriate formation collection point. If this is not possible, then the statements from all those involved are to accompany the CPERS, escort, with all identified evidence. If this procedure is not followed, it will likely result in the detainee being released due to insufficient evidence for continued detention or transfer. Is important to maintain chain of custody for both the CPERS and the evidence gathered on the CPERS.

8. Use of Force. It is essential that Coalition Force Elements understand that the Use of Force for controlling CPERS is dependent on the category in which the individual falls.

Lethal force can be used to detain and prevent escape of EPW, but not criminals and unlawful combatants.

The minimum amount of force necessary to detain an individual is to be applied when dealing with any CPERS.

For detained criminals and unlawful combatants, lethal force is only be used to remove an imminent threat to human life. For all CPERS, once under control, no further force is to be used, unless absolutely necessary to prevent escape, self-defense or injury. National ROE must clearly identify the appropriate levels of force to be used when handling CPERS.

9. Restraint. Flex cuffs are the primary approved method of restraining detainees and, whenever possible, hands are to be cuffed in the front of the body and regularly checked in order to ensure that they are not harming the CPERS.

Hooding is strictly forbidden. In circumstances where it is necessary to protect sensitive information or for force protection measures, blacked-out goggles may be applied. As soon as the reason for restricting CPERS' vision has passed, the goggles are to be removed. *In extremis*, a blindfold may be used, provided it does not cover the mouth or nose or otherwise restrict the CPERS' ability to breathe. Sound attenuation devices may also be used if the tactical situation permits.

10. Reports and Returns. Timely provision of accurate reports and returns is critical to the onward movement and subsequent detention of CPERS. Coalition Force Elements are to report the detention of CPERS at the earliest opportunity using the following tools to include:

a. Common Capture Report (COMCAPREP). **Tab A**. Immediately upon detention a COMCAPREP is to be submitted to CJTF-OIC Ops including the following information:

- (1) Designator of capturing unit.
- (2) DTG of capture (DDTTTTZMMYY).
- (3) Location of capture (UTM grid reference).
- (4) Numbers of EPWs captured. (O/N/S/C)(M/F)(NNNN).
- (5) Captured enemy documents (CDOC).
- (6) Captured enemy equipment (CE).
- (7) Circumstances of the capture.
- (8) Other points of intelligence interest.
- (9) Location of capturing unit at time of COMCAPREP (UTM grid reference).
- (10) Evacuation intentions.

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX R TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

The COMCAPREP is to be completed and securely attached to the CPERS. It is to record all changes of custody and stay with the CPERS up to the Formation Collection Point where other tracking methods can be established, or up to a point where the holding nation can securely control the identity of the CPERS in their custody.

b. CPERS Internment Serial Number (ISN). Upon receipt of the CPERS ISN, National PM are to issue an Internment Serial Number (as per Tab B) to capturing units. These numbers are to be added to the Capture Report and are to be reported to the higher HQ PM on a daily basis.

11. Injured CPERS. Where necessary, medical treatment is to be provided to the same standard as that provided to injured Coalition soldiers. Priority of treatment is to be assessed on medical grounds alone. If injured detainees are to remain in custody after immediate medical treatment, evidence justifying their continued detention is to be provided.

12. Humane Treatment, Abuse, and Prohibited Acts. CPERS are not be subject to intimidation, humiliation, or acts of violence. Inhuman or degrading treatment including torture is strictly forbidden, illegal, and is to be investigated. It is the detaining Force Element's responsibility, and that of the on-site commander, to ensure that CPERS are properly treated.

This responsibility includes preventing, stopping, and reporting incidents of abuse by either Coalition forces or HNSF and does not end until the CPERS is no longer in danger of being abused.

Allegations or suspicions of abuse are to be reported to the CJTF-OIG PM, via national PMs. Food and drink are to be provided at regular intervals and, whenever possible, CPERS are to be provided with protection from adverse conditions and the elements. Where necessary, medical treatment is to be provided to the same standard as that provided to injured Coalition soldiers. Priority of treatment is to be assessed on medical grounds alone.

13. Tactical Questioning (TQ). TQ of CPERS is only be carried out by qualified, current personnel in accordance with national training and policy. The following types of conditioning are expressly prohibited:

- a. Hooding.
- b. Physical punishment.
- c. Stress positions.
- d. Intentional sleep deprivation.
- e. Withdrawal of food, water, or medical treatment.
- f. Degrading treatment, sexual embarrassment, or religious taunting.
- g. The use of white noise.

14. Authority on Detainees. CPERS (other than those with an EPW status) captured by Coalition forces are to be provided information so that they understand that the authority on captured detainees remains with the state and not with the capturing nation. As an example, a criminal captured by Coalition forces in Atropia is to remain under the law enforcement authority of Atropia and is to be transferred as soon as practicable to a recognized Atropian authority. The same is to apply in Gorgas and Turkey.

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX R TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

It is therefore important to not remove the CPERS from the state in which captured as this could create a political situation where the CPERS could claim refugee status in the new state.

15. **Evacuation to a Different Country.** There may arise emergency circumstances where CPERS need to be evacuated directly from one country to another, for example from Atropia to Gorgas, such as where Role 3 or higher medical care is required for the injured CPERS. In any circumstance where evacuation of CPERS to a different country may be required, COM CJTF-OIG is to be advised in order to coordinate this requirement with applicable national authorities.

16. **Release.** CPERS are to be released at the PoA only if the reason for the original detention is no longer valid and the threat posed against Coalition forces is unlikely to continue. A record of release is to be maintained in the patrol notebook and details passed to the appropriate higher HQ. Under no circumstance are CPERS to be transferred directly to HNSF without first passing through the National temporary holding facility.

17. **HNSF/Coalition Joint Operations.** If Coalition forces are on a joint operation with HNSF, the HNSF are to handle any CPERS. If the commander of the Coalition element believes that the CPERS will be mistreated, or that HNSF are unable to safely and correctly facilitate the detention process, the CPERS is to be processed by Coalition forces in accordance with the procedures outlined in this document.

18. **Points of Contact.**

- a. CJTF-OIG Provost Marshal.
- b. CJTF-OIG Legal Advisor.

Attachments:

Tab A – Common Capture Report

Tab B – CPERS Internment Serial Numbers

Tab C – Capture Report and Personal Effects Registry

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TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX R TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

TAB A (COMMON CAPTURE REPORT) TO APPENDIX 1 (PW AND DETAINEES) TO ANNEX R (SUSTAINMENT) TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG

1. **COMCAPREP.** The COMCAPREP is a standard NATO message that nations have agreed to its use through their ratification of AJP 2.5. CJTF-OIG is to use this standard NATO message for all PW/Detainee reporting.
2. **Purpose of the Report.** The purpose of the report is to:
 - a. Alert the J2/G2 organizations of the possible capture of a potential source of information.
 - b. Alert the PW Holding Organization (PWHO) to the capture of PW/Detainees so that arrangements for the movement care and disposal of the PW/Detainee can be put in effect.
3. **Completion of the Report.** Capturing units are to complete the COMCAPREP as fully as the circumstances allow but the evacuation of PW/Detainees is not be delayed by the requirement for the completion of a COMCAPREP. Where the Capturing Unit has the ability to categorize PW/Detainee is to be done and the category noted in the COMCAPREP. Reports are to be originated at the unit level and staffed through their respective HQ.
4. **Format of the COMCAPREP.** The format of the COMCAPREP is below:

COMCAPREP Template

1. Designator of Capturing Unit.
2. Date/Time Group of Capture.

D	D	T	T	T	T	Z	M	M	M	Y	Y
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

3. Location of Capture (UTM Grid Reference).

N	N	A	A	A	N	N	N	N	N	N
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

4. Numbers of PW Captured.

O/N/S/C	M/F	N	N	N	N
---------	-----	---	---	---	---

5. Captured Enemy Documents (CDOC). Free text listing of the numbers, type and nationality of the documents.
6. Captured Enemy Equipment (CE). Free text listing of the numbers, type and nationality of the equipment.

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TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX R TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

7. Circumstances of Capture. Free text statement of such details as; size of force, direction of movement, speed of movement, etc.
8. Other Points of Intelligence Interest. Free text statement of such details as; PW nationality, service branch, unit, function, position, categorization.
9. Location at Time of Report (UTM Grid Reference).

N	N	A	A	A	N	N	N	N	N	N
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

10. Evacuation Intentions. To what location, when and by what means it is intended to evacuate the PW/Detainee.

KEY:

N - Numerical Character except in the first field where it is the designator for NCO.

A - Alphabetical Character.

D - Day.

T - Time.

M - Month except where it is the designator for male.

Y - Year.

O - Officer.

S - Soldier.

C - Other Personnel.

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TAB B TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX R TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

TAB B (CPERS INTERNMENT SERIAL NUMBERS) TO APPENDIX 1 (PW/DETAINEES) TO ANNEX R (SUSTAINMENT) TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG

1. **Allocation of CPers Internment Serial Numbers (ISN).** Every CPERS is to be allocated a unique serial number to enable their identification and tracking by the PW Holding Organization (PWHO) throughout the period of their internment. The ISN represents various items of data about the CPERS and an explanation of the content of the ISN is set out in this Tab to enable the ISN to be read and, if necessary, to be generated without the assistance of IT.

2. **Explanation of the ISN 14-Character Alphanumeric Group.** The breakdown of the characters is as follows:

a. **Positions 1 and 2 - Country Codes.** STANAG 1059 contains a listing of two-character alphabetic codes representing every country in the world. It also contains a cross reference to the two and three letter International Standards Organization codes used by the ICRC. CA, UK, US, FR, GE, AS and NZ are the primary country codes for the TCN members of CJTF-OIG.

b. **Positions 3 and 4 - Superior Unit or Formation Identifying Codes.** A two character alphanumeric code representing the unit or formation to which the capturing unit is subordinate. These Codes are to be promulgated by the relevant higher command for the particular operation. For Op IRON GUARDIAN, 1M is to represent CJTF-OIG.

c. **Positions 5 to 10 - Number.** This is a six digit roll up number generated by the unit or Prisoner of War Records Unit (PWRU) allocating the ISN (100000-199999 for 1 ID, 200000-299999 for 4 MND, 300000-399999 for 82 ABN DIV, 400000 - 499999 for 3 CAV and 500000 and up controlled by CJTF-OIG).

d. **Positions 11 and 12 – Identifying Nation.** This is a two character alphabetical code from STANAG 1059/AJP 2.5 identifying the nation to which the CPERS owed allegiance (e.g. AN for Ariana)

e. **Position 13 –Status.** This is a single character indicating the status of the CPERS as follows:

Value	Meaning
O	Officer
S	Other Rank
M	Retained Medical Personnel
R	Retained Religious Personnel
C	Civilian

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TAB B TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX R TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

- f. Position 14 –Gender Code. A single character indicating the sex of the CPERS:

Value	Meaning
F	Female
M	Male

3. **Example of an Internment Serial Number.** An ISN of US 1U100864ARSM translates as:

- a. US The United States is the capturing nation.
- b. 1U Capturing Unit was under full command of 1 ID.
- c. 100864 A unique number from a block allocated to the unit.
- d. AR The CPERS owes his allegiance to Ariana.
- e. S The CPERS is a Non-Commissioned Member.
- f. M The CPERS is male.

4. Returns on used Internment Serial Numbers are due to the CJTF-OIG PM on a daily basis.

NOTE: Although NATO ISN numbers were developed for CPERS with a PW status only, CJTF-OIG is to use this ISN format for all CPERS including those that are not categorized as PW.

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TAB C TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX R TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

TAB C (CAPTURE REPORT AND PERSONAL EFFECTS REGISTRY) TO APPENDIX 1 (PW/DETAINEES) TO ANNEX R (SUSTAINMENT) TO OPORD 01 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG

INTERMENT SERIAL NUMBER (_____)

Allotment from CJTF-OIG then used at Bde level) C A 8 M 1 0 0 0 0 0 W I(O,S,M,R,C)(M/F)

Captured Personnel Information (CPers)			
Name	Rank	Service Number	Service and Unit
Where captured (Grid Ref)		Nationality	
DTG of Capture		Direction Heading	
Other members of group (Names/Rk/Svc No or Internment Serial Number)			

Particulars of the Capturing Coalition Force Member			
Name	Rank	Service Number	Service and Unit
Reason of capture :			
Witnesses/Comments		_____	
		Signature Date Time	

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TAB C TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX R TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

Personal Effects seized at Point of Apprehension (PoA)	

Water provided to CPers			Meals provided to CPers		
Date	Time	Quantity/Comments	Date	Time	Quantity/Comments

Chain of Custody of CPers				
Date	Time	Transferred to :	Accepting Unit Signature	Losing Unit Signature

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ANNEX S TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

ANNEX S (MOVEMENTS) TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG

References:

- a. JP3-35 Deployment and Redeployment Operations
- b. JP4-01.8 Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration
- c. ATP 3-35 Army Deployment and Redeployment
- d. USTRANSCOM Defense Transportation Regulations Parts I-VII, 2015

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU.

1. **Situation.** No change from OPORD 01.

2. **Mission.** CJTF-OIG formations are to deploy into the JOA and conduct movement throughout the region.

3. **Execution**

a. **General Concept.** Movement of CJTF-OIG troops and equipment within the JOA is to be controlled at the highest level to ensure effective movement with minimal impact on host nation infrastructure and economic activity. Movements operations are to comprise three distinct phases:

(1) **Phase 1 - Deployment.** Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) are to deploy CJTF-OIG assigned formations, units and elements into Gorgas (GO) and/or Turkey for employment under CJTF-OIG using a combination of sea and airlift along with road and rail movement to assembly/staging areas. Detailed instructions for the deployment phase are provided at Appendix 1 to this Annex.

(2) **Phase 2 - Operations.** Positive control of all force movements is to be exercised at every level of command to maximize the efficiency of limited resources, ensure the security of forces and reduce impact on host nation resources.

(3) **Phase 3 - Redeployment.** On termination of military operations a separate redeployment instruction is to be issued to move forces from forward areas and effect an orderly withdrawal of troops and equipment from the JOA.

b. **Scheme of Maneuver.** TCN are responsible for the movement of their respective assigned forces to CJTF-OIG JOA, closely coordinated with CJTF-OIG headquarters and movement control units. Movement control within the JOA is to be assigned based on designated AOs:

(1) 230 Sustainment Brigade (Sust Bde) is responsible for the control of military movements within the borders of the country of GO.

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ANNEX S TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

(2) 15 Sust Bde, on behalf of CJTF-OIG, is responsible for the control of all military administrative movements within the JOA external to GO to include Atropia (AP) and, to the extent that it is required in Ariania and Limaria.

(3) 49 Movement Control Battalion (Mvt Ctl Bn) is responsible for coordination of movement control of military forces into and out of the JOA. While much of this type of movement remains a TCN responsibility it is to be coordinated with 49 Mvt Ctl Bn.

c. Tasks.

(1) 49 Mvt Ctl Bn.

(a) Phase 1.

1. Manage slot times for APODs and SPODs for deployment of CJTF-OIG elements into GO;

2. Coordinate road movement within GO for forward movement of TCN vehicles and equipment to assembly and staging areas.

3. Control the rail movement of TCN vehicles, equipment and materiel to assembly and staging areas.

(b) Phase 2.

1. Coordinate the movement of forces into and out of CJTF-OIG JOA.

2. Coordinate Intra-Theatre Air Service.

3. Control the rail movement of vehicles, equipment and materiel within the JOA.

4. Facilitate coordination of movement control tasks between 15 Sust Bde and 230 Sust Bde.

(2) 15 Sust Bde.

(a) Phase 1.

1. Detach 152 Traffic Ctl Bn OPCON to 49 Mvt Ctl Bn for RSOM tasks.

2. Detach 154 Combat Sustainment Support Battalion (CSSB) OPCON to 49 Mvt Ctl Bn for heavy lift of CJTF-OIG vehicles and equipment from SPODs to Staging/Assembly areas.

(b) Phase 2.

1. Revert to area support operations in AP.

2. BPT facilitate cross border clearance for CJTF-OIG units and personnel entering AP by road.

3. Coordinate support to Atropian authorities for the maintenance and repair of movement infrastructure such as airfields, roads and railroads to meet operational requirements.

4. Execute movement control measures for CJTF-OIG within AP on behalf of HQ LCC.

5. Operate Convoy Support Centers within AP as required.

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ANNEX S TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

(3) 230 Sust Bde.

(a) Phase 1.

1. In coordination with TCN National Support Elements (NSEs) and 405 Army Field Support Brigade (for US forces) provide RSOM to deploying formations and units to include the following:

2. Personnel transportation to/from staging/assembly areas and SPOD;
3. Contingency accommodation for troops arriving at APODs;
4. Feeding for troops arriving at APODs;
5. Accommodation and feeding for work parties at SPODs
6. Operate Convoy Support Centers as detailed at para 3.d. (4) to include fuel, feeding and recovery support.
7. Provide recovery resources at SPOD and railheads in Assembly/Staging areas as identified by 49 Movement Control Battalion.

(b) Phase 2.

1. Revert to area support tasks in GO.
2. BPT facilitate cross border clearances for CJTF-OIG units and personnel entering GO from AP.
3. Coordinate support to Gorgan authorities for the maintenance and repair of movement infrastructure such as airfields, roads and railroads to meet operational requirements.
4. Execute movement control measures for CJTF-OIG within GO on behalf of 310 ESC.
5. Operate Convoy Support Centers within GO as required.

(4) 18 MP Brigade.

(a) Phase 1. Detach OPCON to 49 Mvt Ctl Bn for Traffic Ctl tasks- one MP Bn.

(b) Phase 2. BPT provide traffic control support to CJTF-OIG.

(5) 1 MED BDE.

(a) Phase 1. Detach 12 Area Support Medical Battalion to provide medical coverage during RSOM.

(b) Phase 2. Coordinate MEDEVAC movements with 49 Mvt Ctl Bn

(6) 18 EN BDE.

(a) Provide Engineer support to RSOM.

(b) Deploy 4 NMCB to SPOD POTI for support to port operations throughout RSOM.

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ANNEX S TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

d. Key Installations

(1) SPODS

- (a) Poti, GO. Primary
- (b) Sokhumi, GO. Alternate

(2) APODS

- (a) (Tbilisi, GO. Primary
- (b) Kutaisi, GO. Alternate
- (c) Baku, AP. For sustainment operations only.

(3) Convoy Support Centers (CSC).

(a) Phase 1.

- 1. Samtredia, GO.
- 2. Zestaponi, GO.
- 3. Gori, GO.
- 4. Mtskheta, GO.

(b) Phase 2. TBA.

(4) Railway Hubs.

(a) Phase 1.

- 1. Poti Seaport.
- 2. Kutaisi II Railway Station (42.259021, 42.670642).
- 3. Station Square Tbilisi, GO (41.724223, 44.798615).
- 4. Gardabani (Rustavi) Railway Station (41.475020, 45.098122).
- 5. Ganja (AP) Central Railway Station (40.714147, 46.366298).

(b) Phase 2. TBA.

(5) March Credits.

(a) Phase 1. March credits are to be issued by 49 Mvt Ctl Bn for movements in excess of five vehicles on any routes in GO.

(b) Phase 2.

1. GO. March credits are to be issued by 230 Sust Bde for movements on MSR NEW YORK and MSR CHICAGO in excess of 10 vehicles and for movements in excess of 5 vehicles on all other routes.

2. AP. As detailed by HQ CFLCC.

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4. Sustainment.

a. Convoy Support. CSC are to be established at approximately 50 km intervals along the main deployment route in GO as detailed in para 3.d. (4) for Phase 1 and TBC for Phase 2.

b. Intra-Theater Air Service (ITAS). CJTF-OIG is to operate an air transport service for administrative support within the JOA. An ITAS instruction is to be published separately by HQ CJTF-OIG.

c. Routes.

(1) CJTF MSR CHICAGO. Highway E60 – Poti to Tbilisi, GO

(2) CJTF MSR NEW YORK. Highway E70 – Batumi to Poti, GO

5. Command and Signal.

a. Command.

(1) 310 ESC, Tbilisi GO.

(2) Movement Control Headquarters: 49 Mvt Ctl Bn, located Poti, GO.

(3) 230 Sust Bde, located Poti, GO.

(4) 15 Sust Bde, located Tbilisi, GO.

b. Signal. TBI.

ATTACHMENTS:

Appendix 1 Deployment Instruction.

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX S TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

**APPENDIX 1 (DEPLOYMENT INSTRUCTION) TO ANNEX S (MOVEMENTS) TO
OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG**

References:

- a. P3-35 Deployment and Redeployment Operations
- b. JP4-01.8 Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOMI)
- c. ATP 3-35 Army Deployment and Redeployment
- d. USTRANSCOM Defense Transportation Regulations Parts I-VII, 2015

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU.

1. **Situation.** No change from OPORD 01.

2. **Mission.** CJTF-OIG component formations are to deploy into Atropia, Gorgas and Turkey to prepare for operations within the CJTF-OIG JOA.

3. **Execution.**

a. **General Concept.** Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) are to deploy CJTF-OIG assigned formations, units and elements into Gorgas and/or Turkey for employment under CJTF-OIG. Movement is to utilize a combination of sea and air lift to achieve a timely concentration of forces in Atropia, Gorgas and Turkey. CFLCC fighting vehicles, weapons systems and equipment are to, for the most part be deployed by sea to the SPOD at Poti, and moved forward by rail or road movement to a staging/assembly area where troops who have arrived by air are to marry up with their vehicles and equipment.

Wheeled support vehicles are to be held at the SPOD where troops are to marry up with them for onward convoy road movement to staging/assembly areas. CFACC elements are to deploy principally by air direct to air operating bases. Movements by sea are to be to appropriate SPODs in GO and TU.

b. **Scheme of Maneuver.** TCN are responsible for the movement of their respective assigned forces to CJTF-OIG JOA. Arrival timings and locations are to be coordinated with 49th Movement Control Battalion (MCB). 82 AB Division is already deployed and assisting with theater opening tasks with elements of 310 ESC. TCNs are required to dispatch national movement control liaison teams (and appropriate vehicles) to both the SPOD and APOD to coordinate their efforts with 49 Mvt Ctl Bn.

c. **Tasks**

(1) **49 Mvt Ctl Bn.**

(a) Manage slot times for APODs and SPODs for deployment of CJTF-OIG elements into Gorgas.

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX S TO OPOD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

(b) Coordinate road and rail movement within GO for forward movement of TCN vehicles and equipment.

(2) 15 Sust Bde.

(a) Detach 152 Traffic Control Battalion OPCON to 49 Mvt Ctl Bn for RSOM tasks.

(b) Detach 154 Combat Sustainment Support Battalion (CSSB) OPCON to 49 Mvt Ctl Bn for heavy lift of CJTF-OIG vehicles and equipment from SPODs to staging/assembly areas.

(3) 230 Sust Bde.

(a) In coordination with TCN National Support Elements (NSEs) and XXXXXX (for US forces) provide RSOM to deploying formations and units to include the following:

1. Personnel transportation to/from staging/assembly areas and SPOD.
2. Contingency accommodation for troops arriving at APODs.
3. Feeding for troops arriving at APODs.
4. Accommodation and feeding for work parties at SPODs.
5. Operate Convoy Support Centers as detailed at para 3.d.(4) to include fuel, feeding, and recovery support.
6. Provide recovery resources at SPOD and railheads in assembly/staging areas as identified by 49 Mvt Ctl Bn.

(4) 18 MP Brigade. Detach OPCON to 49 Mvt Ctl Bn for Traffic Control tasks- one MP Battalion.

(5) 1 MED BDE. Detach 12 Area Support Medical Battalion to provide medical coverage during RSOM.

(6) 18 ENG BDE. Detach OPCON to 49 Mvt Ctl Bn 4 NMCB for port operations in POTI.

d. Coalition Order of March. TCNs are to plan for the deployment of their national contributions to coincide with the anticipated movement completion date of their parent formation (where applicable). The coalition order of march is found at Tab A to this appendix.

e. Key Installations.

(1) SPOD.

- (a) Poti, GO. Primary.
- (b) Sokhumi, GO. Alternate.

(2) APOD.

- (a) Tbilisi, GO. Primary.
- (b) Kutaisi, GO. Alternate.

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX S TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

(3) Assembly / Staging Areas.

(a) Kaspi/Kutaisi, GO. LCC/Corps Troops.

(b) Rustavi, GO. 1 1D.

(c) Lagodekhi, GO. 4 MND.

(4) Convoy Support Centers (CSC) .

(a) Samtredia, GO.

(b) Zestaponi, GO.

(c) Gori, GO.

(d) Mtskheta, GO.

f. Timings.

(1) Detailed deployment timings are found at Tab B to this Appendix.

(2) All CJTF-OIG units and formations should be in the JOA by not later than D-60 days.

4. **Sustainment.**

a. Reception Staging and Onward Movement(RSOM). Is to be supported by 230 Sust Bde in coordination with NSEs.

b. Convoy Support. 230 Sust Bde is to provide fuel, feeding and recovery support for elements moving forward to staging/assembly areas. Convoy support centers are to be established at approximately 50 km intervals along the main deployment route in GO as detailed in para 3.d. (4).

c. Feeding. RSOM organization is to provide a first meal in for troops arriving at SPODs and APODS. TCN are responsible for feeding thereafter.

d. Accommodation. RSOM organization is to provide transient accommodation for one night for troops arriving at SPOD or APOD later than 1600 hours. TCN are responsible for accommodation in staging/assembly areas thereafter.

5. **Command and Signal.**

a. Command.

(1) Movement Control Headquarters: 49 Mvt Ctl Bn located Poti, GO.

(2) RSOM: 230 Sust Bde located Poti, GO.

ATTACHMENTS:

Tab A Deployment Order of March.

Tab B Movement Table.

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TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX S TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

TAB A (DEPLOYMENT ORDER OF MARCH) TO APPENDIX 1 (DEPLOYMENT INSTRUCTION) TO ANNEX S (MOVEMENTS) TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF OIG

1. COM CJTF-OIG has approved the following order of march for forces undertaking deployment into the JOA:

- a. 82nd AB Division – already deployed.
- b. 31st Combat Support Hospital – already deployed.
- c. Movement Control Organizations.
 - (1) 9th Movement Control Battalion.
 - (2) Elements 15th Sustainment Brigade to include.
 - (a) 152nd Traffic Control Battalion.
 - (b) 154th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion.
 - (3) 18 MP Brigade. 709th MP Battalion.
- d. RSOM Elements.
 - (1) 230th Sustainment Brigade.
 - (2) 12th Area Support Medical Battalion.
- e. National Support Elements.
- f. 1st Infantry Division Div Troops.
- g. 15th Sustainment Brigade (-).
- h. 1st Infantry Division (-).
- i. 10th Signal Brigade (LCC).
- j. 43 ADA Bn (LCC).
- k. 10th Aviation Brigade (LCC).
- l. 36th Engineer Brigade (LCC).
- m. 360th Civil Affairs Brigade (LCC).
- n. 66th MI Bde (LCC).
- o. 415 CBRN Brigade (LCC).
- p. 10th PSYOPS Brigade (LCC).
- q. 52 EOD Brigade (LCC).
- r. 75th Field Artillery Brigade (LCC).
- s. 4th MN Division Troops.
- t. 18th Military Police Brigade (less 709th MP Battalion already deployed).

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TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX S TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

- u. 4th MN Div.
 - v. 1st Medical Brigade (less 31 Combat Support Hospital already deployed).
2. Deployment of CFACC elements are to be coordinated separately.
 3. Deployment of CFMCC is complete.

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TAB B TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX S TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

TAB B (MOVEMENT TABLE) TO APPENDIX 1 (DEPLOYMENT INSTRUCTION) TO ANNEX S (MOVEMENTS) TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG

	Formation	Unit	SPOD	APOD	Timing
1.	82 nd AB Div				Move Complete
	1 st Medical Bde	31 st Combat Support Hospital			Move Complete
2.	310 th ESC	49 th Mov Ctl Bn	POTI	POTI /TBILISI	G
		HQ 310 th ESC	POTI	TBILISI	G+10
	CJTF-OIG	HQ CJTF-OIG	POTI	TBILISI	G+10
3.	15 th Sustainment Bde	152 nd Traffic Control Bn	POTI	POTI	G+10
4		154 th Combat Sustainment Support Bn	POTI	KUTAISI	G+15
5	16 MP Bn	716 th MP Bn	POTI	KUTAISI	G+18
	230 th Sustainment Bde	HQ 230 th Sustainment Bde	POTI	KUTAISI	G+20
6		Special Troops Bn	POTI	KUTAISI	G+20
7		30 th Combat Sustainment Support Bn	POTI	KUTAISI	G+20
8		176 th Combat Sustainment Support Bn	POTI	KUTAISI	G+20
9	1 st Medical Bde	12 th Area Medical Support Bn	POTI	KUTAISI	G+25
10	4 th (MN) Div	UK NSE	POTI	TBILISI	G+30
11		AU/NZ NSE	POTI	TBILISI	G+30

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TAB B TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX S TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

12		GE NSE	POTI	TBILISI	G+30
13		FR NSE	POTI	TBILISI	G+30
14		CA NSE	POTI	TBILISI	G+30
15	1 st Infantry Div	1 st Sustainment Bde	POTI	TBILISI	G+15
16		1/1 SBCT	POTI	TBILISI	G+30
17		2/1 SBCT	POTI	TBILISI	G+40
18		3/1 SBCT	POTI	TBILISI	G+50
19	15 th Sustainment Bde	15 th Special Troops Bn	POTI	KUTAISI	G+25
		HQ 15 th Sustainment Bde	POTI	KUTAISI	G+22
20		151 st Combat Sustainment Support Bn	POTI	KUTAISI	G+25
21		153 rd Combat Sustainment Support Bn	POTI	KUTAISI	G+30
	LCC	10 th Signal Bde			G+20
		43 ADA Bn	POTI	TBILISI	G+55

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TAB B TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX S TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

		10 th Aviation Bde	POTI	KUTAI SI	G+55
		36 th Engineer Bde	POTI	KUTAI SI	G+40
		360 th Civil Affairs Bde	POTI	KUTAI SI	G+45
		66 th MI Bde	POTI	KUTAI SI	G+50
		415 th CBRN Bde	POTI	KUTAI SI	G+75
		10 th PSYOPS Bde	POTI	KUTAI SI	G+55
		52 nd EOD Bde	POTI	KUTAI SI	G+60
		75 th Field Artillery Bde	POTI	KUTAI SI	G+80
22	4 th (MN) Div	17 th Sustainment Bde	POTI	TBILISI	G+30
23		577 th Combat Sustainment Support Bn	POTI	TBILISI	G+30
24		180 th Tn Bn	POTI	TBILISI	G+35
25		8 (UK) Logistics Support Regiment	POTI	TBILISI	G+40
26		2 (CA) Service Bn	POTI	TBILISI	G+40
27		8 (AU) Combat Service Support Bn	POTI	TBILISI	G+40
28		Franco German Logistics Bn	POTI	TBILISI	G+40
29		2 (CA) CMBG	POTI	TBILISI	G+60
30		3 (AU) Bde	POTI	TBILISI	G+65
31		Franco German Bde	POTI	TBILISI	G+75
32		12 (UK) Bde	POTI	TBILISI	G+85
33	18 th Military Police Bde	HQ 16 th Military Police Bde	POTI	KUTAI SI	G+43
		709 th MP Bn	POTI	KUTAI SI	G+25

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TAB B TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX S TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

		185 th MP Bn	POTI	KUTAISI	G+55
34	1 st Medical Bde	21 st Combat Support Hospital	POTI	KUTAISI	G+45
35		Field Hospital Regiment 41 (GE)	POTI	KUTAISI	G+80
36		13 th Medical Logistics Bn	POTI	KUTAISI	G+60
		Light Helicopter Regiment 10 (GE) (MedEvac)	POTI	KUTAISI	G+90
37	18 th Engineer Brigade	4 NMCB	POTI	POTI	G+5
		389 th Engineer Battalion	POTI	KUTAISI	G+20
		164 th Engineer Battalion	POTI	TBILISI	G+40
		420 Chemical Battalion	POTI	KUTAISI	G+60
		Elm 18 th Engineer Brigade	POTI	TBILISI	G+50

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ANNEX W TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

**ANNEX W ((CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS (EXTRACTS)) TO OPORD 01
(OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG**

References:

- a. MC 411/2 NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil Military Interaction (CMI), 28 March 2014
- b. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, 24 June 2011
- c. JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, 03 January 2014
- d. JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, September 2013
- e. FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, October 2011
- f. FM 3-07. Stability Operations, July 2008
- g. GTA 41-01-001, Civil Affairs Planning and Execution Guide, October 2002
- h. GTA 41-01-003, Civil Affairs Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Planning Guide, August 2009
- i. GTA 41-01-004, Joint Civil Affairs Operations and Joint Civil-Military Operations, September 2007
- j. Gorgas Country Study
- k. Atropia Country Study
- l. Ariana Country Study

1. Situation

a. Background. In response to international concerns regarding the security and humanitarian situation in the Caucasus region, the United Nations Security Council passed UNSCR 7730, determining that the systematic campaign of state-sponsored intimidation, disruption and threats undertaken by AN against AP constituted a significant and grave threat to international peace and stability.

Member States were requested to contribute resources to reinforce and strengthen AP's capabilities through the provision of military assistance programs focused on training and capacity building. Subsequently, condemning the continued and systematic increase in political and military intimidation as well as threats being directed by AN towards AP, UNSCR 7739 denounced the unprovoked attack by AN naval units on an Atropian survey ship operating in the Caspian Sea.

Acting under Chapter VII, Article 41 of the UN Charter, the Security Council authorized Member States to plan for the establishment and deployment of a multinational force in AP. If necessary, Member States are to enforce an end to state-initiated hostile action by AN or other belligerents, should such actions commence and encroach on Atropian sovereign territory.

The Security Council also decided to establish an economic and arms embargo. UNSCR 7739 called upon Member States to deploy maritime forces to the area and to use all necessary means to halt all maritime shipping to and from the area in order to inspect their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the arms embargo.

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Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, UK and US have agreed to provide maritime elements to enforce the embargo within a coalition context. The name of the UN-sanctioned mission is the AP Security and Assistance Mission (ASAM). The coalition force will be known as CJTF-OIG and will consist of land, sea, air and special operations units from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The United States has offered to be the lead Troop Contributing Nation (TCN), providing the majority of critical force enablers. The Governments of AP, Gorgas (GO) and Turkey (TU) have consented, subject to SOFAs, to allow CJTF-OIG forces to stage through their territories, to station forces, materiel and installations involved in supporting its operations and to overflights.

On (insert date) AN military forces invaded Atropian territory with a significant and well-supported ground force. The defending Atropian forces finally succeeded in stopping the AN force. The AN Forces have adopted a defensive posture occupying a pocket extending approximately 60 kilometers into southern AP.

The UN Security Council passed UNSCR 7752 and authorized the deployment of the CJTF-OIG in support of the UN-sanctioned ASAM mission for an initial period of 12 months, with the objectives of expelling Arianian forces from Atropian territory and deterring further aggression, preserving human life and alleviating and re-establishing a safe and secure environment in AP.

See paragraph 1 of the main body of CJTF-OIG OPORD 01, Annex D – Intelligence, Annex G - Land Operations and References k, l and m Country Studies.

b. General. Civil Military Operations (CMO, also referred to as CIMIC – Civilian Military Cooperation) require a collaborative relationship between military and civilian actors in a conflict environment. CMO are activities of a military commander that focus on relations between military, government and non-governmental organizations, civilian authorities and the populace. These activities may be performed by designated CMO elements, by other military forces or by a combination of the two. Activities performed or supported by CMO elements include, but are not limited to,

Populace and Resource Control (PRC), Humanitarian Assistance (HA) and Support to Civil Administration (SCA). CJTF-OIG units will often encounter civilians and a host of civilian agencies. This annex provides guidance concerning relationships between military forces, civil authorities, national agencies of TCNs, UN agencies, international organizations and civilians in the area of operations. In a complex crisis CMO plays a crucial role with focused and coordinated engagement to integrate and synchronize military activities with those of the wider International community, Host Nations and other key stakeholders.

CMO also supports the de-confliction of military and civil activities and provides assessments of the civil situation. Military and civil efforts may place competing demands on limited HN infrastructure and resources, especially when the resources are already restrained by geographical, environmental, and conflict challenges.

CMO is a joint function that enables COM CJTF-OIG to participate effectively in a broad spectrum of Civil-Military interaction with diverse non-military actors.

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ANNEX W TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

c. Policy. Civil affairs activities and civil-military operations are to be executed consistent with applicable international laws, conventions, agreements, and pertinent policies of Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs). The scope of CMO in CJTF-OIG is to provide minimum Populace and Resource Control and emergency Humanitarian Assistance.

CMO is to be accomplished within the limits of CJTF-OIG mission and resources to minimize civilian impact on CJTF-OIG operations, alleviate suffering, prevent humanitarian crises and set conditions for future operations or handover to Atropian Government control.

d. Threat Considerations. The AN forces are likely to use SPF and leverage Zabzimek as well as South Ostremek Separatists to disrupt the deployment of CJTF-OIG into and through Gorgas (GO). It is also likely to use SPF and South Atropian People's Army (SAPA) insurgents in AP to further disrupt CJTF-OIG and AP Armed Forces deployment and operations within AP.

The SHC will use information warfare to discredit CJTF-OIG and AP Armed Forces, challenge the legitimacy the AP government, tell its "liberation of ethnic Arianians" story and promote its claim to Caspian Sea oil and gas resources. AN will deploy additional forces into AP to reinforce the 23rd Mech DTG defense and to conduct crossings of the Kura River between Ali Bayramli (39S UE 2222) and Salyan (39S UD 2685) in order to seize the critical junction in the area of Kazi Magomed to isolate Baku. See Annex B to CJTF-OIG OPORD 01 for more detail.

It may be expected that some civilians will attempt to interfere with friendly operations either with or without malicious intent. Civilian actions that hamper friendly forces could possibly be aided or encouraged by the enemy. Special Purpose Force (SPF) units operating within the JOA, will conduct terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure high value targets in order to destabilize Atropia and create possible consequence management challenges for CJTF-OIG.

Dislocated Civilian (DC) movements will most likely hinder military operations during all phases of this operation. Citizens may be allowed to relocate from forward areas. Small villages are expected to absorb dislocated persons that relocate from forward areas. The impact on the local regimes to care for dislocated persons may be greatly affected.

e. Friendly Forces. CJTF-OIG consists of land, sea, air and special operations units from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. The United States has offered to be the lead Troop Contributing Nation (TCN), providing the majority of critical force enablers. See CJTF-OIG OPORD 01 for more details.

f. Government of Atropia. Atropia is a functioning secular country that is largely democratic, with a developed, albeit limited, civil infrastructure and bureaucracy. It has a significant and ongoing internally displaced persons (IDP) problem resulting from the invasion by Ariana that has stretched the government's capacity.

A number of NGOs and IOs are active in the country and focused on a variety of development and humanitarian assistance initiatives. The Government of Atropia retains authority and responsibility for the welfare and care of all civilians (including IDPs) within its borders. Atropia has recently established outlets and camps to house civilians affected by the invasion.

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At the request of the United Nations, the Atropian Red Crescent Society will establish refugee and IDP camps to provide humanitarian relief for dislocated civilians as required. The local government is responsible for the administration of civilian control measures, and the provision of essential shelter, food, water, and medical assistance for civilians in the JOA.

g. Assumptions.

(1) In areas of heavy combat, there will be displaced civilians and significant damage to civil infrastructure.

(2) HN government organizations and citizens will be generally supportive towards CJTF-OIG forces and operations.

(3) HN authorities and the humanitarian actors (international and national) will be able to handle the humanitarian situation where and when a safe and secure environment is established.

h. CMO Objectives

(1) Military Liaison with Host Nations, International Community and other relevant actors established.

(2) CJTF-OIG Freedom of Movement supported.

(3) Situational awareness and understanding of the Civil Environment maintained.

(4) Contribution to the permissive environment provided.

i. Lines of CMO Activity

(1) Facilitating Civil-Military Interaction. CMO provides the commander with a capability to reach out and interact with the relevant civil stakeholders in order to exchange information, synchronize, coordinate, and de-conflict activities on all levels.

(2) Support to the Force. CMO contributes to the situational awareness on all relevant aspects of the civil domain and contributes to the planning and assessment cycles at all levels. Additionally CMO supports own forces RSOMI by coordinating and de-conflicting the use of the HN infrastructure and LOCs.

(3) Protection of the Population and Environment. CMO contributes to the situational awareness and understanding of the civil environment to reduce the environmental impact and minimize any collateral damages on critical Infrastructures, key life support factors, as well as religious and historical sites. Additionally CMO supports the consequential management efforts in order to mitigate negative impacts caused by the conduct of military operations.

6. **Mission.** CJTF-OIG is to conduct Civil Military Operations to attack the will, capabilities and cohesion of the belligerent forces, establish and maintain trust and cooperation between and the Coalition and HN military and civilian authorities, local population and other actors including IOs, NGOs and/or government organizations, in order to create an acquiescent environment within the local civil context that facilitates CJTF-OIG operations.

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ANNEX W TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

7. Execution

a. Intent. The intent is to facilitate CJTF-OIG operations by providing, in cooperation with other enablers, CMO expertise and efforts that support an effective collaboration and cooperation with HN authorities, the local populace and other actors. These include the UN, international organizations and NGOs. The aim is to provide the establishment and maintenance of a secure and stable environment.

b. Scheme of Manoeuvre. CMO support is to be conducted throughout OIG's three operational phases as follows:

(1) Phase I – Deployment and Defensive Operations. CMO enablers are to be activated. Theatre Mission Specific Training and enabler specific training are to be conducted. Funds are to be allocated to enable CMO Operations. Staff are to contribute to the development of a shared understanding and also conduct Information Preparation of the Operating Environment (IPOE). CMO assets are to deploy as theatre enablers. CMO forces capability is to steadily increase during this phase.

Liaison and coordination mechanisms are to be established with the HNs and IC actors. RSOMI and sustainment of forces are to be facilitated by creating a framework for liaison, coordination and de-confliction in relation to the use of the HN infrastructure and resources. Situational awareness and understanding of the Humanitarian Assistance efforts of the HNs and civil organizations are to be established and maintained. An IDP/refugee mapping and tracking system to facilitate CJTF-OIG freedom of manoeuvre is to be established.

Support is to be provided to minimize the negative impact of CJTF-OIG operations on the local economy. Coordination with other relevant stakeholders to de-conflict the competitive use of HN resources is to be conducted. An Inter-Agency Center is to be established and maintained to support the JOA-wide Civil Military Interaction process. Situational awareness concerning the civil environment is to be created to reduce environmental impact and minimize collateral damages on critical infrastructure, key life support factors as well as religious, historical, and cultural sites. Data is to be correlated with the HNs and the theatre Civil Assessment is to be updated. Support is to be provided to the CJTF-OIG information campaign to strengthen STRATCOM messaging and reduce the impact of Arianian and proxy propaganda. FCMO is to facilitate the transition to Decisive Offensive Operations, including the integration of additional CMO units and enablers.

(2) Phase II – Decisive Offensive Operations. Continue activities from Phase I. The CMO enablers are to conduct full spectrum operations and support assessment efforts as required by HNs related to the consequences of the conducted operations.

If required by the HNs and the IC actors, within means and capabilities, assistance is to be provided to the civil environment. CMO is to contribute to monitoring and assessing the situation related to human rights violations, inter-ethnic and gender-based violence, children affected in armed conflicts and any other vulnerable groups in the JOA in cooperation with the other CJTF-OIG entities involved.

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CMO is to conduct liaison and coordination with the civil organizations involved to support the implementation of UNSCRs 7730, 7739 and 7752. CMO is also to facilitate the handover to follow-on forces, HN security forces and civil authorities in preparation for Phase III.

(3) Phase III – Redeployment. Once a secure and stable environment and other appropriate conditions allow, the focus is to be on preparing the way for the transition from CJTF-OIG to a follow-on force, capacity-building/support to Host Nation civil authorities and security forces, and CJTF-OIG redeployment.

Early attention is to be paid to the capture of lessons learned and best practices, shaping perceptions of the mission, as well as the redeployment and establishment of a positive legacy for CJTF-OIG and ASAM. CMO is also to support the continuing efforts of applicable Security Assistance Missions.

Support is to be provided to COM CJTF-OIG participation in a Joint Military Commission (JMC), if established, with CMO expertise as a part of an integrated effort. CMO is to contribute to CJTF-OIG assessment of HN capabilities and correlate with projected capacity-building requirements to be developed between HN and CJTF-OIG, including facilitating consistent communication at ministerial level upon transfer of C2 in the JOA.

CMO is to facilitate handover or termination of operational activities. Support to redeployment efforts is to be provided by coordinating and de-conflicting the use of HN infrastructure.

c. Assigned Tasks.

(1) Establish the required liaison and coordination mechanisms with the HNs authorities and civil organizations, building upon the initial contacts established.

(2) Establish and maintain an Inter-Agency Center to support the HQ-wide Civil-Military Interaction process.

(3) Establish and maintain situational awareness of the humanitarian situation in the JOA in order to identify any potential gaps in the provision of Humanitarian Assistance and basic civil services.

(4) Integrate all aspects of the civil dimension of the JOA in the Theatre Civil Assessment.

(5) Support the RSOMI process and sustainment in identifying the Host Nations' available resources/infrastructure that is to be used by CJTF-OIG.

(6) Coordinate and de-conflict with the HN authorities and UN and wider humanitarian community on the use of HN infrastructure.

(7) Ensure that all necessary steps are taken to identify culturally relevant property and critical infrastructure.

(8) (U) Contribute to CJTF-OIG assessment of HN capabilities and correlate with projected capacity building requirements to be developed between HN and CJTF-OIG, including facilitating communication at ministerial level.

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(9) Support assessment efforts as required by HNs related to the consequences of the conducted operations.

(10) Support the COM CJTF-OIG participation with CMO expertise in a Joint Military Commission (JMC), if established, as a part of the integrated effort.

d. Implied Tasks

(1) Coordinate security needs for the effective provision of HA with relevant actors.

(2) Support CJTF-OIG freedom of manoeuver by minimizing negative influences of the civil environment on military operations and vice versa.

(3) Support CJTF-OIG information campaign to strengthen STRATCOM messaging and reduce impact of Arianian and proxy propaganda.

(4) Support minimizing CJTF-OIG negative impact on the local economy and the coordination with other relevant stakeholders about the competitive use of HN resources.

(5) Increase situational awareness concerning the civil environment to reduce environmental impact and minimize collateral damage on critical infrastructure, key life support factors as well as religious, historical, and cultural sites.

(6) Support the implementation of Security Assistance Missions by liaison and cooperation, especially during transition in Phase III.

(7) Establish a mapping and tracking system reflecting the IDP and refugee situation in the JOA.

(8) Be prepared to provide assistance, if required, by HNs, and the IC actors, within means and capabilities.

(9) Use the Information Clearing House for effective exchange of information between CJTF-OIG, IC, and HN agencies.

(10) Support COM CJTF-OIG's effective contributions to the International Committee for Atropia Sovereignty and Security (ICASS) and the ICASS Military and Security Subcommittee in support of the UN-sanctioned ASAM mission by providing regular assessments and liaison support.

(11) Contribute to monitoring and assessing the situation related to human rights violations, inter-ethnic and gender-based violence, children affected in armed conflicts and any other vulnerable groups in the JOA in cooperation with the other CJTF-OIG entities involved.

(12) Support the implementation of the UNSCRs 7730, 7739, and 7752 by liaison and coordination with the civil organizations involved.

e. Coordinating Instructions.

During this operation, special operations forces assist conventional forces in securing the HN's populace and resources, conducting civil information management; assisting the established government or providing interim authority over occupied area for public administration; coordinating humanitarian assistance with HN, IGO, NGOS and PVOS; and supporting stability operations.

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(1) CMO is to coordinate with local governments on all civil emergencies planning affecting military operations, with special attention to control, support, and movement of displaced persons and evacuees.

(2) Coordination within CJTF-OIG and with HN and other applicable actors, agencies and organizations is to be conducted to ensure maximum support of CMO.

(3) CMO and MISO is to be closely coordinated.

(4) CMO is to coordinate local military, civil defense, and disaster plans with rear area security and area damage control plans.

(5) The Government of Atropia maintains authority over civilians whenever possible.

(6) CMO is to establish liaison with local government officials located in designated AOs.

(7) When civilian interference with military operations is likely, forces are to provide temporary population control until government law enforcement agencies regain control.

(8) Forces are to provide emergency assistance to dislocated civilians, when required.

(9) Forces are to make every effort to protect religious shrines and historical landmarks.

(10) Subordinate and Supporting Commands shall ensure their deployed forces receive a pre-deployment orientation on the customs, traditions, and religious beliefs of the region.

(11) Dislocated civilians are to be directed to IO/NGO locations in Atropia and Gorgas.

(12) HA is to be provided but without detriment to military operations; to the extent that supports the COM CJTF OIG's desired effects; and to meet the requirements of international law. Essential HA needs are defined as food, water, shelter, medical needs, and security.

(13) All units are to be prepared to supervise or assist relief, rehabilitation, or other assistance provided by non-military organizations that are authorized to function within the JOA.

(14) CMO assessments are to focus on the identification of serviceable civilian and military infrastructure that can support military operations and civil-military operations. Priority in locating infrastructure is to be given to medical, power generation, secure warehousing, fuel storage, and transportation facilities and assets. Military resource priority is to be to POL transportation, distribution, and storage capabilities for use by CJTF-OIG units.

(15) CMO is to report locations of IDPs, actions, conditions, or movements that can interfere with military operations through normal operation reporting channels.

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8. Sustainment.

a. Civilian Personnel. Civilian labor may be required for transportation of clothing and medical supplies.

b. Civilian Facilities and Supplies. Non-perishable food items are available for distribution on a limited basis.

c. For planning purposes one Humanitarian Daily Ration (HDR) provides enough calories for one individual per day.

d. CJTF-OIG will rely on the support of the Atropian Government for HA supply and transportation. CJTF-OIG will coordinate HA resource requirements to ensure that the Atropian Government is prepared to fully support units and CMO.

e. See Annex R – Logistics for more detail.

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ANNEX X (PUBLIC AFFAIRS) TO OPOORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG

References:

- a. JAR 25-55, The Freedom of Information Act Program
- b. US Army FM 3-13 Inform and Influence activities 25 January 2013
- c. FM 3-13, Information Operations: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, Nov. 2003
- d. FM 3-61.1 Public Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, Oct. 2003
- e. AR 360-1, The Army Public Affairs Program, Sept. 2000
- f. FM 46-1, Public Affairs Operations, Jan. 2006.
- g. JP 3-61, Public Affairs, Sept. 2005

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu.

1. Situation.

f. Background. In response to international concerns regarding the security and humanitarian situation in the Caucasus region, the United Nations Security Council passed UNSCR 7730, determining that the systematic campaign of state-sponsored intimidation, disruption and threats undertaken by AN against AP constituted a significant and grave threat to international peace and stability.

Member States were requested to contribute resources to reinforce and strengthen AP's capabilities through the provision of military assistance programs focused on training and capacity building. Subsequently, condemning the continued and systematic increase in political and military intimidation as well as threats being directed by AN towards AP, UNSCR 7739 denounced the unprovoked attack by AN naval units on an Atropian survey ship operating in the Caspian Sea.

Acting under Chapter VII, Article 41 of the UN Charter, the Security Council authorized Member States to plan for the establishment and deployment of a multinational force in AP. If necessary, Member States are to enforce an end to state-initiated hostile action by AN or other belligerents, should such actions commence and encroach on Atropian sovereign territory.

The Security Council also decided to establish an economic and arms embargo. UNSCR 7739 called upon Member States to deploy maritime forces to the area and to use all necessary means to halt all maritime shipping to and from the area in order to inspect their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the arms embargo.

Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, UK and US have agreed to provide maritime elements to enforce the embargo within a coalition context. The name of the UN-sanctioned mission is the AP Security and Assistance Mission (ASAM).

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The coalition force will be known as CJTF-OIG and will consist of land, sea, air and special operations units from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The United States has offered to be the lead Troop Contributing Nation (TCN), providing the majority of critical force enablers. The Governments of AP, Gorgas (GO) and Turkey (TU) have consented, subject to SOFAs, to allow CJTF-OIG forces to stage through their territories, to station forces, materiel and installations involved in supporting its operations and to overflights.

On (insert date) AN military forces invaded Atropian territory with a significant and well-supported ground force. The defending Atropian forces finally succeeded in stopping the AN force. The AN Forces have adopted a defensive posture occupying a pocket extending approximately 60 kilometers into southern AP.

The UN Security Council passed UNSCR 7752 and authorized the deployment of the CJTF-OIG in support of the UN-sanctioned ASAM mission for an initial period of 12 months, with the objectives of expelling Arianian forces from Atropian territory and deterring further aggression, preserving human life and alleviating and re-establishing a safe and secure environment in AP.

The aim of the international community is to:

- (1) end Arianian aggression against AP
- (2) expulsion of all Arianian military forces from Atropian sovereign territory
- (3) creation of a free, safe, secure and stable environment
- (4) continuation of Atropian democratic national governance and developmental programs.

In order to achieve the desired end state, the strategic objectives of the international intervention include:

- (1) Expelling all Arianian military forces from Atropian sovereign territory.
- (2) Restoring a secure and stable environment throughout the AP Joint Operations Area (JOA).
- (3) Effecting force protection for coalition military forces deployed throughout the JOA.

See paragraph 1 of the main body of CJTF-OIG OPORD 01, Annex B (Intelligence), Annex L (Psychological Operations), and Annex O (Information Operations).

b. General. The Public Affairs (PA) office is assigned as a Special Staff section to CJTF-OIG. PA provides timely and accurate information in support of the Commander's objectives for strategic communication. PA informs, educates and counters misinformation with respect to key audiences (both civilian and military) regarding CJTF-OIG objectives, accomplishments and challenges. By engaging local and international media, as well as through social media, PA is able to disseminate key themes and messages to a wide audience in order to engender and maintain support for CJTF-OIG and to correct misinformation in the public domain.

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Using spoken and written word and through still and video images, PA represents a trusted and powerful tool to reach diverse audiences. Robust and effective PA activities are fundamental to CJTF-OIG's ability to proactively communicate to audiences in a truthful and timely manner. PA aims to be 'first with the truth,' providing the facts regarding ongoing events and military and humanitarian activities, and by assisting the media in reporting accurately by providing context.

It also informs public perception and opinion by providing reliable, timely and accurate information to local and international media, while monitoring media outlets to ensure that information is disseminated.

Media monitoring collects reports from all open sources in order to disseminate a complete picture of media coverage to assist Key Leaders in decision-making and ensure consistency with other PA organizations throughout the Joint Operations Area (JOA). All components of CJTF-OIG as well as Host Nations' armed forces and IO and NGOs are primary sources regarding security-related and humanitarian issues.

This annex provides policy guidance and tasking concerning the public affairs coverage of CJTF-OIG operations. It includes coordinating instructions for releasing information and visual products, news coverage, media support and, support of the internal information and outreach engagement programs.

c. Communication in the Information Environment.

(1) Host Nations. Atropia's state-run and public media compete with private and opposition publications and broadcasters. Internet, television and mobile phone networks are more accessible to much of the population in the JOA, notably in urban areas. TV is the most-popular medium.

In more isolated rural areas, traditional communication print and media remain the most influential communication tools. In the Host Nations of Gorgas (more so) and Atropia (less so) freedom of expression through the press is somewhat respected. Atropia and Gorgas government bodies are in the lead for shaping and influencing their publics' opinions regarding progress made in re-establishing regional development and security.

CJTF-OIG is to deliver support and assistance in this area to local authorities. CJTF-OIG PA effort is aimed at attaining and maintaining popular support for the mission at the higher level by explaining the goals and legitimacy of the UN-sanctioned ASAM mission and of CJTF-OIG's intentions, actions and achievements as well as by developing a media campaign based on success stories that appeal to publics.

(2) International Media. All personnel must understand the power of the international media and the importance they play in maintaining support for ongoing operations. The international media, to include traditional journalists, documentarians and reputable bloggers, will significantly influence western public and political opinion.

The international media is strongly augmented by local stringers, who will accompany the other local media representatives at media functions. These stringers will feed the international media from Coalition events as well as from adversary spokesmen.

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(3) Ariana. Transparency in political and social debate is subject to extremely tight governmental control in Ariana, resulting in this being perceived by the population as propaganda. The Arianian government continues to use a wide range of media as an integral part of its activities to influence the populace and international actors. Ariana and its affiliated partners and proxies will attempt to shape the information environment based on their interests.

d. Core Audiences.

(1) Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) members, countries and regional policymakers, opinion leaders, publics, service members, and families.

(2) Regional, national, and international News Media Representatives (NMRs).

(3) Atropian-Gorgan-Arianian publics.

(4) CJTF-OIG TCN service members and civilian staff.

(5) Host Nations Defense Forces.

(6) International Organizations and NGOs.

e. Assumptions.

(1) The Arianian government and the Ariana Armed Forces can be expected to mount a massive, carefully constructed, well-orchestrated, world-wide propaganda campaign as part of its military campaign.

(2) Ariana will use political, economic, cultural, and military issues and events as opportunities to discredit Coalition resolve, military capability and intentions in the free press. Ariana will use the media to further its propaganda goal to weaken public support and confidence in Coalition military resolve and/or intentions.

(3) Non-state organizations and proxies associated with Ariana can be expected to use the media to further their goals.

2. **Mission.** CJTF-OIG is to plan and execute active communications and public affairs activities in support of Operation IRON GUARDIAN in order to provide responsive, timely, and accurate information about CJTF-OIG activities to both domestic and foreign audiences and to counter enemy misinformation in order to support the goals and objectives of the Commander.

3. **Execution.**

a. Concept of Operations. PA policy is maximum disclosure with minimum delay, but consistent with operational security and Privacy Act provisions. PA is to assist in the creation of conditions that maintain Coalition integrity and the confidence of TCNs as well as the International Community in CJTF-OIG operations by:

(1) Providing timely information and news products that demonstrate the core messages; provide timely information about CJTF-OIG operations to public and news media representatives and facilitate news media operations;

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(2) Providing internal command information programs and products to keep units and family members informed;

(3) Countering effects of Arianian propaganda attempts through an active PA posture by informing and educating external and internal publics of the actual situation and facts;

(4) Conducting a media embed program consistent with US and/or TCN media embed directives;

(5) Facilitating outreach engagement initiatives to inform and educate local, national and international opinion leaders, academics, and defense-issues analysts; and

(6) Maintaining and managing CJTF-OIG social media.

b. PA Effects.

(1) CJTF-OIG is recognized as a regional stabilizing force by national and international audiences.

(2) TCNs and public audiences receive timely updates of CJTF-OIG mission progress and significant events to include enemy and friendly casualty status without compromising operational security.

(3) International recognition and support for the ICASS Coalition and ASAM is strong and unwavering.

(4) Arianian propaganda is effectively countered by increased accurate and independent reporting from international, national, and local news agencies.

(5) International public understands that Arianian people are not the targets of CJTF-OIG military efforts.

(6) ICASS, TCNs and CJTF-OIG forces are informed of mission progress and critical issues of force protection and safety and efforts to sustain health, welfare, and morale.

(7) Increased reporting of defeats suffered by Arianian military forces by international, national, and local media.

(8) Key audiences recognize CJTF- OIG will transition authority to follow-on forces or Host Nations for stability or peace support operations once security conditions permit.

c. CJTF-OIG PA Tasks.

(1) Coordinate PA across the CJTF-OIG staff sections and Component Commands to synchronize communications efforts.

(2) Provide PA guidance to Component Commands.

(3) Prepare for media coverage throughout all phases of the operation, including social media coverage and support to outreach engagement initiatives.

(4) Plan for and support the media embed program.

(5) Inform public of ICASS initiatives and diplomatic stances.

(6) Coordinate with national reps of TCNs as appropriate.

(7) Consolidate daily CJTF-OIG PA SITREP.

(8) Inform public in order to support CJTF-OIG mission and objectives.

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(9) Illustrate CJTF-OIG units' capabilities and resolve, as well as their professionalism through external and internal media coverage, social media outlets, and visual imagery

(10) Support internal communications efforts to reach and inform internal audiences and protect them from enemy misinformation and propaganda.

d. PA Support to Inform and Influence Activities.

(1) Coordinate daily messages and talking points consistent with strategic objectives.

(2) Coordinate efforts to counter Arianian propaganda by having international news media presence in critical locations to accurately report events.

(3) Coordinate to ensure PA activities do not compromise or conflict with CJTF-OIG Information Operations, PSYOP, and MISO operations.

(4) Coordinate and focus media attention on operational and strategic isolation of Arianian regime, destruction of Arianian military capability, and CJTF-OIG humanitarian assistance efforts.

e. Coordinating Instructions to Component Command and Subordinate Units PAOs.

(1) All Component Commands are to submit daily Public Affairs Situation Reports (PASITREP) to CJTF-OIG PAO. CJTF-OIG PAO will consolidate all reports.

(2) (U) CJTF-OIG Public Affairs Officer (PAO) are to be informed of any critical information requirements such as media requests, military and civilian casualties, large-scale/significant incidents, injuries to PAO personnel or NMRs.

(3) Lead, plan, coordinate, and conduct operational and tactical PA activities within their AOs.

(4) Obtain still and video imagery of events/activities and send to CJTF-OIG PAO for approval and release.

(5) Safeguard classified information and imagery by retaining the release authority at the public affairs office.

(6) Key Leader Engagements (KLE) are critical to the success of all PA operations. They should be used as frequently and in as many situations and mediums as possible.

(7) Provide public affairs support to the CJTF-OIG command to highlight the successes of the operation to Target Audiences through internal and external media coverage, KLE, and visual imagery.

(8) Keep CJTF-OIG military personnel and family members informed, provide the local and International audiences truthful information through News and TCN Department of Defense Media Representatives.

(9) Support higher level PA plans to counter misinformation, gain, and maintain the support of the Local and International Communities and deter further Arianian aggression.

(10) Be prepared to receive media embeds and provide support to media during the operation.

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(11) Designate Unit Public Affairs Representatives (UPAR) for each BN sized element. UPARs are responsible for briefing commanders on current Public Affairs Guidance (PAG), ensuring PAG is disseminated and units are prepared to facilitate media engagements. All appropriate military personnel are to be provided with Talking Points prior to media engagements to help facilitate communication synchronization and ensure they understand the overarching intent on the mission.

(12) Ensure that subordinate commanders and PA personnel are familiar with communications, transportation and other media support requirements; approved PAG and ground rules concerning this operation.

(13) Do not interfere with News Media Representatives (NMR) as long as they do not interfere with the execution of the mission or threaten to violate OPSEC.

(14) Advise CJTF-OIG PAO immediately of news media exposure to classified information or any possible media ground rules violations.

(15) CJTF-OIG personnel are not authorized to confiscate media cameras, film, audio/videotape, or reporter's notebooks. Any questions regarding the specific application of this policy is to be referred to the CJTF-OIG PAO.

(16) All entitled media are to have approved credentials before joining any unit with CJTF-OIG PAO task organization. Lists of accredited and registered media is to be provided to the BCT PAOs on a daily basis.

(17) Provide CJTF-OIG PAO with a press kit for their Component or unit, to include a formation/unit fact sheet and Commander's biography with photo.

(18) Utilize best practices in media interviews when talking to reporters IAW Appendix 1.

(19) Following official announcement of deployment from DoD, units are to acknowledge they have been notified for a deployment; however, they are not release specific details that may violate OPSEC. Commanders are encouraged to release information if appropriate and PAOs are to be prepared to address media requests in support of family readiness efforts.

(20) In the event of a large-scale incident, critical information leak, capture/kill of a key leader, or mass casualty situation which may require communications consequence management, all key information (5W's) is to be forwarded immediately to CJTF-OIG PAO.

(21) In the event of a crisis, the CJTF-OIG PAO is to coordinate with higher headquarters to determine release authority and appropriate public statements to make.

(22) Requests for public affairs information (RFIs). Submit all RFIs to CJTF-OIG.

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(23) Support for News Media Representatives

(a) Media Escort

1. Accreditation. Requirements for accreditation are to be established by the Coalition/national-level defense agencies and supported by CJTF-OIG PAO. As a minimum, the Coalition Joint Information Bureau (CJIB) is to institute procedures to determine the legitimacy of individuals as *bona fide* media representatives entitled to receive support afforded by TCN and CJTF-OIG forces. News media representatives are to have passports and working visas identifying them as journalists to fulfill CJTF-OIG accreditation requirements.

2. Assignment. CJTF-OIG CJIB, in consultation with subordinate unit PAOs, is to determine the assignment of NMR to specific subordinate units within the JOA to preclude overloading any single unit. Where possible, media representatives are to be assigned to their preferred location.

3. Facilities. CJTF-OIG units are to provide media embeds with adequate billeting, meals, and transportation.

4. Inoculations. NMR accompanying CJTF-OIG in the field are required to have the same inoculations, at their own expense, administered to military personnel participating in the operations.

5. Communications. CJTF-OIG and major subordinate commands are to provide communications services free of charge to civilian media representatives when commercial facilities are not available. Transmission by military communication facilities will be on a non-interference basis. News media are to be advised of the status of their traffic.

6. Courier Flights. Courier flights are authorized to carry news material to appropriate processing or distribution points on a non-interference basis without charge. News media are to be informed of the status of their material.

7. Transportation. CJTF-OIG is to provide accredited media representatives with military transportation into and within the JOA when such travel is in connection with assignments to cover the operation and when commercial transportation is restricted into the area or unavailable.

(b) Security. The presence of news media representatives in operational areas requires the following considerations concerning security:

1. Procedures are to be implemented to preclude the unauthorized release of classified or sensitive information. NMRs violating embargo agreements are to be immediately dis-embedded.

2. Media representatives are authorized to access operations, intelligence, and other classified areas only in the case of strong need and under strict escort and control.

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3. Individuals are not authorized to release information to media nor are they permitted to agree to a personal interview without prior coordination with the PAO supporting that unit or command. When PAO has coordinated the media visit, personnel may grant media requests for interviews and are to provide only unclassified information in interviews, briefings, and written materials. Personnel are to not make “off the record” statements to media representatives.

(c) Audio-Visual. CJTF-OIG is to assist the media as necessary in obtaining audio-visual coverage.

(d) Embedded media is to abide by established ground rules on releasable and non-releasable information.

4. Sustainment.

a. Administration.

(1) Media are required to carry their own equipment.

(2) CJTF-OIG PAO is to maintain a DVIDS system. Component PAOs are to coordinate the DVIDS system.

b. Logistics.

(1) Non-embedded media (Unilateral) covering CJTF-OIG operations should be “self-sustaining”. CJTF-OIG PAO is to coordinate additional logistical support to media as required. Intent is to maximize use of Host Nation Support (HNS). Host Nation Contract Support is to be used if support/service is not available through military logistic means or through HNS.

(2) Media embeds are to have their own protective equipment. Military embeds are to be provided with military transportation (ground or air) into and within the JOA while covering the operation.

5. Command and Signal.

a. Media is to use commercial means of communications if available. If commercial lines are not available, official military means is authorized. Military satellite transmission facilities can be provided when operationally feasible.

b. Media may use independent satellite uplinks for transmission of products from field locations when the on-scene commander determines transmission will not violate OPSEC or compromise an ongoing operation.

c. CJTF-OIG PAO co-locates with CJTF-OIG HQ.

d. CJTF-OIG PAO is to facilitate and coordinate use of LOGPACs in the absence of electronic means in order to facilitate dissemination of media and command information products to higher-level PAO channels.

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ANNEX X TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

ATTACHMENTS:

Appendix 1 Best Practices in Media Interviews

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX X TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

APPENDIX 1 (BEST PRACTICES IN MEDIA INTERVIEWS) TO ANNEX X (PUBLIC AFFAIRS) TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-0IG

1. Units may discuss general capabilities and training they have recently conducted.
2. Soldiers should “stay in their lanes” when discussing daily operations, duties, and responsibilities. They are not to discuss specific aspects of the units, including number of personnel, shortages, and/or equipment.
3. Soldiers are **not** to discuss or speculate on how the unit might be employed.
4. There is to be **no** discussion of operational details, plans, or possible future operations.
5. There is to be **no** discussion of exact unit deployment destination to include arrival/departure locations.
6. There is to be **no** talk about the training we do.
7. There is to be **no** discussion about the specifics of Rules of Engagement.
8. Soldiers are **not** to talk about their job and what they do.
9. Leaders are authorized to talk about their Soldier’s and unit/formation.
10. Everything is on the record.
11. Deal in the facts – do **not** speculate or address hypothetical questions.
12. **Avoid** speculating or commenting on things “outside your lane”, such as other governments or government officials.
13. Do **not** discuss classified information. The media is not the enemy, but remember OPSEC. If not sure, say “Due to Operational Security, I cannot discuss that subject.”

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ANNEX DD TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

ANNEX DD (SPACE) TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG

Reference:

- a. (U) JP 3-14 Space Operations 29 May 2013
- b. (U) FM 3-14 Space Support to Army Operations May 2005
- c. (U) CJTF-OIG Campaign Plan – Operation IRON GUARDIAN insert date

1. Situation.

a. Ariana (AN).

(1) (U) Space Capabilities. While possessing a growing indigenous space capability, AN's threat space capabilities will continue to be augmented to a more robust standard by those state/non-state actors willing to provide or disseminate technology to AN.

(a) (U) Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RISTA). RISTA is viewed as the single-most important function for the Arianian military. Thus, Arianian forces typically commit significant resources to RISTA-related operations, which are usually aggressive with overlapping redundancy in the intelligence disciplines.

AN has access to a government owned and operated low resolution imaging satellite (three meters). This satellite is in low earth orbit (LEO) and is believed to have a relatively short life span, approximately four months. Images received from this satellite are stored and periodically dumped to a ground station located somewhere in AN. This results in an indigenous satellite-based reconnaissance capability able to provide full theatre coverage to support AN's tactical commanders. This system is subject to significant persistence of re-visit time limitations.

To further supplement its Image Intelligence (IMINT) requirements, the Arianian military regularly purchases commercial imagery from other countries. This more robust use of space-based ISR will be dependent upon the nations or non-state actors friendly to AN willing to provide access to satellite imagery possessing more adequate persistence of re-visit time.

More likely however, AN will supplement its indigenous capability by accessing commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) vendors or technologies. The risk to operations escalates with quality of the collectors and the persistence of coverage of the Joint Operations Area (JOA).

(b) Position Navigation and Timing (PNT). AN's military is believed to use commercial L-band receivers that are reciprocal with the Global Positioning System (GPS) or the Donovanian Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) for navigation. This highlights the significance of dual-use technologies, utilizing technologies designed for the commercial sector yet adaptable to support military objectives.

Actual use of space-based PNT in employment is directly related to the technological sophistication of AN's forces. At this time, it is not expected that AN will place an undue emphasis/reliance on space-based Position and Navigation for use in navigation and timing. That said, AN will continue to leverage GPS, GLONASS or both. It is likely that GPS also provides the backbone for timing for services such as SATCOM.

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(c) SATCOM. AN has embarked on a home-grown satellite program to improve its communications network and their advancements in satellite communication services have been rapid.

In February 2009, the Arianians used a two-stage space launch vehicle (SLV) to launch a first-generation communications satellite into orbit. AN can use this or future satellites for communication or possibly for intelligence purposes. Presently, AN operates one government-owned telecommunication satellite which utilizes Ku-band transponders in a geostationary orbit.

When necessary, AN contracts with foreign allies such as Donovia and Olvana to lease satellite communication systems that also operate Ku-band transponders. There is also potential for AN to buy SATCOM services from commercial vendors.

(2) Counter-Space Capabilities. Counter Space capabilities are a set of capabilities that AN may use to deny Coalition space effects:

(a) ISR. AN knows its ability to negate threats from the US, Israel, and other more sophisticated opponents is extremely limited, even given their current launch/surface-to-surface capabilities. AN will probably only attack sensors, links or ground stations as a tactical last resort or where enemy sensors appear poorly defended or unguarded. Any such Arianian attack would require extensive denial and deception techniques to close the distance from launch point to target.

AN highly respects Israeli and US sensors based on its experiences in Iraq and Lebanon. The ability to counter Coalition use of space-based ISR is wholly dependent on AN's ability to maintain space situational awareness (SSA). As it is unlikely that AN has the capability for or access to sophisticated SSA, the threat from AN for ISR counter-space will be minimal.

(b) PNT. The ability to counter Coalition use of space-based PNT will be dependent on AN's access to COTS technology or jammers acquired from Donovia, other vendor nations or third parties.

(c) SATCOM. The ability to counter Coalition use of space-based SATCOM is determinant on technological sophistication of AN. AN will likely access available COTS technologies in an attempt to block or deny access to SATCOM. However, in order for wide denial of access to be successful, it would require access to infrastructure and international links not currently, or likely to be at their disposal.

(3) Launch Capability. The Arianian Space Agency, the government organization with primary responsibility for space operations, maintains a variety of current operational and developmental launchers and payloads. The Safir-2 SLV is the Arianians' current primary operational launcher, with the potential ability (with Safir-2 follow-ons) to put 300+ kilogram satellites into low-earth orbit.

The Arianians have placed a variety of payloads in orbit, including first-generation communications, photographic, and scientific missions. Many of these assets were launched using a space launch facility located just south of the town of Sharood in northeastern AN. This facility is relatively new and remains under construction.

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b. Coalition Forces.

(1) General. For most nations, the civilian and commercial segments dominate space operations. Therefore, civilian space agencies have often taken the leadership role for space. Agencies such as the European Space Agency, the United Kingdom Space Agency, and France's Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales, often issue national policies and strategies in which military space operations may not be addressed.

There are allied space operations centers, such as the European Union Satellite Centre, and several others, but they are not typically part of military forces. However, there may be agreements and procedures in place for them to support military operations.

(a) Disclosures. National disclosure policies will dictate the nature and scope of disclosure and release of space-derived products to multinational partners. Commercial imagery products are normally unclassified and will be of great benefit to multinational partners. Weather data is also readily available to share, as is GPS navigation support.

Of special importance is the provision for missile warning and defense against attack from ballistic missiles. USSTRATCOM is responsible for assisting in development of missile warning architectures and providing this information to CJTF-OIG in a process called SEW (Shared Early Warning). Refer to ref (a).

(2) Space Capabilities. Coalition forces use a wide range of space-based ISR assets, from National Technical Means (NTM) with significant persistence or re-visit time, to the use of COTS vendors or technologies. Use of space based PNT and SATCOM by the Coalition is ubiquitous at all levels; denial of this capability would be debilitating.

(3) Counter-Space Capabilities. Coalition forces have access to a range of counter-PNT, SATCOM, and ISR capabilities. In particular, CJTF-OIG has access to Satellite Reconnaissance Advanced Notice (SATRAN) products to allow risk management of all competitors' use of space-based ISR. The Coalition can leverage existing legislation from respective governments to interrupt or restrict service by commercial satellite imagery providers over the JOA.

(4) Counter-Counter-Space Capabilities. Coalition forces have access to a range of counter-counter ISR, PNT, and SATCOM capabilities and actions.

(5) Host Nation (HN).

(a) Atropia (AP). As a less technologically developed country, AP relies on third party satellite services, leasing commercial Ku-band transponders from larger, more developed countries. This capability may also be used to support government and military operations. It is assessed that AP is in the process of developing an independent space program designed to augment economic and commerce functions within the country. However, dual-use technologies that exist would indicate that these satellites could ultimately assist in military operations. AP commercially purchases global positioning receivers that support commercial needs as well as military navigation and targeting operations.

(b) Gorgas (GO). As a small country, GO relies on third party satellite services and contracts with a larger satellite company that incorporates a fleet of 31 geostationary satellites utilizing Ku-band transponders. GO commercially purchases global positioning receivers that support commercial needs as well as military navigation and targeting operations.

c. Donovia.

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(1) (U) Satellite Telecommunications. Donovia is the largest, most dominant country in the region, possessing a wide range of satellite capabilities. Most are suited for dual-use by the Donovanian military. Currently, Donovia operates four commercial telecommunications satellites utilizing Ku-band transponders in a geostationary orbit. All satellites are powered by solar array panels. These commercial satellites may be used to support military operations when necessary. Additionally, the Donovanian military operates two communication satellites using Ku and C band transponders. The satellites are in a geostationary orbit powered by solar array antenna. The Donovanian government also leases Ku, L, and S bandwidth from commercial satellite companies that support government and military operations when necessary.

(2) Navigation. Donovia has an established history in the development and use of navigation satellite systems. Currently, Donovia operates four navigation satellite systems using L-band transponders. The combined systems create a network of navigation services and provide regional coverage of the Caucasus Mountains and surrounding areas. When necessary, Donovanian military units purchase off the shelf commercial GPS receivers for navigation support.

(3) Implications. The widespread and robust Donovanian space assets and capabilities will complicate, and in some cases hinder, CJTF-OIG space/counter-space operations. In particular the possibility that AN could utilize Donovanian space assets to mitigate Coalition counter-space operations cannot be discounted.

2. Mission. COM CJTF-OIG is to coordinate the employment and defence of identified allied space services supporting the stated overall mission and, on order, deny the enemy freedom of action derived via space capabilities.

3. Execution.

a. General. The use of space capabilities is a significant force multiplier when properly integrated within CJTF-OIG operations. The success of CJTF-OIG operations partially depends on using space capabilities to monitor Maritime, Land and Air operations and must be protected, coordinated and synchronized in an efficient manner.

In order to achieve optimal space support, space capabilities whose effects emanate from and through space from military, national, civil, commercial, and multinational providers are to be integrated into the planning and execution cycle of the CJTF-OIG campaign.

b. Intent. COM CJTF-OIG is to take advantage of the Coalition's asymmetric advantage in space by fully integrating and synchronizing operations within the atmosphere with space-based capabilities made available for mission execution.

As such, it is intended to establish a Space Coordination Authority (SCA) within CJTF-OIG HQ that will provide the necessary coordination of space operations with subordinate commands and SCAs at the US Combatant Command level (i.e. EUCOM and CENTCOM).

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The role of CJTF-OIG SCA is to primarily coordinate space employment, defense planning and coordination via the Components of the headquarters staff with assistance and input from the maritime, land, air, and special operations components.

COM CJTF-OIG is to defend space capabilities within the atmosphere above and the geographic territory within the Joint Operations Area (JOA) to the maximum legal extent possible. When deemed necessary to create conditions for success, COM CJTF-OIG is to deny the enemy freedom of action derived from space capabilities within the boundaries established by the rules of engagement.

c. Concept of Operations. Component Commanders are to establish Space Support Elements (SSEs) staffed by qualified Space Operations Officer(s) (SOOs). SSEs/SOOs are to form part of the SCA Working Group (SCAWG) to plan, coordinate, synchronize and resource space operations.

d. Tasks.

(1) (U) SCA. The SCA is to be established as a staff function within the CJTF-OIG HQ J3 organization. Tasks:

(a) Chair the SCA Working Group (SCAWG).

(b) Integrate space capabilities.

(c) Plan, coordinate, and synchronize space operations in the JOA as well as ensuring inputs from Components are incorporated.

(d) Maintain situational awareness of theater space operations, and coordinate with the Component Commands to integrate theater space operations.

(e) Provide consolidated space requirements through COM CJTF-OIG for coordination as required.

(f) Produce a Joint Prioritized Space Effect List (JPSEL) to be included into the normal decision cycle/battle rhythm of the HQ. The JPSEL will be included for recommendation at the Joint Coordination Working Group, and for decision at the Joint Coordination Board.

(g) Produce the Joint Space Situational Awareness Picture (JSSAP), as relevant to the JOA.

(2) SSE:

(a) Provide tactical and operational space planning and support to subordinate HQ.

(b) Advise on space force enhancement and space control mission areas.

(c) Advise on availability and use of military/civil/commercial space-based assets.

(d) Advise regarding the capabilities, limitations, and status of missile warning systems.

(e) Produce space support annex and space input to planning and orders.

(f) Participate in initial targeting process.

(g) Advise regarding space support to Information Operations (IO).

(h) Provide space support products and services.

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- (i) Synchronize space operations and effects.
- (j) Recommend/coordinate for additional space support and force structure.
- (k) Coordinate with higher headquarters space element.

(l) SOO. The SOO is responsible for providing space-related operational support and expertise on space capabilities to Component Commanders. The SOO integrates space force enhancement and space control operations, and supports both deliberate and crisis action planning. The SOO is charged to:

- 1. Provide space-based expertise and services.
- 2. Maintain space situational awareness.
- 3. Identify prioritized enduring and emerging space requirements to the HQ CJTF-OIG via the SCAWG.
- 4. Report any interference or other unplanned outages to military mission enabling space services to the HQ CJTF-OIG JOC or HQ CJTF-OIG J35 Space SME as soon as possible.
- 5. Identify possible target sets that enable space services/effects to the enemy.

4. Sustainment. No change.

5. Command and Signal.

- a. Space Support Requests (SSRs) are to be passed to the HQ CJTF-OIG.
- b. Space capabilities are provided via a Community of Shared Interest. COM CJTF-OIG does not directly control space assets, but is to coordinate space effects from participating space providers for planning and execution. When allocated capabilities are exhausted, but mission requirements remain, an SSR is to be sent from HQ CJTF-OIG to the UN International Committee for Atropia Sovereignty and Security (ICASS) for engagement with the member-nation space providers.

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ANNEX EE (ENGINEER SUPPORT) TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG (UNCLASSIFIED)

References:

- a. JP 3-34 (6 January 2016), Joint Engineer Operations
- b. JP 4-04 (27 September 2001), Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support
- c. JP 3-18 (27 November 2012), Joint Forcible Entry
- d. JP 3-13 (30 September 2013), Air Mobility Operations
- e. FM 3-34.22 (February 2009), Engineer Operations-BCT and Below
- f. TM 5-330, Planning and Design of Roads, Airbases, and Heliports in the Theater of Operations
- g. USAREUR Contingency Base Camp Red Book (1 February 2004)
- h. CJTF-OIG OPORD 01

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU.

1. Situation

Background. On (insert date) AN military forces invaded Atropian territory with a significant and well-supported ground force. The defending Atropian forces finally succeeded in stopping the AN force. The AN Forces have adopted a defensive posture occupying a pocket extending approximately 60 kilometers into southern AP.

23th (AN) Mech DTG has established a defense centered on Yeni Qaradolag (38S QK 1015) oriented to the northwest.

25th (AN) Mech DTG has established a defense along the Kura River centered on Ali Bayramli (39S UE 2222).

An unidentified Mtzd Div has occupied the southeastern sector of AP.

All of the formations that have crossed the border are part of 3rd Mechanized Infantry Army, normally stationed in northeast AN. This would suggest that an operational-strategic command (OSC) has been formed to conduct cross border operations.

The unidentified (AN) Mtzd Div is likely either 24th or 26th Mtzd Div, also from 3rd Mechanized Infantry Army. There has been no indication of units or formations from 1st Mechanized Infantry Army having crossed into AP at this time.

AN Armed Forces are well trained and capable of conducting combined arms and joint operations but are limited to regional power-projection capabilities. AN's military maintains a robust ground force

For more information refer to Paragraph 1 of of CJTF-OIG OPORD 01 and Annex G - Land Operations.

- a. General. Engineer operations for CJTF-OIG require a rapid build-up of Mobility (M)/Counter mobility (CM)/Survivability (S)/General Engineer (GE) capacity across the Combined, Joint, Interagency domain .

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b. (U) Purpose. The purpose of this Annex is to describe the Scheme of Engineer Operations and provide Engineer guidance at the operational level.

c. (U) Engineer Intelligence. Refer to Annex B to ref (h) - Intelligence. (TBI)

d. Operational Areas.

(1) Joint Operations Area (JOA). The JOA includes the landmasses, national air space and territorial waters of ATROPIA (AP) (less the province/region of Lower Janga), Gorgas (GO), Ariana (AN), and Turkey (TU).

It also includes the waters and associated airspaces of the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas east of 24 degrees longitude, the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea south of 41 degrees 51.5 minutes north latitude, the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea north of 22 degrees 30 minutes north latitude, less the territorial waters and national air spaces of bordering sovereign nations.

The independent state of Limaria is specifically excluded from the JOA.

(2) CFLCC Area of Operations (AO). The CFLCC AO is comprised of the landmass, airspace and territorial waters (12NM) of AP less Lower Janga.

(3) 310 Expeditionary Support Command (ESC) AO. The 310 ESC AO is comprised of the landmass of GO.

e. (U) Terrain and Man-Made Features. See the GO, AP and AN Country books and CFINTCOM-2017XXXXX-Security Threat Assessment (note this would not be available to CJTF-OIG but it does provide an excellent summary of the Terrain).

f. Civil Considerations

(1) AP's and AN's roads networks are mainly paved. However, there are numerous unimproved dirt and gravel roads throughout the area. Disrupting mobility would be easily affected by damaging paved roads through the use of IEDs or cratering charges. Rural roads do not receive proper maintenance, leaving them susceptible to damage from the weather and neglect.

(2) Citizens of AP and AN hold their religion in high esteem and many religious centers and structures are considered to be very important. These structures should be avoided for targeting or used to tie-in obstacles in urban terrain.

(3) Most of the region, particularly rural areas, cannot access all modern utilities such as potable water, electricity, and modern sewage systems. This will cause a reliance on military electrical, water and sanitation systems.

(4) Paramilitary, insurgent, and guerilla forces operate in AP and AN. This could lead to an increased use of IEDs, particularly on main highways and field landing strips, having a negative impact on mobility.

(5) AP contains a number of heavily populated areas. Enemy operations in these areas could result in the Host Nation asking for engineers to provide survivability/force protection, and general engineering assistance.

g. Enemy Engineer Forces. See Annex B Intelligence and AN Country Study.

h. Friendly Engineer Forces. See Atropian Country Study.

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2. **Mission.** CJTF-OIG Engr are to spt the conduct of military operations to expel all AN forces from Atropian sovereign territory in order to create conditions for the re-establishment of a safe and secure environment in AP and the surrounding region.

3. **Execution.**

a. **Concept of Engineer Support.** The Coalition engineer effort is to be centrally planned, coordinated, and executed by the Component organic and assigned engineers. Theater-level engineering support is to be provided by 18 Engineer Brigade (EN BDE). Capabilities of the Host Nation (HN) civil authorities are to be effectively leveraged in order to quickly establish the Sea Port of Debarkation (SPOD) at Poti and Air Port of Disembarkation (APOD) at Tbilisi to facilitate preparations for reception, staging, onward movement and integration activities.

CJTF-OIG integration into the Atropian defense plan with counter-mobility and survivability efforts are critical to prevent Arianian forces from expanding their incursion into AP, and allowing CJTF-OIG to support the development of the Atropian civil authority and security forces.

Assuring mobility and freedom of movement for CJTF-OIG and Atropian Security Forces is to enable CJTF-OIG combat power to be applied as required. Active and passive mobility efforts are to be undertaken by CJTF-OIG to mitigate LOC interdiction. Counter-mobility activities are to be undertaken, if necessary, to isolate and disrupt AN forces.

CJTF-OIG is to acquire and manage real estate, to entail coordination between the Coalition, TCNs, and the HN. Effective use is to be made of available HN construction capabilities and materials. CJTF-OIG, in coordination with HN, must expeditiously acquire construction and engineering services and materials, complete LOC/MSR security and maintenance, build troop/IDP/CPERS life support, and support force protection.

b. **Scheme of Engineer Operations.** CJTF-OIG Engr are to provide and synchronize mobility, counter-mobility, survivability and general Engineer efforts to defeat Arianian forces and support Atropian civil authorities. The majority of planning effort will focus around Phases I and II.

c. **Priority of Engineer Effort by Phase.**

(1) **Phase I – Deployment and Defensive Operations.**

(a) Support to 82 ABN DIV and Atropian Armed Forces in the conduct of defensive operations against the Arianian invasion.

(b) Support the establishment of the SPOD at Poti and the APOD at Tbilisi in GO.

(c) Support preparations for reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOMI) activities.

(d) Support the establishment of the Theatre Logistics Area in GO.

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(2) Phase II – Decisive Offensive Operations.

(a) Continue to support CJTF-OIG in the conduct of defensive operations against the Arianian invasion.

(b) Support CJTF-OIG in the conduct of counter-move operations to repel remaining Arianian forces from AP and restore Atropian sovereignty.

(c) Support to the establishment of favorable ground conditions for counter-offensive operations by CJTF-OIG.

(d) Support CJTF-OIG in the re-establishment of a safe and secure environment in AP.

(3) Phase III – Redeployment.

(a) Support the handover of engineer sites and works to civil and military authorities of respective Host Nations.

(b) Contribute to capacity-building of Atropian security forces.

(c) Support CJTF-OIG in the conduct of relief in place and transition to a follow-on force.

(d) Support the withdrawal of CJTF-OIG forces to locations directed by TCNs.

d. Assignment of Additional Engineer Assets. The Engineer Task Organization is at Appendix 1. Components are to deploy with organic and assigned engineer units and assets. Engineer organizations are assigned as follows:

(1) LCC. 36 EN BDE.

(2) LCC/1 (US) Infantry Division. 555 MEB BDE.

(3) LCC/4 MND. 130 MEB BDE.

(4) CFACC. 555 Red Horse Squadron and 560 Red Horse Squadron (USAF Reserve) are attached to CFACC for airfield repair and maintenance.

(5) 310 ESC. 18 EN BDE and 4 NMBC are assigned to 310 ESC to provide integral engineer support, and theatre-level general engineering support.

e. Common Tasks.

(1) Conduct combat engineering and general engineering support to assigned Component or formation.

(2) Maintain CJTF-OIG MSRs operational within assigned AOs.

(3) Coordinate Explosive Hazard information collection and counter-explosive hazard operations.

(4) Be prepared to assist AP and GO authorities with the repair of critical infrastructure that impacts CJTF-OIG operations.

(5) Be prepared to coordinate engineer support for humanitarian assistance and to create a safe environment in AP.

(6) Liaise with Host Nation Engineers, and coordinate Host Nation engineer support in AOs.

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f. Specific Tasks.

(1) HQ 416 ENCOM.

(a) Establish JTFG-OIG policy, standards, and priorities for construction, facilities, and real estate utilization.

(b) Establish JTFG-OIG environmental policy and standards.

(c) Operate the theater Explosive Hazard Coordination Centre and reporting system.

(d) Provide geospatial support to the JTFG-OIG (70 Engineer Co (Topo)).

(e) Manage engineer reach back capabilities.

(2) 130 and 555 MEB BDEs.

(a) Be prepared to receive CBRNE TFs from 415 CBRNE BDE for CBRN and EOD operations in assigned divisional AOs.

(3) 18 Engineer Brigade.

(a) Receive 4 NMCB to provide engineer support to 310 ESC and JTFG-OIG.

(b) Receive CBRNE TF 420 for CBRN and EOD operations in the 310 ESC AO.

(c) Provide engineer support to 310 ESC.

(d) Provide theatre-level engineer support to CJTF-OIG, including permanent horizontal and vertical construction, pipeline repair and construction, well-drilling, and power generation.

(e) Manage CJTF-OIG facilities, real estate, construction, and engineer construction contracts.

g. Engineer Intelligence Requirements for Planning.

(1) APOD and SPOD capacity, limitations, and damage.

(2) Extent of damage to GO and Atropian critical infrastructure.

(3) Disruption to the Ground LOC.

(4) Employment of improvised explosive devices, booby-traps, and mines.

(5) Extent of damage or obstacles on GO and Atropian airfields.

(6) Location and disposition of Arianian breaching and bridging assets.

(7) Type and location of Arianian obstacles.

(8) Capacity, limitations, and damage of bridges over major waterways.

(9) Loss of friendly breaching and bridging assets.

(10) Location and extent of engineer construction materials in GO and AP.

h. Explosive Hazards.

(1) HQ 416 ENCOM is to establish an Explosive Hazards Coordination Cell (EHCC) to gather information, track, predict, distribute information on, and mitigate explosive hazards within the theater that affect force protection and mobility. 18 Engineer and 36

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Engineer Bdes are to establish an EHCC in their AOs, and investigate IED and mine strikes in cooperation with EOD forces.

(2) (U) EOD and combat engineer units are to conduct tactical activities to address explosive hazards. Combat engineer unit activities include the detection, reporting, breaching and clearing of minefields, and the detection, reporting, and destruction of IEDs. Only EOD units and properly qualified EOD personnel are to conduct EOD procedures against explosive ordnance, UXO, or IEDs. Attempts are to be made to render safe explosive devices for intelligence gathering efforts if the situation does not affect the local population and CJTF-OIGs ability to accomplish the mission being undertaken.

(3) IEDs/Booby-Traps. CJTF-OIG is not to employ booby-traps or IEDs.

(4) Mines. COM CFLCC is emplacement authority for scatterable mines in the CFLCC AO. Ground or artillery delivered mines with less than 48-hour self-destruct times are delegated to division commanders, who may further delegate to BCT commander as needed. Greater than 48 hours remains with COM CFLCC. The emplacement authority for U.S. Air Force delivered GATOR mines regardless of self-destruct time is retained by COM CJTF-OIG. Emplacement authority for Air VOLCANO delivered mines is to be retained by COM CFLCC. Anti-tank mines are to be surface laid.

(5) Humanitarian Demining (HDM). Because of the threat to peace and safety, HDM has become a significant disarmament and peace operations activity. Demining is ultimately an HN responsibility; however, CJTF-OIG is to assist AP through mine awareness education and training of HN personnel in the surveying, marking, and clearing of mines. Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 407, specifically states that no member of the US armed forces, while providing HDM assistance or stockpiled conventional munitions assistance is to engage in the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of land mines or other explosive remnants of war, or stockpiled conventional munitions, as applicable (unless the member does so for the concurrent purpose of supporting a US military operation).

i. Geospatial. Components and formations will deploy with integral terrain analysis capabilities. Theater geospatial support is to be provided by 70 Engineer Co (Topo).

j. Firefighting. CFACC and CFMCC are to deploy with organic firefighting capabilities, as will the National Support Elements from TCNs. Fire protection is to be coordinated with the Host Nations. 18 EN BDE is to provide theater-firefighting capabilities, including developing fire prevention and protection plans for all CJTF-OIG facilities. TCNs will develop fire prevention and protection plans for TCN-owned or rented facilities that meet CJTF-OIG standards. CJTF-OIG fire protection priorities are:

- (1) APOD and SPOD.
- (2) Medical facilities.
- (3) Ammunition and fuel storage installations.
- (4) CJTF-OIG and Component Headquarters and communication centers.
- (5) CFACC airfields.
- (6) Personnel accommodation facilities.

k. Reachback. HQ 416 ENCOM is to facilitate the utilization of US Army Corps of Engineers capabilities. All requests for assistance are to be passed to HQ 416 ENCOM.

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l. Facilities.

(1) Facility planning factors include: CJTF-OIG concept of operations; expected duration and intensity of operations; cost of facility; time-phased activities; and prioritizing the use of existing assets over new construction.

(2) The six broad categories of facilities in order of priority for use are:

(a) TCN-owned, occupied, or leased facilities;

(b) Host Nation, allied, and Coalition support where an agreement exists to provide specific types and quantities of facilities at specified times in designated locations;

(c) TCN-owned facility substitutes pre-positioned in theater; facilities available from commercial sources;

(d) TCN-owned facility substitutes stored in contributing nations; and construction of facilities that are considered shortfall after an assessment of the availability of existing assets.

(3) (U) Contracting support is to be used to augment military capabilities. Because construction is time consuming and entails the risk of not being finished in time to meet mission requirements, supported commanders are to seek alternative solutions to new construction.

m. Joint Engineer Planning and Execution System (JEPES). The JEPES program is a tool used to support the development of the quantitative aspects of civil engineering support planning and provides the general requirements for Engineer Support Planning (ESP). The non-quantitative aspects of the ESP require the CJTF-OIG engineers to edit and coordinate JEPES results with all functional civil engineering support users during preparation of the ESP.

n. Real Property. The United States is the Lead Nation and 416 ENCOM is the action agency for all real CJTF-OIG property requirements in AP and GO. The CJTF-OIG Engineers are to request direct real property support through the Command Real Estate Support Team (CREST) augmentation to the Forward Engineer Support Team (FEST) and reachback capability. No military commanders will enter into real estate acquisition or lease agreements without involving the CREST.

o. Host Nation Support. CJTF-OIG Engineers are to maximize the use of Host Nation engineer support. Host-Nation Support planning considerations include the following:

(1) indigenous labor;

(2) local availability of construction materiel, supplies, and equipment; local contractor support;

(3) local facilities.

p. Construction Standards.

(1) When new construction is the only means of sourcing facility requirements, it is to be constructed either using respective TCN standards or using temporary guidelines (less than six months) found in USAREUR Contingency Base Camp Construction Red Book. Any exemptions for more permanent construction standards are to be approved by the CJTF-OIG Engineer.

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(2) Expedient construction (e.g., rapid construction techniques such as pre-fabricated buildings, clamshell structures, etc.) are also be considered as these methods can be selectively employed with minimum time, cost, and risk to offer in-theater forces another source of required temporary facilities.

4. Sustainment.

a. Logistics. Engineer Brigades are to deploy with their own organic logistic support, and will receive additional support from their supported Components and formations.

b. Medical. Engineer Brigades are to deploy with their own organic medical assets, and will receive additional support from their supported Components and formations.

c. Construction Materiel. Construction materiel is readily available for local purchase, and contracted construction capability is available. 18 EN BDE and 36 EN BDE are to establish gravel pits as necessary.

5. Command and Signal.

a. COM 416 ENCOM - Brigadier-General XXXXXX (US) is appointed as the Joint Force Engineer.

b. Location. HQ 416 ENCOM is to locate and be established at Tbilisi, GO by XXXXXX.

c. Engineer Coordinating Boards.

(1) The CJTF-OIG Engineer Synchronization teleconference is to be conducted every Friday at 1000 hours, commencing XXXXXXXX. Required attendees:

- (a) USACE, HQ CTF-OIG CJ2, CJ3, CJ4, CJ5
- (b) Engineer staff officers,
- (c) 416 ENCOM, 18 EN BDE, 36 EN BDE,
- (d) 70 Engineer Co (Topo).

(2) The CJTF- OIG Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board, chaired by COM 416 ENCOM, is to provide overall direction for civil-military construction and engineering requirements and priorities in the joint operations area (JOA).

(3) The CJTF- OIG Joint Facilities Utilization Board (JFUB), chaired by COM 18 Engineer Brigade, is to coordinate the use of real estate and existing facilities.

(4) The Joint Environmental Management Board, chaired by COM 416 ENCOM, is to assist with prioritizing and managing environmental requirements.

d. (U) Engineer Liaison.

- (1) GO. 18 EN BDE.
- (2) AP. 36 EN BDE.
- (3) US Army Corps of Engineers. HQ 416 ENCOM.

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
ATTACHMENTS:

Appendix 1 Engineer Structure

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX EE TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN)

APPENDIX 1 (ENGINEER TASK ORGANIZATION) TO ANNEX EE ((ENGINEER SUPPORT) TO OPORD 01 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CJTF-OIG



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